

21-CSAVA

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6 February 1951

TO : []
 FROM : []
 SUBJECT : Hungarian Legion
 REF : 7-CSAVA, OGIVE MAV-8501 (SLZ/2352), MAV-8418

1. General

An important source of personnel for active resistance exists in Austria in the form of the large Hungarian minority. These people can be categorized generally into four groups as follows:

- a. Former Army
- b. Political Refugees
- c. Business Men and Former Royalty
- d. Recent Draft Evaders

The total number of Hungarians presently in the three Western Zones of Austria and Vienna is approximately 14,000, of which about 1,400 are males of military age (between 18 and 30 years). Naturally, this number is affected most by emigration to the U. S. and by the changing political and military situation within Hungary. The political attitudes of the groups living in Austria have been well summarized by Ogive in [] discussion of the MHEK titled Potentialities of the HAKO Group (KOPJAS and MHEK). In this memorandum [] points out the cleavage between the two major factions of Hungarian leaderships, first the Hungarian National Council based in the U. S. and enjoying at least friendly relations with the U. S. State Department and second, the MHEK, commanded by General Andras ZAKO and possessing "de facto" leadership of the Hungarians in Austria. It is quite apparent that the MHEK is more than a veterans group and that it contains, as well, a political section and an intelligence section. It is also obvious that one of the main reasons for the existence of the group is the hope of eventual political power after the liberation of Hungary. The political leanings of the present leadership are considerably to the right almost to the extent of fanatical fascism. However, the fact remains that ZAKO is the actual leader "on the ground" of a large national group.

The value of the Hungarians from the FJCase point of view lies in the fact that they are all refugees from Communism. Should a war come these people must either escape, stand and fight with the West, or be killed on capture. The only way they can turn for help is toward the West. They have repeatedly indicated their desire for a more solid relationship with the U. S. but with no apparent success. Undoubtedly, the major reason for the past Allied "hands off" policy has been the distaste for the

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leadership and the hope that some popular center group will spring up, and command "grass roots" support inside Hungary as well as among the refugees. In the past six years, this hope of the West has not been realized. The Ferenc NAGY, Bela VARGA, Tibor SCHMIDT, Otto von HANSEBURG group now commanding official U. S. support apparently enjoys only meager local support among the emigres. From information available here they enjoy even less support within Hungary itself.

The latest MHRK approach to the U. S. was made on 12 December 1950 (Ref. V-CSAVA). The decision to conduct a meeting as requested by ZAKO is still being debated; however, judging from past deliberations and rebuffs, the proposed meeting will probably never materialize. In the meantime, potential anti-Communist fighters are neither being trained nor organized. This situation promises to continue until D-Day whereupon the U. S. will have refugees instead of soldiers with whom to deal.

II. Specific Plans

It is not proposed in this paper to advocate cooperation with the MHRK or any other emigre group. Rather it is proposed to sponsor, train and equip a U. S. controlled Hungarian Legion. Such a legion would be of value to several U. S. agencies including the U. S. Army, JJCape and Ogive. From the Army point of view, the legion could perform service and guard duties prior to D-Day after which time it could fight beside U. S. troops on and after D-Day. From the JJCape point of view, the legion would serve as an excellent recruiting center for men to be used either as drop-ins, line crossers, saboteurs or any of the other associated jobs. Such a legion would serve as an excellent base for operations and as a recruiting center for Ogive. In addition to the individual benefits to be gained from the legion, it could, with proper leadership, develop into a center of actual potential power controlled and supported by the U. S. It could eventually drain off General ZAKO's power and divert popular support to an organization under U. S. command.

The risks of establishing a Hungarian legion must be faced before further consideration can be given to the matter. Until the present, no overt U. S. move has been made to organize or support any of the emigre groups in Austria. It is realized that the Western Powers should be most discreet in their dealings with the anti-Communist emigre groups so that the delicate political and geographical situation will not be altered by a Russian counter move. Any move by the Soviets to blockade Vienna or partition the country would more than offset the values to be gained by the organization of a legion. It is also possible that the Austrian Government might voice objections to the U. S. use of non-Austrian labor as well as to the requisitioning of buildings and training areas required for the legion. A third source of objection might be from the U. S. State Department which might not approve the sponsoring of an unrecognized emigre group. However, the precedent for such a move has already been set in Austria and in Germany as well. In Innsbruck, the French have organized an overt Hungarian guard company, and in Germany, several U. S. sponsored uniformed Polish units have been organized since 1946. In addition, the U. S. Army presently employs both truck and guard units composed entirely of local civilians. These units

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are formed simply by hiring civilians from the local labor pool. They are purely civilians in character and receive no military or political training, neither are they barracked together. They represent no organization and are a continual source of personnel problems for the employing agency. Finally, when D-Day comes, these individuals will either fade into the general civilian mass or will spring up as saboteurs within the midst of the already confused military situation. A new legion could be phased slowly into being so that as it grew, its members could gradually assume the duties presently performed by civilian labor.

III. Proposed Organization

A. Organization:

Realizing the risks outlined above, and weighing them against the advantages to be gained for all interested agencies, it is proposed that the organization described in this and the following paragraphs be considered. The legion would be organized initially into one infantry battalion consisting primarily of three light infantry companies of approximately 100 men each. A Headquarters and Service Company would be necessary for logistical and administrative support, thus making a total battalion strength of approximately 400 men. The detailed organization could be thoroughly worked out with G-3 to fit the eventual needs for such a unit.

B. Leadership:

Thoroughly screened and tested leadership is of primary importance to assure proper orientation and cooperation by the legion. Through the excellent contacts of [] a wealth of potentially good leadership is readily available. The recruitment of these individuals could be coordinated by [] and []

C. Personnel:

From the reservoir of young Hungarians in Austria, it is evident that sufficient personnel are available to fill at least one battalion. All recruiting would be done on an individual basis with thorough screening carried out both by the Hungarian leaders and by available U. S. agencies.

D. Training:

A coordinated training program could be worked out with G-3 being responsible for all but the covert portion of the training. In addition, particularly adaptable individuals could be cut out for specialized training for FJGape or Ogive missions. In certain cases men could be furloughed away from the unit to receive sensitive training.

E. Equipment:

The table of equipment for the legion should consist primarily of light shoulder weapons consistent with the overt duties of the unit. Initially, the weapons issued should be restricted to rifles, carbines,

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and pistols. Heavier weapons, including automatic rifles, mortars, and rocket launchers, could be phased into the unit after the initial disturbance caused by its formation has receded. All equipment should be standard U. S. Army issue with no attempt at sterilization.

F. Cover:

The Hungarian legion would be overt to the extent that its ostensible mission will be that of guarding and servicing regular military installations with uniformed guards. The covert training and use of the legion personnel could be covered by the general "cover" created by the existence of such a unit.

G. Finances:

Financing of the legion has not yet been contemplated; however, it is believed that financial and logistical support can be provided by the Army. Finances for covert training and equipment should reasonably be provided by NSCops. No attempt has been made to estimate eventual costs, and no assurances have been solicited from the Army to determine their financial capabilities.

H. Disposal:

The problem of disposal of the legion members should not be difficult since the membership will consist mainly of properly screened, young men all of whom would be valuable immigrants to any Western country. Should it be deemed advisable, negotiations could be initiated with U. S. Immigration authorities for the eventual acceptance of the legion members. A list of standards could be devised so that the personnel can be limited to those acceptable to their final destination nation.

IV. Recommendations

It is recommended that the proposal outlined herein be considered in the light of the present desperate shortage of U. S. troops in Austria. In addition it is felt that the value to be gained by siphoning off the political and actual power of the present unacceptable Hungarian leadership will more than compensate for the expenditures of time and money and for the risks to be taken.

Incl.
Location of Hungarians

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HUNGARIANS IN AUSTRIA

Following is an accurate list showing the present location of Hungarians in Austria. Source of the figures is the Hungarian Welfare Office in Salzburg. Date of information is 31 December 1950. The numbers for the Russian Zone and Vienna are approximations.

American Zone.....	8,050
British Zone.....	4,340
French Zone.....	1,793
Russian Zone.....	950
Vienna.....	<u>3,000</u>
Total.....	15,133

An approximate age group distribution follows. This was estimated from known statistics of a few specific areas. Age group 18 - 30 constantly fluctuates because of emigration.

Over 50.....	20%
30 - 50.....	54%
18 - 30.....	18%
6 - 18.....	5%
0 - 6.....	3%

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