

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE  
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PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

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
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SUBJECT SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN II CORPS DURING DECEMBER  
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SUMMARY-- DURING DECEMBER VIET CONG /VC/ POLICY AND ACTIVITIES IN THE II CORPS AREA CENTERED AROUND THEIR WINTER /SPRING CAMPAIGN. ACCORDING TO CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, THE GOALS OF THE CAMPAIGN RANGE FROM COMPLETE LIBERATION OF LARGE SECTIONS OF THE B-3 HIGHLANDS FRONT AREA TO "SIGNIFICANT VICTORIES" IN OTHER AREAS. AS THE VC ATTEMPTED TO GET THE CAMPAIGN UNDERWAY, MILITARY ACTIVITY PICKED UP IN KONTUM, PLEIKU, BINH DINH, AND NINH THUAN PROVINCES, AND THERE

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PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

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WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE VC WERE PREPARING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TUYEN DUC AND LAM DONG. AS IN PREVIOUS MONTHS THE VC CONTINUED THEIR FOOD AND TAX COLLECTIONS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IN SPITE OF THEIR AGGRESSIVE PLANS, THE VC STILL HAVE CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS IN II CORPS, THE CHIEF ONES BEING FOOD SHORTAGES AND LOSS OF POPULATION FROM VC-CONTROLLED AREAS WHICH HAS HINDERED THEIR RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING DECEMBER THE VIET CONG /VC/ IN II CORPS APPEARED TO BE CONTINUING PREPARATIONS FOR THEIR WINTER /SPRING CAMPAIGN WHILE IN SOME AREAS IMPLEMENTATION OF PRELIMINARY PHASES APPEARED TO BE IN PROGRESS. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND PRISONER INTERROGATION REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE MOST AMBITIOUS GOAL OF THE CAMPAIGN IN II CORPS CALLS FOR THE LIBERATION OF KONTUM AND /OR PLEIKU PROVINCES. IN OTHER AREAS THE VC ARE STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF "SIGNIFICANT VICTORIES" DURING THE COMING PERIOD, FREQUENTLY REFERRING TO IT IN CADRE INDOCTRINATION SESSIONS AS A DECISIVE PHASE OF THE WAR. THIS IS USUALLY ACCOMPANIED BY EXHORTATIONS TO CADRES AND GUERRILLAS TO WORK AND FIGHT HARDER DURING THE CAMPAIGN.

2. THIS APPARENT INTENTION FOR AN AGGRESSIVE WINTER /SPRING CAMPAIGN WAS REFLECTED IN INCREASED VC ACTIVITIES IN SEVERAL

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PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

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PROVINCES OF II CORPS DURING THE MONTH. IN THE B-3 HIGHLANDS FRONT AREA, PARTICULARLY PLEIKU AND KONTUM PROVINCES, VC UNITS WERE MANEUVERING FOR POSITIONS FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM /GVN/ AND ALLIED INSTALLATIONS. IN KONTUM PROVINCE, ACCORDING TO PRISONER INTERROGATIONS, THE VC STRATEGY IS TO STRIKE AT AIRBASES IN THE HOPES OF CRIPPLING THE AIR SUPPORT WHICH GVN/ALLIED FORCES RECEIVE DURING MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS. IN ADDITION THE VC STEPPED UP THEIR ATTACKS ON VILLAGES AND HAMLETS IN BOTH PROVINCES IN AN EFFORT TO DESTROY CONFIDENCE IN THE GVN'S ABILITY TO PROTECT THE INHABITANTS, AND TO EXTEND VC CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRYSIDE.

3. IN BINH DINH PROVINCE THE THRUST OF THE VC WINTER /SPRING CAMPAIGN APPEARS TO BE TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE WHICH THEY HAVE GRADUALLY LOST AS A RESULT OF GVN/ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS. DOCUMENTS CAPTURED DURING THE MONTH REVEAL THE VC ARE INITIATING INTENSIVE CAMPAIGNS TO SABOTAGE TOWNS AND CITIES, TO ORGANIZE YOUTH, AND TO INCREASE PROSELYTING OPERATIONS AMONG MILITARY FORCES AS WELL AS AMONG THE POPULATION. THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL IN OVERRUNNING THE DISTRICT CAPITAL OF TUY PHUOC, BINH DINH PROVINCE, WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THE DISTRICT CHIEF AND THE RELEASE OF 60

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PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES

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VC PRISONERS. ATTACKS ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION CONTINUED IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE CERTAIN AREAS, MAKING THEM MORE VULNERABLE.

4. MILITARY ACTIVITY ALSO PICKED UP IN NINH THUAN PROVINCE. IN ENGAGEMENTS DURING THE MONTH A NUMBER OF ENEMY DRESSED IN NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY /NVA/ UNIFORMS WERE OBSERVED AND A NUMBER OF CHINESE AK-47 RIFLES WERE DISCOVERED, PROVIDING SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT NVA UNITS ARE NOW IN THE PROVINCE. NINH THUAN ALSO SAW AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ATTACKS ON VILLAGES UNDERGOING PACIFICATION BY REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT /RD/ CADRES. THE RD PROGRAM IN NINH THUAN HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE IN STOPPING VC TAX AND PROPAGANDA INCURSIONS INTO VILLAGES WHERE RD GROUPS ARE OPERATING AND THE VC HAVE BEEN THREATENING FOR SOME TIME TO LAUNCH ATTACKS ON RD-SUPPORTED HAMLETS.

5. IN TUYEN DUC AND LAM DONG PROVINCES THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE INCREASE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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6. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE ACTIVITIES, VIRTUALLY ALL PROVINCES IN THE CORPS REPORTED THAT THE VC WERE CONTINUING TO PUSH FOOD AND RICE COLLECTIONS FROM VILLAGES AND HAMLETS, AND TAX COLLECTIONS ALONG THE MAJOR HIGHWAYS. QUANG DUC PROVINCE NOTED A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN TRAFFIC STOPPAGES ALONG THE ROUTES FOR TAXATION PURPOSES SINCE THE DESTRUCTION OF A FOOD PRODUCTION AREA BY DEFOLIANTS.

7. THE VC IN II CORPS APPEAR TO HAVE A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF PROBLEMS TO OVERCOME IF THEY HOPE TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS OF THE WINTER/SPRING CAMPAIGN. FOOD SHORTAGES WERE PROBABLY ALLEVIATED SOMEWHAT WITH THE AUTUMN RICE HARVEST, BUT STILL EXIST. A RECENTLY CAPTURED DOCUMENT IN AN LAO DISTRICT OF BINH DINH PROVINCE STATED THAT FOOD SHORTAGE HAD REACHED CRISIS PROPORTIONS AND WAS AFFECTING THE MORALE OF VC CADRES AND THE POPULATION. IN

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PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

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KHANH HOA PROVINCE, MILITARY ACTIVITY DROPPED OFF DURING DECEMBER, AND THERE WERE AGAIN REPORTS THAT FOOD SHORTAGES PREVENTED THE VC FROM BRINGING IN THE ADDITIONAL UNITS NEEDED TO SUSTAIN MILITARY OPERATIONS.

8. A SECOND MAJOR PROBLEM SERIOUSLY AFFECTING THE VC IS THE LOSS OF POPULATION AS REFUGEES LEAVE VC-CONTROLLED AREAS AND MOVE INTO GVN AREAS. THIS LOSS HAS NOT ONLY DECREASED THE ECONOMIC BASE FROM WHICH THE VC CAN DRAW SUPPORT, BUT HAS ALSO HAMPERED THEIR RECRUITMENT OPERATIONS. SEVERAL PROVINCES- BINH DINH, LAM DONG, AND BINH THUAN- NOTED AN INCREASE IN FORCED RECRUITMENT DURING DECEMBER. LAM DONG AND KHANH HOA PROVINCES ALSO NOTED THAT APATHY ON THE PART OF THE POPULATION TOWARD THE VC AND RESENTMENT OF INCREASED TAXATION WERE AFFECTING VC EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS.

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