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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2006

10 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR

SUBJECT : Some Comments and Suggestions for CSR  
in connection with President SCHRUEBBERS'  
pending TDY to Headquarters

REFERENCE : Memorandum from EL/G/CE, Dated 19 May 1965

1. Listed below are items for your background information on our BFV relations, comments regarding Kisevalter's lectures to various BFV components and specific recommended points which we feel would be useful to make if you have an opportunity during your meeting with Schruebbers.

a. Kisevalter Visit

A graceful point of departure might be a reference to George Kisevalter's October-November 1964 TDY to West Germany, during which he gave a general briefing to about 35 senior BFV staff officers at the BFV school. (Note: In his briefings he used the name Dr. Bishop except in his interview with General Gehlen who knows Kisevalter's true name.) The briefings were concerned primarily with RIS modus operandi and organization. Specific identities of BFV personnel were not reported. Kisevalter also gave the same briefing to the LPVs in Berlin, Hamburg, Rhoiland, Westphalia and Munich, and to Kuenast and the BND. The general response was most favorable and the Germans were impressed with Kisevalter's expertise and depth of knowledge. Several times German liaison contacts were heard to remark they did not realize that such information was available to them, and they would in the future know where to turn in dealing with special problems involving the Soviet target. On the basis of subsequent correspondence the Kisevalter trip, we feel, has contributed to our stature in the BFV eyes. [ ] stated that BFV members openly state that they prefer to deal with CIA.

b. We were flattered to note that the BFV chose to come to us for assistance on a current O/A case involving the BFV and the U.S. Army, i.e., 'Fall Experiment.' This

**SECRET**

SECRET

-2-

case involves a KGB staffer specializing in emigrant operations, Yakov Stepanovich BARSUKOV, who recruited a young German student from the University of Heidelberg and later targeted him against female employees of U.S. Army intelligence offices in the Heidelberg area. The case is of more than passing interest, since BARSUKOV is reported to drink to excess at their meetings which run into the wee hours, to have more than a passing interest in female companionship, and shows signs of irregularity in his financial dealings with the agent. The field is providing guidance on this case to the BFV.

c. What the BFV does for us: Relations with the BFV have been described as excellent. They provide us with Soviet visa applications, Soviet PCS arrival and departure data, data on visitors to the Soviet Embassy, operational leads to persons in contact with Soviets, traces on Soviets, data on D/A cases, surveillance findings, and a host of other things. Currently the BFV is discussing with our field representatives possibilities of installing audio devices in some Soviet residential apartments and vehicles. The field station and we at headquarters are both very appreciative of the BFV assistance, cooperation and the good will of BFV liaison officers.

#### Recommendations:

d. In discussing this visit to the United States, [ ] recommended and we agree that we include in our briefing some examples of how Soviets operate in other areas. He felt this would be an excellent opportunity to pass the word to the top man on specific proposals we want approved and implemented on the lower working levels of the BFV. For example, we would like the 201 type data on Soviets which the BFV has collected while the Soviet was in Germany, if not earlier than after the Soviet departs Germany. We can in this instance refer to the history of Soviets popping up in other areas and our global collection effort.

e. We feel it useful to encourage the BFV to collect data and pass on to us readings on individual Soviets especially those who appear to be deviating from the normal Soviet behavioral pattern, e.g., getting drunk, chasing after girls, going to brothels, attending night clubs and generally living it up. Our interest is positive exploitation if possible.

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

f. We are most interested in receiving the identities of third national contacts of Soviets which the BFV discovers in the course of their normal activities.

g. In February of this year a lengthy session was held with WEYDE, head of Soviet operations for the BFV, at which WEYDE complained of his inability to keep track of Soviet TDY trips, even those routinely reported and approved by the FRG Foreign Office. Funds and additional manpower to attempt any enforcement are simply not available. WEYDE sees the situation of keeping track of Soviet TDY acceptance engineers, who may or may not be accredited to the STV as equally hopeless. Normally, Soviet TDY visa requests for a year or longer are routinely processed and approved. Typically the Soviet in question will spend perhaps two days a week at one or another of the West German plants to which he is accredited, and we have apparently no unilateral or joint capability to pin down the movements and activities of these Soviets. The suspicion is that the STV is using this administrative loophole to exceed substantially its allotted PCS personnel ceiling (60 persons). We recommend that the BFV examine existing procedures with the aim of closing this loophole.

h. On 9 February 1965 Yuriy Ivanovich VOLODIN, (2) picked up an Embassy car from a local garage where it had been repaired and on returning to the Embassy he was killed in a collision with a German truck. Another Embassy car that had taken him to the garage initially observed the accident, notified the Soviet Embassy immediately, with the results that SHICPAC and SOLOVATIN arrived at the scene of the accident before anyone else. They reportedly removed a miniature camera VOLODIN was wearing under one of his coat lapels, as well as his briefcase. The car was a CD licensed vehicle, license originally issued to Sergey Filipovich BARANTSEV, who departed from the Federal Republic on 29 March 1964 (nearly a year previously).

i. We would encourage the BFV if they have assets to publicize more fully such unfavorable publicity items in the local press since there was a question of violation of German vehicle registration.

j. We strongly recommend that continuing efforts be made by the BFV (which we understand have been unsuccessful) to have the West German Foreign Office reprimand the Soviets on violating the 40 kilometer restriction

SECRET

SECRET

10 June 1965

on travel. It appears the Soviets are becoming more and more self-confident in their activities in West Germany as regards travel and deviation from itineraries submitted to the Foreign Office. By calling them on violations, the Soviets, we feel, based on past behavior would pull back and thus make the job of monitoring their activities and movements somewhat less difficult.

[ CSR/O/EĒ ]

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