

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 302B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2006

Munich

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
		SECRET	
TO	Chief, Munich Operations Base	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO	Chief, Bonn Element Frankfurt Chief, EE; Chief, WE; COS, Germany; Chief, Bonn Ops Base		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief [] <i>J D 8</i>		MICROFILM
SUBJECT	Operational/CATIDE/[] CATIDE Double Agent Case		<i>R/LB DC/LB L/CE</i>
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>1. [] recently informed us that he had spent the major portion of a week-end wining and dining some CATIDE officers who had come to Copenhagen in connection with a CATIDE double-agent case run against the Czechs. One of the CATIDE officers (not further identified) got quite drunk and revealed some information to [] about the case. He explained that the case had been active for quite some time and involved a Czech citizen who was working for the CIS and who was frequently sent to the West on missions for the CIS. The CIS agent had at some time in the dim past been doubled by CATIDE and was now reporting to his CATIDE case officer about his missions to the West on behalf of the CIS. The case had not been particularly worthwhile and CATIDE had apparently quite recently decided to make an analysis of it in order to decide whether it should be continued or whether some other action should be taken against the agent. We are not quite sure from []'s story what happened at this point, but apparently the analysis made some of the senior CATIDE officers conclude that most probably the double agent was not being run by his CATIDE case officer, but rather the <u>Czech double agent was running the CATIDE officer, i.e. the alleged missions to the West were only a cover for the CIS (or possibly the RIS) to remain in contact with the CATIDE officer who was a recruited CIS agent.</u> [] tried to find out why the CATIDE suspicions had thus focused on the CATIDE officer and it was explained to him by the inebriated CATIDE visitor that a number of years ago the AIS had reported to CATIDE that the officer was a suspected CIS agent. In view of the lack of further details in the AIS report, however, CATIDE had <u>dismissed the charge</u> and not until the analysis of Subject case was made did they have any reason to suspect the CATIDE case officer. []'s friend went on to explain that CATIDE now found itself in the embarrassing position where they had decided to disregard an AIS warning and now found that the AIS was probably correct anyway. [] got the impression that CATIDE had not revealed their conclusions to the AIS and did not plan to do so until it had been firmly established whether the CATIDE officer was really under enemy control. When [] tried to elicit some more information about Subject case, his CATIDE friend said that the case had been going on for many years, that the meeting in Copenhagen was the 34th meeting between the CATIDE officer and the CIS agent, and that there were relatively few meetings per year. The CATIDE officer under suspicion was quite senior in the CATIDE hierarchy and [] got the impression that he was the chief of the Czech desk or maybe even the satellite department.</p> <p>2. When [] was telling us his tale, we were reminded of []'s LCFLUTTER of CATIDE's Czech expert which resulted in [] charging that the man was an enemy penetration. We do not recall what action was taken in that</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Cont'd)</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
	ODCA-12607	150/CICE MO 6 November 1964	<i>406</i>
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER	
	SECRET	21-6-20/3	

GROUP 1
 Excluded from automatic
 downgrading and
 declassification

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instance by CATIDE but we are of the impression that CATIDE did in fact at that time decide to dismiss [] charges because they were based on technical results only. At any rate, we assume that MOB can identify the case on the basis of []'s statements as reported above. If, however, MOB needs additional information we shall attempt to elicit some more from N-12.

[] []

*Very helpful assist by
[] I'd say. Should we
send an interim thanks?
What do we do now?*

- 2 - Munich
- 2 - EE
- 2 - WE
- 2 - COS, Germany
- 2 - Bonn Ops Base
- 2 - Bonn Element Frankfurt

Worm