

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION		PROCESSING ACTION	
	SECRET		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
TO	Chief []		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	Chief, EE; Chief, WE; Chief of Station, Germany; Chief, Bonn Operations Base			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Acting Chief, Munich Liaison Base			MICROFILM
SUBJECT	CATIDE/DIZTAG/UJRANDCM C CATIDE D/A Case			
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	SEE PARAS 4 AND 5			
REFERENCE:	L J12702 210 243			
<p>1. In order to facilitate []'s research on the CATIDE D/A case, we cite in paragraph 3 a chronology of our knowledge of the case and are forwarding under separate cover, descriptions and/or photographs of some of the personnel who we think <u>might</u> have been directly involved with the case. This does not mean, of course, that all of them participated or that others might not also have been involved.</p> <p><u>Identity 1</u> - is the Chief of the CATIDE equivalent to Chief of KUDESC. He is known to have been on trips in the case during October, November & December 1964. He and Iden 5 and 6 were on a dry run for the operation on 15 October 1964. Identity 1 was in charge of the entire operation and gave us the descriptions indicated. On 9 December he stated the case had been run "last week".</p> <p><u>Identity 2</u> - is Identity-1's deputy and Chief of Evaluations also known to have been away from his office in November and December 1964 but claimed to know nothing of the case. However, he and Identity 4 were "away on business" on 27 November 1964.</p> <p><u>Identity 3</u> - is Chief of Operations for Identity 1 who was definitely concerned with the operation. He would be our candidate for the talkative officer since he is inclined that way. He definitely was not on the dry run in October.</p> <p><u>Identity 4</u> - is a high level technician working in Iden-3's shop to whom we turned over the audio device. He would most likely have supervised the technical end of the audio surveillance.</p> <p><u>Identity 5</u> - is Deputy Chief of Operations for Northern Germany and Northern countries and according to Identity 3 was conducting the "dry run in place" in October 1964.</p> <p><u>Identity 6</u> - is a desk or case officer working for Identity 3 who was also on the "dry run" trip. He was also "away on business" on the 27th of November. We know very little about this man. have no direct contact with him and if he should be known to either [] or [] we would appreciate anything we can get on him especially true name and description.</p>				
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE		
	EGMA - 65781	31 December 1964		
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER		
	SECRET	32W-5-38/1 CONTINUED		
GROUP I - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	ORIGINATING			
	OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
	COORDINATING			
	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME	
DISTRIBUTION: 2 - [] w/atts. 1 - USC 1 - USC TNP 2 - EE w/atts. 1 - USC 1-TNP 2 - WE w/atts. 1 - USC 1-TNP 1 - COS/G/Bonn w/atts USC 1 - COS/G/Fran w/att USC 2 - Bonn Ops.Base w/atts USC S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN Dated 12 Jan 65 13 Jan 65	DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2R NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2008			
	RELEASING			
	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	
FORM 53b OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (40)	HQ COPY		DISPATCH	

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Identity 7 - is sort of a trouble shooter for Identity 1. He is in charge of the office if Idens 1, 2, and 3 are away and ranks high on the staff. He, too, was away on 27 November 1964 and on several trips during October, November and December 1964.

Identity 8 - is UJDREADFUL. He is our prime candidate for "the case officer who became controlled by his agent". In this connection the phrase "UJDREADFUL's DIZTAG agent" as used in paragraph 2 of Reference is confusing. As far as we understand the case, the suspect in the case would be UJDREADFUL himself not an agent. CATIDE distrusts their own man. The device was to be used against the suspect, without his knowledge. In fact, as we gathered from Identity 1 the suspect would not be at all aware of the presence of the rest of the officers. It would be most illuminating to determine exactly how this part of the operation was controlled and whether "the staffer turned penetration agent" knew of the presence of his colleagues, etc. The use of UJDREADFUL in paragraph 3 is equally open to question. "Der Sachbearbeiter" would have been one of Identities 3-7, under no circumstances Identity 8 or 9. UJDREADFUL is a Sudeten German, speaks Czech and Slovak fluently, worked on Czech targets and was chief of the section running Slovak operations. He was given an LCFLUTTER on 12 October 1952 with results so poor that he was eventually interrogated by three senior CATIDE officers on 17 July 1954. On 27 August 1954 MLB sent a strongly worded analysis of his record to CATIDE. The investigation to our knowledge continued until 1956 or 1957 but nothing drastic happened. When [] questioned OFLEMING on 6 May 1964 about the case he was told that Subject had lost his "Beamtenstatus" (civil service rating) because the investigation had shown that he had falsified his education record. Apparently he was still on the staff as of that time.

Identity 9 - is another candidate for the culprit. He has been with CATIDE since April 1946, and was with the old Abwehr since 1940. He is a lawyer by trade, speaks fluent Czech, Slovak, English and some Russian. Subject first came under suspicion in 1949 as a possible Soviet agent. Since the suspicion was founded on a denunciation by the notorious Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL, nothing much came of it. In March 1953 Subject was LCFLUTTERed in connection with the UJDROSHKY program. The operator's comments were: "This bird is probably engaged in more intrigue and dubious activity than any other" (of the six candidates). EGIA-4584 dated 23 July 1953, however, opens with the sentence: "UTILITY has categorically repudiated the LCFLUTTER technique and, in the specific case of Subject, has from the outset placed no credence in the unsatisfactory findings of the test". Subject has probably worked against Czech targets for many years. In 1951 he was transferred to the CE section at CATIDE headquarters, working on satellite operations. He was at that time apparently responsible for the preparation of all "build up material" for all Fedrep D/A cases. In 1961 [] reported that Subject has "an almost pathological interest in [] material" but also that CATIDE according to FLEMING considered him "above reproach". CATIDE's SCHIMMER who LCFLUTTERed Subject in 1962, described Subject as a blasé verbose type who would like to lead one to believe that he had seen and experienced everything in the world and could no longer be excited about anything. Subject consented to testing but pretended to fall almost asleep during the interview. It was obvious that SCHIMMER did not like the man and considers him somewhat of a transparent phony. At the completion of testing, Subject asked to see the charts and in the words of SCHIMMER: "looked them over carefully, making comments, as though he had been an expert who had seen a thousand tests". The fact that Subject had been previously tested by KUBARK in March 1953, was apparently unknown to SCHIMMER and not disclosed by Subject during his second test. SCHIMMER had not come to any final conclusion in the test but was inclined to give a favorable report of the findings. In July 1962, Subject was moved to positive ops and we note that thereafter CATIDE requested EDC traces, curriculum vitae and other information indicating that they may have been investigating him again.

2. As Attachment 1 we are forwarding normal aliases used by Idens and as Item A a description of the audio device we made available to Ide 1 for the case. In this connection it should be noted that the names contained in Attachment 1 are not used like KUBARK pseudonyms but are "office names" by which CATIDE staffers normally address and refer to each other. Many times they do not even know each others true names. As far as we know all but Identity 3 are addressed in this manner. Identity 3 is commonly known by a nickname cited in quotations in

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Attachments 2. Identity 7 is often referred to but not addressed by his nickname. Although these aliases are regularly used in daily conversation, CATIDERS frequently also use operational names for specific operations so that in contact with [] or [] personnel they may have used another set of names. We also note, however, that most CATIDERS use their true names in passports unless there are overriding reasons for not doing so. In a liaison operation as the one in question they may very likely have used true names. Therefore under Attachment 2 we are forwarding the true names of Identity 1-5 and 8-9. (We do not know the true names of Identities 6 and 7 but would be most anxious to have them.) If [] should have a capability to determine any of the true names the officers used in passport control, one true name might flush them all out. Possibly these identifications may help [] to spot some of the personalities involved in the case.

3. The case itself goes back to 9 September 1964. On that date Identity 1 told [] that he had a special request to make. He said that he had a fairly smooth running D/A operation which had not been productive for some time and that he had had thoughts of terminating it when suddenly he found on the other side a legal resident in a neutral country. Since he had some suspicion about the sudden "luck" of his "double agent", he wanted an independent check of the operation in the form of a monitoring of the rather lengthy discussions held by the "agent" and his opposite number. For that purpose he asked for the specific monitoring device which had been shown to CATIDERS at a general briefing some months before. In order to procure a suitable device, and, of course, in order to get some information on their operation, we asked for a rather detailed description of the conditions under which it was to be used and received the description of the restaurant, which we now know to be located in Copenhagen. In line with his request, we gave Identity 1, in presence of Identity 4, on 22 September, the device cited as Item A in Attachment 1 together with one SRR 4 Receiver, two SRT-5 transmitters, one Uher recorder and one power supply for use with Uher recorder. At the same time we were promised a technical report on the performance of the equipment. On 21 December 1964, Identity 1 stated that the operation had been completed but that "his" technicians had trouble deciphering the tapes. Since we are to receive the technical report, and since, as we now understand it from Reference, the equipment which we gave Identity 1, may not even have been used, we would like to know, if that can be established, whether any of the equipment we gave Identity 1 was used in the operation at all. This will give us a clue to just how convincingly Identity 1 can lie to us and of course, whether we should even forward his report when we get to [] as pertaining to their equipment, or whether we must tell them that the equipment was never used and the report is a fake. Reference states that [] had similar equipment. [] If so, we would like to give [] the exact description of what actually was used so they can make a true evaluation of the report, regardless of what equipment was used.

4. For evaluation of the UJRANDOM aspects of the case we would like to know

- a. Was the "CATIDER turned D/A for the CIS" either Identity 8 or Identity 9? If not, can [] get some description or possibly a photograph of the man so that we may be aided in our further search for a penetration of CATIDE?
- b. Was the "talkative officer" any one of Identities 1-7? If not, can [] give us any clue to his identity so we may search our files and send other descriptions and possibly photographs for identification? An insecure officer who talks after he had a bit to drink is of greatest interest to us, specifically, if we should be in contact with him.

5. We finally note that we have no information in our files on the CIS personnel involved. Could [] supply us details for the completion of our file on the case. We note with interest that Identity 2 had on 5 October 1964, in connection with quite another operation, requested the CIS manual book. We borrowed it for him from Vienna and CATIDE had it in their possession at the time of the

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operation in Copenhagen.

6. For the record, we wish to add that it goes without saying, of course, that the bulk of the information contained in this dispatch and the attachments thereto is intended for background information only on a KUBARK ONLY basis, and cannot be revealed to any liaison service. Most of the personnel information, as well as the photographs, comes from MLB files and must be considered classified KUBARK information. The pictures, by the way, are only copies. We are sending them only because pictures are so much better than descriptions, but they may not be shown to liaison and we must have them back as soon as possible. We are presenting the information as a basis for elicitation only, in the hope of gaining valuable clues which might enable us to form a better picture of the present status, the M/O, sophistication, security and general policy of the new CART section of CATIDE. It will be recalled that that section was hardest hit by the UJDROWSY affair and has been completely reconstituted since April 1963. By their own admission they are just now commencing aggressive operations. By seeing how they operate in a case such as the one presented, we hope to gain a better picture of their overall capability. Extreme care must be taken that our interest in, and knowledge of this case does not get back to CATIDE.

APPROVED: []

ATTACHMENTS: UNDER SEPARATE COVER

- 1 - Alias List
- 2 - True Names and Descriptions - TNP

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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO
EGMA - 65781

ATTACHMENT 1

ALIAS LIST

Identity 1	-	OPETERSEN
Identity 2	-	OKASTELL
Identity 3	-	ODOELNER
Identity 4	-	OSCHIRLING
Identity 5	-	OKUIZBACH
Identity 6	-	OMARETZ
Identity 7	-	OMARWITZ
Identity 8	-	ODr. Erich WANDT
Identity 9	-	OSCHREITER

ITEM A

A WOODEN PEPPERMILL

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operation in Copenhagen.

6. For the record, we wish to add that it goes without saying, of course, that the bulk of the information contained in this dispatch and the attachments thereto is intended for background information only on a KUBARK ONLY basis, and cannot be revealed to any liaison service. Most of the personnel information, as well as the photographs, comes from MLB files and must be considered classified KUBARK information. The pictures, by the way, are only copies. We are sending them only because pictures are so much better than descriptions, but they may not be shown to liaison and we must have them back as soon as possible. We are presenting the information as a basis for elicitation only, in the hope of gaining valuable clues which might enable us to form a better picture of the present status, the M/O, sophistication, security and general policy of the new CART section of CATIDE. It will be recalled that that section was hardest hit by the UJDROWSY affair and has been completely reconstituted since April 1963. By their own admission they are just now commencing aggressive operations. By seeing how they operate in a case such as the one presented, we hope to gain a better picture of their overall capability. Extreme care must be taken that our interest in, and knowledge of this case does not get back to CATIDE.

APPROVED []

ATTACHMENTS: UNDER SEPARATE COVER

- 1 - Alias List
- 2 - True Names and Descriptions - TNP

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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO
EGMA - 65781

ATTACHMENT 1

ALIAS LIST

Identity 1	-	Ø PETERSEN
Identity 2	-	Ø KASTELL
Identity 3	-	Ø DOELLNER
Identity 4	-	Ø SCHIRLING
Identity 5	-	Ø QUIZBACH
Identity 6	-	Ø MARETZ
Identity 7	-	Ø MARWITZ
Identity 8	-	Ø Dr. Erich WANDT
Identity 9	-	Ø SCHREITER

ITEM A

A WOODEN PEPPERMILL

S/C ATT 1 TO EGMA-65781 CS COPY

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PHOTOS and passport
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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO
EGMA - 65781
ATTACHMENT 2

TRUE NAME AND DESCRIPTION

1. Rudolf GRAEBER, born 25 April 1911 - 5'10" - ca 150 lbs. - blue eyes, slightly bulging - medium brown hair, graying, combed straight back - crooked upper teeth - lined face, north German accent, "looks like a rabbit" - likes sweaters - colored vests. (Passport copy attached.)
2. Diets Max Siegfried von dem KNESEBECK, born 30 May 1912 - 6'3" - 164 lbs. - blue-gray eyes - dark blond hair - slender build-gaunt, ugly, leathery complexion - liver-lipped - long face, sometimes nicknamed "Abe Lincoln" because of his gaunt look - Actually a fairly typical German Army snob. (picture attached).
3. Axel" August aka Auke DECKER, born 19 December 1917 - ca 5'7" - stocky - blue eyes - dark blond hair - 1 large gold tooth - dent over left eyebrow, apparently shrapnel wound - appears to be overly subservient to everyone in authority and deliberately plays the "junior officer type" although he is not. He is quite senior in rank but not in behavior. (No late picture available.)
4. Fritz SRIBOLD, born 31 August 1914 - ca 6' - ca 200 lbs. - dark brown eyes - black hair, thinning-thicket - dark complexion - dresses well - smokes heavily - he looks somewhat like a "bouncer" - loves to talk about his only operational experience with KUBARK, when his wife befriended a Soviet wife in Bonn. Although a technician he is high ranking. (Picture attached.)
5. Erich Martin KUTSCHE, born 10 February 1909 - 5'9" - 145-150 lbs. - gray eyes - dark blond hair, thinning - slightly round-shouldered - good teeth (a/o 1958) - straight nose - pointed chin - frequently referred to as "Uncle Erich" because of his friendly uncle-like attitude toward everyone. A senior officer who is sure of himself, calm and quiet. (Picture attached - has aged since date of photo (1952) but general impression is good.)

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ECMA - 65781 - PAGE TWO
ATTACHMENT TWO

6. No description or picture. Known to us only by alias and position.
7. True Name Unknown - born ca 1915 in Hirschberg, Silesia - (No photograph) - Nickname "Napoleon" used by his colleagues regularly - ca 6' - at least 200 lbs. - blue eyes - thin gray hair - ruddy complexion - heavy jowls - a big lumbering "good fellow" - pendant in his ways, inclined to over-organize things - close to #1 but not too well-liked by #3, who would not take him on such a job if he had his choice.
8. Ernst WORM, born 25 April 1907, Obergrund, CSSR (now? there were four Obergrunds in CSSR) - 5'9" - 195 lbs. - blue eyes - dark blond hair - heavy build - picture attached - since not known to us recently, accuracy of picture cannot be judged.
9. Emmerich OFCZAREK, born 15 July 1914 in Vienna - 6'3" - 200 lbs. - blue eyes - brown hair - slender build (a/o 1954) (Picture attached for comment - See 8.)

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