

SECURITY INFORMATION

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DESENSITIZED

PER DOI 70-17

OCT 8 1952

M.A.W.S

Chief of Station, []

Chief, SA
Chief, NE

Operational/WADSOX
NOSTRIL and Project AE-ASTER.

Reference- A) [] 086 B) [] 1087

1. Headquarters has undertaken a thorough investigation of NOSTRIL's background and character reputation. While the results of this investigation cannot be called definitive, they are presented here for your consideration:

A. Many reports re NOSTRIL, in addition to those forwarded by [], indicate that he is a rather unscrupulous individual who has on occasion taken steps to better his own position at the expense of other Circassians. Headquarters has discussed NOSTRIL with recent Circassian arrivals to the United States and we find that this reputation is generally prevalent here as well as in Germany and the Middle East.

B. No information has been uncovered which in any way casts doubt on NOSTRIL's devotion to the Circassian cause. As [] indicated to [] in Beirut, NOSTRIL seems to be a sincere patriot who is highly motivated to work for an independent Caucasus. While NOSTRIL has been reported as "still harboring pro-Communist leanings", such accusations stem from cadres who are in all probability prejudiced for the reasons in para 1A above. Therefore, at this time there are no apparent security objections to the use of NOSTRIL under AE-ASTER.

2. If NOSTRIL is to be used as a spotter and/or recruiter, it is felt that [] should attempt to determine whether Nostzil will, in view of his apparent prejudiced attitudes toward certain Circassians in Jordan, be able to objectively perform his mission. If NOSTRIL is likely to "rule out" potential WADSOX recruits because of prejudiced attitudes, his effectiveness under AE-ASTER will naturally be decreased. This is not to imply that headquarters feels NOSTRIL should not be used under AE-ASTER, but simply that we are aware of this possible limitation on his usefulness.

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3. In view of para 2 above and the general sensitivity of any RABDVA spotting and recruiting program, headquarters feels that M STRIL should be subjected to operational testing prior to his full-scale employment under AI-ASTRA. Headquarters is currently planning such tests, which we hope will help determine his security and effectiveness in this work, and will submit them for []'s consideration within a few weeks. In the meantime it is requested that you consider the feasibility of coming M STRIL to Beirut for polygraph examinations. While it has not yet been determined whether M STRIL can give such examinations in Beirut, []'s comments re such a procedure will be appreciated. Polygraph tests plus the operational testing mentioned above should determine as definitely as possible the reliability of M STRIL.

4. Headquarters will leave to []'s discretion the extent to which M STRIL should be briefed and trained for his mission under AI-ASTRA. In all probability he will have to be told what use will be made of those people he spots and/or recruits in or that he may be able to assess during the spotting process.

5. Re reference B, it is requested that [] advise headquarters on a continuing basis of the activities of the Tolstoy Foundation representatives after their arrival in Jordan. Headquarters will be especially interested to learn (well in advance if possible) of any final arrangements made by the Tolstoy Foundation for the removal of Circassians from Jordan. In view of Titiana Schaufuss' recent trip to Jordan it may be well to notice if the Tolstoy representatives mentioned in reference B show especial interest in the Circassians whom Schaufuss contacted while she was in Jordan. Headquarters files contain enough derogatory information on Schaufuss to cause us to view her activities with definite suspicion. While she cannot be said to be positively a Soviet agent, headquarters wishes to advise that extreme caution be used in any dealings with her.

6. For the conversations with [] and [] in Beirut, it is requested that [] continue to attempt to clarify the situation reported in RMAA-120, especially as regards whether or not the subject of RMAA-120 was in fact indiscreet during his visit to Jordan and his possible connections with the British.

7. It was reported in RMAA-121 that Mahmud MALTSCHKOFF gave the names of some fifty Circassians in Jordan to Mrs. Schaufuss. It would be helpful to headquarters to learn these names in order that an effort be made to keep track of these individuals during the next few years. If Schaufuss is connected with Soviet intelligence, these individuals may be a source of indication as to the nature of her RAB activity.

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8. Headquarters will immediately advise when provisional clearance has been received for MOSTEL.

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BY _____

SR/4JJS:ls
30 Sep 1952

KERMIT ROOSEVELT

NE/2

Coordinating Officer

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SR _____

Authenticating Officer
