

SECRET

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

T. G. Hughes, Jr., CIA, American Embassy

Bundesrat Four Verfassungsschutz (BFV)

Re: SCHROEDER, Robert

1. Reference is made to paragraphs 5c(1)(b), 5c(1)(f) and 5c(2)(a) of Operations Memorandum 16/44. HQ, 64th CIG Group, WAREER.

2. Robert SCHROEDER is the current President of the Bundesrat Four Verfassungsschutz. He was appointed to the position in August 1955 to succeed Hans JESS, who had served for a year as provisional BFV President after the defection of Dr. Otto JOHN. The purpose of this memorandum is to outline for your information the gist of some interesting remarks made by President SCHROEDER during a lengthy conversation which I recently had with him. The substance of these remarks is substantially as follows:

a. The testimony of some BFV officials, i.e. Vice-President RADKE and department head Richard GIBBEL, at the trial of Dr. JOHN has undermined the BFV's prestige to some extent. He had warned these gentlemen prior to their court appearances of the danger involved in expressing personal opinion, but he could not impose any definite instructions upon them.

b. Vice-President Albert RADKE is "only" an intelligence practitioner. He doesn't understand the broader problems and possesses neither organizational talent nor the ability to evaluate character. At the beginning (of SCHROEDER'S incumbency) everything was in RADKE'S hands because neither JOHN nor JESS interested themselves in internal BFV affairs. This situation has now been changed. Department I, Administration, is now under his, SCHROEDER'S, control; he has gradually wrested control over administrative and personnel matters from RADKE.

c. One of his immediate tasks is to ensure that the BFV becomes an organization capable of competent work. In order to achieve this, certain changes must be made. These include the contemplated reorganization of the BFV's internal structure, now scheduled for implementation in early February, and the bringing of competent, loyal people into the BFV to staff key positions. A lack of competent personnel continues to exist. Some few new officer ("Beamten") slots have been approved and can be filled in April. Insofar as the employees ("Angestellten") are concerned, he believes they are too highly graded, but this fact is not appreciated by the rank and file. The BFV's employees' organization ("Betriebsgewerkschaft") recently put to him the question as to when it was intended to proceed with the conversion of all employees ("Angestellten") to officer ("Beamten") status. In response to this question he made his attitude clear; he said that he would indeed seek the conversion of some deserving employees to officer status, but that he certainly did not intend to recommend a blanket conversion of all employees. He is aware that this announcement resulted in some criticism of his personnel policy by dissident elements. No matter, the dissenting elements and trouble makers will have to go. In some cases, he will not hesitate to so irritate and annoy the trouble makers that they will be glad to leave of their own accord, if no other means to effect their transfer can be

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found. He will also attempt to bring more career civil servants of officer grade into the RTV so that he will not lose key persons later, as has been the case with former military officers who, after some years at the RTV, left to join the new armed forces. Here before the department heads have had their own personnel policies, each differing from the other, so that there has been no overall coordination of personnel affairs. Illustrative of the reason for disappointment on the part of some RTV personnel is the fact that department heads had assumed 126 employees of early promotion, despite the fact that at the time the RTV could promote only two employees. This sort of partisan personnel policies will no longer be permitted. The new head of the Administration Department, Herbert PUGH, is a competent responsible official and he will see to an improvement in the personnel field.

d. Another immediately important task is the establishment of satisfactory relationships with the Lieutenant Rear Performance Groups (LTVs). Herebefore the LTVs have essentially consisted of RTV investigators in their affairs and of the failure of RTV leadership. Much of this complaint has been unjustified and unfounded. It will be made very plain to the LTVs, although in a tactful manner, that they need the RTV as much if not more than the RTV needs them. In addition as the nation will always have need of a central security office, thus assuring continuation of the RTV in some form, but that this is not the case with the LTVs, which are subject to the differing attitudes of local politicians. The RTV and the LTVs must support one another. Each LTV complaint will be carefully investigated in the future. In the case of a recent LTV complaint about the conduct of a RTV representative in a refugee camp in one of the islands he had personally caused an investigation to be held. It was found that the complaint was without basis. The LTVs will be informed that there is to be no more of this. Complaints will be welcomed and their cause corrected when they are well founded, but meddling and interference will no longer be tolerated.

e. Control over the RTV by intermediate levels of the Federal Interior Ministry must be discontinued. Consideration is to be given to the manner in which this might be accomplished. Perhaps it would be better if the RTV were to become a sub-department ("Unterabteilung") of the Ministry thus the RTV would have direct access to the leading officials of the Interior Ministry and be relieved of supervision by intermediate ministerial officials who have little conception of the RTV's problems and less of the manner in which they might be solved.

f. With respect to personnel security investigations, some decision must be made as to the agency or agencies which shall be charged with them. SCHIRMERS has no interest in devoting RTV energy and personnel to a fragmentary portion of an uncoordinated project and would rather give up all RTV personnel security responsibilities rather than do half-a-job. They, i.e. ministerial officials, are now talking of a large personnel security section in each ministry to be headed by a "Vollstreckungsleiter" (higher ranking civil service officials). In the end, when the other have had their say, it is probably come to the RTV to get them out of the mess. The RTV has done all the spade work quite alone in this field and has accomplished the job they are with only a few people.

g. It is necessary for the BfV to become "politically active," i.e. ensure that the BfV develops timely information on subversives and subversive activity and that the information developed gets to the right hands in order that, where necessary, corrective action may be taken. For instance, the SPD sponsors an "Institut für Politikal and Economic Affairs" in GOLFENHAIN. This was headed by a man named AGARTZ. "They" were all Communists. "We" went to the SPD and they have all been thrown out. In another case it was known that an industrial union intended to go on strike and that 35 Communist instructors intended to take over the strike leadership for their own purposes. SCHREIBERS went to Walter FREITAG, former west German labor boss whom he knew personally, with this information and FREITAG took action to have the strike called off. RAJKE did not want to do this, i. e. talk with FREITAG about the matter, but we did it and it is to our credit.

h. In the CE field a great deal of work must be done. MAD ("Militarischer Abschirmdienst") cannot undertake this work, other than with respect to its own installations, and GEBLEN cannot-- he has his hands full. Besides, they have failed miserably in the past and are in many cases restricted by Communists. Before 1933, for example, the police were unable to prevent the Communist revolt in BERLIN and, as a matter of fact, went over to the Communists, singing the "Internationale." The BfV has financed the work of the LfV in the CE field, with the exception of Land North Rhine Westphalia where the BfV/LfV responsibility for CE activity is not recognized, and will continue to do so. In North Rhine Westphalia little espionage has been detected, but this does not mean that it does not exist. On the contrary, it would seem more to indicate that due to the lack of cooperation in the CE field on the part of the LfV in DUISSELDORF an adequate defense against espionage does not exist there. After the BfV reorganization SCHREIBERS will give a great deal of attention to the CE field; the departments to be charged with coverage of left and rightwing subversion will function without any difficulty. In the CE section there are two good men, Erich WENGER and Fritz NICKEL, but some personnel changes must be made. The draft BfV/MAD delimitations agreement has been forwarded to the Interior Ministry for approval. It is in Walter BARGAZKY's hands there. He is not expected to permit its approval without making some changes-- he must make changes if for no other reason than to show that he reviewed it-- and it will undoubtedly have to be renegotiated with Colonel WESSEL of the Defense Ministry.

i. Some attention must also be given to the field of public relations. Effort must be made to develop more satisfactory relations with the press. RAJKE doesn't want to do anything here either, but we will have to do something in this direction.