

December 1941

Third International Report

General Secretary
of the Party

Summary

1941

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REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956

1. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956

2. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956

(a) Summary of the Commission's findings and recommendations on the organization and administration of the FBI, 1956

(b) Summary of the Commission's findings and recommendations on the organization and administration of the FBI, 1956

(c) Summary of the Commission's findings and recommendations on the organization and administration of the FBI, 1956

(d) Summary of the Commission's findings and recommendations on the organization and administration of the FBI, 1956

SUMMARY: The Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956, was organized on July 1, 1956, to study and report on the organization and administration of the FBI. The Commission's report, dated December 1, 1956, contains a summary of its findings and recommendations. The Commission found that the FBI is a large and complex organization that has grown significantly since its inception in 1908. It found that the FBI's organization and administration are generally sound, but that there are several areas where improvements can be made. The Commission's recommendations include: (1) the creation of a new position of Director of the FBI, (2) the reorganization of the FBI's field offices, (3) the improvement of the FBI's personnel management system, and (4) the improvement of the FBI's financial management system.

1. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956

- A. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956
- B. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956
- C. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956
- D. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956
- E. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956
- F. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956
- G. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956
- H. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956
- I. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956
- J. Summary Report of the Commission on the Organization and Administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1956

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SUBJECT

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

[Illegible text block]

BACKGROUND

[Illegible text block]

[Illegible text block]

[Illegible]

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STEIMLE, Eugen, (Cont'd)

shootings of active partisans and Communists, which he considers justified under the provisions of international law, but he emphatically denies having ever ordered the shooting, or killing by other means, of civilians, Jews, or hostages. Although STEIMLE does not impress this agent as a cruel and bloodthirsty person, he will undoubtedly be a worthwhile subject for a special investigation by Allied War Crimes Authorities.

Although this report contains the bulk of Subject's factual knowledge of the GIS, as far as it is of direct GI interest, and as far as it will aid in further GI operations, STEIMLE is in a position to give further interesting information of a more general nature, such as "Inter-Office Politics in the RSHA", "Cooperation among the Agencies of the GIS", "Germany's Future", etc.

VI. RECOMMENDATION:

- (a) Subject, who has been transferred to USFET Interrogation Center, should be put at the disposal of such higher Allied agency that may, in order to complete their overall picture of the GIS, require a certain type of information from Subject which has not been covered in this report.
- (b) This case should be brought to the attention of the Allied War Crimes Authorities. In this connection Appendix #2 of this report might serve as a starting point for a special investigation.
- (c) Subject should be interned in accordance with SHAET Counter Intelligence Bulletin, dated 13 April 1945.

/s/ George G. Charig
GEORGE G. CHARIG,
Special Agent, CIC

APPROVED:

John G. Hammond
John G. Hammond,
Major, Infantry,
Commanding

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PERSONAL HISTORY OF SUBJECT, [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date]

PERSONAL

On [Date] [Name] was born at [Location]. [Name] was the [Number] child of [Parents]. [Name] was educated at [Schools]. [Name] was employed by [Employers]. [Name] was married to [Spouse] on [Date]. [Name] has [Number] children.

[Name] has been a member of [Organizations]. [Name] has held the following positions: [Positions]. [Name] has been active in [Activities]. [Name] has been a member of [Parties]. [Name] has been a member of [Groups].

POLITICAL

In the past [Name] was politically [Ideology]. [Name] was a member of [Party]. [Name] was active in [Activities]. [Name] was a member of [Groups]. [Name] was a member of [Parties]. [Name] was a member of [Groups]. [Name] was a member of [Parties]. [Name] was a member of [Groups].

[Name] was a member of [Party] from [Date] to [Date]. [Name] was a member of [Party] from [Date] to [Date]. [Name] was a member of [Party] from [Date] to [Date]. [Name] was a member of [Party] from [Date] to [Date]. [Name] was a member of [Party] from [Date] to [Date].

Several times in the past [Name] has been [Action]. [Name] was a member of [Party] from [Date] to [Date]. [Name] was a member of [Party] from [Date] to [Date]. [Name] was a member of [Party] from [Date] to [Date]. [Name] was a member of [Party] from [Date] to [Date]. [Name] was a member of [Party] from [Date] to [Date].

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criticism of such an effort. Nevertheless, Gruppe succeeded in realizing shortly the political aims and development in the countries coming under it, and, also, did it succeed in obtaining detailed information on the basis of collected news items, reports, and other data. The respective countries were each assigned irregular interviews. Special reports were made and submitted to Gruppe. fuhrer, SCHELLENBERG, or was up to SCHELLENBERG to decide whether they were to be filed or passed on through Dr. WILHELM BRUNNER, to HIMMLER, GIBBENS, or GOEBBELS. I was thoroughly satisfied and deeply interested in my work mainly because I was in complete agreement with SCHELLENBERG, especially in refusing the policy of the German Foreign Office. I both had the agency for an understanding with the western Allies and the German Foreign Office domestic and foreign aims of National Socialism, as well as the need of personnel changes in Germany's leadership. The situation was that SCHELLENBERG had to be very cautious. The Foreign Office did not support of the G.M.D. and rendered no support. Moreover, it continuously tried to impede our work. On the other hand, G.M.D. held a peculiar and controversial place within RSHA, often finding itself in juxtaposition to Amt IV (Georgap) because the nature of its work was entirely different, and there was a distinct difference in the type of people engaged in it. Due to his personality more and more people gathered around SCHELLENBERG. These people were all striving for new political ways, especially in regard to foreign policies and were of a generation which we felt was new compared with that of the 1920 Revolution. We were resolved to use our influence permanently and in an evolutionary way so as to convert our laws into practice at the right time. However, developments of the war after the invasion were so fast that there was no chance for the hoped-for development to go into effect. Evacuation of Amt VI to Camp "Waldburg" near BERLIN in Sep. 44 and to Castle "Lauenstein" in Thuringen in March 45 brought about separation of German leadership agencies to an extent which more and more curtailed the efficiency of Amt VI. Finally with the removal of the remainder of Amt VI to NEGERNSEE, all activity was suspended. Evacuation to LAUENSTEIN and NEGERNSEE was effected primarily by Gruppe VI B and VI C.

After cessation of hostilities, I personally left Austria for CHEMSEE, Bavaria. Early Aug. 45 I went to Wurttemberg to inquire the whereabouts of my family. I lived under the assumed name of Hermann BUEHLICH and also had a passport made out in this name for identification purposes. I had requested this passport from the Office of the President of Police, BERLIN, in 1944 for reasons of official business. When I was interrogated 2 Oct. 45 by CIC in BACKNANG I volunteered my original personal data. Having assured myself of the whereabouts and condition of my wife and children, I saw no more reason to hide from American authorities my political activities. I was alive, guided by idealism. The love of my country was born with me.

Signed: Eugen Steinle
 BACKNANG, 21 October 1945

SECRET
The following information was obtained from a report on the activities of the SS in the area of the Baltic Sea, dated 10/20/44.

SECRET
Activities of the SS in the Area of the Baltic Sea
Of the SS in the Baltic Sea

Part A: SS Activities in the Baltic Sea

1. The SS in the Baltic Sea area is organized into several units, including the SS Baltic Sea Division, the SS Baltic Sea Flotilla, and the SS Baltic Sea Air Corps. The SS Baltic Sea Division is the largest unit and is responsible for the administration and control of the Baltic Sea area. The SS Baltic Sea Flotilla is responsible for the control of the sea and the protection of the coast. The SS Baltic Sea Air Corps is responsible for the control of the air and the protection of the coast.

2. The SS in the Baltic Sea area is engaged in a variety of activities, including the control of the coast, the protection of the sea, and the control of the air. The SS Baltic Sea Division is responsible for the control of the coast and the protection of the sea. The SS Baltic Sea Flotilla is responsible for the control of the sea and the protection of the coast. The SS Baltic Sea Air Corps is responsible for the control of the air and the protection of the coast.

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He joined the Army on September 1942... from the Gestapo and was previously... investigations... of Gestapo... SCHLITZ... of the Gestapo... the war...

d. von RADETZKI... and comes from one of the... preter (Russian)... the army to which the... In the Spring of 1945... Summer of 1945... approved... which was made... of RADETZKI...

e. SCHLITZ... von RADETZKI... 35-36... makeup, SCHLITZ... legal mind for... long standing...

f. RUSSEL... the Krino... because of illness... in November 1942...

g. At the end of October 1942... fuhrer from Sonderkommando... a Kommissar of the Krino...

h. THOMAS... (Ukraine)... SCHLITZ... SS and Polizei... that THOMAS was... ness or injury...

George G. ...

Document No. 1000000

Report of the SS Security Service...
on the 17 October 1945...
Supplies...
Austria...
Stamps...
names...
when...

RENZ...
Research Department...
was occupied by...
of the...
the...
developments...
Lorenz...
of...
discharged...
Lorenz...

OSIC...
1945...
Commercial...
VI...
persons...
however...

VOERBERG...
1934...
expelled...
WOLLERCH...
who...

OHLBRUCK...
belonged to...
inefficiency...
and...

BICKER...
1909...
the...
Black Forest...
S...
perg...
L...
St...
the...

NOSSLO...
BICKER...
the...
occupations...
discovered...
he...
submitted...
in...
at...

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finally succeeded in... condition which... frequently became... in the VI... of the Secret... tive of Grub... VI, but this... tion was aggravated... Hospital in... the war. His... message from... 1945 in Tub... 35 years old.

ZSCHENKE... arrested in... He was a... STEINLE suggested... had done was... at that time... woman; thereupon... ment in the... used to good... saw him last... Sturmabfuhrer... Bad Toel... or French...

SOMNENHOL, Dr... CI War Room... information about... SONNENHOL since... where he was... Dr. SOMNENHOL... SONNENHOL has... the time... vnu for the... under Co... Office. He... Foreign Office... Intelligence officers... He was a member... VI, but thought...

BANDORI, Dr... Party #23970... STEINLE committed... civilian wife... Wuertemberg. He... Stuttgart. He... letter part of... ano (?), or where...

BAUER, Jakob... #83524... and entered... Home of the... trained for... proazcal. He... unity arose... nity of Lako... in Saarbruecken.

SECRET

Appendix No. 3 (Cont'd)

BEISSNER, Wilhelm, Sturmbannführer (SS) (Personality #115452, #1324, #38526, #1129, amended #1820) was Referent for AMT VI matters at the SD Einsatzkommando in North Africa (in 1943). His accomplishments in this capacity were completely unsatisfactory. None of the N-Notes which he reportedly built up in North Africa ever reported in after the German retreat. Therefore STEINLE dismissed BEISSNER from his group and also refused to make use of his services later on in Spain. Subsequently BEISSNER was active in Italy for a short period of time in connection with the withdrawal of the Duc and then transferred to VI 1/2 where he took care of the movements of the former Grand Mufti, who was in Berlin at the time. BEISSNER was finally dismissed by SCHEIDTWEGER in 1944 and referred to AMT VI to be used in another capacity. He was transferred to the B.d.S. Kreisstelle where he represented himself as still working for AMT VI. STEINLE therefore sent him a sharp rebuke and dismissed him. BEISSNER is approximately 33-35 years old.

DETERING, Otto, Hauptsturmführer (SS) (Personality #12248) was a member of Abt VI of the B.d.S. Paris, and so was on that Office in Vienna after the evacuation of France. He became Head of the Office in Vienna after the which was located at Sigmaringen. At the same time he was supposed to be acting as an observer of German operations in the same area. He was supposed to be activity never accomplished the task assigned to him. He was dispatched to Sigmaringen in March 1945. DETERING was responsible for the guidance and training of the German forces of the Milice, and it's utilization for AMT VI. DETERING went to Italy in January or March 1945 and requested AMT VI that STEINLE should accompany him. His request was granted. STEINLE has heard nothing further from DETERING since then. DETERING was responsible to the Gestapo in Sigmaringen. He was in charge of the post in Sigmaringen. DETERING is approximately 35 years old.

DOERING, Otto, Hauptsturmführer (SS) (Personality #96965 (?), #87017 (?), #101961 (?)) was transferred from AMT VI to AMT VII in 1944. Before that he had been active in Spain and France for AMT VI. He was transferred in the course of a disciplinary action during which he was accused of charges. In AMT VII he was put in charge of North African matters. In this capacity he belonged to Referat VI B 1, though the results of his work were evaluated by VI B 2. The work for North Africa was known under the cover name "PARSIFAL". DOERING was in charge of training and commitment of agents in the North African sector. STEINLE recalls only one successful commitment of an agent in Algiers, which resulted in the establishment of a radio contact. The situation in the West Indies from had to cease in the Spring of 1945. STEINLE eliminated the African operations and put PARISIFAL in the hands of the "Leistelle" with the task of establishing connections with France (perhaps through Arabs). This plan was put into effect in the Spring of 1945; however, it is not established whether or not any messages were actually received. DOERING had chosen Stuttgart as the seat of his department and was located there in a building which belonged to the Hitler Youth. STEINLE did not hear from him anymore during the last weeks before the final collapse and does not know of his present whereabouts. DOERING is approximately 35 years old. His wife used to live in Berlin.

ENDELMANN, Hans, Obersturmbannführer (SS) (Personality #10556) was a man, but an able and industrious co-worker. He was only a few years from Berlin. He took care of all financial questions of AMT VI and made the corresponding requests to VI A. He remained with Group VII during its movement around until it reached Tyrol. He was then discharged by Sturmbannführer FENDLER on 1 or 2 May in the vicinity of Innsbruck and nothing further has been heard of him since.

ERNST, Dr., Obersturmbannführer (SS) (Personality #110513) was taken over by the RSHA when the German forces in France were taken over. He was employed by the RSHA. In the past he was an employee of the Reichsministerium of the Interior. STEINLE has heard nothing of him since.

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Appendix No. 2 Cont.

the Chief of AMT... Dr. ERNST... Rottach-Eger... May, when the... Salzburg then... years old and...

FELPE, Obersturmbannführer... 1945... years old and... Langmarkstudium... ed the Criminal... He joined AMT... was detailed to... practical work... hear from him... in Dresden...

FREISE, Dr. Josef, SS Sturmbannführer... #120292... Head of AMT... the Schupo... believed from... ment FREISE... representative... Justice... porary residence... in the way of... Chief of AMT... ded to put FREISE... again in his... ferred him to... That was during... FREISE.

GIRARDIN, SS Obersturmbannführer... employed of AMT... od service... Standartenführer... Paris, with... is approximately... studied at the... member of the...

GOHL, Sturmbannführer... to the SD... Abt III, which... transferred in... called to AMT... rendered him... es Referent... Italian border... last station... 38-40 years old... entering the SS... made, that he...

GOTLOB, Josef, SS Sturmbannführer... ly 40-45 years old... Embassy in Lisbon... made...

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Jan 1943... originally... no longer... only... May 1945...

LEITENDOR, Milan... originally... no longer... only... May 1945...

ROMIC, SS... originally... no longer... only... May 1945...

GRUBER, Herbert... originally... no longer... only... May 1945...

YOUNG, Robert... originally... no longer... only... May 1945...

LANG, SS... originally... no longer... only... May 1945...

NEUBOURG, Dr... originally... no longer... only... May 1945...

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APPENDIX No. 4 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standarten-
fuhrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45.

Organization and Personalities of Amt. Mil., Especially Abteilung Mil. B.

The former Abwehr des OKW, previously known in OKW as Amt Ausland-
Abwehr, was transferred according to its elements into Amt MIL (Militarisches
Amt) of RSHA in the spring of 1944. The new Chief of Bureau (Amtschef) was
Oberst i.G. Hansen. After 20 July 1944, Chief of Bureau (Amtschef) VI,
Schellenberg, also took over the Amt Mil in dual function (Personalunion).
Remaining in Amt Mil of the old Abwehr were the so-called Abwehr I (Army,
Air, Navy), Abwehr II and Abwehr III (counter espionage in neutral and
enemy countries). The Amt Mil was organized along the same lines as the
Aemter of OKW into Abteilungen and Gruppen.

- Abteilung Mil A: Organization, Personnel, Training and Administration.
Abteilungsleiter: SS-Standarten-Fuehrer Dr. Sandberger.
- Abteilung Mil B: Western Theater of Operations.
Abteilungsleiter: SS-Standarten-fuehrer Steimle.
- Abteilung Mil C: Eastern Theater of Operations.
Abteilungsleiter: Oberstleutnant i.G.J.b. Ohletz.
- Abteilung Mil D: Sabotage and Destruction.
Abteilungsleiter: SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Skorzey.
(It is not known to Steimle to what extent Mil D has been
merged with VI 8.)
- Abteilung Mil E: Communications Section (Abteilung fuer Nachrichtenwesen)
Nachrichten Regiment (?)
Abteilungsleiter: Major Poratschkin.
- Abteilung Mil F: Tactical Intelligence (Abteilung fuer Frontaufklaerung)
Abteilungsleiter: Oberst i.G. Buntrock.
- Abteilung Mil G: Intelligence Technique (Nachrichtentechnik) such as paper,
ink, etc.
Abteilungsleiter: Oberstleutnant Boening
(According to Steimle's knowledge this Dept was later on
merged with VI 8.)

The Abteilung Mil B was broken down into the following Gruppen:

- Mil B1: headed by Major Kempf
- Mil B2: France and Belgium, headed by Hauptmann I. l. van Meuten who was transferred to Abwehrstelle Hamburg.
Abwehrstelle Hamburg was subordinated to Gruppe Mil B1 and dealt with Denmark,
Norway and Holland.

Mil B2: France and Belgium, headed by Hauptmann I. l. van Meuten.
Humpert was a Navy Reserve Officer and a merchant in civilian life.
He is about 50 years old. Steimle dismissed him on 25 April in Rottach-Egern.
He had the intention of remaining in the vicinity of Tegernsee and later on
of joining his wife in Berlin or Hamburg.
Subordinated to Gruppe Mil B2 were the Abwehrstellen Aachen and Wiesbaden.
Towards the end of March 45, Abwehrstelle Stuttgart was also subordinated to Mil
B2.

S E C R E T

Appendix No. 4 Cont'd

There was far too much German military red-tape: superiors and subordinates, too much centralization in administrative and financial matters. The diplomatic aspect was another problem. Only 5 or 6 officers actually possessed diplomatic passports, whereas the rest had merely certificates from the German Embassy to the effect that they were members of the Legation. Steimle points out that not a single Abwehr Officer as much as attempted even camouflaged diplomatic functions, so that everybody at the German Embassy could spot the members of the Military Intelligence. The climax of it all happened in Madrid when the German Embassy moved all KO members - with very few exceptions - to a building separate from the Embassy, the exterritoriality of which was rather questionable. For all these reasons it was no surprise to Amt Mil resp VI that the Spanish deportation list contained practically all names of KO members from its Chief down to the radio-operator handyman. Consequently, during Steimle's time of office, the Amt had to be aware that the KO was fully known to enemy counter intelligence and was under permanent surveillance. Besides the KO, Amt Mil had at its disposal in the Reich the nets of the various Abwehrstellen as indicated above, which relied for the most part on economic infiltration or worked through and with help of the travelling businessman. Subject is not familiar with details. Oberstleutnant von Bohlen should be best informed of the activities of the Military Intelligence Service in Spain.

Though Steimle's experiences in it were brief, he mentions the cooperation with Spanish Government Agencies:

An official or semi-official coordination work to Spanish agencies, possibly the Spanish General Staff, with the active military news-agencies (Aktiven Militaerischen Nachrichtendienst) did not exist. In so far as Intelligence obtained through subordinate Spanish Military units was concerned, it was found to be of poor quality and not usable. In this connection, Steimle remembers an "Order of Battle" of Anglo-American troops (divisions) fighting in France and Belgium, which evidently originated from Spanish Military circles. The Order of Battle was neither complete nor correct and contained some of the most unbelievable statements.

It is not known to subject how many semi-official connections Admiral maintained, though his numerous trips to Spain might lead to an assumption that they were numerous.

It seems to subject that semi-official coordination appeared to exist with the old "Abwehr III" as the Spaniards could utilize the results of the German counter espionage for themselves.

It therefore seemed that the "Amt Mil." could not count upon successful work of the "K.O. Spanien" and consequently gave the above mentioned new mission to Kleyenstueber.

B. KO Portugal. The chief's name is Lt. Colonel Friederici. He is a mentally clumsy and, from an intelligence point of view, incapable officer, whose recall was urgently demanded by Steimle. In the search to find an able successor, the recall did not materialize until the very end. The KO-chief in Portugal was a Lt. Colonel, 50 to 60 years of age. Until his appointment to this post, during the summer of 1944, he was Chief of the "Abwehrstelle" Krakau or Warschau. The entire KO consisted of about 7 to 10 officers. Its news-results were insignificant. On the other hand, one "Nachrichten-Netz 'Ostro'", guided directly by "Gruppe Mil B3" was especially successful in England. The name of the Chief of this "Netz" is unknown to Steimle. The "Netz" was known by the name of "Ostro" and was active in Portugal in economic affairs. Steimle mentions in this connection, that the good results of "Arabal" in Spain and "Ostro" in Portugal occasionally brought about the suspicion that enemy decoy-information was being delivered, although this never could be proven. The Headquarters of the individual Armed Forces, in spite of inquiries, never had any doubt as to the genuineness of the material.

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Appendix No. 4 Cont'd.

Steimle never had the possibility at his disposal to check.

C. KO Switzerland. Chief: Kapitaen zur See Meissner, whose real name possibly might have been Leissner. Meissner was active as Consul-General in Bern. He originally came from "Abwehr III" which was definitely noticeable in the work of the KO. The situation in Switzerland was such, that during most of the war years, and, due, to the fact that the country was surrounded by Axis powers, no contacts could be made by active "N.D." agents with enemy countries. On the other hand, the activities of the enemy "N.D." Agents, especially the Anglo-American and Polish NDs, was particularly strong throughout Switzerland. Therefore of prime importance with the KO was the counter-espionage, while the active espionage was very much neglected. This was proven quite emphatically to be a disadvantage upon the successful invasion of France. It was noted that the KO-Switzerland had no "ND-Netz" in France at their disposal the moment France was occupied and consequently any Intelligence of military interest up to the collapse of the Western Front. Aside from insufficient planning, the poor results might also be blamed on the withdrawal of Auersberg, Gisevics and Watjen, who in connection with event of the 20 July 1944 left the KO and undoubtedly went over to the enemy. See APP. No. 8.

The names of officers active in Switzerland are not known to Steimle, as he met only Meissner. During the subject's term of office only a Major Bohlen was sent in a diplomatic position. Major Bohlen up until that time was active in the "Amt Mil." He was, as far as Steimle knew, "Vice-Consul" in Bern for a very short time.

The KO Switzerland had no connections with the Swiss Intelligence Service. Subject knows that Meissner did not personally know Col Masson (or Maco). Occasionally, interesting political bulletins arrived by an officer of the Swiss ND. These bulletins supposedly originated from the Swiss Legations in New York and London. Strong anti-Russian tendency of the text could be noted after continued observation. The bulletins repeatedly brought to Steimle's attention the anti-Russian tendency of Anglo-American politics. It was never explained if this was so desired by the Swiss, as far as "Spälmateral" (fabricated material or information) was concerned, or if these developments actually gave a true picture of the situation.

Remarks: When the "Abwehr" was fused with the "Amt Mil.", the words "Kommandomeldegobiet" were used, rather than "Abwehrstelle" and "Kriegsorganisation" (KO). Example: 1. Abwehrstelle Stuttgart became Kommandomeldegobiet Stuttgart.
2. K.O. Spanien became Kommandomeldegobiet Spanien.

D. Additional Personalities.

During the training of the Miliz in Wuelflingen, later in Mengen, the following men were active: Hauptsturmfuehrer Detering and Hauptmann Kurrer. The latter was charged with the schooling of "Abt. Mil. B". Kurrer was relieved by Steimle from his post about December 1944. Until this time, he was active in the "Verwertung/Heer in der Abteilung Mil B". Kurrer is about 35 years old; he speaks perfect English and French, and, furthermore, was a very capable Intelligence Officer.

Korvettenkapitaen Strauch was active at the Leitstelle "Siegfried" in Marburg. He was charged with military affairs of the department Mil B. His work was known with Mil B by the code name of "Gunter".

/s/ George G. Charig
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG
Special Agent, CIC.

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APPENDIX No. 5 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standartenfuehrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45.

Summary of Recent Activities, Sources of Information, and Organization of
The GIS, especially Gruppe VI B, and Abt. Mil. B, in Spain, Portugal, England
And the U.S.A.

1. REFERENCE: Interrogation report on NEUBOURG, Dr. Ludwig, SS Obersturmfuehrer, chief of subsection VI-B-4-o RSHA, Berlin, by the 307th CIC Detachment, dated 30 Aug 1945.

2. SUMMARY: The undersigned agent does not intend this appendix to be exhaustive in its information. He further points out that part of the following information is already contained in the aforementioned reference and in other appendices of this report. The purpose of this appendix is to give a convenient survey of the general situation of the GIS in the above countries, in such a fashion that a reader will obtain a comprehensive conception of what agencies etc. of the GIS were active and available in those countries in the recent past. It should be borne in mind that the following information was given by the chief of Gruppe VI B and Amt. Mil. B, i.e., a man who was in an excellent position to obtain a rather clear over-all picture.

THE GIS IN SPAIN:

A. Amt VI:

1. The Polizei-Attache in Madrid (until the Fall of 1944 WINZER), although not directly a member of Amt VI, was one of its main sources of information. The Madrid Polizei-Attache, and others in other countries, were directly responsible to KALTENBRUNNER, who had created a special "Polizei-Attache Gruppe". (More details on Pol. Attaches are contained in Appendix #9). STEIMLE states that WINZER, although not always in harmonious relations with Amt VI, was extremely successful. In May 1944 WINZER obtained, probably through a V-Man, photostatic copies of the Anglo-American trade treaty within two days after its conclusion. This treaty covers important agreements concerning the exports of strategic metals (Wolfram) etc. The "leak" in the Spanish foreign office probably was a foreign office employee, who more or less regularly gave his reports to WINZER through a contact man. In this way Germany was fairly well informed on British-Spanish relations, and to a lesser extent, on Spanish-American relations. This source in the Spanish Foreign Office was available to WINZER (or his associates) since the end of 1943. STEIMLE termed this connection the most valuable in Spain and asserts that the German Foreign Office actually made use of the information thus obtained. STEIMLE further stated that the Germans had advance notice of their expulsion from Tangier (Tangiers).

2. Working actually inside the office of the Polizei-Attache was a representative of Amt VI. In Madrid this was SS Obersturmfuehrer SINGER, aided by SS Obersturmfuehrer KRUEGER. Their mission was to provide liaison between the Polizei-Attache and Amt VI. The sphere of activity of the Pol. Att. WINZER, as well as SINGER and KRUEGER, extended beyond Madrid, and also covered Barcelona, and formerly, until the closing of the German Consulate in Tangiers, Tetuan in Spanish Morocco. In Tangiers Amt VI also had a representative, an aid to the German Press Attache, a Herr SCHULZE, fnu, who returned to Germany after the closing of the German Consulate in Tangiers, and who was dismissed by STEIMLE in the Summer of 1944.

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3. "SOFINDUS": semi-official Spanish-German trade agency, led by BERNHARD, Johannes, SS Oberfuehrer (Details are contained in Appendix #7). BERNHARD was mainly a commercial executive within this corporation, but also a Amt VI representative. The Amt VI mission within SOFINDUS went under the name "GRILLE", and was headed by SS Sturmbannfuehrer MOSIG, who thereby became the main co-ordinator of all intelligence activity within SOFINDUS. The information obtained through SOFINDUS was not as important as that obtained through the Polizei-Attache, but SOFINDUS had, in STEINLE's opinion, great possibilities for development, because it provided easy commercial "covers" for agents. It also had access to high Spanish industrial and commercial circles, and, indirectly, to Allied commercial circles.

4. Between two and four agents, steered directly by Referat VI B4 (Spain) in Berlin, which was headed by SS Sturmbannfuehrer FENDLER, Lothar (see Appendix No. 3). They directed their mail through SINGER. One of these agents was operating a travel agency, probably in Sevilla. DOLLAR (until Nov 1945 in American custody, now in French custody) was a member of this group. Furthermore, there were at least two W/T stations near the French frontier, operated by agents who had been recruited by the Paris office of Amt VI, by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer ALISCH.

5. Special confidence men directly under SCHELLENBERG, chief of Amt VI:

- a. Prinz Max Egon zu HOHENLOHE, a citizen of Spain or Liechtenstein, alias "ALFONZO".
- b. Graefin (Countess) PODEWILLS MECHTILD, alias "CARMEN".

Prinz HOHENLOHE and Graefin PODEWILLS were also referred to as "Korrektivlinien des Amtchefs", i.e., the chief's personal checking system. During the summer of 1944, the Countess came under the jurisdiction of Referat VI-B-4 (Spain), RSHA. Her letters still were addressed to SCHELLENBERG, but were usually turned over to VI B4. She was paid by Amt VI, which was not the case with HOHENLOHE or SPITZY.

- c. SPITZY, responsible to SCHELLENBERG, probably working with or under HOHENLOHE. He formerly belonged to the German Foreign Office, which he left after a controversy.

6. Agents of Gruppe VI D (North and South America): ARNOLD, Karl, called "THEO", and MAXWALD. They were probably operating a beauty shop in Madrid or another large city. Their mission was to obtain information about North and South America through Spain.

7. Transmission of messages: Amt VI had a special arrangement with the German Foreign Office in Spain, as well as in other countries, with German Polizei-Attaches, or wherever Amt VI had pseudo-diplomatic representatives. According to that arrangement, Amt VI representatives could send messages in "green envelopes", which were not to be opened by members of the German diplomatic corps. Amt VI also had its own W/T connections with the RSHA. The transmitter was set up in the building of the German Embassy in Madrid. Many letters were transported through SINGER, Amt VI representative with the Polizei-Attache.

B. Amt Mil. (For details see Appendix No. 4)

1. Kommando-Meldegebiet Spanien, formerly KO-Spanien, 90% of which was concentrated in Madrid. Most of its members appeared on the list of persons to be expelled from Spain. That list was published by the Spanish Government in the Spring of 1944, and originally comprised 400-500 names. Through negotiations the Germans were able to reduce that number to below 100. The Kommando-Meldegebiet (KdM) Spain consisted of approx. 80-100 men, including section "CHI", i.e. the coding, decoding and deciphering section. Only four or five officers of the KdM Spain were in the possession of true diplomatic credentials. Besides Madrid, Barcelona was a concentration point for personnel of the KdM.

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Leiter of the KdM (formerly KO) Spain was LENZ, fnu, Kapitän zur See, who, however, was well known to the Allies as a leading German Intelligence Officer. He was therefore replaced in Oct 1944 by Lt. Col. KLEYENSTUEBER. LENZ was instructed to continue posing as Leiter of the KdM Spain to give KLEYENSTUEBER an opportunity to reorganize the KdM unobtrusively. (Agent's Note: KLEYENSTUEBER's real role in Spain may not be known to Allied Intelligence yet. Further details about KLEYENSTUEBER and his work in Spain are contained in Appendix No 4). KLEYENSTUEBER's function was, according to STEIMLE, (a) to clean up the KdM from a personnel point of view. He was to select, if possible, the persons that should be placed on the Spanish expulsion list, (b) to consider and start with a reorganization of Amt Mil. in Spain. He succeeded in placing 5-6 German Intelligence Officers in Spain, outside the channels of the KdM, with good "cover". (c) He was to coordinate the efforts of the KdM Spain with those of the KdM's inside Germany, that had ties, contacts and possibly agents in Spain.

2. The "ARABAL-NETZ", led by Sonderführer KUEHLENTAL, operated with Spain as its base, and was successful in obtaining military information from and about England.

C. STEIMLE's Comment concerning possible GIS postwar activity in Spain, in particular, and other Western European countries, in general.

1. STEIMLE states that at the time of the German collapse and the cessation of all W/T and all other connections with Spain, there was no directive in existence concerning continued and postwar GIS operations in Spain or any other countries under STEIMLE's jurisdiction. The last directive to be addressed to the GIS in Spain by STEIMLE was dated approx. 15 April 1945. It had been drawn up by von BOHLEN, Leiter of Mil. B3, and SS Sturmbannführer FENDLER, Lothar, Leiter of Referat VI B4 (Spain). It exhorted the members of the GIS in Spain to continue their operations even if the situation looked difficult and discouraging. It promised that the leading men of the RSHA would not let them down. STEIMLE states that this directive was based on the assumption that "Festung Alpenland" (Fortress Alps) could be held by German troops, an assumption that STEIMLE made on the strength of reports received from SANDBERGER. STEIMLE states that no orders were given to the GIS men in Spain or any other country under STEIMLE's jurisdiction for a continuation or discontinuation of GIS operations, at the time of the German collapse. STEIMLE pointed out that, forced by developments and circumstances, the GIS abroad has no possibility of a continued functioning.

The German diplomatic service, which served as a cover for much of the GIS activities abroad, is not in existence any more. German official property and funds are probably confiscated. There is a possibility, according to STEIMLE, that in the case of the SOPINDUS in Spain, some funds are invested "beyond recognition", i.e. they may not be identified as German funds. In conclusion, STEIMLE stated that to the best of his knowledge and in his opinion, a German Intelligence Service does not exist any more.

THE GIS IN PORTUGAL:

A. Amt VI:

1. Polizei-Verbindungsführer (Police Liaison Officer) with the German Diplomatic Corps in Lisbon. This position was held by SCHROEDER, Erich, SS Sturmbannführer, who obtained information mainly about purely Portuguese affairs. He had V-men who held official positions in the Portuguese Government.

2. Two representatives of Amt VI under the official cover of scientific assistants (Wissenschaftliche Assistenten) with the German Embassy in Lisbon. NASSENSTEIN, fnu, SS Sturmbannführer, and VOLLBRECHT, Dr. fnu, SS Sturmbannführer. NASSENSTEIN showed great interest in North and South American affairs, while VOLLBRECHT was engaged in the creation of a net of German V-men, made up of merchants, teachers etc.

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Both men have been interned in Portugal, STEIMLE believes. There was a third AMT VI representative with the German Embassy in Lisbon. He was assistant of the German Commissioner of Wolfram, Pres. or of Transport. NASSENSTEIN, although a representative of Gruppe VI B, covered, mainly, work for Gruppe VI D (The Americas). He submitted his reports in duplicate, one copy going to VI B and one to VI D.

B. Amt Mil. (See Appendix No. 4)

1. Kommando-Meldegabiet Portugal, formerly KO Portugal, Oberstleutnant FRIDERICI in charge. He was assisted by KRAEMER (or KRAEHMER), who was a VI Z (counter intelligence) man, and a Major, who was in charge of Abteilung I (the former Abwehr I, i.e., positive intelligence).

2. The "OSTRO-NETZ", led by a German merchant with the cover name of OSTRO. This net produced excellent secret military information, which was submitted in weekly reports. This net had good connections with England. It was only very little known and not even the Kommando-Meldegabiet Portugal knew about it. The officer at the RSHA, Berlin, who handled all the OSTRO matters, was Oberleutnant (1st Lt) von KARNAPP (or CARNAP, spelling uncertain), who is said to have remained in Berlin when the RSHA was evacuated. STEIMLE states that the "OSTRO-NETZ" was considered extremely successful and more important than the KdM Portugal and the Portuguese Amt VI connections combined.

THE AMT MIL. IN ENGLAND

(Amt Mil. in England was under STEIMLE's jurisdiction, and came under the jurisdiction of Gruppe VI D, Dr. PAEFFGEN in charge).

1. One source of information for the GIS in England was a W/T connection handled by Ast Wiesbaden. The agent was a Polish officer, who had been apprehended in France by Abwehr III in 1941 or 1942 as an Allied espionage agent. He was to be tried for espionage, but was then "turned", and sent back to England. He actually was in more or less continual contact with Ast Wiesbaden until a few months before the German collapse. His family lived in Germany, which put the Abwehr in a very advantageous position and kept the Polish officer under pressure. His information was considered as important and reliable. He probably had a responsible position with a British or Polish military staff. He had been recruited by Oberstleutnant (Lt. Col.) REIHLE, or REILE (spelling uncertain) of Abwehr III in Paris. His operations, as stated above, were steered by the KdM, Wiesbaden.

2. The "ARABAL-NETZ", operating from Spain (see paragraph B sub-paragraph 2)

3. The "OSTRO-NETZ", operating from Portugal (see paragraph B sub-paragraph 2)

4. A French Colonel, alleged pro-de Gaulle man. He came to North Africa after a "phony" escape from France and joined the de Gaulle forces. He actually was sent by the KdM Wiesbaden. He remained in North Africa until the summer of 1944 and then went to France with the Allied Forces. STEIMLE states that this Colonel was an extremely important source of military information. (Agent's note: This Colonel may be identical with the man who was reported arrested by the "Stars & Stripes" in the summer of 1945. This agent has the vague recollection that said Colonel was attached to SHAEF).

5. FRITZCHEN (cover name), an English V-man who maintained a W/T connection with the KdM Wiesbaden until the Spring of 1945. He was steered by Rittmeister von GROENINGEN (?) who was transferred to KdM Wiesbaden by STEIMLE in Sept or Oct 1944. FRITZCHEN had been on the Continent in 1943 or before. He was to obtain information in the industrial sector, especially information pertaining to British anti-submarine devices. FRITZCHEN had a criminal record for theft or embezzlement some time ago.

6. A connection steered by the KdM Hamburg, about which nothing further is known to STEIMLE.

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7. A further valuable source of information were the "phoney" or "turned" W/T operators, i.e. British or Allied W/T agents that had been apprehended in Western Europe by the GIS and that had then been forced to maintain W/T connection with England under the supervision of Amt IV. SS Hauptsturmfuehrer or Sturmbannfuehrer KOPKOW, of Amt IV, specialized in arranging and carrying through these "plays". STEIMLE claims that it was through such W/T agents that the Germans discovered or obtained confirmation of the exact invasion date at least 24 hours before the invasion took place.

8. STEIMLE's Comment about the GIS Situation in England: The sources of the GIS in England were not numerous but valuable. The agents and informants were well placed and had access to important information, which was mostly confined to the military sector. There were no agents of Gruppe VI B in England and probably none of VI D either. STEIMLE claims that the GIS had a good picture of the disposition of Allied troops in England, their training sites, equipment etc., and that the great majority of divisions which saw action on the Western Front had been identified when they were still in England.

THE GIS IN THE USA: (This is covered in detail in Appendix No. 6)

A. Amt Mil.:

1. Two W/T Connections existed between the USA and the KdM Hamburg. The results were very disappointing. No valuable information of military nature was received. One V-man had the code name KOEHLER.

B. Amt VI:

1. The chief of Gruppe VI D, Dr. PAEFFGEN, never disclosed any VI D connections with America to STEIMLE, leading the latter to believe that none existed. There were no VI B agents in America.

/s/ George G. Charig
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG
Special Agent, CIC

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APPENDIX No. 6 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standartenfuhrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 1945.

The Situation of the "German Secret Service" (Especially Amt. Mil. B) in the U.S.A.

When STEIMLE took over the department "Mil. B" of the "Militaerisches Amt" in RSHA during August 1944, he found the following situation regarding the USA sector. The German "Militaerischer Nachrichten Dienst" had not a single reporting post at its disposal. None could furnish any intelligence material whatsoever to the German G.M.D. This condition prevailed up to the collapse during May 1945. As improbable as this might seem, it still is a fact, STEIMLE states, that the German "Militaerischer ND" in the entire US Sector was a complete failure from the very beginning. All attempts to rectify this situation had negative results. STEIMLE came to this conclusion on the basis of his knowledge of the contacts and sources which the former "Amt Abwehr" had in the USA at the time it was absorbed by the RSHA in the summer of 1944. Furthermore, he claims knowledge of what was undertaken by the "Amt Mil." since that time. From information received by former Abwehr officers who were taken over by the "Amt Mil.", it became clear that in former years also no real and genuine intelligence channels went to the USA.

However, subject cannot make a statement about possible personal connections of Admiral CANARIS. He has never heard of any such connections with the USA and does not believe that any existed. However, attempts were often mentioned to transport V-men to the USA during the course of the war in submarines. These efforts remained unsuccessful, because of either the sinkings of the subs during the crossing, or because of immediate arrest of the V-men by the police after their landings. It is not known to STEIMLE how often and at what times such missions were attempted. Not only did the "Abwehr", i.e., "Amt Mil." engage in this sort of activities, but also the "Gruppe VI D". As far as is known to STEIMLE, "Gruppe VI D" also failed in the USA sector.

Of the "Kommandonebegebiet", as far as is known to Subject, only "K.d.M. Hamburg" had two connections to the USA. Nothing in particular, however, is known to STEIMLE about these. In this connection, only the name V.M. KOEHLER is remembered by STEIMLE. The Hamburg connections, too, were without results. Not a single receipt of one important military news item from the USA is known to STEIMLE. He maintains he would have been informed if such had been the case. 8K
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This deplorable condition of the German ND in the US was the subject of numerous discussions in the "Amt Mil.". During all the time STEIMLE was in office, no criticism was voiced by the various staffs of the Wehrmacht. This might be explained by the fact that, before the invasion, US troops stationed in England were covered by the German ND in England, and after the invasion through the "R-Netz" in France, covering the embarkation, movement and strength of troops.

STEIMLE claims that absolutely nothing is known to him about the activities in the USA of "Abt VI W", especially of "VI W/n".

Little is known to the Subject about the cause for the dismal failure of German Intelligence Service in the USA. However, certain comments of former "Abwehroffiziere" point to the fact that the last German military attache in USA might have played an important role in this connection. It appears, that before entry of the US into the war he prohibited every preparatory activity of the German military ND. He rather worked on the assumption that his own knowledge of US affairs would be sufficient. Whether or not he himself made preparations in case of war against the US is not known to STEIMLE. STEIMLE remembers to have read in the press of the discovery of a German ND organization in the US shortly before the USA entered the war. At any rate, the ND did not function in the USA.

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During the time STEIMLE was in office, he carefully had the problem of the ND in the USA scrutinized. However, due to rapid war developments, his efforts did not pass the investigation stage. He planned to form a Gruppo "U" and to charge this group with all activities against the US. In preparation of this plan, STEIMLE ordered detailed interrogations of German officers, who he returned from US PW camps on an exchange basis. In this manner he wanted to explore the possibility of using PW channels to dispatch agents. The plan was to send by submarine individual German officers, particularly naval officers, to prisoner-of-war cages, from which they were to escape to work in the USA. These officers were to have thorough knowledge of the country, possess a special aptitude for this sort of work, and were to be selected on this basis. They were to receive specialized training, particularly in code and the construction of radios, and thus to be prepared for their activities.

To insure success it would have been necessary to establish an "Anlaufstelle" (starting point or station) or perhaps several of them. This station would have been there to give information to escaped Prisoners of War, furnish them with the necessary papers, money and keys. At these interrogations it appeared that it might be possible for prisoners to escape from their stockades and then to start work for a ND group. This, however, would only have been possible if the necessary papers and money were put at the disposal of the escaped officers at an earlier date.

Subject states, however, that this plan did not progress further than the examination stage and, especially, that no selection of officers for schooling had begun. STEIMLE's temporary appointee in these affairs was Hauptmann VAN VZEUTEN. STEIMLE had him transferred to the K.d.M. Hamburg, as he intended to put K.d.M. Hamburg in charge of all American affairs.

/s/ George G. Charig
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG
Special Agent, CIC.

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APPENDIX No. 7 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standartenfuhrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 1945.

The Organization "SOFINDUS" in Spain, and its leader, SS Oberfuhrer BERNHARD

"SOFINDUS" is the name of a semi-official corporation founded during the Spanish Civil War. While STEIMLE does not know too much about the legal structure of "SOFINDUS", it may safely be assumed that the corporation operated under the auspices and guidance of the German Ministry of Economics (Reichswirtschaftsministerium), insofar as German interests in "SOFINDUS" were concerned. The corporation engaged in barter-trade, i.e., the export of Spanish commodities to Germany and the importation of German goods in Spain. "SOFINDUS" may be regarded as an attempt to monopolize semi-officially the important foreign trade of these two countries. STEIMLE is not informed whether or not other companies, aside from "SOFINDUS", engaged in German-Spanish trade nor does he know whether or not contracts of individual business concerns had to have the sanction of "SOFINDUS". "SOFINDUS" had several subsidiary companies. Outstanding was the delivery of Spanish ores, wolfram in particular. STEIMLE believes the corporation also owned mines and plants in Spain. Within the Ministry of Economics (Reichswirtschaftsministerium) it was Ministerialrat (?) BETTIKE who handled "SOFINDUS" affairs. Mr. Johannes BERNHARD was the company's manager in Spain. He had an assistant for the commercial branch of the business, but STEIMLE does not know his name. BERNHARD is said to have been a rather unsuccessful merchant in Hamburg. He emigrated to Spanish Morocco and settled down as a business man. There he became acquainted with Franco. At the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, he went to see Goering at Franco's request. It was in this connection that a German-Spanish "transportation company", for the purpose of movement of Spanish troops from Morocco to the mainland was founded. It would be reasonable to assume that BERNHARD played an important role in the delivery of German war materials to Spain. From that time on, BERNHARD entertained personal connections with Franco and Goering. In any case, the foundation of "SOFINDUS", as well as the appointment of BERNHARD as manager, were based on the Spanish Civil War. Later on, the German ambassador STOHRER eased BERNHARD out of his political position, with the result that BERNHARD had to obtain permission from the German Embassy before he could contact or negotiate with Spanish political agencies. This rule applied up to the end of the war. STEIMLE does not know when BERNHARD joined the SS, presumes that it happened after the end of the Civil War. He did not belong to the SD, but was a member of the "Allgemeine SS" and appeared on the roster of the Reichsfuehrung SS. According to subject's knowledge he was promoted to SS Oberfuhrer in 1944. BERNHARD is about 50 years old. He lived with his family in Madrid and came to Germany on official business only. STEIMLE saw him last in Berlin in the summer of 1944 (July?).

Collaboration between "SOFINDUS" and Amt VI; no collaboration existed in 1943 when STEIMLE assumed office. It was only during the summer of 1943, when BERNHARD happened to be in Berlin and conferred with SCHELLENBERG and STEIMLE that BERNHARD agreed to put his information on politics and economics - gained through social contacts - at the disposal of Amt VI, within the framework of "SOFINDUS". The cover name "GRILLE" for the project was then agreed upon.

SS Sturmbannfuhrer Eugen MOSIG, primarily an Intelligence operator (ND Mann) who had been in charge of Referat VI B 4, was thereupon transferred to Spain as a director of "SOFINDUS". It was his task to exploit the connections and capabilities of "SOFINDUS" for the purpose of gathering political information as well as information on economics. MOSIG started his job about September 1943. Later on he was assisted by a certain LACKNER, who had been a resident of Spanish Morocco before the war. His achievements were poor and he was expelled from Spain in 1944. The organization "GRILLE" had at its disposal a fairly large number of V-men, partly within and partly outside of "SOFINDUS". MOSIG

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exploited BERNHARD's social connections by frequently attending parties at BERNHARD's home. He also arranged for parties at the BERNHARD home for the purpose of gathering intelligence. Thus it was made possible for the "GRILLE" organization to obtain fairly comprehensive political and economic information not only on Spain but also on England and the US, inasmuch as such information was available to Spanish individuals. All such information was transmitted to the Central Office. In this manner, the Germans were pretty well up to date on conditions in Spain, while information on England and the US was necessarily only sketchy. Until the end of the war, the "GRILLE" organization was unable to establish what might properly be called a real secret service system, and permanent channels to England and the US existed. An explanation for this deficiency would be the youth of the "GRILLE" organization. In any case, "GRILLE" was of great value to Amt VI and an expansion and further development of the organization appeared promising.

BERNHARD's motives in cooperating with AMT VI, in STEIMLE's opinion, was not idealism, but that he saw in it the possibility to strengthen his position in Berlin, particularly with the Ministry of Economics. At the same time, he frequently approached Amt VI for support of some economic plan or other which he liked to describe as of great interest to "GRILLE". This attitude was significant for BERNHARD's character. He is highly qualified, smart and shrewd business man, but there is a great deal of egotism in all he does. In summing up, STEIMLE states his belief that the only basis for an efficient intelligence system, be it in the field of military, political or economic intelligence, is commercial organizations (Wirtschaftliche Organisationen). The collaboration between Amt VI and "SOFINDUS" was the first experiment in this respect.

/s/ George G. Charis
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIS
Special Agent CIC.

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APPENDIX No. 8 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standardfuehrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45.

The "Desertion" of the Abwehr Officers AUERSBERG, GISEVIUS, and VAETJEN, in Switzerland

1. Prinz zu AUERSBERG was the representative of Abwehr I Luft in Switzerland until after 20 July 1944. His official position was aid to the German Luftwaffenattache in Bern. After the events of 20 July 1944 he appeared at the office of the Abwehrleiter of the "KO Schweiz", Generalkonsul MEISSNER, for a conference. In spite of MEISSNER's attempts at persuasion, AUERSBERG resigned from the Abwehr, and with him the Abwehr officers GISEVIUS, and VAETJEN. One or both of the latter men actually contacted British or American intelligence circles in Switzerland. As a result of this, according to STEIMLE, all further Amt Mil. work in Switzerland was impossible. Another result was, according to STEIMLE, the expulsion by the Swiss authorities of DAUFELDT, Hans, German Vice Consul at Lausanne, and Amt VI representative for Switzerland. DAUFELDT was replaced by Graf DOENHOFF, former resident of Africa, later active in the AO (Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP). Both DAUFELDT and DOENHOFF were reported arrested by War Room Publication, CI War Room London, dated 4 Sept 1945.

/s/ George G. Charig
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG,
Special Agent, CIO

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APPENDIX No. 9 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS
Standartenfuhrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin,
12 Dec 45.

Police Attaches and Diplomats Who Were Active for Amt VI.

STEIMLE is unable to state when the office of Police Attache (Polizeiattache) was created. The first Attaches were in Italy and Spain. He believes they were dispatched to these countries in 1937 or 1938. These countries (Spain and Italy) also had their own police attaches in Germany. The Attaches were part of the diplomatic Corps. However, they were Himmler's appointees and subordinated to him in his capacity as Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of the German Police. They were supposed to be the representatives of the SS and the German Police and to act as liaison with the police forces of the countries they were accredited to. With one single exception all Attaches were proposed by and drawn from Amt IV. The reason for this might be that Amt VI was not in existence when the Office of Police Attache was created and that later on Amt VI was not particularly interested in Attache appointments. In 1944 Amt VI had the following Police Attaches:

- 1) Rome: Obersturmbannfuhrer Keppler
- 2) Madrid: Sturmbannfuhrer Winzer
- 3) Sofia: Obersturmbannfuhrer Hoffmann
- 4) Bukarest: Sturmbannfuhrer Richter (From SD-Inland, Amt III)
- 5) Agram)
- 6) Presburg) unknown to STEIMLE
- 7) Budapest)
- 8) Lisbon had a unique position. It had a Polizeiverbindungsfuhrer (Police-Liaison-Official): Sturmbannfuhrer Schroeder. He did not occupy an official Attache position, although he was a member of the diplomatic Corps.
- 9) Tokio: Standartenfuhrer Meissinger

Keppler remained in Italy up to the debacle. His last position was that of Liaison-Official (Verbindungsfuhrer) with the Italian Security Police. Winzer has been missing since the Fall of 1944, when the plane which was supposed to take him to Spain was lost. The fate of Winzer was never ascertained. No new appointment was made and the post was filled temporarily by an employee of the Office of Police Attache. STEIMLE believes his name was Vey (?) but is not certain of it. At the time of the collapse Schroeder was in Portugal. Hoffmann has been missing since Bulgaria's desertion. According to radio-news in Aug 44 Hoffmann was captured by the Russians. It was within the scope and function of the Police Attache to work for Amt VI on secret intelligence. Madrid was the most successful in the Western Sector. This Office was reinforced by Obersturmbannfuhrer Singer, but it's success was Winzer's merit. Friction was frequent between Amt VI and the Police Attaches, the latter refusing to execute missions of a secret nature by referring to their official status of diplomats. But there were additional difficulties. The Police Attaches in RSHA belonged to an Attache group (Attachegruppe) responsible directly to the Chief of SIPO and SD, instead of to the Aemter. Chief of the Attache group was SS Standartenfuhrer Zindel. Zindel was a Kriminalpolizei official in the higher brackets (hoeherer Beamter) in charge of the Attache group since its inception in 1944. The Attache group demanded that all correspondence with the Attaches be cleared through it. For that and also for other reasons, Amt VI refused more and more to work with the Attaches and tried to get its own representatives into the German Legations.

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Appendix No. 9 Cont'd

This turned out to be an extremely complicated and difficult project:

- 1) Due to pressure from the Allies, the countries with which Germany had diplomatic relations were opposed to the idea of enlarging the diplomatic corps.
- 2) The Foreign Office opposed 90% of Amt VI infiltration suggestions on the grounds that the Abwehr had been doing the exploiting since the outbreak of war.
- 3) Amt VI did not have at its disposal sufficient number of linguists or personnel familiar with foreign countries. Consequently the following personalities were active as diplomatic functionaries in the Western Sector:

Vatican: Obersturmbannfuhrer Elling (interned by the Allies in 1944)

Switzerland: Vice Consul Daufelot (expelled in 1945)
Graf Doenhoff (entered Switzerland in March 45)

Portugal: Sturmbannfuhrer Massenstain
Sturmbannfuhrer Dr Vollbrecht

There were none in Spain.

/s/ George G. Charig
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG
Special Agent, CIC

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APPENDIX No. 10 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standartenführer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45

The "J-NETZ" (Stay-Behind "Information Net") of AMT VI in Western Europe

The political and military situation in Western Europe was characterized by Allied preparations for the Invasion at the time STEIMLE took charge of his post in AMT VI in February 43. Therefore, after a brief period of orientation, STEIMLE proposed the formation of an "invasion-net" (I-NETZ) to Mr. SCHELLENBERG. After his Chief agreed to this plan, a corresponding order was signed by KALTENBRUNNER in May 1943.

The order read that a net of confidence men was to be built up in sections of France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway in view of a possible invasion of the territories in question. That would enable AMT VI to obtain information from these territories in case of an invasion. Individual instructions were to be given by AMT VI. The order was issued to the Commandants of the SIPO and SD in Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Oslo and Copenhagen.

During the succeeding period it was the task of REFERAT VI B 2 (the competent operational headquarters) to see that this order was complied with in full detail; that the corresponding operational organizations, i.e. the AMT VI in Paris, Brussels, The Hague, etc., were properly advised, and that the creation of the "J-Netz" was controlled.

The order was taken very lightly, especially - and absurdly enough - by the BdS, Paris, Dr. KNOCHEN, who presented it as completely unnecessary and therefore did not support it. It is known to STEIMLE that Dr. KNOCHEN, the BdS, Paris, made statement whereby he thought it impossible that an invasion would succeed. He also expressed the opinion that, if Paris were already lost to the Allies, the war for Germany would be lost too. This attitude of the BdS was the first great barrier for the formation of an J-Net. Furthermore, AMT VI was lacking in experience at that time. Only after constant pressure did AMT VI in Paris charge a few men with the new task.

LANG, who was in charge after RICKLER, had no experience in the intelligence service. His only qualification was an excellent knowledge of the French language. The only positive work was done principally by SS HSCHAF RISSMANN, who made every effort to recruit experienced confidence men. He received no support whatsoever from the BdS or the individual commanders of the SIPO and SD a mistake which was made initially was that they failed to take the technical qualifications of the V-men into consideration at the time of the recruitment. Thus, a high percentage of the agents was disqualified after a short training period.

The following places were used as training centers: a school in Paris which was very inefficient, a radio school in The Hague, and - in a few instances - a school in Lehnitz near Berlin. The training subjects in all three schools were radio techniques and procedure. They were not attended successively, but each agent went to only one school.

As far as STEIMLE knows the Paris School was without its own Chief. The agents lived elsewhere and attended classes whenever ordered to do so. STEIMLE remembers vaguely that one of the French radio instructors who taught in Paris was arrested later on as an enemy agent. As a consequence of this incident, a considerable number of trained people could never be committed. The Paris School may be considered a failure.

The school at The Hague was an institution of VI S, with a subsection for radio training. The greater part of the pupils were trained there. However, too much time was lost there through military training which was not necessary for the commitments of agents of VI B. Furthermore the classes were too big and too many people got acquainted with each other (though certain security measures were taken, such as cover-names and undercover contact places).

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The School Lehnitz, which was under command of VI F H was scheduled to close later on because of insufficient results. The constant cause of complaints in this school was the poor personal care the pupils received and, also, the unfavorable composition of the pupils from the different countries.

The training of the pupils in missions of political nature and other directives were given individually to each agent by the German supervisor responsible for them. But it seems to STEIMLE that this was also done in a very inadequate manner.

The fact that the agents were recruited without exception from pro-German groups proved to be the biggest mistake. In many cases these men had to be considered as "verbrannt" (too hot). Finally, the establishment of an agent in a pre-arranged zone of activity was carried out too late in many cases. Thus, the newly settled resident was under special scrutiny after the invasion. As soon as the invasion started, every responsible person concerned realized that the established "J-Netz" would bring no important results.

STEIMLE does not remember the exact number of agents, who were "settled" in the different countries. As far as he recalls, it was approximately as follows:

In France	about	15-25
In Belgium	"	10-15
In Holland	"	10-16

Radio contact with V-men was actually established in France with 5-7 men, in Belgium with 2-4 men, in Holland none. The incoming radio messages were received at a radio station in the Black Forest and passed on to the Leitstelle "WALTER" resp. "SIEGFRIED". From there they were sent either to Amt VI with comments attached or else they were exploited by the Leitstellen on their own authority. To STEIMLE's knowledge, nothing but descriptions of morale and general conditions in France were contained in those radio messages by agents of the J-Net. However, demands for money, etc arrived very soon. He had the impression that in some cases a "game" (double play) was being played. He did not know the details since it was the task of BICKLER and his men to take care of any matters concerning the "Netz".

One fact became clear to STEIMLE: among the agents there was not one man who could give any important political news since apparently they were all "little" people. Furthermore, the geographic construction of the "Netz" was wrong, as it was located solely in the coastal districts and its most easterly outpost was in Paris. Of course, the LEITSTELLEN "WALTER" and "SIEGFRIED" endeavored later on to amplify the "Netz" but without success.

It may be assumed that the persecution of collaborators eliminated some of the agents. Furthermore, the rapid military and political developments had a most unfavorable effect on any further cooperation of the agents. Added to this is the fact that the supply of money and equipment became more difficult each week, since the "Luftwaffe" furnished us only a few planes, a great number of which were shot down.

A real political intelligence service in France after the invasion was out of the question, according to STEIMLE.

/s/ George G. Charig
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG
Special Agent, CIC.

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APPENDIX No. 11 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standardenträger, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 46

The "R-NETZ" (Stay-behind "Retreat Net") of Amt. Mil. in the
Western Theater of Operations

It is not known to STEIMLE at what time the former Amt Abwehr received the order to establish a "Rückzugsnetz" ("R-Netz") in France, Belgium and Holland. However, he was informed that up to Spring 1944 there was only an order permitting an establishment of an "R-Netz" throughout the Atlantic and Channel coast. Where this order originated, is not known to him. Accordingly, the results of the "R-Netz" were rather poor.

The "Netz" were established according to the elements of the armed forces, for instance, one "Netz" for the Army, one for the Airforce and one for the Navy. The amount of established supporting points is not known to STEIMLE. He seems to remember that the Heer had about 100 V-Leute, the "Luftwaffe" about 20 to 30 and the "Marine" (Navy) about 15. Each V-Man received a certain amount of schooling. He was schooled in radio and code, and was supplied with money and radios. It is not known to STEIMLE whether this training was given individually or collectively, as at this time he was not yet in charge of Abteilung Mil. B. In most cases individual schooling was used, STEIMLE presumes.

The agencies charged with R-Netz activities were the newly created "Frontaufklärungskommandos and Trupps", who were assigned to the Armies stationed near the Atlantic Coast. They were recruited from "Abwehr" personnel in the Fall and Winter of 1943/44. Central Radio Station was the W/T Station of the "Frontaufklärungsstelle West". Leitstelle I West was commanded by Oberstleutnant HERRLITZ.

During the advanced stage of the operations in the West, these "R-Leute" were sent to the K.d.M Wiesbaden and Stuttgart for the greater part. This was done, because they didn't serve in their original capacity of "Frontaufklärung" (tactical intelligence), but rather worked on actual "Fernaufklärung" (long-range intelligence). STEIMLE can quote the following approximate figures to indicate the scope of the "R-Netz" in France: Approximately 15-20 V-Men of the "Heer" actually came through with repeated W/T transmissions; of the "Luftwaffe" V-men about 8 to 10, and of the "Marine" about 5. The worst results in proportion came from the "Heer", the best from the "Marine".

In the course of time, a great number of "V-Leute" dropped out; that is, radio communications broke off without explanation; or agents informed home office that their batteries were exhausted, or that no additional funds were at their disposal; or they gave other similar reasons. Individual agents sent in good eye-witness accounts, especially those of ship landings, troop movements and about the location of gasoline dumps and pipelines. No single case is known to STEIMLE where an agent had access to important military staff or through one way or other would have been able to gather important information of planned military operations.

As a critique of the military "R-Netz" the following can be said: Its results were used. However, they can only be characterized as fair. The long occupation of the "Westraum" was not sufficiently exploited to build up a military Meldedienst (Intelligence System). The reasons for this condition of the German Intelligence System in France and Belgium might be summed up as follows:

1. Official sources and agencies doubted very seriously the possibility of a successful invasion up to the year of 1943.
2. The limitation of preparations to the coast area until 1944 had catastrophic results during the operations.

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This is true, particularly, since a great part of the German agents were concentrated, after the invasion, in the very channel ports still held by Germany, and consequently they were not able to move about or go into action.

3. Selection and schooling of the agents was not done with the necessary care or seriousness, as for the most part the responsible officers did not believe in the possibility of a successful invasion. These officers furthermore did not possess the necessary qualifications or experience in the establishment of an "R-Netz".

4. It appeared that necessary frequent inspections were not carried out.

5. The W/T system was not modern, and was not prepared to resist the possibilities of modern "W/T locator-teams".

6. Furthermore, the German military ND had the psychological disadvantage, unlike the French or Belgium agents, of facing military defeat. Especially this point was neglected and least considered in choosing agents for the "R-Netz".

The military G.M.D. naturally continued the schooling and the commitment of agents throughout the West after the invasion. This was done through the "Frontaufklarung", on one hand, and through the "Kommando-meldegebiet" on the other. Successful assignments were achieved particularly by K.d.M. Wiesbaden. They, for instance, were able to report continuously on the results of the V-bombing of ANTWERP. Commitment of agents by the K.d.M.'s was continued until March 1945. From that time on commitments failed due to the "Luftwaffe", which, for want of gas and suitable planes, had always found it difficult to place the agents at the intended destination.

This "R-Netz" was steered by the K.d.M. WIESBADEN, STUTTGART and by the the RSHA, BERLIN, Amt Mil. B-2, Korvettenkapitan HUMBERT.

/s/ George G. Charig,
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG,
Special Agent, CIC

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APPENDIX No. 12 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standardentrainer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45

The "R-NETZ" (Stay-behind "Retreat Net") of Amt. Mil. in Italy

At the time STEIMLE was in charge of Abteilung Mil B, practically only the Frontaufklaerung was active in the Italian Sector. The K.d.M's Salzburg and Munich had no success whatsoever, which may be attributed to delayed preparations for an Intelligence Service in Italy. The Heeresaufklaerungskommando under the command of Hauptmann Berger was particularly successful. An Airforce Aufklaerungskommando or Trupp was commanded by Luftwaffe Hauptmann Hoermann. A naval intelligence unit (Aufklaerungseinheit) was active in the region of Genoa, but was of no importance. A well functioning net had been established by an Aufklaerungskommando stationed in the Balkans. Line Crossers (Frontlaeufer) were used successfully next to static radio-communication posts. Generally speaking, it can be said that no specific deficiencies existed in the Italian sector and the operational theater, and that intelligence results were satisfactory. STEIMLE estimates the number of active W/T stations as between 10 and 15. He is fairly sure that he is correct in remembering that the results in Italy earned a citation from OKH. STEIMLE cannot give details on agents, locations or training establishments. CIC ought to be able to obtain that information from Hauptmann Berger, Hauptmann Hoermann or Oberleutnant Hohmann (Gruppenleiter Mil B IV). Since the end of 1944 Abteilung Mil. B was represented in the Italian Sector by "Fuehrungsstelle Italien". In addition to its duties as Frontaufklaerung, Fuehrungsstelle Italien had the mission of establishing an R-Net in Italy. For that purpose Fuehrungsstelle Italien was to secure and train Italian personnel for Fernaufklaerung, including England and the USA. Coordination of the various Agencies and representation of Amt Mil at German Headquarters in Italy was another duty of the Fuehrungsstelle. Head (Leiter) of Fuehrungsstelle Italien was Oberst der Luftwaffe von Engelmann. Engelmann had been active for Abwehr Luft in Denmark up to the Fall of 1944. STEIMLE knows furthermore that he was engaged for some time in Abwehr activities in Tunisia. He is about 50 years old. STEIMLE saw him last at a conference in Rottach-Egern about 15th April 1945. On that occasion STEIMLE told him his opinion and left no doubt with him as to the imminent catastrophe. Von Engelmann did not return to Italy. STEIMLE does not know his whereabouts.

Since its inception Fuehrungsstelle Italien has not been in action. To what extent it actually did undertake the training of agents STEIMLE does not know. But he is certain that nobody was operationally employed by that organization, and that no agents were sent on any missions, as yet.

/s/ George G. Charig,
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG,
Special Agent, CIC

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APPENDIX No. 13 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standartenfuehrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45.

The Issue of a "FRIEDENSNETZ" (peacetime intelligence net) of AMT VI

Until the end of the war in May 1945, AMT VI had neither built up an intelligence net nor employed individual V-men or agents in the West-sector. The decision had been made that AMT III and AMT IV were responsible for these functions. This does not concern the Amt Mil., which automatically kept up a military news service within German territory ever since military operations took place on German soil.

The only thing known to STEIMLE about the interior intelligence nets is a remark he once overheard, that AMT VI F/H was supposed to give AMT III technical support. However, he does not know whether or not that actually happened.

STEIMLE's Group of the Berlin area had to move to Thuringia, later to Bavaria, and finally to Austria, when the collapse of Germany became apparent during the last three months of the war. This necessitated a cutting down of the machine to make it possible to move around altogether. For that reason STEIMLE ordered his REFERENTEN to dismiss the majority of their co-workers, or to place them at the disposal of combat units. Thus, only about a third of STEIMLE's group was transferred from Thuringia to Bavaria. When he moved from Bavaria to Austria, he only took his two Referenten BERNHARD and FENDLER, and about 5 other co-workers along.

STEIMLE left the decision for the future use of the individual co-workers to his REFERENTEN, and therefore he can't make any statements as to their later whereabouts. However, it is certain that a great number of them was put at the disposal of combat units. Others gave their Referenten their future address thus enabling AMT VI Hqs - should they be able to operate in Austria under German dominance in case of prolongation of the war - to contact them and assure their future use in new tasks. Everybody recognized the fact that - for all practical purposes STEIMLE's group was dissolved in Rottach-Egern. STEIMLE received no instructions for a formation of a peacetime net during this or the preceding phase; nor did he exercise or plan any intelligence activities after armistice had been declared.

In this connection, STEIMLE mentions the activity of an SS STUBAF, whose name he has forgotten. (PEREY?) He worked on French and Belgium Nationalist-movements in Sector West of AMT III, as far as they were of interest for AMT III. During the last days of April, this STUBAF got in contact with STEIMLE in Rottach-Egern, and asked for his assistance in the financial support and the evacuation to a foreign country of his former co-workers. After mentioning this in his interrogation, STEIMLE remembered the name of DIELS in connection with these happenings. Others were LESSUEUR, the successor to DORIOT, and another Frenchman. STEIMLE referred the STUBAF in question to OSTUBAF BERNHARD for settlement of his financial requests. STEIMLE saw this STUBAF last in the vicinity of Innsbruck, where he introduced him to the last-named Frenchman.

STEIMLE can say with relative certainty that this case was merely the effort of this STUBAF to help his former co-workers save their skin in the approaching catastrophe. Besides the fact that he never spoke to STEIMLE of a peacetime-net, it may be assured that any such plans on his part would be headed for failure because of financial and technical difficulties.

/s/ George G. Charig.
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG
Special Agent, CIC

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APPENDIX No. 14 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standarte fuehrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45.

AMT VI, RSHA Organization and General Remarks

Amt VI occupied a special place in the RSHA set-up. It was a much newer department than all the others, employed a different type of personnel and had an altogether different program.

For all practical purposes, Amt VI has only been in existence since SCHELLENBERG took it over. This, according to STEIMLE's knowledge, was late in 1941. SCHELLENBERG intended, or rather received orders from HEYDRICH, to build up a German secret political Foreign News Service. The personnel he found in the department when he took over was completely unfit for the job. STEIMLE knows that at first he concentrated primarily on the dismissal of ND-men. He then tried to clarify and redefine the purpose and concepts of a secret, political News Service (referred to as GMD below, i.e. GEHEIMER MELDEDIENST).

The purpose was defined something like this: "The GMD has to acquire secretly news of a secret, political character which is of decisive value to the leadership of the Reich".

a) "Secretly": News is to be obtained in such a manner that the enemy will be ignorant of the fact that this or that piece of information has fallen into the hands of the hostile ND. Thus the enemy shall be prevented from taking counter-measures.

b) "Decisive Political Information": Every ND runs the danger of being flooded with insignificant material, and of thus sacrificing its effectiveness for quantity. It is possible that in a case like this many people work hard without, however, obtaining any decisive results. This misdevelopment can only be avoided by thorough schooling of the personnel concerned and through a carefully worked out statement of purpose.

c) "Secret Information": This characteristic differentiates the tasks of the GMD from that of the Press Information Service, the Radio and also - in a certain sense - from that of the Foreign Office.

A GMD is not an information service; it can, in the best case (and this is highly advisable) use the product of the press bureaus as basis for its work. While the key word for a press service is "early", the GMD must always write the word "GEHEIM" at the top of its work. Every reporter wants to be the first to obtain and submit to his paper a news item designated for general publication. A member of the GMD is all out to obtain secretly from the enemy a report which is being kept secret and is not released for publication.

Method

Amt VI separated the procurement and evaluation service. It had been decided in the reorganization that STEIMLE was primarily to take care of the procurement service, i.e., the procurement of news, the interpretation and evaluation of which represented the second process. In procurement Amt VI distinguished between an intelligence sector and a secret sector. With respect to the former, the office took it for granted that there is a lot of information which is available to every intelligent human being without his having to do intelligence work: newspapers, weeklies, statistics, scientific publications, conversations etc. The individual pieces could thus be formed to a pattern. The secret sector aims to achieve a certain goal by secret means. While the intelligence sector could employ its personnel according to their profession, the secret sector, as a rule, had to search for certain individual who, if necessary, had to be trained. Amt VI recognized those basic principles. In reality, however, the secret sector had scarcely been developed.

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Organization:

Within the frame of the well known groups VI A, VI B, VI C, VI D, VI E, VI F, VI S, VI W, the group VI B was subdivided into four REFERATE:

- VI B 1 Italy
- VI B 2 France, Holland and Belgium
- VI B 3 Switzerland
- VI B 4 Spain and Portugal

Mission: to obtain news from and about these countries. The REFERATE were supervised by REFERATLEITER (also known as REFERENTEN).

VI B 1 and VI B 3 were supervised until 1944 by STUBAF Dr. HUEGEL. On his departure O/LT HOHMANN (HOMANN) took over as his deputy. The latter was Italy REFERENT in AMT MIL, ABT. MIL B.

- VI B 2 OSTUBAF BERNHARD in charge.
- VI B 4 STUBAF FENDLER in charge.

Within the Reich, Amt VI, unlike Amt III, IV and V, maintained no offices of its own. Of the former organization there remained some insignificant REFERENTEN in a few SD ABSCHNITTE. Thus the SD-LEITABSCHNITT Munich had a Amt VI REFERAT; likewise the SD-LEITABSCHNITT Stuttgart. In Stuttgart this organization was later attached with the INSPEKTEUR. Basic plans had not provided for such an organization.

Group VI B 1 was handled by the Amt VI Procurement Service of the Chief of SIPO and SD, Italy (last in Verona). Abteilungsleiter HUEGEL was allowed to build up the organization necessary for his work. In this respect Amt VI did not make any rules.

Group VI B 2: Amt VI work in France was taken care of by Abt. VI of BdS, Paris, until the invasion of France. SS STAF Dr. BICKLER was in charge since summer 1943. REFERENTEN: HSTUF NOSSEK and Dr. BOURJEAU.

Group VI with BdS in Paris was also strongly dependent on the BdS and did not work quite to the satisfaction of the Amt VI, though the latter was in charge of the work to be done and the direction. Therefore Amt VI sent an observer direct to Vichy. At first OSTUF REICHE, who was, however, employed by the Waffen SS to help build up the SS Division CHARLEMAGNE and was killed on the Eastern Front. His successor was SS USTUF SCHMIDT who was also transferred after the surrender of Vichy - to the CHARLEMAGNE Div., since he was a member of the Waffen SS and as such was claimed by his old unit. STEINLE does not know what happened to him after that.

There also was an office of Amt VI in Strasbourg which was attached to BdS in Strasbourg in 1944. Mission: to build up an information-net in France for peace time. This objective has not been accomplished, particularly because the BdS Paris refused to give any assistance to the Strasbourg branch and because the employed SS leaders were not qualified for the job. Chief of this branch was, at first, a certain OSTUBAF SCHNEIDER. His co-worker was UHRING, a former French police official. STEINLE dismissed SCHNEIDER because of his lack of ability and his progressing age. After this he became security director in a factory in Strasbourg. At this time he had no connections with AMT VI. Successor to SCHNEIDER was SS STUBAF Dr. FREISE, whom STEINLE dismissed also for lack of ability. He was put at the disposal of Amt I. Branch Strasbourg ended without any success, due to the military events.

REFERAT VI B 2, RSHA, was in charge of - besides Abt. VI, Paris - Abt. VI of the BdS, Brussels, which had only a small contingent of personnel. Leiter (chief) in 1943 was HSTUF ZSCHUNKE. In charge 1943/4, HSTUF LAWRENZ. Finally, there was a REFERAT VI with the BdS Den Haag. In charge: HSTUF AHREN.

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Appendix No. 14 Cont'd

Neither of these two branches was charged with coverage of the INLAND, i.e. Belgium and Holland. The Belgian and Dutch problems were handled by Amt III. But they were supposed to furnish information with the help of Belgian and Dutch nationals on Belgian and Dutch problems in neutral and enemy countries.

The occupation of France and Belgium made a reorganization in the West mandatory. Two LEITSTELLEN were established in the Fall of 1944 or the Spring of 1945: 1) LEITSTELLE WEST (code name WALTER) covering Franco, BICKLER in charge; 2) LEITSTELLE NORTHWEST (code name SIEGFRIED), LAWRENZ in charge.

Both LEITSTELLEN were to take over the direction of the "I-Net" as well as enlarge the news procurement service in France and Belgium. A program was started in conjunction with organizations of French and Belgian emigrants to train confidence men and agents and to commit them. Individual Frenchmen and Belgians were also enlisted for this purpose. The development of this work was under the pressure of the military events and the dwindling confidence in a German victory. A number of agents schools were founded in connection with this work which were supposed to train V-LEUTE and agents. The cooperation with the French PPF (Partie Populaire Francaise) and the militia was handled separately, as these two groups were allowed to have their own organizations and only received one liaison officer each and other assistants. In consideration thereof, the results of these officers were supposed to be delivered to Amt VI

The two LEITSTELLEN did not achieve any considerable success, mainly because the agents had not been trained long enough or well enough, particularly along radio-technical lines (due to the critical situation). Most of them (agents) were still in the process of training.

Group VI B3: The news procurement service in Switzerland comprised various branches. Amt VI was in complete charge of the "BEAUFTRAGTEN SCHWEIZ", OSTUBAF DANFELDT, who lived in Lausanne and who was deported from Switzerland in March or April 1945. Despite many efforts, Amt VI failed to build up further HAUPT-AMTLICHE forces in Switzerland. In order to cover Switzerland, STEINLE therefore had to resort to questioning Germans on economic missions on their impressions and views of the country. The Swiss police in charge of foreigners caught on to this method and clamped down. On the whole, it can be said that the Swiss police made operations in that country completely impossible. One other possible source of information was the interrogation of fleeing Swiss National Socialists on their arrival in Germany. These could not, however, be used as agents, since their flight from Switzerland made any return to that country impossible. It never has been the aim of Amt VI to spy out Switzerland itself but rather to obtain news about enemy countries through Switzerland.

The German agents in Switzerland - so frequently mentioned in the foreign press - were very few in numbers, and all those that were captured worked for the ABWEHR or for the STAPO bureaus in Stuttgart and Karlsruhe.

Group VI B 4 Spain: Amt VI at first made use for its purposes of the existing organization of the Polizei-Attache. Amt VI was empowered to give him assignments and to make use of his help. There was, however, no system of subordination and the Polizei-Attache was afraid to compromise his position by working with the ND. This fear was justified, considering the completely open organization of a Polizei Attache. Consequently, Amt VI sent their own man, SS OSTUF SINGER, to the Polizei Attache. It was his job to take care of the interests of Amt VI and to exploit the possibilities of the organization for the ND. Thus, Amt VI possessed a number of good V-men and obtained good results from Spain. Amt VI employed the same method in Madrid and Barcelona. The quality of the work decreased considerably after Polizei Attache SS STUBAF WINZER, met death or was taken prisoner on his way from Berlin to Madrid. Independently of the Polizei Attache, it was tried to make room for ND-members in the German-Spanish economic set up or to create points of vantage there. Thus, the former Spain RERERENT, SS STUBAF MOSIG, was given a job with the "SOFINDUS", with the mission to build up his own independent information net. The point was to make use of the possibilities of the

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organization "SOFINDUS" under cover and to possess a certain security through the absorption of agents in a commercial enterprise. The office MOSIG had good initial successes considering the short time of its existence.

Besides these "built-in agents", individual businessmen who travelled to Spain were provided with missions (similar to the policy in Switzerland). Also Group WI/T and the former ABWEHR had numerous economic collaborators at their disposal. The REFERAT VI B 4 kept regular V-men besides STEIMLE does not do these latter. Furthermore, Amt VI obtained information from BdS, Paris, which it maintained a REFERAT "Spain" with HSTUF ALISCH in charge.

The V-Men of Group VI D who were charged with obtaining information from England and America through Spain occupied a special position. STEIMLE does not know any of these men.

Group VI B 4 Portugal: In this country, the position of Polizei-Attaché was non-existent. Instead there was a Police Liaison Officer: SS STUBAF Schroeder. This Police Liaison officer worked for the Amt VI too. Besides him there were two STUBAFs NASSER and VOLLBRECHT, who were employed in the Embassy as scientific assistants. Each one of these had his own "net" and reported to Amt VI apart from the Police Liaison Officer. STEIMLE knows that Dr. VOLLBRECHT was either interned or deported by the Portuguese just prior to the German capitulation.

/s/ George G. Charis
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIS
Special Agent, CIC

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APPENDIX No. 15 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standartenfuehrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45

The Organization of Counter Espionage in Amt VI and Amt Mil (VI Z)

Prior to the incorporation of AMT MIL into AMT VI, the latter had no agency engaged in counter espionage. AMT IV, on the other hand, originally claimed the necessity for such activity in the political sector. It maintained that after the destruction of the anti-Nazi organizations inside of Germany, subversive activities were planned and executed from foreign soil and should be apprehended there. That was the reason why GESTAPO officials were active with their N-APPARAT at the Reich's border. This partially explains the part of the Police Attaches who were selected from among the members of AMT IV.

The counter espionage in AMT ABWEHR was handled by group III F. AMT IV attempted to take over III F when the latter was incorporated into the RSHA. Such a development was unbearable for AMT VI and MIL, since active espionage and counter espionage depends on close cooperation if successful work is to be expected. Also SCHELLENBERG attempted with all means to exclude AMT IV from its foreign activities. The incorporation of III F in AMT IV would have represented a development in the reverse direction.

Dr KALTENBRUNNER was therefore presented with a detailed memorandum on this problem which resulted in a clear definition and division of the former jurisdiction of AMT IV and VI.

a) Counter espionage in Germany and German-occupied territory was the mission of AMT IV. The former Leiter III F in AMT ABWEHR, Col ROHLEDER and a few of his officers were taken over by AMT IV. The officers for counter espionage at the ABWEHRSTELLEN in the REICH and the occupied territory were transferred to the respective branch offices of the AMT IV (STAPO bureaus and Section IV of the Chief of SIPO and SD)

b) Counter espionage in neutral and enemy countries was to be the future assignment of AMT VI. The Group or SONDERREFERAT VI Z was founded for this reason. Lt. Col. FREUND, former deputy of Col. ROHLEDER (as Chief of III F, AMT ABWEHR) was officially put in charge of AMT VI Z. STUBAF SCHMITZ, the personal Referent of SCHELLENBERG was also active at VI Z. STEIMLE presumes that SCHMITZ specialized on liaison with AMT IV since he had formerly been employed there.

Lt. Col. FREUND was an active officer of the WEHRMACHT, about 50 years old, and a native of the Palatinate. He moved VI Z after leaving Thuringia to the vicinity of Bregenz on Lake Constance. STEIMLE talked to him in Bregenz on or about 10 Apr 45. He never heard from him after this date.

AMT VI Z was divided into West and East like AMT MIL. STEIMLE feels reasonably sure that the designation VI Z/B was used for Western affairs. Referent in the Sonder office was a Sonderfuehrer, 35-40 years old, who was particularly efficient. Besides, there was a DIENSTELLE of VI Z at the Abwehrstelle Stuttgart, at least it was attached to it administratively, which dealt with western affairs, particularly France.

Col. EHINGER, was in charge of this office, about 55 years old, from Singen on Lake Constance. EHINGER was one of the most capable officers in the counter-espionage field with a great deal of practical experience. During the occupation, he had been active in France (Dijon?). His office was still located in Heiligenberg vicinity Lake Constance on Apr 16, 45. STEIMLE talked to him there and met him again on 28/29 Apr 45 in St. Anton, Tyrol. He left on 29 Apr for Feldkirch. He intended to surrender to the French together with Col. WAGNER, formerly in charge of Abwehr Stuttgart. STEIMLE has not heard from him since. VI Z maintained branches in

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Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal.

Switzerland:

The KO LEITER, Switzerland, Consul General MEISSNER came from Abwehr III and had particularly good background for this work. His Referent VI Z was a 40-45 year old aristocrat whose name STEIMLE does not recall.

Spain:

Lt. Col. KIKEBUSCH, a particularly able officer, whom STEIMLE never met personally. He succeeded frequently in gaining politically valuable information, which was placed at STEIMLE's disposal by AMT VI Z.

Portugal:

KRAENNER (or KRAMER, Inu), rank unknown. He was a reserve officer whose civilian occupation was receptionist in a Berlin Hotel (Presumably ADLON). There were occasional doubts as to his reliability. Results achieved by him were reputed to be good.

/s/ George G. Charig,
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG,
Special Agent, CIC

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APPENDIX No. 16 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standartenfuehrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45

Schools of Amt VI, Especially of Gruppe VI B

After the successful invasion, it became necessary for GRUPPE VI B to immediately employ V-Men and agents in France and Belgium. The LEITSTELLEN 'Walter' and 'Siegfried' were therefore charged with the establishment of training centers.

LEITSTELLE 'Siegfried', which was located in Marburg on the Lahn, started collection points for agents in two places near Marburg. This is where the training for the Belgium branch took place. The students could be divided into three different classes:

- 1) Freely recruited V-Men and agents without any particular political connections, recruited from among the Belgium workers.
- 2) Supporters of Leon DEGRELLE.
- 3) Supporters of van der WIELE (?)

The LEITSTELLE 'Walter' had several training centers.

- 1) One group (freely recruited agents) between Baden-Baden and Freiburg, with Dr BOURJEAU in charge.
- 2) One group (members of a small French political cast, whose name STEIMLE does not know) in Meersburg, with OSTUF MORITZ in charge.
- 3) A group (freely recruited agents) in Tuebingen with a SONDERFUEHRER, who had been taken over from the WEHRMACHT, in charge: Dr MORO.

Members of the PPF (Partie Populaire Francaise) and of the Militia had a special status in the training. Both groups were granted their own intelligence services, and therefore had their own schools to which AMT VI delegated liaison officials.

Militia. Training center: SCHLOSS Woelflingen near Sigmaringen (name unknown), with HSTUF DEYERING as liaison leader.

PPF . Training center: Mainau island in the Bodensee, and the surroundings of Konstanz, with HSTUF NOSSECK as liaison leader.

School of the GRUPPE VI S in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

As regards this school STEIMLE knows not much more than that it existed. It was built up by SKORZENY in either 1943 or 1944. It was designed for agent-training in sabotage and included training on signal matters in its curriculum. STEIMLE believes that the school conducted training particularly for the Balkans and for the East. STEIMLE's group never had any contact with this school. He knows that a certain STAF KNOLLE was active in this school during the last months. KNOLLE had previously worked in Den Haag for AMT III and at the 'Haager' school.

Replacement School of AMT VI and MIL

The men engaged by AMT VI were sent to this school without any special training, whether they were recruited from the SD INLAND or from free professions. It was necessary, therefore, to conduct a general training with corresponding curriculum. This striving coincided with the incorporation of the ABWEHR which possessed a training unit in the Training Regt 'KURFUERST'.

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The Gruppenleiter of VI A, Dr. SANDBERGER, called for an advisory commission from all groups, which discussed the new installation and set up a corresponding curriculum. As representative of STEIMLE's group OSTUBAF BERNHARD took part in the discussions. The curriculum was fixed during autumn 1944. It comprised general and specialized subjects. It was of such a nature that members of AMT VI and of the AMT MIL could be trained together. Of the subjects STEIMLE remembers the following:

- 1) The problems and missions of a political and military Intelligence service.
- 2) The importance of a secret intelligence service.

Both were introductory lectures and were conducted by STEIMLE. OSTUBAF BERNHARD held lectures in several week-hours about practical questions of the GMD with subjects like "Recruiting of Agents", "Conduct of V-Men", "Double-play Material." Furthermore BERNHARD had collected for subject material certain characteristic cases from practical experience which were designed to point out well-founded principles as well as mistakes of positive and negative work.

Furthermore REFERENTEN or assistant REFERENTEN lectured on the political, economic, and military situation in their countries, in order to convey a picture of the respective country.

Besides, the respective GRUPPENLEITER talked about the work and the organization of their groups. STEIMLE further recalls that several hours were dedicated to history and geo-politics. Furthermore, outside speakers, e.g. SCHWARZ van BERK and WIRSING, were invited to give single lectures on questions of general interest.

The directors of the school had not as yet been finally appointed. An officer of AMT MIL was usually appointed as director of a training course. According to STEIMLE's knowledge, there were three training courses altogether, two of which were in BARUTZ, near WUENS DORF, and one in Camp "Waldbur" near FUERSTENWALDE.

Students of the training courses were mainly full-time employees of AMT VI. Every group of the RSHA was instructed early enough that a new course was beginning and they were told to send a certain number of men.

All newly arrived officers of AMT MIL were ordered to take this training course. After completing the course a commission decided to which group the officers were to be assigned. Each student was called before the commission and assigned according to qualifications. The commission consisted of SS FUEHRER and officers of the two ABMT. Dr. SANDBERGER or a man appointed by him acted as chairman.

STEIMLE cannot give an opinion on the value of the training, since there was too little experience. The duration of four weeks should at least have assured the general introduction into the GMD. The participant was to be introduced to the basic concepts, instead of being thrown right into the practical field which had been the case prior to the introduction of this school. It was imperative, of course, that the pupils had reached a certain level of general education and knowledge and were interested in foreign questions.

/s/ George C. Charig
/t/ GEORGE C. CHARIG
Special Agent, CIC

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APPENDIX No. 17 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standartenführer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45

Funds of Amt VI

Group VI A of AMT VI took care of the money and foreign currency problem. Group VI A was in turn controlled for this part of their activities by AMT II. The representative of AMT II at VI A was HSTUF SCHULER, who, to STEIMLE's knowledge, was responsible for all financial problems in AMT VI. STEIMLE last talked to him during the first part of Apr 45 in ROTTACH-EGERN on the Tegernsee.

The individual LEADER-groups had no financial department of their own and had no funds at their disposal except for some petty-cash. This allowance was up to RM 1000 a month and was intended for small expenditures within the country as directed by the group chief.

All other requests for money and foreign currency had to be approved on prescribed forms by the Chief of AMT VI. The respective group chief approved the request as SACHLICH RICHTIG (sound and essential). Chief of AMT VI approved the request, and the group VI A paid out the amount, either as 'final expenditure' or as 'advance' which had to be accounted for in detail at a later date.

STEIMLE cannot make any statement as to the amount of money and foreign currency which were at the disposal of AMT VI. He was never informed about that - not even by implication. He does not know how or where the money and the foreign currency was kept at the time of the collapse. He was always under the impression that the treatment of these financial questions was strictly centralized and dealt with at AMT II.

He knows of only one exception:

ST. ANTON, Tyrol, was intended as Hq of STEIMLE's group and group VI D (total of eight men), during the retreat to Austria for the duration of the German resistance. He had already acquired a building. Since this involved a separation from group VI A, Dr. PAEFFGEN and STEIMLE requested an advance of 1,000,000 Reichs Marks, 500,000 Swiss Francs, and smaller amounts of other foreign currency. The payment was delayed until 2 or 3 May 45 and took place in FRITZENS, Tyrol, since VI A had to obtain the money from AMT II in SALZBURG. That same day a revolt of the Austrian Resistance Movement took place in INNSBRUCK while, simultaneously, the Allies invaded the Inn Valley thereby closing the road to ST. ANTON. This signified clearly the final collapse.

The same day, Dr. PAEFFGEN and STEIMLE went to LOFER near SALZBURG. There they met Dr. SANDBERGER on 3 or 4 May 45. There, following STEIMLE's decision, Dr. PAEFFGEN or STUBAF FENDLER refunded the total above-mentioned amount to a REFERENT of VI A, whose name STEIMLE does not recall. Since that day, he has had no money of AMT VI at his disposal. They kept RM 20,000, which was divided up as advances of RM 2,000 and 6000 each, respectively, between PAEFFGEN, FENDLER and STEIMLE. This was done because their families had not received salary allotments for Feb or Mar 45, and the SOP of VI A was that all discharges were to receive a salary for an additional three months.

/s/ George G. Charig
GEORGE G. CHARIG
Special Agent, CIO

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APPENDIX No. 18 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standartenfuehrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45

Files and Documents of Amt VI and Amt. Mil.

Amt VI had a central card index on personnel. Personality files of members of the AEMTER were kept at Amt VI A as well as at Amt I. VI A also administered a card index of all former V-Men.

On the other hand case files and indexes of V-Men were kept in the individual Referate. The Referate were also allowed to keep special indexes, according to their own wishes.

In contrast to this decentralization there was a central V-Men index in Amt MIL which contained the names of all V-Men in all offices of the Amt MIL. Before employment of a V-Man this central index had to be consulted if and when the man in question had been active for the Amt and what else was known about him. The central index had to be notified of the personnel information, code names and mission of the V-man in case of his final acceptance.

The question of destruction of records became acute for the first time in Jan 45 for the groups of VI and Amt MIL (VI B, VI D, MIL B, MIL C) which were located in Camp 'Waldburg' when the Russians approached Frankfurt on the Oder.

At this move, SCHELLENBERG ordered a housecleaning of files and indexes. All files and indexes not absolutely essential for the continuation of the work were to be destroyed. This order was complied with on 30 and 31 Jan 45 to such an extent that all closed cases of the Referate VI and groups MIL were destroyed and all Referate, or even groups, were able to put the remaining files and indexes into a military records box. The eliminated files were burned.

A repetition of the housecleaning of files was made at Lauenstein in connection with the move to Rottach-Egern. If STEIMLE remembers correctly nearly 100% of the centrally kept files and indexes of VI A and MIL A were destroyed. Only so-called "Hand-Akten" were kept by the Referate, i.e., only the most important current cases. Indexes were no longer kept after this date. The Hand-Akten were destroyed in Rottach-Egern at the end of Apr 45. Those Referenten who had not been discharged kept only personal notes which they finally destroyed in Lofer near Salzburg. These statements apply to the group VI B and the military section MIL B. STEIMLE knows that VI D and MIL C proceeded in the same manner.

/s/ George G. Charig,
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG,
Special Agent, CIC

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APPENDIX No. 19 to Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standartenfuhrer, Chief of Gruppe VI B and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45.

Origin of Report of STEIMLE's Alleged Death

While receiving orders in the Hq of Dr. KALTENBRUNNER in Bad Aussee on Apr 30, 45 OSTUBAF WANNECK, GRUPPENLEITER VI E showed STEIMLE a radio message of the Gestapo LEITSTELLE MUENCHEN directed to Dr. KALTENBRUNNER informing him that STEIMLE had been killed during a plane crash on an air port near Munich. During that day or night a plane had crashed in flames, 3 or 4 male and one female body had been recovered. A pass-port was found in the wreckage giving the following description of one of the dead: EUGEN STEIMLE, born 8 December 1909 in Neubulak.

STEIMLE remembers distinctly that his birth place was reproduced only in part. He could not find any explanation for this message until he recalled after some thought that he had left his official passport (Dienst Pass) in his Berlin office. Also, STEIMLE had sent a wireless message on/ or about Apr 15 via Dr. SCHMITZ to his Berlin secretary, Miss THORMANN, to immediately leave for Rottach-Egern. A secretary friend of Miss THORMANN in VI D, who called on STEIMLE in this matter on May 2, 45 in Fritzeben in Tyrol, stated to him that she had talked to Miss THORMANN in Berlin after the 15th of April. Miss THORMANN mentioned to her that she had an opportunity to come to Bavaria by plane. She was to bring STEIMLE's pass and some other articles left in Berlin at the same time.

There is no doubt in STEIMLE's mind that the female dead in question is his old secretary THORMANN.

/s/ George G. Charig
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG
Special Agent, CIC

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APPENDIX No. 20 to Final Interrogation Report of STEINLE, Eugen, SS-Standartenführer, Chief of Gruppe VII and Abt. MIL. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45

Frontaufklärung (Tactical Intelligence) vs. Fernaufklärung (Long Range Intelligence) - General Remarks and Recent Developments

As far as STEINLE knows, no differentiation was made in the Abwehr between tactical and strategic intelligence before 1943. The nucleus were the Abwehr bureaus of the Interior, which followed the troops as AUSSENSTELLEN. Toward the end of 1943 a separation was effected between tactical and strategic information: the former was transferred to the FRONTAUFKLÄRUNGSKOMMANDOS which were subordinated to ABTEILUNGEN (East or West). The strategic intelligence was carried out by the AMT ABWEHR, respectively by the Abwehr bureaus in the REICH and the KO's in the neutral countries.

When the Abwehr was taken over by AMT MIL, the FRONTAUFKLÄRUNG remained with the OKW and was directly subordinated to it.

This arrangement was intolerable although the AMT MIL was authorized to exercise a so-called FACHLICHES WEISUNGSRECHT (right to operational direction) with respect to the FRONTAUFKLÄRUNG. It was never explained or what this right to operational direction consisted. Practical experience, however, called for close cooperation between AMT MIL and FA. AMT MIL alone had at its disposal trained replacements, signal apparatus, and all other means for ND work. The OKW as the leading element was unfamiliar with these matters. The switch-over of missions from FA to Strategic information was so fluctuating, that what was FA today, could easily be strategic information tomorrow. Example: the E-net in the west.

For this reason AMT MIL did everything in its power to incorporate FA completely into the military ND of AMT MIL. This plan finally succeeded in the fall of 1944 by order of the OKW. A new dept MIL F was formed in AMT MIL with Col. G. BUNTRUCK in charge. The FA ABTEILUNGEN with their KOMMANDOS and TRUPPS were subordinated to this department. They had to accept directions and missions from the Ic of the respective Army Group, Army, or Corps to which they were attached. At the same time they reported their material results to the competent specialist branch of the AMT MIL (MIL B or MIL C). They were charged with the ND activities in the operational area of the battlefield. Their territorial borders were formed approximately by the location of the enemy's operational Hq. Abt. MIL F and the so-called specialist dept MIL O and D well realized that a certain amount of overlapping was unavoidable and even desirable.

The FA, towards the end of the war, had approximately the following position in the chain of commands:

- 1) Hq. Training, Organization, finance, supplies; MIL F
- 2) Tact Employment; Ic of respective military headquarters.
- 3) Right to Operational Direction; Geographical specialist branch of AMT MIL.

Operational directions were not sent directly to the individual KOMMANDOS or TRUPPS but were sent to the Abt. MIL F. Thus the specialist branch could direct their requests for confirmations and supplements which arose from the operational news reports of the KOMMANDOS and TRUPPS directly to the source.

This arrangement, as it was enforced, even during the last few months, has proven its value. Prerequisites for this was that MIL F closely cooperated with MIL B and C which was the case. This cooperation was of particular importance for the commitment of officers. Younger officers were sent from the specialist branches to the FA and experienced officers of the FA were employed in the specialist branches. On the other hand, the results of the operational news reports of the FA were a necessary supplement to the conclusions reached by strategic intelligence.

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Appendix No. 20 Cont'd.

Finally, only the pooling of experience and methods of both branches furnished the possibilities to develop the basic system of a uniform secret information service.

The achievements of the FA were generally recognized. Particularly good results were developed by LEITSTELLE 'OST'. STEIMLE personally read a letter from Gen JODL to Dr. KALTENBRUNNER in which the OKW expresses its appreciation for the achievements of the GMD in connection with the Russian Warsaw offensive in Jan 45.

/s/ George G. Charig,
/t/ GEORGE G. CHARIG,
Special Agent, CIC

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APPENDIX No. 21: Final Interrogation Report of STEIMLE, Eugen, SS Standard-
tenfuhrer, Chief of Gruppe WING and Abt. Mil. B, RSHA, Berlin, 12 Dec 45

Organization of the RSHA in 1945

1. In 1945, the RSHA consisted of the following departments:

- AMT I : High Command, Personnel, Organization
- AMT II : Administration (finance)
- AMT III : SD (interior, "German Spheres of Life")
- AMT IV : GESTAPO (political matters, Executive Branch)
- AMT V : KRIPD (criminal matters, Executive Branch)
- AMT VI : Foreign Political Intelligence Service
(GEBEIMER MELDEDIENST - G.M.D.)
- AMT MIL : Military Intelligence Service - parts of the former
ABWEHR (also designated as G.M.D.)

The head of each AMT was an AMTSCHIEF (Chief of Dept). These AMTTER were subdivided into GRUPPEN. The GRUPPEN were headed by GRUPPENLEITER (Chief of Section). Each GRUPPE was composed of several REFERAT. The REFERAT was headed by a REFERATSLIEITER. These subdivisions held true in all AMTTER with exception of AMT MIL, which was organized by ABTEILUNGEN and GRUPPEN.

II. The RSHA has two bases and two completely different functions, according to its history of origin and its Personnel composition:

a) The Function of the State and the Police, in political and criminal police fields: This function was a transformed continuation of the activities of the political police and the criminal police machines of the former Provinces. There existed, for instance, a Wuertemberg Political Police as well as a Criminal Police before 1933. Even after 1933, the "Machine" was carried principally by these employees of the former provincial police forces. An example: The former Chief of AMT IV, GRUF MUELLER, was an employee of the Bavarian political police before 1933; the former Chief of AMT V, GRUF NEEB, was an employee of the criminal police before 1933.

b) The SD Intelligence Organization of the SS: Its origin from the "Information Service HIMMLER" (founded approx. 1931) already points to the "information & intelligence" character of this organization. Its task until 1933 was the observation and treatment (from an intelligence and information point of view) of the opposing political parties and of the political life in Germany. The accomplishments of this Service are rumored to have been very moderate. HEYDRICH is the only one known to STEIMLE, who still played a part in the organization later on.

The year of 1933 brought the police task completely into the foreground. The SD existed as an unimportant instrument beside the GESTAPO, violently attacked by the latter organization, who saw in it a potential rival. The employees of the GESTAPO in Stuttgart were not allowed to have anything to do with members of the SD. The GESTAPO rejected the SD as incompetent, superfluous, and untrained in police duties.

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The sharp division was also evident in the Organization. The Head of the GESTAPO in Berlin, until 1937/38, was the powerful GESTAPO AMT, besides the SD HAUPTAMT. At that time still very unimportant. The GESTAPO AMT was an apparatus led by State Officials; the SD HAUPTAMT was an SS Bureau, i.e., a tool of the SS. Only in the course of time did an occasional exchange of officials and SS leaders take place in the Central Office. According to the methods used by the SS, all GESTAPO and KRIPO Officials were given SS ranks, which corresponded to their official ranks. Up to a few years ago, they could be distinguished as members of the GESTAPO from the members of the SD since the latter wore a rimmed SD insignia on the sleeves of their uniform.

Only in 1938/39 were both offices formally united in the RSHA. The difference of functions was, however, still expressed in the title of the Chief, who was called, as is known, "CHEF DER SIPO UND DES SD", just as his representatives in the WEHRKREISE were called "INSPEKTEURE DER SIPO UND DES SD". There was no merger in the operational work division of the individual GAUE: SD - (LEIT) ABSCHNITTE, STAPO - (LEIT) STELLEN, and KRIPO-(LEIT)STELLEN were working side by side. Their coordination was, in a certain sense, the job of the respective inspector, who possessed, however, only supervisory rights. Messages and Reports, on the other hand, went directly to the respective AMT. Thus, in all matters,

the SD ABSCHNITT reported to AMT III,

the GESTAPO STELLE reported to AMT IV,

the KRIPO STELLE reported to AMT V.

Vice versa, the orders from higher to lower echelon did not go through the inspector, who was only informed about particularly important matters.

As to the individual AMTER, STEIMLE can only give information about AMT III and AMT VI, since, as SS-FUEHRER of the SD, he did not work either for the GESTAPO or the KRIPO.

AMT III (SD INLAND):

A State with a totalitarian form of government, like the National Socialist, lacks any public criticism as well as any check of its State Machinery, as is generally guaranteed in a Democratic state by the press and the opposition parties. This function was taken care of to a certain extent by the SD INLAND, but with the limitation that its reports were refused by most ministries, in particular, by the Party Chancellery. Equally important was the fact that the Party fought most strongly any reports referring to Party matters. Thus, STEIMLE knows many cases where leaders of the SD were transferred by request of the particular GAULEITER, because the former had reported about irregularities within the NSDAP.

The fields covered by the SD INLAND were approximately the following:

1. Law and Administration (General situation)
2. VOLKSTUM and Public Health.
3. Cultural Life.
4. Economy.

Current weekly so-called LAGEBERICHTE directed at AMT III of the RSHA concerning these branches or LEBENSBEREICH (which was the official designation) were submitted by the ABSCHNITTE. At the RSHA's summary REICHSLAGEBERICHTE was written and submitted for information purposes to the ministries concerned with internal affairs and to the Party Chancellery.