

VIA: _____
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D. ATCH NO. HMMA-11425

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
Attn: _____

DATE: 19 March 1957

FROM : Chief of Base, Bonn

Info: COS, Germany

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/CANT/Liaison

specific— British Remarks on President Hubert SCHREIBERS of the BfV

Ref: HMMA-11115, 11 Feb 57 *Stallig - Thielmann*
Hubert SCHREIBERS 31.7.58 4.11.57 - 11.1.57

- Attached in extension of reference is a letter just received from Keith Randell, Director of Security for BSO concerning the impression SCHREIBERS made while in England. Paragraph 7 is interesting inasmuch as it presents again the question of whether to use English or German for the briefings. We are relatively certain this not what Randell meant however, when he cast doubt on SCHREIBERS ability to absorb what was handed to him, since the probable reason for this lack is laid out well in paragraphs 6 and 8. Nevertheless, it would be well to consider the maximum feasible use of an interpreter to insure that we do not fail to make our offerings intelligible to him.
- We have given one copy of this letter to the ODOPAL liaison officer.

[Handwritten signature]

Enclosures:
A/S; H/W; 2 cys

grh

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DATE 2006

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From: Mr K. Handell, VE -
Director of Security

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Enc. to ECNA - 11428

19 March 1957

HEADQUARTERS
BRITISH SERVICES SECURITY
ORGANISATION

REF: S/PF.91034

BRITISH FORCES POST OFFICE 40

TEL: RHINE ARMY 3250

13 Mar 57.

Jan

SUBJECT: President SCHRUEBBERS of the BfV

You recently asked Gledd BLATCH for an estimate of SCHRUEBBERS on the basis of our impressions of the latter during his visit to LONDON.

The following views are largely those of Vic ANDERSEN but you can take it that they are shared by me.

2. During his visit, SCHRUEBBERS made it clear that he regarded the main task of the BfV as being of a political nature, i.e. that the observation, study and reporting of anti-constitutional elements of the politically subversive type was the essential function of the BfV, and that the BfV itself existed as part of the political complex of Germany.
3. When such functions as protective security advice to Government Departments were put to SCHRUEBBERS as being an essential and logical corollary to the work of a Security Office in its observation of individuals and groups whose activities could endanger the security of the State, he indicated that this might indeed be a desirable adjunct to the work of the BfV and that he was very conscious of the importance which the UK Security Service placed on such functions.
4. He repeated on a number of occasions, however, that "the BfV had a political task" and for that reason the principles followed in LONDON could remain only theoretical as far as his Office was concerned. Thus, while he agreed with the LONDON concept (which was put to him several times) that one should first decide what needed protection and then base one's security measures on the decision, he gave us no reason to suppose that he saw the BfV playing an important and acknowledged role in this particular sphere of Government security planning.
5. We formed the impression that SCHRUEBBERS was interested enough in all he saw and heard in LONDON, but that he was somewhat remote when it was suggested to him that the status of a Security Office such as the BfV could only become really effective if less stress was put on the 'political' functions and more on the technique of protecting the Government's security.
6. Like many of his compatriots, SCHRUEBBERS has the failing of a considerable ignorance of those affairs in the outside world which he cannot relate directly to his own experiences. Thus, he tends to make up his mind in a set way in matters on which he considers he is well informed; when a new concept is put to him he finds it difficult to grasp, and subconsciously avoids taking action on it precisely because it is a departure from a set pattern of behaviour.
7. During his visit to LONDON it was difficult to establish definitely how much he understood and absorbed what was said to him. Although he himself stated he had comprehended the various exposés, the nature of many of his

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subsequent questions during his visit showed that this was by no means always the case.

8. In fairness to SCHUEBBERG it should be appreciated that his knowledge of the theory and practice of security and intelligence work is limited to what his own subordinates (not necessarily ideal teachers) have imparted to him and to whatever views on this work he has formed himself. But he did not commit himself to expressing what were his views, hopes and intentions on the role of the BFV; his attitude was correct, non-communicative, affable and courteous.

9. He did not leave behind him the impression of being a big man; a likeable one, certainly, but not forceful.

*Tommy Lee,
Kerr*

C D