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EUR/G  
INCOMING

FRP: , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: EUR/G-3 (855) INFO: ODPD-D, VR, FILE, EUDORECORD, DC/EUR/N3,  
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83 1432573 ASR

PAGE 001

IN 1432573

TOR: 141032Z JUN 83

66190

SECRET 140928Z JUN 83 STAFF

CITE [ ] 66190

TO: DIRECTOR INFO [ ]

WNINTEL KEYWAY CALL CASCOPE

SUBJECT: CASCOPE AND CLANDESTINE WARNING COLLECTIONS

REFS: A. [ ] 66161 1428307

B. DIRECTOR 586531

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2006 -

1. REF A ADDRESSED SOME OF THE SPECIFIC ISSUES RAISED IN THE BRIEFING PAPER COVERING DISCUSSIONS WITH CASCOPE ALIAS ACKERMANN REGARDING HUMINT COLLECTION AGAINST I AND W REQUIREMENTS. IN THIS MESSAGE [ ] HOPES TO SUGGEST A POSITION WHICH IS PROPERLY RESPONSIVE TO CLEAR MESSAGE OF REF B WHILE AT SAME TIME PRESENTING OUR OWN SOMEWHAT MORE GUARDED RESPONSES TO WHAT ACKERMANN MAY BE HOLDING OUT AS AN OPERATIONAL PROGRAM.

2. FIRST, AND MOST EMPHATICALLY, WE WISH TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION FOR PARA FIVE REF B POSITION. IF WE ARE TO CONDUCT ANY MEANINGFUL OPERATIONAL EXCHANGE WITH CASCOPE ON THESE INITIATIVES THEN WE BELIEVE THAT [ ] MUST BE THE FOCAL POINT FOR DISCUSSION AND EXCHANGE, NOT THE CASCOPE REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON.

3. WE WISH TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TWO OBJECTIVES, OR POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES IN PURSUING "WARNING INITIATIVES" WITH CASCOPE. IF THE OBJECTIVE IS TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL CAPABILITY IN THE WARNING AREA THAN THERE MAY BE OTHER, AND MORE PROMISING AVENUES, OF APPROACH. WE MENTIONED SOME OF THESE IN REF A. IF THE OBJECTIVE IS, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL AREAS OF POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL EFFORT WITH CASCOPE, THEN WE HAVE ANOTHER, PERHAPS MORE COMPLICATED BUT ALSO POTENTIALLY MORE REWARDING AVENUE OF APPROACH. IN THE FIRST CASE, GAINING ADDITIONAL PRODUCT ON THE WARNING FRONT, BASE FEELS THAT PNXCEL INTERESTS MAY BE SERVED AT LEAST AS EFFECTIVELY BY MORE AGGRESSIVE EXPLOITATION OF OUR US MILITARY COUNTERPARTS AND THEIR ESTABLISHED PROGRAMS. WE HERE ARE VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING INCREASED EFFORTS BY THE MILITARY IN THE HUMINT FIELD. COLLECTION TARGETS

SECRET

1432573

ASR

PAGE 002  
TOR: 141032Z JUN 83IN 1432573  
66190

ALL CERTAINLY INCLUDE I AND W REQUIREMENTS AND OUR REQUIREMENTS  
 DERIVED ON THE MILITARY THROUGH ESTABLISHED TASKING MECHANISM WOULD  
 IN OUR JUDGEMENT BE AT LEAST AS EFFICIENT A MEANS OF GETTING  
 ADDITIONAL REPORTING AS THE (AGAIN IN OUR JUDGEMENT) DECIDELY  
 THE MOST EFFICIENT MEANS OF WORKING THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF A  
 FOREIGN LIAISON SERVICE. AS SUGGESTED IN REF B, CASCOPE HAS, BY  
 ITS OWN ADMISSION, SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND RESERVATIONS  
 REGARDING CERTAIN OF THESE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.

*They are  
military  
items in  
first place*

4. IF THE OBJECTIVE IS TO EXPLORE AN ADDITIONAL AREA OF  
 POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL COOPERATION WITH CASCOPE THEN WE HAVE  
 ANOTHER IDEA TO RAISE FOR DISCUSSION. AS BACKGROUND, THE  
 CASCOPE VICE PRESIDENT HAS FOR SOME TIME, WITH A VARIETY OF  
 PNXCEL INTERLOCUTORS BEEN PURSUING THE LINE OF ARGUMENT THAT JOINT  
 TARGETTING AND OPERATIONAL PURSUIT OF SOVIET/EAST BLOC TARGETS  
 IN SOME OF THE SMALLER COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD WHERE BOTH  
 CASCOPE AND PNXCEL ARE REPRESENTED WOULD BE AN EFFICIENT AND  
 SENSIBLE WAY FOR US TO DO BUSINESS. HIS POINT, USUALLY ARTICULATED  
 WITH HIS CUSTOMARY WIT, IS THAT IT MAKES NO SENSE FOR CASCOPE  
 AND PNXCEL TO COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER IN SOME SMALL  
 AFRICAN CAPITAL IN GOING AFTER TARGETS OF SOVIET/BLOC INTEREST.  
 HE ARGUES THAT IT WOULD BE FAR MORE SENSIBLE FOR US TO EFFECT AT  
 LEAST SOME COORDINATION IN OUR PURSUITS. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM  
 HAS BEEN FROM OUR SIDE THAT THE LOGIC OF HIS ARGUMENT MAY APPLY  
 TO THE MARKETPLACE BUT NOT NECESSARILY TO OUR FIRMS AND THAT  
 THEREFORE THE IDEA, SENSIBLE AS IT MAY SOUND, PROBABLY WILL NOT  
 WORK. WE WOULD LIKE TO EXAMINE THAT CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND OPEN  
 THE DISCUSSION UP A BIT FURTHER.

5. ADMITTEDLY, MOST CASCOPE REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD ARE  
 MORE NEARLY LIKE PANGLEAN REPRESENTATIVES AND LESS LIKE SVMACE  
 OFFICERS IN TERMS OF THEIR TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL INTERESTS.  
 FOR OUR PURPOSES, HOWEVER, WE WISH TO SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING LINE  
 OF ANALYSIS. ASSUME THAT WE CAN IDENTIFY A SMALL NUMBER (WE  
 WOULD SUGGEST THREE OR FOUR) OF COUNTRY CASES IN WHICH THE FOLLOWING  
 CONDITIONS APPLY: BOTH PNXCEL AND CASCOPE ARE REPRESENTED, THERE  
 ARE BOTH SOVIET AND BLOC (PARTICULARLY EAST GERMAN) REPRESENTATIVES  
 PRESENT, AND THE LOCAL OPERATING DIRECTIVE OF PNXCEL PERMITS  
 THE CONDUCT OF AN AGGRESSIVE SOVIET/BLOC RECRUITMENT PROGRAM IN  
 SUCH CASES, WITH LIMITED NUMBERS OF SUITABLE SOVIET/BLOC TARGETS,  
 IT MAY IN FACT MAKE SENSE TO COORDINATE OUR PURSUIT OF TARGETS.  
 DEPENDING ON LOCAL CONDITIONS WE COULD DEVELOP A FORM OF BURDEN  
 SHARING, ACCORDING TO WHICH SERVICE HAS THE BETTER ACCESS TO WHICH  
 TARGETS. WHERE WE HAVE DUPLICATIVE COVERAGE WE CAN MODULATE OUR  
 APPROACHES. WHERE OUR OWN PERSONNEL RESOURCES ARE LIMITED WE  
 WANT TO GAIN FROM THE ADDITIONAL EFFORT OF CASCOPE COLLEAGUES.  
 A NOT UNWELCOME BY PRODUCT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL INSIGHT INTO  
 THE CASCOPE OFFICERS THEMSELVES. A FURTHER, NOT INSIGNIFICANT  
 BENEFIT IN THE LOCAL CONTEXT IS THAT CASCOPE REPRESENTATIVES ARE

SECRET

SECRET

83 1432573 ASR

PAGE 003  
TOR: 141032Z JUN 83

IN 1432573  
66190

DECLARED TO THE HOST COUNTRY AND MAINTAIN OFFICIAL LIAISON. WHERE WE TOO HAVE SUCH RELATIONS WE STAND TO GAIN INSIGHT FROM ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE. WHERE WE DO NOT HAVE SUCH RELATIONS WE GAIN MUCH MORE.

6. WHAT WE SUGGEST IS ALSO A CASE OF "RISK/GAIN" CALCULATION. THESE CALCULATIONS ARE NOT ABSTRACT, HOWEVER, BUT IN OUR JUDGEMENT MUST BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF INDIVIDUAL SITUATIONS. WE CONCEDE THAT THERE ARE RISKS AND WE WELCOME DISCUSSION OF THEM. WHAT WE ARE ARGUING HERE IS THAT THERE ARE ALSO GAINS TO BE REALIZED. FROM WHAT WE HAVE SEEN OF CASCOPE LINE OPERATIONAL MANAGERS WE THINK THAT THE CASCOPE AFRICAN DIVISION IS A VERY PROMISING PLACE TO LOOK FOR DISCUSSION PARTNERS. WE HAVE EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THESE SENIOR CASCOPE SVMACE EQUIVALENTS, HAVE DEVELOPED AN INCREASING RESPECT FOR THE OPERATIONAL SAVVY AND EXPERIENCE OF THESE OFFICERS, AND COULD TALK VERY CANDIDLY TO THEM ABOUT WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND. TO RECAPITULATE, WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IS THE FOLLOWING:

A. IDENTIFYING THREE OR FOUR COUNTRIES IN WHICH BOTH CASCOPE AND PNEXCEL ARE REPRESENTED, IN WHICH OUR REPRESENTATIONS ARE SMALL, AND IN WHICH THERE ARE SOVIET/BLOC TARGETS;

B. EFFECTING INTRODUCTIONS BETWEEN OUR AND THE CASCOPE REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING, ON THE BASIS OF LOCAL RECOMMENDATIONS, JOINT APPROACHES TO IDENTIFIED TARGETS;

C. SHARING THE TAKE FROM THESE COORDINATED APPROACHES AND JOINTLY MONITORING THE OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.

7. WELCOME YOUR VIEWS.

8. FILE: DEFER. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82. ALL SECRET.  
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