

SECRET

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2 November 1945

XX 9667

TO: SAINT, Washington

FROM: SAINT, London *pd*

SUBJECT: Interrogation Report on SCHELLENBERG,
27 June - 12 July 1945

1. Herewith one copy of this report, the subject of your 2693 and our 1253. A check of the registry files shows that XX-8333 went to Berne, Stockholm, Madrid and Lisbon.

2. It is impossible now to determine the reason for this and other failures to forward reports (such as the KRAMER one) last summer. We can only apologize, and ask you to inform us of such cases as quickly as possible, since the whole problem of receiving and disseminating interrogation reports is growing more difficult with the reduction in War Room activities.

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
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W. E. Egerlin
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"SECRET"
H/3

Report on Interrogation of

Walter SCHELLENBERG

27th. June - 12th. July.
1945.

SCHELLENBERG also supplied the following information which has been omitted from the general report at the request of the Special Agencies. No circulation whatsoever must be given by recipients to the contents of this appendix.

I. Additional information to paragraphs in the attached report.

Para 76: ARNOLD had contact with an elderly American woman of the U.S. Embassy in Madrid.

Para 153: It was at SCHELLENBERG's "request" that in 1942 RAISKY contacted DEMAREST and ROSSEAU of the U.S.A. Embassy in Lisbon. The symbols of the two Americans were "HERO" and "LEANDER".

Para 168: These Freemason and Free Austrian circles took up relations with the American Secret Service in Switzerland.

Para 181: SCHELLENBERG was the monocled "Captain SCHEMEL" who before the kidnapping of Stevens and Best took place, as an "opposition Army officer" met, together with his friend the S.S. Dr de CRINIS who in his turn posed as an "opposition General", Stevens and Best in Amsterdam and The Hague and even dined at Best's house in The Hague with Mrs. Best and Stevens!

II. Additional paragraphs.

Para 129a: One woman sent to London worked a W/F from there. She cost 15,000 dollars. Her symbol was "EVA". Colonel DAHNE and SCHRIED know the case.

Para 129D: JESSEN ran three Albanian brothers in London named POPOV (?). STEINLE knows the case intimately.

Para 117a: SCHELLENBERG was very anxious to know if the "CICERO" material that is, that is taken from Ambassador KNATCHBULL HUGHESSEN's safe in Ankara was real or British deception material. A wax model of the key had been sent by plane to W/F in Berlin where the key was reproduced. SCHELLENBERG says that if the material in question was real then he could only take his hat off to the British for producing such convincing intelligence. At moments, especially when he once received a photograph showing a front and a

and a left hand thumb on it, SCHELLENBERG had his doubts. He summoned MOYCZISCH from Ankara to Berlin in order to clear the matter up. MOYCZISCH removed his doubts. In the German Foreign Office a Committee of three ministers (Gesandte) was formed in order to study the material. MOYCZISCH in Ankara, who ran the Turkish valet who stole the material from his master's safe, received the "Kriegsverdienstkreuz" for his success. The Turkish valet received £.T.300,000. He asked to be given the later instalments in English instead of Turkish bank notes. His wish was granted and he received the rest of the money in notes faked by Amt VI F.

Report on Interrogation of

Walter SCHELLENBERG

27th June - 12th July
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I. Introduction

1. Walter SCHELLENBERG, head of "SD Ausland" or chief Amt VI, is facing his present plight as a prisoner in Allied hands in a spirit of complete realism. This does not mean that he is dejected at the thought of the fate that may befall the former SS Brigadeführer. The fact that SCHELLENBERG seems to be possessed by a certain amount of faith in Allied goodwill is due to his conviction that he has, ever since becoming conscious in 1940 that Germany had lost the war, been striving for a settlement with the Western powers and for an improvement of the lot of Allied nationals, soldiers and civilians in German hands. Numerous instances are proffered as evidence for such conduct. The general impression left by SCHELLENBERG is that of a man who, aided by remarkable intelligence and zest for work and abetted by a seemingly insatiable ambition, saw his chance for meteoric career on the wings of the SS in the domain that monopolised his interests - "the Intelligence Service"; and then, disillusioned by the enmity he incurred amongst some of his socially and intellectually inferior colleagues, and the change in Germany's war fortunes, paid in instalments for his passage home.

2. The "Geheime Meldedienst", the new name chosen by SCHELLENBERG for the old designation "Abwehr" which he thought had fallen into disrepute owing to its inefficiency and the low intellectual and moral standard of most of its members, was the task entrusted to "Amt VI", which was joined by the "Mil, Amt" when the incorporation of the Abwehr into the RSHA took place. The "Geheime Meldedienst" in its present shape and composition represents by no means SCHELLENBERG's ideal of a future German Secret Service. If SCHELLENBERG had had his way and if defeat had not put an end to his grandiose, not to say megalomaniac, plans, which provided the participation of more or less the whole educated part of the nation in secret service work, he would have branched out in time into all social, cultural, economic, scientific and even artistic manifestations of German life at home and abroad in order to permeate them with "collaborators" (honorary and paid) and "runners" (Zutragler) of the "Geheime Meldedienst".

II. Post defeat plans

3. The sudden deterioration of the military situation of Germany in the last months before defeat did, however, according to SCHELLENBERG, not allow the German leadership to develop any post defeat plans. SCHELLENBERG maintains that the whole working method of the National Socialist system prevented any such premeditated schemes taking shape. Every intelligent man saw the end coming. Nobody was allowed, however, to allude to it, as the policy of despair ("Katastrophen Politik") pursued by the leaders, that is "if we must die, then let the whole people die", punished every precautionary or protective measure in an exemplary way as desertism.

4. For this reason SCHELLENBERG could broach this subject only very late in the day and only in the shape of private discussions with chiefs of departments and sections. As late as February 1945 he brought this subject up at a meeting of all department chiefs and gave them the task to submit to him in two weeks time purely personal ideas regarding this question and merely in the shape of suggestions. He had defined the subject very carefully and had taken great care in the formulation of his statement. Notwithstanding this fact the result was a discussion which proved anything but agreeable to SCHELLENBERG. The gist of this discussion was: "So this is the position which is responsible for the Amt VI chief nursing such ideas". SCHELLENBERG is convinced that WÄNNECK and SKORZENY reported in this sense to KALTENBRUNNER who tackled him a few days later in harsh words about his statement. SCHELLENBERG replied evasively by pointing to technical preparatory work. SKORZENY brought the subject up again by telling SCHELLENBERG in a rather condescending manner that the SS "Jägerbände" (north, east, south and west) were all being concentrated at the Alps and were fighting there valiantly. All who could, had to

5. SKORZENY obviously meant what he said as noted accordingly. SCHELLENERG took no notice of him in future and gave him up as hopeless. The continuous measures concerning the evacuation, the technical possibilities, etc., did not allow SCHELLENERG sufficient time to treat the problem mentioned with the department chiefs. He discussed it on various occasions with Dr. SANDBERGER and Lt. Col. OHLETZ. The progressive break up of the Reich showed that a disappearance into civilian clothes and corresponding civilian professions, if necessary even in an extreme way (clergyman, monks, etc), was the only thing one could advise others to do. It amounted to an endeavour to save "human substance". The question how a working Intelligence Service could be built up on such a basis, remained completely open and unexplained. Not a word was said any more about a possibility of contact with foreign countries, the real centre of gravity of secret service work. SCHELLENERG is of the firm conviction that apart from the measures for the evacuation which had by then degenerated into flight, nothing systematically planned was done for post war work.

6. Of great importance in this connection were SCHELLENERG's discussions with Major General von GEHLEN. GEHLEN was until February 1945 "Chef Fremde Heere Ost". He was an excellent general staff officer who employed all round esteem. He possibly possessed the greatest understanding amongst the members of the "Wehrmachtsfuhrungstab" for the "Geheime Meldedienst". He was SCHELLENERG's strongest supporter within the army. This was shown by the acceptance of SCHELLENERG's suggestion that all military attaches and I.o.s. of the Wehrmacht were to pass through the school of the "Geheime Meldedienst". The preparations for this were complete when GEHLEN was deprived of his post because he failed to form a correct estimate of the attack by the XI Ukrainian army from the direction of Posen. GEHLEN's I.o. situation report was, however, absolutely irreproachable, admitting as it did the possibility of an attack in the direction of Berlin as well as Pomerania. Hitler had one of his usual attacks of rage and KALLENBURNER was delighted when he was able, addressing himself to SCHELLENERG, to declare in the course of a lunch party: "This little savage of von GEHLEN now had got to go - he probably relied too much on your poor intelligence services. Don't forget I don't dream of courting one day speeches by the Fuehrer with to your reports. In that case you would be most speedily dismissed." SCHELLENERG describes this particular performance as one of the many attacks of KALLENBURNER against him.

7. Major General von GEHLEN in March 1945 asked SCHELLENERG for a quiet talk in private. One evening he spent three hours with SCHELLENERG. In the course of this talk GEHLEN estimated that military resistance would last another two months. Then the end had to be counted with. GEHLEN said that preparations had to be made for this case. The only man with the necessary imagination and energy to undertake this task was HIMMLER. HIMMLER should as Commander of the home Army, authorize SCHELLENERG to build up, together with GEHLEN and the best general staff officers, a resistance movement and army on the lines of the Polish resistance. GEHLEN said that the army had the fullest confidence in SCHELLENERG as an organizer and he, GEHLEN, and his best general staff officers, as well as many whom SCHELLENERG did not yet know, would put themselves voluntarily under SCHELLENERG's command. GEHLEN added that he would now pretend that he was taking a four weeks holiday, but in reality he was going to "Frankenstrupp" (a cover name standing for a prepared evacuation quarter of the GSW) in order to prepare his plan quietly. He had already asked for a comprehensive survey regarding the Polish resistance army. GEHLEN requested SCHELLENERG to prepare the same on his side. The evening ended with SCHELLENERG's assurance that he would think it all over thoroughly and then secure the decision of HIMMLER.

8. SCHELLENERG promised GEHLEN strictest secrecy. GEHLEN attached above all great importance to KALLENBURNER not being put into the picture. SCHELLENERG discussed the matter with Dr. RAPP, Lt. B., and asked for a report on the whole issue. Not more than ten days after SCHELLENERG's talk with GEHLEN he brought with him an excellent survey of the whole structure of the Polish resistance army, together with GEHLEN's request to transmit as soon as possible, preferably by the same courier, the written consent of HIMMLER.

The courier explained orally that as GUDERLIN was ^{found} more chief of the OKH and as WENK was his successor, it would be a good thing if HIMMLER initiated WENK into the plan.

9. SCHELLEBERG explained the whole plan to HIMMLER who declined it abruptly. He said verbatim to SCHELLEBERG: "This is complete nonsense, if I should discuss this plan with WENK I am the first defeatist of the Third Reich. This fact would be served boiling hot to the Fuehrer. You need not tell this to your GENEL. You need only explain to him that I strictly refuse to accept the plan. His idea - it is typical of the high class general staff officer to sit in Frankfurtrupp nursing post war plans instead of fighting." SCHELLEBERG quickly changed the subject otherwise he thought HIMMLER would not have stopped talking and no-one could have predicted what orders HIMMLER might have given inspired by a momentary mood. SCHELLEBERG informed GENEL and DR. HOFF of the negative attitude of HIMMLER. As far as SCHELLEBERG knows no further development occurred.

10. As a further illustration of how difficult it was to raise the subject of post defeat plans, SCHELLEBERG furnishes the following examples: A circular order of the general staff of the army dated February 1945 and marked "Only for general staff officers" again drew attention to the severe penalties for desertion. Three general staff officers were quoted by name who had been shot for this crime. In one of the cases, the victim had pointed out that the military superiority of the Western powers was so great that a bad end was in sight.

III Post defeat Plans in Neutral Countries

11. SCHELLEBERG states categorically that there exist no concrete post war plans for Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. There exist in Portugal, Spain and elsewhere so-called I-networks ("I-netze"), that is "Meldekoepfe" provided with money and technical equipment which were only meant to enter into relations with the country in question were severed or if an "invasion" took place. The primary condition was, however, in every respect (personnel, material and technical) that the central offices in the Reich should function!

IV. The role of VI.Wi and VI. Kult in Post defeat plans

12. SCHELLEBERG points out that what he said about post defeat plans in general applies also to the role which might have been assigned to economic and cultural questions in schemes of this nature. He admits the possibility that there took place within Section VI Wi and VI Kult very detailed talks on these subjects and that plans were discussed with the chiefs of these sections. These plans concerned, however, the "Homeland" and as far as SCHELLEBERG knows nothing concrete resulted from these talks.

V. Ant VI Wi and German Industry

13. There can be no doubt that the advantages to the "Geheime Meldedienst" resulting from close collaboration between Ant VI.Wi and German economic life at home and abroad, were not lost on SCHELLEBERG. He well knew that the "Abwehr" had always made use of the agencies abroad of powerful German industrial enterprises as cover for its own activities. Whilst this arrangement was mostly done locally, that is as the result of private relationship between representatives of German business undertakings and Abwehr officers, SCHELLEBERG's plans envisaged the systematic penetration of German "Wirtschaft" with both the spirit and the flesh of his "Geheime Meldedienst".

VI. Ant VI and I.G. FARBEN

14. SCHELLEBERG's efforts to penetrate the I.G. FARBEN for his own purposes may serve as a characteristic example of the methods he employed. Relations between Ant VI and the I.G. FARBEN were not precisely defined. SCHELLEBERG himself was anxious to endeavour to get a clear picture of the whole organization of the I.G. FARBEN. He was particularly interested in the Economic Section of the

I.G. FAREN had its Intelligence Service which was The Director of this Economic Section of the I.G. FAREN, married to a Swedish woman, was above all very well informed about the situation in the Balkans.

15. Co-operation between Amt VI and I.G. FAREN was effected in three stages. SCHELLEBERG knew that minor officials of the Amt VI as well as a few officers of the Mil. Amt had personal contacts with individual directors of the I.G. FAREN. The members of the Board of Directors of this concern were on the other hand rather suspicious, for they always confused Amt VI with Amt III, that is "S.D. Inland". All of them were very frightened of the "S.D. Inland" and also of the Gestapo and it was only when they realised that Amt VI dealt with intelligence from abroad that they became more confident. In the end quite a few of the minor employees of the I.G. FAREN abroad were working for the Amt VI. SCHELLEBERG says that he had no practical proof for this, but that he felt so sure about it that he advised the department chiefs of VI.Wi to continue co-operation with the lower ranks of the I.G. FAREN. He made it clear however that no efforts should be made by them to approach the leading officials of this enterprise because he felt that such approaches might undermine the separate plans which he nursed himself of engaging I.F. FAREN in the Intelligence work of Amt VI.

16. SCHELLEBERG's own plan was to effect co-operation from the top downwards, that is in conjunction with the six or seven leading chiefs of the I.G. FAREN. He purposely did not choose the medium of Dr. ILKER, head of the Economic Department of the I.G. FAREN, though he knew him to be a relative of the general manager of I.G. FAREN, Dr. SCHMITZ, Heidelberg. He did not choose the channel of ILKER because the latter was a man who would have immediately tried to exploit all the economic and personal advantages which collaboration with Amt VI would have brought him. He would also, after having discussed the matter with SCHELLEBERG, have told all and sundry that he had been in conference with say Hitler or Himmler. ILKER's own I.G. FAREN colleagues took the same view of him and for this reason SCHELLEBERG never tried to make his personal acquaintance. ILKER, on the other hand, made several efforts to meet SCHELLEBERG by inviting him to lunch. SCHELLEBERG chose instead the medium of Dr. BUETEFISCH who had his general office in Berlin. SCHELLEBERG discussed quite frankly his plans with Dr. BUETEFISCH. The latter was of the opinion that the Economic Department of the I.G. FAREN would be the right quarter to collaborate with Amt VI. On the other hand he shared SCHELLEBERG's reservations about ILKER.

17. He also understood that the I.G. FAREN as a "state within State" were regarded by the economic chiefs of the German Government with a certain amount of apprehension, (those economic chiefs were FUNK and OHLENDORF who apart from being chief of Amt III, was at the same time Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Economic Affairs). As SCHELLEBERG was known as a man who without any regard to National Socialist principles, sought practical co-operation where he could find it, he had to be very guarded in this respect. SCHELLEBERG achieved full understanding with BUETEFISCH on all these points. They agreed that BUETEFISCH should introduce to SCHELLEBERG the director of the sales organisation of I.G. FAREN abroad. This foreign sales organisation was in the hands of the firm of BAYER, well known for the sale of aspirin, pyramidon and many other chemical preparations. They had representatives in every country abroad. The Director of BAYER called MANN came from Cologne. SCHELLEBERG had two long discussions with MANN in the course of which many practical problems concerning forward intelligence were gone into. MANN was not over enthusiastic about SCHELLEBERG's plan. He submitted that there existed too many organisations which approached him on the matter. He also said that too many men lacking intelligence were in charge of these questions. In principle MANN declared himself ready as a German to collaborate in this domain. At the same time he asked SCHELLEBERG first to co-ordinate all these questions under one single management. MANN also wanted to see affected by such reforms the different sections of the Abwehr which as he knew were not pulling in one single direction, but were representing conflicting interests.

18. This situation confirmed SCHELLENBERG in his view that he had to find the line to SCHMITZ of Heidelberg via BUEDEFISCH. In the course of a later discussion with BUEDEFISCH, both SCHELLENBERG and BUEDEFISCH agreed that it was necessary to introduce SCHELLENBERG to SCHMITZ for the purpose of discussing these problems. BUEDEFISCH was all the more convinced of the necessity for such a meeting, as not long before Lt. Colonel FOCKE of the Abwehr had given rather a strange lecture to the assembled Directorate of the I.G. FAHREN. This lecture, owing to the rather confused thoughts of the lecturer, made a bad impression on the assembled I.G. FAHREN Directors and did not leave them with a conviction that intelligence matters were left in the best possible hands.

SCHELLENBERG discussed with BUEDEFISCH what was preferable, to meet Dr. SCHMITZ alone or to give a lecture to the assembled Board of Directors of I.G. FAHREN. It was decided that it was more practicable to limit the first discussion to SCHELLENBERG and SCHMITZ. These problems were ventilated by BUEDEFISCH with SCHMITZ and most certainly also with the Board of Directors of I.G. FAHREN. The meeting with SCHMITZ was fixed for the end of 1944, but it never took place. Correspondence on this subject, however, passed between SCHELLENBERG and SCHMITZ. As indicated above, there certainly existed contacts between the Department chiefs and their officers of VI. W1, such as SEBASTIAN, ZEIDLER and Professor Dr. SCHMIED, with a number of sub-directors of I.G. FAHREN, who therefore collaborated with Int VI in the manner in which SCHELLENBERG himself envisaged collaboration with the Board of Directors of this undertaking. SCHMIED's main contact was HÄNER. HÄNER was usually aided in as collaborators one or two of the officials of the economic department of I.G. FAHREN. He succeeded in making use for Int VI of the intelligence at the disposal of the I.G. FAHREN Economic Department.

all was decided

VII. Werewolf

20. SHELLENBERG does not remember the exact date, but thinks it was in the late autumn of 1944 when HIMMLER, in the form of a long statement made in the presence of SHELLENBERG, Obergruppenfuhrer FRUETZMANN, SKORZENY and he believes also of KALTENBRUNNER, declared for the first time that he had selected FRUETZMANN as the chief of a new organization called "Werewolf" after the title of the book by Loens. He said that this organization was completely independent and would be built up in the manner of the "Gaulleitungen". FRUETZMANN would form the organization in close collaboration with the Gaulleiters. The RSHA, especially SKORZENY, would have to provide the fullest support regarding technical needs and training. FRUETZMANN would have to be aided above all in respect of W/T needs. KALTENBRUNNER and SKORZENY were not satisfied with this decision and sabotaged FRUETZMANN's work from the very beginning by pleading ignorance or being evasive when he addressed queries to them or made requests.

21. SHELLENBERG says that the whole question left him completely cold, especially as Obergruppenfuhrer BERGER began to interfere in it. BERGER maintained close relations with FRUETZMANN and tried to assume the command over the Werewolf when the possibility arose that FRUETZMANN was being sent to Croatia as HSS u. PF or even a Wehrmacht commander (in the same manner as WOLFF in Italy). As FRUETZMANN started his job without personnel he picked from everywhere particularly reliable SS leaders "Orpo" and members of the Wehrmacht. KALTENBRUNNER provided for FRUETZMANN, Obersturmbannfuhrer TSCHELOCHKY (he was for a while in charge of VI.C. but had been handed over by SHELLENBERG owing to incapability). FRUETZMANN, who in the end did not go to Agram, TSCHELOCHKY and the rest of the staff had a special train and began "wildly to organize". SHELLENBERG gathered this from the continuous complaints of Lt. Colonel BOEMER and Major PORETSCHKIN (VI.F and Mil.E) who in accordance with the instructions received from HIEBLER had to help with the provision of W/T installation and training.

22. Soon SHELLENBERG ceased co-operation in this field. The reasons given for this cessation of co-operation were first that Amt VI had no W/T installations which they could spare, and second that according to a report made by Lt. Col. ROEFING from Wiesbaden the boys who had arrived there for a W/T training course were "raw" to such an extent that they had to be sent home again by the officer in charge. Thereupon FRUETZMANN attached himself technically entirely to the Orpo and to the Wehrmacht and as far as SHELLENBERG remembers his departments had nothing more to do with FRUETZMANN. SHELLENBERG does not know how far SKORZENY and his "Jagdverbände" were still meant to cooperate with the Werewolf. SKORZENY worked completely independently in direct contact with KALTENBRUNNER. SHELLENBERG is convinced that the collaboration between SKORZENY and FRUETZMANN was not very good as SKORZENY planned establishing a sort of Werewolf organization of his own with his SS "Jagdverbände". Besides TSCHELOCHKY and SKORZENY were personal enemies. SHELLENBERG does not think that FRUETZMANN was able to build up a large and strong organization. FRUETZMANN himself was a desperado and always boasted having played as a young man a part in the Ruhr and Rhineland struggle. The little SHELLENBERG has seen of the organization of FRUETZMANN, TSCHELOCHKY and their large staff corresponded, as he says, to their mental capacity: it was weak. SHELLENBERG maintains that in April 1945 he reproached HIMMLER severely regarding the Werewolf, calling this enterprise "criminal and stupid". He thinks that his reproaches lead to contradictory orders being issued. The whole Werewolf question became chaotic when the Werewolf transmitter was turned into a network and propaganda organ of Dr. COERBELS. SHELLENBERG does not know how the Werewolf organization was to be built up, how it was to function and how it did in fact function. One name SHELLENBERG remembers, that of SS Standartenfuhrer KNOLLE, formerly in the Hague, who was responsible for the Hamburg area.

23. In the end FRUETZMANN began to pick out his men from the Army Groups as well as the armies. He also started to establish depots for material. This was reported to SHELLENBERG by Colonel BUNTROCK, chief of reconnaissance at the front. SHELLENBERG says that he did not trouble to oppose these activities of FRUETZMANN for the disorder within the so-called "retreat organization" had become uncontrollable in the course of the last months. At the end everything was compressed as in an accordion: Party, Hitler Youth, D.A.F., N.S.V., Stapo, SD, Klein Kampf Verbände of the Wehrmacht Werewolf, SS Jagdverbände - everything upside down and everybody solely responsible for everything.

owing to the increasing deterioration of the transport situation and became in the end completely dislocated. The first headquarters of this department must have been for a short while in the neighbourhood of Halle. SCHELLEBERG does not know where KETTLER proceeded from there. SCHELLEBERG's men were in any case ordered to keep in close touch with KETTLER.

28. SCHELLEBERG maintains that he has never seen deciphered British messages. He has learnt that the last successful deciphering was that of British messages sent by W/T from Cairo to London. After that a coding machine was introduced in Cairo which abruptly prevented all further deciphering. General THIELE has continuously asked SCHELLEBERG to provide him with an English code machine or an English diplomatic or military attaché code still in use, but SCHELLEBERG never succeeded in getting these. SCHELLEBERG believes that the results of the W/T monitoring service of the army in the field were only sent to the Interpretation departments of the general staffs. SCHELLEBERG does not know if KETTLER had anything to do with this, though he is sure that GIMMLER had. SCHELLEBERG received copies of these results.

IX. "Irrefulran" (Deception)

29. This subject was dealt with in Amt VI by a special department created by SCHELLEBERG called "Mil.1" which was placed under Kapitän von BEHRENSHAGEN. During the months before the invasion the interest of the "Geheime Meldedienst" centered quite naturally on the enemy plans connected with the impending invasion. In co-operation with the different General Staffs, SCHELLEBERG arranged for all reports concerning invasion (derived from agents, the press, the deciphering department, W/T double agents and other sources) to be entered graphically in special charts. By means of varying colour effects it was possible to fix optically intervallic intensification respectively obscuration of space and time factors. SCHELLEBERG recognized in some of these fluctuations, the planned work of the enemy's secret services. At first these findings only raised the question of how to tighten the control and the direction of all Amt VI and Mil Amt connections. SCHELLEBERG made this very question the subject of constant instructions to all department chiefs.

30. At the same time SCHELLEBERG asked himself the obvious question, what was being done on the German side for the methodical deception of the enemy. The answer was disappointing. He says that neither on the political nor the military, not to mention the economic, field could any traces of deception be found. In the political and economic sector the non-existence of deception efforts was plainly due to the existing disorganization resulting from the dualism - State and Party. In the Wehrmacht the fundamental cause was the absence of a "Reich General Staff". There existed, it is true, a Wehrmachtführungstab. This institution was however in reality only an assistant of Hitler on that theatre of war for which he had at that moment a special interest. In the end the chief of the General Staff of the Army (OKH) i.e. GUDERIAN and later WITK was responsible for the Eastern front, JODL as chief of the Wehrmachtführungstab was responsible for the Western Front and his deputy General WINNER (not General WINNER of the WZA, i.e. Wehrmachtzentralamt, right hand man of KEITEL) for Italy and partly the south eastern front. The Luftwaffenführungstab worked entirely independently. The Navy of course did the same.

31. There was no real working contact between the different departments, for instance Fremde Heere Ost West, Fremde Luftwaffen Ost West, Fremde Marine (J.Sookriegesleitung). The interpretation of the intelligence was undertaken completely separately. There was no general direction. A new arm making its first appearance say in the Russian war theatre remained therefore confined to the knowledge of the department Fremde Heere Ost. This was essentially the reason why no independently conceived operative deception plans were put into action before major military operations. This represented the operative strategical side of the problem. A systematic scheme for the distribution machinery also did not exist. The entire German "Meldedienst" had not made use of this important instrument.

32. For the purpose of building up and activating this essential branch, SCHELLENBERG created a new department called "Mil.i". Apart from this measure, the I.a.s M, H and Luft were given in their service orders strict instructions to co-operate in close touch with their General Staffs regarding the plans of far-sighted operative deception. The chief of the Wehrmachtsfuhrungstab also issued, at the suggestion of SCHELLENBERG, a detailed order by which he created within the Wehrmachtsfuhrungstab a department for operative deception to which the chiefs of the Wehrmacht sections had to submit their proposals. A general staff officer with the rank of Major became chief of Mil.i. His job was to see to it, in co-operation with the three I.a.'s of the Mil Amt and especially with the Counter-espionage section (VI.2), that all possible channels of the Geheime Meldedienst should be examined for the purpose of using them in a deception plan worked out by or in conjunction with the Wehrmachtsfuhrungstab. At the same time Mil.i. was given the task of registering all technical military material released for W/T playing back purposes. The execution of the whole plan was still completely in its infancy. The different departments showed little enthusiasm for co-operation as they were very reluctant to offer and release their high grade connections for the purposes of deception.

33. Co-operation with the counter-espionage section was more simple and more readily secured as this section in most cases had closer contacts with the enemy's services. SCHELLENBERG attached via a vis the Wehrmachtsfuhrungstab the greatest importance to the closest check on the troop movements, train and lorry transports, necessary for deception. This check was effected by means of photographic reconnaissance from the air. For the purpose of deception on a grand scale, W/T playing back by double agents was also made use of. This was called "Punkspiele" which meant the continuation of W/T contact by enemy W/T agents captured by the police or Section II (Abwehr) of Front Reconnaissance. This was done under the supposition that the taking over of the W/T connections had not been noticed by the enemy. This was a particularly developed branch of the Staatspolizei work.

34. After long negotiations Mil.I had received the right to take part in using the existing W/T contacts in order to perform its own deception. Apart from this, open and coded W/T messages (which it was assumed the enemy would be able to read) were worked out and transmitted by the services in the field, by the Navy or other quarters. All this work had, however, only begun. The former Abteilung III of the Amt Ausland and the Abwehr understood by "Irrofuhrung" merely long drawn out wrangles with some Waffenpruefung (arms testing department) or a technical Luftwaffen section, regarding the release of some equipment in order to give a counter-espionage agent "playing material" for the opposite side. The first large scale operative deception task executed in co-operation with the Wehrmachtsfuhrungstab was to fake the transfer of four or five divisions in the sector Weser-Rhein-Elbe, whilst in reality only one division was withdrawn. On the other hand SCHELLENBERG was rather sceptical about an effort made to convince the Japanese Intelligence Service by means of British intelligence from Lisbon and Stockholm of the importance of the war in China. BUERKNER's methods were even more primitive. He invited the chiefs of the Japanese I.S. to his house in Berlin, got drunk with them, and then told them that the war in China was important!

X. The Work of Amt VI C Z ("Unternehmen Zepplin") and the officers concerned with it.

35. The basic idea of this enterprise was, to try and establish in the widest possible shape the use of Russian prisoners of war for purposes of the "Maldedionist". The object was to secure through mass deployment maximum achievement. A great number of "duds" was consciously allowed for. The procedure was as follows: So called "Ausson Kommandos" tried to select from freshly captured Russians those who seemed best suited for future training owing to their experience and personal aptitude.

There a continuous sifting occurred conditioned by stot military service with the object of maintaining discipline and spirit as well as by special training in W/T and Intelligence work. The best amongst these Russian prisoners of war reached in most cases a so-called "Final Camp". There an effort was made for moral and "Weltanschauung" affiliation. The decisive factor remained however in SCHELLENBERG's view "the human and personal tie with the man who trained them".

36. Those who had been earmarked for future use returned in separate groups well equipped to the Hauptkommando from where they were moved by parachute or smuggled through the enemy lines. All were equipped with W/T sets. The whole enterprise entailed, owing to the mass deployment which was adhered to, the application of great numbers of men. Later mass deployment was dropped.

37. Those chiefly responsible for the "Unternehmen Zeppelin" at Ost VI C were: the late Dr. GELBE, Dr. WENZELMUELLER, Dr. LUMMA, Dr. SCHINDOWSKI, Dr. KRAUSS, Dr. HUEDE, and Stabsarzt DR. RUFF.

XI. The work of the Police Attachés.

38. The names of the Police Attachés in foreign capitals are the following:

Tisbon: SCHROEDER. He had four creative police Kommissars and secretaries to assist him. Amongst them were HALSK, HELS and RUH.

Madrid: WENZEL. He also has two or three police secretaries as assistants. WENZEL whose plane was reported missing on the way from Germany to Spain, was succeeded by Police Kommissar HAMES from Barcelona.

Athens: Kommissar MACH.

Sofia: Dr. NOFFMANN. His predecessor was WILFER.

Bucharest: Originally GELBER, a drunkard. He was condemned to concentration camp for life owing to sadist indulgences in the course of interrogations. He was given the choice of rehabilitation by unscrewing five unexploded landmines. He did not survive this vocation. His successor was DOEMER who was in turn succeeded by LICHTER.

Paris: HEISE.

Prague: COLTZ

Budapest: None

Stockholm: None

Berne: None

Ankara: None

Istanbul: WOLF, who was accredited as Police Attache, but all the same originated from MUELLER's Amt IV.

Vichy: ?

Tokio: MEISINGER. He had two deputies in Shanghai: HULER in Bangkok?

The Police attaches were all united in an "Attache group". This group was under the immediate orders of RALPH RUNNER and was commanded by SS Standartenfuhrer Dr. LINDE.

39. These Police attaches were from SCHELLEBERG's point of view of little importance regarding Amt VI or Mil Amt work because they were "marked" officers bearing the onus of Gestapo activities and therefore in most cases automatically shunned by the other members of the mission. In the whole scheme they were however important to SCHELLEBERG because the representatives of Amt VI had been by an arrangement with the German Foreign Office conceded the right to use the special so-called green envelope of the courier post which enjoyed diplomatic rights. In this arrangement it was stated that the Police attache is responsible to his chief of mission regarding the activity of all agents and representatives of the Reichsfuehrer SS in every country. The Police attaches, and above all MUELLER, tried to derive from the above mentioned stipulation a right to act as superiors. They never succeeded in this, though it led to continuous internal fights and intrigues. The attaches themselves were all officials who had originated from the police career, as well as personal proteges of MUELLER who were given good jobs as awards for special deeds or for other reasons. Not one of these police attaches was suited in the sense of a really far sighted political intelligence service. The only really bright ones were WINZER whose intelligence was, however, outweighed by grave deficiencies of character, and Dr. HOFFMANN, a legal man who did not originate from the police. SCHELLEBERG in order to secure influence on these Police attaches, succeeded in obtaining the exclusive authority for the allocation of foreign exchange. This right proved to be an important counter-weight against MUELLER's influence. SCHELLEBERG in the end only used the Police attaches as letter boxes and as a postal service. Gradually they themselves tried to join SCHELLEBERG's work which he says "became increasingly successful".

XII. Relations with ~~Private~~ Colonel MASSON

40. SCHELLEBERG came in touch with MASSON through political issues, above all the questions of Swiss subjects arrested in Germany, the increasing Press campaign in both countries (especially the periodical "IPA" published in Germany) and of the Swiss National Socialist restoration movements. MASSON believed that he could solve these issues between the two countries, with greater chances of success, in an indirect way. SCHELLEBERG says that he shared this opinion as he did not think highly of the work of the German Foreign Office in these questions. He hoped to render MASSON valuable help in all problems of interest to Switzerland. This connection was in SCHELLEBERG's view of particular importance in 1943 when he succeeded with the help of MASSON and General GUISSAN in nipping in the bud an invasion against Switzerland. SCHELLEBERG positively knew from HIMMLER that party circles in Germany tried to influence Hitler to effect a preventive occupation of a Switzerland joining all the same the Western powers, especially after the landing of these powers in Anzio. These circles which were also joined by influential quarters of the German Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht, brought forward the argument that Switzerland in the case of an Allied landing in Genoa was forced to abandon her neutrality and would thereby become a particular menace.

41. SHELLEBERG discussed this question in detail with HIMMLER. He tried to convince him of his firm belief that Switzerland would never agree to abandon her neutrality. SHELLEBERG at this juncture again assumed contact with MASSON in order to enlighten him of the situation existing vis a vis Switzerland. They both agreed to eliminate all difficulties by a statement on the part of MASSON about the maintenance of Swiss neutrality. SHELLEBERG hoped thereby to put a stop to the agitation against Switzerland. As he noticed that his proposal was not considered sufficient in Berlin, he secured the same statement from General GUISSAN. With this statement SHELLEBERG was able to convince HIMMLER of the genuine intentions of Switzerland to remain neutral to such an extent that HIMMLER became an outspoken partisan of his (SHELLEBERG's) standpoint and strongly fought all opposition against SHELLEBERG's policy. Later, reproaches against Switzerland, especially during the increasing deterioration of the economic situation, could be met in the same way. SHELLEBERG says that regarding the Swiss problem he found an ally also in the Minister of Economics, PUNK. SHELLEBERG emphasises that at no time did MASSON ever discuss with him intelligence questions. He admits that he tried to broach this subject, but was always given the cold shoulder by MASSON.

XIII. Amt VI collaboration with the Japanese

42. The officers of Amt VI dealing with Japan were:

- Professor Dr. CLASSEN Dr. KIRFEL
 - Dr. LEC Dr. WEIRAUCH (till the end 1944)
- and a number of other experts whose names SHELLEBERG has forgotten.

Mil. Amt officers dealing with Japan were:

- Colonel OHLEITZ
- Two naval officers whose names SHELLEBERG does not remember.
- Captain PLACK who ran an office in Berlin (travel bureau or something similar) under the cover of which the daily exchange of intelligence took place with the Japanese officers.
- Several other experts, whose names SHELLEBERG is not familiar with, collaborated in this domain.

Dr. WIRSING was another collaborator of Amt VI with the Japanese Intelligence Service. He worked on the political side of central intelligence regarding Japan, whilst Lt. Colonel FREUND, together with an officer whose name SHELLEBERG has forgotten, covered the field of counter espionage.

43. The names of Japanese officers prominent in the collaboration between the Japanese Intelligence Service and SHELLEBERG's Amt are as follows.

- OSHIMA
- KAWAHARA - First Counsellor at the Japanese Embassy, an impenetrable and difficult man who was the real political observer representing Tokio.
- KOMATSU - Major General and Military Attache. Typical army officer who dealt with everything in a crude and military way and was blindly devoted to OSHIMA. KOMATSU's assistants were:
 - a) OTANI. He had a good command of Russian and was the expert for Russia. An able intelligence officer and in SHELLEBERG's view one of the best the Japanese had in Germany.

b) Lt. Colonel HIGUTI. A Samurai-type, very serious and fanatical. SCHELLENBERG thinks that HIGUTI worked a great deal with Poles and Ukrainians. He sought close contact with SCHELLENBERG and even called on him in his office. SCHELLENBERG always switched him over to FREUND whom HIGUTI knew well, or to OHLETZ. HIGUTI collaborated closely with NAMBIAR. NAMBIAR was the SUDHANDRA DOSE's lieutenant in Germany. He was very intelligent, knew the Indian question thoroughly and had lived four years in Moscow. SCHELLENBERG thinks that there was more behind him than was outwardly visible.

c) NISHI. He was as far as SCHELLENBERG remembers, KOMITSU's third assistant. He played, it seems, a particularly important role.

Admiral KAJIWA - Naval Attache. He was from 1934 (?) until 1937 or 1938 assistant Naval Attache and returned again to Germany in 1944. He was in SCHELLENBERG's opinion the most active and also the most capable Japanese in Berlin. He possessed a great knowledge of the personalities amongst the German leaders and knew many details regarding the most intimate happenings. He had good collaborators, but must have also had in SCHELLENBERG's view, well informed German "Zuträger" and agents. SCHELLENBERG says it was terrifying to what extent German counter espionage against the Japanese seemed completely disinterested. It was always argued that Japan was a good ally!

Admiral ABE - He was chief of the Japanese military mission within the terms of the three power pact. SCHELLENBERG described him as an old trained intelligence officer. He spent many years in U.S.A., has studied there and acquired a great deal of knowledge in manifold domains. He is regarded by SCHELLENBERG as cold blooded and cunning, a 100% Japanese who looks down, at least on German life, in a superior and slightly ironical manner. His functions were of particular importance amongst the Japanese military representatives and he was obviously tacitly recognised by all as the "senior chief".

44. With the Japanese there were frequently arranged official and unofficial parties. In general the Japanese were tremendous drinkers (especially OSHIMA and KOMITSU, but also the others. The exceptions were in most cases the most intelligent ones and those who really did the work). The Japanese were represented in Berlin in great numbers. One evening at a party given by HIMMLER in the summer of 1944, there were present not less than seventeen high Japanese officers. This was only a 'small' delegation. In the course of this evening SCHELLENBERG had an interesting conversation with ABE who constantly returned to the subject of South America and the possibility of German-Japanese collaboration there. SCHELLENBERG left this question completely open. The counter question of HIMMLER regarding Japanese work in the U.S.A. on the other hand found no response with ABE. In the discussion that followed, ABE showed particularly good knowledge regarding the U.S.A. (Touching the negro question, he remarked that negroes were not suited for intelligence or sabotage work, the same applied to the Japanese who emigrated to the U.S.A.)

45. As a result of this party at HIMMLER's, SCHELLENBERG asked HIMMLER to pick for him from the Wehrmacht and the SS, ten to fifteen young keen officers who could after a short general training and without being charged with intelligence tasks, proceed to Japan in order to get acquainted with the country, its inhabitants and its language. SCHELLENBERG's request was refused. When some time later ten young naval officers were at last supposed to be going to Japan, Seekriegsleitung and DOEWITZ did not, however, allow them to receive a short political training from the experts of SCHELLENBERG's Amt VI.

46. KOJIMA, so SCHELLENBERG says, recognized very clearly these mistakes in German policy. In the course of many conversations he had with SCHELLENBERG on this subject he declared: The German military authorities regard everything only through their narrow military spectacles. For instance Admiral MEISEL sees only his U-boats and has no other problems. KOJIMA knew very well all the deficiencies of the German leadership. He had no use whatsoever for RIBBENTROP. One day in January or February 1945, KOJIMA, confiding himself to SCHELLENBERG, said: The whole German state machinery, also the military leadership of the Reich, are over-organized; in separate sections everything works very well and in an exemplary way. What is lacking, however, is the right combination of the whole. Hitler has concentrated everything on himself. This will not do. He needs a Reich General Staff and a Reich Cabinet. Co-operation with Japan has not been realized either in the political, the military or even the economic field in the manner in which a war like this makes it imperative. RIBBENTROP, KOJIMA said, confuses foreign policy with propaganda. His (KOJIMA's) main object after his return to Germany had been to bring about a compromised peace between Germany and Russia. Behind him had stood the opinion of the Japanese navy which regarded a block, Germany-Russia-Japan, as a desirable goal.

47. Japan had even been prepared to give up parts of Manchukuo and other territories and to bring about a complete change in the policy vis a vis China. KOJIMA said it had taken a long time before he had convinced OSHIMA of the necessity for such lines of thought, as OSHIMA had been a devoted follower of Hitler's ideas. RIBBENTROP and Hitler had shown completely wrong reactions and had transferred the centre of gravity of entirely superficial soundings to Tokio and Ambassador STAHRER who as a result of the questions which he was asked to put officially to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, had given a wrong direction to the whole course of events. KOJIMA said now everything was too late and he regretted sincerely that he had to wait to February 1945 to speak with SCHELLENBERG in this way. He thought that if he had found the line to SCHELLENBERG in 1944 things would have gone better. The same applied also to the intelligence connection between SAKAI and EGGEN.

48. According to SCHELLENBERG, SAKAI was an obviously specially picked intelligence officer working with KOJIMA. He was in contact with EGGEN. The latter worked with SAKAI on an economic basis. As far as SCHELLENBERG remembers he founded a firm for which the Japanese had to find the money. Apart from the tendency to put thereby his financial position in order (EGGEN had, it seems lost a great deal of money in Hungary and France), he achieved good relations based on confidence with SAKAI. This man must have had contacts with the Russians or must have known ways to approach them. It was planned that EGGEN should together with SAKAI, meet a Russian spokesman in Bern at OKAMOTO's house. This meeting did not, however, take place as OKAMOTO fell gravely ill (it was alleged that he had a heart attack). SCHELLENBERG remembers EGGEN telling him that the Russian in question was a professor at one of the Swiss Universities (Zurich?). His name was something like ORLOWSKI(?) (7). EGGEN always pretended that the Japanese, therefore mainly SAKAI and KOJIMA, wanted to win over SCHELLENBERG for co-operation with the Russians. KOJIMA referred to disagreements between the Army and Navy in Japan. The Navy wanted a quick termination of the war in China and a moderate, peaceful and purely Asiatic co-operation with China as well as a close alliance with Russia, which in KOJIMA's view was quite natural because Russia needed in the Pacific a naval power tuned in with Russian policy. KOJIMA firmly believed in his thesis. He was therefore also of the opinion that it was essential that a more intelligent and more flexible Japanese Ambassador should be dispatched to Moscow. He maintained that MATSUOKO was too old for his job. He also said that the Japanese army always wanted to show off and for this reason prolonged the war in China.

49. This difference of views was also perceptible between KOMATSU and KOJIMA. They kept from each other their visits to SCHELLENBERG.

KOJIMA spoke to SHELLEBERG in April 1945 quite openly of a three days "secret" visit of ONODERRA in Berlin. He (KOJIMA) had assumed that KOMATSU had visited SHELLEBERG secretly together with ONODERRA. About three days later KOMATSU called alone. He received an awful shock when SHELLEBERG asked about ONODERRA and wanted to know if he had had a good time in Berlin. When KOMATSU last called on SHELLEBERG he asked again for closest collaboration and offered at the behest of the Japanese General Staff that all Japanese Military Attaches abroad should assume contact with SHELLEBERG's representatives and should co-operate also in the domain of W/T. This offer was, however, never put into practice. KOMATSU had asked for exact details concerning the preparation of underground work, and of guerrilla warfare. He said that the intention was to start these things in Japan earlier than in Germany.

50. In order to characterize the existing situation, SHELLEBERG told the following episode: At a dinner party in OSHIMA's house (apart from HIGUTI only political members of the mission were present) the consumption of alcohol was immense. Two men fell for each other, OSIMA and KALTENBUNNER. At the end both of them made endless speeches. HAWAHARA and a very intelligent Japanese Legation counsellor who was very different from the rest, were reserved and were not happy about the trend of the evening. Another Legation Counsellor of a pronounced Mongolian type, sat down near SHELLEBERG in an ostentatious manner and pointed out to SHELLEBERG that it was not right of him not to drink alcohol (SHELLEBERG is a confirmed teetotaler and non smoker). The Japanese added that the other Germans made good for SHELLEBERG's deficiency. The Japanese then drank very quickly two or three glasses of whiskey and asked SHELLEBERG if it was correct that his policy tended always towards England and why he had no weak spot for Russia instead. SHELLEBERG replied that he himself had not asked the Japanese for his attitude towards Russia. Thereupon the Japanese rose and poured a whole glass of whiskey over SHELLEBERG's face. SHELLEBERG says that it was a very painful situation for him. Other Japanese ceased the culprit and dragged him out of the room by his ears and hair. SHELLEBERG later asked about the man: he was the expert in the Japanese Embassy on Russia.

51. SHELLEBERG maintains that the Japanese Sections of Amt VI and Mil. Amt worked in reality against Japan. The Kommando Meldegebiet China worked foremost against Russia and Japan. WEIRAUCH was for a long time working together with Dr. LEO in the Japanese section and maintained numerous connections with Japanese as well as with Germans who knew Japan. WEIRAUCH was however mentally not up to his job. He was therefore transferred to political intelligence work. As far as SHELLEBERG remembers he was working from Hungary against Russia. Dr. KIRFEL had passed a Japanese language exam. He was destined to proceed to Japan by submarine for the purpose of studying the country. Ultimately he was dispatched as a liaison officer with and for observation of the Japanese evacuated from Berlin to Kitzbuehl as far as SHELLEBERG knows.

52. Intelligence co-operation abroad between the Geheime Meldedienst and Japanese Intelligence officers did not exist according to SHELLEBERG. As far as he knows there existed especially good contacts between:

MOYCZISCH in Ankara and a young Japanese (Baron AKI). They had agreed to pool their W/T service in the event of a possible rupture of diplomatic relations on the part of Turkey with any one of their countries. This arrangement did not, however, take practical shape.

✓ KRAEMER in Stockholm with ONODERRA.

MEISSNER in Bern with OKAMOTO. OKAMOTO according to SHELLEBERG must have had at his disposal an "immense amount" of foreign exchange. He tried twice to bribe MEISSNER with huge sums.

53. No plan existed for foreign work of the secret services of Germany and Japan after a German defeat.

54. In Japan itself the Geheime Meldedienst had no strong representation. The so-called Police attache, Police Colonel MEISINGER, had no qualifications whatsoever for his job (he was formerly the expert on homosexuality, Jewish property and kindred subjects) and received his job only because he had to be given a lucrative position. He was in close touch with MUELLER. They often spoke on the telephone to each other and needed no telephone code both speaking the same broad Munich dialect unintelligible to outsiders. MEISINGER's only importance to SCHELLENBERG was that he maintained at the same time the connection with a younger man of Amt VI in Tokio (Dr. COHMEN or KOHNER?) and also with BRUECK in Shanghai as well as a third man (name forgotten) in Bangkok. MEISINGER was able to send the reports of these men and of their intelligence contacts by diplomatic W/T to Berlin. In 1943 a new chief of the Maslans Organisation Japan proceeded to Japan. His name was SPAHN and he had been trained by V.I.C. As far as SCHELLENBERG remembers he worked very little in Amt VI. He does not know to what extent he was useful to the N.S. towards the end it was planned to send KIRKEL together with the new Military Attache, Major General KESSLER, to Japan. Owing to the heavy cargo which the three submarines in view were carrying (they had the engineers for the V-weapons on board and apart from that it was said also "fighting orders" Kampfauftrage - an "idea fixe" of DOENITZ and MEISEL - which meant guns, torpedoes etc. to attack enemy shipping on the way to Japan), this idea could not be realised. It was then arranged that KESSLER should work as far as he found it possible for Mil.C. He had been put into the picture by CHELTZ and his officers. Two of the engineers had been as far as SCHELLENBERG knows, roped in for Amt VI work by Dr. RAIP.

XIV. KRANEFUSZ and the FREUNDESKREIS

55. SCHELLENBERG first heard of KRANEFUSZ in 1941 from HEYDRICH who always spoke disparagingly of him. However, in the latter half of 1942, SCHELLENBERG was struck by general political reports sent to him by HEDMLER concerning Spain and Portugal. SCHELLENBERG asked HEDMLER's secretary about the source of these reports. He replied that they came from KRANEFUSZ. SCHELLENBERG thereupon asked Dr. BRANDT to give him more detailed information about KRANEFUSZ and learnt that KRANEFUSZ came from the banking profession and had been launched and protected by Obergruppenfuehrer WOLFF. Relations between HEYDRICH and KRANEFUSZ were very strained. It was often said that KRANEFUSZ lived in physical fear of HEYDRICH. The reasons have never been clear to SCHELLENBERG. He only heard that a woman was at the back of it. KRANEFUSZ re-appeared in SCHELLENBERG's field of vision after the death of HEYDRICH. SCHELLENBERG had been advised to be in touch with KRANEFUSZ first by his department Amt VI which considered this connection important owing to the Freundeskreis and secondly by Dr. BRANDT, who was well-inclined towards SCHELLENBERG and thought that it would be a good thing to neutralise KRANEFUSZ who was in the habit of running people down with HEDMLER. BRANDT added that KRANEFUSZ had already begun to intrigue about SEBASTIAN who worked in Amt VI. KRANEFUSZ professed great friendliness towards SCHELLENBERG and had, after his first meeting with him, always endeavoured to be useful to him. Notwithstanding everything, SCHELLENBERG could not rid himself of the feeling that KRANEFUSZ was jealous of him. The judgement of DIEHN chief of the Kali works, whom SCHELLENBERG held in high esteem and who thought KRANEFUSZ was a sycophant, encouraged SCHELLENBERG not to maintain too close ties with KRANEFUSZ and he was confirmed in this by a similar opinion of LINDEMANN, president of the North German Lloyd.

56. SCHELLENBERG does not know what the reason was for the foundation of the Freundeskreis. SCHELLENBERG only knew of its existence, he knew several members and the fact that these business men in former times - if later SCHELLENBERG does not know - gave financial contributions to the SS. SCHELLENBERG believes that most of these business men were not moved by conviction, but by pure calculation. For, so they thought, this was a short

out to HINDLER and therefore provided support against arbitrary actions of the Gestapo and above all the Party (Gaulleiter Gau-economic advisers etc). SCHELLENBERG still remembers the following names of Freundeskreis members; the late DIEHN, ROSTERG (Kali), SACHS, DUETEFISCH, LINDEMANN, HAYLER, etc. SCHELLENBERG was interested in the Freundeskreis only from the angle of his intelligence work. Whilst therefore paying attention to DUETEFISCH and KRANEFUSZ himself (as a bridge to Brabeg for which he worked), he placed a man such as LINDEMANN in a different category, seeing in him only one of his personal advisers.

57. KRANEFUSZ and OHLENDORF at first were not on good terms at the time of HYDRICH; OHLENDORF even supplied reports against KRANEFUSZ and also the Freundeskreis. Later on he reproached KRANEFUSZ with using HIEBELER's name for both his personal and his economic policy. During the last years KRANEFUSZ was on the best of terms with OHLENDORF. Both co-operated closely in economic questions. This intimacy increased with the differences existing between the Reich Economic Ministry and the Reich Armaments Ministry (FUNK versus SEIBER, LANDFRIED versus KEHRL, until in the end LANDFRIED was replaced by the team of OHLENDORF and HAYLER). KRANEFUSZ balanced between OHLENDORF and KEHRL. He inclined however towards OHLENDORF because OHLENDORF's position was considerably stronger owing to the dual function as chief of the SD Inland. OHLENDORF originally thwarted SCHELLENBERG's endeavours to undertake intelligence work through the big industrial concerns. The motive, so SCHELLENBERG believes, was jealousy. A case in question was the General Electric concern (OHLENDORF wanted to bring this concern into German hands and to nationalise it in the same way as had happened with Unilever). Other cases were SCHELLENBERG's connections with Kali (NAUMANN), I.G.Farben (DUETEFISCH), Conti-Oel (FISCHER), Zucker (LUCKE), SIEMENS (LYSCHEN), Ferrostaal & Otto WOLFF (KIRSCHFELD).

58. KRANEFUSZ modelled his attitude on that of OHLENDORF. However, after SCHELLENBERG had succeeded in launching KIRSCHFELD as successor in place of the former Under Secretary of State Von JACKWITZ, as chief of the Foreign Trade department in the Reich Economic Ministry, OHLENDORF, KRANEFUSZ and also KEHRL, became much more careful. KEHRL even approached SCHELLENBERG regarding the desirability of regular co-operation. SCHELLENBERG mentioned these things in order to demonstrate the role which KRANEFUSZ played. During the last year KRANEFUSZ had undertaken another job in the Reich Economic Ministry. As far as SCHELLENBERG remembers he dealt there with claims by civilians for damages caused by air attacks. In order not to maintain too close a contact with KRANEFUSZ, SCHELLENBERG used first KRANEFUSZ and then Professor SCHMIED for this purpose. SCHMIED fulfilled his task very well. SCHMIED always warned SCHELLENBERG that KRANEFUSZ was not sincere towards him. He said that KRANEFUSZ always asked him if SCHELLENBERG continued to be as pessimistic as before. SCHMIED was of the opinion that this question was put in order to catch SCHELLENBERG out. In general KRANEFUSZ was well informed about German domestic policy and its background.

XV. VLASSOV.

59. The following men were dealing with this complex:

- (1) In the SS Hauptamt - Obergruppenfuehrer BERGER
 - Oberfuehrer KROEGER) Chief Political Direction
 - Stabf. ARLT) and relief.

- (2) In the RSHA
 - Obergruppenfuehrer KALTENBRUNNER
 - Gruppenfuehrer MUELLER
 - Gruppenfuehrer OHLENDORFF.

MUELLER amongst other things, watched the activities of VLASSOV in the Russian Prisoner of War camps as well as in the works and factories. VLASSOV had his own jurisdiction. OHLENDORF and a large staff of collaborators (all of whom were Balts) co-operated in the above-mentioned with VLASSOV, and his staff and dealt with the whole complex.

KROEGER was also a Balt and all of them were his personal friends. The chief task of Amt III was to supply constant information.

(3) In the OKH - A General for the Russian Volunteer Units (first it was General KOESTRING and then another General). It was planned to raise fighting divisions.

(4) In the Foreign Office - RIBBENTROP
- SIX
- HILGER

60. SHELLENBERG says that his own association with VLASSOV was brought about in an imperceptible manner. It had been arranged by KROEGER and Dr. RAPP that SHELLENBERG and VLASSOV should meet and dine together. In the meantime RAPP concluded an agreement with VLASSOV regarding intelligence work on the following lines:- VLASSOV and his staff to have a completely free hand as to how, where and with whom they worked in Russia; Amt VI to provide all technical and material support. All intelligence results to go to both sides. SHELLENBERG was personally certain that VLASSOV already had intelligence contacts in Russia. VLASSOV seemed convinced of his political mission and in SHELLENBERG's view did not play a double role. Besides, VLASSOV had married a German woman with whom he had fallen in love, and who exerted a strong influence over him. On the other hand, his organization was, according to reports from the Wally I (Front Reconnaissance I, under Lieut. Colonel BAUN an eminent expert on Russia), honey-combed with NKVD agents.

61. SHELLENBERG made use of the manifesto issued by the VLASSOV movement in order to found a "Union of European Peoples" on the basis of "national privileges" ("nationaler Freizuegigkeit"). SHELLENBERG believed this measure to be urgently necessary as the question of foreign workers consisting of racial minorities who were infiltrating in an increasing degree from the South-East and also the South and West into the reduced tip of the Reich, developed into a rising political problem which was almost inevitably driven towards VLASSOV. SHELLENBERG believes that his solution had solved the Russian problem of national minorities (Ukrainians, Caucasians, Georgians, etc) without difficulties. Prince TURKUL agreed with VLASSOV in the military but not in the political field. He could therefore be used in order to watch over the political moves of VLASSOV. He was very reticent in his judgment of VLASSOV. SCHILENKOV and TRUCHIN were gravely suspected by BAUN. SHELLENBERG considers the VLASSOV enterprise a still-born child both from the political and the military point of view because it came two years late. From the point of view of domestic policy it could, if well managed, have been a factor making for order as a rallying point in the shape of relief for three to four million Russians.

XVI. Horia SIMA

62. He was the successor of CODREANU. The old Amt VI under JOST, according to the instructions of HEYDRICH, pursued the policy of the "Iron Guard" and supported this party up to open revolt. A special role was played in this by Von BOLSCHWINGH and GEISZLER. The whole thing ended very badly and RIBBENTROP used the incident in order to bring HIMMLER and HEYDRICH into a difficult position with HITLER. Outwardly HIMMLER took severe measures against the ring-leaders in order to restore his position with HITLER. Horia SIMA and 500 members of the Iron Guard were arrested "for their own protection" in Roumania and put in "protective custody" in Germany. Either at the end of 1943 or the beginning of 1944, Horia SIMA escaped. MUELLER did not immediately report the flight. He hoped in the meantime to apprehend SIMA by means of the comprehensive measures he had taken for this purpose. After six or seven days SIMA had not yet been accounted for. RIBBENTROP had heard of the incident and used the disappearance of SIMA in order to undermine HIMMLER's position with HITLER. A huge scandal followed and the excitement was great. The result was a deep crisis in the relationship between HITLER and HIMMLER. It is said that HITLER abused HIMMLER in the grossest manner, being of the firm opinion that SIMA had fled with the consent of HIMMLER. After about ten days SIMA was arrested in Italy. The conditions of his detention were made more strict.

63. SCHELLENBERG says that the change in Roumania in 1944 came as a surprise though the symptoms recorded by his Intelligence Service were so numerous and serious that an intelligent "Fuehrung" ought to have reacted. A report by the Chief of the Roumanian Secret Service, CHRISTESCU, was particularly alarming. He had repeatedly invited SCHELLENBERG to visit him and tried to add weight to this invitation by showing keeness in rendering services. RIBBENTROP and the reports of Von KILLINGER who, as SCHELLENBERG put it, "was certainly not quite normal", frustrated all warnings. HITLER never showed an inclination to expose himself regarding Roumania. SCHELLENBERG was even officially forbidden to "work" in Roumania (the same veto existed for Italy and Japan!) Before the change in Roumania SCHELLENBERG had reorganised the counter-air-bombage service in the Ploesti oil region. For that purpose he had to get the special permission of HITLER.

64. Immediately after the beginning of disorders in Roumania, SCHELLENBERG and "Volksgruppenfuehrer" Andreas SCHMIDT who was "by chance" in Berlin, were summoned before HITLER. Horia SIMA had immediately been released. SCHELLENBERG met him, together with SCHMIDT, at a dinner party given by HITLER. SIMA made a timid, weakly and sickly impression. He did not strike SCHELLENBERG as a particularly impressive personality. The shape of his head was characterised by a relatively high but strongly receding brow. SCHELLENBERG says that his experience of heads shaped thus was not good and added that they pertain to fanatics and that HITLER too had a receding brow.

65. It was decided that SIMA should immediately form a counter Government and start a resistance movement together with SCHMIDT. For this purpose use should be made of the remaining adherents of the "Iron Guard" as well as the "Volks" Germans in the "Volks"-group of SCHMIDT. Both SIMA and SCHMIDT were instantly sent to Budapest by plane. Amt VI and Mil-Amt were to supply technical support for W/T, money and training. SCHELLENBERG says that in order to understand how this worked in practice the following must be considered:-

- (1) SCHMIDT and WANNECK were sworn enemies.
- (2) WANNECK claimed political leadership vis a vis SKORZENY, and last but not least,
- (3) Horia SIMA hoped to make special arrangements with the German Foreign Office (Minister ALTENBURG and Professor SIX), with military quarters in Vienna, and above all with the Mil-Amt (Front Reconnaissance).

When SCHELLENBERG wanted to make order, the "Vienna clique" headed by KALTENBRUNNER assailed him. SCHELLENBERG therefore left the whole thing to stew in its own juice. He says that quite naturally nothing much resulted from it. When it came to the worst (in the military domain SCHELLENBERG had settled the question previously in detail with OHLETZ of Mil C. and WIESE of Vienna), SCHELLENBERG summoned SIMA who appeared accompanied by a Legation counsellor of the German Foreign Office (for SIMA had in the meantime been made "Exzellenz") and informed him in an unmistakable way that he had to apply to WANNECK in all questions relating to the "Genuine Melledionst" and so on. According to SCHELLENBERG, this step at least had the result that all intelligence measures undertaken by air were in future controlled by one single quarter.

66. SCHMIDT then flew to Roumania. His plane crashed, he continued his journey on foot, established contact with all his men and reported one day that he would return by Roumanian plane. According to W/T messages sent by the "Hauptbeauftragter" GUNNE, SCHMIDT's plane was shot down. It was alleged that the ground staff had betrayed his flight. SCHMIDT was said to be only wounded. It was reported of GUNNE that on that day, that he had entered into close contact with the British Intelligence Service. So far as SCHELLENBERG remembers, GUNNE was a very good contact. He does not know what happened to SCHMIDT.

XVII. Ivan MIHALOV

67. This Bulgarian from Macedonia was the leader of the Duro Movement (National Macedonian Movement). His propaganda chief was Dr TSILEV in Sofia. MIHALOV lived for many years as an emigre. KALTENBRUNNER and WANNECK had made much ado about him and had overwhelmed him with money and commissions. It was planned:-

1. to raise Macedonian Volunteer Corps in order to let it fight against the Greeks in the event of a retreat by the Germans. 2,000 men were equipped.
2. to make certain concessions to Bulgaria in Albania;
3. to use MIHALOV as a "factor of order" and a "means of pressure" in that field of domestic policy.

From the political aspect this plan was wholly contrary to the ideas of KALTENBRUNNER, a friend of Dr. NEUBACHER. It led to endless friction, quarrels and difficulties with the Army Group South East etc. From the Intelligence point of view the whole thing was worthless. It cost a great deal of money. One had to assume that Anto PAVELITSCH, the Poglavnik in AGRAM, in whose house MIHALOV had lived for many years, received his share of the proceeds. It remained, however, a pet plan of the "Balkan specialists".

XVIII. Draha MIHALOVITSCH.

68. Intelligence connections with this man were manifold. The main lines led to the I.C. of the Army Group South-East (SCHELLENBERG does not remember the name), and to the staff of the Minister Dr. NEUBACHER. NEUBACHER had with him officers of the military I.S. (for example, Captain Dr. LANGE, Dr HAESKER (?) and many others), as well as all the political Intelligence Service (Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr WUEHRER). Considerable differences existed between the military and political opinion as to the importance of MIHALOVITSCH. Sometimes the military people were predominant and sometimes NEUBACHER. Apart from that an important role was played by the Commander of the Sipo and by the Hoehere SS and Polizeifuehrer who had views and contacts of their own. SCHELLENBERG believes that NEUBACHER had after all the best connections. HAESKER even claims having maintained his own W/T personnel at the headquarters of MIHALOVITSCH. NEUBACHER was of the firm opinion that he could enter into contact with the British regarding the solution of the questions of MIHALOVITSCH. The whole issue became pressing in the course of the last months because NEUBACHER intended to provide arms for about 40,000 volunteers of MIHALOVITSCH, in order, thereby, to win the MIHALOVITSCH movement over to Germany and to use it as a fighting unit against Russia and TITO. This plan failed repeatedly owing to the strong resistance of the Wehrmacht which had no confidence in MIHALOVITSCH and his organisation, though it was increasingly inclined towards the opinion that MIHALOVITSCH was pursuing not so much a pro-Communist but a pro-British policy. The Wehrmacht categorically refused to arm MIHALOVITSCH's troops maintaining that it did not want to rear an adversary on its flank and in its back. Apart from NEUBACHER's ideas no guarantees were available. Dr WUEHRER sent via WANNECK numerous reports against Dr HAESKER. He maintained that HAESKER was not honest, and had a firm financial hold over NEUBACHER. He had used his own position only in order to feather his own nest. HAESKER's frequent trips to Switzerland ought to be watched. SCHELLENBERG says it is a fact that HAESKER was in Switzerland in March and that incoming W/T messages could not be deciphered because he had not handed the code over.

69. SHELLENBERG thinks that the Russian Intelligence Service must have worked during the war with good success against Germany and cites as a proof the case of the "Rote Kapelle." This was the name of a wide-spread Russian espionage organisation working in Berlin from the end of 1942 until the middle of 1943. The case caused great excitement amongst the initiated. High German officers and officials occupying important positions were involved in it. SHELLENBERG remembers a few of the names. There was a Major in the General Staff of the Luftwaffe called SCHULZE-BOYSEN. He had a key job in the Luftwaffenfuhrungstab. Ever since the "Schu-bo" case Colonel WODARC (I.C. in the Luftwaffenfuhrungstab) seemed to be very nervous and tried to maintain particularly good relations with the Staatspolizei. Also involved were a Colonel in the Air Ministry and an Oberregierungsrat in the Reich Economic Ministry. The latter occupied a most important position, that is, that of "Generalreferent fuer Rohstoffplanung." Three members of the Foreign Office were also connected with the case, one of them being Geheimrat Legationsrat Von Schalia who played a special role in the younger social set of the Foreign Office. The first-named all worked without remuneration, and inspired only by their Communist ideals, whilst SHELLIA, owing to an affair with a Polish woman during his stay in Warsaw, had been pressed into the Russian Intelligence Service. As far as SHELLENBERG remembers the agents maintained W/T contact with Moscow.

70. According to SHELLENBERG the Communist idea of world revolution, the eternal human problem of "poor and rich" and the opposition to the existing regime in Germany, supplied a well-prepared soil for Russian Intelligence work. Especially after Stalingrad and the formation of the "Seydlitz" Committee there must have existed many German prisoners of war who placed themselves at the disposal of the Russian Secret Service. Apart from these Germans the Russians disposed of their own prisoners of war in Germany, and territories occupied by Germany, numerous emigrants (Caucasians, Georgians, Ukrainians etc), members of neutral nations (especially the Balkan countries), and of Allied nations (for instance the Poles), from amongst whom they were able to draw their agents. SHELLENBERG could not offer many concrete details about the contro-espionage activity against Russia. He only knew that the Staatspolizei was engaged in large-scale W/T playing back activities and that the Russians made use in a wide measure of agents dropped by parachute. Lieut. Colonel FREUND and Colonel RHELEDER are, according to SHELLENBERG, able to render account especially of the contro-espionage against Russia in the Balkans.

71. Forward intelligence against Russia was based mainly on the activities of the whole Front Reconnaissance (I, II, and III) as well as the Unternehmen Zeppelin VI C.Z. Front Reconnaissance I called Wally I (Lieut. Colonel BAUN) was highly organised, and was an enterprise which both in its conception and in its execution, was much better planned and yielded much better results than the work of VI C.Z. Wally I also undertook so-called deep penetrations (Tiefaufstaebe) and had Meldeposten far inside Russia. The work of Wally and Zeppelin, the methodical interrogation of the prisoners of war (there existed a highly organised "special camp" system with scientists etc), and the wide-spread W/T monitoring and deciphering service formed the essential sources of intelligence both in the military and political domains. To this has to be added the scientific and methodical basic research work of the Wannsee Institute and the assistants attached to it (Professor OBERLAENDER, Professor ACHMETELI, Professor KOCH, Dr TRICH and others, VI C. and VI G.).

... also Amt VI E) for intelligence lines from Berlin, VLASSOV, Prague, Stettin, Stockholm, Sofia, Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, Helsinki and Istanbul. The work was so organized that the chiefs of the "Waldgebiete" for the Russian sector had special experts. In many cases, however, there were no clear demarcation lines between the different fields on which they worked.

72. After the evacuation of the Balkans, there did not exist there any intelligence posts in working order against Russia. In Turkey too the service petered out. The same happened in Finland. The work against Russia as described above deteriorated to such an extent that serious plans were considered to establish as quickly as possible new connections through VLASSOV and "agents provocateurs" directed against SKILLITZ. The Ukrainian Freedom Movement (the UPA) also offered good prospects. Towards the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945 the reliable Russian "human material" at the disposal of Wally and Zoppelin was exhausted. Diminishing morale was responsible for this. In March 1945 it was decided, with the approval of the General Staff of the Army, to pick from the Wehrmacht 1000 Russian-speaking Germans respectively "Volks" Germans for Wally and Zoppelin purposes. The choice and the training of these men had already begun at the end of March and the beginning of April. SCHELLENBERG says that intelligence regarding Russia coming from both the K.M. China, and from Japan, was sometimes very interesting.

73. Russian Deception. The Bureau of Colonel WAGNER supplied reports from Stockholm about Russia which were regarded by Amt VI as deception material. The Japanese too, frequently gave KRAMER in Stockholm material which betrayed its Russian origin. WAGNER's reports could be traced back to a member of the Russian Legation in Stockholm called SEMENOV. The result of the ensuing W/T monitoring of Amt VI specialists in the Wannsee Institute revealed that a central office in Moscow was engaged in huge deception manoeuvres. In tactical deception the Russians were very strong. Every Russian Army order carried an appendix referring to deception. Numbers of Russian divisions were repeatedly changed. The systematic control of deception through the card index of the "Front News" department mostly revealed such deception in its initial stages. The same applied to tank numbers. During the invasion of Poland and the Baltic States as well as the Finnish war, the Germans had come to the conclusion that Russian deception as to troops and equipment was the greatest that had ever been undertaken. SCHELLENBERG cited the case of a Russian Major KALUGIN (?). He landed with his fighter plane at the beginning of April 1945 on a German field aerodrome. SCHELLENBERG was immediately consulted about this Russian Major as the Luftwaffenfuhrungstab could not agree about this man. He pretended to have deserted in order to have an opportunity of speaking on the German wireless. He said that the struggle was not for Germany but for Europe. This also ought to be told to the Western powers who should encourage anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia, otherwise the war would continue after the defeat of Germany. It was finally established that the Russian Major's mission had as its only object the deception of the Germans regarding the date of the Russian attack on Berlin. He said that the attack was due in ten days time. In reality it started the following day. According to SCHELLENBERG the Russians published in Moscow periodicals, maps, armament figures etc. always in two editions. One very limited edition which was only destined for staff officers, high Government officials etc. gave the true facts, the other edition which was generally distributed gave the facts published for deception purposes.

Continued

74. The following, according to SCHLEIBERGER, are persons who were working with Amt VI against Russia; KEDIA, TSCHENKELI, KAUER, TURKUL, two or three Poles in Gotenhafen (run by Kapitän WIEBE), a man in Switzerland associating with the Communist leader NICOLE, a German refugee journalist in Spain who was in touch with Red Spaniards and received his intelligence via Switzerland. In Roumania MORUZOV (dead), CHRISTESCU and quite lately, a Roumanian Jew (run by ROELDER) about whom FREUD knows more. Members of the Roumanian General Staff also co-operated copiously. In Turkey, considerable support was received from the Turkish Secret Service who supplied Caucasians, Georgians, etc., who were smuggled into Russia by the Germans through the Caucasus. The German firm of "Fudon Soohna" (?) helped in these ventures. NONZISCH in Ankara, backed by the German Legation counsellor WALTER, maintained contact with the Turkish Secret Service. The German agents PAST, DUPLITZER, and the journalist WOLF in Istanbul also co-operated in espionage directed against Russia. A woman journalist Frau CROSS, representing D. N. B. in Ankara and also involved in the Levantine Intelligence organization covering the Mediterranean (symbol: "Revo") also assisted in the work against Russia. She was in touch with a man called W. G. N. F. and was the centre of scenes of jealousy in which another man figured who worked in the office of Von der MARWITZ. In Finland Kapitän CEE RIVE of Amt VI maintained connections with the Finnish General Staff regarding Russian intelligence. BOSS worked in the same direction in Sofia. The Bulgarian General Staff and Foreign Ministry were close collaborators against Russia. So were an architect SEVOV (?) and the Police chief, General POPOV (?). In Hungary support, though weak, was accorded by the Hungarian General Staff and the Foreign Ministry. SCHLEIBERGER has forgotten individual names but one belonging to a staff officer he remembers vaguely (U. J. Z. I.?). HEIST and KLUS used Poles for anti-Russian intelligence work.

Amt VI representatives and agents in neutral countries.

SCHLEIBERGER supplied the following names. The spelling and sequence is his:

75. Portugal: FRIEDRICH, GRAMER, SONO, BENDIGEN, KAULRACH, SCHROEDER, WOLFRUM, VOIGT, BERNER, WREISS, SCHMIDT, LOT LOB, WENSS, W. TELLA, QUEIROZ, Z. K. H. ANDRE, FRANZ S. JENSEN, W. RICO, SENIGCO, KOSTER, ELIVIO DI SALGADO (who had a firm). There were two Hungarians introduced by the Hungarian General Staff under diplomatic cover and who were in W/T contact with London - source "NERO" JOHANNES and ELTZER. All Portuguese Consular reports from England, Canada and sometimes also the U.S. were available. There existed also good connection with Liverpool which KARSTORFER had built and also a wide flying weather service and port intelligence. Wolfram mines, firms and companies were honeycombed with German Intelligence Service agents.

76. Spain: STREIBSCHNEIDER, BOHRSCHNEIDER, LENZ, WITZEL (successor from Barcelona), HALLER, SENGER (economic), MOGIC, FERBER (comprehensive economic organization), WIEDERH, ZIEGLER, PODEWILS, ARNOLD, DE WILD, SCHMIDT (SCHLEIBERGER has forgotten), ALLESCH, KRAEHL, SCHADE and were many more in Barcelona. There was also contact via Spanish S.S. who supplied reports, and contact with the Spanish Foreign Office. Many diplomatic reports and nearly all those by Dils of Alba were available. There were numerous reports from the Spanish Deciphering Department. These included observation of Gibraltar, extensive weather service and local German deciphering department. There was monitoring of the whole South American service. The majority of the German firms in Spain were working

Card for Italy

For Amt VI

for Amt VI - such as Telef Jan LORENZ who worked with HEICZ POST. Cultural relations (Ibero - American Institute, Paupel etc) also served Geheimdienst purposes. On the Franco-Spanish frontier Irún and Hendaya strong Amt VI detachments were active. In Spain use was made of French, Hungarians, Roumanians, Belgians and also Dutch.

77. Sweden: WAGNER, FINKE, KRAMER, Count Douglas, GOLCHER, Von der GOLTZ, von KNORR (DNB), Frau Von KINZHAUSEN, KRUEGER, KLEISY, Von ROSSLER, JOHANSSON, Von KOENIGSECK, WAHLEIT, BECKER, DANKVORD (run by FINKE), Von GLENANDT, THORNER (run by SIX), FENZLIN, BAUERSFELD, KLAUS, RASON (Swedish Jew who lived for a long time in Russia), and prince Molar-SAKOMELSKI.

78. Switzerland: MEIBSNER (his agent was an officer in Swiss General Staff called JAKOB), DAUFELDT, Von PESCHORE, SONNENHOL (who worked with STEDLE), BOHLEN, STENDEL, REKINDAEN, Professor NOCH (or something similar. No case from the U.S.A.), Dr BITTER, FELOFF (wife PASTNAECHT), LARWIRSCH, W. KESSERSCHMIDT, Peter NIKOLAUS (contact with Mrs. MUSSOLINI), Von W. KATE, ASHTON, MAUER, Frank Von ILLMANN, TELSCHOW, ENGELBRECHTEN, WETSCHNEIDER, and the Chinese General COUE who later transferred to London. Contact with him then stopped.

III. General Intelligence.

79. SCHELLENDORF gave a detailed account of the case concerning the KUNCZEWIENCZ, who with two other Poles worked against the Russians and the Japanese, and provided their task-masters with the complete German invasion plan against Russia. KUNCZEWIENCZ's lines led to the Polish Major W. KATE in Stockholm who worked for the Japanese Military Attache there called ONODERA, and to the Jesuit General LEDOGOWSKI in Rome. These three Polish agents, the second of whom was a female cook at the Manchukuo Legation in Berlin, and the third a professor in Warsaw, all had Japanese passports. SCHELLENDORF was at that time (end of 1939 to beginning of 1941) in the counter-espionage section, that is, Abteilung III of the RSHA and had therefore a good insight into the case. KUNCZEWIENCZ was arrested in the Berlin Tiergarten at the very moment when he handed to the cook a parcel which he had brought with him from Warsaw. The chief of the Polish desk of Abteilung III of the RSHA was then KUBETZKY who collaborated with ROHLEDER who then worked in III F of CANALIS' Abwehr. The parcel which KUNCZEWIENCZ had handed to the cook, who had received it on behalf of the Japanese, contained tooth paste and a clothes brush, which in turn contained micro-photographs embracing the whole of the German invasion preparations against Russia. These photographs when enlarged, later filled not less than three volumes. They had been made by the Polish professor in Warsaw. An attempt was made, together with ROHLEDER, to play back on the Stockholm courier line used by KUNCZEWIENCZ. This attempt failed.

80. King Leopold of the Belgians was medically looked after by Professor GEDHARDT. On one occasion KALTENBRUNNER accompanied GEDHARDT on his visit to the Belgian King. SCHELLENDORF does not know if KALTENBRUNNER saw the King. As far as SCHELLENDORF knows, the former military A.D.C. of the German Wehrmacht with Leopold, was either arrested or sacked by KALTENBRUNNER.

81. Alfred W. KATE must have had sources in France of whom SCHELLENDORF knows little. They were mainly concerned with W. KATE's activities. SCHELLENDORF knows more about them.

82. SCHELLENDORF knows nothing about the Joel DRAND offer to exchange Hungarian Jews for trucks with the western Allies. He knows, however, that MULLER might know something about it. With regard to Jews, SCHELLENDORF's hands were tied by the fact that HITLER had issued a veto against employing Jews in the "Geheimdienst". When HITLER heard, in connection with Russian intelligence material, that Amt VI had engaged the Jew KEATT in such work, he threatened that if a similar case occurred again he would have SCHELLENDORF shot.

83. SCHELLENDORF rules out the possibility that SCHICKANE followed up the two despatches of W. KATE by sailing back to South America on the last March before W. KATE's departure, and another sailing was...

Handwritten mark resembling a stylized 'h' or 'd'.

E4.

ad

84. In 1942 a man in Amt IV 3 (later called Amt IV E) worked for a long time for the Russians. He received large payments. He was executed. SCHELLENBERG suspected MUELLER of being a Russian agent and spoke about it with HIMMLER who did not trust MUELLER. SCHELLENBERG thinks that in the end MUELLER went over to the Russians. He also believes that many members of Amt IV are prepared to do the same.

85. Many South American diplomats stationed in Berlin were contacted there by Amt VI and Mil-Amt for which they, when transferred to other capitals, worked as paid collaborators. The Argentine Military Attache, CEDALLOS (in Madrid) and others worked for STITZY and ARNOLD. In Lisbon the Chilean (?) diplomat MONTE was in German pay. GROSS (cover name GRANDE) who worked with PAEFFGEN in Amt VI dealt with South American Diplomats. All these diplomats received money. The procedure to win them over in Berlin was as follows: They were frequently invited and greatly encouraged to live beyond their means. GROSS always had seven to eight women (some of them provided by a fashionable Berlin bar) handy to help in the process. Once in trouble these diplomats readily accepted financial considerations. The rest was by no means silence!

86. Josef GOTTLOB in Lisbon is said to have obtained intelligence from an English girl friend there.

87. FIDEMUC, the best agent for Military Intelligence in Portugal, according to SCHELLENBERG, had a group of from ten to twelve men working in Lisbon. They reported on Army, Navy and Air Force matters. These were mostly Spaniards and Portuguese. One English business man belonged to this group. A number of VI and V2 hits were reported almost immediately and found to be correct. SCHELLENBERG maintains that he could never say how many of FIDEMUC's reports were pure invention and how much was Allied deception material. He himself had great doubts but the Army backed FIDEMUC. SCHELLENBERG says that both STETMLE and CARNAP know the names of these agents. He advises questioning them if captured.

88. Fritz CRAMER had also "good men" in England, mostly Swedes, who reported chiefly on the aircraft industry.

89. KUELENBERG received United Kingdom reports from two Spaniards, one of whom was probably a South American diplomat. These reports were of a purely military character.

90. General political reports from England were obtained by bribing Portuguese and Spanish officials who allowed inspection of Consular reports from the United Kingdom.

91. "Friend O" was CUMANO whose house in Lisbon SCHELLENBERG stayed in 1943 under the name of "SCHENKENDORFF". CUMANO received "much money". So did CAPELLA whilst LORENCO was not paid and was, on the contrary, suspected of working for the British. Nuno ALMADA was paid by Otto WOLFF.

92. Agent "T.100" was a White Russian with a Chilean passport called RELEV in Switzerland who was also used by KALTENDORFFNER to transfer his funds there.

93. The chief agent of Hans ERLANDS covering E.K. intelligence was the Swiss BURKHARDT. His symbol was I² ("I quadrat"). BURKHARDT has nothing to do with the Red Cross man of the same name.

94. JEDSEN was kidnaped at the Portuguese-Spanish frontier in a truck by Lieut. Colonel HUEBARTH and another officer whose name SCHELLENBERG has forgotten. HANSEN had given the order for the kidnaping. SCHROEDER in Lisbon aided and abetted the scheme. JEDSEN fell under suspicion because he sent conflicting reports to different departments, amongst them Amt IV. JEDSEN was handed over to MUELLER and was accused of working for Britain. SCHELLENBERG does not know what has happened to him.

95. Amongst Allied agents dealt with by FREUND of Amt VI 2 was the Polish "Agent 792" who had a large German net. This agent was discovered by deciphering a telegram of the Polish Intelligence Service. In Portugal FREUND co-operated closely with GRUBER in planning a Communist plot.

96. During the very last months, grave suspicion was entertained re Fritz CRAMER who was thought to be working for the British Intelligence Service. He had been denounced by Aloys SCHLEIBER, Chief of I H K in Portugal.

97. One of SCHELLENBERG's pet ideas was to encourage the co-operation of the Polish Intelligence Service in Amt VI work. However, he found the Poles extremely difficult to approach. Apart from source "ARABEL" run by Wiesbaden (a Polish General Staff Colonel who worked by W/T first from North Africa and then from De GAULLE's headquarters in Versailles, and who is said to have transmitted a good report about the impending invasion of Europe), little success was achieved with the Poles. "FERNOV" ran several Poles but without much result. If there were collaborators in the Polish I.S. then FERNOV must know them.

98. The agents' funds for Spain amounted to approximately R.M. 200,000 a month. The amount for Portugal was sometimes higher, but usually the same as for Spain. In Sweden KRAEGER was the highest paid agent. He received 30,000 kronen a month. Switzerland was the cheapest of the neutral countries.

99. Fritz LAUN the "Trans-Danubia" representative worked for SCHELLENBERG in Hungary where he remained.

100. ROET was TONNIGEN was run by JRAEFYSS,

101. Both ELT and LINDLUND received money from SCHELLENBERG.

102. Scoops secured by Karl Heinz BRÄUER (symbols JOSEFINE and HASSO) were messages of intended Arnhem landing as well as impending attack on Philippines. BRÄUER cooperated closely with ONODERA Japanese Military Attache in Stockholm. BRÄUER sent a great deal of Russian intelligence from Sweden.

103. O'RYAN in Berlin helped SCHELLENBERG in parachuting two Irishmen over Ireland. ALBERTOP and VESENER who were just preparing revolt in Ireland were furious owing to this interference with their plans.

104. LOHMAYER's Free Austrian movement in Lisbon was financed by SCHELLENBERG via BREISKI. LOHMAYER was however unconscious of it.

105. The following were SCHELLENBERG's guesses regarding the whereabouts of Amt VI and other officers: MUELLER of Amt IV in Berlin, JAHNS near Baugwalde Pomerania, SIX in Kitzbuehl, SCHMITZ surely captured near Flensburg, EGGEN in south near Marquardstein where he was to protect SCHELLENBERG's wife after escorting the Americans, VANLAKEN, over the frontier, SCHMID on his property in Styria, KNOCHEN in Vienna or Munich, SEIFLE in Marquardstein, LYCKLER in Constance, PRITZMANN in Homburg, JENSEN in Toels, ZEIDNER in Berlin or Homburg, SCHUEDEDEFF had gone on leave to Homburg and has not returned from there, SANDROGER in Marquardstein, DAUFELDT in Toels. RAFF and Von DEWITZ remained in the north, RAFF was last seen on May 3rd in Flensburg. PAKFUGEN, OLSROCK and SCHINDOWSKI are believed to have been with SANJENEC in the south. FERNOV and GARCINICO last reported near Constance. Von DER KESSECK and DUNDRUCK last reported about April 12th in the South. OHLETZ also believed to be in the south near Marquardstein. BOENING remained in Berlin to fight, Von DOHLEY went south and may be found with his friend SWEDER. LASSIG, FORTSCHKEN and KOS (MI Amt D) also went south. FORTSCHKEN last reported at JUNG.

106. Regarding the present abode of Amt VI files, SCHELLENBERG stated that Amt VI was first transferred to Burg Leuchstein near Probstzella then to Marquardstein near Munich. SCHELLENBERG's wife, who is in her ninth month with her fourth child, is also there.

107. Faked pound notes. SHELLENBERG gave a detailed account of the fabrication of many millions of English £.5. and £.10 notes by Amt VI F. When he took over Amt VI there existed already a well-equipped special department in VI F for the falsification of pound notes. Apart from this Amt VI F faked passports, rubber stamps, various currencies, finger prints, ration cards and postal stamps. This department also dealt with microphotography and secret inks (expert: Dr TAUBOECK). It was also equipped with a photo-copying section. According to SHELLENBERG, the results were very bad. After about one and half years the results improved and the stocks increased. The faked English money was, according to SHELLENBERG, intended to be used in the first instance for propaganda purposes. It was planned to dump it on England in the course of a mass flight of German planes. This money was used for intelligence purposes only in a limited measure. Until the end of 1943 the amounts thus put into circulation were small. Sums up to £.1,000 were for instance handed over to small agents for distribution. These agents were "not always" told that the notes were forgeries. An attempt was made in Portugal to dump between £.20,000 and £.30,000. NASSENSTEIN was in charge of this transaction. He only succeeded in getting part of this money and his deal led to "disagreements with the Bank he used". In 1943 the faked notes were mainly £.10 notes. In 1944 KALTENBRUNNER took over the administration of the forged Bank of England notes, the amount of which had in the meantime, risen to many millions. KALTENBRUNNER charged a man whose cover name was WENDIG (real name unknown to SHELLENBERG) with the distribution of faked pound notes on a huge scale. SHELLENBERG says that at that time only faked English currency was available as the forgery of dollar notes was more difficult. At the end of March 1945 the first faked 10 - ? or 20 - ? dollar note was ready as an experiment.

108. WENDIG was no newcomer to the business. He had previously been incriminated in, or punished for dealings in illicit Foreign Exchange. He worked closely with WANNECK, Dr HOETTL and SCHIEDLER. SHELLENBERG does not know the exact figures which he brought into circulation. He calls him "one of the greatest crooks and imposters" because he disposed of the false pound notes almost exclusively in the territories occupied by Germany. This led at the end to even the German Reichsbank buying these notes. ZEIDLER was ordered by SHELLENBERG systematically to oppose KALTENBRUNNER's plan to buy art treasures in Italy with the faked money. SHELLENBERG says that he succeeded in thwarting this plan by interfering with HIMMLER against it. WENDIG seems to have had a wide organisation of distributing agents. The deal enabled him to satisfy KALTENBRUNNER's most luxurious wishes and also to enable GOETTSCH, WANNECK and HOETTL to share in the proceeds.

109. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. EL HUSSEINI Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, was a close collaborator of Amt VI, and SHELLENBERG, and cost him much money. So did his adjutant Dr JANDALLI. One of the Mufti's most important advisers was later killed by a bomb. The Mufti had a staff of collaborators of between 20 to 30 men. About the same number of Arabs were trained for intelligence work in a school near The Hague. From there they went to a finishing school in Berlin. Parachute and sabotage lessons were given in SMORZENY's establishment in FRIDENFAL and near Belgrade. Two flights were made to Palestine, one in the autumn of 1944 and the other in the winter of 1944. Arabs and German Palestinians were dropped. They were meant to prepare the way for succeeding parachutists and to encourage incitement to revolt and sabotage. The Grand Mufti had also agents in Turkey. An Arab agent of the Mufti was smuggled, at the beginning of 1944, to Africa and back via Spain and Tangiers. In Spain he used a German service passport. The Mufti was important because of the Mohammedan divisions in the Balkans (Bosnians and Albanians). The Mufti also supervised the Muslim school in Dresden where priests were trained for later use with the Mohammedan minorities in Russia. According to SHELLENBERG, it was ERHARD, chief of the press department of the Propaganda Ministry, who brought the Mufti's sons home to Germany.

The Mufti was killed by means of bandages round his head. SCHELLENBERG's man in Ankara, MDYCHISCH, was instrumental in arranging the Mufti's journey. At the beginning of his stay in Germany, the Grand Mufti was looked after by the former German minister in Teheran, Von EITTEL. E-2

110. The Grand Mufti's competitor in Berlin for the favours of the Nazi Orientalists was RASHID EL GAILANI. He was looked after by GROBBA, former German Minister in Baghdad.

111. In 1943 a member of the German Legation in Kabul worked for Amt VI.

112. Amt VI had a "Maldekopf" in North India (Delhi?). It was commanded by an Indian who had W/T contact with TROTT ZU SOLZ of the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, who was BOSE's care-taker before BOSE went by submarine to Japan. It was intended to send reinforcements to the North Indian "Maldekopf". A Kapitän KIRN was to fly there at the end of 1944 with two Indians and two Go mens. Everything had been prepared in detail for this flight. KESSLER, Secretary of State in the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, objected to news of this plan being transmitted by W/T to the Indian agent. The plane was to take off for India from the furthestmost tip of Creucco. When that country was lost to the Germans, the plan had to be abandoned.

113. Amt VI collaborated both with the intelligence service of the Spanish General Staff and with the Falange. In SCHELLENBERG's opinion, collaboration with the Spanish General Staff was less simple than with the Falange but yielded more results. Cooperation with the Falange was quite open. Amt VI received from the Falange a great amount of material which was of no special intelligence value. LENZ had a very good contact dating from the time of CANARIS, with the Spanish General Staff. SCHELLENBERG knows nothing about Amt VI or Mil-Amt agents being handed over to the Spanish Intelligence Service in the last six months of the war for further exploitation. He does not think it likely as he would have had to be consulted. E-7

114. August-FINNE's main sources in Sweden were a few members of the National Socialist Party there (JOHANSSON and his predecessor). One of these men joined the Swedish Trade Unions and worked from there against Russia.

115. The motive for SCHELLENBERG's visit to Turkey in 1943 with GRAEFE was to seek cooperation with the Turkish Secret Service. It was also meant as a return visit for that made to Berlin by two Turks, PERKEL and KORKUT (one of them was the Wali of Istanbul). SCHELLENBERG met the Chief of the Turkish Intelligence Service NACI PERKEL with whom he had a discussion mainly on political problems, but also on the question of smuggling German agents (Caucasians, Georgians etc) across the Caucasus into Russia. PERKEL in future not only closed a blind eye to these activities, but also helped in providing suitable candidates. SCHELLENBERG's talk with PERKEL also had the result that a Turk was allowed to work for MDYCHISCH without official Turkish interference. GRAEFE went with SCHELLENBERG in his capacity of Amt VI C.

116. The Hungarians passed a great volume of their cryptography results to the Germans. They were very successful in their deciphering work. The old school of RONEE, Intelligence Chief of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire made its influence felt.

117. SCHELLENBERG undertook several journeys abroad in the company of CANARIS. He was with him in Madrid (1943 ? 1944), in Stockholm (beginning of 1944) and in Sofia (1943).

118. With the assistance of the Swedish Intelligence Service, in the last six months before Turkey broke off relations, a German courier was to

119. The "Henkedienst" called after the Under-Secretary for State in the German Foreign Office was a secret intelligence service working for RIBBENTROP. First it was run by HENKE, then by Von EITEL. Finally Baron Marschall Von HIEBERSTEIN took it over. A man called KIEBI worked for the "Henkedienst" in Marseilles. He was later arrested because he worked for other services as well.

120. Efforts by Amt VI to come to an arrangement with BOUSQUET and MAVAL were at first not successful. Later KNOCHEN succeeded in bringing about a rather "loose" working agreement. The results were nil.

121. Towards the end of the war an agreement was reached between Amt VI and the German Foreign Office for the exchange of personnel and information for the purpose of collaboration. The name of the Foreign Office representative in Amt VI was Von KOSSEL, whilst that of the Amt VI man in the Foreign Office was Dr ROEDER.

122. According to SCHLEIBENBERG, Amt VI contacts with the Vatican were sparse. In the Vatican a German librarian worked for Amt VI. KAPPLER, Police Attache in Rome, had arranged this. CANARIS had many men in the Vatican. All these contacts were broken when the Allies took Rome. Thirty W/T stations, mainly military, continued to work for the Germans in Italy.

123. In Spain one of the big tasks was to supply the French Atlantic ports still occupied by the Germans with food. Almost all the sailing boat expeditions succeeded. The whole was managed by SIEFEL together with BERNHARD.

124. SCHLEIBENBERG pointed out the difference between the "I-net" and the "R-net". The "R-net" that is the retreat net (Rueckzugsnetz) operated in occupied territory and their base fell under the "S.D. Inland" and WELENDORF who was responsible for the organization and maintenance of the "R-net".

125. A good source of intelligence on Russia was an Estonian in Spain who was later expelled and whose symbol was "DOLLAR".

126. A Russian called FCIOV in Stockholm (according to HANSEN) covered the Russian Legation there for the Germans.

127. German deception was effected through W/T playing back undertaken by Amt IV and through double agents. In Spain ROHRSCHEIDT ran such double agents, amongst them a Major in FRANCO's entourage. DARNAND and DORIOT were also used. In Portugal Fritz GRMER was responsible for deception. He mainly used CATELLA.

128. Intelligence re American armament production was secured by VI W1 which had an extensive network for this purpose in Spain and Portugal. Spanish firms played an important role in this, above all, Hispana-Suiza in Barcelona. This firm worked first for the British Intelligence Service. After the introduction of a Spaniard working for Amt VI W1, it produced American armament figures. In Portugal four or five Luftwaffe officers worked with the same object. Some intelligence was also secured from Sweden.

129. The German female agent Countess ROEWELS in Madrid, who had very good Spanish contacts, associated mainly with one Spaniard whom she had completely in her power.

130. The Germans never succeeded in breaking the British diplomatic or Intelligence Service code. General THEELE, department chief under General FELLGIEBEL, chief of the Wehrmacht-Nachrichtenverbindungen in the OKW, stated that the British use a code machine similar to the German Enigma machine. The Germans broke the American code. Messages sent by HARRISON, U.S.A. minister in Bern, to Washington, lay daily deciphered on SCHELLENBERG's desk. These messages sometimes contained intelligence service material. SCHELLENBERG also received Turkish, Polish, French, Swiss, South American, Spanish and Portuguese messages which were all decoded. Amongst the latter were those of the Portuguese Ambassador to the U.S.A. From an intercepted and deciphered message sent by the Turkish Foreign Office to the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow, SCHELLENBERG learned that the Russian Ambassador in Ankara had lodged various complaints regarding the support the Turkish Police and the Turkish Secret Service had been giving to the Germans in their efforts to send agents to Russia through the Caucasus. The Turks always denied rendering such support. Loose cooperation was however maintained with the Germans to the end.

131. Good Naval intelligence was received from an organization in Istanbul which had the symbol "REMO". This was an organization composed of Greeks, Armenians and other Levantines. It covered the whole of the Mediterranean. An Italian as well as REICHERT served as links. The service cost 5,000 dollars monthly.

132. According to SCHELLENBERG, South Africa was mainly covered by the A.O. It is possible that the Mil-Amt despatched an agent or two to South Africa. SCHELLENBERG knows nothing of an organization there. In the middle of 1944 two men were sent there by Mil D (sabotage). SCHELLENBERG wanted 1,000 dollars each for them. Both were Germans who had lived in South Africa before. Their task was to sabotage ships leaving South Africa. The man who knows everything about this matter is a lawyer (former lawyer from Magdeburg) who used to work in the former Division II of the Abwehr under ERIC LORINGHOV. The two Germans who went to South Africa were sent from Spain.

133. Four months before the end of the war, WICHMANN of the K.M. Hamburg, or more precisely his I.H. (KLEIN ?) sent a Portuguese to America from Bremen. FRISCHAT worked against America. He transmitted many good economic reports. Some of them originated from the Japanese Embassy in Berlin.

134. Amt VI and Mil-Amt men expelled from Tangiers either remained in Spain or went back to Germany and returned to Spain under other names.

135. "Wannsee Institut" for purposes of administration was recently placed

136. SCHELLENBERG maintained friendly relations with Prince August HOHENLOHE whom he considered "particularly important" from the point of view of politics. SCHELLENBERG intended using him for the purpose of contact with Lord TEMPLEWOOD. The mother of SCHELLENBERG's secretary, Miss SCHINER, was evacuated to HOHELOHE castle in Czechoslovakia.

137. Amt VI WI paid 20,000 dollars for a Portuguese and his wife who were sent to the U.S.A. not so long ago. (This quite obviously refers to MARGHERITA DELLO who was despatched to the U.S.A. from Berlin to the U.S.A. T/W is now directed by Wicht.)

138. A W/T post in Cairo was manned by four or five men (Greeks and one Cretan). OHLENZ knows the case well. Money was sent by sailing boat from Athens and conserved in the post.

139. PAEFFGEN despatched a German to a British prisoner of war in the Service in Estonia, equipped with

140. [unclear] a [unclear] addressed
whose [unclear] was [unclear] by [unclear] and [unclear]. Sometimes the
intelligence gathered in this way was [unclear].

141. Amt VI telephone monitoring of the trans-Atlantic telephone service between London and Washington was very successful. This monitoring was effected from Holland and a highly complicated machinery was used for that purpose. Before the Teheran conference, SCHELLEBERG received a report of a conversation between CHURCHILL and ROOSEVELT. Most trans-Atlantic calls referred to questions of supply. Decoding these talks was difficult as the essential words were coded twice. Oberpostkap VETTERLEIN supervised the monitoring service in Holland. This service offered great difficulties from the technical side.

142. Amt VI in the guise of a "relief organization" working for German prisoners of war in Canada, despatched there money and parts of W/T equipment hidden in food, etc, parcels. This "relief" was intended to enable them to escape to U.S.A.

143. Both SCHELLEBERG's former secretaries, Fr. SCHINKE and Fr. ERDMANN are in Stockholm.

144. KALTENBRUNN presented EGELEIN with an entire castle.

145. The idea of putting two thousand German soldiers in British uniforms during the Ardennes offensive for the purposes of deception, originated with SKORZENY and JODL. SCHELLEBERG stresses that he had nothing to do with it.

146. Towards the end of the war a German Consul who worked for Amt VI was sent to Switzerland (Zurich?). His name, which SCHELLEBERG does not remember, had the word "Von" affixed to it.

147. An adopted son of ERIK DANZ worked in the German Foreign Office. SIX maintained the connection with FELDMAN of Amt VI. He was also in touch with Obergruppenfuhrer LORENZ who knew in Switzerland a Frau Dr. RICHTER (?).

148. SCHELLEBERG says that the German counter-espionage service in Sweden was bad. It was intended to change the personnel there. Defeat intervened.

149. The representative of the A.G. in Spain was an Amt VI agent: HANS THOMSEN.

150. Paul RUH who worked under SCHROEDER in Lisbon is a great friend of MUELLER Chief of Amt IV. Their friendship dates from the time when they took part together in executions.

151. Erich SCHROEDER in Lisbon used to drink heavily. He seduced his secretary to whom he expected a child from him. He was summoned by SCHELLEBERG to Berlin to render account. SCHROEDER's proposal to shoot himself then and there was not supported by SCHELLEBERG who advised him to give up drinking and to mend his ways. Since then according to SCHELLEBERG, SCHROEDER has become a temperate man who leads a happy family (Ripe).

152. In Madrid the fashion shop of Madame de POMERO worked for Amt VI and was financed by SCHELLEBERG. It was run by Madame herself assisted by MAYWALD and the picture dealer SCHMITZ (GERT SCHMIDT).

153. The Culture and Propaganda Departments in the German Foreign Office were placed under Professor SIX who was in direct contact with SCHELLEBERG. SIX had originated from the S.S. and HIMMLER himself had placed SIX in the Foreign Office in order to keep a finger in the pie. SCHELLEBERG transmitted orders to SCHMITZ in Lisbon through SIX.

154. SCHELLEBERG shared [unclear] in Portugal during [unclear] in Portuguese.

155. In [unclear]

White Russian Court SHO
The charge of dismissal being to informally.

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SP

156. In Spain SPITZ was SCHELLENBERG's chief representative.
157. SCHELLENBERG mentioned a contact which had been made in Africa. Its symbol was "ATLAS". UNDEBERG was connected with this undertaking. Three flights were made in 1944 over North Africa in order to drop paratroopers, native and others.
158. Kurt SELL was mentioned by SCHELLENBERG as an "honorary collaborator" of Amt VI in Portugal. He described MARIJAK as a priggish journalist who had only joined up as a collaborator of Amt VI in order not to have to join up with the Army.
159. SCHELLENBERG maintains that he does not know the name of DAHLGREN (Stockholm).
160. KREMENTAL received United Kingdom reports from the Spaniards, one of whom was probably a South American diplomat.
161. SCHELLENBERG says that the British "Soldaten Song" was very successful and had a most demoralising effect, at the end of the struggle, on German civilians and soldiers alike.
162. There existed "deadly enmity" between RIBENTROP and SCHELLENBERG. RIBENTROP resented SCHELLENBERG's interference in his policy. RIBENTROP surrounded himself with people of low intelligence.
163. The marriage of MAXWALD (Spain) to an English woman was not very happy. SCHELLENBERG advised MAXWALD to divorce.
164. SCHELLENBERG says that it was he who induced "Klein" to join the NSDA.
165. One of Amt VI's most important W/T nets was in the Argentine where SCHELLENBERG was the principal man. On the whole SCHELLENBERG never considered South America important from the intelligence point of view and only as a stepping-stone to the U.S.A. via Mexico.
166. SCHELLENBERG thinks that NAUJOCK who was with SCHELLENBERG in the Vonloo affair, has either committed suicide or gone over to the other side. At a given moment he suddenly disappeared.
167. To illustrate the enmity that exists between SCHELLENBERG and KALTENBRUNNER, SCHELLENBERG told of his suspicion that KALTENBRUNNER once tried to poison him at a dinner party after which SCHELLENBERG was extremely sick. SCHELLENBERG also feared that KALTENBRUNNER would kill his wife in the south of Germany where she had taken refuge.
168. GOETTSCH, like NAUJOCK and KALTENBRUNNER is a disreputable type of man. Both he and NAUJOCK were used in order to eliminate people. GOETTSCH with the consent of KALTENBRUNNER, entered into contact in Vienna, with Freemason and other opposition circles with the idea of penetrating them.
169. As a proof of his argument that penetration of business concerns offers better prospects for information on intelligence than the old-fashioned employment of professional agents, SCHELLENBERG told a story of how BUCKING with fifteen agents watching the Lisbon port was not able to establish that the local I.G. FARBEN representative found out without difficulty from his friend the director of the port.
170. KEITEL refused SCHELLENBERG's proposal that Military Attaches should be involved in Amt VI intelligence work. The only success SCHELLENBERG achieved was that these Attaches should attend courses held by Amt VI. The I.O.'s of the Army were also to attend.

171. SCHELLENBERG and IX worked out a plan how to train recruits for the German Diplomatic Service in intelligence work.

172. Hans KOESTER in Lisbon was suspected by SCHROEDER of working for the British. SCHROEDER also suspected VOLLBRECHT and Chancellor KLEBANOWSKI was suspected of being in the service of the Vatican.

173. In 1942 a low-type Englishman was flown from Paris to England and dropped by parachute. He was later engaged in W/T traffic with Paris. *Probably Chapman*

174. Amt VI had a strong contingent of intelligence officers and agents in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar. A large radio station and an independent deciphering station operated there, as did also a most extensive machinery with the latest technical devices (infra red rays) for observation of shipping. Barcelona soothed with Amt VI agents.

175. SCHELLENBERG is firmly convinced that it was HIMMLER who ordered the doctor to give HITLER the fatal injection in order to remove him in this way. SCHELLENBERG states also that he himself inspired HIMMLER's capitulation to the Allies and thereby contributed considerably to the dissolution of the internal front in Germany.

176. Karl Heinz KRAEMER (Stockholm) was formerly a lawyer in Hamburg. SCHELLENBERG heard his name for the first time from DAUFELDT for whom he had occasionally worked. Dr. PAEPGEN and SCHUDDENKOPF were very critical of KRAEMER saying that he took his reports from the British Press or from the British Intelligence Service. On the other hand, Dr. WIRSING, one of SCHELLENBERG's most able collaborators who was chief of the "Zentralburo" thought a great deal of KRAEMER. SCHELLENBERG was struck by KRAEMER's reports for the Amt-Mil. They were political reports and concerned the U.K. and the U.S.A. For this reason SCHELLENBERG sought closer contact with KRAEMER. In the political domain he collaborated closely with Dr. WIRSING. KRAEMER needed a great deal of money. In SCHELLENBERG's view this was the reason for the suspicion that existed against KRAEMER for a long time. KRAEMER was first "run" by KLEYENSTUEBER and later by Lieut. Colonel Von DEWITZ who was formerly in the Luftwaffenfuhrungstab, and there had differences of opinion with the Lieut. Colonel WODARG. WODARG's opposition to DEWITZ was transferred to SCHELLENBERG. From his chiefs of sections WODARG ordered a comprehensive memorandum saying that the reports of KRAEMER represented conscious deception by the enemy, of fraud. This memorandum, comprising nearly eighty pages, was given to MUELLER by WODARG, without consulting SCHELLENBERG, with a request to start proceedings for espionage against KRAEMER. MUELLER put two of his best specialists on the job. There now began a dispute between MUELLER and SCHELLENBERG about KRAEMER. There were a number of weak points in KRAEMER's military reports. He had, for instance, reported British aircraft factories which, according to the evidence of prisoners of war, did not exist at all. Another mystery was the time factor in the transmission of KRAEMER's reports. Often, for instance, counter enquiries referring to some remote place in England were answered within ten hours. After many discussions and negotiations, SCHELLENBERG was himself obliged to summon KRAEMER to Berlin. MUELLER's plan was not to let him depart again but to arrest him. SCHELLENBERG prevented this by telling MUELLER that he had succeeded in a personal talk with KRAEMER, in clearing up the issues that were most doubtful, and that for technical reasons he could not renounce KRAEMER's collaboration. SCHELLENBERG allowed KRAEMER to leave Germany again. In fact, KRAEMER was important to SCHELLENBERG owing to his political reports. He was forbidden to be in direct contact with the Luftwaffenfuhrungstab, or other military departments, in order that SCHELLENBERG should not be reproached with the fact that KRAEMER secured it the source important material for the possession exchange of intelligence undertaken by him. In the talk SCHELLENBERG had with KRAEMER, the latter declared that he would not reveal to SCHELLENBERG the names of his collaborators unless SCHELLENBERG was prepared to dispense with his services in future. At the same time, KRAEMER offered plausible explanations for his cooperation with Swedish friends. The only thing he revealed was that some of his friends were in the Swedish Foreign Office. KRAEMER sent good political reports about England, about the situation in the British Foreign Office and about the views of "the Conservative Opposition within the Inner Circle" (ANDERSON). SCHELLENBERG says that it was KRAEMER's mirror of events which confirmed him in his intention to do everything in Germany itself in the question of Jews and the church policy, in order to prepare the way for the creation of a Western Bloc of states under the leadership of Britain.

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which later a crippled Germany should form part. SCHELLENBURG assumed that there must be contact between the "Conservative Opposition in England", the Vatican and a Conservative group in France under BIDEAUX. This contact could be exploited by a cleansed Germany. Thereby the basis could be created for a compromise. All this happened in 1944.

177. Richard KLATT @ KANDERS (source "MAX"), Budapest. This man worked in the first instance for military intelligence. His reports on Russian Army matters were good. On Air matters they were weak; on political questions devious. He was "run" by Vienna (Colonel WIESE). The General Staff "Fremde Heere Ost" thought highly of KLATT. His reports were classed as "important to the Wehrmacht" ("Heereswichtig"). KLATT was a Jew. His greatest wish was to become an Aryan. The case was very complicated owing to HITLER's strict order that no Jews must be employed in intelligence work. KLATT, who was half Jewish, added to the problem. One of the personal onomias of KLATT was Colonel WAGNER (DELIUS), formerly a Sofia lawyer in Stuttgart. He said that KLATT works either for the Russians or for the British. According to SCHELLENBURG, KLATT ran his show very successfully. He had the advantage of working with the Abwehrstelle of Vienna which supplied deception and play-back material. In the end KLATT became too independent and started working with HOETTL and WANNECK. SCHELLENBURG asked Lieut. Colonel OHLETZ chief of Mil C to have a look at KLATT's "shop" in Budapest which was suspected of covering all sorts of Black Market (Exchange and other) illicit deals. OHLETZ for five days looked for "snags" in KLATT's organization but could not find anything suspicious. Then SCHELLENBURG summoned Colonel WIESE from Vienna and asked him to investigate. SCHELLENBURG had to make haste before KLATT's collaboration with HOETTL and WANNECK became too close to prevent successful investigations. WIESE found out that the men who in reality provided intelligence for KLATT's racket were a Slovak lawyer and Prince TURKUL. The latter had a White Russian line to Moscow. These lines led also to Istanbul and Presburg. Colonel Wiese arrested KLATT together with 28 small agents. They were a motley crowd containing all sorts of nationalities and even a Gestapo man from Vienna. After only a few days the services of KLATT's office could again be resumed. For eight days it declined in value then it improved and at the end it became excellent. SCHELLENBURG transferred Prince TURKUL to Berlin in order to serve as a watch on VLASSOV. SCHELLENBURG does not know what has become of KLATT. He knows, however, that he was afraid of falling into Russian hands.

178. LEVERAJHN was recalled owing to the VERMEHREN case. Amt VI received the news that VERMEHREN had proceeded in 1944 to London from the Turkish Police and from Cairo.

179. Karl ARNOLD (Madrid). This man is about 38 years old. He was formerly an export merchant. He returned from South America (Argentina or Brazil). He was trained by Dr. PAERFGEN personally. ARNOLD became the specialist for the whole courier service to South America. He directed and supervised all "Postanlaufstellen" and had established a wide system in Spanish ports. He enjoyed his work and always described by PAERFGEN as a reliable and painstaking worker. It was due to him that Amt VI received its courier mail until the end. ARNOLD had built up his own system. He ran lines of his own, mostly to the Argentine and to Brazil. He also provided good reports about the United Kingdom. SCHELLENBURG asserts that he had a contact inside the British Embassy in Madrid.

180. SCHMIED (Major) sent economic reports to VI W I T. The opinions of him varied. Some people call him "very intelligent and efficient", others called him "A swaggerer and a charlatan". SCHMIED and OGILVIE were of the latter opinion. STEINLE disagreed, perhaps because both had been leaders in the National Socialist Students' Association.

181. The Venloo Incident. This enterprise, in the preparation and execution of which SCHELLENBURG played a prominent part, quite obviously weighed on SCHELLENBURG's mind. He raised this subject himself and was greatly relieved to hear that both Stevens and Best are alive. SCHELLENBURG states that this is the only incident which might have connected him with war crimes. He claims that it was he who saved the lives of both Englishmen. SCHELLENBURG says that at Venloo he was not armed and kept in the background. He further maintains that he protested violently against RIBBENTROP's filthy propaganda in connection with the two captured Englishmen, and saw to it that the ridiculous charge of connection with the Munich attempt on HITLER's

life was dropped. By is he saved Stevens and Best from the "Volkgerichtshof" and execution. SCHELLENBERG thinks that neither of these men are aware of this as Stevens' and especially Best's later attitude towards him proved.

182. SCHELLENBERG, though not providing concrete proofs, connects KALTENBRUNNER with the shooting of British officers at Halle.

183. Ludwig NEUBERG, chief of the Spanish desk of Amt VI is described by SCHELLENBERG as "an unimportant man".

184. Lieut. Colonel FREUND. This officer of Amt VI Z (counter espionage) worked under ROHLEDER and dealt with questions affecting the Balkans. In this subject he was at home and knew all the links there. SCHELLENBERG says that he chose him for counter-espionage work because he was less obstinate and disputatious than ROHLEDER. He collaborated closely with Dr. SCHMITZ of the Secretariat because SCHMITZ also made use of FREUND for counter-espionage vis a vis Amt IV that is, "against MUELLER". FREUND was a valuable colleague vis a vis Amt IV that is, "against MUELLER". FREUND nursed the plan to take over the whole of counter-espionage as a domain for the Staatspolizei. Abroad he wanted to hand over the desk to the Police Attache. In Section VI Z FREUND was still a non-cooper. His special successes in former times must have been in the Balkans. SCHELLENBERG did not know much about them. He thinks that FREUND must always have been very efficient because he was recommended by everybody. Other special territories of FREUND were Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. In Switzerland, the solution of the "Agent 509" case was his particular hobby. In Portugal FREUND maintained close contact with Fritz COLLIER and in Spain with ROHSCHEIDT. FREUND did not know many names in Spain, Portugal and Switzerland. In Spain FREUND worked with JOHN and LEDEBERG in Switzerland and in Turkey. FREUND had an interesting case in Turkey. FREUND worked there on what the British Intelligence Service called "P.O.P.S.O.V.". LEDEBERG reported this case. In Istanbul FREUND had a number of contacts. He concerned the Austrian freedom movement and had ramifications in Vienna and to the former Emperor's parks there.

185. Sturmbannfuhrer EGGEN was not a serious intelligence officer; but exploited the Wehrmacht soldier's position for his own amusement and profit. He regarded his privileged position in the SS as a means of further enriching himself; SCHELLENBERG took pleasure in protecting him against investigations. He had his own contacts and sources in Switzerland, the most important of which was the Japanese OKAMOTO; but he did not produce reports of any value.

186. Dr. SCHUBERT originally came from Tilsit. In 1943-4 he was in Amt VI C. He was then posted to Amt VI Kul as special assistant to SAIDBERGER. One of his functions was to receive and entertain visitors. He was presentable and sufficiently intelligent.

187. Sturmbannfuhrer TSCHERSKY. TSCHERSKY was removed by SCHELLENBERG from Amt VI C because he was too stupid. He joined PRUETZMANN's staff and was always in PRUETZMANN's special train. He must know everything which can be known about the Wehrwolves and their training.

188. Sturmbannfuhrer RAPP. RAPP was put in command by SCHELLENBERG of the remnants of Amt VI in North Germany when the offices of the RSHA were divided into Northern and Southern sections. He was SCHELLENBERG's specialist on Polish questions.

189. Obersturmbannfuhrer PRAEFGEN. PRAEFGEN was an efficient intelligence officer, but without initiative or independent political judgement. He always required to be given instructions. SCHELLENBERG had confidence in him.

190. Obersturmbannfuhrer BERNHARD. BERNHARD was an altogether negligible figure.

191. Oberstleutnant FOCKE. SCHELLENBERG has no respect for FOCKE, whom he describes as hard working and active but stupid and politically uneducated.

192. Major LOOS of Mil Amt D was given to SOBZEM as NADLER's successor by KALTENBRUNNER. LOOS, like KALTENBRUNNER, was native of Linz and had a bond between them.

193. Oberst. ROHLE. The effect of ROHLEDER's joining Amt IV was that he was trusted and liked by no-one; by the SS he was regarded as a military man, and by the military as a Gestapo man. SHELLENBERG himself had no contact with him for a year or more.

194. Oberstleutnant BOENIG. BOENIG was brought in as head of VI F, because it was thought that such a large department, employing 200 or more people, required military discipline. He had been in the Kripo in the early part of the war. He was a soldier rather than an intelligence officer or technical specialist and insisted on going to Berlin at the end to fight the Russians.

195. K. & S. Von BUCHTOLDSHEIM. BUCHTOLDSHEIM was selected by SHELLENBERG with the other I.A.'s as part of the plan to train staff officers to understand the utility and methods of the Geheime Felddivision. The necessity of this training, and of the interchange of personnel, had not been understood in the days of CANARIS and HANSEN. Consequently the G.M.D. received no support from the Wehrmachtsfuhrungstab.

196. JAMER. SHELLENBERG often consulted JAMER because, although he was old and hors de combat, he "had a nose" for a case, and his advice was good. His circle consisted of a Dr. DACH, and the D.H.B. people, particularly Von RITZGEN, REICHERT, who came from Palestine, and also belonged to this circle, but was killed in a railway accident.

197. SHELLENBERG supplied an up-to-date chart of the Amt VI organization including names. This chart comprises the Mil Amt with recent additions such as the deception section Mil 1, the "Regiment 1001" in which non-German members of the Wehrmacht were trained for intelligence work, and also the "Kommandomeldegebiete" inside Germany and abroad.

XIII. The British Intelligence Service.

SHELLENBERG has the highest admiration for this service. He knows absolutely nothing about it. He says quite simply, that an Empire like the British could never have been built up without the British Intelligence Service. There the matter ends. The fact that SHELLENBERG assumes the difference between the "Intelligence Service" and "Secret Service" to be that of a loosely knitted fraternity of unpaid gentlemen, and an organization working with paid professional agents, shows depths of his ignorance. The fact that he was not able to produce a single name belonging to the British Service, SHELLENBERG attributed to the inefficiency of German counter-espionage. On the other hand the endless list of German names with all details, submitted to SHELLENBERG, reinforced his scoundrelly blind belief in the wealth of knowledge at the disposal of the British Intelligence Service. SHELLENBERG complained that "too many stupid men" were populating his "Geheime Felddivision", but had to admit that for a bad cause this might have been the best possible thing.

XIII. Conclusion.

For SHELLENBERG the puppet-show has ended. The puppet-show in which he pulled the strings and in which Grand Muftis, Balkan politicians, white Russian Generals, French collaborators, and other venal agents, took his money and danced to the tune of the young SS General. Instead, the tragedy has started. The tragedy which he foresaw and foretold early in the war but could not prevent because he and his betters, HIMMLER, HITLER and all the rest lived in a world of their own making in a fools Paradise. Their ignorance about the normal world around them, which had risen to crush the monster, staggers belief. The following episode which was told with the modesty of an intelligent man who knows that his fate is in the hands of the victors and in all sincerity, throws a revealing light on the shocking stupidity with which the German leaders were saturated. In August 1942 SHELLENBERG visited HIMMLER in his Headquarters at Jitomir in Poland. HIMMLER asked SHELLENBERG how he thought all this would end. SHELLENBERG answered that a compromise peace with Britain should be striven for. HIMMLER agreed and the two bent over maps and sketched out the compromise. They found a solution: in the west Germany would withdraw from all the territory it had invaded, except Alsace-Lorraine and a small tip of Holland which HIMMLER, for sentimental reasons - because it contained a particularly pure-blooded Germanic population - would not abandon. In the south

and in the southeast Czechoslovakia, would be retained. In the east Poland would be held for bargaining reasons, but if Britain insisted Poland could be evacuated too. Britain on the other hand, was to receive the whole of France, the whole of Belgium and the whole of Holland - except the small tip dear to HIMMLER's "blood and soil" filled heart. SCHELLENBERG asked quite seriously if this compromise would not have found British approval and if the war could not then have been ended on these terms. When SCHELLENBERG received the reply that these conditions would have been acceptable with the reservation that France, Belgium and Holland should be returned to their rightful owners, that Germany should withdraw within the frontiers it occupied before it started its career of aggression, and that it should hand over to Britain for trial as war criminals, the whole Nazi Government, the whole of the SS, all Nazi officials and all officers and men of the Wehrmacht guilty of crimes against the common law, SCHELLENBERG after some reflection answered solemnly that he does not think these conditions would have been accepted at the end of 1942! This is the state of mind or better still, the mental disorder, brought about by twelve years of Nazi ideology. For, it must not be forgotten, SCHELLENBERG when HITLER came to power, was only 23 years old. He says that for him HITLER's Germany was GERMANY. He knew no other Germany, no foreign countries to compare it with. He was poor. He was industrious. He sought work and under HITLER he found more than work. His membership of the SS which initially was meant to free him from material embarrassments, brought this man of undoubted mental capacity and persistent diligence (whom HIMMLER at HEYDRICH's coffin lovingly called "my Benjamin"), affluence and, above all, power. All this is gone. More is gone. His wife who is in her ninth month with her fourth child is lost somewhere in the south of Germany. As SCHELLENBERG says, she is "half Polish". Not so long ago there was a time in Nazi Germany when such blood mixing was not considered a mitigating circumstance! The plane which brought SCHELLENBERG to England on a glorious summer day passed over Greater London. SCHELLENBERG who for the first time in his life flew "gegen England", stared spellbound down on the giant living city. His eyes sought anxiously for the wounds inflicted on the centre of the British Empire. He could find no wounds, nor even scars. Giving up the hopeless search, he whispered: "I cannot understand - no destruction at all". On the other hand not only the whole of Germany, but his whole world had crumbled. This he cannot understand either.