

Air Force No. 77

SECRET

RJA-A-26

**Secret**

SECURITY INFORMATION

Chief, RH

21 December 1952

Chief, C

SECRET

Operational  
NOSTRIL Testing

1. Attached herewith are the reports prepared by Nostril on the individuals listed on attachment (a) of RJA-A-26. Nostril reported that he was unable to obtain any information on Uthman Mawla or Umar Sadiq. From all indications he was unaware that he was being tested.
2. An examination of the material indicates that Nostril: (a) was efficient and logical in his approach, (b) accomplished his objectives in this particular assignment, (c) was thorough, (d) was able to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant material and (e) was discreet and obtained the information without disclosing his or our interest. Further, it appears that there is sufficient evidence in the reports to show that Nostril neither held back information tending to indicate that an individual under consideration has pro-Soviet or pro-Communist inclinations nor attempted to tag an individual as a Communist for malicious or other reasons.
3. Although a number of the reports indicate that Subject knows the individual of interest, it would be more accurate to state that in many cases the acquaintance is a mere casual one. In all cases Nostril was required to dig-up additional facts and information for our purposes. He obtained most of his information on an unwitting basis and employed customary investigating techniques. For example, in the case of Mohammad Aly Rida, he hinted to a friend of Rida that there is considerable speculation in Amman regarding Rida's morals. Although such is not true, the friend rushed to Rida's defense and in refuting the accusations disclosed many details concerning Rida.
4. With the satisfactory completion of this preliminary testing of Nostril, it is hereby requested that Headquarters arrange as soon as possible for the polygraph testing in Beirut described in para 5 of RJA-W-13. As requested in para 6 of that dispatch, we are awaiting approval from Headquarters before discussing the matter with Nostril.
5. As stated to   in Beirut and as indicated in paras 11 and

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

14 of NJA-A-13, [ ] has encouraged and developed Nostril to date with the promise of trying to help him obtain employment with the Army or Airforce in Germany. [ ] originally volunteered to assist Subject with the explanation that: (a) possibly the Army is in need of a reliable Circassian to teach the language to Army specialist personnel in Europe or (b) possibly the Army is employing Circassians in clerical jobs in order that they might be available to serve as translators in time of war. [ ] has always stressed that although he could make no promise or guarantee, he would endeavor to do everything possible to help Subject obtain employment in order that he might take care of his family. Satisfied with this explanation, Nostril supplied the material forwarded in NJA-A-156 through 159 as well as a considerable amount of other operational information.

6. With the above in mind and for the sake of security the polygraph testing of Subject should be handled as follows:

(a) Upon receiving approval from Headquarters, [ ] will tell Nostril that he has received word from his friend in Germany that although Nostril appears to be qualified, all recruiting has been temporarily halted because of changes in Europe and because a new Secretary of Defense will take office in a short time.

(b) However as a favor to [ ] and because of Nostril's apparent qualifications and potential usefulness to the United States, the friend has arranged for an interview with Nostril in Beirut in the near future in anticipation of other possibilities.

(c) Rather than allow Nostril to know that the testing is being specifically arranged for him, [ ] will convey the idea that the interviewers have been at the Dhahran air base interviewing and testing employees and are scheduled to return to Germany via Beirut. Although they have no actual business in Beirut, they will be available to interview and test Nostril. The latter will be briefed along the lines suggested in para 5 of NJA-W-13 with equal emphasis being placed on the interviewing aspects so as not to overplay the testing angle. Thus maximum security will be achieved by viewing the interview as a routine job opportunity.

(d) Provided Subject passes the polygraph test, full operational clearance will be requested. Nostril will then be informed that although there is nothing available in Germany at the moment, our friend has arranged to pay him a "retaining" fee until such time as the job in Germany "crystallizes". In return for this assistance Subject will be expected to perform the duties outlined in NJA-A-12 and NJA-W-13.

7. Please advise via Air Mail as possible regarding plans for the polygraph tests here.

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