

015 BP/DB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 14 MAY 56

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

RATS
FI-PP

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ()

ACTION: *FE/7*

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, FI/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, SR S/C 2
(SUSPENSE DD/1)

1511 14 8 28 AM

() 4409 (IN 18091)

0631Z 14 MAY 56

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE
CITE ()

TO DIR

PSYCH () PODAM

RE () 4191 (IN 12472)

1. REGRET CIRCUMSTANCES NOT FAVORING FULLER REPORTAGE KONO-MOSCOW MISSION. PRESUME LACK CONTACT. KONO-AMEMB MOSCOW PARTLY TO BLAME.
2. MOST IMPORTANT HQS PROVIDE TIMELY AND DETAILED INFO RE KONO STOPOVER WASH.
3. INCONCLUSIVE INDICATIONS PORTEND POSSIBILITY GROWTH KONO'S INTRA-PARTY STATURE IF MOSCOW MISSION SUCCESSFUL; HOWEVER INCONCLUSIVE TOKY PRESS REPORTS AS OF 14 MAY INDICATE POSSIBILITY COMPLETE DIPLOMATIC FIASCO. PRESUME HIS PLANNED STATESIDE SOJOURN AS WAS CALL ON AMBASSADOR ALLISON ON EVE DEPARTURE FOR MOSCOW DESIGNED CONVEY TO PARTYA ASSOCIATES AND PUBLIC OPINION JAPAN REACTING IN CONCERT US, OR AT LEAST ENJOYING US TACIT APPROVAL.
4. KONO'S AVOWED PHILOSOPHY IN DEALING WITH SOVS: SINCE IMPOSSIBLE DISLODGE THEM FROM POSITION OF STRENGTH IT BEST TO KNUCKLE UNDER, IF ESPOUSED AS OFFICIAL JAPANESE POLICY, MAY CONSTITUTE SERIOUS THREAT TO JAPAN'S STABILITY IN TERMS FUTURE CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH US. THEREFORE BELIEVE SOMTHING SHORT OF OPENLY DISAPPROVING MOSCOW MISSION AND KONO'S MODUS OPERANDI SHOULD BE DONE TO DENY HIM GRATUITOUS BENEFIT APPEARS AS CHAMPIONING CAUSES IN WHICH US PURPORTEDLY BELIEVES.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

S-E-C-R-E-T

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(C) Foreign Relations

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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() 4409 (IN 18091)

PAGE - 2 -

NOTHING LEADS US TO THINK KONO A FRIEND OF US.

5. TOKY HAS CAPABILITIES THRU FEW SELECT AND FAIRLY SECURE CHANNELS SUCH AS () 'PODAM ET AL DISABUSE RESPONSIBLE JAPANESE QUARTERS OF ERRONEOUS NOTION KONO'S POLICY OF CUTTLE ACCEPTANCE TO US. THIS COULD BE DONE WITHOUT DENIGRATING HIM OR ADOPTING PARTISAN ATTITUDE REGARDING MOSCOW TALKS.

6. SUGGESTED MOVE, IN ORDER TO BE EFFECTIVE, WOULD HAVE TO BE DEvised AGAINST BACKGROUND FAIRLY ACCURATE KNOWLEDGE THAT KOHO TOLD US GOVERNMENT AND WHAT HE WAS TOLD IN RETURN. MOST EFFECTIVE TIMING IMPLEMENTATION WOULD BE JUST AHEAD KONO'S RETURN TO JAPAN. (THIS NOT DISCUSSED EMBASSY AS YET.)

7. PLS COMMENT AND ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Handwritten notes:
/ 7.
H. J. ...
H. J. ...

S-E-C-R-E-T