

DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED

REF ID: A6905

HEADQUARTERS SECTION

CASUALTY

Chief of Base, Munich  
Attention: Liaison Division  
Chief of Station, Germany

Chief, IS

DATE

23 April 59

RE "43-7" CHECK "X" ONLY

INDEXED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

UPSIDER/CARE/CASUALTY  
Identity-1

ADVISEE COMMENTS ARE SOLICITED AND CROSS PER  
RESEARCH 6 ARE REQUESTED

REFERENCES

1. In the search for the CASUALTY culprit in UPSIDER, we have compared in connection with @ HISSER, the strange case of Identity-1 and ANNOVA, the CE implications of which appear here been examined, probably because of the elusive nature of the small amount of information available. Although additional data is needed in order to arrive at any really definite conclusions, it is possible to draw certain tentative conclusions indicating the need for further investigation, even though the case may prove to have nothing to do with CASUALTY.

2. ANNOVA has been working for both HIRSHK and UPSIDER as a positive source on the Ukrainian emigration since the early occupation period in Germany. This dual employment never has been alluded to during discussions between the two organizations, and the operation has continued until present under what can best be called a tacit "we know that you know, etc." arrangement. An UPSIDER Soviet specialist, @ JIPP is the most recent of several UPSIDER officers who have directed ANNOVA along positive intelligence lines. On the HIRSHK side ANNOVA has been run by a long series of staff officers, and the case in most of its essentials has been relatively unchanged over the years. Not so with UPSIDER where the operational complexion changed in early 1954 with the introduction of Identity-1, a CE specialist run outside of UPSIDER headquarters by @ HIRSHK. (1954 is the earliest clearly established date of UPSIDER contact to ANNOVA through Identity-1, although this could have been earlier.) The two have known each other since wartime, and had entered into some kind of post-war relationship at least as early as 1950. Identity-1 himself had been recruited by UTILITY in 1952 or early 1953. In any event, during the past five or more years both Identity-1 and @ JIPP have been in touch with ANNOVA, suggesting the possibility that @ JIPP, in line with their usual practice, is running ANNOVA as a double agent directed by Identity-1, with @ JIPP handling the positive aspect and supplying build-up material for the DA side of the case. There might be other perfectly valid explanations for the Identity-1/ANNOVA relationship, but this one can not be ruled-out. The actual basis for the CE aspect of the relationship is more difficult to determine, but conceivably could have something to do with the strange case of Kurt HERRMANN, who appeared on the scene about the same time Identity-1 became officially concerned with ANNOVA for UPSIDER.

3. On 18 February 1955 following a meeting with Identity-1, ANNOVA reported to HIRSHK as follows concerning Sonderbeauftragter von HERRMANN, an ex-Abscher officer from the Identity-1 stable on the Eastern Front:

"Sonderbeauftragter (tm) HERRMANN, former German CE officer-

"1. General marins ego Subject returned to Kessel, Germany, from Bolewitzk Imprisonment. He formerly was a member of Abscher-Staffel III command. Speaking perfect Russian, he was placed as a spy/captain on the Russian side of the front in order that he may radio information to the Germans concerning Red Army movements. Before this operation became a reality he was captured by Soviet and was condemned to death but was reprieved to life in prison. I regret that I don't have information concerning the nature of his capture and capture. However, it is my belief that HERRMANN certainly was recruited as a Soviet agent."

SCHMIDT SQWL REGE R. Blum

FORM 355  
USE PREVIOUS EDITION  
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"2. HARTMANN wrote a report (attached) for (Identity-1) concerning MIB methods of interrogation. . . . .

"3. According to (Identity-1) HARTMANN may have already established contact with an American intelligence group in Kassel. According to HARTMANN's letter to (Identity-1), the former is seeking employment of some sort."

4. HARTMANN prepared the above mentioned report on MIB methods of interrogation for Identity-1, who edited, retyped, added a source description (referring to the source only as H.), and submitted it to UPSEING. We assume the latter point to be the case since the report carried his V-number. He also gave a copy to AEDOGMA who passed it along to us with the comments quoted above. Suffice it to say that this incident raises many questions, none of which have been answered satisfactorily. Taking the most dismal view, we can not reject the possibility that either Identity-1 or AEDOGMA, or both, attempted for one reason or another to interest KUBARK in HARTMANN, who was already targeted against UPSEING by the RIS. In any event it is interesting to note that this is the same operation described by [ ] in his report titled, "HARTMAN, Kurt", which is quoted in its entirety as follows:

"1. In late 1944 or early 1945, the Soviet military counter-intelligence dropped behind the German lines a Soviet intelligence operative, a girl (I do not recall her name or surname), who was caught and doubled by the Germans and began working for the leader of a German Intelligence group - HARTMAN, Kurt - who fell in love with her and married her. Later, the Soviet intelligence girl doubled HARTMAN herself, and towards the end of the war he went over to the Russians reported to the counter-intelligence and he related the whole story.

"2. At the conclusion of the war the girl was sentenced to 10 years for treason, and HARTMAN, as a German war criminal, got 25 years.

"3. From 1945 to 1953 HARTMAN was imprisoned in the MINSK prison, apart from the German war prisoners. In the latter part of 1953 the Austro-German Section received the HARTMAN file from MINSK with the proposal that HARTMAN be used for intelligence purposes in West Germany. After familiarizing himself with the case and with HARTMAN personally (the case was being handled by SUGEROV) with authorization from PITOURADOV, HARTMAN was sent to the Butyrsk Prison in Moscow where work with him was started, i. e., preparation for dispatch into West Germany. When it was determined that he was a suitable candidate, he was placed in a hotel in Moscow, and later in a villa near Moscow. In June 1953 it was finally decided to send him to Germany with the next group of German PWs being returned home. Before that he was given the assignment of establishing himself in GREEN's intelligence group. HARTMAN himself suggested how this was to be done, and contact procedures were established (however, I do not remember them). Before my departure for Vienna, efforts were being made to locate HARTMAN'S wife and child (i.e. our intelligence girl) in order that the family might spend some time together, after which HARTMAN would be dispatched to Western Germany alone. Both could not be sent out together, since that is not done in our country.

"4. I am certain that he has already been dispatched since the authorization had been received from the Deputy Minister SEROV. It is difficult for me to say when he was dispatched, but apparently it was after September 1953. Where he will be at first, or where he was being dispatched in West Germany, or whether he will at first remain in East Germany and get out later -- these details of the plan I do not know.

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"5. I was on this case only in January and February 1953, after that it was turned over to another case officer, and the last to handle the case was KOROTKA."

5. Headquarters files contain the following traces on HARTMANN, all of which probably are identical with our man:

- A. SHAFI CARD - Kurt V. Hartmann, born 25 May 1901 in Riga. STATUS - Abwehr employee (prob. 1944) ADDRESS - Posen, Kniprodeweg 18 CAREER - Transferred from Abt III Walli to Abwehrtrupp 306 attached to Abwehr KDO 305 (5 June 1944).
- B. CE CARD FROM GERMAN DESK - Kurt HARTMANN visited Sparta in July 1940 with his wife, declaring his intention of setting up a sausage factory. Was in constant touch with the German legation and spent lavishly. Was due to leave Greece on 11/14/40. A person of the same name and probably identical wrote to SEITZ (qr) from Berlin in January 1941.
- C. CE CARD FROM GERMAN DESK - Kurt HARTMANN, airman, parachutist, German I. S. Agent, of Russian origin, Austrian wife. Cover is sausage factory.
- D. MEXA 12186 74-4-8-33 15 November 49 - British interrogation report of Anton Godzenba. Concerns info on MVD officers - names and positions held by these personalities. Document cannot be located. Carded info on Kurt HARTMANN (Lt.) - born in Riga and living in Kassel, was head MVD agent in the PW camp in the Minsk area.
- E. MEX 484 32-4-23-7 (pg.5) 13 July 48 - List of persons arrested by MVD Brandenburg 1945-47 compiled from original MVD documents. Kurt HARTMANN, born 1900, arrested 28 August 1946 by MVD officer DOLGIREV, charged with being a provocateur, sent to Opergruppe Rostock by request.
- F. EGNA 7895 32-2-2-210 11 Jan 1956 - CIC cables transmitting BFV trace requests to COG/G. One cable is on Kurt Von Hartmann, born 25 May 01 in Riga. Address is Kassel, Wilhelmsbocher Alle 308, former address (before 45) Posen, Warthegeu. Under date of 20 Dec. 1955, BFV requests all available info on Subject who is alleged to have worked for an "MVD" office in Weimar during 48 or early 49.
- G. EGNA 75452 32-2-2-210 (Encl) 7 March 1956 - COG/G reply to EGNA 7895 same info as given above under 484.
- H. German Primer - Sonderfuhrer HARTMANN; Probably attached to III Ast Warsaw; left Warsaw for Vilna in September, returning via Riga in October 1941, visited Smolensk in November 1941; Attached to A. S. A. P. in June 1942.

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6. Another, and earlier suspicious incident involving Identity-1 and AEDOGMA was their appearance in the Pavlo DIMITRENKO @ DEBEACH case in 1950. This was an operation wherein SIS agent Otto KRUSGER recruited DIMITRENKO to collaborate with the "Ukrainian nationalist officers of the Red Army". One of his missions was to prepare a report on the Ukrainian emigration, which he accomplished by obtaining a report on this subject from AEDOGMA, allegedly under the pretext it was desired by Identity-1 (according to AEDOGMA). As far as we can determine from available material, this strange affair never was clarified, possibly because of the death of DIMITRENKO in November 1950. (Note: DIMITRENKO is another WW II cohort of AEDOGMA and Identity-1) At this juncture, almost as though taking over from DIMITRENKO, one Alfred LOBENWEIN introduced himself to AEDOGMA (according to AEDOGMA) "in order to report DIMITRENKO'S death." This contact never was explained in greater detail; however LOBENWEIN next appeared on the scene in March 1954 when he approached Identity-1 requesting contact with UPSWING. Identity-1 reported the incident to UPSWING who thought little about it at the time; however, a short time later, in the wake of the Alois EDER case, UPSWING determined to their satisfaction that the LOBENWEIN approach had been aimed at Identity-1 and themselves by the SIS.

7. Other odd aspects of this case need not be reviewed in detail herein, our present intention being only to point out the need for the kind of detailed investigation best done in the field. To mention only two of the anomalies: (a) AEDOGMA'S continual insistence that his relationship with Identity-1 is nothing more than friendly contact between old wartime comrades; whereas, even a cursory examination of the subject matter discussed, and the material passed between these two is firmly indicative of an intelligence relationship. (b) AEDOGMA'S consistently clean LCFLUTTER, and a statement by one LCFLUTTER operation that if AEDOGMA were ever caught in any major deception, that the test results could be reevaluated by interpolation. Subsequently AEDOGMA'S former wife, until then unknown to KIBARK, appeared out of Poland. Both her background in Poland and her reappearance in West Germany had possible intelligence implications. (c) AEDOGMA'S extreme reaction to LCFLUTTER, ostensibly as evidence of lack of personal trust, despite the fact KIBARK statements to the contrary should have indicated to him that he had run clean. (d) AEDOGMA'S hesitancy to transfer to another geographic area despite frequent KIBARK pressure to do so, suggests at least the possibility he was under other instructions to remain in place.

8. In conclusion, we would like to reiterate that this is not to be considered a blishest denunciation of AEDOGMA or Identity-1, but rather because of the possible nature of UPSWING'S interest in the case, and in consideration of the unclarified suspicions concerning the principals, that the case bears looking into. Within this context, our paramount concern at the moment is the role played by @ RISCHEE, in view of the suspicions against him. We have discussed our suspicions (outside the context of CAMELION) with SE division, and have jointly concluded that a candid discussion with UPSWING of our special interest in AEDOGMA is in order. Correspondence to this effect will be initiated in the near future, and the ensuing conversations with UPSWING on our joint interest in this agent can serve as a framework within which we can strive to clarify our outstanding suspicions, without indicating to UPSWING the true nature of our interest. Meanwhile, we request COS and base traces on HAYDMANN. To trace or diagnose HAYDMANN with UPSWING, at least at this time, would serve to alert our suspects in the event something sinister really is involved.

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1 Attachment - Under Separate Cover (Identity)

Distribution:

2 - MOB/LD w att. DEC 2 - COS w att. DEC

THIS REMAINS OPEN SUBJECT TO NEW 400

Section 1: General Data DEVELOPMENT

References:  
1 - 100/20  
2 - 100/2

