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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	Japan/USSR	REPORT NO.	CS DB-36417
SUBJECT	Observations of TSUJI Masanobu on USSR and China	DATE DISTR.	22 December 1955
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PLACE ACQUIRED	Japan, Tokyo	REFERENCES	
DATE ACQUIRED	25 October 1955		

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: American businessman with contacts in the Japanese defense forces and defense industries (B); from TSUJI Masanobu. Appraisal of Content: 2 as to accuracy of reporting.

Field Comment. TSUJI Masanobu, a former Japanese General Staff colonel, left Japan on 23 August 1955 and returned on 2 October, as a Democratic Party member of a delegation of Diet members who made a trip to the USSR and Communist China. The observations and interpretations below resulted from his trip. CSDB-36037, from another source, also reported TSUJI's comments on his trip.

1. During his flight to Irkutsk, USSR, TSUJI observed that the railroad from Kalgen to Irkutsk was completed and even an express train was operating. The railroad line was guarded by troop installations at intervals of 14 to 15 kilometers. A large number of bulldozers and ground-breaking equipment was in operation at a considerable depth on both flanks of the railroad. TSUJI speculates that pitchblende is being mined extensively and shipped to the USSR.
2. Judging from piecemeal information, Baku is estimated to be furnishing 50 percent of the petroleum requirements today. The area is clustered with oil towers; however, only 50 percent seem to be operating. The Soviets are going full force in developing underwater petroleum fields, which are currently developed to the extent of supplying 28 percent of the total output of Baku. In the near future, this level will be raised to approximately 50 percent. About 50 percent of the petroleum is refined in Baku and the remainder is shipped to other refineries in the USSR for processing. TSUJI estimates that the refining facilities and technical know-how of the USSR are about ten years behind Japan; thus the gap is still wider when compared with the advanced technology of the United States.
3. Since the defeat of Germany, the USSR has built a new factory city in the Georgian S.S.R. known as "Stalin Factory." Its population is 500,000 and it is the largest industrial center of this region. Over 70 percent of the machine facilities bear the mark of German manufacture in 1941-1943. TSUJI judges that the Soviets building such an industrial center so close to the borders of Turkey means plans for aggression into the Middle East. The nations of the Middle East have petroleum fields required by the USSR for successful military ventures. The Soviets are softening the Middle East.

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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by (X); field distribution by ())

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for aggression by fomenting racialism and making tempting offers of arms to the Arab nations at a drastically reduced price.

4. Internal conditions in the USSR are far from normal, especially among the farmers, who are underfed and underclothed and who live in shacks such as are seldom seen in Japan. A very small number of livestock was seen during trips to the countryside. TSUJI stated that this clearly indicates the complete failure of collective farming. Judging from conversations with the common people, TSUJI estimates that 97 percent of the Soviets desire peace, the remaining three percent belong to the USSR Communist Party. The USSR is in no position to wage all-out war until their domestic issues are settled to the satisfaction of the masses. Under Stalin the people were coerced into following the dictates laid down by the Kremlin; however, the present committee system of governing does not have as much force as the dictatorial might of Stalin. For this reason, struggles for power within the Kremlin are sure to develop, with Defense Minister Zhukov and Nikita S. Khrushchov, First Secretary of the USSR Communist Party, as the central figures. Until this leadership is settled, the USSR cannot afford to risk an all-out war. In the meantime, the USSR's only alternative is to create indirect pressure on the weak point of the Free World, promoting disharmony and general weakness through the deception and treachery of international communism.
5. The information TSUJI gathered in the USSR indicates that the USSR will be ready to wage all-out war in five to six years, with the "peace offensive" being used only as a means to an ultimate end. The "peace offensive" is disliked by the Kremlin; however, it is the only alternative to gain time to stabilize the domestic situation. Although he tried to do so, TSUJI heard no reports on a resistance movement. TSUJI believes that either the movement is very weak or the MVD has been thoroughly effective in uprooting such groups.
6. After his return to Japan, TSUJI visited leading officers of the National Defense Agency and strongly recommended that total rearmament of Japanese defense forces be completed prior to the five to six years lead time of the Soviets. Postwar Soviet arms development has shown great strides, with the mass production of highly efficient and effective modern weapons. As the Japanese defense forces have been basically armed with outdated and second-hand equipment from the United States, it is now time for the indigenous development of modern ordnance by Japanese engineers and industry. Instead of concentrating on increasing the size of the defense forces as suggested by the United States, Japan should improve the esprit de corps and equipment of the defense forces. The Japanese Government should seriously consider cutting down its personnel strength by 20,000 men and allocate the savings therefrom to the research and development of new ordnance items as well as providing State support for the ordnance industry, which is the backbone of military strength. Defense forces without an indigenous ordnance industrial base are meaningless. A well equipped and highly trained small force with modern weapons is far more capable than a large force without a highly efficient ordnance industrial base. It is time for Japan to improve the defense forces' weapons and equipment instead of increasing its personnel with people who join only to provide themselves with a means of gaining a livelihood.
7. The trip through the two countries took 40 days, most of the time being spent in the USSR. The tours were strictly controlled and guided; however, TSUJI managed to be out on his own occasionally. TSUJI, having a good knowledge of both Russian and Chinese, talked with over 400 common people in attempting to find the true feelings of the people. His real intention in making the tour was to ascertain the truth of the "peace offensive" program of the USSR. TSUJI's military background assisted him immeasurably in talking to military leaders in the USSR and Communist China, and also made him an outstanding target for constant surveillance.

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- 3 -

CSDB-36417

1. Headquarters Comment. This is presumably the rail line under construction from China to Ulan Bator.
2. Field Comment. Presumably for the USSR only.
3. Headquarters Comment. This city is probably Rustevi, where the Stalin Steel Combine is located. The population figure should probably read 50,000.

8/8-02-0403

12/55 (30)

125.3

3-5/735.5

1-6/735.5

4-5/735.5

1-12/732.16

1-12/732.17

11-12/740.1

783.311

122.51

122.41

111.3

850.01

172.2

174.8

172.1

3L (N) (CL)

N

32IN

32IN

IL/C

IL/C

3IN

3IN

N (2K) (3L)

6K/A (3L)

N (3L)

N (3L)

N (3L)

3L

3L

+4