OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DISPATCH NO.: MGB-A-4177

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DATE: 18 June 1949

TO : Chief, FBM   Attn: [   ]

FROM : COS, Karlsruhe

SUBJECT: CAMISADE -- Termination of Operation

REF : MGK-W-1818

1. We share fully your disappointment at the dearth of operational information communicated to you. This operation was, we confess, highly unsatisfactory both from the point of view of the operational techniques employed to bring CAMISADE under control, and the time and effort we invested as measured against the intelligence results. This was one of the major considerations that prompted us to sever our relations with CAMISADE on a rather inconclusive and abrupt note. We made this decision after mature reflection, firmly convinced that a major operational effort would be required to obtain a conclusive answer to the pained question which we have been asking ourselves for the last two years: is CAMISADE a straightforward double agent case or had he at any stage of the operation been tripled against us.

2. For the record it should be stated that [   ] ran this operation single-handed for almost a year with very little support from this base or from Washington. Every known device of keeping it alive was tried--to no avail. During the winter 1947/48, while [   ] was in Washington, an unofficial hint was dropped to us that the Washington desk considered this operation a waste of the tax-payers' money and that they would not look with favor upon a continued flow of operational data covering it. Since, as you may recollect, little detailed operational guidance was forthcoming from Washington at that time, we considered this hint sufficient cause to discontinue the operation. I issued instructions accordingly, but asked [   ] to maintain a casual contact with CAMISADE just in case there should be a development warranting a revival of the operation. Since the last operational memorandum, on 15 October 1947 (BSC/Ops/173), was dispatched to you, the operation has been in a state of suspended animation. We tried to get to the bottom of the

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mystery in applying a carriage test, but here again we had the uncomfortable feeling that the positive result of the test was not the whole answer. We recommended W/T training for CAMISADE, proposing to use him under Pasttime conditions, but dropped the project when new doubts assailed us.

    3. All this time, i.e. from October 47 on, we did not keep operational notes, because we felt that no useful purpose would be served in burdening you with a recital of data which you considered of no possible intelligence interest. In particular, your allusion to the Alexander episode, which we considered the one single development in the tortuous course of the operation, suggesting that CAMISADE might be on the level after all, proved to us that you were formalizing Washington's views as to the uselessness of this operation. My own views in the matter fully coincide with yours. I too believe that a double agent operation, per se, is of little use unless it opens up a channel for deception, and this is what we vainly strove to accomplish.

    4. In summing up, we believe that there are two courses open to us. We can cover this operation with the cloak of charity, i.e. write it off and try to do better next time. This is the solution we advocate. Or we can revive it and try to get to the bottom of it. In that case we would have to assign an experienced counter-espionage specialist of our staff full time to run it. Tertium non datur. The latter course we shall adopt if so instructed by Washington. In that case we would request you to prepare a detailed analysis of the operation and, based on it, specific directives as to what information objectives you wish us to pursue.