

AIR

EGB-A-10646

Chief, EE

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

INFO: CADRAIN, BONN

CALL/CADORE/OPERATIONAL

CAMLET-1 -- Four Power Conference

1. During a general conversation on 23 December 1953 CAMLET-1 inquired whether I thought that he could be provided with official American guidance during the forthcoming Four Power Conference. He intimated that such guidance would not only be welcome but that he was prepared to support the American position down the line in order, as he put it, not to weaken the position of the American negotiators vis-a-vis their Western colleagues and of course the Soviets. I gathered from his remarks that, should a major conflict between the SPD line and U. S. foreign policy develop, any advice we might be in a position to give him would have a decisive bearing on the editorial policy of his newspaper.

2. I am of course under no illusions that this offer is only in part prompted by altruistic motives. That notwithstanding, there is sufficient evidence that CAMLET-1 is loath to see the breach between his party and the Americans widen. We can also accept at face value his repeated assurances that—as long as he has any influence in the matter—he will strive to prevent any SPD harrassment or pressure being brought to bear upon the Western powers to accede to Soviet demands for a neutralization of Germany as the price of its reunification. Since this is likely to become a pivotal issue of the conference and since CAMLET's newspaper is bound to be accepted as the party's mouthpiece, his offer of collaboration is nothing to be scoffed at.

3. While I doubt whether CAMLET-1's counsel will carry sufficient weight to force what in effect would be an abandonment of the Schumacher line, I believe that it would help matters considerably to get him and his paper lined up solidly behind the American position. As an example, his acceptance of our judgment whether the U. S. went far enough in placating the USSR and whether the rupture of the conference is attributable to their intransigence or ours, would strengthen those elements in the SPD who would like a bi-partisan (SPD/Adenauer coalition) approach emerge from the ashes of the Four Power meeting.

Date of Origin: 23 December 1953

*RC/RC for action  
1/20.*

Approved by \_\_\_\_\_

GLP:nbi

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4. CAMLET-1, in discussing the mechanics of American guidance, dropped the significant remark that he doubted whether BOERNER at all times was voicing official U. S. views. As an example he cited a recent briefing of German newspaper editors (with CAMLET-1 not present) in which BOERNER left the impression that the U. S. was convinced that the Four Power Conference would fold, was entering the conference in that spirit and was mainly concerned with bringing it to an early end. (I suggest that you take this version with a grain of salt.) CAMLET-1 does not believe that this was a reflection of official American thought and — as he put it — would like to crosscheck the authenticity of BOERNER's views.

5. CAMLET-1's proposal strikes me as worth considering, with the proviso, however, that there is absolutely no assurance that in a real showdown he will defy the policy direction of his party. The best we can hope for under such conditions would be that he will present both sides of the issue leaving it up to the reader to choose. It appears worth mentioning that if KUBARK decides to extend into the field of covert guidance for overt news media, BOB can bring considerable influence to bear upon the French licenced Kurier through [ ] and the BZ through [ ]

6. May I request your instructions as to what position to take should CAMLET-1 broach the question of policy guidance again.