

the U.S. detested the debut. The MVD planned other reprisals. A fortnight ago the Soviet Foreign Office ordered the expulsion of two U.S. assistant Army attachés from the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Last week it followed this up by demanding the withdrawal of two U.S. assistant naval attachés. To substantiate its clumsy charge that the naval aides were spies, the MVD had arranged for them to be assaulted by a civilian mob in an open Leningrad street, under pretense that they had been caught red-handed in subversive activity against the Soviet regime.

The MVD's hottest surprise reprisal was strictly a TV spectacular. Called to Moscow's House of Journalists one morning last week, 200 foreign and Communist correspondents found batteries of electric lights and TV cameras focused on four pale men surrounded by a curious array of pistols, explosives, maps, Soviet currency, mini-ure radio transmitters, parachutes and poison pills. Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Chief Leonid Ilyichev identified the four men as Russian refugees recruited as spies by the U.S. and parachuted into the Soviet Union in 1943 and 1955.

As the TV camera bore down on their white faces, each man in turn told his fantastic tale. Said one: "In order to turn us into obedient servants and make us forget our love for our mother country, the Americans encouraged drinking, gambling and had dances among us and even took us to Munich to visit immoral haunts to enjoy ourselves." Beetle-browed Press Chief Ilyichev tied the show to the Soviet maneuver in the U.N. with a long commercial charging the U.S. with waging a "secret war" of subversion and espionage against the peace-loving Soviet Union. Said Ilyichev: "When you live with wolves, you must be a wolf."

### "Well Taken Care Of"

For almost twelve years Russia and its Baltic neighbor, Sweden, have been in a bitter dispute over the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg, a slender, lolling Swedish-legation attaché who was picked up by Russian secret police in Budapest near the end of World War II. When the NKVD drove him off to Marshal Malinovsky's headquarters on Jan. 17, 1945, Wallenberg said: "I'm going to Malinovsky's . . . whether as a guest or prisoner I do not know yet." Those were the last words ever heard from him.

Raoul Wallenberg was no ordinary diplomat. The polylingual, multi-traveled son of a wealthy Swedish banker, he had begun his diplomatic career only some six months earlier after a quiet meeting in Stockholm with U.S. Minister Herschel Johnson and Iver Olson, representative of Franklin Roosevelt's War Refugee Board in Sweden. Olson and Johnson put the mission to Wallenberg simply: Would he go to Budapest as a member of the neutral Swedish-legation staff and, using U.S. funds, try to save Hungary's remaining 300,000-odd Jewish and Hungarian Jewish population: 800,000 from Nazi

ga. chamber-of-slave-labor camp. Wallenberg was warned that if the Germans or the Hungarian puppet government learned of his work, nothing could be done to save him. "If I can help," said Raoul Wallenberg, "if I can save a single person, I will go."

With zeal & energy, Wallenberg went. He arrived in Budapest listed officially as third secretary of the Swedish legation, his luggage bulging with information on Hungarian underground agents and secretly pro-Allied officials of the Hungarian government. Operating with enormous zeal and energy, he persuaded Hungarian officials that if a Jew claimed neutral citizenship he should not be deported until the truth of his citizenship was established. The show he staged allowed to



THE LATE RAUL WALLBERG

the homes of some 20,000 such Jews signs that read, "Under the Protection of the Swedish Legation." He rented 32 houses in Budapest in the name of the Swedish legation, packed them with other Jews; he issued thousands of "protective passports" to still others, finally became so bold that on several occasions he bluffed Gestapo or SS guards into releasing Jews already loaded aboard freight cars for deportation or worse.

Inevitably, the purposeful young (32) diplomat came under Gestapo surveillance. Just before the Russians entered Budapest in January 1945, he went underground. When the Russians arrived, he made contact with Marshal Malinovsky. Red Army commander on the Hungarian front, who advised Stockholm, via Moscow: ". . . Diplomat Raoul Wallenberg well taken care of by army authorities."

Without Post-Mortem. Then the curtain descended. Shortly after Wallenberg was picked up by the NKVD a Russian official in Stockholm declared: "Wallen-

berg is not really a prisoner. He committed some follies after liberation; therefore he had to be taken care of. He will return soon safe and sound."

After that, while the Swedish Foreign Office kept up a steady barrage of protests, and Swedish public opinion angrily demanded Wallenberg's release, Moscow said nothing. Last week the Soviets finally broke the silence. Raoul Wallenberg, Soviet officials told the Swedish government, died of a heart attack in Lubyanka prison on July 17, 1947, nearly ten years ago. His arrest and detention, they said, were undoubtedly the result of "the criminal activities" of then State Security Chief Viktor Mikhurin, who was executed in 1954 for "crimes against Soviet laws" as an accomplice of his boss, Lavrenty Beria. There was the Russian said a report to Mikhurin from Colonel A. L. Smolitsov, chief of the Lubyanka medical service, certifying Wallenberg's death, and adding that the body had been ordered cremated about a post-mortem.

Best guess as to why the Russians really did imprison Wallenberg in the first place was that he had worked out an elaborate plan for the restoration of Jewish property seized by the Germans, and the Russians wanted to seize it for themselves. What had actually caused his death could only be inferred from the fact that the Soviets blamed all on that old scapegoat, former Chief Mikhurin, without benefit of post-mortem.

## RED CHINA

### A Many-Fingered Thing

Class poetry, a favorite preoccupation of scholars, has been in low repute in China since the advent of Communism. The subtle allegorisms of the poet's traditional language have little in common with the blunt ideologies of modern Marxism, and for that reason China's top Communist, Mao Tse-tung, has long had to dissemble the fact that he is a workaday poet himself.

In recent months, however, Mao's China, desperately in need of brain power, has spread the word that the old, traditionally trained scholars it used to hector are not so bad after all. "Let diverse schools of thought contend," was the way the official policymakers put it. Last week, in line with the effort to make the classics acceptable, humble Chinese were getting a look at 18 of Mao's own classic poems—set out in a new poetry magazine. "There is nothing outstanding about them," said Mao modestly, "but since you consider the poems publishable, let us proceed."

Sample Mao classic, written during the famed Red "long march" to Yenan:

*His high and clouds sparse,  
The eye encompasses the end of the horizon.*

*He who does not reach the great wall is not a man.*

*A mere count of the fingers reveals twenty thousand miles covered.*

Mr. Farmer admitted under questioning last week that, if elected, he would vote against at least that clause of his party's bill which promises complete demerol of 300,000 higher-priced dwellings.

### The Psychological Emigrant

Great Britain has a high standard of living, full employment, political freedom, womb-to-tomb medical care, and as much peace as most nations in the world. Why should a Briton want to leave home? Yet when the Gallup poll (published last week) asked, "If you were free to do so, would you like to go and settle in another country?" 41% of the Britons pulled answered yes, and another 12% said they were not sure.

This is no sudden mood. In 1948, when Britain was still suffering from war-spurred austerity 42% of Britons answered yes to the same question. When 1951, were still saying yes in 1950, many thoughtful Britons concluded that sentiment on emigration was gradually returning to normal. Today, in the aftermath of the Suez debacle, emigration sentiment is once again on the rise.

According to Gallup's analysis, the whimsical emigrant spread across all levels of politics, income and education. A recent poll of Cambridge undergraduates in their last two years showed that among men students 11.3% had definitely decided to go, and another 27.6% were seriously considering leaving. Among women students, 14.1% had made up their minds to leave. Most favored goals: Canada 36%, Africa 10.5%, the U.S. and Australia about 8% each. Said one student: "I want to go to a country where new ideas are needed, so that I can give something to that country rather than just live off it."

Except during the Depression years, actual migration from Britain has always been high (an average 120,000 a year) but the vast majority of those who now say they want to go will never leave. They will go on, as now, believing in the job as if "there's no future in it"; they have given up hope of making for themselves in Britain the kind of life they want. In short, the main limiting factor on opportunity in Britain's welfare state is that so many of its people believe there is no real opportunity. The debilitating mood of the psychological emigrant pervades the country.

### RUSSIA

#### Down With the *Piatletki*

To change horses—the present plan, horse for the horse of heavy industry—that is the goal . . . of the Five-Year Plan.  
—Stalin, 1951

At the beginning of Soviet Russia's shift from a plus-horse to a horsepower economy, the Five-Year Plan, or *Piatletka*, was a dramatic slogan as well as an effective method of primitive state planning. But when the sixth *Piatletka* arrived last year the word had lost its power for millions of Russian workers,

war-hardened by 30 years of ceaseless urging to achieve ever higher production norms. Last week the Soviet leaders indicated that they were ready to drop the old *Piatletka* for a more relaxed method of planning and executing the progress of their national economy.

At a joint session of the Supreme Soviet (Russia's rubber-stamp legislature), Economic Boss Mikhail Pervukhin admitted that scores of economic targets set for 1956 had not been achieved. Then Pervukhin made, for a Soviet leader, a surprising statement: instead of scolding the workers, he blamed the *Piatletka* planners. They had placed too much emphasis on oversized industrial complexes, particularly in the coal, steel and chemical industries. Pervukhin promised that industrial targets for 1957 would be lowered by nearly 4% on previous planning, with continued emphasis on heavy industry. More important than the substance of Pervukhin's announcement was the principle involved: the Soviet leaders were scrapping the rigid Five-Year-Plan system for a realistic, ad hoc economy more in line with the West.

One reason for the sought-after economic flexibility is the crisis in the satellites. Pervukhin ordered new efforts to be made in coal, fuel and cement production in western Russia, to compensate for deliveries no longer coming from Poland and Hungary. Another reason is the need for a new approach to the problem of defense. The declaration that the 1957 defense appropriation is \$2 billion (down 6.6% from 1956) was an obvious attempt to invite comparison with the U.S. defense budget (estimated for 1957 at \$11 billion). Actually, there has been no reduction in the Soviet's armed forces and the trend

in the U.S. has been toward more highly specialized equipment (e.g., guided missiles and submarines)—suggesting increased rather than decreased defense spending.

Only one hint of the Soviet Union's vastly stepped-up nuclear program (five bombs exploded since August 1956) was given by Pervukhin: an order to rush work on his electric-power projects—essential to atomic development—at Kuybyshev, Saratov and Stalingrad (on the Volga) and Kairak-Kum, Irkutsk and Novosibirsk (in Siberia). Something swifter and more pliable than the old *Piatletka* was needed to harness these homes.

### The Wolves

With hundreds of key operators working under diplomatic immunity in foreign embassies, the Soviet MVD's foreign intelligence section has long been the world's biggest and busiest espionage organization. But allied counter-espionage agencies are beginning to box in the Russians. Since 1950 the U.S. has declared 11 Soviet diplomatic employees *persona non grata*. The practice has spread to Holland, Denmark and Sweden, which have recently demanded the withdrawal of suspected Soviet embassy spies. Last month the FBI, arresting Jacob Allum and Myra and Jack Sobole on charges of being Soviet agents (TIME, Feb. 4), hinted that it had evidence of a vast spy network "involving Soviet officials."

No one expected Russia's MVD to take this kind of treatment lying down. In December the Soviet U.N. delegate laid the basis for counter-espionage training and the U.S. was obliged to announce tactics in the satellite nations and Russia. While



ACCUSED SPY IN Moscow  
Too much Munich.