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Source: *[Handwritten: ...]*

NOTE: The following are alleged by *[Handwritten: ...]* to be statements made by MATSURI Takamuro, former Colonel, Japanese Army, to him as a result of direct conversations on the topics concerned. The following wording is allegedly MATSURI's.

1. I have met with Major General C. A. Willoughby several times, but the number of meetings which I have had with him is by no means unduly great. I cannot help but pay the highest respect to his personality and I feel completely grateful to the deepness of his consideration for me. He was indeed a great general and superior. It is entirely attributable to the assistance of Maj. Gen. Willoughby that I have come to win the understanding and trust of the United States Army. To my satisfaction, I was really able to work well.
2. Regardless of the articles which may have been provided for in the Potsdam Declaration, ever since the surrender of Japan I have been resolutely of the belief that the future world situation would not leave Japan defenseless. Therefore, even since the end of the war, I have been a firm advocate for the rearmament of Japan. I am not a man who availed himself of changing times in which everyone has begun to talk considerably in public about rearmament; ever since the surrender I have been holding firm to the opinion that Japan should be rearmed, and I believe that is an absolute necessity. When it occurred last year that a plan was to be drawn up for the formation of a National Police Reserve, I was asked by Maj. Gen. Willoughby to formulate such a program and plan. I took it over. At that time, Colonel TSUJI Masahiko advised me, "Don't accept such a task. It is not the right time to be doing that now." However, I did not conform to TSUJI's suggestion and proceeded with the plan for the formation of a National Police Reserve to the best of my ability, always with the aim in mind of the rearmament of Japan. In TSUJI's opinion, it was very difficult to recruit capable men under the circumstances then prevailing (August-September, 1950), even if the National Reserve were to be organized. Consequently, TSUJI believed that no national and competent Police Reserve would be formed. He argued with me that if I brought such a makeshift organization into being despite the attendant circumstances at the time, dishonor might be brought upon me and he told me I should not make a laughing-stock of myself over such an issue. I did not accept his Reserve force. Thus, his advice was in that way full of favorable considerations for my personal position. Since I was aware of the trust accorded to me by General Willoughby, however, and since I

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advocating the cause of rearmament for a long time, I accepted Maj. Gen. Willoughby's request with willingness. I did not give in to TSUJI's kind and thoughtful workings, as I considered that this project was my destiny, and believed that it should be the way of the Japanese people to go along with such directions and to perform the assigned mission, even though it would mean a dishonor to me personally.

However, as it happened, I was not permitted to take the initiative in establishing the Police Reserve and leading it myself, in spite of my efforts. I do not know whether that was good fortune or bad.

3. Since then, the report and resultant rumors that I was concerned with the National Police Reserve issue have gradually come to spread among the people. As an echo to the public advocacy of Japanese rearmament which became intensified since the end of 1950, voices of accusation and recrimination have been raised against me, becoming more and more intense. My name has appeared in both the TASS News Agency press and in newspapers following the Chinese Communist line. They alleged that my group was unilaterally plotting the remilitarization of Japan; they slandered me quite maliciously, saying, "This man is one who was a great wartime anti-American leader and was Prime Minister TOJO's protege; he has now turned into a spy and tool of America since the termination of the war. This man, moreover, is plotting the rearmament of Japan! If Japan is to be rearmed by a man like him, we must stand silently by. In the event that Russia should come into Japan, he would probably cooperate with the Soviets too." Quite recently, again, another baseless and slanderous rumor is being spread about, that "General OKAMURA (Keiji gōkyūjūgon) and General OKAMURA (Sadamu) are using me to make preparations for rearmament," and are these dangerous militarists. Both General OKAMURA and General OKAMURA are men of fine character. I have had almost no chance to meet with General OKAMURA. However, I sometimes do pay a visit to General OKAMURA, who is my senior officer and my former operational strategy chief under whom I once served. None among the former military men of Japan could equal him in the performance and observation of justice. It is indeed regrettable that I am at present in circumstances which do harm to the name of such a fine and noble superior.

I have never thought in terms of effecting the rearmament of Japan by the efforts of my group alone, nor have I advocated excluding other groups. I believe that it is wise policy to rearm Japan; but I know full well how difficult a process those persons responsible for rearmament will be obliged to undertake before it can be realized. I did not undertake the project of the National Police Reserve of my own volition, but rather did it because of the instruction of Maj. Gen. Willoughby. Subsequently, I have entertained no political ambitions whatsoever. I do not have any demands as to my future position either. My earnest desire is merely to recruit and weld together fine men who are eligible from a military point of view and to create an army of Japan really capable of contributing to world peace. It is extremely difficult to understand the reasoning of those former Japanese Army men, fortunate enough to enjoy considerable confidence and trust of the U.S. Army and contact with the latter, who not only do not try to aid me but who even denounce and exclude me.

(Qualification for paras. 3 and 4, excepting news quotes G-2-propaganda.)

As is known to you (Source), TSUJI was arrested and I have long been in the

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TSUJI for over long years maintained a... In work, however, there exists no... (EVALUATION of last sentence:... TSUJI knew of his projected task, among... planning Japanese rearmament in cooperation with... at the present time merely as an intimate friend... his opinion to me and often brings me information, but he... at my request. As far as my work is concerned, I have neither... nor have I consulted with him. (Evaluations C-5;... above.) My relationship with him is extremely close personally and privately, but is completely non-existent officially.

The rumor is rampant among the people, nevertheless, that he and I are cooperating closely in working out a plan for Japanese rearmament. TSUJI is a very naive person and he is greatly concerned about me. Therefore, if he hears any malicious slander concerning me, he would investigate and confide its source and then directly accuse the person who blurted it out of his irresponsibility. The other day, when ISAKURO (Hideo) spoke ill of me, TSUJI went to ISAKURO and stormed at him. I am indeed grateful for TSUJI's devoted friendship to me. However, when TSUJI castigates other persons in the cause of friendship, the people around the person attacked misunderstand me and speak as if I am urging TSUJI to make such charges. From this they derive some propaganda. Therefore, some day in the not too distant future, I intend to ask TSUJI kindly for my own benefit not to operate in such a radical and heated fashion.

I was several times invited by Mr. MATSUYAMA (Ichiro) to visit him, and I went to him. I went to see him because he indicated that he was anxious to hear my opinions. I certainly never asked him to undertake any activities for me. When I saw him, I was impressed with his fine character. He was a very gentle and courteous man. Concerning the problem of rearmament, he regarded me as his petty junior and subordinate figure, as if I were an expert, and he showed a serious and respectful interest in my opinions from beginning to end. Although I have no idea as to how much he appreciated my viewpoint, I am definitely looking forward to the day when Mr. MATSUYAMA leads the cabinet.

Judging from the recent activities of the YOSHIKAWA (Shigeru) Cabinet, it does not seem that the present cabinet members are even dreaming of the possible emergence of a MATSUYAMA Cabinet. The present cabinet appears to be making every attempt to hold down the influence of the powerful MATSUYAMA clique.

With the replacement of General MacArthur and the return to America of General Willoughby, the attitude of the U.S. military authorities towards the Japanese Government has relaxed to a certain extent. At the same time, however, the force of rearmament against me appears merely to have become stronger. I feel that even the existing YOSHIKAWA Cabinet is attempting to get rid of me. (In that connection,) my acceptance of the invitation of MATSUYAMA Ichiro is said to be cunningly used against me.

As I stated above, I am at present in a tough spot. Some people urge me to take resolute and vigorous counter-measures towards the malicious propaganda and slander (directed at me.) Other people say that TSUJI's close connection personally to me is not doing my reputation any good, and they warn me against any further association with him. I do not have the slightest intention of heeding to their suggestions. My only aim is to work for the... of the Japanese people.

any public counter-measures, it would only boomerang. My enemies who are blinded with self-interest and avarice would certainly twist and make ill use of my excuses and would merely fire back another blast of slander.

I have no desire at all to see old soldiers quarrel and split up on such a picayune matter. However much I may be rebuked and slandered, I should like to keep silent and non-resistant and to bear it. Reflecting back upon my past actions, I have done nothing of which I should be ashamed, though there are some who are casting slurs at me. That is all that consoles and relieves my mind. Nor do I intend nor even dream of breaking up with TSUJI.

10. In my judgment, there seem to be two different groups of former soldiers who are now concerned with rearmament and which are also entertaining animosity towards me. One of these groups is headed by former Lt. General IWAKURO (Hideo) and the other is a group primarily formed and directed by Lt. General TANIDA Isamu. 谷田 勇

a. Mr. IWAKURO seems to be operating on an extremely large scale in political, economic, and news publication circles. He also appears to be making a plan for the creation of a new political party. The central power of this new group will probably be reinforced by the group of YOSHIDA Shuhiro (吉田 寿夫) and others who are right-wing leaders of the Socialists, SHIBASAKI Keiso (志保 敬三), former Finance Minister and present president of the Japan Steel Works Inc. (NITTEISU). Mr. IWAKURO seems to be utilizing the argument for rearmament just as a tool for political purposes. In his group, there appears to be no one who is seriously planning the mechanics of rearmament. The principal military men of IWAKURO's group are YAGAMI Yoshio (八木 洋生), a former colonel, a certain YAMANE (北 山), YAMASHITA Ichichi (山崎 一), a former lieutenant colonel, YAMAZAKI Masaharu (山崎 正久), a former lieutenant colonel, and a few others. These persons are by no means acting in a staff officer capacity to Mr. IWAKURO; to Mr. IWAKURO, who is so gifted with abundant talents, advisors, staff officers, and aide-de-camps are not necessary for consultation. All these persons, therefore, are operating at the crack of his orders and under his dictatorship. For this reason, very few mature and experienced persons come under IWAKURO; in the ranks of those who are gathered together around IWAKURO, an extremely large number are not yet forty years of age.

b. Lt. General TANIDA is considerably trusted by Prime Minister YOSHIDA. TANIDA claims that he is formulating a plan for rearmament in cooperation with Lt. General YAMAMOTO Eiichi (原 見 栄 一). However, in reality there seems to be no relationship nor cooperation between the two. It is reported, nevertheless, that many persons who do not know the truth and who believe in Lt. General TANIDA's statement care to rally about him.

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