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MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Automatic Data Processing

1. This memorandum contains a proposal in paragraph five requiring approval by the ADDP.

2. The West German internal and external services, the BfV and BND, plan to automate their file holdings during the course of the next several years. The Agency offered the benefit of its experience and proposed that technical discussions with both services be held at Headquarters whenever German plans become advanced enough to make such a meeting profitable.

3. Recently the BND announced its intention to move forward rapidly into the ADP area, and have scheduled the delivery of IBM equipment (IBM 360-40) for late 1966. Their choice of the IBM 360-40 is based on a ADP plan submitted to them by IBM without IBM having had the opportunity to enter BND premises, and without having any exposure to BND file problems. General Gehlen, the President of the BND, steadfastly has declared he would not accept cleared outsiders to examine his problems. When asked by the BND in December 1964 to comment on the IBM proposal, which of necessity was conceived and written in a vacuum, the Agency declared it unworkable. Nevertheless, the BND persists in moving ahead and recently proposed to Munich Liaison Base that they send a team to Headquarters in early June 1965 for briefings and discussions, despite our unheeded request that such a visit would be profitable only if they would first define for our examination their problems and objectives in detail in writing.

4. It has been reiterated to the BND that according to Agency experience it would be folly to seriously consider ADP without first having defined and concentrated on their own document, index and information retrieval problems; that management must take charge, define objectives and limitations realistically, and that fully cleared specialists be employed to work under direction in developing means to achieve BND objectives. A BND visit to Headquarters for the purpose of attending another briefing on our ADP system (they have had several) would be a sterile and probably counter productive exercise. Wishful thinking mixed with

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misinterpretation and misunderstanding could well accompany technical discussions and briefings with a service not yet equipped with systems and machine experience. Our investments and objectives cannot be translated and applied literally and to copy our approach can mean failure, with ultimate blame on the Agency.

5. There is strong BND pressure for talks in early June 1965, largely at the insistence of General Gehlen, a gadgeteer with no understanding of the problem. EE Division, after consultation with the DDP Systems Group, feels it would not be in the best interest of either the Agency or the BND to sponsor this visit. The consequence of this decision will be to disturb momentarily our liaison relationship at various levels in the BND, and for this reason the German Station has proposed, as a compromise solution, that the Chief, DDP/SG and one of his specialists visit BND Headquarters in early June 1965 to examine the BND problem and to convince them to postpone the U.S. visit until they have complied with Agency advice per paragraph four above.

6. The BfV has indicated they are not yet prepared to discuss ADP with the Agency, and has proposed they visit Headquarters at a later date, perhaps in September 1965.

[Acting Chief]
Eastern Europe Division

APPROVED:

Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

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