

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

| | | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|
| TO | Chief of Station, [] [] | X | MARKED FOR INDEXING |
| INFO | Chief, European Division Chief of Station, [] [] | | NO INDEXING REQUIRED |
| FROM | Chief of Base, [] [] | | ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING |
| SUBJECT | Meeting with [] [] | | MICROFILM |
| ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES | | | |

Reference: OSSA-17945, of 28 May 1970

1. In accordance with [] [] request for a meeting with me, I went to Hamburg on 7 July and met him in accordance with arrangements which had been worked out by cable. He had with him the new chief of the [] service, whom he introduced to me as Identity-A. (At least that's what the name sounded like, and I did not pin him down as to its spelling, since I presume Identity-A is by now fully identified to the [] Station.) I must say it was good to see [] again, and this meeting served to confirm my opinion of him as being an outstanding individual, and one of the finest Swedes I have ever met.

2. It's difficult to know how much detail to put in this report, since basically the whole subject of our discussion is of little or no interest to JKLANCE at this point, and what interest it has for us stems only from the importance of the case to [] himself. The whole thing is rather quixotic, and altogether a rather strange little vignette. We had hardly sat down to chat in the hotel bar before [] was explaining to me the unhappy circumstances surrounding the recent retirement of Identity-B, and the reasons for his replacement by Identity-A. Although I presume this story is also well known to the [] Station, I will recount what [] said, in case there might be some new element to the story as it was told to me.

Attachment:

Identities - USC

Distribution:

2 - COS, [] [] w/att

2 - C/EUR w/att

2 - COS, [] [] w/att

10 July 1970

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| CROSS REFERENCE TO | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER | DATE |
| | EGBA - 80078 | 13 JUL 1970 |
| | CLASSIFICATION | HQS FILE NUMBER |
| | SECRET | [] [] |

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

3. [] said that Identity-B had come under political attack because of statements he was alleged to have made regarding the new prime minister. Although in fact Identity-B had not made these statements, the whole affair cast a shadow over his role as chief of the [] and it became a question of the government's confidence in him. Even though Identity-B and [] knew he was innocent of the accusations against him, Identity-B felt he could no longer continue without the complete confidence of the government, and therefore it was arranged that he would retire. He is now working in some industrial security job, with which he is not particularly happy.

4. [] went on to speak of the particularly difficult period which he and the [] service have been going through for the past several years. He said that, in his own case, he has only known for some three or four weeks that he would be renewed by the government in his present position. He said there had been considerable pressure from the government on him to accept the governorship of Göteborg province, but that he had twice refused suggestions that he accept this post. He said he has now been reappointed, and therefore -- all other things being equal -- will continue in his present post for another six years.

5. Let me comment briefly regarding Identity-A. In the course of the three and a half hours we spent together, I doubt if Identity-A said 50 words, and of these 50, a goodly percentage had to do with ordering his lunch. I don't think this is necessarily characteristic of the man, but he was obviously deferring completely to [] on this occasion. Identity-A seems to be an attractive, personable individual. What few words of English he spoke seemed to indicate a reasonable command of the language. [] said that Identity-A has been with him for three or four years, working primarily on budgetary problems. Prior to that he had been employed in various governmental legal positions in the Stockholm city administration. He is a born Stockholmer. []

6. After lunch in the Atlantic Hotel, we repaired to the corner of the hotel lounge, and [] got down to business. What follows is the essence of what he had to say. At the time that Identity-C retired, he in effect passed the torch on the Raoul Wallenberg case to [] Identity-C made a name for himself as some one who never gives up on a case, and [] cited the fact that Identity-C had worked on the Wennerström case for 13 years before the latter was finally arrested. [] recalled that the Wallenberg case had been an extremely important one in the eyes of the Swedish government and the Swedish public for many years, although in the past few years official interest in the case had pretty well died away. The impression I got was that this had continued, however, to be pretty much of a personal crusade with Identity-C, and he had entrusted [] with carrying on this crusade, in the hope that some day the full and true story might be known and the case could be properly closed. (To interject one comment about Identity-C: when I asked how Identity-C was and whether or not he was writing his memoirs, [] said that, in fact, Identity-C had done so, and had asked [] to read them. [] did, and found them interesting, and told Identity-C that he thought it would be very desirable to have these memoirs published, since they would be very helpful to the

[] from a psychological point of view -- that is to say, in helping to keep in front of the Swedish public the problems of the [] service. Unfortunately, Identity-C had also let Identity-D read the memoirs, and -- in characteristic fashion -- Identity-D had been horrified at the thought of their being published, and had strongly recommended that this not be done. Identity-C was now in a dilemma over this, because he did not want to disregard Identity-D's counsel because of the close personal relationship which had existed between them for many years.)

7. [] explained that what he really wanted from me was my advice as to whether or not I felt it was worth making further efforts to try to obtain -- from any source whatsoever -- the true version of what happened to Raoul Wallenberg. He then produced various official reports and memoranda concerning the case, and reviewed for my benefit the history of it, as far as it is known to the Swedish government. Since JKLANCE files contain a great deal of this information already, I will only record that portion of it which was new to me, and to which [] attached particular importance. The first part of the record can be summarized in a few words: Wallenberg was arrested in Budapest in January 1945. When the Swedish government initiated inquiries regarding him, the first Soviet reaction came through the then Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, Madame Kolantai, who assured the Swedes that Wallenberg would be properly taken care of, the implication being that he would be released promptly. Of course this never happened, and subsequent Swedish queries brought negative responses and statements that there was no information available regarding him. Through the years the Swedes collected bits of information -- mostly from returning POW's -- which persuaded them that Wallenberg had been taken to Moscow and imprisoned in various prisons there, at least through the late 40's.

8. In 1961 a famous Swedish lady physician, Dr. Nana Schwarz, happened to be in Moscow visiting a Soviet physician, whom she had come to know very well over a period of years, Dr. (fnu) MYASHNIKOV. In a conversation Dr. Schwarz had with MYASHNIKOV in January 1961, she asked him if he knew anything about the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg, MYASHNIKOV nodded affirmatively. Dr. Schwarz asked him if he could give her any information about this. MYASHNIKOV said that he knew Wallenberg was in a mental institution, but that he might be able to get more information from a friend of his, one SEMYONOV, an officer of the Foreign Ministry, who had at one time served in Stockholm. Dr. Schwarz asked that he do so. When Dr. Schwarz returned to Stockholm she reported this to the Foreign Ministry, and the result of this was an official request to the Soviet government for information on Wallenberg, which referred to the conversation between Schwarz and MYASHNIKOV.

9. In May of 1961, Dr. Schwarz returned to Moscow to pursue this matter with MYASHNIKOV. When she saw him, he told her that this matter had caused him a great deal of difficulty, and that she had completely misunderstood him and that he had never told her he knew anything about Wallenberg. That was the end of that episode, except that MYASHNIKOV was reported to have died several years later. [] commented that he has himself talked to Dr. Schwarz about this, and she is convinced that there could not have been any misunderstanding during the first conversation with MYASHNIKOV. [] is therefore satisfied

that, at least as late as 1961, Wallenberg was still alive. During Khrushchev's visit to Sweden in 1964, the subject was raised with him. Khrushchev reacted very violently, stating that the Soviet Government had already answered the Swedish government's query regarding Wallenberg, and there was nothing more to be said on the subject. Since that time there had been no further official Swedish queries.

10. [] next produced a memorandum written by Identity-C covering a conversation that the latter had had with Carl Gustav Svingel [] The latter is a lay official of the Swedish Lutheran Church, who has been in Berlin for many years and who is involved in the exchange of political prisoners between East and West Germany. At some unspecified point within the last several years, in the course of a conversation that Svingel was having with some of his East German contacts -- among whom the well-known East German attorney Vogel is included --, the East Germans inquired whether or not the Swedes would be willing to exchange Wennerström. Svingel said he could not comment, but promised to look into the question. Svingel, in discussing this with Identity-C, suggested that an appropriate counter offer from the Swedish side might be that the Swedes would exchange Wennerström for Wallenberg. However, because the Swedish government was unwilling to consider any exchange at all for Wennerström, Svingel was never authorized to pursue this matter.

11. [] asked me if I could give him any information about Svingel, commenting that he had a feeling that the man was not to be trusted. I said that I of course knew his name, and that he was involved in prisoner exchange matters, but could not spontaneously say very much more about him, although I did not have the impression that Svingel was doing anything other than performing a humanitarian service. I promised to collect some information on Svingel for [] and send it to Stockholm for him. I also explained to [] something of the mechanics of the prisoner exchange business, and commented briefly on the principals involved. [] wondered if this channel might be one which could be used for making another query regarding Wallenberg. I said that I thought it could be used, and that if he decided he wanted to try this, I would be glad to see if we could be of some assistance. He commented that this would require considerable thought, because, in fact, he has no authorization from the Swedish government to pursue this matter. He said he even believes that at this point the government would rather not reopen the subject, since in the past it has been criticized for not having handled the case more effectively.

12. When [] had finished his account and asked me what my personal views and recommendations were, I told him that, while it was perhaps an appealing and romantic idea to think that Wallenberg was still alive, my own best guess was that he had probably died some time ago, and that there is little likelihood of ever learning more about his fate from the Soviets. I said it seemed to me that the various contradictions between the evidence the Swedes had been able to collect and the official Soviet statements probably represented bureaucratic confusion, rather than deliberate malice, and that once the Soviets had officially stated that Wallenberg had disappeared, they probably were simply unwilling to come around years later with a statement that, in fact, he was still alive and they had been incapable of locating him earlier. I said it seemed to me highly improbable that the Soviets would consider that, whatever they

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thought Wallenberg had done (remember he was involved with OSS), it would warrant holding him as a prisoner for 25 years. [] said that at this point all he really hoped for was an honest statement from the Soviets as to what had actually happened: he had really no expectation of ever seeing Wallenberg returned alive. I suggested that the best way to get this would probably be for the prime minister to call in the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm and ask him for such a statement, rather than go back through some channel such as the Stange-Vogel channel.

[] commented that he did not believe such an approach would be possible any longer. I pointed out that the present Soviet government might well take a different attitude toward this case than had Khrushchev, and that one would lose nothing by trying.

13. This is about where we left the matter. [] said he would consider the whole thing further, and that perhaps either he or Identity -A would come to Berlin later to review the matter once more with me, or perhaps I would be coming to Stockholm. I told him that I did, in fact, hope to be in Stockholm sometime in the fall, and would be happy to renew our discussion at that time. He said there were other things we could also profitably discuss (not specified).

14. One final note regarding this case: [] asked whether I thought Svetlana Alluluyeva would have ever heard anything about Wallenberg. I said I thought it would be one chance in ten thousand if she had, but that if he felt it would be worth putting the question to her, I supposed that this could probably be done without too much difficulty. (May we have Headquarters' view on this score?) [] also raised the possibility that Wallenberg might have been sent to some other eastern European country and incarcerated in a mental institution there, in order to enable the Soviets to say factually that he was not in the Soviet Union. [] had heard somewhere that the Soviets did this sort of thing occasionally. I said I had not heard of that, but that it seemed unlikely to me that the Soviets would permit an individual who had been a subject of so much attention to be out from under their own control.

15. During our luncheon conversation, we naturally touched on the activities of Soviet Bloc intelligence services and the question of the East German presence in Sweden came up. I asked [] whether he felt the East German Mission in Stockholm was engaged in other than commercial and diplomatic activity, and he said that the [] had some indications of MfS activity. He gave no details, however. On the general subject of Swedish-East German relations, he said that pressure for Swedish recognition of East Germany is building up quite rapidly, and he is inclined to believe that the government will not be able to resist this pressure for very much longer.

16. We shall be forwarding the paper on Svingel shortly.

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CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

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TO: Chief of Station,
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station,

Separate cover attachment to EGBA

89378

Dated: 13 JUL 1970

Identity -A:

Identity -B:

Identity -C:

Identity -D:

former chief of the
State Police

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