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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 9828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

August 7, 1946

RE: ~~CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
YONO HAMANAKA; Tsunezo Maki, was.,
Tsunezo Maki, Tsunezo Maschi
Tokyo, Japan.

Synopsis of Facts:

Employees of Japanese Legation, Mexico City, Mexico, gathered information of military, economic and political nature from U. S. publications prior to their internment in January, 1942. YONO HAMANAKA, former Naval Attache, Mexico City, serving fifteen year prison term at Borotal under Australian jurisdiction. Ex-Captain ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MUGIL, Imperial Japanese Navy, advised he was Assistant Naval Attache, Mexico City, from November, 1940 to internment in January, 1942. Engaged in radio intelligence monitoring passage of U. S. ships thru Panama Canal. Was in contact, through Military Attache, with one "X" who may be ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUTLER (SHEET), a retired U. S. Army officer. "X" furnished information on U. S. war plans to Japanese as known during last of December, 1941. Information transmitted to Navy General Staff, Tokyo, by German radio communications, and by invisible ink letter to Argentina, thence by cable to Tokyo. Names of German intelligence agents not remembered by ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. HAMANAKA had Mexican girl friend who may be identified in Mexico City.

Investigative Details:

Inasmuch as the allegation has been received that ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~, former Japanese Naval Attache, Mexico City, Mexico, and ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MATTI, Assistant Japanese Naval Attache, Mexico City, Mexico, had been in contact with certain German espionage agents in Mexico City, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KAWAKA, Economic Section, General Affairs Bureau, Japanese Foreign Office, Tokyo, Japan, was interviewed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ advised he was employed in the code room of the Japanese Legation, Mexico City, from November, 1940, to June, 1941. He stated that he gave numbers to messages, directed them to the proper department in Tokyo, encoded them, and dispatched them via commercial telegraph facilities. He advised that from July, 1941 to February, 1942, he clipped newspapers, namely the New York Times, Washington Post and a San Antonio, Texas, paper. These clippings were turned over to minister ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MUKAI, they containing political and economic information concerning the United States.

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MIKAWA apprised that he was acquainted with both MIKAWA and Lt. Commander WILL. He advised that MIKAWA was promoted to Rear Admiral after repatriation to Japan in August, 1942, on the first exchange trip of the "Gripsholm" and was given a Navy command in Morotai, where he was killed by Australian forces. He said he had learned this from a friend and could not vouch for its accuracy. He let it be known that WILL is presently confined in Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

MIKAWA concluded by stating that he never remembered MIKAWA or WILL receiving any mail or messages from the United States of an intelligence nature, and that he, himself, knew nothing of any agents Japan may have had in the United States.

TSUNASHIMA KIMURA, Secretary, Saiei Motion Picture Company, Tokyo, Japan, advised that from July, 1941, to February, 1942, he was one of five translators at the Japanese Legation in Mexico City working on clippings from the New York Times, and a San Antonio, Texas, newspaper for Minister MIURA. The clippings he translated from English into Japanese were concerned with military, economic, and political information. MIURA stated that he remembered MIKAWA however but, in view of their different stations, he had no contact with him. He stated that MIKAWA had a Mexican girl friend whose name he did not know. He also advised that MIKAWA is now confined in a prison in New Guinea, where he was sentenced to ten years by an Allied court. He stated that WILL is now incarcerated at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

On July 24, 1946, source A advised he had learned from the Japanese Liaison Office that MIKAWA had been sentenced to serve a fifteen year prison term at Morotai, and that Morotai is presently controlled by Australian forces. No American units are presently stationed there.

The following information was extracted from the files of source B concerning TSUNASHIMA WACHI, ex-Captain, IJN:

"Upon interview by Agents of the 53rd SIG Area, WACHI advised that in 1932 he entered the communications school at Yokosuka, Kanbu, where he began his radio intelligence career by studying the following subjects: radio theory, mathematics, radio transmission and receiving, communications regulations, and basic cryptography. He was then transferred to the general staff in Tokyo where he was a member of the communication section and engaged in some radio intelligence work.

"In his work as assistant to the cryptographic section chief, WACHI had successfully broken some 4,000 words of the American Gray Code (a part of State Code). He explained that often by being acquainted with the content of various messages before they were sent, he could easily break the code.

"In 1933 he continued his studies at the Yokosuka communications school.

"In 1934, he was communications officer of the Japanese cruiser "Naka", and on this ship there were three types of codes used. They were the tactical or easily broken code, the more difficult strategic code, and the extremely complex machine code. The machine code had been invented in 1932 by GUNICHIRO MATSUOKA and had the appearance of an electrically operated typewriter. When asked if he knew what happened to the "Naka", WACHI replied that he believed it was sunk at Truk. It carried a long wave direction finding set aboard and a 300 megacycle radio telephone.

"From 1935 to 1937, WACHI was a member of the Tokumu Nihon. He entered Shanghai using civilian passports and wearing civilian clothes. Coordinating his efforts with four other Tokumu Nihon agents, WACHI's chief duty was stated to be that of radio intelligence against Great Britain. Though WACHI's secondary duties consisted of all variations of intelligence work, he carried out this main objective by merely employing other Japanese agents and having them actually break into the safes of British high officials, steal their code books, photograph each page, using a combination of twin lens cameras, and finally turn the codes to their proper places in the short time of two hours. A typical example of this officer's task can be found in his unsuccessful attempt to steal the codes from the British Consulate in Ichang, China, on four separate occasions, he giving up when he learned that similar codes had been obtained from the British in Osaka, Japan. WACHI claimed that probably the most prolific source of information was the teletype to Shanghai cable. Tokumu Nihon agents were said to have told the Chinese telegraph operators that they were representatives of the Chinese Government and were therefore entitled to receive copies of official messages. The U.S. trans-Pacific cable provided a wealth of information as WACHI revealed that it had been tapped, while only the Danish, strictly disciplined, great Northern Cable remained impervious to Japanese operatives.

"Upon his return from China, WACHI, in 1938, was appointed commanding officer of the worldwide monitoring station in Wada, Honshu, Japan. At this time messages coming over

"the U. S. Naval radio were coded in a simple cipher, and I obtained. Since these codes were changed every ten days, it was a simple matter for the information to be learned from the Shanghai radio approximately two hours before it was received over official Japanese sources, and only three hours before the well-known Marco Polo Bridge incident at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war. The message using call signs of JIF to JIBAV stated that troops of the Chinese 29th Army were dissatisfied with Japanese terms and that they would attack in a very short time. As a result, I was able to warn the Japanese troops of the impending attack, thanks to American radio facilities.

"In 1935, I was transferred to the staff of a midshipman training squadron where he served in the dual capacity of instructor and radio intelligence agent. While on a training cruise to the Philippines, I maintained contact with Cavite, P.I., while the signal of the Cavite radio was photographed on the cathode ray oscilloscope. Likewise, he was able to obtain examples of Cavite's simultaneous transmissions merely by asking for them. Also on this same cruise he was able to obtain the basic time difference of retransmission of signals of the Hawaiian radio.

"In 1940, I was placed on the general staff in Tokyo where he was appointed chief of the radio intelligence section against the United States. It was at this time that I claim the radio intelligence was started gathering information for the Pearl Harbor attack. The Hawaiian commercial radio station, KHK, was monitored continually since, after its normal operating hours it would broadcast personal messages back to the U.S., and its traffic continually indicated the position of the American fleet. It was determined that personal messages would noticeably increase in number every Friday night and suddenly drop off on Monday night, thus indicating that the fleet left for maneuvers on Monday and returned on Friday of each week. Also an excellent picture of the morale of personnel and of living conditions in Hawaii could be assimilated. To complete a picture of the activities of the American Navy could be attained in this manner that I revealed that a similar attempt was made to monitor their own Navy, which was unsuccessful since I insists that a foreigner must actually do the work in order to catch the finer 'give away points' necessary to good radio intelligence.

"In 1941, I was sent to Mexico City not only in the capacity of Assistant Naval Attache but also to serve as Japan's 'ear on the Atlantic'. The Japanese had no other

"means by which they could follow American Naval movements in the Atlantic than this, so it proved to be a vital assignment. WACHI was given one particular mission, that of determining the purpose of an American 'Support Force' of which the Japanese had heard but knew nothing about. He soon learned that this particular force was merely designed for convoy duty in the Atlantic. After the outbreak of war in 1941, WACHI admitted that activities in Mexico were rather limited, but his method of sending information to Japan was to airmail messages to Argentina via Panama. These messages were written with invisible inks and since the censor in Panama was not overly cautious they were passed through to Argentina. From Argentina they were easily cabled to Japan. Also, messages were sent to Germany by secret stations in Mexico and relayed from Germany to Japan. Both methods were later proved to be successful by WACHI upon his return from Japan.

"In 1943, after his repatriation from Mexico City, he returned to the staff of the radio intelligence bureau as chief of operations, succeeding Captain KAMAKAKI. From this assignment WACHI asked for command duty and was assigned as Naval Garrison Commander of Iwo Jima. WACHI disclosed that upon his arrival at Iwo fortifications were less than one per cent complete, but acting on orders from higher authority construction was greatly increased. Iwo's strategic value had become obvious to the Japanese. Construction on the second and third airstrips was completed, while technical equipment included ten small radio transmitters and two early warning long range radar sets. Through radio intelligence the Japanese learned valuable information such as the destination and number of planes in a certain raid, because pilots were heard talking between planes, aircraft carriers were heard giving instructions and submarines which had surfaced during the night were heard talking between themselves.

"The final phase of WACHI's naval career consisted of his duty with the 32nd Assault Boat Section based at Kagoshima, Japan, and Sakura-Jima. This group used one man or human torpedoes, crash boats, small submarines, and torpedo launching craft. This assault boat section was prepared to counter the expected invasion of Japan."

Following demobilization, the file reflects that WACHI was arrested by the Kagoshima District Prosecutor on charges of misappropriation of materials (failure to turn over fuel, food, and other items to proper authorities as ordered).

On July 29, 1946, former Imperial Japanese Navy Captain Ichizawa WACHI, Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan, was interviewed by reporting agent. He advised he had used his present

name since his return to Japan in August, 1942. In this connection, it is observed that KOSHIMIZU MITSUHI is a German Romanization of the Japanese name, KOSHIMIZU MITSUHI, a Japanese Romanization (Mitsunori Maki, and KOSHIMIZU MITSUHI, or American Romanization (Mepburn).

He stated he first went to Mexico City, Mexico, in November, 1940, as Assistant Naval Attache to Captain KUROKI MITSUHI, who departed from Mexico City for Japan in May, 1941. MITSUHI then became Assistant Naval Attache to Captain KYOKU MITSUHI, who replaced KUROKI. MITSUHI advised that his title was deceptive in that he was sent to the Legation in Mexico City to engage in radio intelligence work because of his background in radio. The radio intelligence work in Mexico City, he advised, took about 70% of his time. In the office, in addition to himself and MITSUHI, were three Japanese secretaries.

MITSUHI apprised that he was in Mexico City until February 21, 1942, when he was taken to White Sulphur Springs, Virginia, and interned until he was exchanged in August, 1942, returning to Tokyo, Japan. From October, 1942, to February, 1943, he was on the general staff of the Navy Department in Tokyo, and from February, 1944, to October, 1944, he was garrison commander on Iwo Jima. From December, 1944, to January, 1945, he was Naval Attache at Manila, and from February, 1945, to September, 1945, he was Commander of the 52nd Assault Unit in Japan.

MITSUHI stated that up until Pearl Harbor the Japanese Legation in Mexico City, was not interested in positive intelligence work concerning the United States, since the Embassy and various Legations and Consulates in the United States carried on the work. However, after Pearl Harbor they realized they would have to carry on if possible.

He advised that Colonel KOSHIMIZU MITSUHI, the Military Attache of the Legation in Mexico City, had a friend who was a retired American Army Major, that MITSUHI had known in Tokyo years prior to the war. This ex-Army officer, who was either retired or separated from the U. S. Army, had a personal grudge against the American Army and began furnishing information to MITSUHI and MITSUHI through MITSUHI. MITSUHI advised that MITSUHI, who had intimate contact with the ex-Army officer, whose name MITSUHI did not know, was killed while flying from Singapore to Germany during the war, or more specifically in Malaya.

This ex-U.S. Army officer was known to MITSUHI as "A", the origin of this destination being unknown to MITSUHI. "A"

was in the engineering corps of the U. S. Army and had served in the Panama Canal Zone. MASHI stated that he on one occasion gave MASHI \$2,000 to give to "Q" for information to be supplied by him although "Q" apparently was not interested in money, but wanted to give vent to his hatred of the U. S. Army by supplying information to the Japanese. MASHI did not know of his own knowledge that MASHI gave this money to "Q", but MASHI informed him that he did.

MASHI stated that "Q" was in the Panama Canal Zone at or about the time of Pearl Harbor, and he flew from Panama to Mexico City, where he advised MASHI, through MASHI, of the movements of U. S. ships through the Panama Canal. According to MASHI, "Q" was never seen by him as it was their custom never to introduce their friends who were supplying information to other officials of the Legation. MASHI stated that "Q" was in Panama a short time during November, 1941, where he was a very good friend and possibly a former classmate at the West Point Military Academy of the commanding officer in the Engineering branch of the U. S. Army, from whom he possibly secured information which he turned over to MASHI. MASHI stated that the information concerning the passage of U. S. ships through the canal was confirmed by signals which he picked up in his radio intelligence work and he knew such information was accurate.

MASHI stated that about the middle of December, 1941, "Q" flew from the Panama Canal Zone to Mexico City to see Colonel MASHI. MASHI advised he suggested to MASHI that they did not need "Q" in Panama, but needed him in the United States, inasmuch as he felt he, MASHI, was effectively covering shipping movements by radio intelligence work. The plans for "Q" were therefore discussed by MASHI, MASHI and MASHI, and it was agreed that he should go first to Washington, D.C., thence to the West Coast of the United States, then return to Mexico City, gathering military and political information as he traveled.

MASHI stated that on MASHI's suggestion "Q" then flew to Washington, D.C., via Pan-American Airlines, from Mexico City, and allegedly in the Army and Navy Club in Washington secured information from friends concerning the General War Plan. Before he departed from Mexico City for Washington, MASHI gave Colonel MASHI \$2,000 in U. S. currency, which money was the Naval Attache's share for information supplied, and to be supplied, by "Q". MASHI advised that he never heard how much Colonel MASHI gave "Q" as Military Attache's share.

MASHI advised that instead of making the circuit from Washington to the West Coast, thence to Mexico City, "Q"

returned directly to Mexico City because of the importance of the information he had.

In this connection, WOOD advised that the data included the Army's plans for mobilization of 8,000,000 men; the dispersal of units to Europe and Australia; information about the mass production of bombers; political plans for establishing an air base in the eastern corner of Brazil, facing the Atlantic, for an air route from Brazil to Africa and India as well as a China air route; the plans the United States had for China about mass production of war supplies, and the possibility of the United States using a base in China to cut fuel supply lines between Japan and South Pacific occupied areas (Philippines, Singapore, Java, and Borneo). Data concerning the probable actions of General Rommel in Africa; also, the probability as to what Chinese General Ho-in-Ching would do, inasmuch as he was a graduate of a Japanese college and pro-Japanese; data about the United States Navy's plan to take no offensive action in the Pacific for upwards of one year; information concerning the United States plan for construction of submarines, and use of them to cut Japanese supply lines. Lastly, detailed accounts of the true damage to the U. S. Navy and installations at Pearl Harbor, which WOOD stated was vastly different from that published in United States newspapers at the time.

WOOD stated that "A" also had furnished WOOD information about ships patrolling in the Pacific, and about United States oil stores in Panama, upon the occasion of his coming to Mexico City from Panama.

WOOD advised that he did not know how much money was paid to "A" by WOOD but that he, WOOD, kept cash in the Naval Attache's safe for such purpose and disbursed it on the request of WOOD. He only remembered the \$2,000 referred to hereinabove as being that given to "A". He advised, however, that WOOD would know the amount. WOOD advised that Colonel WOOD also kept a safe account; that the money reached Mexico City in United States currency from New York City and Tokyo; that it was brought by plane by an unknown Japanese New York company employee. He advised that neither he nor WOOD kept a bank account in any Mexico City bank.

WOOD advised that in October or November, 1941, he had given a German agent, whom he believed to be CARL G. LORENZ, \$500 for pyrazinon and other chemicals to prepare secret ink messages, as the Japanese had no such information or secret ink before that. He advised that he had a letter typed in Spanish ostensibly from an Argentine girl to her aunt in Buenos Aires, and on the back thereof in Japanese

characters, and with a Japanese brush (fude), he had written the information concerning American war plans, and data on the American losses at Pearl Harbor. He stated he airmailed this letter to a drop in Buenos Aires, the name of which he could not remember, who turned it over to Admiral [REDACTED] [REDACTED], Naval Attache there, from whence it was transmitted to Tokyo via commercial radio.

[REDACTED] stated instructions were given to him by [REDACTED] on the use of the pyramidon and other chemicals. He also instructed [REDACTED] on how to develop this ink. He stated, however, that only two letters were written in this manner. Upon his return to Tokyo in August, 1942, he determined that the information reached the Japanese Navy Department in Tokyo within ten days from the time it was mailed by him in Mexico City. He advised that at the time he dispatched the letter in Mexico City he also gave the information gathered by "A" to the Germans through [REDACTED] with the request that they transmit it by radio to Germany and thence to Tokyo, which was done. He advised that the information also reached Japan in a very short time via this route. Upon his return to Tokyo, [REDACTED] advised he talked to a Commander [REDACTED], who was in charge of the American Intelligence Section in the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, who told him, [REDACTED], that the information had been received but little attention was paid to it, as the Japanese Navy was then confident of victory. He apprised that [REDACTED] was killed in a plane crash between Java and Borneo, and that there was no one else present when they talked about the information, but possibly [REDACTED] would know about it.

[REDACTED] denied having any Japanese or other agents in San Francisco, San Diego, or San Pedro. He advised, however, that in August, 1941, he met a young Mexican student in a cabaret, the name of which he cannot recall, near Chapultepec Park in Mexico City. According to [REDACTED], they struck up an acquaintance and, as this Mexican was employed by a tourist bureau in Mexico City, [REDACTED] asked him to go to the West Coast of the United States and gather what information he could about Navy yards and damage done at Pearl Harbor. He stated this was between Christmas and New Years in 1941. The Mexican, whose name he could not remember, but who was called "Kubi Furi", Japanese for "shaking neck", went by train in company with his girl friend or wife to San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego. Upon his return one week later, "Kubi Furi" gave him data concerning the American fleet secured by observation in the above mentioned ports. [REDACTED] stated he did not trust "Kubi Furi" but paid him either two or three thousand pesos, plus travelling expenses. He stated that "Kubi Furi" was

constantly moving and changing his name, and although he believed he, WACHS, could find him, he had no knowledge or suggestions as to how he could be located at this time.

WACHS described [redacted]'s Mexican girl friend as 30 to 35 years of age, hair dyed several times, medium size with flat features and body, smart, spoke good English and Spanish, smoked a great deal and drank heavily. He does not recall her name. He advised, however, that she was a reporter for a newspaper in Mexico City. Upon learning that the Japanese would leave Mexico City in February, 1942, he destroyed all the radio receivers there by throwing them in a well in the Legation yard, with the exception of one which he loaded in his car and destroyed elsewhere. For this, WACHS advised he was taken to the Metropolitan Police Department and questioned, and [redacted]'s girl friend later wrote up an article on the questioning, which carried his picture. He stated further that she was in contact in an intimate way with the U. S. Naval Attache in Mexico City, who was a full commander in the USN. He stated this commander, whose name might have been [redacted], was in the Navy, then quit to go on the Pan American Airways staff, then returned to the USN as Naval Attache in Mexico City. He could not say whether [redacted] had asked this individual to cultivate the U. S. Naval Attache's favor; however, on one occasion he did know that the Commander beat this girl very severely because he found out that she was also intimate with [redacted].

WACHS advised that he did not remember that the individual who furnished the invisible ink was definitely named GREGG NICOLAUS; however, he did remember a man about 30, a German press correspondent, whom he met at the home of Colonel JOSE S. BAMBIN, the ex-Argentine Military Attache in Mexico City. He opined that he did not remember [redacted] DONOR, ex-Uruguayan Consul in Mexico. He further stated that he did not remember [redacted] BAMBIN. WACHS advised that BAMBIN furnished him information, of no interest to him, on the Mexican Naval coastline, which BAMBIN said he secured from a girl typist in the Mexican Naval Office when she was inebriated. He stated that [redacted] also obtained data on the real damage at Pearl Harbor, from him, WACHS, which BAMBIN transmitted to Argentina by telegram. He apprised, however, that BAMBIN never gave him any information concerning the United States.

WACHS said that he had no knowledge of who might be left in Mexico to supply information to the Japanese after the Japanese Legation personnel departed from Mexico City. He does not believe there were any agents there.

MUCHI described a machine which he said resembled a typewriter in the Japanese Legation which was used for encoding messages. He advised that if one letter was punched another one came out, thus encoding the communication. He stated that this machine was changed at frequent intervals.

He advised that in 1937, the United States State Department started using the "Brown Code", and the Japanese had it even before it went into use as the code books were stolen from the Consulate safe in Kobe, Japan, and photographed. He described the safety of the U. S. Consulate in Kobe at that time as "very poor". MUCHI stated he only knew of this from others as he took no part in the theft.

He further advised that in 1939, the U. S. State Department started using "strip cipher" and messages were intercepted between United States and Europe, which cipher the Japanese were unable to break.

He stated that prior to the war with Japan, the Legation in Mexico City used Radio Mexico and RCA for the transmissions of their messages to Tokyo. They had no short-wave transmitter in the Legation, but had several short-wave receivers. He advised that Mexico City was admirably suited for the picking up of radio communications between ships at sea and shore stations in view of the high altitude of Mexico City.

On July 31, 1946, MUCHI was re-interviewed at Sugamo Prison by Reporting Agent. MUCHI advised that he was unfamiliar with MUCHI's true name or any of his aliases. He advised that Colonel MUCHI had first informed him of "A" when he, MUCHI, desired information about American warships going through the Panama Canal, and that this was the latter part of October, or early November, 1941. He advised he had picked up information by radio intelligence but wanted confirmation of it. He stated that Colonel MUCHI contacted "A" by letter and that "A" sent information back by letter written in English of the number of United States warships, destroyers, etc., that passed through the Canal, and the direction in which they were going.

MUCHI was again interrogated as to his memory of "Mabi Kuri" but could not elucidate on the information set forth hereinbefore. Further, he could not recall the name of MUCHI's Mexican girl friend, nor that of the U. S. Naval Attache, except that it was possibly SMITH.

When questioned concerning the possibility of obtaining the messages sent by him from Mexico City to Tokyo, MACHI stated that he is sure they were destroyed when the Navy Department in Tokyo burned.

When interrogated concerning German agents, he could furnish no further information on the German newspaper reporter other than that he would go out of the room at times, and change his hair, and the color in his face; that he used many names. He recalled that he was an Argentine citizen, and was a good friend of Colonel ROSS G. BARKIN.

MACHI identified Dr. Hisao YOSHII as president of the Pacific Oil Company in Mexico City, which company had rights to remove oil from Mexico. YOSHII also held the rank of honorary colonel in the Mexican Army, according to MACHI, who described him as "one honest Japanese."