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SUBJECT: (Optional)

MEMORANDUM

FROM:

C/SB/CI:

EXTENSION

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NO.

SX-25683

DATE

23 February 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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CI/RA

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Attention:

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C/CI/RA

3 MAR 1971

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CIRA/ER

2B23

- In response to an informal query of mine asking what SB/CI thought about a Radio Lib analysis by your friend R. Waring Herrick, whom you wanted advised (for his analysis of KR). Copy attached.... On this one, he's really off the beam. I brought this to the attention of the CA Staff officer responsible for Radio Lib and he said he agreed with SB's + my analysis of "F. Fitzgerald" article and would look up Herrick's paper to examine it. Lee

11 ~~Flow samples~~ and classify to 100-6-139/3

Craig

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FORM 3-62

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DATE 2007

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SX-25683

23 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/RA

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : SERGEYEV Articles

IP/EDI	TRAVEL PROGRAM
IP/FIS	INDEX
IP/FH	PREPARE FOR FORWARDING
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CIRA RECTS

1. We have read the full texts of the SERGEYEV articles, called "Without Leaving the Study," as they appear in FBIS DAILY REPORTS of 20 November 1970 pp A22-28, and 2 December 1970 pp A18-27.

2. We do not agree with the Radio Liberty analysis/speculation that the purport of "F. Sergeyev's" articles is to warn against a reversion to more stringent censorship of Soviet publications because of possible retaliation which would reduce the flow of Western overt information; nor are we persuaded that the explication of American expertise at using Soviet open literature for intell analysis is intended as an exhortation for the KGB/GRU to match this effort and thereby reduce the need for the risks of clandestine acquisition. On the contrary, our reading of the SERGEYEV articles leads us to believe that they are more sophisticated versions of the classic "vigilance" items. The moral of the articles is that although a major modern state like the USSR cannot now cut off the flow of overt publication, it can and should make every effort (i.e., all responsible organs and citizens must be vigilant) to prevent Western analysts from getting too much benefit from overt material, benefits which not only result in intelligence to the enemy but also reduces the enemy's need to take those clandestine risks which socialist counter-intelligence is so ready and well equipped to foil and expose (etc.). In sum, like several public pleas once made by Allen Dulles about the American penchant for technical magazines (and certain newspapers) to give it all away for the price of a subscription, "Sergeyev's" message seems to be exactly what he says at the conclusion: "a blabbermouth is a windfall for the enemy," so cut it out, there is no need to be "excessively frank."

23 FEB 71
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3. Nevertheless, the SERGEYEV articles are indeed very interesting - almost entirely devoid of the usual polemics and distortions; some portions show such a sophisticated understanding and exposition of the interdependence of overt and clandestine intelligence in the requirements/collection/production cycles that one might suspect the hand of a former Western intelligence officer (such as KGB consultants Philby and Blake) if it were not for the more likely probability that it has all been cribbed straight from Harry Howe Ransom and Sherman Kent. Either way, the tone and elevated style of the articles leave a clear impression of non-Soviet authorship. We cannot identify "F. Sergeyev" (indeed, the entire RIS machine run contains not one SERGEYEV with a first name beginning with F.); interesting to note is that the author of Part One, "Candidate of Economic Sciences F. Sergeyev" (who is merely "F. Sergeyev" for Part Two) became "Colonel F. Sergeyev" for an article on DIA, "Pentagon Intelligence - A Weapon of American Imperialism" which appeared in KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL on 2 January 1971 (see DIALY REPORT 12 February 1971 pp A33-40). We are not aware of any previous appearances of "F. Sergeyev" in print, although the Radio Lib analyst lists one prior use of the name, for an attack on "Adherents to the Doctrine of Total Espionage" in 1964.

✓]
C/SB/CI

Prepared by:
SB/CI/P: []
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CRD 439/70

Munich, December 22, 1970

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST URGES GREATER
RELIANCE ON OPEN SOURCES

By R. Waring Herrick

"The aphorism of the war years -- 'a blabbermouth is a windfall for the enemy' -- still has not lost its meaning in our divided world"
"Without Leaving the Study,"
Nedelva, December 2, 1970.

Summary. Izvestiya's Sunday supplement recently concluded a two-installment analysis on foreign exploitation of Soviet media output for intelligence purposes. Conforming superficially to the standard Soviet propaganda line of "unmasking" Western intelligence activities in order to alert the Soviet public to the dangers, the lengthy analysis includes a remarkably revealing comment suggesting Soviet failure to match the West in taking advantage of open sources. It is even inferred that this failure results in unnecessary use of covert intelligence collection means that involves unjustified risk of exposure of the "illegal" actions of the state. Equally surprising -- and perhaps reflecting the real reason the articles were prepared and published -- was a clear statement of defense against reverting to a stricter censorship that would inhibit international exchange of publications, scientific exhibitions, "or other forms of intellectual intercourse".

Non Aff
In recently concluding a two-article series in Nedelva¹ on Western use of open source materials for intelligence purposes, author "F. Sergeyev" pays minimal attention to giving his product the required ideological gloss by including a few statements such as the one quoted above. Rather he concluded his lengthy, well-informed, and remarkably polemic-free analysis with two unprecedentedly frank comments on current Soviet problems with regard to making use of open sources. The depth of information evidenced by the author, ostensibly one F. Sergeyev, and the fact that this otherwise unknown individual has been engaged in the study of Western intelligence as long as six years² suggests that he is a professional intelligence analyst.

The first of the quasi-revelations in the Sergeyev articles was contained in the first three sentences of the summary which concluded the series:

sequitur?

"To sum up. The supplying of information services with modern means of electronic and computer equipment today is enabling the accumulation of information to be quickly systematized and assimilated, turning it into an effective base for an in-depth analysis for intelligence forecasts. Under modern conditions one state's intelligence interest with respect to another has become so all-embracing that it can only be satisfied by means of the integrated utilization of all possibilities of obtaining information, including of course open sources. The use of open sources frees secret service forces for more complex and responsible tasks, whose fulfillment is only possible with the help of illegal means and which therefore justify the state risk connected with them."

Taken in the context of the whole article, including unwonted use of superlatives to describe Western processing of open-source information³, it seems warranted to conclude that the USSR was being alluded to when Sergeyev said, in effect, that lack of full exploitation of open sources resulted in a state taking unnecessary risks of being caught using illegal means. From his preceding description of the "enormous" Western investment in this field, it is obvious that Sergeyev was making a plea for an equivalent allocation of money and talent for open-source exploitation.

The conclusions of the Sergeyev article went on to an even more surprising remark, one which reveals the second of the USSR's problems with regard to open sources:

"It is clear to everyone that, with such a rapid development of scientific and technical thinking in the modern world, not one of the foremost countries can close off open sources without damaging its development by foregoing scientific and technical publications, the exchange of publications, exhibitions, and other forms of intellectual intercourse."

no sense

This appeal for reason on the part of the Party leaders not to further handicap the USSR technologically by turning back to Stalinist norms of censorship was followed by constructive suggestions for satisfactorily handling the admitted "danger" posed to any country by intelligence analysis of its open literature⁴. This "counterintelligence" aspect of the problem, being extraneous, in that it wasn't even mentioned in the body of the article, suggests that it might be the real point of the article. In the present situation, in which the USSR clearly is trending back to Stalinist conservatism in many aspects of its internal affairs⁵, it may well be that the Soviet "intelligence community," both secret police (KGB) and military intelligence (GRU), are concerned that their efforts to achieve optimal exploitation of Western literature might be heavily handicapped by a misguided return to strict censorship of the publication, or any form of exchange, of Soviet scientific and technical information. Such a development would have a boomerang effect in retarding Soviet acquisition of that 80-90 per cent of intelligence information available from open sources and which, the article observes, is so important

why? it would still exist, they could still get it

for providing the necessary direction for the illegal intelligence collection effort.

FOOTNOTES

1. Nedelya No.'s 46 and 47, November 9-15 and November 16-22, 1970, pages 14-15 and 16-22 respectively.
2. F. Sergeyev, "Nasledniki doktrina total'nogo shpionazha" (Adherents to the Doctrine of Total Espionage), Znamya No. 11, 1964.
3. "The imperialist states. . . are systematizing, analyzing, and evaluating a colossal amount of information without leaving their country or even their own study"; ". . . study in the United States of open sources. . . has been formed into a large branch of intelligence activity on a scientific basis, in which an enormous number of military and civilian specialists are engaged;" again referring to the U.S., Sergeyev writes of "the millions of facts now absorbed and analyze by the incredibly expanding intelligence machine".
4. Basically, Sergeyev recommended self-censorship by individuals well-informed on Western procedures and interests.
5. E.g., the uncompromising attack on "bourgeois ideology" in the Pravda editorial of November 23, 1970.

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<p>Remarks: A most remarkable article - the Sovs claim complain that the West has been using open sources for intelligence gathering purposes. Look who's calling the kettle black.</p> <p>There is an oblique admission that the Sovs are engaged in illegal intelligence activities.</p> <p>We had noticed this in the original as well as in the Sov.Lithuanian press. I was going to have this translated, but then we found this item. I would also want to compare the Lith text with the Russian, but we have one of the 3Lith installments missing and are trying to find another copy of it.</p> <p>I wonder if SB has taken note of it? Shouldn't we send a copy to the Bureau?</p> <p><i>I think we should get a complete translation.</i></p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
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1. E. ... will be interested.
2. Yes, a copy should go to S.B. Dore
sent to report + set of documents.
3. Give a copy to ...
she can pass it if she thinks the
FBI would be interested.
4. This is not really a new theme.
For scientists have also complained
of lagging far behind the world in
computer technology.

- land
- ① This is Col. F.M. SERBETEV. There are at least a
half dozen H.M. order-type things by him in
recent period, in our bibliography.
 - ② Let's get a full translation of the Widelya
articles.
 - ③ Our Sov. IS bibliography, 63-70 -
would be a great tool for Lodi's labors.
They apparently have no research
apparatus in that area. [That's why we
have to get it published!]

CRD 439/70

Munich, December 22, 1970

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By R. Waring Herrick

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evl F.M. Sergeyev. See
bibliog.

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This appeal for reason on the part of the Party leaders not to further handicap the USSR technologically by turning back to Stalinist norms of censorship was followed by constructive suggestions for satisfactorily handling the admitted "danger" posed to any country by intelligence analysis of its open literature⁴. This "counterintelligence" aspect of the problem, being extraneous, in that it wasn't even mentioned in the body of the article, suggests that it might be the real point of the article. In the present situation, in which the USSR clearly is trending back to Stalinist conservatism in many aspects of its internal affairs⁵, it may well be that the Soviet "intelligence community," both secret police (KGB) and military intelligence (GRU), are concerned that their efforts to achieve optimal exploitation of Western literature might be heavily handicapped by a misguided return to strict censorship of the publication, or any form of exchange, of Soviet scientific and technical information. Such a development would have a boomerang effect in retarding Soviet acquisition of that 80-90 per cent of intelligence information available from open sources and which, the article observes, is so important

why? It would still exist, they could still get it. It's on the open market, and its production is unrelated to Soviet Communist plans or requirements.

for providing the necessary direction for the illegal intelligence collection effort.

FOOTNOTES

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I have understood from the Amur press that the Soviet acquisition and dissemination system on overt Western spy information is the best in the world, after making their scientific letters informed on Western literature in their disciplines than ours. It is not clear to me from the portions translated that the Soviets are complaining for lack. I'd like to see a complete translation of the two installments.

Thus, the author sums up, not only the domestic financial and economic policy of Nixon's administration and its efforts to balance the budget and curb inflation proved a failure but also the U.S. external economic policy has moved towards a dangerous brink of increasing the world monetary crisis.

RAMSEY CLARK CRITICIZES FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER

Moscow TASS International Service in English 1010 GMT 20 Nov 70 L

[Text] New York, November 20. TASS--Ramsey Clark, former attorney general of the United States, again criticized the F.B.I. and its director J. Edgar Hoover.

As attorney-general under President Johnson, Clark presided over the F.B.I. and was intimately familiar with its operations. It is reported that in this capacity he had frequent differences with his subordinate Hoover.

Clark hinted at these differences in a newly-published book entitled "Crime in America." He suggested that the F.B.I.'s efficiency had been impaired by Hoover's "self-centered concern for his own reputation." Hoover responded, in an interview with the Washington POST, by calling Clark a "jellyfish" and an ineffective attorney-general.

At a press conference in New York, Clark countered by saying that Hoover is intolerant of criticism and added that the F.B.I., under Hoover's direction, lacks objectivity in its pursuit of information.

Discussing the Clark-Hoover controversy, New York TIMES observer Tom Wicker today said that Hoover's response to Clark's criticism proved Clark's charge that Hoover is intolerant of even mild criticism. More serious, Wicker said, is that Hoover and his agency "have become over the years a classic self-perpetuating bureaucracy, operating more for their own interests within the government and to maintain their own reputations and position, than as a disinterested investigative body."

U.S. USES OVERT SOURCES TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE

Moscow NEDELYA No 46, 9-15 Nov 70 pp 14-15 L

[Installment of an article by Candidate of Economic Sciences F. Sergeyev: "Without Leaving the Study"]

[Text] As 100 and 1,000 years ago, the "cloak and dagger knights" are continuing to operate in all latitudes, feeding intelligence with their espionage reports, and the scales of this kind of espionage are increasing in accordance with the intelligence services' increasing demands for secret information. But time has brought correctives into the aims of intelligence, both to the scope of its activity and, correspondingly, to the ways and means of extracting information, particularly to the organization of the analysis and evaluation of information.

In the second half of the 20th century, in the era of the scientific and technical revolution, the old methods like "shots in the dark" do not count for much in intelligence. "Mysterious chases," "fights on the platform of a speeding express," "the seduction of the possessors of state secrets by beautiful women," "secret addresses in secluded places," and other things--from the arsenal of the detective books and cinema films--are, of course, used in the secret war even in the age of space and nuclear power. But the proportion of this kind of operation in the overall activity of the U.S. CIA, for example, has dropped considerably.

This is by no means because the leaders of the U.S. intelligence do not wish, as the saying goes, to soil their hands with dirty work; on the contrary, it is known that U.S. intelligence is marked by its aggressiveness and cruelty and that it is not ashamed of its means. But it is now impossible to solve such a complex riddle as the military and economic potential of another state solely with the help of the old and traditional methods of espionage--and herein lies one of the main tasks of the intelligence services.

There are also methods for the task.

The modern intelligence service is primarily a vast scientific research apparatus supported not only and not so much by secret intelligence means as by the modern possibilities of gathering, studying, and systematizing the information which is being extracted.

Many scientists are working in the technically well equipped intelligence organization of the imperialist states--they are systematizing, analyzing, and evaluating a colossal amount of information without leaving the country or even their own study.

This entire mass of information comes to them not from the reports of secret agents but from sources which are absolutely accessible to each and everybody and which the secret service calls "open." These are those sources without which not a single civilized state can manage in the age of the scientific and technical revolution and the "information explosion": newspapers and magazines, radio, television, national and international exhibitions, the exchange of books, international scientific and cultural exchange.... The secret service with its goals is also a part of this "information explosion."

This did not begin today.

A little history. The intelligence services previously also resorted to using open sources to reveal the military potential of their enemies' countries. The case of Berthold Jakob serves as a classical case proving that, as Allen Dulles said, one can engage successfully in intelligence work "without leaving one's study." A German journalist and military expert, he emigrated to Britain and wrote a great deal at the beginning of the thirties about Hitler's army, the rearming of which had only just begun. Berthold Jakob published a book in London which discussed the organization of the fascist army in detail and described its higher military leadership, the leading workers of the general staff, and 168 generals. Hitler ordered his intelligence adviser, Col Walter (Nikolai) to find out from what sources the author had received such important information and to establish the names of his accomplices.

German secret service agent Besemann was instructed to entice Jakob into a trap. Posing as a publisher who had emigrated from fascist Germany to Basel, Besemann opened a bookshop not far from the German border. Then he got in touch with Jakob and invited him to visit Switzerland to discuss publishing business. The latter accepted the invitation and came to Basel. Taking advantage of a short absence by Jakob, Besemann put a soporific drug in his glass of wine during lunch. Suspecting nothing, the journalist drank the wine and at once fell asleep. Besemann asked the waiter to help to carry his "intoxicated" friend to their waiting automobile. Thus, Jakob was in Germany again.

He was brought straight to Gestapo headquarters and taken to a study where he appeared before (Nikolai). Jakob stated: "I got everything which is published in my book from the newspapers. I obtained from an obituary in the local newspaper the grounds for affirming that Major General (Gaaze) commands the 17th Division stationed in Nuremberg. The obituary stated that General (Gaaze) commanding the 17th Division was present at the funeral." Jakob continued: "I found the data about the wedding of Colonel (Virov's) daughter to a certain Major Stemmermann in a column in the society news. A paragraph noted that (Virov) commands the 306th regiment of the 25th Division. Major Stemmermann was named as the officer of this division's communications service.

The wedding was attended by Major General (Shaller), named as the commander of this division. The newspaper reported that he had come from Stuttgart where his division is located...." Here the interrogation ended in practical terms. (Nikolai) reported to Hitler that all the information on the Wehrmacht had been taken by Jakob from the German newspapers.

Meanwhile a diplomatic incident had arisen in connection with the kidnapping of Jakob. The German Foreign Ministry, which had begun a search for Jakob, found him in a Gestapo prison. A few months later Jakob returned to Switzerland, where he talked about his kidnapping.

Hitler's intelligence service also widely used legal possibilities, in particular the enemy press. Some 380 information and scientific-research institutes were operating in Germany during World War II. Many of these institutes (for example, the "Russian Institute" in Wannsee) were engaged in discovering the military and economic potential of future enemies by carefully analyzing their open publications. A large part of the information of the first section of the Abwehr, led by Colonel Hans (Pikenbrok), was based "on the ability to read between the lines of the Soviet press publications, on questioning returning travellers, and on other methods of study research." The Japanese intelligence service also operated in the same way.

The United States for its part widely used the German and Japanese experience of work on open sources. During World War II American intelligence drew a considerable amount of information about the enemy directly from the German, Italian, and Japanese press. The allied intelligence services established special agencies in Europe and Asia which bought newspapers and scientific magazines or ordered them through neutral countries and redirected them by plane to Washington, New York, and London.

U.S. Strategic Intelligence chief General William Donovan stated one day soon after the war that the Americans had determined the scales of the Wehrmacht's personnel losses by analyzing the lists of officers who died at the front which were published in the German provincial newspapers. Donovan said: "It is known that in all armies there is a proportional correlation between the number of privates and officers, and correspondingly between the losses among them. Basing themselves on this, our workers, skilled in the field of analysis, have been able to determine the size of the German Army in 1943." According to Donovan's evident, these evaluations were confirmed after the war.

The Americans began to study the military and economic potential of Japan before the war. Naturally, it was easy for the American secret servicement to be persuaded that the production of agricultural products was one of the most vulnerable places in the country's economy because it was constantly based on artificial fertilizers. Thus, the two small islands (Nauru) and (Oksan), on which enormous stocks of phosphates were concentrated, appeared in the list of strategic objectives.

In 1942 Pennsylvania University economist Dr Robert Strausz-Hupe turned his attention to the fact that before the war Japan imported a large amount of fertilizer from the French possessions in North Africa. But U.S. troops were already there by 1942. Nevertheless, as Strausz-Hupe determined from Japanese information, Japan was experiencing no fertilizer shortage.

Naturally, there arose the question of how the losses were being replaced. Strausz-Hupe suggested that the fertilizers were being imported from the Island of (Nauru) which abounded in alkaline guano and phosphates. The suggestion was confirmed by aerial reconnaissance. An aerial survey showed that new production installations had been erected on the island and that a large number of transport ships was loading at the quayside. The island was subjected to saturation bombing. After a certain time reports began to come in about the gradual exhaustion of stocks of fertilizers in Japan and, consequently, about the approach of a food crisis.

Such is history. But we are more interested in modern times.

The role of open sources today. Work on open sources of information received its greatest scope in the United States in the postwar years. Such recognized authorities in the intelligence field in the United States as A. Dulles, S. Kent, L. Farago, W. McGovern, and many, many others dedicated special research to substantiating the importance of this branch of intelligence activity and justifying the enormous expenditure connected with it.

As American authors say, the study in the United States of open sources of foreign states is so organized so as "not to let slip anything which is accessible or potentially useful." Under the modern conditions, it has been formed into a large branch of intelligence activity on a scientific basis, in which an enormous number of military and civilian specialists are engaged.

Work on open material, when done by highly qualified specialists, permits important conclusions to be drawn concerning the enemy's strategic possibilities and the vulnerable spots in his military economy, conclusions which go far beyond the limits of the published text. With new work and branches of the nonproduction sphere being constantly drawn into servicing military consumption and also with the complication of the military-economic potential, the opportunities for determining that military-economic potential and its individual elements through indirect data have increased.

A statement by American political observer H. Ransom is interesting in this respect. Stressing that the United States does not rely completely on secret operations but uses open information on the USSR's scientific and technical achievements appearing in the Soviet press, he cites the following specific instance by way of confirmation: "A report in the press on the laying of a railroad in an uninhabited region could serve the intelligence service as a stimulus to gather information on that region and elucidation of whether there is an airfield, metallurgical plant, or uranium mine at the end of the line." Such facts drawn for open sources, Ransom concludes, "could be of no less importance to our military and foreign political planning than the showing of a new model of the 'bison' (long-range bomber) at a parade in Moscow."

The scientific methods now being used in intelligence for comparing and generalizing fragmentary and uncoordinated information drawn from open publications and also the modern technical means for accumulating and processing such material insure rapid systematization and assimilation of an enormous mass of collected information.

It is not difficult to turn this into an effective base for military-economic forecasts and strategic decisions. The processing of and research into this information have also opened up colossal opportunities for borrowing other people's ideas for developing one's own science, technology, and production and also opportunities for making timely analyses of the economic situation for the purpose of gaining new markets.

As W. McGovern pointed out, "It is very difficult to calculate mathematically, but I am inclined to guess that in the process of preparing strategic decisions approximately 20 percent of the basic information comes from secret sources and almost 80 percent from open, legal sources." L. Farago says that 90 percent of information can come from open sources.

The correlation of percentages can be disputed, but this does not alter the essence of the matter. It is, of course, naive to interpret this correlation as the result of a reduction in secret intelligence. This, let us say, "20 percent" attributed by the American authors to secret intelligence sources is different in both number and quality from the past: First, it is estimated in correlation with the millions of facts now absorbed and processed by the incredibly expanding intelligence machine, which, therefore means an increase in the volume of secret-service intelligence, second, this "20 percent" at the present level of development of intelligence activity is not working in the semi-darkness as in olden times, is not groping its way, but is working along strictly thought-out lines, with constant corrections on the basis of the latest equipment, scientific research, and analysis of the flood of information, which means an incredible qualitative increase in secret intelligence. It is, thus, more strictly and accurately orientated and attention is concentrated on the main directions determined in relation to the development of the enemy's military-economic potential.

But here the imperialist states' intelligence services have to take account of the modern development of international relations and the position of the opposing forces in the world arena. It is not so simple to illegally place one's man in a foreign world, nor is it so easy to find secret agents there. It is necessary to take account of the fixed norms of international law and avoid international complications, all the more since energetic counterintelligence activities by the forces opposing imperialism considerably increase the risk of failure. What is the point of taking a risk, when information can be obtained without risk and, what is more, faster.

Let us repeat, the division of labor within the intelligence service in no way signifies a desire on the part of its leaders to have clean hands; on the contrary, they use secret agents to fulfill the most serious and profound tasks which cannot be solved by spy satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, or information centers using fast electronic equipment.

What are they interested in? What tasks does U.S. intelligence set itself in the collection of open material?

Analysis of U.S. literature permits three main directions to be picked out for which open sources of intelligence information are used.

The most important, apparently, is the collection of general political, economic, and military information, necessary for assessing the military-economic and moral-political potential of countries which are the objects of intelligence.

The importance of this direction is determined by the fact that it is precisely general information which serves as the main strategic orientation of government organs, both military and civilian. In fulfilling this task, U.S. intelligence gathers all data which it might need for waging the economic and political struggle, and for diplomacy and propaganda.

The second direction is the obtaining of special intelligence information concerning specific fields of economics, science and technology, and military affairs. This, as a rule, is destined for a narrower circle of specialists and serves as material for formulating strategic plans.

Finally, the third direction, where open sources play a substantial role, is personalia, the gathering of information on individuals. U.S. intelligence is interested not only in important state, political, public, and military figures and eminent scientists, but also, as will be shown later, in lesser persons, either already engaged in specific sectors of the economy, production, science, politics, or the armed forces, or the youth which can be considered promising.

The source of all this type of information is primarily the generally available press material, from official reports to all kinds of reference publications. The intelligence specialist working on a specific problem can use this information as a basis for important conclusions. One official document of the U.S. Army intelligence directorate which was made known stated that, with such material at their disposal "each side could draw conclusions on the other side's intentions and know how it was going to act." On the basis of general information, "trends systems" [sistemy orientirov] are drawn up. These are a complex of information permitting speculations to be made on the development of events in the future and forecasting of the policy of this or that state.

In using open sources, maximum attention is given to each of them, since valuable information can appear in a completely unexpected context and, in addition, is revealed by comparison. Thus, into the field of vision of intelligence come the central and outlying press, radio and television broadcasts, special military open publications, publications and papers in the scientific and technical field not distributed abroad but available within the country, and all kinds of other publications not of a highly secrete nature.

Great attention, is naturally, paid by U.S. intelligence to works by scientists of the socialist countries in the fields of atomic energy, nuclear physics, space radiation, chemistry, biology, missile construction, the development and improvement of missile fuel, electronics, telemechanics, automation, and other data of modern science and technology.

As a result of the processing and analysis of open sources, the intelligence services gather information on the state of science, technology, industry, the armed forces and on other important questions concerning the socialist states' defense capability. Sometimes an experienced researcher only needs a simple mention of an objective of interest to the intelligence services in order to draw definite conclusions.

With the modern scope of economic, scientific-technical, and military information, it is completely natural that articles on various branches of the economy, science and technology, and military affairs should be published (they cannot be published) in the open periodic press. Though these articles do not contain secret information, the thorough systematic study of the sum total of published data and the analysis, generalization, and drawing of conclusions from them can give the specialist a fairly close idea of the state and development trends of this or that branch of science or the economy.

For example, in the middle fifties (which we can judge from American publications), U.S. intelligence, by means of "daily fishing" and analysis of data from open publications on Soviet foreign trade in aluminum, tried to determine the start of the USSR's transition to broad-scale building of missile equipment and reduction in the building of military aircraft. By searching into the technical literature of the socialist countries during the sixties, the U.S. Air Force's scientific and technical intelligence center stubbornly tried to find out the answer to the question of what kind of metal, having the capacity to withstand great loads, was preferred by these countries for protecting the crew's cabin of combat aircraft from gamma rays. During the same years the very fact of the increase in publications about training actions by interceptor-aircraft, in the absence of evidence, gave U.S. intelligence a foundation for concluding that the socialist countries were developing such aircraft construction.

ALLENDE'S GOVERNMENT ALREADY TAKING PROGRESSIVE STEPS

Moscow in Portuguese to Brazil 2200 GMT 19 Nov 70 L

[Dispatch from Santiago by Vladimir Korotkov]

[Text] Two weeks have passed since the Popular Unity Government came to power in Chile. Much work has been done in such a short period of time: Practically the entire state and administrative apparatus has been renewed. In spite of the forecasts of the rightwing, these changes have taken place calmly and efficiently.

The new leaders, representatives of six progressive parties and organizations which compose the ruling bloc, have started to solve the many problems left to the Popular Unity by the Christian Democrat Government. The new administration also establishes a new style of leadership, in large and small problems. The ministers and other leaders meet daily with the workers, discuss different problems with them. The local press reported a few days ago that four ministers, those for labor, economy, agriculture, and the mining industry, took part in the plenary meeting of the single central of Chilean workers. This is a fact without precedent in Chile. One of the most crucial problems was discussed: that of the increase of wages due to price increases. This is a very serious problem. It is sufficient to say that 700,000 Chilean workers earn only 84 centimos per day. After a multilateral discussion by many organizations, the government will take the necessary steps, as it has stated. The largest increases will go the sections of the population earning lower wages.

The newspaper NACION, which reflects the interests of government circles, reported that in the next few days a resolution will be adopted on the nationalization of the copper industry and the private banks. NACION says that for many years hundreds of millions of dollars were drained from Chile to the United States.