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17 July 1945.

TO: Chief OIB, G-2, United States Forces European Theatre.  
FROM: CO, SOI Detachment, OIB, G-2, United States Forces European Theatre.  
SUBJECT: Special Interrogation Report, Werner GOETTSCHE

Attached is a report of interrogation conducted and written by Reginald Phelps, American civilian, member of this Detachment, on above Subject. Interrogation was made in order to bring out some points it was believed should be known to GOETTSCHE.

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1 Incl.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

S E C R E T

4 July 1945

SUBJECT: Special Interrogation Report on Werner GOETTSCH

1. CONTACTS IN VIENNA:

GOETTSCH's first "ideological" contact in VIENNA was that with Dr. DOPPLER, beginning at the end of 1943; his second was with the SPANN-HEINRICH Group, which stemmed from the Kameradschaftsbund of Sudetenlanders; the third was that with POPEK and through him (invisibly) with the Social Democrats. This last is the one that GOETTSCH appears most intrigued with; he recited again his meeting with POPEK and Ursula HEGSCHEIDT, the story of Ursula and her frequent imprisonments and escapes.

POPEK was far to the Left himself, and had ideas of a Social Democratic uprising of behalf of the Russians, but was about equally willing to cooperate with the Western Powers.

2. CONTACT WITH THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS:

GOETTSCH maintains that his only real contact with the Social Democrats was this one. He knows Ministerialrat RAUB, the present Minister of Labour in AUSTRIA, but apparently had no active contact with him. He learned only a little about Socialist plans from POPEK. HOETTL requested that a Socialist be sent to SWITZERLAND, evidently as evidence of good faith to the Americans, but POPEK was at BRUENN, keeping away from the Stapo, and it was too late to send anybody.

GOETTSCH says that he arranged with POPEK, in February or March, to postpone an intended Socialist uprising for at least three weeks, pending some definite answer to the overtures in SWITZERLAND.

3. OTHER RESISTANCE GROUPS:

GOETTSCH says he knows nothing of Q-5 or O-5 (COMMENT: HOETTL in a special interrogation said GOETTSCH had been in contact with Q-5, a Leftist resistance group in VIENNA).

GOETTSCH says that he discussed with POPEK the Austrian Freiheitsbewegung, and that POPEK advised against contact with it because of its disunity and its heavy communist tinge. This discussion took place in the fall of 1944; GOETTSCH made no further effort to approach this group.

Some time after 20 July, GOETTSCH discussed with POPEK and SPANN the possibility of assassinating HITLER. All agreed that it would be necessary to have Wehrmacht support, and it was felt that this could not be forthcoming without a guarantee of support from the Western Powers.

SPANN had some plan for a revolt in VIENNA also, but took no active steps because of this lack of support from the West.

4. CONTACT WITH MILDNER, STAPO HEAD IN VIENNA:

Once again GOETTSCH turned in a human interest story on even this unpromising subject; his first contact with MILDNER was in 1944, on POPEK's behalf, when POPEK asked GOETTSCH to find out about a friend of his who had been arrested; the second was in regard to a Dr. WINTERSBERGER, who was about to be "declared a Jew" despite evidence to the contrary, and on whose well-being SPANN and HEINRICH depended strongly. GOETTSCH gave MILDNER false information that WINTERSBERGER was working for V-E in SLOVAKIA, and thus saved him.

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MILLNER tried to reach GOETTSCH late in the spring, but GOETTSCH did not respond.

SPANN and HEINRICH had urged GOETTSCH to get in touch with MILLNER, and GOETTSCH had talked with him in the winter, but felt he could not trust him. He recalls that MILLNER showed him a dossier on the comments of an agent about a meeting with some one in the Austrian Freiheitsbewegung. MILLNER knew nothing about the plans of GOETTSCH. (COMMENT: HOETTL states that MILLNER was intentionally misinformed about the contacts of the GOETTSCH-HOETTL Group, by the claim that they were engaged in penetrating a resistance movement.)

5. KALTENBRUNNER'S APPROVAL OF GOETTSCH'S PLAN:  
"UNTERNEHMEN HERZOG"

Late in 1943, GOETTSCH got KALTENBRUNNER's approval of his effort to contact "ideological opponents", but he insists that KALTENBRUNNER had no inkling of his real purpose. Not till the four weeks before his arrest did GOETTSCH discuss openly with KALTENBRUNNER his intentions. He had some onto the ideological interests during his long sickness before 1943, and felt that some points of contact must be made with the Western Powers in this respect - Freemasonry and the churches he thought were the most promising, and hence he worked with SPANN, DOPPLER and HEINRICH in this direction.

It was intended that if any of the group should be arrested, they would say that they were working on a project approved by KALTENBRUNNER.

This assignment - to study ideological opponents - was called UNTERNEHMEN HERZOG. GOETTSCH emphasizes that KALTENBRUNNER had nothing to do with starting it or with its real purpose. WANECK knew something of it, because GOETTSCH had to have him indoctrinated to get his help in preparing false papers, etc. but he too, like KALTENBRUNNER, was not told till near the end the true import of the plan. Only WINKLER, SPANN, HEINRICH and POPEK were fully indoctrinated.

6. KOMMANDO DES MELDEGEBIETS WIEN:

GOETTSCH says he had no contacts with people from this office, but thinks possibly SPANN and WINKLER may have.

7. GOETTSCH'S W/T STATION, ALT AUSSER:

The sender at ALT AUSSER did not work while HOETTL was in SWITZERLAND (COMMENT: KALTENBRUNNER stated that information was sent via this method). GOETTSCH wanted to make contact with WINKLER in SWITZERLAND, but says his own station never succeeded in reaching SWITZERLAND.

8. SKORZENY AND THE WEREWOLF:

GOETTSCH had not seen SKORZENY for about two years till they met at LINZ about 15 April 45. Previously, HOETTL had greed in SWITZERLAND to work on SKORZENY, who, it was thought, might be a leader in defending the redut; it was hoped that KALTENBRUNNER and SKORZENY could be brought together and won over to giving up the defense

SKORZENY told GOETTSCH that he had little to do with the redut, and that he had no definite office in the Werewolf, but that Werewolf chiefs in various areas turned to him for supplies and personnel. GOETTSCH urged him to get in contact with the Werewolf. SKORZENY said he could not get control of the whole organization; he knew in fact only the head of the lower Danube Werewolves.

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MUEHLAMANN had been active in urging GOETTSCH to try to win KALTENBRUNNER over, and agreed on the importance of trying to win SKORZENY too. GOETTSCH does not seem to have indoctrinated SKORZENY, but he learned that WANICK spoke with SKORZENY later, and had the impression that SKORZENY was favourable to their plans.

When GOETTSCH learned that SKORZENY's role in the reduct was not be a key one, and that he had only a group of 3-4,000 loyal followers with whom he wanted to retire into the mountains, GOETTSCH decided to try to get this company as a palace guard in the event of trouble when the anticipated Austrian Provisional Government should be set up, and the Gauleiters fired.

GOETTSCH says that SKORZENY expected to retire to the area of ST. JOHANN; he knows nothing about further contacts of SKORZENY with the Werewolf (though he thinks he remembers SKORZENY's saying that he had some contact with a Werewolf chief in the West).

GOETTSCH asked about using people from VI E as couriers for SKORZENY's troop, but SKORZENY was unwilling to consider it.

9. MEETING WITH KALTENBRUNNER AND SKORZENY IN SALZBURG:

In order to renew on a friendly basis the contact between KALTENBRUNNER and SKORZENY, GOETTSCH arranged that they should meet at SALZBURG late in April. His purpose was to assure himself of SKORZENY's troop; he says neither KALTENBRUNNER nor SKORZENY knew the real purpose. By that time, GOETTSCH knew for certain that there was little likelihood of real resistance in the reduct; and hence saw that the original reason for approaching SKORZENY was not valid.

10. OBERLEUTNANT KRAUSBERGER:

This man, a friend of SPANN, came to GOETTSCH about 12 April, saying that he had 40-50 men available on whom he could count if they were needed for any operation. (This was the man responsible for saving four British officers see full Goettsch report). GOETTSCH viewed this as an opportunity to infiltrate his friends into the reduct, and from this occasion he also thought of using SKORZENY in the same way, since KRAUSBERGER was an old Brandenburg Division man, and GOETTSCH thought he might somehow serve also as a contact to SKORZENY.

KRAUSBERGER he last saw on the day of his arrest, when K. was at the Hohen Tauern Pass, with the four British officers.

11. FUNDS FOR SKORZENY AND GOETTSCH:

SKORZENY had asked KALTENBRUNNER in vain for money to support his people. The matter was discussed again at the SALZBURG meeting, and KALTENBRUNNER told SKORZENY to ask the Verwaltungsfuehrer Amt I, who was somewhere in Bavaria, for money. GOETTSCH says he knows nothing further about funds for SKORZENY. He himself had money with him in ALT AUSSEE which he wanted to turn over, to himself.

12. KALTENBRUNNER'S VOLIMAOHT:

GOETTSCH is sure that KALTENBRUNNER received full powers for the South at the beginning of April. KALTENBRUNNER hardly made use of it; what was done, e.g. in discussing with the generals - RENDULIC, KESSELRING - was done at MUEHLMANN's request; and MUEHLMANN was working of GOETTSCH's line. MUEHLMANN tried to work on HOFER, who was friendly to the Group, though not consciously involved in their plan, and

KALTENBRUNNER had spoken with HOFER and also with EIGRUBER of Oberdonau about Austrian plans.

GOETTSCH remarks that KALTENBRUNNER had once been the hope of his Group as Foreign Minister, in the belief that he would come into line with the Western Powers; but that as things have turned out, he doubts that KALTENBRUNNER would have been able to handle the job.

13. KALTENBRUNNER'S PLANS:

GOETTSCH saw KALTENBRUNNER nine or ten times in April. He knows that KALTENBRUNNER thought of retiring to the mountains, with his few immediate followers, after the establishment of a new government. He is certain that KALTENBRUNNER had no thought of resuming any sort of political activity or NSDAP contacts; that at best he hoped that a good word might be put in for him with the Americans on the basis of his alleged cooperation with HOETTL.

14. POPEK (See Report No. 1, Para 1); GOETTSCH'S CONTACT:

POPEK was last seen by GOETTSCH in VIENNA in March. About that time, POPEK had asked GOETTSCH for money to enable him to move about, and GOETTSCH had made some available out of an allotment of 5000 marks originally taken from VI E funds to build a bunker for GOETTSCH in VIENNA. GOETTSCH thinks POPEK is still in VIENNA, and thinks he has probably gone along with the communists.

As for the OESTERREICHISCHE FREIHEITSBEWEGUNG, POPEK himself was not in it, but told GOETTSCH that some Social Democrats and communists were. RAAB appeared to GOETTSCH to be closer to the FREIHEITSBEWEGUNG people; RAAB was a Christian Social man.

GOETTSCH says he never knew anyone in POPEK's group. He adds that POPEK was not especially friendly with SPANN, because the SPANN Group appeared too heavily intellectual.

GOETTSCH points out that all his own contacts in his movements were in VIENNA. He says he knows nothing directly about the FREIHEITSBEWEGUNG.

15. SPANN'S IDEA FOR A REVOLT:

From 1943, SPANN had in mind a revolt which would work along with an Allied airborne action, and with the aid of Wehrmacht officers from his Group, or with whom he came into contact through WINKLER. The plan was never worked out in detail, as far as GOETTSCH knows, because no contact was ever made with the Western Powers.

GOETTSCH himself felt that contact with the Social Democrats would have been more important anyhow, but curiously made no effort to reach them, except in the somewhat opaque connection with POPEK.

16. GOETTSCH'S IMMEDIATE GROUP:

With regard to a reference in the final interrogation report on GOETTSCH to persons who were supposedly in his more intimate group (WANECK, HOETTL, AUNER, MANDL, BARTMIG, KLAUS, FEHLAND, ZEISOHKA) GOETTSCH now claims that he was never really open in disclosing his basic plans (re ideological reform) to any of them, except to HOETTL, and then only recently and only in part. The rest of the group he wanted to keep together because they represented a unit with extensive knowledge of a region, and he had in mind to offer their services to the Americans. This subject he discussed only at the end with these persons (aside from HOETTL and

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WANECK, who had earlier been informed of it).

GOETTSCH adds that WANECK never was told of the ideological basis for GOETTSCH's plans. WANECK, he says, had in recent years clearly separated himself from the LIMMLER and NSDAP line.

17. PSCHIKRIK, MUEHLMANN, NEUBACHER:

PSCHIKRIK, director of an electrical (?) plant in PRAGUE, GOETTSCH met through HOETTL about May, 1944. PSCHIKRIK became pretty thoroughly indoctrinated GOETTSCH's ideas, but he had no following behind him.

PSCHIKRIK urged that MUEHLMANN be initiated, because he was close to KALTENBRUNNER and GOERING, and MUEHLMANN was gradually (and partially) initiated. By the end of 1944, MUEHLMANN was convinced that the war should be ended in accordance with Austrian plans, and he and NEUBACHER worked on KALTENBRUNNER with this in view.

In 1944, PSCHIKRIK urged that the group find somewhere a man strong enough to use against HITLER and HIMMLER. GOERING came to mind, but there was doubt as to the prospects of using him, and he was never approached.

NEUBACHER had no definite group to add to the initiates, beyond some personal friends.

18. MEETING AT SALZBURG ABOUT 15 APRIL - SKORZENY:

GOETTSCH recalls that KALTENBRUNNER, SKORZENY, WANECK, GOETTSCH and MUEHLMANN were present at this meeting; there was a discussion of the fact that Amt VI was "hanging in the air", and GOETTSCH, who had previously been briefed by WANECK, proposed to dissolve it. He does not know exactly what was done later, except that WANECK was to be the head of whatever remnants there were. He says that he knew that STEINLE and PAEFFGEN were in the South at that time, and probably other figures of Amt VI; WANECK ordered STEINLE and PAEFFGEN to ALT LUSSEE.

SKORZENY asked for money that KALTENBRUNNER had promised him earlier for the Jagdverbande, and KALTENBRUNNER told him to get it from some one from Amt I (See Report 1, Para 11).

By this time, GOETTSCH had learned that there was little prospect of a retreat on the original scale, especially since HITLER was no longer intending to withdraw into the mountains. He hoped to find out through SKORZENY what strength the remaining resistance might have. He says that there was, however, no real discussion with SKORZENY about resistance plans at this meeting. He had already urged SKORZENY at LINZ to get control of the Werewolf, and had been told by SKORZENY that he had no direct connection with the Werewolf. No agreement had been made re SKORZENY's trying to get control.

SKORZENY had from the start (presumably of GOETTSCH's discussions with him) the idea of retiring to the mountains with a few hundred men and waiting.

KALTENBRUNNER knew nothing of the basic reason for which HOETTL and GOETTSCH wanted to win over the Werewolf; he thought that it was simply a question of the operation of the Jagdverbande and Werewolf, and that the Werewolf was to be given additional support through SKORZENY.

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19. WANEOK told GOETTSCH that KALTENBRUNNER had, after another meeting with WANEOK and SKORZENY at ALT AUSSEE, given orders that the Werewolf should not operate against the Western Powers. At the ALT AUSSEE meeting, SKORZENY told WANEOK that he agreed with stopping hostilities against the Western Powers.

20. MEETINGS AT GMUNDEN:

GOETTSCH now remembers that two meetings were held at GMUNDEN around 20 April. They were arranged by MUEHLMANN, and were aimed to bring together groups to make concrete plans. NEUBACHER was there, and urged that resistance be stopped. KALTENBRUNNER, PSCHIKRIK, GOETTSCH, WANEOK, WUEHRER (NEUBACHER's secretary, who also worked in VI E under WANEOK, and whom GOETTSCH met for the first time then) were present. The attempt was made to convince KALTENBRUNNER to use his power to bring about a change in the Government. They also discussed the possibility of stopping resistance against the Western Powers while it continued against Russia. KALTENBRUNNER gave no assurance that he would act to bring about a change of government.

21. MEETING AT STROBL AROUND 28 APRIL:

Here KALTENBRUNNER, MUEHLMANN, WANEOK, PSCHIKRIK, and GOETTSCH were again present, and in addition HOETTL and GLAISE-HORSTENAU. This meeting had the purpose of bringing together KALTENBRUNNER with GOETTSCH's circle.

WANEOK and GOETTSCH arrived late, after MUEHLMANN and HOETTL had already spent a long time with KALTENBRUNNER. KALTENBRUNNER had already agreed to a provisional Austrian Government; HOETTL was to try to get the approval of the Western Powers for it, and MUEHLMANN was to make contact with potential members. GOETTSCH remembers ENDER as a possible member; he himself proposed OTTMAR SPANN and Dr. DOPPLER. GOETTSCH urged KALTENBRUNNER to broadcast, ordering the end of resistance, but he refused.

GOETTSCH feels that KALTENBRUNNER would have had it in his power to prevent further action toward foundation of the redut, but that, probably out of a false sense of loyalty to HITLER, he refused to take positive action.

22. PLANS TO SET UP COURIER SERVICE WITH SKORZENY GROUPS - ZEISCHKA

About ten people from VI E were at ALT AUSSEE the end of April and the beginning of May - GOETTSCH does not reveal their names - and it occurred to him that one way to penetrate the activities of SKORZENY's people would be to place the ten men in SKORZENY's company, if possible, as couriers; they were largely competent mountaineers and so well qualified.

GOETTSCH says that he had ZEISCHKA discuss the possibility of acting as couriers, with these people, from some time about 20th of April on; GOETTSCH explained to ZEISCHKA something of the importance of being informed of the whereabouts of the SKORZENY groups. The penetration business was never actually carried out, nor were the men actually used as couriers.

GOETTSCH claims that these men withdrew to a cabin near ALT AUSSEE, and that WANEOK reported their whereabouts to the Americans. He does not know what became of them.

23. EICHMANN:

In connection with this plan, EICHMANN of Amt IV appears. He had come from PRAGUE in April to his home (?) in AUSSEE, and it occurred to

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GOETTSCH that he would be an ideal man to penetrate SKORZENY's group, consciously or not, since SKORZENY would certainly be sure that he could count on EICHMANN's eagerness to keep out of Allied hands.

Both GOETTSCH and ZEISOHKA talked with EICHMANN about the courier plan, and they succeeded at least in keeping him at AUSSEE. At the beginning of May, EICHMANN retired with the other intended couriers to their cabin.

24. SKORZENY knew little or nothing of the Austrian plans, nothing about GOETTSCH's idea of using his men as a sort of palace guard in connection with establishing a new government, and nothing about KRAUSBERGER.

25. KRAUSBERGER (Report No. 1, Para 10)

GOETTSCH was sure he could count on KRAUSBERGER, and knew where to reach him in case of need. GOETTSCH would have liked to have KRAUSBERGER's people at AUSSEE also for possible use as couriers, but was afraid that SKORZENY would notice them.

No other groups were thought of as possible palace guards.

26. KALTENBRUNNER'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF SKORZENY'S PLANS

KALTENBRUNNER knew nothing of GOETTSCH's plan to keep in touch with SKORZENY in order to weaken the reduct. GOETTSCH simply worked on KALTENBRUNNER to have him extend his own powers by getting SKORZENY's people under him.

27. MILLNER AND THE UNTEREHMEN HERZOG (Report No. 1, para 4)

On re-questioning, it appears that MILLNER did ask what GOETTSCH was doing in VIENNA, and GOETTSCH explained that he had the task of contacting ideological opponents. (COMMENT: This now agreed with HOETTL's testimony).

28. TRISCA:

GOETTSCH recalls his name, but cannot remember in what connection, even with a slight amount of additional information.

29. ZEISOHKA:

GOETTSCH had urged ZEISOHKA to keep his position as contact man for Amt VI with the Propagandaministerium, in the hope of developing contacts there. ZEISOHKA was transferred to VI E in January or February 1945, and received from WANECK the duty of keeping in contact with the Balkan Governments in exile at AUSSER. About 2 April GOETTSCH himself arrived at AUSSEE; he remembers discussing with ZEISOHKA the possibility of gaining some supporters among these governments, and he remembers that one of the ZANKOV brothers in the Bulgarian Government was favourable to their ideological plans. GOETTSCH says he had also tried to establish contact among the Serbs.

30. SPANN:

SPANN wanted to recruit in all center to the ideological basis of the group, but GOETTSCH feared such a large-scale expansion, since among other things it was dangerous because SPANN himself was being watched by the STAPO. GOETTSCH says he had discussed the possibility of a large-scale organization in 1941 with KRAUS, formerly of the (Sudeten) Kameradschaftsbund.

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