

B-2551

MEMORANDUM

19 April 1945

TO: Mr. Philip Horton
FROM: A. W. Dalles

Attached are two memoranda — one dated April 17 (23 pages), and one dated April 19 (4 pages). The first memorandum covers a conversation between Mr. Leslie (of the OWI office here, who is acting at our request) with Heettel and von Winkler, and the second memorandum covers a further talk between Leslie and von Winkler alone. This all relates to various phases of the Austrian resistance.

I have not had time either to study carefully, or to copy these memoranda. The background with regard to Heettel you have already received, namely an SD man working under Kaltenbrunner who is at least making a pretense of being helpful. As he apparently wants to save his skin there may be something to it; but obviously the resistance people do not fully trust him. What he has to say, therefore, about the resistance is to be taken with caution. However, as long as there is a possibility of his being really helpful to us in the question of the redut, we wish to play along with him very cautiously. In order to keep us out of the matter as far as possible, I arranged for Leslie of OWI, who is both astute and an excellent German speaker to see him. Hence a copy of this report, as you will note, is going to Gerry Mayer of OWI. But he will only use the sections in it which relate to his own work.

What Heettel has to say with regard to the party, the redut and the Werewolf organization struck me as interesting and possibly worth dissemination, but you can make use of any of this report, disguising the source, as you may see fit. I should like to have a copy of it, together with a copy of my covering memorandum go to Washington and Caserta.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

The second memorandum, dated April 19, gives Leslie's impressions based solely on a talk with Winkler, whom we believe to be a member of the Austrian resistance, but of the Catholic right wing.

In general I feel that the names in this memorandum should be used with caution, both for security reasons and pending a further check on our part. I should be much interested to know if you have anything on Wernerhandführer Jützek, whom Winkler considers a most important and useful man from the resistance viewpoint.

We hope discreetly to get some check on these names from K-22 in the near future, and will let you know the results.

I have asked Lada-Masuzaki to take this memorandum to you personally and shall give him a little additional background.

Winkler claims that he was in touch with McDowell about September 25, 1944, and that McDowell agreed to send in a report about him. I'd be interested if you could get any trace of this.

A. W. D.

Attachment

For: Mr. J. McSherry
From: E. Murray Leslie.

Bauer

Herewith the particulars concerning W.

Dr. Karl von Winkler.

Born December 8, 1912 at Stainach, Styria.

Private Secretary of Count Nikolaus von Ballestren.

Representative of the Board of Directors of

"Vereinigten Oberschlesischen Hüttenwerke" (Ober-
hütten) for Belgrade and Agram, where Oberhütten
owned expert firms.

(Oberhütten is owned 100% by Count Ballestren).

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INTERVIEW WITH DOKTOR VON WINKLER.

Taufanally Mettley

This man's background, his contacts with important personages, the details of the body of dissentients which he represents and more especially his political interests are all more than adequately dealt with in the report drawn up by Mr. Leslie. My interview with von Winkler was limited mainly to a discussion of the military implications of the news which he brought in from Austria.

He reports that an army group under General Lühr consisting of twelve to fifteen divisions and situated in the triangle Agram-Besek-Sarajevo requires directives from the Allies (by which is meant the Anglo-American authorities) as to the best way in which it could help to bring the war to a speedy conclusion. He was not very precise as to the composition of this army group but said that it contained infantry, artillery and panzer divisions and also three Cossack divisions. The panzer divisions were not to be taken seriously since the lack of fuel would prevent their use altogether. The Cossack divisions under General Panwitz consisted of a hodge-podge of refugee Russians who had been living for a long time out of Russia and also Russian prisoners of war recruited by the Germans. Von Winkler emphasized that the strength of these fifteen divisions was not likely to be more than seven or eight thousand each. The German-speaking divisions were 70% Austrian and some had previously been in Norway and some in Russia.

I then asked him whether these fifteen divisions had drawn up any plans themselves for action likely to shorten the war and he replied that they had not. I further asked him what General Lühr thought about the subversive movement in his army group and he replied that the General knew about it but overlooked it; in other words he was thought to be in favour of some communal act designed to help the Allies at the expense of the Wehrmacht, but clearly was not in a position to come out into the open with his views.

This brought the discussion round to what the army group did not want to do, as it did not appear to have much idea of what it did want to do. First among its negative wishes was to avoid falling into the hands of Tito. Second was to avoid being captured by the Russians, though it was prepared to do this if we could suggest no alternative. I then asked von Winkler what he personally thought would be a good plan of action for this army group. He made four suggestions:- first that it might stay where it was and offer no resistance to the advancing Allied (in this case presumably Russians) and so open the gates into the réduit. Secondly, that it might march westwards to join the Allied (Anglo-Americans) advancing north through Italy. Thirdly, it might withdraw into the réduit and there play the part of a Trojan horse. This suggestion was inspired by myself and not adopted with any great enthusiasm. Fourthly, it could withdraw "according to plan" but not carry out the scorched earth policy. This it had already done in Sarajevo where everything vital to the functioning of a civilized town had been left intact.

One thing that came out very clearly in the inter-

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view was that this army group - and, indeed, his whole "movement" - are desirous of doing something to save as much of and for Austria, both material and spiritual, as possible and that love for the Allied plays only a secondary role.

Yon Winkler also mentioned that the Croats could be counted on in addition to the army group mentioned above but this was something which I did not discuss with him since I personally think the story quite tall enough with out the addition of a few hundred thousand Dombrodjans and Ustachis to complicate the matter, with their unreliability.

As a side-line I asked him about his relations with Cardinal Inzitzer, which appear to have been of the very closest. I asked him why it was the Cardinal had done nothing to direct the activities of the catholic clergy into anti-nazi channels and he replied that the Cardinal had, on the contrary, done a great deal since 1939, particularly as he was anxious to wipe out the list on his ecclesiastical dating from the time when he submitted to Hitler. The Cardinal had issued a great many pastoral letters in which, in the guarded language of the church, he had made it quite clear that the clergy were in duty bound to take a stand against Nazism. He told me in addition that the Cardinal had remained in Vienna and that communications with him were therefore interrupted.

Assuming that we can check up on yon Winkler and satisfy ourselves about him, then I suggest that he should first be sent to Rome to discuss the whole thing with General Alexander or his staff.