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DISPATCH NO. WSM-A-1756

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TO : Chief, Foreign Division W DATE: 21 December 1951
FROM : Chief of Station, []
SUBJECT: GENERAL -
 SPECIFIC- Skorzeny "Plan"

1. Forwarded herewith is a copy of SKORZENY's "plan", which has been the subject of various dispatches and cables from []
2. The plan was finally procured by Major Robert Bleck, Assistant Air Attache, and was translated from the Spanish into English by Hugh S. Warburton.

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FORM NO. 51-26
APR 1947

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Comments on the Political and Military Situation,
and the Consequences Thereof

More than a year ago I analyzed my thoughts on the current situation, making proposals on what could be done to counteract the Red peril. Basically, nothing has changed since then. The East was able to gain several new victories in the Cold War, and the West was unable to do anything against them. Ideologically, Western European Defense has not improved at all. Likewise, material preparation for the defense of the West has received, in actual practice, some 80% of what had been planned for it, according to official American figures. The problem of the contribution of Germany to the defense of the West continues to be the subject of theoretical discussion, and the various offices which have been created in Trizonia on this subject also constitute a theoretical beginning without having made a single step towards practical realization.

During the past year several factors have been established which must be taken into account in considering the situation, and they are as follows: The separation of MacArthur from the supreme command of the Far East was a victory for the Kremlin and demonstrated the actual weakness of the West. Moscow took note of this sign of weakness, and took advantage of the opportunity to carry out its policy of wearing down the West through political maneuverings. Thus the opportunity to choose the most favorable moment to deal its own preventive blow is not to be passed by by Russia.

The beginning of Eisenhower's concrete efforts gave way to widespread hope. Reality quickly forced General Eisenhower to criticize openly the notorious deficiency of the defense effort in Western Europe, as well as these countries' willingness to rearm. There is absolutely no doubt that the initial strategy of the Pentagon for Europe would have to be drastically revised. Even today the defense of the greater part of Western Europe is practically inoperable, and it is impossible to determine how long this state of affairs will continue. Nor can one eliminate or clarify the great political obstacles facing Europe, such as the relations between France and Germany.

For more than a year experiments have been made on the limited battleground of Korea, taking into account that the modern armaments of the Russians have barely been used. Thus, the events in Korea have revealed nothing on the actual Russian supremacy in tactical aviation, and nothing has been learned about modern Russian submarines. In this regard, one must consider above all that, at the eventual outbreak of world conflict, the armies of the United States and her allies of the West will be operating from an enormous naval structure, and all offensive advantages, at the time, will lie with the powerful Russian submarine forces. Possible losses in submarine strength can be replaced more rapidly than those in the surface naval potential of the West.

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Undoubtedly, the rearmament program of the United States has made great strides, even if production figures reached, according to American statistics, lag some 15% behind the projected figures. If Wilson has recently announced that the United States will be prepared to meet all the necessities of war through its own production as of the end of 1953, this actually means that the Soviet Union can wait until then. Moscow thus has time to spare to fill the gaps of its war potential, and can adapt its decisions to the developments of the next two years. Until that time, probably six months before or after, Russia will hold all liberty of action for any preventive military or politico-military measure whatever, because of her actual military advantage. At the close of 1953, the United States will be faced with two alternatives. Either they will have to recognize the status quo established by the Soviets, or they will have to undertake a preventive war against the Soviet Union. In the meanwhile, the Soviet Union will continue to carry the offensive in the Cold War, and can consolidate and mobilize its fifth columns in the Western nations, its most dangerous weapons against those countries. Allied propaganda in the Soviet sphere has, on the other hand, very little chance of achieving noteworthy results. It is also dangerous to speculate on the death of Stalin during this period, in the hopes that such an event would result in the mending of the political situation. The dynamic policies of the forces of Bolshevism, whose secret goal today, as before, continues to be world revolution, while presenting themselves as the exponents of world peace, must not be underestimated. In analyzing the situation, one must not forget, in addition, present economic risks and the general scarcity of products. One of the greatest dangers now threatening the United States is inflation. Last year, this inflationary tendency resulted in a practical disadvantage of 20% in the rearmament race. One of the most acute problems in American industry is undoubtedly the need for wolfram, now that Communist China has been eliminated as traditional supplier. In the event that Persia is lost, temporarily or permanently, as a source of petroleum, this loss will be equivalent to a battle won by the Reds.

Let us also consider several political factors. Practically speaking, Communism has lost no ground at all in France. Today it is busy completing its preparations for the eventual use of a subversive partisan organization. Positive Rightist blocs have been unable, to date, to show that they are ready to control the difficult political problems of France. It is to be assumed that it would be impossible to clear up the political positions of French domestic government without previous intestinal disorder. It is significant that the Centrist parties currently governing France wish to strive against the weakness of Germany rather than confront the Red peril hovering over the country. In Italy the same thing is happening. Although the Italian government is acceding more willingly to the wishes of the United States, one must not forget the inferior capacity of Italy, and that the quality of the greater part of the Italian army should not be overestimated, as has been proved to us by History. In the case of England, one must not forget the private strategic interests competing in that country. The difficulties in Persia and the Near East are specifically English, and the precarious stability of India and the selfish attitude of some members of the Commonwealth against the Empire's trends of political unification are factors which undermine the active political offensive of Great Britain in line with

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American objectives. In any respect, these and many other interior difficulties are a brake to political activity. Notwithstanding the apparent consolidation of the situation in Finland, it is obvious that the Communist Party holds third place. If future developments follow this course so favorable to the Russians, the Soviets can, at any time, touch off disturbances which could spread like wild-fire to all of Scandinavia. The Peace Treaty with Japan undoubtedly constitutes one of the positive steps in general developments. But Japan cannot be included, in practice, as a strong base for the American Pacific Front, unless the conflict in Korea is rapidly eliminated. Apart from this consideration, the foreign policy of the United States would have to be maneuvered extremely cleverly in order to take advantage of the tension actually existing between the Soviet Union and Red China. At the present time, until a prolonged armistice is achieved in Korea, the period can be used not only for peaceful ends, but for the preparation of a new blow on the part of Red China in the same direction, or for the creation of new battlefronts in other parts of Asia.

All these considerations lead to a practical consequence. The United States might possibly find itself forced to carry out its own strategic plans without its Western Allies. This has already brought about the well-known negotiations between the United States and Spain, at one end of Europe, and events of even greater interest in Turkey at the other end. Without the control of these fortresses on either side, the defense of the North African bases could not be assured.

The strategists of the Kremlin have devoted their scarce arms potential entirely to rearmament since the beginning of 1945. In comparing the production of pig-iron and steel in the Soviet Union and the United States one must consider the following points: 1) That we do not have exact figures for Russia. 2) The entire production of these materials has been put at the disposal of war industry, certainly 90 to 95% since 1945. While the United States have been rearming under the watchword of "the least possible effect on civilian economy". 3) That Russia has been able to establish a strategic stock-pile in the last six years. Russia, in addition, does not need such great quantities of steel for naval rearmament as does the United States.

Similar comparisons can be made of petroleum production on both sides. The Soviet Union does not have to take care of such fantastic consumption by its fleet. It has, on the other hand, limited itself to the creation of a tactical aerial defensive potential, with the aim of substituting strategic aviation through the development of guided missiles.

The Soviet Union has, in addition, extraordinary mobile capacity. All executive measures conform to one single order, to one state apparatus, which, coincident with being a world power, is the directive body for an international subversive organization. In Europe the Soviet Union pursues the sole objective of delaying as much as possible, if not preventing completely, the military rearmament of Western Germany. Towards this end

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The Kremlin is waging its present political offensive with regard to the German problem, and proposing the unification of Germany, a peace treaty, and the withdrawal of occupation forces, proposals which cannot be anything more than theoretical. It is very possible that some day the Kremlin may induce the Red governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia to protest against the remilitarization of Germany and to take measures of a military nature because of the apparent threat of Germany, and to argue that the Potsdam Agreement has in effect been violated. Nevertheless, the actual danger of political and military development in Western Germany continues to be nothing more than latent, as it does in all Western Europe, a fact which brought me to set forth my proposals on the matter a year ago. I feel, therefore, that it is opportune to repeat the opening words of my previous treatise:

"The inclusion of Western Europe into the Russian sphere of influence would mean the inevitable collapse of European culture, and, above all, the total destruction of European intelligence. Although Europe might again be liberated by an invasion, there would later be no men capable of bringing about reconstruction in the spirit of the West. Asiatic Bolshevism, solely for motives of its own survival, will accomplish devastation which is as total as it is inexorable."

A conquest of Europe by world Bolshevism could occur in various ways: 1) Through open war. In this respect, during the past year the effective force of Western Defense has barely increased. The Western Divisions could, under the most favorable conditions, defend themselves in retreating to the peninsula of Jutland, on one side, and to Switzerland and Southern France on the other, although it is not known how long they could maintain these two flank strongholds. In the event of open warfare, the greater part of Western Europe could be lost today in a matter of a few days.

2) The conquest of Western Europe could also be accomplished through civil wars. Police forces in the Eastern Zone of Germany have been reinforced more and more, and could very well be mobilized some day for the "liberation of Western Germany". In France and Italy a subversive movement could be initiated at any time with probable success, the Communist Parties in those countries already having within their ranks the great majority of the active members of such a movement.

In view of the above, it is absolutely necessary that preparatory measures be taken, as I indicated a year ago, just in case some day the situation arises as described in points 1) and 2). Steps should be taken so that in such a case highly valuable human resources can be saved. It would be senseless to try, in desperation, to arm such valuable men at the last minute, only to waste them in useless battles of retreat or in a civil war.

The trip which I took to Germany last August and September has proved to me the validity of the above reflections. Thus, for example, I have learned that an American office, which employs mainly German personnel, resembles a project which I proposed two years ago: in case of necessity, they are preparing for the evacuation of top-flight German scientists and

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technicians. I suppose, nevertheless, that the majority of these individuals would devote themselves more wholeheartedly to action of this type if it were completely German. I have also learned, on the other hand, that the Federal Government of Bonn has contacted Spain, on the possibility that here German air units may find refuge. In addition, I have found out that at the present time a project, under the direction of one of the most capable military experts, is under way for another of these "rescue actions" in the Southern Zone of Germany, if it should be necessary, although in this case the final goal is Switzerland, which in my opinion is inadequate from all points of view. I know also that several units recently created as continuing the tradition of Wehrmacht X-formations are currently studying similar operations (in this case, cavalry divisions). I believe that the time has come when all efforts should be brought together.

Besides, during my recent trip I had the opportunity to speak with a number of generals in the former German Army. Among them is Colonel General Guderian and one of the greatest military experts now working in Bonn. We agreed basically in the view that, aside from official remilitarization efforts, parallel measures should be undertaken in one form or another in case of catastrophe.

I realize that such steps could not be taken officially by one body, nor by all those official groups which now function jointly to bring about the remilitarization of Germany. But preparations in the event of any unforeseen catastrophe could be made with the knowledge and silent consent of these official bodies and of the Bonn Government. It is assumed, in addition, that a very important consideration at the outset is the consent of the Spanish Government, since only Spain could be considered for such projects, as well as the approval of the United States, for positive assistance in the realization of such plans.

Consequently, and without going into detail, I wish to make the following proposals:

1. The formation of a basic German cadre in Spain, made up of Army, Air and Naval personnel, which could at the same time be used as an organization to absorb the mass of active German forces, the withdrawal of which would have to be organized simultaneously. This latter group would be formed of soldiers, scientists and technicians of the highest quality.

2. The formation of European cadres which would involve the thorough investigation of all European youth prepared to make the sacrifice. This model European organization could be used later in case of war to go into action throughout European territory. The American Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, has pointed out the enormous importance of commando action in a future war.

- 2a. Later on, with the inclusion of Spanish commando units, I would propose the creation of special sharpshooter cadres within the Spanish Army. Appendix 1 has been drawn up by an ex-captain of one of my former

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units, who, under my command, has carried out the training and incorporation of such cadres. Through my knowledge of the Spanish temperament, particularly that of the Spanish soldier, I think that we can achieve extraordinary results in this field.

3. I should also like to propose, emphasizing that Proposal 1 requires previous American authorization and subsequent aid, as was pointed out to me by the Spanish Estado Mayor a year ago, that an organization be created for an ordered withdrawal from Germany. The seeds of such a group already exist. It would have to be brought into play only in the case of a catastrophe. Included in this group would be these active elements not already incorporated in other military organisms.

Further notes on Proposal 1: At the time of receiving the basic concurrence of the Spanish Government and General Staff and of appropriate American authorities, immediate contact could be made with Col. Gen. Guderian. In a very short time a skeleton staff in Germany could be formed of outstanding officers, who would willingly give their services for such a task. This small staff would consist of officers from all branches of the armed services, whose mission would be to prepare, on Spanish soil, the preliminary groundwork for their own functions, and to investigate the existing possibilities. At the same time, in secrecy but with the considered and tacit authorization of the German Government, an organizational committee within Germany would recruit qualified officers and subalterns from all branches, in accordance with instructions received from the general planning staff in Spain. This unit set up in Spain may vary in the number of its members, but it should be given the opportunity for training in the use of the most modern American armaments. If only, for example, it were possible to form a group of 5,000 men, such personnel fully trained would be ready to absorb at any time an additional number of 10 times as many soldiers, to instruct them, in turn, in a very short time, and incorporate them into a very effective army. At the same time, this cadre, which would naturally be composed of seasoned commanding and lesser officers, could establish technical courses which would also benefit the Spanish Army.

In the event that the European situation should become less acute, it would always be possible, after a certain period of time, to transfer these units to Germany as solid reinforcements for the units already established in that country.

But if an unforeseen catastrophe should come to pass, this cadre would have the mission of assimilating the great mass of German soldiers, scientists and technicians participating in an organized withdrawal, incorporated in the organization proposed in (3) above. The German soldiers arriving in Spain would be carefully screened for inclusion as volunteers, on an equal basis, in the German units then formed in Spain.

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Further notes on Proposal 2: If in the course of the next few years a new world conflict should break out, it is probable that fixed battlefronts could not be established in Europe. In the course of the coming years bridgeheads such as Spain, or perhaps the entire Iberian peninsula, could at least be established. The remainder of Europe would fall under the Communist yoke. In order to hold off strong enemy forces in the West and in Eastern Europe, it will be necessary to develop, within enemy territory, military action concentrated against defined objectives. These specific objectives include the nerve centers and especially the supply points of the enemy forces, their communications and their munitions plants. The targets for such military undertakings on the part of the commando forces would be specific industries such as, for example, ammunition factories, oil refineries, steel mills, blast-furnaces, uranium mines, explosive factories, munition dumps, strategic bridges, power plants, etc. Such nerve centers are found in all the countries of Europe. For such commando undertakings to have any chances of success, they should be carried out by soldiers who know the terrain, and for such a purpose volunteers must be recruited from all the nations of Europe. For the members of such commando forces to receive thorough special training, and for practical knowledge of the military terrain involved, there must be a relatively long period of preparation. But, in proportion to their numbers they would be especially effective and could contribute enormously to the general war potential. Under certain circumstances the commandos' intervention could be decisive. As the writer would have recruited, from the units under his command in the last war, volunteers from virtually all the countries of Europe, he would be ready to assure with confidence the effectiveness of these units. In a study of the points of view of many of his former officers and soldiers, and of members of other national active forces in other countries, he has found among all these individual widespread inclination for the creation of and participation in such cadres. Volunteers, chosen in their respective nations on the basis of rigid standards, which would certainly form the picked troops of each nation, can be counted upon from the following countries: Italy; Rumania (emigres and members of the Iron Guard); Hungary (emigres and former officers and subalterns); Estonia; Lithuania and Latvia (refugees); Finland; Norway; Denmark; Holland; Belgium; France; and of course Germany and Austria. For the most effective operation of these commandos, they must have all possible means at their disposal. During the training period they must have at their disposal all the facilities which they would have to employ in time of war. The American Army, which would also in this case be obliged to give its unconditional support, has already gathered a great deal of experience during the last war with its OSS troops.

The preliminary work for the formation of the special commando cadres could be initiated with a relatively small number of operating personnel. A basic group of, for example, 20 to 80 men from each of the countries mentioned above, and proportional to the strength of the country in question, would be enough for the time being. Once these initial cadres have acquired the necessary group spirit and have undergone preliminary training, the active personnel of this organization could be gradually increased.

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Further notes on Proposal 2a (see Appendix 1): The training of the special sharpshooter cadres could be carried out very quickly with picked personnel. Perhaps it is not realized how tremendously effective a trained sharpshooter squad can be in the defense of a battle line, as, for example, it could be in the Pyrenees. If they were brought in as independent unit in support of other forces, harrasing the movements of the enemy and causing losses among officers in enemy positions, their effective action could bring results before the beginning of the attack itself. But also in tank attacks, which cannot operate without simultaneous infantry action, the activity of the special riflemen could be of incalculable advantage. In mountain warfare, the intervention of well-trained sharpshooters becomes indispensable. In this regard, one should note the fact that the development of infra-red technique today makes possible the night action of specialized units.

Further Notes on Proposal 3: With some assistance, this organization can be formed in Germany. As time passes, more and more Germans, soldiers, scientists and technicians, are becoming convinced that if the Soviet war machine or the troops of the Eastern Satellite nations are allowed to overrun them it will mean deportation, if not certain death. Even the difficult problem of abandoning ones family would be resolved by the situation, which becomes more evident every day. Few men, after Russian occupation, could be sure that they would be able to stay with their families, much less protect and feed them. The youth would be recruited en masse by the Red Army, and the aged would be deported to far-off industrial centers or to forced labor in Russia. In order to allow for the rapid growth of this organization, it is planned to establish a form of organization on the so-called "snow-ball" system. Each 20 or 25 men under the command of an officer or leader would pick a vehicle for transport. The fuel for this truck would set aside and each man should have a 20 liter tank in case of emergency. The system to give the alarm could be prepared in collaboration with the occupation forces of Western Germany. The special difficulties of crossing the Rhine could similarly be solved in collaboration, for example, with the American Army. The preferable route for withdrawal would be through the Rhone valley, and as American Army units would us this route in retreat towards Southern France, the road would be adequately protected.

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Appendix 1 and 2a

Memorandum on the Importance of the Use of Specialized Sharpshooters During the Past War and Proposals for the Formation of Such a Cadre

The author of the following lines was Captain and Chief of the Special Operations Sharpshooter Cadre under the command of Res. Col. Otto Skorzeny. (Captain) Odo WILLISCHER is an engineer in civilian life, with three degrees (Civil, Construction and Industrial Engineer). For many years he has practiced in South America and Africa on behalf of the German Government in investigations on forestry projects. At the opening of the last war he was assigned to the Brandenburg Battalion, a special unit destined for commando operations, as a part of which he was trained in parachute technique. During the summer of 1944, when a large part of the Brandenburg Battalion was absorbed into the "special operation" units, WILLISCHER underwent special training for sharpshooter combat. In his own words: In 1930-31 I had to serve in the Czech Army as a Sudeten German. At that time I was trained in the Carpathians by Russian specialists in sharpshooter technique. Even then I had learned a sufficient amount on the operations and tactics of these special Russian units. This unbroken training demanded hardship, sacrifice, excellent marksmanship, caution and shrewdness, adaption to the terrain and camouflage, deception and fanaticism. The Soviet trainers in those days used to compare the action of the sharpshooter specialists on the front to the current of a river, in constant movement towards a definite objective, using all cracks and crevices to reach its destination. Their tactics are to infiltrate behind the lines, taking advantage of every break in the front, as an invisible and powerful weapon, not only killing but demoralizing at the same time the war potential of the enemy, both physically and psychologically.

The principles laid down by the Russian instructors in those days came to my mind during the first months of the Russian campaign in 1944, when thousands of German soldiers, particularly officers, were liquidated on the Russian front by Soviet sharpshooters. The German command unfortunately realized too late the danger and effectiveness of these weapons. Not until the summer of 1944 did they initiate the creation of similar sharpshooter cadres. For this reason, the German sharpshooter units had little opportunity to demonstrate their effectiveness. But there is one note-worthy example of the operation and possible success of well-trained marksmen. In the spring of 1945 a unit of sharpshooters, consisting of 30 men, was attached to the division under the command of Col. Skorzeny then defending the only bridgehead across the Oder in the Schedt sector. The German front at that time was completely without heavy armaments, and the Russians were attacking daily with the strength of two tank regiments. It has been shown that the 35 sharpshooters, in heavy battle and under the most adverse climatic conditions, through rain and snow, ice and thaw, annihilated more than 1500 Russians in four weeks. In every battle, even when using the most modern methods and the newest arms, it is still in the final analysis the infantry which must hold the terrain. The trained marksman who operates almost invisibly and in the shelter of the terrain can even decisively intercept tank attacks, machine-gunning the infantry advancing on the tanks, without being attacked even by the tanks, because

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of the sharpshooters' practical invisibility. (Actually, in the central sector of the Schedt bridgehead, an armored tank attack was halted before the German lines only through the intervention of trained marksmen posted in advanced positions.) Evident in these examples is the importance of these special sharpshooter units, a factor which up to now has never been conceded in its true value. In the following pages we will cite several advantages gained by creating these specialized sharpshooter cadres, as against the formation of other specialized units:

Advantages gained by the creation of special sharpshooter units:

1. Equipment and training of a specialized marksman, who practically does not need special indoctrination, can be carried out at a cost 16 times less than that for training an ordinary infantry soldier, according to data gathered during the last war by the German High Command. This is without taking into account the cost of other special troops, or aviators, or navy, or heavy artillery.
2. The training, for example, of a tank combat unit requires two entire years, at least, for full effectiveness. The training of a man suitable for sharpshooter requirements could be accomplished in two to three months, and if soldiers with battle experience are used and special aptitude exists, this training period can be reduced even more.
3. The trained sharpshooter, as a reservist, can keep his special rifle in his home, as is done for example in Switzerland and the Tyrol. For this reason, he can be mobilized by radio alarm within a few hours, and independently from the regular methods of mobilization to be used. In the Russian campaign excellent results were obtained through the use of special sharpshooter parachutists.
4. No other method of battle or type of battlefield operations results in less bloodshed or waste of war man-power than the independent action of trained sharpshooter units, or, in other words, picked men trained in hand-to-hand combat.
5. The equipment of a sharpshooter: an excellent rifle with a telemeter, some good lenses, a pistol and a knife, and a packet of ammunition can easily be manufactured by national industry. Such equipment would not have to depend on heavy industry or on supplies from overseas. The camouflage uniform is simple and practical, and can also be made inside the country.

Proposals for the creation of sharpshooter cadres:

1. The command must be given to a sharpshooter officer with field experience, who should have special abilities for teaching and drilling.
2. A nucleus of trainers, either lesser officials or soldiers, who have proved their marksmanship on the field of battle. In case there is not a sufficient number of these men, a short training course should be organized

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to teach and drill the necessary number of Spanish instructors. Experience has shown that no more than 50 men should be trained jointly in a single course. There should be one officer as chief instructor and 5 professors. In addition, there should be a special rifle range equipped for the training of sharpshooters, as well as the necessary auxiliary personnel. There should also be an excellent arms expert for the course.

Men suitable for marksmanship training must have excellent eyesight and steady nerves. Perfect marksmanship can be taught with the same exactitude as reading and writing. The sharpshooter must also be highly intelligent. A love of nature is most important, and those most suited for this service are mountaineers, hunters and country people. There should be rigid requirements concerning physical fitness, tenacity, personal sacrifice and valor. The sharpshooter cadre must be a model unit of excellent morale and patriotism, and it will be of the greatest value if its members are picked and adequately trained.

Adequate special preparation was begun in Germany in 1944. Today few experts are available who have gained combat experience on the Eastern fronts, but they are all in contact with each other and still fired with group spirit. These men can be contacted and can certainly be engaged as trainers. All the technical materials for training and drill, as well as the necessary manuals, still exist in Germany.

The above notes should only serve as a brief outline, and their author, Captain Odo WILLSCHER, is ready to discuss the matter in greater detail.

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Some Notes on the Present State of Mind of the People of Western Germany, and on the Infiltration, which Actually Exists, of a Communist Fifth Column in Trizonia

From July until the end of September 1951, on the occasion of a 16,000 kilometer automobile trip through Western Germany, I had the opportunity to talk with a great number of former soldiers of all ranks and specialties, as well as with political figures and individuals of all political leanings from the extreme left to the extreme right, and also with outstanding economists, numerous laborers and country people.

In general it can be said that the great majority consider the present political and political-military situation in Western Germany as quite unsatisfactory and unstable. There is no question of the doubt and resignation expressed by Federal President Heuss, at the time of the national holiday on 12 September 1951, in that the German people feel no interest whatsoever in public and national life. As the great majority has no marked interest at all in the political life of Western Germany, but in addition the most absolute and widespread resignation is evident in great sectors of the populace, it is not surprising that there is no close unity at all with the present government, nor does the government itself show the least hope in the future.

In addition to this resignation, deep bitterness is frequently evident among ex-combatant circles. For several years these former military men have lived under insults and lack of appreciation, during the course of the demilitarization, as much on the part of the Western Allies as on that of German officials during that period. And without the last reparation for this injustice, projects for remilitarization are now being discussed, if only theoretically, without taking this mass of ex-combatants into account. But, in this regard, it must be remembered that the most insignificant soldier who has spent years at the front has gleaned enough knowledge as well as experience to recognize the impossibility of the present military situation in Western Germany. It is he who best understands the force and potentialities of the Soviet armies, and realizes that the only forces against those armies are a few Allied occupation divisions which frequently have little resemblance to a military organization. About six months ago the first union of German ex-combatants was formed by Admiral Hansen, and the only way in which it represents the interests of members of the former Wehrmacht is in its demands for pensions and the fact that it is made up of reservists. This group ended up by depending entirely on the Government, and is not in the least qualified to judge any aspect of the basic problems of remilitarization. Naturally all members of the young war generation defend the principle that the life of a German soldier is more important than any pension claim, no matter how vital in itself. During my stay in Germany the new organization was consolidated, and in its roster of leaders sound the names of the most outstanding generals of the old Wehrmacht. As I have been able to gather from preliminary conversations, the greater number of these gentlemen admit that they are simply representatives of the young war generation, to prepare the way for their rise to power. This new military organization, if it wishes to carry out its proposed objectives,

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will become an organization of the masses, which will represent not only the present interests and claims of the former German army, but will take a stand in any future situation. According to the line expressed by the present president of the group, ex-Colonel Friesner, they demand simply equal and actual rights for the German people with respect to other members of the Atlantic Pact (attached is a special number of the parachutists' magazine published on the occasion of a meeting of former parachutists held in late June 1951). One of the points, perhaps the most important one, stressed by the German ex-combatants is to give the German people an ideal and a theme worth fighting for. The democratic parties currently governing the country do not consider this theory worthy of effort. But this does not mean that the majority of the German people wish another dictatorship. They simply want the state to be strong and sure, and would like their public servants to be free of corruption and bureaucratic entanglements. They do not want the people's representatives to put Party interests before the interests of the Nation. If the situation in Germany is to be improved, it must be seen that propaganda, which is trying to reawaken the German people to sympathy and approval of the military uniform, is as effective as possible, and above all that conditions are such that, in the case of future armed intervention, this would not mean the useless sacrifice of German soldiers. The body of public opinion of the "not me" (Ohne mich Bewegung) attitude actually existing today does not signify absolute negation of any remilitarization plan, but rather its exponents refuse to accept any unconditional remilitarization principle of senseless struggle.

It is significant that organizations officially American, although run by Germans, are now trying to formulate a plan for the rescue of German scientists and technicians who should not fall to the Russians in the case of sudden catastrophe. A former officer has received the task of forming an organization of this nature. The fact that in the relatively near future at least Central Europe may eventually fall before a Russian attack, almost without a struggle, has brought about such a project, and private individuals as well as official organizations are trying to work out a way to save the greatest number of German men from the clutches of Bolshevism in the case of an emergency.

In order to shed some light on the effectiveness and technique of the Russian Fifth Columns, I wish to cite the following example, which I myself experienced during my recent trip:

I had made contact in Germany with the various nationalist groups, such as the Union of Sudeten Germans, the Union of Exiles and the "Brotherhood of German Union", and with different organizations carrying on the traditions of the former army, etc. Generally, those who approached me were the leaders of these groups, to discuss the general situation. All of them fervently defended my own point of view and agreed with my comments, namely that something must be done to save the Germans. I was surprised to find that certain groups were already beginning to stand out in the midst of the general resignation, which itself seemed to result at times in virtual spiritual lethargy, and that these groups were unexpectedly showing a new

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desire for action. Thus in Germany today there are various groups which, if they oppose the official policy of remilitarization, are prepared to sell their lives if necessary at the highest possible price. These groups, which are more numerous every day, are ready to back any new, good idea enthusiastically at any time. Almost all these groups are led by some former officer, and some of these leaders are former officers and comrades of my old units. One of my former company commanders introduced me to a certain Lieutenant L., who had served in one of my units during the last seven months of the war. During the next few days this man introduced me to a whole series of personalities, generally refugees from Eastern Germany. All of these men belonged to the organization formed by Lt. D, and asked me to take over military command. I told them that I first wished to carry out my own plans, but that once organization was under way I would be glad to help them. The plans of this organization were explained to me as follows: A form of militia would be created from among the active national forces in Germany whose mission in peace time would be voluntary reciprocal aid among all Germans, but especially to help refugees from the East, and to serve as an emergency auxiliary technical staff in the event of any kind of public calamity. Liaison had already been set up with various official agencies in Bonn, which had promised their support. I myself became convinced of the truthfulness of their statements. At the same time, this so-called emergency militia would maintain a communications network within Germany, with privately-owned automobiles and motorcycles for their use so that they would not have to depend on public communications for their orders and reports. Once this organization was set up in Western Germany, small groups of specially trained men would be formed to act as commando units. With the aid of the occupation forces, or of the New German Army, they could be equipped with light arms such as pistols, automatics, telescopic rifles, and bazookas. If war should break out with the East, these small commando forces could infiltrate Eastern Germany and spread as far as Poland to hinder Russian supply lines.

Lt. D. did not hide the fact that he was maintaining contact with several former comrades in the Eastern Zone. He also admitted to me that he himself often crossed into the Eastern Zone and that he had had many conversations with various individuals. This apparent frankness almost broke down my initial reserve, but his private life, which I had a chance to observe, put me on guard. In spite of the fact that he personally had organized a large office with more than 200 employees, most efficiently run, he lived with his family like the member of a sect /sic/. In view of this, I could not positively accept the proposals of the Lieutenant and his fellow leaders of the organization, but neither could I definitely refuse. I simply declined from making a definite decision for a few months, although I agreed to permit two of my former officers to enter the directing commission of this organization, purposely the two most in my confidence.

A short while ago I received a definite report from these two individuals. It has been proved that Lt. L. is clearly working in the pay of the East, and that this operation was mounted at the orders of the Karlhorst (General Soviet Headquarters in the Eastern Zone). The greater

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part of the personalities making up the directive body of the above-mentioned organization are not aware of this fact, nor are the governmental bureaus in Bonn, which recently allotted the sum of 600,000 marks for the use of this organization. In this case, the East has practically managed to set up an organization of supposedly Western character and even with the aid of the Western Powers.

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