

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO EGWT-41
TO INFO	Chief, EE Chief of Base, Bonn Chief, CSB		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO --
FROM	Chief of Station, Germany	DATE	16 December 1964
SUBJECT	Operational/Liaison Luncheon with Herr Schruebbers, 8 Dec 64	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	
		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ACTION REQUIRED		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY	
REFERENCE(S)			
<p>I attach herewith a Memorandum for the Record on my meeting with Schruebbers.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">[Handwritten marks]</p>			
<p>Attachment: h/w Memo for the Record</p> <p>Distribution: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> - Chief, EE w/att h/w (2) 2 - COB Bonn w/att h/w (2) 2 - Chief, CSB w/att h/w (2)</p>			
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006</p>			
FORM 10 57 53 40	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51 28 51 28A AND 51 28 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PAGE NO <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luncheon with Herr Hubert Schruebbers, 8 December 1964.

1. Purpose of my taking Schruebbers to lunch was to express my appreciation to him for the cooperation of his Agency during the past year. Schruebbers made the following points: The BfV will be in a funny position if the SPD comes in and Gustav Heinemann becomes Minister of Interior. After Heinemann left the CDU, the BfV discovered he was receiving financial support from the East for his political projects. Heinemann was charged with this and knows that the BfV dug up this information. Schruebbers characterized Heinemann as strong-minded, sharp-tongued, puritanical, but not really reliable as far as the East is concerned.

2. In discussing the telephone affair, Schruebbers said that the group that meets in the Chancellery is divided in its opinion as to whether the Allies want the Germans to have general coverage. He asked me if valuable current intelligence were obtained from such coverage. I replied that we really do want to have it, that day-to-day intelligence of striking value is not obtained from this coverage but in the event of a serious international crisis coverage from this source would be of value. I said that I felt the Germans should have a going operation in this field at all times. They should also be in a position to expand their coverage during a crisis.

3. Schruebbers brought up an interesting angle with regard to the coverage of transiting communications. He said that Germany is one of the few countries which has bound itself under international law to guarantee the privacy of communications transiting Germany. It got into this fix by signing a declaration on human rights which, as I understand it, was promulgated by the United Nations. Other western countries did not sign. The Bonn lawyers feel that they are bound to take this treaty or declaration into consideration in drafting their law.

4. In addition to the foregoing, Schruebbers was full of stories about Minister Hoecherl, whom he finds to be an amusing and unpredictable character, but whom he also admires as a clever politician. He repeated his observation that the telephone affair had in the last instance been directed against Hoecherl for political reasons, i.e., to cause a split between the CSU and the CDU. The last time he covered this ground he characterized Hermann Schmitt-Vockenhausen, Chairman of the Bundestag Committee for Internal Affairs, as the prime mover. This time he said Bucarius had had a great deal to do with this effort. He regards Bucarius as a strong man in the German political scene.

E J