

# BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

UJDREADFUL

25 Nov 53

TO: 25

FR: 25.40 S1

RE: 25 memo of 2 Nov 53 and request for comments

1. In my opinion, the specific problem you cite (i.e. the danger that under current stress UTILITY might carry out some step that might interfere with our own conduct of UJDREADFUL investigation) can and should be solved by a direct statement on your part to UTILITY that we expect complete coordination of any steps taken by ZIPPER in this case, and that we particularly request most urgently that they take no step which might warn UJDREADFUL without full and timely coordination with POB.

2. Although one pending lead in Austria looks promising, we cannot reasonably predict that the case is likely to be broken, at least within a reasonable time. No matter how fascinating it would be to carry the case on, hoping that a solution would turn up in time, it seems to me that other compelling factors (i.e. ZIPPER and AIS security, as well as financial policy) dictate that some solution be forced.

3. It would still appear that UJDREADFUL's obvious attempts to get himself recruited by AIS directly are not only incriminating under the circumstances, but point to a feasible solution. In short, either with or without ZIPPER cognizance, a member of POB ( [ ] is now a natural possibility as well as [ ] ) would allow UJDREADFUL to proceed to the point where he either offers himself for AIS recruitment or requests assistance in emigration to the U.S. At this point we would agree to help Subject, conditional on his voluntary submission to complete interrogation and rerun on the machine.

4. The following is a possibility that has not as yet been considered. We have not considered the possible effect of the shock treatment, i.e. the sudden confrontation by unfriendly authorities who act upon an obviously real lead and refuse to recognize his emergency number because they believe him to be a security case of sufficient importance that they can ignore normal emergency procedures. After all, GEYER fled when he wrongly assumed the KRIPO was on his trail. Although UJDREADFUL is an unusually cool customer, he must, if guilty, labor under a considerable mental and nervous strain. He is undoubtedly afraid he is a sick man, and this may be a clue to an inner nervous strain which might break in reply to a sudden shock (he has recently had a thorough

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heart examination, as proved by the doctor bills in the intercepts). The operation could be set up this way. On the basis of the lead from Austria, we could explain the case to 66th CIC and lay on carefully with them the arrest of UJDREADFUL as a strong security suspect. They could question him in such a way as to indicate generally the nature and source of their suspicion. We could tip them off to several useful lines, such as the fact that he was recently in a Linz hotel, and the Soviets had a check on him, as reported by CIC Linz. CIC should ignore requests for application of the emergency identity procedure as mentioned above until they see he is not going to react. Then they could reluctantly call us in. We would be more than willing to help him clear the matter up. However, he would already be under a considerable cloud, particularly after we recalled that, coincidentally, there had been some extremely strange things about his previous test. He would be in a poor position to decline an invitation to submit to interrogation and rerun on the machine. This method would accomplish in much less time everything we could hope to gain by the use of para 3 above, and would in addition provide at least a limited shock treatment which might just produce results.

5. Since Washington has again passed the ball back to POB, 25 would certainly be justified in solving the problem by arbitrary excision of CSW via the budget. Unless UTILITY would agree, however, this method would have the disadvantage of affecting POB/ZIPPER relations in an unpredictable but probably adverse manner. It would further increase the possibility of UTILITY taking independent uncoordinated action prejudicial to any further conduct of the case after UJDREADFUL is dropped from ZIPPER. There would not be any guarantee that such a course would make it possible for us to interrogate UJDREADFUL subsequently, in fact we would have much less pretext for such a course of action. It is also possible that ZIPPER might attempt to continue CSW with or without UJDREADFUL much in the same way GV A was handled. I therefore believe that this course of action is less desirable than either para 3 or para 4 above.

6. In the interests of a quick solution, I recommend application ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ of para 4 after we give the Austrian lead about one month to mature, and as soon as we can make arrangements with CIC.

CA