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VIA: AIR

DISPATCH NO. 1171A-3

TO: Chief, IRE

DATE: 12 April 1949

FROM: Chief of [ ] Station, [ ]

SUBJECT: General Intelligence

Specific: Views of U.S. Officials on Near Eastern Situation

AGENCY REQUIREMENT: None for your information.

Transmitted by airmail in translation of Dispatch No. 112 from the Japanese Embassy in Manila to the Japanese Embassy, dated 20 January 1949. The dispatch contains information (a) received from a member of the production (copy of the dispatch) [ ] by [ ] on 7 February 1949. The dispatch is primarily a report on the views of U.S. officials and does not contain any information of a proprietary nature. It is being furnished to you for your information and you may care to accord the [ ]

[ ]

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Date: 2005

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Attachment to FTA 16/27

Date: 1 April 1957

Europe-Asia 7

(Received 4 February 1957)

Syria Confidential 42, 23 January 1957

To: Minister KIS I

Acting Minister to Syria TAMURA

Report on Conversation of U.S. Military Attache with Representative TSUJI

Representative TSUJI has since the 18th been exchanging views with Government and military leaders, including Acting President KUDOSHI (phonetic) (President of the National Assembly), and Acting Premier Harid Asm (Foreign Defense Minister) through the introduction of this Legation, as reported in Confidential 38, and on the 21st, the evening before the Representative left for Cairo, this officer invited him to dinner with the local U.S. Army Attache, Halloy (phonetic) at my residence, and on this occasion the Attache stated roughly as follows concerning conditions at the time of the outbreak of the Suez dispute and on the U.S. attitude toward the Arab nations:

1. On 27 October he and the U.S. military attaches at Tel Aviv and Amman had cabled that Israel would soon undertake military action in some direction, and on the 28th he cabled that, since the Syrian army's defense against Israel was relatively strong, there was no possibility that the Israeli Army's attack would be on Syria. On the other hand, the U.S. Military Attache in Israel cabled that, judging from the fact that at 1000 hrs 29 Oct. the Israelis had enforced strict control over transportation and communications going to the Sinai peninsula, military action directed at the Sinai peninsula would begin within 24 hours. There, the complete evacuation of American families was begun at 1000 hours 29 Oct. and completed by 1100 hours. There was absolutely no information that the British and French armies would attack Egypt in cooperation with the Israeli Army, and the British Ambassador here seemed to be aware of nothing. The fact that Israel had begun military action at 1600 hours the same was first learned from a radio broadcast at 0200 hours, 30 October.
2. It was entirely a mistake of policy for the British and French armies to have taken military action to attack Egypt in cooperation with the Israeli Army, and it is believed that the cause of the defeat was that, while overestimating the Egyptian Air Force, they underestimated the position of Nassir. Should they not rather have left it to the Israeli Army and then taken military action and had the Israelis retire after occupying the Suez Canal, in the hope of securing free passage through the canal?

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3. The U.S. fully recognizes that it has suffered defeats because of not having fully understood the facts of the Middle Eastern area in her policy toward Israel and the Arabs, is trying to correct this. The Eisenhower doctrine also followed that line, but now among the leaders of the Arab states there is none who realizes the sincerity of the U.S. and can cooperate truly with the U.S. For instance persons like Abdel Nasser do not suit their actions to their words and are obstructing the accomplishment of US policy in the Middle East. The US will actively support the Near East states and Lebanon, on which she can rely.
4. It is not believed that the USSR will make military advances into Syria and Egypt. The strong promotion of a pro-Arab policy by the USSR is because political conditions in the satellites such as Poland, and Hungary are extremely unstable and so they want to turn the attention of the Soviet people to foreign problems and so took up the Middle Eastern question. So they will not take military action, and if by chance they should take such action, the US plans to prevent this by force.
5. This is of course not to say that there are no wise leaders in Syria and Egypt. People like Abdel Nasser are realists and are considered good men, but it is believed that the excessive nationalism of the young officers blunts the power of the leaders to act. That is, in the destruction of the IPC pipeline in Syria, although the Government gave strict orders for the Army to protect the pipelines, Lt. Col. Sarraj and his faction immediately destroyed the pipelines.
6. It has been decided, through the Arab Solidarity Treaty between Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, that the first three nations will give financial aid to Jordan, but there is no chance that they can raise the \$12,500,000 annually; Egypt of course and even Saudi Arabia which is rich from oil income is getting from ARABIS two-year's advance on her oil income; it is not expected that the three nations can get the funds to help Jordan from any source, and so it is believed that they will have no choice but to get help from the USSR.

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