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NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

28 September 1945

VIA AIR POUCH NO. X-5-S

TO: Lt. Col. Charles W. Thayer
Headquarters,
United States Forces in Austria
OSS, Austria
APO 777

VIA: Major Edward P. Barry
Commanding Officer, SCIA

FOR: Saint, IDL

FROM: Saint

CONTAINS: Memorandum regarding the Employment of
Foreign Nationals, with Attachments 1
and 2.

X-3369

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED OR CHANGED TO

~~Secret~~
By AUTHORITY OF EE/EC
TSC/EC J/J
19 JUN 1958

Please date and return this cover memorandum indicating receipt of contents.

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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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28 September 1945

VIA AIRFOUCH NO. X-1298

TO: Mr. Colonel John A. Brass
OSI Mission to Great Britain
APO 413

FROM: Sisk, BR/OOI

CONTAINS: Memorandum regarding the Employment of
Foreign Nationals, with Attachments 1
and 2.

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receipt of contents.

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MEMORANDUM

28 September 1945

TO: Saint, DDI
FROM: Saint
SUBJECT: Employment of Foreign Nationals

1. We have been in touch with the Security Office here on the above subject as a result of reports made by F, the Security representative at Salzburg. According to these reports F is concerned about the presence of a number of foreign nationals in the OSS establishment in Salzburg who he feels are undesirable for staff employment in an organization of this type. The Director has recently announced a new policy covering the employment of foreign nationals (see Wash cable #9667 dated 24 September 1945 which is being relayed to you from Amson). You are requested to cooperate with the Security representative at your station to insure that the provisions of this policy are carried out and that the Salzburg establishment is made properly secure in regard to the question of the employment of foreign nationals.

2. Attached to this letter is a list of names of foreign nationals, the security of whose employment has been questioned by F. We are including beside each name the information which we have on that person. Attachment 2 contains a summary of the action taken by a former station in the cases of certain of these persons.

3. It will be noted that on most of the above named persons we have already notified you that we have little or no derogatory information. On this basis we have no objection to the proper use of these persons according to the policies outlined in the above referred to Director cable, but we do request that you investigate the status of the above named individuals and take steps to insure that in each case this status is consistent with the policy as laid down.

4. It will be noted that vetting cases submitted to us should give an indication of the type of work to be performed by the subject. This item was asked for in pouch instructions on Vetting and Tracing from here dated 24 May 1945. Copy of this should have been made available to you in Caserta, but if not let us know and we will send you one.

cc: Saint, #2/001

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ATTACHMENT 1

A. SALZBURG OFFICE

1. ~~Baron Hans Heinrich Herwarth von BATTENFELD~~. Vet request received here 11 August; cable reply no record 20 August.
2. Zolt ARAM. See attachment I.
3. Andor GELLERT. See attachment II.
4. ~~Countess Ann BERAN~~. Vet request received 29 August; our reply 2-3305 5 September.
5. Fritz MOLESN. No derogatory information here. Never vetted from COMPLETE form.
6. Rudolf von HILFER. Vetted here through Security office. NO RECORD.
7. ~~Erich Louis LAEDI, alias Erich A. LOESE, alias Erich Albert HARRIS, alias Al HARRIS, alias E. A. HARRIS~~. No derogatory information. NEVER vetted here from full form.
8. Ernst BRENNER. Vet request received 15 August; cable reply no record 20 August.
9. George FUSSENER. Vet request received 13 March; reply by post 2 April.
10. Gunther JUTNER. Check here at Security request 13 November 1944 from very incomplete form. No record.
11. Sigand KANAGUR. Never vetted here from complete form.
12. Alfons LAUFER. Never vetted here. Has this man any connection with Friedrich LAUFER, former German intelligence figure? This is a very important case and any connection should be signalled here at once.
13. Leopold NIEBERLE. Vet request received 12 March; cable reply No record.

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14. Enzo FLAN. Vet request received 13 March; pouch reply no record.
15. Josef STAFFE. Never vetted here.

B. LIES

1. Hans HINTERKLEINER. Vet request received 18 April; cable reply BENNINGTON-Caserta #32944, 27 April.
2. Ludwig KISS. See attachment II
3. Robert WICHMANN. Checked here at request of Security 13 November 1944 from very incomplete form. No identification.

C. HELL-AM-SES

1. Josef BUSCHILL. Vet request received 16 August; cable reply 22 August.
2. Heinrich M. HELLIG. Vet request received 14 August; cable reply 20 August.
3. Ludwig HESSEL. Never vetted here.
4. Karl GRENZNER. Vet request received 21 September; reply going out today.
5. Josef HESLER. Vet request received 20 September; cable reply 25 September.
6. Siegfried HUBER. Vet request received 14 March; cable reply 15 March, later cable reply 20 August.
7. Hansig HALL HUBER. Vet request received on Heinrich How HALL HUBER 14 August 1945; cable reply 20 August 1945. Are these identical?
8. Otto HOLEBE. Never vetted here.
9. Jean LAHERT. Never vetted here.

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ATTACHMENT II

C-E Aspects in the Employment of Certain Hungarian
Nationals in Italy and Central Europe

1. Early in November 1944 X-2 Washington expressed concern to SI Washington over the attachment of certain Hungarian nationals, namely, Zsolt ARADI, Gyula MAGYARI, Lazlo KISS and Paul KOVACS, to the Hungarian Desk, SI, Central European Section, Bari.
2. Reportedly, Zsolt ARADI, at that time a member of "the Committee of Free Hungarians in Rome", close associate of Francois LUTTOR and Vitez SZASZ, and before the fall of Rome himself the Hungarian Press Attache at the Vatican, had been recruited by SI-CE for work on the Hungarian Desk sometime early in July 1944. Later, Paul KOVACS, Mgr. Gyula MAGYARI, and Lazlo KISS were recruited for the same purpose.
3. It should be mentioned that in a written memorandum dated 26 August 1944 X-2 Washington made it clear to SI here that according to directives issued by the Director, this branch regarded it the responsibility of X-2 to vet a group of Hungarians considered for employment in certain SI operational plans. It was specifically stated that SI interests required this action and that within the authorization of existing directives, any resultant studies and recommendations would be brought to their attention.
4. At the end of August 1944 the Chief of X-2 Bari, and also the Security Officer at Bari, reportedly gave blanket disapproval of the above-mentioned Hungarian nationals and refused to assume any responsibility for their continued employment.
5. On 22 September 1944 X-2 Bari, upon a renewed request made by SI-CE Bari for X-2 vetting, sent a memorandum to X-2 Caserta and asked for careful vetting of the above-mentioned Hungarian nationals, their associates, and their contacts; and the formulation of authoritative statements concerning their suitability for OSS employment.
6. On 10 October 1944 X-2 Caserta forwarded to the Chief, X-2 Washington, a situation report together with all pertinent vetting data on the personalities involved. This was accompanied by a memorandum requesting X-2 Washington action.

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This memorandum stated that Hungarian Nationals attached to SI-CE not only circulated freely through the OSS Headquarters there, but also had "access to all Hungarian and Czechoslovakian SI files and materials". It was further reported that an ARADI and KISS were assigned to the now defunct Budapest OSS mission; also that it had been planned to introduce MAGYARI into Hungary as an independent OSS SI-CE agent. Sometime later it was learned that MAGYARI had left on a clandestine mission via Slovakia to Hungary at the end of September or early in October, 1944.

7. Early in November 1944, after this problem had been given careful consideration and study by X-2 Washington, it was taken up directly with the SI Branch and the Director. A joint "T.S." X-2 SI cable was sent on 7 November to SI-CE Caserta, in which apprehension was expressed about possible intelligence plants by and possible operation leaks to the enemy through the above-mentioned Hungarians and/or their contacts. It was requested that the views of SI-CE Caserta concerning this matter be conveyed to SI Washington.
8. At the end of November a reply to this inquiry was received by SI Washington. X-2 Washington was advised of this at the end of December. On 29 January 1945 at a meeting, attended by several members of this branch and by the Assistant Chief of SI, the contents of the Caserta pouch letter were made known to X-2. Two points were of particular interest and concern to us. First, it was stated that the problem connected with the employment of the above-mentioned Hungarians had been thoroughly discussed with X-2 on about 13 November 1944. SI Caserta reportedly believed that, given the manner in which the persons in question were being used, a satisfactory understanding had been reached with X-2 Caserta. Secondly, SI Washington was advised by SI Caserta that the chief concern of X-2 Caserta was no longer the continued employment of these Hungarian Nationals as ex-enemy aliens, but rather the linkage of one or two of these Hungarians with the British Intelligence Service.
9. Therefore, SI-CE Caserta requested SI Washington to confer with X-2 Washington and confirm the above, namely that currently X-2's chief concern was not the possibility of any linkage with the enemy but rather the possibility of a linkage with the British.

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10. Naturally, we could not confirm the above, nor could we agree with it. The Executive Officer of X-2 stated at this meeting that X-2 Washington continues to apply the general principle that X-2 cannot approve the direct employment or attachment of any ex-enemy alien personnel recruited abroad as members of OSS field or office staffs -- though such aliens, if officing apart and sealed off, under proper control may be used as sources of information.
11. On 14 February, 1945, X-2 Washington was informed by X-2 Caserta that a series of conferences had been held between the Chief SI, the Chief SI-CE and the Chief X-2 in regard to the Hungarian Nationals employed by OSS, at which an understanding was reached that could in no sense of the word be termed satisfactory, but was the only possible conclusion, namely, that no further action would be taken by X-2 until further facts could be ascertained.
12. It was also reported that MAGYARI and KOVACS had been dropped into enemy territory on the following mission: 'to contact certain churchmen and others connected with the so-called Court Group in Budapest for the purpose of securing a Hungarian resistance'. With the collapse of the HORTHY government, which had occurred at this time, it was thought that this mission had become fruitless and MAGYARI and KOVACS were of no further use to SI-CE. It was added that since at the time of their drop, no further word had been received from them; it was presumed that they had been captured or killed. Contrary-wise, that is, if they were overrun or if they were to contact, by any means, an OSS representative, SI-CE agreed immediately to consider them as enemy-controlled agents and would make no further use of them.
13. With regard to APOR, it was stated, OSS was making no further use of him as a source of information, nor had they considered the use of the proffered W/T. He was reported at the time to be under close CIC and SCI supervision in Rome. KISS, it was said, had been assigned to the Budapest city team as an interpreter, however, it was doubted whether he would ever actually reach that city.

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14. ARADI reportedly was continuing as a Hungarian consultant to SI-CE at Caserta, however, under close surveillance of the X-2 Branch. The Chief of X-2 Caserta stated that ARADI had been interrogated informally on several occasions in regard to his movements and his contacts in Rome, however, that he still had access to SI-CE files and plans.
15. In conclusion, the Chief of X-2 opined that ARADI alone constituted a major threat to SI-CE security--in spite of the fact that with the impending collapse of the enemy further SI-CE plans for operation in a new territory were considered inconsequential--since ARADI could be looked upon as a man who very successfully had penetrated OSS. In view of this, the Chief of X-2 Caserta stated that long-term surveillance of ARADI's activities had been planned.
16. On 4 April, 1945, X-2 Washington learned that MAGYARI saw HORTHY on 15 October, 1944, gave himself up to the Russians in Budapest in mid-January and was transferred to Debrecen from where he returned to Rome in late March. It was suggested at the time by X-2 Washington that MAGYARI be interrogated in Rome on his interview with HORTHY, his detailed experience with the J-E Landers and the possible nature of his mission in Rome. No interrogation report has been received here to date.
17. On 17 March, 1945, the Chief of X-2, Bari, forwarded to X-2 Washington supplementary information, including biographical sketches on Allied-employed Hungarians and their contacts. (See: Appendix B). These biographical sketches were offered with the intention of bringing up-to-date the "Rome-Bari Hungarian Chain" whereby information of an operational and intelligence nature might have leaked out to the British and the enemy via Hungarians in contact with Axis-affiliated diplomatic representatives accredited to the Vatican--reference was made specifically to LOTTOR and APOR. These biographical sketches were not intended to reflect adversely upon the character of the subjects or their pro-Allied sentiments; exception at the time was, however, made of HALASZ who was under suspicion of German Intelligence connections.

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18. In reviewing the whole problem the X-2 Chief, Bari, pointed out that upon analysis, he was again brought face to face with the basic problem of the employment of unvetted foreign nationals recruited abroad as OSS staff members, and he whole-heartedly agreed with the X-2 Washington principle regarding the employment of such personnel (See Para.10). He also stated that in tracing possible leakages, it was necessary to take into consideration the background and political orientation of the individuals involved, namely:
- A. As Hungarian nationals active throughout their lives in Magyar affairs, they feel, on one hand, patriotic allegiance to their own land while, on the other, they are professedly in sympathy with the Allies who have aided them morally and materially. All are politically mature and some have a definite interest in the destiny of their country, to which they expect to return.
 - B. Most of them are employed at tasks which, in recent months, have left a good deal of their energies unused. Thus they see one another frequently, have the same circle of mutual friends and contacts, and may drop information intentionally or unintentionally during their visits.
 - C. Subjects make frequent and uncontrolled trips to Rome where they meet Baron APOR. The Baron, it will be recalled, is a former Hungarian envoy to the Holy See (who allegedly still continues to receive his salary in Swiss francs). Members of the Budapest City Team returning from Rome consistently report that APOR is well-informed concerning OSS. That the Baron is the recipient of information emanating from the OSS, other American agencies, and the British is well established now.
 - D. The extent of information on OSS personalities and operations relayed by Baron APOR to Ferenc LUTTOR or other pro-Nazi Hungarians having access to the Vatican channels or enemy diplomatic circles cannot be ascertained by this Desk from this distance.

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19. On 29 August, 1945, the Chief of X-2 Balkans, reporting from Rome, forwarded to X-2 Washington an original statement made by MAGYARI. According to this statement, MAGYARI was told on 13 October, 1944, by Dr. Jusztinian SFREDI, Prince Primate of Hungary, that LUTTOR had denounced him, that is, MAGYARI, to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. MAGYARI was accused of working for the Allies, "recruiting partisans in southern Italy against Hungary". From the above, it can be seen that MAGYARI was in Hungary on a dangerous mission for the OSS when he learned of this. (See JDX-197 disseminated 29 August, 1945 to SCI/A Salzburg).

20. Currently we are in no position to know the situation regarding these Hungarians. According to sketchy reports we surmise that the basic problems regarding the employment of these foreign nationals still prevails in your and perhaps also in the Rome area. In view of our responsibility and according to the Director's cable dated 20 September, 1945, Wash. #9667, (sent to the Commanding Officer of each station for action and for X-2, Security, information), it is paramount that X-2 carry out the principles outlined by the Director. It is suggested that you look into the counter-espionage aspects of the above-mentioned problem and send us a clear statement of your views. It is difficult for us here to advise with the Security Office on problems of this nature unless our field staff communicates with us directly and keeps us au courant concerning X-2 vetting matters. X-2 matters brought to our attention through non-X-2 channels--i.e. through the medium of the Security Office--do not always reach us on time or are available to us in a form which will enable us to properly discharge our X-2 responsibilities.


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(Chart showing possible interrelationships between Hungarian personalities is based on information as of 17 March 1945 and was prepared by X-2 Bari.)

APPENDIX G.



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APPENDIX A

(Information as of 30 October 1944 only)

I. APOR, Baron Gabriel

Nominal head of Free Hungarian Committee.

Pointed to the value of Tibor ECKHARDT as a spokesman to Hungary from the outside world.

Is an intimate friend of HORTHY, according to his own admission. Until mid-September 1944 was known to be in possession of a secret W/T transmitter and operator, imported from Hungary, by which it can be assumed he kept in touch with HORTHY.

Was in contact with at least two potential leaks of information on OSS Hungarian operations to the enemy; SZASZ and LUTTOR.

Recommended and/or recruited the following Hungarian persons to work for SI, Bari: ARADI, MAGYARI, Paul KOVACS, Lasso KISS. ARADI, KOVACS and KISS reported directly to subject, who allegedly directed their movements, sifted their information, having them report to OSS only what he approved.

II. ARADI, Zsolt

Ex-Press Attache at Hungarian Legation at the Vatican.

Recruited for SI Bari desk early in July, 1944. On 7 August 1944 the OSS Bari Security Office gave limited security approval on subject. On 1 September 1944 the Security Office revoked its approval and gave complete Security Disapproval of subject. On 18 September SI-GE asked for X-2 vetting of subject, who was still employed at that time.

Intimate associate of LUTTOR, known pro-Fascist who replaced APOR as Minister to the Vatican. Subject was seen with LUTTOR early in October, 1944.

Also close to SZASZ, another potential leak of operational information.

Worked very closely with APOR and has long been his mouthpiece. From a British report: "He has been deprived of his appointment but not of his citizenship by the SETOJAY Government. Regrettable consequences have already arisen from the combination of his relationship with APOR and his too sympathetic reception here." "Claims personal influence with APOR." "He is aware of an ISLD infiltration plan which on his own statement he has communicated to APOR. Not only this but he has agreed to submit to APOR's scrutiny the names, etc. of the contacts which he is going to suggest to the ISLD agent."

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III. MAGYARI, Gyula

A Catholic Priest.

First recruited for SI Bari in July 1944. On 7 August the Bari Security Office gave limited security approval on subject. On 1 September 1944, on information from a higher Echelon Security, the approval was revoked and Security Disapproval of subject was given. Eighteen days later Major Chapin, who had kept subject on nonetheless, asked for X-2 vetting of subject. According to a report of 22 September 1944, subject was then training, along with Paul KOVACS, outside the ~~OS~~ Bari Office for certain SI missions into Hungary. They were said to be going out on a mission soon.

A strong Monarchist who has been in contact with Otto von HAPSBURG and was one of the contact men of the Hungarian Monarchists to DOLFUSS and SCHUSCHNIGG.

Made a trip to Hungary as late as December 1943.

May be a source of information for one von FALDAS who communicates with MEYER, important S.D. official in Italy, through a German agent Eugenio PIANDRO.

IV. KISS, Lasso

A script writer for the moving picture industry and story writer.

Was in contact with the British from October 1943. Worked for FWE film division in Rome from June to August 1944. Was then recruited for the SI Bari Hungarian desk. On 18 September 1944 Major Chapin asked X-2 to vet subject and judge his qualifications as a member of the Hungarian desk staff, running agents; as an instructor of Hungarian POWs; as a member of the future OSS unit in Budapest. Reported an ardent Communist.

Was in contact with an S.D. agent, CIPOLLA, from the summer of 1943 to 1944. Relations with CIPOLLA are not clear.

V. KOVACS, Paul

Highly trained precision tool mechanic.

Was recommended to SI Bari by Zolt ARADI and hired as an SI agent. Was granted limited Security approval by the OSS Bari Security Office on 7 August 1944. On 1 September 1944 this approval was withdrawn and Security Disapproval ordered on the report of a higher Echelon Security. On 18 September 1944 Major Chapin requested X-2 vetting on subject whom he had retained in spite of the Security Disapproval. According to a report of 22 September 1944, subject and MAGYARI were being trained outside the OSS Bari office for certain SI missions in Hungary and were expected to go out on a mission shortly.

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VI. LUTTOR, Msgr. Francois

Hungarian Minister to the Vatican since APOR repudiated the SZTOJAY government.

Known to be pro-Nazi. Was formerly a close associate of APOR and is still close to ARADI, with whom he was seen in Rome as late as the beginning of October 1944. Is a possible leak to the enemy of SI Bari operational information obtained from ARADI.

VII. SZASZ, Vites

Director of the Hungarian Legation to the Quirinal, now under Swedish protection.

Has neither resigned nor been dismissed by HERTHY or the SZTOJAY government. Therefore is regarded as an enemy alien. Is still diligently distributing anti-Trianon propaganda. Maintains contact with APOR and ARADI, and is therefore another possible leak of operational information to the enemy.

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APPENDIX B

(Information as of 17 March 1945 only)

I. HALASZ, George O.

Subject, supposedly an escapee from Hungary, arrived in Italy during August 1944. For a brief period he was employed in a consultant's capacity by CSDIC Naples, Target Section. Soon afterwards he came to Bari where he was given employment as a Hungarian-language radio announcer in the FNB Radio Section. Before I-2 could make a check of Subject he had already contacted various members of the Budapest City Team and virtually all important British, American and French agencies in Bari, including VERESS (see III below).

Although Subject was not given direct employment by OSS Bari, he was a frequent visitor for several months (Nov.-Dec. 1944) of the offices of the Budapest City Team of which he made efforts to become a member. Because of derogatory information received and unexplained Gestapo connections prior to his escape, Subject was dismissed from his job as announcer at FNB.

The suspicion expressed by this Desk to the Commanding Officer of the Budapest City Team receives substantiation from Bari CIC in Report No. 36800 dated 22 February 1945. According to this Subject admitted upon his second interrogation by them that the story he had told at his first CIC interrogation had been false. Furthermore the report states that "inasmuch as Subject withheld information during interrogations (extending back to September 1944) his position has become less enviable than before. The continued deliberate omission is a reflection on his character, if nothing else, and strengthens recommendations previously made that he be denied positions of trust with the Allies."

As a result of further investigation by I-2, SILO and CIC (all of Bari), Subject will be deprived of letters of recommendation received from Allied agencies and will probably be interned.

II. GELLERT, Andor

Subject, age 33, Hungarian national, was a confidante of the late Hungarian Premier, Count TELEKI. Not long before the beginning of World War II he was sent as political observer to Berlin under journalistic cover (PESTI HIRLAP).

In 1942 Subject was transferred to Stockholm where he maintained close contact with the American intelligence. Recruited by OSS, Subject arrived in Bari September 1944 and was attached to the Budapest City Team as adviser and interpreter.

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Subject is an intimate friend of ARADI with whom he shared a billet in Bari last Fall. He refers to Aradi in complimentary terms. Is also a good friend of VERESS (see below).

Gallert enjoys the confidence and respect of the leading members of the Budapest City Team. He makes no secret of his resolve to return to Hungary "to aid in the reconstruction of the country", as he expresses it.

III. VERESS, Laszlo

Age about 38 years. A secretary in the Hungarian Foreign Office, Budapest, until the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944. He escaped from Hungary that same month, via Yugoslavia where he was aided by the British and by the Partisans. Since April 1944 he has been a guest of the British in Bari, serving as advisor on Hungarian intelligence matters.

With regard to OSS contacts, Subject is a close friend of both ARADI and GELLERT. Veress and Gallert visited one another frequently in Bari. Shortly before Christmas 1944, Subject, accompanied by Gallert, travelled to Rome where they stayed as guests of Aradi. At that time Veress also paid a visit to Baron APCR.

Subject intends to return to Russian-occupied Hungary and eventually participate in Hungarian government work. This end, he has stated, he would achieve with British help. In mid-February he established residence in Rome while awaiting clearance, visa and transportation to Hungary.

IV. BLOSSFELD - An ARADI contact

While Major HADNAGY and Dr. SOOS were in Rome for consultation as directed by SI during March 1945, they were billeted by ARADI at the home of one of his friends or acquaintances. The family in question was that of Mrs. BLOSSFELD, widow of a German university professor.

(Miss) Mrs. Blossfeld's daughter, age 17, has had a pronounced German background, and before the Allied occupation of Rome counted numerous German officers and civilians among her friends. Since that time Miss Blossfeld has often been seen in the company of British and American officers.

Both HADNAGY and SOOS were warned by several Hungarian nationals in Rome to be very circumspect about the BLOSSFELDS who are known for their German connections. The two Hungarians themselves expressed surprise, upon their return to Bari, that OSS personnel should identify themselves so closely with past or present Germanophiles.

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