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TO: SAINT, WASHINGTON  
FROM: SAINT, LONDON  
SUBJECT: Transmittal of Interrogation Report

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SUBJECT OF REPORT: Interrogation Report on Meeting Between WIRSING and SCHELLENBERG end of April 1945

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HEADQUARTERS  
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY  
INTELLIGENCE CENTER  
INTERROGATION SECTION  
APO 403

25 July 1945

SUBJECT : Meeting between WIRSING and SCHLEIBERBERG end of April 1945 -

TO : 12th Army Group.

1) Contacts with SCHLEIBERBERG (First Version)

WIRSING persistently claimed to have seen SCHLEIBERBERG for the last time when taking leave on 20 March 1945.

He reportedly stated to have taken up residence in HEILBRUNN vic BAD TOLZ (BAWERTIA) and to have stayed there until the day of his capture, denying by implication that he had taken trips of any kind.

His subsequent contacts with SCHLEIBERBERG, he claimed, could be summed up in a report he wrote on President TRUMAN. Aside from that one report, he claimed, he had not taken any active part in political activities.

2) Contacts with SCHLEIBERBERG (Corrected Version)

When confronted with direct evidence, taken from SANDBERGER's interrogation, WIRSING finally conceded to have seen SCHLEIBERBERG once more, end of April 1945, in LUBECK. He explained his reluctance that a casual reader of interrogator's report might derive the erroneous impression that he was a man of consequence in the NSDAP.

3) WIRSING's Alibi

In his interrogation WIRSING has consistently tried to play down his importance. WIRSING also believes that the handle to his name -- SS Sturmbannfuhrer - is liable to lead an experienced interrogator astray, inasmuch as it tends to overshadow his true merits, viz to have disapproved of the Nazi concept of a 'New Order' in Europe and to have gauged Germany's plight correctly at a very early stage of the war.

4) ITINERARY

WIRSING left BERLIN on 1 April 1945 heading South. After a short stay at Burg LAUENSTEIN, one of the hide-outs of Ant VI, he proceeded to TEGERNSEE (BAWERTIA), where he had been assigned a billet by SANDBERGER and, finding the place overcrowded with refugees, went on to HEILBRUNN vic BAD TOLZ where he put up in a private residence, retained by RAFFGEN for the key personnel of VI D.

5) CALL TO LUBECK

End of April SCHLEIBERBERG wired for WIRSING to look him up at the earliest possible moment. The message was conveyed to WIRSING at BAD TOLZ by SANDBERGER who did not have the telegram on him and who could only offer conjectures as to WIRSING's mission.

WIRSING immediately offered strenuous objections. He told SANDBERGER that he had been out of touch with current developments for the last four weeks and that he did not feel qualified to tender any responsible advice.

6) PROBABLE MISSION

SANDBERGER told WIRSING that he assumed his call to LUECK had nothing to do with a general report on the political situation and more likely was connected with the negotiations HITLER had initiated. SCHELLENBERG probably wanted WIRSING to participate in some form in these negotiations.

7) WIRSING GIVES IN

WIRSING again raised objections, telling SANDBERGER that he did not feel competent in the matter. SANDBERGER, in turn, urged him to sink all objections inasmuch as SCHELLENBERG probably knew what he was doing. In deference to SANDBERGER's entreaties, WIRSING finally consented to taking the trip.

8) SANDBERGER'S AIDE-MEMOIRE ON ANT VI REFORMS

In the course of their conversation SANDBERGER produced a typewritten aide-memoire, covering one page and sub-divided into paragraphs, which outlined certain reforms to be undertaken on KALLENBUNNER's orders.

WIRSING claims not to recollect the exact contents of the aide-memoire and who had signed it. The gist of it was that responsibilities were divided up between WANDOK and SKORZENY, with GOTTSCHE having been assigned to some sort of liaison job.

SANDBERGER asked WIRSING to take the paper along with him to LUECK and to show it to SCHELLENBERG.

9) WIRSING ON ILLUSORY CHARACTER OF REORGANIZATION

WIRSING told SANDBERGER that he considered any basic reorganization of Ant VI as out of keeping with the stark reality of Germany's impending military defeat. For this reason he did not pay any particular attention to detail. He noticed however and immediately commented upon the fact that the aide-memoire made no mention of SCHELLENBERG.

10) SANDBERGER COMMENTS ON REORGANIZATION

SANDBERGER concurred with WIRSING to the extent of admitting that the reforms amounted to a virtual dissolution of Ant VI.

He emphasized that the solution arrived at was fraught with dangerous implications.

11) SANDBERGER ON WANDOK AND SKORZENY

WANDOK was altogether unsuited for the job, SANDBERGER stated.

The choice of SKORZENY he described as grotesque. SKORZENY had neither the military background nor the experience in intelligence work necessary for the job.

12) SANDBERGER ON ADEQUACY OF ORDER

SANDBERGER pointed out that the aide-memoire had left one very important question unanswered:

Was the order to apply to the whole of Germany, or was it confined to the South of Germany which by virtue of the power of attorney given by HITLER had come under KALLENBUNNER's jurisdiction?

13) SCHELLENBERG'S EXCLUSION

SANDBERGER pointed out that the reorganization as outlined in the aide-memoire could be taken as a dismissal of SCHELLENBERG by implication.

WIRSING asked SANDERGER whether one could construe the reorganization as forming the basis for plans entertained by KALTENBRUNNER to continue resistance in the recalcitrant area and also as a disavowal of SCHELLEBERG's attempts at reaching a negotiated surrender to the Western Allied through Count BERNDOTTE as intermediary.

SANDERGER conceded that this was a possible interpretation.

#### 14) REASONS FOR SCHELLEBERG'S DISMISSAL

SANDERGER told WIRSING that WANECK did not mention the name SCHELLEBERG until SANDERGER asked him a pertinent question. WANECK passed the matter off in a dilatory fashion and SANDERGER did not see any sense in pressing the issue.

SANDERGER surmised that from his conversation with WANECK he carried away the strong impression of having been witness to a "Hilliputan rebellion" resulting in SCHELLEBERG's dismissal.

#### 15) WIRSING TAKES OFF

SANDERGER made a last appeal to WIRSING's sense of responsibility. He argued that WIRSING's loyalty well that SCHELLEBERG would have nobody by his side in any surrender negotiations should begin in earnest, unless WIRSING joined him. WIRSING left by plane from BAD BIELEFELD air-strip the same day (April 30).

#### 16) MEETING WITH SCHELLEBERG

Upon his arrival at LUTECK on the evening of 30 April WIRSING learned that SCHELLEBERG had left for DUISBURG.

WIRSING then returned by plane to FLEISBURG where he met SCHELLEBERG just back from DUISBURG.

The conversation between WIRSING and SCHELLEBERG took place in the latter's private car and lasted several hours.

#### 17) FAILURE OF ...

SCHELLEBERG informed WIRSING that his trip to LUTECK had been supervised by ...

In the face of GYMARSAL's categorical refusal not to entertain any offer of surrender or final to the Western Allies, negotiations with Count BERNDOTTE had inevitably broken down.

#### 18) SCHELLEBERG ON NEGOTIATIONS

SCHELLEBERG talked at some length about his negotiations with BERNDOTTE. No new developments had come to the fore. In this connection SCHELLEBERG characterized HEDLER as the prototype of a man who can never take the right decision at the right moment.

#### 19) WIRSING ON BERNDOTTE NEGOTIATIONS

From listening to SCHELLEBERG's account WIRSING derived the impression that he had failed to see these contacts in their right perspective, viz against the backdrop of Germany's inevitable military defeat. Otherwise, WIRSING believes, SCHELLEBERG would have not followed up this particular tack with so much fanatical zeal (Verbissenheit).

#### 20) SCHELLEBERG ON AMT VI REORGANIZATION

SCHELLEBERG read the aide-memoire, the gist of which was apparently known to him and passed it off with a shrug of the shoulders.

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Commenting upon his (implied) dismissal as chief of Amt VI he only said 'At five minutes to twelve they take time out for a thing like that'

He made no derogatory remarks about KALTENDRÜNNER and took the matter with perfect equanimity. This, in WIRSING's opinion, proves his estimate of SCHELLENBERG as a man of stature to be correct.

21) SCHELLENBERG ON WALSCH

WALSCH, SCHELLENBERG stated, was not exceptionally gifted for intelligence work and had been put in charge of VI E only at the request of KALTENDRÜNNER. He doubted that WALSCH was a man with much vision.

22) SCHELLENBERG ON STORZENHE

About STORZENHE, SCHELLENBERG spoke with a great deal of acerbity.

His appointment to take charge of the military sector was merely the culmination of an intrigue of long standing. STORZENHE was the type of a mercenary (Landsknecht) who would probably cause a great deal of mischief while the German people would have to foot the bill.

23) WIRSING FRANKLIN SPENCER MISONNER, SCHELLENBERG CONCURS

When WIRSING expressed his indignation at the 'nihilistic' Werewolf propaganda in German broadcasts, SCHELLENBERG hastened to reply that he had endeavored to stop this nihilistic practice. He added that he considered the incitement of children a lamentable crime.

To WIRSING's great astonishment SCHELLENBERG avowed that HEBLER too was opposed to the Werewolf propaganda. Obergruppenführer PRUTZMANN had been attached to HEBLER's staff upon HITLER's specific orders.

24) SCHELLENBERG INquires FURTHER ACTION

When WIRSING stated that this explanation was not in accord with the facts - only a few days ago the MUNICH station had broadcast a Werewolf proclamation - SCHELLENBERG appeared impressed and promised to bring up the matter again. He did so however. There are strong indications that HEBLER was unable to assert himself against GOEBBELS.

25) SCHELLENBERG'S PRE-OCCUPATION WITH BERNECOTTE CONTACTS

WIRSING gained the impression that SCHELLENBERG, even at this late hour, concentrated all his energies upon creating domestic conditions conducive to resuming contact with the Western Allies.

HEBLER, SCHELLENBERG complained, had failed to live up to his promises and no assistance from that corner would be forthcoming.

26) SCHELLENBERG ON KALTENDRÜNNER

When asked to comment on KALTENDRÜNNER's role, SCHELLENBERG stated:

KALTENDRÜNNER is cooking his own broth in Austria.

I would not be the least bit surprised if his connections with the Austrian underground movement enter into the game. In the end KALTENDRÜNNER is bound to get caught in the very trap he was baited so carefully for his opposite number.

27) WIRSING'S COMMENT ON POLITICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KALTENBRUNNER AND SCHELLENBERG.

KALTENBRUNNER and SCHELLENBERG never saw eye to eye in matters of political strategy.

Around Christmas time 1944 WIRSING had a talk with KALTENBRUNNER in the Japanese Embassy during a dinner party of Ambassador OSHIMU. WIRSING tried to press his main argument home (see special report on EGMONT Lageberichte), viz that a cleavage among the Allies would be a windfall, to base Germany's foreign policy on the expectation of such an occurrence a fatal error.

KALTENBRUNNER suggested to WIRSING to have another long talk on the political situation. WIRSING mentioned this to SCHELLENBERG and asked for his advice what topics to touch upon. SCHELLENBERG's answer was:

Try to make KALTENBRUNNER realize that matters of world policy are not synonymous with South-Eastern policy and that the decisive questions of Germany's foreign policy cannot be decided from a vantage point in Europe's backyard.

28) WHAT NOW?

Before winding up their conversation, SCHELLENBERG asked WIRSING: What Now?

WIRSING's answer: All you can try to do now is pick up where we left off in February/March 1945 (see special report on EGMONT Lageberichte), viz to disband the SS and the Gestapo and to create all the necessary conditions for a transition period in which BRUNING could play his part.

29) SCHELLENBERG WANTS ALL RESIGNING

WIRSING was struck by the candor with which SCHELLENBERG discussed all the topics brought up during their conversation.

In his thoughts left VI was evidently a thing of the past that had been written off or at least been relegated to a matter of secondary importance.

30) SCHELLENBERG ON GERMAN ATROCITIES

When WIRSING made a passing reference on conditions found by Allied troops in German Concentration Camps, SCHELLENBERG replied:

I am fully aware of the significance of the Allied Propaganda.

WIRSING:

I am not talking about propaganda, I am talking about the facts.

SCHELLENBERG:

I had nothing whatever to do with the executive, but I would not be the least bit surprised if the omnipotent people who always caused trouble, have perpetrated deeds which will be put to the discredit to the whole German people.

31) WIRSING RETURNS TO DAVARIA

As soon as SCHELLENBERG apprised him of the futility of further attempts to negotiate, WIRSING declared that he saw no sense in staying on in HOLSTEIN and that he would return to DAVARIA to his family and his few remaining belongings. SCHELLENBERG offered no objections.

He offered to arrange for a trip to SWEDEN if WIRSING cared to quit Germany. WIRSING declined. WIRSING returned by plane to HEILBRUNN on 3 May 1945.

32) COMMITTEE OF SS-STURMBÄNNEFÜHRER DR. HOTEL, CHIEF REFERENT OF VI E. RSHA.

SCHLEIBERER'S DISMISSAL

WERSING's assumption that SCHLEIBERER had been eliminated from the command of Ant VI is absolutely correct. This decision was made by KALTENBRUNNER himself, in the presence of MERTZ, GORZENTY and Dr. HOTEL, at a meeting in Hotel Österreichischer Hof at WILTZBURG around the 25 April.

KALTENBRUNNER DISMISSES SCHLEIBERER

In talks that took place around the 25 April in Alt Aussee SCHLEIBERER had already expressed the opinion that he would be able to cross the border with his own forces in his fight with HEIDLER.

SCHLEIBERER

SCHLEIBERER's chief attorney for a long time, incompatible with his own, merely agreed to SCHLEIBERER's plan that SCHLEIBERER was in on the case and probably with the help of his lawyer in his fight with HEIDLER.

SCHLEIBERER'S POLITICAL ADVISOR TO HEIDLER AND BERGER

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KALTENBRUNNER's chief attorney for a long time, incompatible with his own, merely agreed to SCHLEIBERER's plan that SCHLEIBERER was in on the case and probably with the help of his lawyer in his fight with HEIDLER.

NO MORE CONTACT WITH SCHLEIBERER

It is decided that KALTENBRUNNER in particular ways with SCHLEIBERER was the main reason for the latter's decision to pass where an Austrian solution was the only one possible.

SCHLEIBERER very likely feared that SCHLEIBERER would pursue his own political line via certain other connections which KALTENBRUNNER had reserved for his own use (see above).

SCHLEIBERER'S POLITICAL ADVISOR TO HEIDLER AND BERGER

KALTENBRUNNER had been then once taken up the subject in SCHLEIBERER's chief and for that reason must be conceived to be disloyalty on the part of SCHLEIBERER, incensed his own side.

KALTENBRUNNER also remarked:

I can almost hear SCHLEIBERER, in his unctuous manner, draw HEIDLER's attention to the dangers inherent in my Austrian separatism. At a skillfully chosen opportunity he will then bring BERGER's personality into the discussion.

THE OLD ANT VI BEYOND REPAIR

The cue was furnished by Dr. MULLMANN who had just returned from INNSBRUCK and who told KALTENBRUNNER in SALZBURG (25 April) that SANDERGER had asked Gauleiter HOPFER of TYROL to arrange for billets for the personnel of Ant VI. MERTZ and GORZENTY immediately hooked in, telling KALTENBRUNNER that there was absolutely no sense in trying to re-activate Ant VI, also in view of the circum-

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tance that, according to SKORZENY, all telephone communications had broken down. SKORZENY also mentioned that the hide-out of Ant VI in Burg LAUENSTEIN had been evacuated in a hurry with American tanks dangerously close and that most of the group chiefs had paid out their personnel, loaded themselves and their secretaries into cars and taken off. Ant VI was therefore a thing of the past.

REORGANIZATION BASIS OF VI E AND VI S

Inasmuch as the only groups still existent were VI E (WAGNER-HOTEL) and VI S (SCHNEIDER), a re-organization appeared conceivable only on the basis of the Austrian concept esp. in the field of intelligence. To WANDERER and his advisers it appeared the logical solution to create something similar to the old Ant VI with VI E and VI S as the foundation.

WANDERER'S ORDER

WAGNER, assisted by SKORZENY, immediately drafted an order putting into effect their proposals. WANDERER SIGNED. Besides giving an outline of the re-organization decided upon, the order directed WANDERER to liquidate the old Ant VI in accordance with directives issued by WAGNER and SKORZENY for their respective sectors.

/s/ EDWARD L. KING  
Major, Inf.  
Commanding.

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