FROM THE JULY PLENUM (1953) TO
THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS: ANTECEDENTS AND AFTERMATH
OF MALENKOV'S RESIGNATION FROM THE PREMIERSHIP
(Reference title: CAESAR I-58)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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FROM THE JULY PLenum (1955) TO THE
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Introduction

With the defeat of Malenkov in January 1955, Khrushchev became unquestionably "number one" in the Soviet "collective leadership" but he did not thereby command full and continuing support from all the other members of the party presidium. "Old Bolsheviks" Molotov and Kaganovich, who must have initially welcomed and probably assisted Khrushchev to victory over Stalin's first successor, were almost certain to view with alarm both the rapidity with which he, as the second successor, put into action new policies and tactics and the direction those policies and tactics were taking. The July 1955 plenum of the party central committee, by its censure of Molotov for not accepting grace- fully the rapprochement with Tito, put a powerful brake on any ambitions Molotov may have had for a stronger voice in Soviet policy; and at the same time, in its resolution on Bulganin's exposition of problems and policies in the field of industry, it put the public stamp of high party approval on an approach to industrial problems which Kaganovich was to view with growing apprehension.

Khrushchev's increasing role in Soviet policy formulation and implementation and the consequent loss of influence by Malenkov and Molotov meant essentially that the circle of top leaders had been reduced, and it was doubtful if the addition of Kirichenko and Suslov to the presidium by the July plenum would serve to enlarge that circle. But though the voices of Malenkov and Molotov had been diminished they were still members of the presidium and potentially could challenge Khrushchev's continuing leadership.

Having eschewed police terror as the cornerstone of control, both of the regime over the populace and of himself over the presidium, Khrushchev was far more vulnerable to political machinations and policy failures than Stalin had been for many years. He had, it is true, already shown considerable skill at political maneuvering, but his new policies had yet to be fully implemented and proven in practice.
I. POLICY ISSUES AND RELATIONS AMONG THE TOP LEADERS

The July Plenum and the 20th Party Congress

The last item on the agenda of the central committee plenum, held from 4 to 12 July 1955, was the calling of the 20th party congress to meet on 14 February 1956, just three years and four months after the 19th congress had finished its work. There was no announcement of the reason for calling the congress before October 1956—the outside date for holding the next congress under the party rule adopted in 1952 which established that "regular congresses of the party are called not less than once every four years." The year 1955, however, ended the Fifth Five-Year Plan period, and the necessity to consider party directives for a new plan for the period 1956-60 probably accounted for holding the congress as early as possible in 1956. The motivation for so much advance notice of the time and agenda of the congress—only six weeks' notice was given in 1952—was not so evident. It is conceivable that Khrushchev, clearly in the ascendency in mid-1955, intended to use the upcoming congress as a propaganda peg for his policies and for securing increased productivity in "honor of the congress" by typically Soviet storm tactics. However, such a propaganda campaign did not materialize; after a brief period of publicity, mention of the congress became increasingly rare in the Soviet press. By January 1956, failure of Soviet media recently to mention the date of the opening of the congress led to reports that it might be postponed.

The resolution calling the 20th congress was similar to the one issued in 1952 for the 19th congress. The agenda provided for the report of the central committee to be delivered by Khrushchev, the auditing commission report by chairman of the commission P. G. Moskhatov, presentation of the draft directives for the Sixth Five-Year Plan by Bulganin, and election of the central party bodies. No major revision of the party rules such as occurred in 1952 was apparently contemplated. Delegates to the congress were to be elected according to the same norms—one voting delegate for each 5,000 party members and one nonvoting delegate for each 5,000 candidate members—and in the same manner. The only innovation was a provision for members of party organizations in Soviet Army and Navy units abroad to elect delegates at party conferences in their military units. Military personnel abroad had long been provided representation in the USSR Supreme Soviet on the basis of deputies elected in special military electoral districts. The extension of this privilege to the election of delegates to the party congress was another of the many gestures to the military which were made after Stalin's death.
The resolution also called for the holding of oblast and kray party conferences and republic party congresses in December 1955 and the first half of January 1956 in preparation for the 20th congress. Within the next several weeks party plenums in the union republics dutifully set dates for their congresses. Three republics, for reasons unknown, called them to meet in the latter half of January instead of the first half as specified by the July plenum's resolution: the Ukraine, 17 January, Belorussia, 20 January, and Uzbekistan, 26 January.

Delay in Drafting the Sixth Five-Year Plan

As it turned out, nearly all republics held their congresses in the latter half of the month, for reasons apparently related to the completion of the draft directives for the Sixth Five-Year Plan. The latter were not available until 14 January. All republic party congresses which were to meet before the 14th were rescheduled to meet after that date; the four congresses which were to meet on the 14th and later, met as scheduled.

The delay in preparation of the plan may have been due to little more than a miscalculation--in mid-1955--of how long it would actually take to develop the directives. It is also possible that Soviet planners and political leaders ran into unexpected difficulties involving differences over aspects of economic policy. The apparent divergence of views expressed at the 20th party congress in February by Deputy Premiers and party presidium members M. Z. Saburov and M. G. Pervukhin on the one hand, and Minister of Coal Industry A. N. Zademidko and Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy A. G. Sheremetyev on the other, probably reflected a behind-the-scenes battle in the formulation of the draft Sixth Five-Year Plan directives. The disagreement was over the chances of the two ministries' fulfilling the production goals assigned them, but behind the specific issue were basic differences between regime objectives and the interests and propensities of the economic bureaucracy that exists to translate those objectives into reality--the conflict of interest between those at the apex of the regime and the lower echelons concerning the tempo of industrial growth and the balance between objectives and means.

One of the aspects of Soviet life that is almost universally resented is the frenetic tempo of economic activity, the pressure on the individual, which is engendered by the regime's efforts to maximize growth and with which the concomitant and inevitable shortages of housing and consumer goods is associated. While it is probably not correct to conclude, as Barrington Moore does,
that resentment of the tempo is so great that the Soviet economy would stagnate if the dynamic forces emanating from the top leadership were removed, there is considerable evidence to support the belief that if the lower echelons of the Soviet bureaucracy were making the decision, the rate of growth would be much lower. The principal evidence for foot dragging at levels not far removed from the top leadership is found in the public statements of the leaders themselves and hence must be presumed to be but a small sample of the foot-dragging attempted throughout the system.

In late 1954, amid complaints that several major ministries had proposed very moderate expansion in their activities, the planned growth of industrial production for 1955 was set at 9 percent instead of the usual 11 to 13 percent. The Soviet leaders, however, proceeded to tighten the screws and an increase of nearly 13 percent resulted. Scattered evidence indicates that when the time came to draft the Sixth Five-Year Plan directives the producing ministries again proposed only moderate increases. In his speech to the 20th party congress, Saburov noted, as an example, that the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy had "stubbornly defended" production increments of 1,300,000 tons and 1,700,000 tons of rolled steel below the increments finally incorporated into the 1956 plan.* It seems clear that if left to their own devices, the bureaucrats and engineers who run the Soviet economy from the ministries down to the plant would settle for growth at a level well below that demanded by the leadership.

The conservative production goals submitted by the producing ministries did not derive only from opposition to the tempo. Very important was the managers' desire to maintain a cushion, to keep a certain amount of "fat" to protect them from the inevitable exigencies of the system and the insatiable demands of the top leadership. The general attitude of the lower echelons was to ask for more than they needed and propose to do less than they could and this attitude was countered by the people at the apex of the pyramid by setting production goals high and calling on the producing ministries to make up the difference out of "unutilized internal reserves." "Internal reserves" refers to any improvement in the use of resources which will yield a greater output with no increase in inputs. "Unutilized" simply

* Another example was the more than doubling of the 1960 goal for the production of blister copper in Kazakhstan over the figure which the Kazakh leaders as late as 18 December 1955 seemed to consider proper. An article on that date in the Kazakh Republic newspaper, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, gave the 1960 goal as an increase of 43 percent over 1955 production. The plan directives, published in January, called for an increase of 90 percent. Since Kazakhstan produces almost half of total USSR blister copper this represented a substantial change.
means that owing to a combination of lack of imagination and conscious decision to hoard and to keep some "fat" available, the responsible managers, at whatever level, have not taken the necessary steps to realize potential economies. The point of view of the top leaders was well expressed by both Saburov and Pervukhin at the congress. Saburov noted that:

The directors of certain ministries and institutions incorrectly understand their tasks in the sphere of planning and directing the economy; they direct the efforts of their apparat toward drawing up and implementing plans in a manner designed to extract excessive means and resources from the state, rather than striving to expose and utilize existing internal reserves and thus fulfilling the agreed-to plans with the maximum economy in the use of state resources.

Pervukhin approached the problem from a somewhat different angle but in the same spirit and with a similar conclusion. After berating the oil and chemical industry ministries for neglecting natural gas as an excellent cheap fuel and as a valuable raw material for the chemical industry, Pervukhin said:

Such a narrow departmental approach to intersector problems is a serious deficiency of many ministries and institutions. Certain Communists—directors of ministries, economic organizations, and enterprises—are so bound up with narrow departmental interests that they cannot see beyond the end of their noses, and therefore they bring a narrow, utilitarian attitude rather than a broad state attitude to the solution of the most important intersector questions.

He then berated the ministries for purposely overestimating construction costs, stating that the ministerial cost estimates for the Sixth Five-Year Plan investment program had been scaled down some 250 billion rubles, from about 1,240 billion rubles to the 990 billion programmed in the directives, and arguing that:

By strictly observing a regime of economy and by correctly distributing the resources allocated to capital construction, all the investment projects for the Sixth Five-Year
Plan for developing the various branches of the national economy, the construction of housing and social-cultural institutions, can be unconditionally fulfilled without supplementary capital investment.

The case for the opposition was presented by Zademidko and Sheremetyev. Zademidko's position was simply stated. Yes, there had been "internal reserves" in the coal industry; despite a considerable lag in new mine construction the industry had overfulfilled the Fifth Five-Year Plan goals. But the overfulfillment had exhausted all the "unutilized internal reserves"; there was no "fat left, not even sufficient reserve capacity to permit the minimum necessary repair and maintenance work. Zademidko concluded by stating flatly that the investment allocations to the coal industry for the Sixth Five-Year Plan were not sufficient and that Gosplan would have to re-examine the matter and increase allocations.

Sheremetyev stated a similar case. The "internal reserves" in his industry had also been largely exhausted, the iron ore situation was unsatisfactory, and the prospects for improvement were dim owing to the unsatisfactory progress of new ore mines. Although Sheremetyev did not say that the investment allocations were insufficient, he did say that the 1960 goals for ferrous metals could not be reached if the construction of new mines, blast furnaces, rolling mills, and other new plants fell short as had happened in the 1951-55 period.

The conflicts of interest illustrated in these differing assessments of production capabilities are, of course, inherent in the Soviet economic and political system and have played a role in the preparation of all state economic plans beginning with the first in 1928. What may have exacerbated the situation in late 1955 and stiffened lower level resistance to the changes proposed by the top planners was the fact that in several industries—coal, ferrous metals, cement, and possibly others—the pressure for production, coupled with a failure to provide sufficient new plants in the past, had squeezed out most if not all of the "unutilized internal reserves" and left the ministries concerned dependent on new capital construction to meet the high production goals assigned them. Neither Pervukhin nor Saburov, nor for that matter, apparently, any of the other top leaders, appeared willing to consider the possibility that not all of the ministries were asking for more than they really needed, and that there was an element of increasing urgency in the requests of all.
The regime was well aware that the economy was facing some potentially serious problems. For example, it recognized that outmoded machinery and equipment and industrial processes constituted a major drag on improving the quantity and quality of production, and that labor could no longer be transferred from the agricultural to the industrial sector to meet industrial production goals without sacrificing necessary agricultural production. This realization increased the attractiveness of some demobilization which, in the regime's view, depended in turn on easing international tension, and it was clear that the required increase in labor productivity was to a certain extent, at least, dependent on improving incentives—rationalizing the wage structure and increasing the availability of housing and consumer goods.

The regime was also aware that the system of industrial organization was too centralized to make effective use of available talent, both managerial and technical, or to develop talent and initiative at lower echelons. Moreover, there was a developing imbalance between the growth of the basic materials and fuel industries on the one hand and the fabricating industries on the other, with, as indicated above, warnings of impending trouble in at least two of the key basic materials industries because of insufficient new investment and delays in the completion of new construction. But the dominant Soviet leaders were apparently blissfully confident that these problems were either not really urgent or else could be overcome by ad hoc measures within the traditional framework of Soviet "political" planning. If any members of the collective leadership disagreed with this view, they were careful not to press the issue.

Another possible reason for the failure to complete the plan directives as early as had been anticipated was the apparent redrafting of plan submissions from lower echelons in the industrial hierarchy in September in accordance with an August letter from the party central committee. The letter was probably decree No.1422, dated 5 August 1955, jointly issued by the central committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. It was entitled "On Letters to Directors, Secretaries of Party Organizations, and Chairmen of Trade-Union Committees in Connection With Drawing Up the Draft of the Sixth Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy" and dealt with procedures for drawing up of the draft plan and apparently emphasized improving labor productivity, lowering costs, and increasing the
output of industrial products.* Aside from the natural propensity of enterprise officials to ask for more resources than they needed and to propose to produce less than they could, there were at least two recent developments that might have necessitated a redrafting of the plan submissions made earlier.**

The first of these was the increased attention to modernization—new technology—evident in the creation in late May of a special State Committee for New Technology under the chairmanship of Deputy Premier V. A. Malyshch and the emphasis Bulganin placed on technological improvements in his speech to the July central committee plenum. The other development was the success of the regime's efforts toward achieving international detente, symbolized by the summit conference and the "Geneva spirit." The close connection of the latter with problems of economic planning was frankly asserted by Saburov in early July conversations with his planning chief, Insisted again and again that a lessening of tension must take place at Geneva because the Kremlin must put an end to indecision in economic directives, that is, must settle the question of the relative share of resources to be devoted to defense, investment, and consumption.

Summit and After

On 26 May, the day Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Shepilov traveled to Belgrade for the historic rapprochement with Tito, the Soviet Government, in notes to Great Britain, France, and the United States, formally accepted the Western invitation to a four-power, heads of government (summit) conference. Another step was thus taken toward realizing what had been a continuing goal of the post-Stalin leadership—a relaxation of international tensions that would enable the Soviet Union to reduce military expenditures and devote more attention to domestic economic problems. One of the clear differences between the Malenkov and post-Malenkov regimes was that the former, as described in a previous study in this series, had "attempted to enjoy the fruits of detente before detente had been assured."

* Decree No. 1422 was mentioned and partially described in a joint decree of 5 January 1956 published in Spravochnik Partiynogo Rabotnika. Moscow: 1957, pp. 131-133.

** One trust had submitted its draft as early as May, and a June deadline for such submissions is a reasonable assumption.
The Khrushchev-Bulganin regime sought to remedy this mistake by increasing its efforts to secure agreement on a set of general principles of peace, security, and coexistence. Where the Malenkov government had been hesitant, defensive, and perhaps somewhat fearful in pursuit of its foreign policy, Khrushchev's regime was confident, bold, and imaginative. The Austrian treaty and the improvement of relations with Belgrade were followed by the summit conference in July, an announcement of armed forces reduction in August, establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany in September, the foreign ministers conference in October, and a trip to South Asia by Bulganin and Khrushchev in November-December. All this activity was marked by increasing evidences of a new face of amiability and reasonableness in endless rounds of visits and cocktail parties with the Soviet leaders and among Soviet diplomats abroad.

Bulganin, as premier, was Soviet head of government, and therefore certain to be head of the Soviet delegation to the summit conference, but there was some skepticism in Western circles concerning the conclusiveness of his authority. A Western newsman asked Khrushchev in early May if it were true that he was "the power behind the throne in Russia and if, in that case, it was necessary (for him) to attend such talks also?" Khrushchev's reply that "If Bulganin goes, I do not have to go to look over his shoulder" seemed to answer the question of Khrushchev's participation but did not relieve the doubt about Bulganin's authority. President Eisenhower in his press conference on 29 June voiced this doubt when he queried whether the Soviet leader at Geneva would be able to make decisions binding on the other leaders. The press gave unusual coverage to the President's query, and the regime announced that the delegation would include Khrushchev, despite his earlier disavowal of any necessity to go, as reassurance to the West that the Soviet delegation would be able to make binding "on the spot" decisions at Geneva, and that the Soviet leaders were making a genuine effort to seek a detente. In a press conference on 15 July, Bulganin emphasized this last point by stating that the Soviet delegation sincerely desired a peaceful resolution of the world's problems and was going to Geneva with every intention of cooperating in the search for peace.

Khrushchev, the principal architect of the regime's new "activist" approach in foreign relations, was certainly not a reluctant participant in the conference, and to have to sit at home while one of the major steps in this approach was being taken might well have galled the self-confident and impatient first secretary. Foreign Minister Molotov was the only other member of the top leadership included, the remaining members
of the five-man delegation being Defense Minister G. K. Zhukov and First Deputy Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko. Zhukov, of course, was included in order to capitalize on the wartime relationship of friendship and respect established with Eisenhower, while Gromyko was to supply technical advice.

At the time of the summit conference Molotov's role in the Soviet top leadership and the extent of his influence was not clear. His censure by the central committee at the July plenum for continuing to oppose the reconciliation with Yugoslavia after the decision had been taken in the presidium and affirmed by the central committee, showed, of course, that he had suffered a severe loss of political power, but he had not been removed from the presidium nor relieved as foreign minister and so presumably retained some voice in Soviet foreign policy. The party censure may well have softened Molotov's voice but he was obviously a tough nut to crack and it is entirely conceivable that he continued to express his dissatisfaction with various of Khrushchev's policy proposals.

The summit conference itself appeared to provide few grounds for additional disagreements arising between Molotov and the others, either in regard to Soviet objectives or the mechanism of the conference. Molotov may have been somewhat apprehensive, however, about how far the attempt to create a spirit of conciliation might carry Bulganin and Khrushchev toward making substantive concessions, and he would most likely have been more comfortable without Khrushchev's presence.

As events transpired, Molotov need not have been overly concerned about concessions, and Khrushchev, so far as is known, neither usurped Bulganin's role as head of the delegation nor interfered in Molotov's job of drafting, in conjunction with the foreign ministers of the other three powers, the communiqué or directive which represented the substantive results of the conference. This was the difficult task of diplomatic negotiation, the painstaking formulation, word by word and comma by comma, of what the parties to the conference could agree on. It was Molotov's responsibility as foreign minister and a job he was comfortable doing. In the round of luncheons, dinners, and cocktail parties, however, he took a back seat to Khrushchev and Bulganin in propagating the spirit of cooperativeness, amiability, and general good feeling—the "Geneva spirit"—which was the main Soviet objective at the conference.

The contrast between the early part of the conference, when Khrushchev and Bulganin were intent on creating this cordial atmosphere, and the later stages of the conference, when Molotov and Gromyko were hardheadedly negotiating the conference agreement,
led some observers to conclude that Molotov was a stumbling block to conciliation, and that so long as he remained foreign minister little real progress could be registered toward the settlement of outstanding issues. Bulganin, in apparent agreement with this view, remarked at Geneva, according to one report, that it might be necessary to get rid of Molotov as foreign minister before the foreign ministers' conference, which the four powers had agreed to hold in October.

The context within which the remark was allegedly made was not stated, but it is likely that Bulganin was responding to criticism of what one observer described as Molotov's "tactics of trickery and deviousness." Bulganin, therefore, was probably seeking to dispel any feeling that the regime was not sincere in its talk of peace and relaxation of tensions, rather than indicating any imminent move to remove Molotov. The remark did appear to show, however, that Molotov's future was still in question.

In the weeks following the summit conference, Molotov's status appeared unchanged. He was present with the other Soviet leaders at the Supreme Soviet session in early August at which Bulganin reported on the summit talks, and he participated in the campaign for affability at Bulganin's unprecedented party on 7 August for the chiefs of foreign missions accredited to Moscow, with their wives and children, an afternoon of walking, rowing, refreshment, and exchange of pleasantries. Moreover, he was among the presidium members who delivered reports on the July central committee plenum to local party meetings in Moscow, his being to a party meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Khrushchev and Bulganin continued, however, to play the principal roles in relations with foreign states. They stopped off in Berlin on their return from Geneva to reassure the East German regime concerning Soviet intentions vis à vis the reunification issue and probably to discuss their tactics in regard to the forthcoming talks with Adenauer and negotiations for establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany; and they took the lead at receptions and talks with foreigners in Moscow in the program to "humanize" the Soviet regime.

Further Moves Against Molotov

What was either evidence of a further deterioration in Molotov's position or a dramatic rendation of the low estate to which he had fallen was apparent during the talks with Chancellor Adenauer, 9-13 September. The Soviet policy of seeking detente on the basis of the existing power positions in Europe involved the immediate objective of winning general recognition of the
existence of two German states. The first step in that objective was for a "normalizing" of Soviet relations with West Germany, and steps to that end had been initiated as early as January 1955. During the four days of the sometimes bitter negotiations which resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations, Molotov sat in the second row at the conference table and did not participate in the exchange of views. Molotov's appearance was "depressing, and at times pitiable." "At times he was the official, and at others, he seemed a romantic of the old days who no longer knew how to conduct himself." Both Khrushchev and Bulganin apparently went out of their way to treat him in a degrading manner. When ideas were agreed to or decisions reached they continually used the expression "let Molotov work this out," treating him like a secretary.}

Bulganin berated Molotov at one point for agreeing to a statement he had worked out with the German state secretary: "You are not to make agreements with anyone! that is our business and not yours. Your sole task is to draw up the agreements. You are our editor." Chancellor Adenauer himself, was shocked at the manner in which the Russians treated Molotov. He related how Khrushchev and Bulganin joked over someone's comment that Molotov's photographs portrayed him looking duller than reality. Khrushchev laughed, nudged Bulganin and inquired if he noticed any improvement in real life.

The whole episode made a very bad impression on the West Germans, so it is difficult to see what provoked both Bulganin and Khrushchev into this demonstration of Molotov's insignificant influence and power. A possible clue is provided by issue number 14 of Kommunist, approved for publication on 30 September, which carried Molotov's forced admission of having made a "theoretically mistaken and politically harmful" declaration about the achievement of socialism in the USSR. Molotov undoubtedly resisted this additional move against him with all the strength he could muster, so it is conceivable that the writing of the letter, dated 16 September, the day before he left for the UN General Assembly, followed an acrimonious struggle within the presidium which carried over into Khrushchev's and Bulganin's treatment of him during the negotiations with West Germany.

The ideological "mistake" which was the basis of Molotov's public penance was certainly a pseudo issue. It is highly unlikely that anyone could seriously have been misled by Molotov's faux pas, which occurred in the course of a long speech to the Supreme Soviet on 8 February 1955 devoted entirely to foreign policy:

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Along with the Soviet Union, where the foundations of a socialist society have already been built, there are also such countries of people's democracy as have made only the first, but highly important, steps in the direction of socialism. (italics added)

The phrase was clearly at variance with official dogma which, since 1936, had stated that socialism has been achieved in the main and that the Soviet state is now on the path to communism. But this was a slip in terminology rather than an attempt to contradict official doctrine since just five paragraphs earlier in the same speech he had "correctly" stated that "socialism had already triumphed in our country in the period before the second World War."

The lead editorial in the same issue of Kommunist that published the letter used Molotov's "error" as a springboard for a broad exposition of party propaganda on both external and internal affairs. The main stress of the editorial was on the need for a "creative" rather than a "dogmatic" application of Marxist theory:

Marxist theory illuminates the path of practice toward great aims. But advanced theory only proves capable of this by virtue of always sensitively heeding the demands of life. The isolation of theory from life, attempts to cling fast to dogma, are particularly impermissible.

The editorial was a pointed warning, certainly to Molotov, but possibly also to other high-ranking members of the Soviet hierarchy, to cease opposition or foot-dragging against the new policies of the Khrushchev-Bulganin regime:

Guided by the revolutionary dialectic, the party analyzes the phenomena of life from the angle of the struggle of the new with the old, in every way supports what is positive and eradicates what is negative, takes the necessary measures for removing from our path the obstacles impeding the unfolding of the creative forces of the Soviet people. The party is intolerant of the complacency, the conceit of certain leaders, of instances of their isolation from the masses. (italics added)
Both domestic and foreign relations problems were mentioned in this connection, making it clear that the editorial was directed against general inflexibility and obstructionism and not exclusively at a dogmatic approach in foreign policy.

A central committee censure such as that given Molotov in July would probably have been sufficient to bring most Soviet officials into line, but Molotov was not so easily broken. There is more than a hint of continued intransigence in a remark he is reported to have made to one in early September. Referring to the new approach in foreign policy, he said in obvious disgruntlement, "In order to accomplish something, we do not need new methods of negotiation." Though undoubtedly somewhat subdued, he may have continued to carry on a rear-guard action against Khrushchev's program thus giving the aid and comfort of an Old Bolshevik, widely respected throughout the Soviet Union, to those Soviet officials who for one reason or another were opposed to any aspect of the new policies.

The familiar Bolshevik ritual of public penance for past mistakes may, therefore, have been resorted to as a means of dramatically illustrating the strength of the Khrushchev faction and the extent of Molotov's political bankruptcy in order to underscore the futility of continued opposition and the seriousness with which such opposition or foot-dragging would be viewed. If this were the sole reason for the letter of recantation, it would suggest that Khrushchev was having more difficulty putting his program into effect than is readily apparent from other information.* Outwardly, at least, the policies espoused appeared

* A behind-the-scenes controversy over agricultural policy, perhaps involving the introduction of ideas gleaned from US agricultural practice, however, might have been going on at this time. The post of minister of agriculture, which had been vacant since 2 March 1955, was filled by the appointment of Khrushchev's protegé V. V. Matskevich on 14 October, just six days after Kommunist No. 14 was distributed. Matskevich, who was the acting minister, had headed a Soviet agricultural delegation to the United States (16 July-25 August) and was apparently very much impressed with some aspects of American agriculture, particularly the relatively few laborers required to farm America's acres. In early January 1956 a letter was sent out by the party central committee calling attention to "serious deficiencies" in agricultural work. The principal deficiencies listed were the low productivity of labor on the kolkhozy, the poor use of agricultural machinery, and the poor efficiency in farming. As an example of efficient employment of labor, reference was made to the USA, where only one man was needed to farm one thousand hectares of corn. The letter also cited the successes of US farming in corn harvesting, silaging, hay harvesting and other activities.
the schedule set in the Fifth Five-Year Plan.* In an effort to fulfill its production goals the government was forced to resort to the expedient of increasing the labor force beyond its intentions.

The problem was complicated by the fact that the consumer goods goals were not fully met, largely because a sufficient increase in agricultural output did not materialize, and, consequently, purchasing power ran ahead of available supply. The effect of the government's policies was thus to increase demand before it was able to provide the consumer goods to meet it and, therefore, to vitiate the incentive element in its program. In a March 1955 conversation with a foreign diplomat in Moscow, Khrushchev reportedly criticized Malenkov directly on this score, alleging that he had "created demands in the Soviet people without having created the capacity for satisfying them."

Much the same point was made by Kaganovich, who remarked to a Western diplomat that "it was a mistake to raise the standard of living too quickly as this produced demoralization and lack of discipline among the population." But, though it had failed to meet its goals, the program had apparently had the further undesirable effect of putting a drain on state reserves, a condition which Bulganin, in his first speech as premier, said could not be allowed.

Confusion in the Ranks

Towards the end of 1954, apparently, there was a fair amount of perplexity as to the regime's aims and intent. The [___________] has described a meeting of ideologists and economists which he attended in Moscow in December 1954. "When the subject of relative stress on light and heavy industry came up for discussion," he says, "there was a situation amounting to 'bourgeois liberalization,' with every man expressing his own interpretation of the party position. It was complete disorder and the first

*According to Soviet statistics, labor productivity increased only 33 percent for the 1951-54 period, whereas real wages increased 37 percent. From the point of view of the Soviet leadership, such a relation between these rates of growth is highly unfavorable, because it tends to constrict the surplus available for investment and hence the rate of growth of the Soviet economy.
on disarmament on the 10 May proposals already rejected by the Western powers—in other words to stand pat on all three items on the conference agenda—it is doubtful that the letter had any adverse effect on the negotiations. Molotov ably upheld the Soviet position on all issues and managed at the same time to convey the idea that the failure of the conference to reach agreement on any of the main issues did not end the Geneva spirit or herald the return of the cold war. Though bereft of much of his old power and influence he continued to be a useful member of the presidium for his experience and skill at diplomatic negotiation.

The Decline of Kaganovich

Molotov's difficulties in adapting to the new foreign policy line and to Khrushchev's dynamic and sometimes unorthodox tactics were apparently in some measure shared by Kaganovich. In his four public speeches since Stalin's death, Kaganovich had revealed a continuing orientation toward: a Bolshevik style of thought and reverence for Stalin, a rather reluctant endorsement of the post-Stalin "new look," and a tendency to emphasize a tough foreign policy. He was undoubtedly one of Khrushchev's staunch allies in the heavy vs. light industry controversy and he probably also supported him in his efforts to re-establish the supremacy of the party and instill a more militant spirit in party members.*

On 24 May, Kaganovich had been appointed chairman of the newly organized state committee for labor and wages in what appeared to be another of the trouble-shooting assignments for which he was justly famous. The formation of this supraministerial body was part of a broad program for increasing labor productivity which, in view of the smaller additions to the labor force likely to be available, was a major requirement for continuing the high rates of industrial growth desired by the regime. The committee was given responsibility for coordinating and overseeing the work of ministries and departments in the handling of labor resources, for regulating inter-industry and interregional wage differentials, the industrial and geographical distribution of the labor force, work conditions and safety, construction of dwellings and other buildings designed for worker use, and social insurance—in short, general supervision of all government activities in the labor field. The job of chairman was, therefore, one of prime importance and not likely to be given anyone felt to be out of sympathy with the aims of the regime.

* He was, for example, the first presidium member to come out publicly (early 1954) for Khrushchev when the latter began his climb to the top in the collective leadership.

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Other signs that Kaganovich ranked high in the leadership were noted well into the fall: the photograph in the 28 July Pravda showing the return of Bulganin and Khrushchev from the summit conference has Kaganovich looming in the foreground as the most prominent of the greeters, and he was chosen to deliver the October revolution anniversary address, traditionally the most comprehensive and authoritative policy statement of the year.

The speech he delivered was a curious mixture of expressions and concepts of revolutionary Marxism, affirmation of the virtues of coexistence, and praise, albeit grudging, for the West. A major emphasis of the speech was on classical Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory, a preoccupation unparalleled in October revolution speeches since the war. In this emphasis the speech was in line with the Kommunist editorial that accompanied Molotov's apology for ideological error. But whereas the Kommunist editorial inveighed against the "isolation of theory from practice, attempts to cling to dogma" and appealed for flexibility, Kaganovich stressed "devotion to principles" and the lessons of the 1917 revolution. He seemed to be trying to show that current Soviet policy with its innovating flexibility was part of the world revolutionary stream and constituted a "truly Marxist approach," but his militant doctrinaire orthodoxy so overshadowed the whole effort that the speech stands out as the major discordant note in the Soviet new look between the July plenum and the 20th party congress.

Two and a half weeks later, on 25 November, the Moscow subway, which had borne Kaganovich's name since 1935, was renamed for Lenin. The subway may have been renamed in imitation of the newly completed Leningrad subway, named for Lenin on 14 November, and to ensure that a lesser subway would not bear a greater name, but it was the first time that the name of a Soviet leader had been removed from a major Soviet institution except when such leaders were purged or otherwise disgraced, and so was unquestionably a blow at Kaganovich's prestige and a sign that he had slipped somewhat in power and influence. However, there was nothing in the subway incident to suggest that it was part of an attack on him--there was no mention, for example, that it had ever borne his name and one of the stations was immediately redesignated with his name.

Possibly Kaganovich had begun to slip even before his 7 November speech. There is some evidence, at any rate, to suggest that M. G. Pervukhin had gained in prestige and influence at Kaganovich's expense. Both men were first deputy premiers but Kaganovich was senior to Pervukhin, having been a first
deputy premier since March 1953, while the latter was not made a first deputy premier until February 1955. On 20 and 23 September and again on 19 October 1955, Pervukhin signed decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers, presumably as acting chairman since decrees (postanovleniya) are signed by the chairman (or person assigned to act in his stead) and by the administrator of affairs. Pervukhin, therefore, would seem to have had seniority over Kaganovich, who was apparently in Moscow during the period covered by these decrees. Pervukhin had apparently earlier been made chairman of a "Commission of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers for Current Affairs" which had been created "to examine and decide all current questions" relating to areas of responsibility of more than one first deputy premier or deputy premier, in other words, to decide issues between deputy premiers. This would appear to be a job of considerable power and influence, but none of the problems with which the commission is known to have concerned itself appear particularly significant so it is possible that its power did not extend beyond relatively minor administrative disagreements. Even so, the job was an important one and served to enhance Pervukhin's position.

Following the ouster in June 1957 of the "anti-party group" (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov "who joined them") Kaganovich was charged in Sotsialistichesky Trud, journal of the State Committee on Labor and Wages, with having sabotaged the work of the committee while he was chairman (May 1955-June 1956):

Kaganovich deflected it from solving the fundamental, pressing tasks of setting in order organization of work and quota-setting, improving working conditions, and consistently applying the socialist principle of payment and through stimulation of higher labor productivity... the only thing in which Kaganovich showed persistence was the policy of

* Premier Bulganin did not leave on his vacation until 23 September but may have been so busy by the 20th with diplomatic functions and last-minute preparations for the trip that he had already appointed Pervukhin to act for him. Of the other first deputy premiers, Mikoyan was absent from Moscow on vacation throughout the period; Molotov, who was away in September, had returned before 19 October but was not likely to rate the acting chairman's job; Saburov like Kaganovich was present throughout the period and was apparently therefore also outranked by Pervukhin.
liquidating (the committee). Sensing that there would be inevitable exposure of his inactivity in carrying out the 20th party congress decisions on putting in order the organization, quotas, and payment of labor, Kaganovich tried to put through a decision to disband the committee and thereby evade responsibility.

There is, of course, a suspicion of prevarication in such delayed criticism but the committee did make little observable progress during the period of Kaganovich's chairmanship, and the pace of the wage reform was stepped up considerably in the fall of 1956 after he was relieved. The main emphasis of Sotsialistichesky Trud's criticism was on the period following the 20th party congress, so there is a strong possibility that Kaganovich's opposition developed slowly through the fall and winter of 1955-56 but did not become really active until after the denigration of Stalin at the 20th party congress.

It seems improbable that Kaganovich was opposed to wage reform as such. More likely, he became generally disillusioned with the trend away from the tried and true practices of the past associated with Khrushchev's post-Malenkov policies. With his general ideological orientation it is certainly conceivable that he evaluated the results of the summit conference negatively, on the grounds that capitalists can't be trusted, and opposed any reduction in the share of national income to be devoted to defense in the coming five-year plan period. He may also have opposed even the very limited steps toward decentralizing Soviet industrial administration that followed Bulganin's July plenum speech, probably fearing that the regime would weaken its control of the industrial process. And he probably had strong reservations about the value of wage reform in increasing labor productivity, an issue more directly related to the work of his State Committee on Labor and Wages. However, despite the probability that he was less than enthusiastic for some of Khrushchev's policies, there was no public attack on him, suggesting that he was careful not to object too strongly.

Personal Diplomacy

The Soviet role in the impasse at Geneva suggested that the Soviet leaders had only a limited appreciation for formal multilateral negotiations, while the vigor with which they were pursuing informal and bilateral nonbloc contacts reflected Khrushchev's faith in personal persuasion. Mikoyan "vacationed" in
Yugoslavia from 18 September to 4 October, continuing the wooing of Tito and other Yugoslav party officials on an informal, unofficial plane, and during the summer and fall an unprecedented series of visits to Moscow by non-Communist leaders and delegations were solicited, a large number of which were accepted. Following the visit of Adenauer, there were visits by Finnish President T. K. Paasikivi in September, Canadian Minister of External Affairs Lester Pearson, New Zealand Deputy Premier Keith Holyoake, and Burmese Premier U Nu in October, followed by one by Norwegian Premier E. Gerhardsen in November. Some of these came at the head of official delegations for negotiations with the Soviet leaders, others were just friendly visits.

Another type of contact which was fostered was the visit of parliamentary delegations. These visits had developed rapidly after the USSR had organized a parliamentary group on 29 June and decided to join the Interparliamentary Union. Visits of parliamentary delegations from Syria, Yugoslavia, Japan, France, Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg, and others followed in rapid succession. The Soviet group was a bit slow on returning the visits but did visit Yugoslavia and Finland. More specialized contacts were also sought, such as sending a construction delegation headed by Deputy Premier V. A. Kucherenko to Britain, France, and Italy; exchanging naval visits with Britain, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Sweden; and receiving such groups as an Austrian delegation of journalists, several agricultural delegations, and a delegation from the London County Council and such individuals as US Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas.

During the negotiations with or receptions for these foreigners, Bulganin and Khrushchev played the principal roles; and they were the stellar attractions, for the first time unaccompanied by other top leaders, in the most ambitious and dramatic of their post-summit efforts at personal diplomacy—the month-long tour of India, Burma, and Afghanistan which began on 18 November.

From the outset it was apparent that the Soviet Union intended the trip to be more than just a friendly visit and that Khrushchev and Bulganin expected to use it as a springboard for launching a major propaganda and policy bid to line up Asian "neutralism" behind Soviet "peaceful coexistence." The two appeared to work well as a team. In a tactic repeated with considerable effect, Bulganin as premier made the expected friendly, noncontroversial speech and Khrushchev followed with a vitriolic, rabble-rousing speech taking considerable liberty with historical developments and seeking to stir up hate for past colonial masters. Except in Afghanistan, the two made special efforts to break away from a VIP, conducted-tour routine
and meet the people. They strived to create an informal atmosphere, donned national costumes, tasted local foods, and gave special attention to little children.

So far as relations between the two were concerned, the trip served to demonstrate the relative superiority of Khrushchev over Bulganin. Though Khrushchev had certainly been the more vocal in proclaiming the post-Malenkov new course, the West Germans had come away in September with the impression that the two were equal, neither apparently making a decision without consulting the other. Adenauer even entertained the idea that Bulganin might be the more important man. During the South-East Asia trip, however, Khrushchev quite obviously took the initiative on several occasions without prior consultation with Bulganin.* It was Khrushchev who announced the Soviet explosion of a multi-megaton device, who gave approval for dispatching a group of Soviet students and scholars to work in Indian educational institutions, and who took the lead in pursuing informal contacts.

That Khrushchev and Bulganin should have felt free to trundle around South Asia for over four weeks and to take with them the chief of the secret police, Serov, was convincing proof of the confidence with which they viewed the stability of their positions and the serenity of the political scene at home. Mikoyan, who had accompanied them to China in 1954 and Yugoslavia in 1955 but who had been left at home "to run the farm" when the two went to Geneva for the summit meeting in July, was apparently again left in charge during the Asia junket.

Toward the last of December, both Khrushchev and Bulganin gave reports on their trip to the Supreme Soviet, emulating the example set it in August when Bulganin reported on the summit conference. Bulganin's December report was largely a routine account of the trip while Khrushchev's remarks covered a whole range of international problems. Both expressed confidence that the trip had enhanced Soviet prestige and influence among the so-called "uncommitted" nations of Southeast Asia. The speakers in the ensuing "discussion" praised their activities and the Supreme Soviet formally commended them and expressed complete satisfaction with the results of the trip.

* Khrushchev's primacy in the presidium had already been more or less publicly acknowledged. On 15 October, Pravda published his remarks at the presentation of the Order of the Red Banner of Labor to the City of Sevastopol on 13 October in which, though Voroshilov had made the major speech in presenting the award, Khrushchev undertook to speak "on behalf of" the central committee and the presidium. On 3 November, Pravda published without change or comment a telegram from Deputy Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand, mistakenly addressing Khrushchev by the old title of supreme leadership, "General Secretary of the CPSU."
II. PERSONNEL APPOINTMENTS IN PREPARATION FOR THE TWENTIETH
PARTY CONGRESS

Promotions to the Presidium and Secretariat

In his struggle to reach the commanding place in the leadership, Khrushchev, perhaps mindful of the reaction against Beriya, had apparently used with restraint and some hesitancy whatever powers he possessed in the manipulation of personnel assignments and packing of party and government bodies. Whether this was by choice or because he lacked a free hand in this field is relatively unimportant. The point is that the struggle took place primarily in a different arena. Both Malenkov and Molotov were bested in policy disputes and, though they received their demotion and rebuke at the hands of the central committee, this action was largely pro forma following the victory of Khrushchev's point of view in the presidium.

The July plenum appears to mark a slight change in Khrushchev's approach; he seems to become somewhat less restrained in securing personnel changes clearly in his political interest. It is difficult, for example, to see "collective leadership" at work in the selection of the new members added to the all-important presidium and secretariat at the plenum, the first to either body since the reorganizations following Stalin's death. Beriya's old position on the central committee was taken by Marshal Zhukov in July 1953, but no successor had been named to Beriya's place on the presidium and no replacement on the secretariat had been made for S. D. Ignatyev--removed in April 1953 for complicity in the Doctors Plot--or N. N. Shatalin--transferred to Primorye Kray in March 1955 following Malenkov's demotion.

A. I. Kirichenko, elected to the presidium, was Khrushchev's protegé and political steward in the Ukraine. Two of the new secretaries, N. I. Belyayev, party boss in the Altay Kray and an agricultural expert, and Pravda editor D. T. Shepilov showed evidences of being Khrushchev men. Belyayev had championed an aggressive virgin lands agricultural program in Altay Kray in December 1953 in apparent anticipation of Khrushchev's "new lands" program presented to the central committee in February 1954. Shepilov accompanied Khrushchev to Peiping in September 1954 for the fifth anniversary celebration of the Chinese People's Republic and to Belgrade in May 1955 for the rapprochement with Tito. Khrushchev's outraged description of Shepilov in July 1957 as a "shameless, double-dealing individual" supports the view that earlier, at least, he had been on Khrushchev's team.
Suslov, the other addition to the presidium, had become a central party secretary two years before Khrushchev. And though they were together on the secretariat for four and a half years there is no evidence to indicate more than a working relationship. Suslov, therefore, may have been sponsored by some other member or members of the presidium. The same can be said concerning the sponsorship of Aristov, transferred from the first secretary's post in Khabarovsk Kray to become the third additional central party secretary. It is difficult, however, to see who their sponsors might be. Neither Suslov nor Aristov had any special discernible ties with other members of the presidium and in any event their appointment hardly seems an adequate quid pro quo for the appointment of Kirichenko, Belyayev, and Shepilov. Moreover, Suslov's speech at the 20th party congress in February 1956 was the most frankly laudatory of Khrushchev of any by a top leader, and Aristov promptly took over responsibility for party organizational and personnel work, apparently acting in Khrushchev's interests for an increasing number of high-level appointments began to bear the stamp of Khrushchev's hand.

Control of Personnel Selection and Appointment - The Secretariat and Apparatus

Concentration of control over personnel assignments in all fields of Soviet life in the party secretariat and its executive staff, the apparatus, was one of the important, if not the most important, factors in Stalin's rise to supreme dictatorial power. If this power remained concentrated in the secretariat after Stalin's death, then Khrushchev, from March 1953 the top-ranking secretary and in September named first secretary, was from the very beginning in the most powerful political position, and it could be only a matter of time before he had established his own one-man rule as Stalin's true successor. That Khrushchev seems well on his way to a position of absolute political supremacy, however, is not proof that what was true for Stalin was true for Khrushchev. Khrushchev for a time at least may have had to rely on other means.

What is not clear in this connection is the extent to which the presidium in the months immediately following Stalin's death maintained a direct interest in and control over the secretariat and apparatus in the personnel field. Ultimate control over personnel selection and appointment, as in all substantive policy fields, was presumably intended to be exercised by the presidium, acting as a body. But this did not prevent Beriya from independently making personnel changes in a bid for supreme power.
It is doubtful, however, even if presidium control were for a time somewhat lax, if Khrushchev would have had a free hand within the secretariat. The maneuver in March which cost Malenkov his place on the secretariat left there one of his protégés, N. N. Shatalin, where he could report to his patron and possibly check any unilateral moves Khrushchev might make. The role of Suslov, who had become the ranking secretary in terms of tenure, and who presumably had ample opportunity in his six years of intimate day-to-day work with the professional party machine to learn the political ropes and build a following through personal relationships and patronage, is still something of a mystery. His political ties with members of the post-Stalin presidium are not clear, and it is extremely difficult to see his hand in more than a few of the personnel changes between the 19th and 20th party congresses. Pospelov seems to have been even less involved in political machinations. With the downfall of Malenkov and the consequent removal of Shatalin from the secretariat, Khrushchev's freedom of action within the secretariat and apparatus was perceptibly increased.

The Central Apparatus - Organization and Personnel

The value of the apparatus as an instrument of influence and power lies principally in its two major functions. It serves not only as a means of centralized control over personnel assignments but also as an important source of information and advice for the top leaders. Reports, memos, and staff studies emanating from the apparatus undoubtedly influence policy-making. Put to partisan purposes, such reports might be decisive in effecting policy decisions desired by Khrushchev.

Organizationally, the main developments in the apparatus in the two years following Stalin's death were a reversal of most of the departmental mergers which occurred shortly after the 19th party congress in October 1952, and an organizational innovation associated with Khrushchev—the division of the departments of agriculture and of party organs along territorial lines. Responsibility for the Russian Republic was given to the departments of "Agriculture for the RSFSR" and "Party Organs for the RSFSR," while the other 15 republics were served by the departments of "Agriculture for the Union Republics" and "Party organs for the Union Republics." In his speech to the central committee in January 1955, Khrushchev related the creation of the new departments "for the RSFSR" to deficiencies in the work of state and party organs connected with agriculture in the Russian federation.
THE CENTRAL PARTY MACHINE
1 JULY 1955

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<th>SECRETARIAT</th>
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APPARATUS

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| AGRICULTURE FOR THE UNION REPUBLICS | AGRICULTURE FOR THE RSFSR | ADMINISTRATIVE TRADE AND FINANCE ORGANS |
|                                     | V.P. MYLARSHEIKOV         |                                    |

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<th>PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION V.S. KRUZHKOV</th>
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<th>GENERAL</th>
<th>A.N. MALIN</th>
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Full Member, Central Committee, CPSU
Candidate Member, Central Committee, CPSU
Member, Central Auditing Commission, CPSU

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A general restaffing of leading posts was also carried out within the apparatus. The old corps of leading apparatchiks, developed for the most part during the period when Malenkov's influence within the apparatus was especially strong, had been largely replaced with new directing personnel, several of whom had had prior associations with Khrushchev.

In the months preceding the 20th party congress Khrushchev made additional appointments, and a reorganization of several departments and related personnel changes led to a completely new leadership supervising the party's activities in the propaganda, agitation, education, science, and cultural fields. V. M. Churayev, party first secretary for six years in the important Kharkov Oblast in the Ukraine when Khrushchev was Ukrainian party boss, was appointed head of the department of party organs for the RSFSR. To head the agriculture department for the union republics, Khrushchev picked P. Ye. Doroshenko who had risen in the Ukrainian party organization to serve as head of the agriculture department in the Ukrainian party apparatus and then first secretary in Vinnitsa Oblast.

The Department of Propaganda and Agitation was divided, apparently in October or November, into a department "for the union republics" and a department "for the RSFSR" along the lines of the departments of party organs and agriculture, earlier. F. V. Konstantinov, rector of the Academy of Social Sciences under the central committee since March 1955, became head of the "union republics" department, and V. P. Moskovsky, until mid-November 1955 editor in chief of the Defense Ministry's newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, was assigned to head the "RSFSR" department. It is not clear whether Konstantinov replaced V. S. Kruzhkov as head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, earlier, in order to carry out the reorganization or came in just as the division took place. In any event, Kruzhkov, whose article in December 1954 was unquestionably on the right side of the light vs. heavy industry controversy, had been replaced by Konstantinov whose corresponding article appeared to be just as unquestionably on the wrong side. (See Caesar I-58, pp. 17-18.) The subsequent disappearance of Kruzhkov, who was last identified on 15 February 1955 as head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, has only served to deepen the mystery.

Sometime during the fall of 1955 the Department of Science and Culture was broken up and A. M. Rumyantsev, who had been its head since its formation in 1953, was named editor in chief of the party's theoretical journal, Kommunist, replacing S. M. Abalin who became editor in chief of the party's organizational
journal, Partiynaya Zhizn. Abalin's predecessor on Partiynaya
Zhizn is not known. Out of "science and culture" came a De-
partment of Schools, a Department of Culture, and, though not
specifically identified, presumably a Department of Science.

N. D. Kazmin was transferred from third secretary of the
Leningrad Oblast committee to head the new schools department.
His background indicates that he was for a time, at least, a
protegé of Malenkov's. He was head of a sector, presumably
schools, of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation in Jan-
uary 1949 and was transferred to Leningrad Oblast as third sec-
retary in July 1949 at a time when Malenkov appeared to be en-
engineering the replacement of Zhdanovites in the Leningrad party
organization. He remained in the third secretary's post until
April 1953 when the assignment of N. G. Ignatov as second secre-
tary moved him down one slot. In November 1953 he regained the
third secretary's post in the shake-up, apparently engineered by
Khrushchev, which marked the removal of V. M. Andrianov as
Leningrad party boss and the end of Malenkov's control of the
Leningrad party organization. Khrushchev's interest in and in-
volve ment with Leningrad affairs and the subsequent careers of
such Leningradites as Kazmin and F. R. Kozlov and the curious
career of N. G. Ignatov strongly suggest that the Leningrad
party organization fell under Khrushchev's influence and con-
trol during 1953 and that a switch in the political allegiance
of Kazmin and Kozlov was an important factor in Khrushchev's
victory. (See below pp. 50-51.)

The head of the new Department of Culture, D. A. Polikarpov,
had had a rather checkered career marked by nearly complete po-
litical eclipse from 1946 to 1953. He lost his job as secre-
tary of the Union of Soviet Writers in 1946 in the reorganization
of the union which accompanied the campaign for strict doctrinal
orthodoxy in literature and the arts, a policy associated with
A. A. Zhdanov. In 1953 he emerged from obscurity in the position
of Director of the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute, became a
secretary in the Moscow City party committee in March 1954 and
in December again became a secretary of the writers' union,
transferring to the Culture Department job in late 1955. His
assignment in the Moscow party organization suggests that Khrush-
chev had a hand in his rehabilitation.

If as seems logical a Department of Science existed, there
is reason to suppose that V. A. Kirilllin was its head. Kirilllin
had been a teacher and deputy director in the Moscow Energetics
Institute, named for Molotov. He became USSR deputy minister
of higher education in mid-1954 and soon after the State Com-
mittee for New Techics (Gostekhnika) was created in May 1955,
he was named deputy chairman. He was last identified in this
post in September and was not identified in the central party apparatus until November 1956, as head of the Department of Science, Higher Educational Institutions, and Schools, the result of a reorganization in 1956 involving the departments of culture, schools, and science. His election to the presidium of the 18th Armenian party congress in January 1956 and the fact that he was not elected to the Armenian central committee suggests that he was at the congress as a representative of the central party apparatus and hence may already have been head of some department, most likely a Department of Science.

In early November 1955 the editorship of Literaturnaya Gazeta was transferred from B. S. Ryurikov, who had succeeded K. M. Sinomov in the post in 1953, to V. A. Kochetov. Kochetov had been general secretary of the Leningrad branch of the Union of Soviet Writers; Ryurikov became deputy head of the Department of Culture.

The reason behind these moves is not yet clear. It has not been possible to find in the appointments evidences of controversy over policy but it may be observed that the organizational changes would probably aid in increasing flexibility in the party's operations in these fields, and that the personnel shifts would bring new blood to the solution of problems. What the regime may have intended was to prepare for a fresh approach to solving the dilemma which had plagued it since Stalin's death: how to stimulate creativity and at the same time maintain ideological conformity.

The bid of writers and other creative artists for a relaxation of political controls over the arts which was made in the "thaw" of late 1953 and early 1954 had been rebuffed, but total repression was not revived; and discussion at the second writers' congress in December 1954, though steering clear of the basic issue of political control, frequently called for greater aesthetic latitude and more imaginative approach. The status quo had its defenders but the regime failed to speak and the congress ended on an inconclusive note.

By the end of 1955 no clear, unequivocal line had yet been evolved by the regime. Apparently authoritative articles in Pravda and Literaturnaya Gazeta in November 1955, on the 50th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's work on Bolshevik Literature, strongly affirmed the propagandistic function of Soviet literature and asserted that the militant Zhdanov decrees on culture would remain the basis of party policy for a long time to come. In December, an equally authoritative editorial in Kommunist, republished in the regional press, carried the claims for...
aesthetic flexibility further than anything that had appeared in
the party press since the end of World War II, but the validity
of the Zhdanov decrees was again stressed in January by A. I.
Kirichenko at the Ukrainian party congress. There was thus an
evident need for clarification of the party line and a suggestion
in the Kommunist article, at least, that the regime might be
tempted to make limited concessions in order to release the well-
spings of creativity. The emphasis on the Zhdanov decrees, how-
ever, served notice that Soviet creative artists must stay within
party-defined limits.

The 20th party congress in February would have been an ap-
propriate place for the concessions to be explained and the
limits defined. Instead, Khrushchev made it clear that, with
an extension of cultural contacts with the West, the party must
guard against a relaxation of ideological discipline and the in-
filtration of "alien" influences. The congress, it is true, stimu-
lated cultural ferment, not as a result of any newly
defined policy in the cultural field, but of the iconoclastic
destruction of the Stalin myth.

Changes in Republic Leadership

Changes in the leadership in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had
the effect of preparing the way for the promotion of two of
Khrushchev's proteges to the presidium at the 20th party congress
in February. L. I. Brezhnev, the new party first secretary in
Kazakhstan, had served as a political officer with the Soviet
armed forces during the war—the years 1944-1945 in the Ukraine.
He remained in the Ukraine after the war as first secretary of
the industrially important Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk Oblasts
under the close supervision of Khrushchev, then Ukrainian party
boss. In July 1950, shortly after Khrushchev had returned to
Moscow as a member of the central party secretariat and as agri-
cultural spokesman for the regime, Brezhnev was appointed first
secretary of the Moldavian Republic then plagued with agricul-
tural difficulties. He was elected to the expanded party pre-
sidium at the 19th congress as a candidate member and to the
party secretariat. Removed after Stalin's death, he returned
to military political work directing the political directorate
of the navy. In February 1954 he was sent to Kazakhstan as
second secretary. P. K. Ponomarenko, a candidate member of the
party presidium, was appointed first secretary at the same time.

The first secretary's post in Kazakhstan became vacant,
in effect, when Ponomarenko was appointed ambassador to Poland
on 7 May 1955 and its duties were performed by Brezhnev. On
6 August, Ponomarenko was officially relieved and Brezhnev named
first secretary. The reason for the delay in replacing Pon-
omarenko is obscure. In the few months immediately following
Malenkov's demotion there were other delays in completing per-
sonnel shifts: G. F. Aleksandrov, removed as minister of cul-
ture on 10 March, was not replaced until 21 March; the post of
ambassador to Poland, vacated by Aleksandrov's replacement, N.
A. Mikhaylov, was not filled until, as noted above, 7 May. Alek-
sandrov, a Malenkov protegé, was an obvious target after his
patron's demotion, but the ensuing delay in completing the chain
of transfers suggests a complicated political maneuver with Pon-
omarenko also a victim and Brezhnev a beneficiary.

I. D. Yakovlev was named to assist Brezhnev as second secre-
tary, and even then may have been thought of as heir apparent.
He became first secretary in March 1956, Brezhnev having been
transferred to Moscow as a member of the central party secretariat
and a candidate member of the presidium by the 20th party congress.
Yakovlev had had many years of service in the agriculturally im-
portant Novosibirsk Oblast, in which a portion of the "new lands"
is located, as second secretary, and then, after 1949, as first
secretary. He was succeeded in Novosibirsk by B. I. Deryugin, the
second secretary, who appears to have had an industrial background.

On 22 December, N. A. Mukhitdinov replaced A. I. Niyazov as
first secretary in Uzbekistan, the cotton basket of the USSR.
Mukhitdinov had been republic premier. The shift came just a day
after Khrushchev and Bulganin, who had stopped off in Tashkent
for a republic agricultural conference, on their return from the
tour of South-East Asia, had departed for Moscow. Niyazov, Uzbek
party boss since 1950, was charged by the republic party plenum
with responsibility for shortcomings in the Uzbek cotton industry,
for neglecting ideological and cultural work, failure to support
the press, persecution of innocent workers, and for serious errors
in selection and training of cadres. The circumstances surround-
ing Mukhitdinov's promotion were reminiscent of those of a year
before when he had received promotion as a result of Khrushchev's
intervention. On 22 December 1954, Mukhitdinov, then a first
deputy premier, was appointed premier of Uzbekistan to succeed
Usman Yusupov. The action came following a plenum of the Uzbek
central committee. Subsequent press reporting indicated that the
criticism Khrushchev had leveled in November against Yusupov at
a cotton growing conference in Tashkent had figured heavily in
the decision to oust him.

Mukhitdinov has had an almost meteoric rise. An obscure
central Asian oblast propaganda secretary in 1948, he became
Samarkand Oblast first secretary in 1949, republic secretary
for a few months in 1950, Tashkent Oblast first secretary in
1950, and republic premier in 1951. The postwar crisis in cotton
production appears to have given him the opportunity for rapid advancement. In the government reorganizations which took place after Stalin's death, he had relinquished the premier's post to Yusupov, former Uzbek premier and, since 1950, USSR minister of cotton growing. In February 1956 at the age of 38 he became the youngest member (candidate) of the presidium and the first Uzbek elected to such a high party position. S. K. Kamalov, Uzbek third secretary since 1950, was promoted over the head of the perennial second secretary, R. Ye. Melnikov, to succeed Mukhitdinov as premier.

On 16 August the party leadership in the Karelo-Finnish Republic was shaken up. A. N. Yegorov, removed as first secretary, was charged with inefficient leadership of industry, ignoring the principle of collective leadership, and suppressing criticism in party affairs. That Yegorov was held responsible for the backward state of the Karelo-Finnish timber industry seems clear. A joint decree of the CPSU central committee and USSR Council of Ministers, issued on 6 August just 10 days before Yegorov's dismissal, had called attention to the inadequate state of affairs in the Soviet timber industry and outlined measures for its radical improvement. Two months later the plenum of the Karelo-Finnish central committee held a major discussion on the republic's timber industry in which most of the shortcomings noted were charged to inadequate party leadership. Neither P. S. Prokonnen, the republic's premier, nor O. V. Kuusinen, the chairman of the Karelo-Finnish supreme soviet presidium who was to be made a full member of the central party presidium in June 1957 when Khrushchev won his victory over Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, seemed to be affected by the purge, though it would seem that Prokonnen would bear some responsibility for the state of affairs in the Karelo-Finnish Ministry of Timber Industry.

Be that as it may, in the charges against Yegorov there were political overtones which suggested that more was involved than just deficiencies in the timber industry, serious as they may have been. It is not clear whether "ignoring the principle of collective leadership and suppressing criticism in party affairs" was an accurate description of Yegorov's guilt or a euphemism for being on the wrong side in a policy dispute or struggle for power. He does not seem to have had any particular interest in any of the identifiable policy disputes involving the central party leadership, nor is it possible to connect him, politically, with any of the top Soviet leaders. Yegorov's replacement was L. I. Lubennikov, a party worker in Belorussia since the war--most recently first secretary of Minsk Oblast (1953-1955).
Oblast Shake-ups

A series of provincial personnel shifts, many of the musical chairs variety, took place in the latter half of 1955 and at the oblast and kray party conferences in December and January. By the time the process was completed the party bosses in more than a third of the major territorial divisions of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) and three oblasts in the Ukraine had been changed. Nine secretaries were simply shifted from one oblast or kray to another; Belyayev and Aristov became CPSU secretaries and Yakovlev became Kazakh party secretary, as noted above; I. T. Grishin was transferred from Stalingrad to Prague and A. A. Yepishev was transferred from Odessa to Bucharest as Soviet ambassadors in those satellite capitals; and A. N. Kidin left Vladimir to work in the party apparatus in Moscow. Kidin apparently suffered a slight loss in party standing but none of the others mentioned lost status.

Fourteen secretaries, however, were not so fortunate; for them the shake-up in provincial leadership meant exclusion from high party circles. While it is clear that the shake-up was carried out in preparation for the 20th party congress, scheduled to meet in February, the exact political motivation is something of a mystery. Only Malenkov protegé N. N. Shatalin, removed from the top post in Primorye Kray, had clearly discernible ties with any of the top leaders (see Caesar I-58 p. 43), although D. G. Smirnov, replaced in Gorky, may have had a political tie with Malenkov stemming from work in the central party apparatus during the war. N. I. Gusarov, however, who was relieved as first secretary in Tula Oblast and subsequently disappeared, may have been a victim of malevolence on Khrushchev's part for reasons not directly connected with current political machinations. In November 1946, Gusarov, temporarily an inspector of the central committee, had presented a report on "Personnel Work in the Ukrainian Party Organization," sharply critical of the Ukrainian central committee bossed by Khrushchev. It is quite likely that the Gusarov report was responsible, in part at least, for the assignment in March 1947 of Kaganovich as Khrushchev's replacement. Khrushchev apparently took the first opportunity to get back at Gusarov. Having repaired the damage done his political career and maneuvered a transfer to Moscow as central party secretary and agricultural spokesman for the regime, he presumably engineered Gusarov's ouster as Belorussian party boss in July 1950 on charges of deficiencies in agricultural work. This was the post Gusarov had received in March 1947 as a reward for his attack on Khrushchev. Gusarov apparently fell into political oblivion until resurrected in December 1953 to replace N. I. Nedosekin—a possible Malenkov protegé—as party first secretary in Tula Oblast. Gusarov's patron at that time is not known.
What ever may have been the full behind-the-scenes reasons for the personnel shifts in the oblasts (where any criticism was published in connection with them, leadership faults were stressed), Khrushchev did take the opportunity to promote a few of his political supporters. All-in-all, the provincial shake-up provided important jobs for 20 new people, six of whom show evidence of being in Khrushchev's camp: V. S. Markov (appointed Orel Oblast first secretary), M. M. Stakhursky (Khabarovsk Kray), A. I. Kirilenko (Sverdlovsk), L. I. Naydek (Odessa), and V. G. Komyakhov (Crimea) had developed their careers in Khrushchev's political fiefdom, the Ukraine. None of the others had discernible ties with any of the top leaders.

III. THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

The Top Leaders on the Eve of the Congress

As the delegates from all over the Soviet Union to the first post-Stalin party congress were gathering in Moscow, Khrushchev appeared unquestionably the most prominent member of the party presidium. His pre-eminence was reflected by the obvious influence he exercised in personnel appointments, by the adoption and continuation of major policies associated with him, and by the gradually increasing deference accorded him by lesser leaders.* Moreover, there was no evidence of strong opposition to his leadership within the presidium. Bulganin, whom Khrushchev had nominated for premier, seemed content to play a supporting role, and Mikoyan, who apparently "ran the farm" during the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to South Asia, appeared to approve fully of the state of affairs. Kaganovich seemed to have slipped but he had endorsed the policies of the regime, though reluctantly, in his speech at the revolution anniversary celebration on 6 November and still appeared to be a key economic expert. Malenkov's demotion had all but silenced his once powerful voice, and Molotov's declining influence on Soviet foreign policy and his public admission of ideological deviation indicated that his star was waning. The exclusion of both discredited leaders from the party

* For example, Ukrainian party secretary I. D. Nazarenko, at his republic's party congress on 20 January, said that the CPSU was "consolidated around its central committee and its presidium, headed by Comrade Khrushchev," and on 24 January the eighth congress of the Kazakh party elected an honorary presidium consisting of "members of the presidium of the central committee of the CPSU headed by the first secretary of the central committee of the CPSU, comrade N. S. Khrushchev."
presidium at the forthcoming congress appeared well within the realm of possibility and none of the other presidium members seemed to have either the means or inclination to pose a serious challenge to Khrushchev's leadership.

However, Khrushchev's leadership was still expressed "in committee" and there was little indication that he was moving toward a personal dictatorship. The lead article in the February Kommunist, issued just before the congress opened, strongly emphasized the principle of collective leadership, condemned the "cult of personality," and stressed the leading role of the central committee.

Report of the Central Committee – Khrushchev's Speech

In his six-hour central committee report, Khrushchev set the tone for the entire "open" part of the congress. He reaffirmed the correctness of the regime's policies as they had evolved up to that time; he expressed enthusiastic confidence in the strength of the regime, the USSR, and the Communist world; and he showed unequivocal faith in the inevitable triumph of the Communist world over capitalism:

...our party is correctly estimating the requirements that have arisen in both domestic and foreign policy and is working out timely measures to meet these requirements: This graphically demonstrates our party's close, indissoluble ties with the people, the wisdom of its Leninist collective leadership and the all-conquering power of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on which the work of the party is based.

The Soviet state is growing and gathering strength. It towers like a powerful lighthouse showing all humanity the road to a new world.... our cause is invincible.... the future is ours.

In varying degree most of the other leaders agreed with this unguarded optimism.

The congress had convened, as scheduled, on 14 February 1956 and was dominated by Khrushchev from the very beginning. He opened the congress--in the past some comrade other than the rapporteur of the central committee had been selected for the honor--and a much larger number of his friends and proteges
were elected to the governing bodies of the congress than those of the other leaders. In his opening remarks Khrushchev noted the death of Stalin, but unlike Molotov's warm eulogy of dead Soviet leaders Shcherbakov, Kalinin, and Zhdanov in opening the 19th congress, Khrushchev's statement was cold and abrupt:

In the period between the 19th and 20th congresses, we have lost outstanding leaders of the communist movement--Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Klement Gottwald and Kyuchi Tokuda. I ask everyone to honor their memory by standing.

The slight to Stalin in such faint praise was unmistakable and was in sharp contrast to the publicity accorded him in December when his birthday was observed with unusual press and radio treatment equaling that attending his 75th birthday in 1954. Khrushchev thus took the lead in a new assault on the Stalin symbol.

Khrushchev took great pains in his central committee report to make clear that collective leadership was a basic party principle and that its practice was a major reason for the party's victories and the correctness of its policies. The main burden of his discussion of these points was to demonstrate that the Stalinist system was a thing of the past:

It was necessary to restore the norms of party life worked out by Lenin, which had often been violated in the past. It was of cardinal importance to restore and strengthen in every way Lenin's principle of collective leadership.

He described the collective as a "businesslike group of leaders whose relations are based on a foundation of principled ideas which permit neither mutual forgiveness nor personal antagonism." While this formulation was probably intended to remove the onus of power struggle from the demotion of Malenkov and discrediting of Molotov, it could also be read as a warning against further opposition to Khrushchev's policies. It was clear that Khrushchev considered himself the true successor to the leader's mantle. But it was also clear that he wanted everyone to understand that it was his intention to exercise that leadership in a different way than had Stalin.

Judging from his speech, there was no doubt at all in Khrushchev's mind that the economic policies being followed by the regime, particularly those most closely associated with his
name—the "New Lands" and corn programs in agriculture, and emphasis on the priority of heavy industry in the industrial sector—were correct and that they had already proven themselves:

From the results of our work in planting virgin lands, one can draw the indisputable conclusion that the party line of cultivating the new lands is correct.... Did the party central committee make a mistake in recommending (corn), successfully grown in the south, for the entire Soviet Union? No, comrades, it was not a mistake...(the priority development of heavy industry) is the general line of our party—a line tried and tested by the whole development of the Soviet state and corresponding to the vital interests of the people.

In parts of his discussion, however, he seemed a bit overly defensive and this suggested that some criticism of these policies still continued. Mikoyan, for example, may have been more pessimistic concerning the value of the new lands program than suited Khrushchev. In a speech on 8 November 1956, on the occasion of awarding an Order of Lenin to the Komsomol, Khrushchev revealed that Mikoyan had earlier disagreed with him on the amount of grain that would be produced in Kazakhstan in 1956.* But whatever reservations Khrushchev's presidium colleagues may have had, they were careful not to air them to the congress.

Khrushchev's speech, however, was more than an optimistic reaffirmation of policies that were already in effect. He also introduced modifications which, though generally consistent with the main objectives of the post-Stalin leadership, were of a magnitude sufficient to inaugurate a new phase in the regime's pursuit of its goals. Not only was the studied slight to Stalin in his opening remarks carried over into his major speech, but he undertook the task of making revisions in Communist dogma. The motivations for both the downgrading of Stalin and the modifications of ideology were essentially the same—to free the

* "When I told (Mikoyan) that Kazakhstan would produce a billion poods of grain in 1956, he didn't say a word. I said to him: 'Why are you silent?' He replied: 'I'm not arguing, but I don't quite see a billion. Maybe 750,000,000 instead of the 650,000,000 under the plan, but a billion?'"
regime of the more repugnant and counterproductive aspects of
Stalinism—to erase the stultifying effects of terror from the
domestic scene, to make the Soviet system more appealing po-
litically, and to secure allies and a dominant place in world
affairs.

Khrushchev linked the repudiation of Lenin's dogma that war
between capitalist and communist states was "fatalistically in-
evitable" to the Soviet Union's "peaceful coexistence" campaign:

When we say that the socialist system will
win in the competition between the two
systems—the capitalist and the socialist—
this by no means signifies that its vic-
tory will be achieved through armed inter-
ference by the socialist countries in the
internal affairs of capitalist countries... 
war is not a fatalistic inevitability.

Khrushchev's other major doctrinal revision—the assertion that
Communists might win political power in capitalist countries
through peaceful parliamentary means—was also part of the cloak
of "peace and sweet reasonableness" with which the Soviet leaders
were seeking to clothe their pursuit of international objectives.
Neither change seemed immediately dangerous to the regime but
doctrinal revisions are always risky and not lightly undertaken.
Khrushchev's willingness to inaugurate these changes, and thereby
associate his name with them (particularly in revising a Lenin-
ist precept) is further indication of the confidence with which
he viewed his strength within the leadership and the ability of
the regime to surmount difficulties that might arise.

De-Stalinization—Mikoyan's Assault and Khrushchev's Secret Speech

Judging from the speeches at the congress Mikoyan was the
only Soviet leader who seemed to consider himself anything like
on a par with Khrushchev.* His range of subjects was nearly as
great as Khrushchev's; his language and means of expression were
harder hitting; and on a number of points he went farther than
Khrushchev in dotting the i's and crossing the t's of regime
policy. There was in none of this, however, any sign of serious
disagreement with Khrushchev. If the two did not see completely
eye to eye, their differences were over how strong and clear pol-
cies should be stated rather than over the substance of those
policies.

* Assuming, of course, that each of the speakers at the con-
gress was relatively free to fashion his speech as he saw fit.
In one respect this possible difference had serious repercussions. Khrushchev had chosen to damn Stalin with faint praise and vague references to "norms of party life worked out by Lenin, which had often been violated in the past" and to restore "Lenin's principle of collective leadership." Mikoyan chose to assault the dead dictator more directly. On the first occasion of a Soviet leader's taking issue with Stalin by name, he said:

Stalin's well-known pronouncement in "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" to the effect that after the world market had been split up "the volume of production in (the USA, Britain and France) will contract" can hardly help us...and is hardly correct.

Mikoyan, moreover, made clear reference to Stalin's errors in leadership. "For about 20 years we had in fact no collective leadership...and this could not fail to have an extremely negative effect," and he topped his irreverent treatment with a sarcastic reference to Stalin's "We swear to thee, Comrade Lenin" funeral speech in 1924:

How Lenin would rejoice if, after 32 years he could see...that we not only swear by Lenin's name but are exerting all our efforts to put Lenin's ideas into practice.

None of the other leaders mentioned Stalin; although they were in general agreement in condemning the "cult of personality" and deploiring the arbitrary rule of the previous period. The decision to downgrade Stalin was presumably taken by the entire leadership, however, it being doubtful that Khrushchev and Mikoyan, despite their obvious self-confidence, would have taken the momentous step on their own. Moreover, there were signs that some such decision had been reached before the congress met. The Stalin symbol had been used in routine fashion throughout January; his name was invoked frequently, as a matter of course, in the press and on the radio, and in speeches at the republican party congresses in the latter half of the month. On 4 February, however, a change appeared when Voroshilov was greeted on his 75th birthday as "Lenin's faithful pupil" without reference to Stalin. * Soviet newspapers ignored Stalin in their editorials leading up to the congress, and Pravda's 14 February issue appeared with a half-page portrait honoring Lenin but no picture and no mention of Stalin.

* As recently as 25 November, 1955, on the occasion of Mikoyan's 60th birthday, the usual phrase of "Lenin's faithful pupil and Stalin's comrade-in-arms" was still being used in such greetings.
The decision that had thus been made was certainly to de-
Stalinize; whether it also included the denigration of Stalin's
name may be open to some question. There was no hint in the
published speeches, even in Mikoyan's disrespectful criticisms,
of a decision to charge Stalin with mass murder, megalomania,
and military incompetence. When, then, was the decision for
Khrushchev's secret speech made and what lay behind that decision?

It is conceivable that the collective had not planned to
carry the public attack on Stalin beyond Mikoyan's irreverent
statements, but that it expected to give a fuller explanation
to the congress delegates as an aid to them in guiding the de-
Stalinization campaign in their respective bailiwicks. The doc-
umentation in Khrushchev's secret speech and the way in which
its points dovetail with and support general Soviet policy and
theoretical statements suggest that it was not a spur-of-the-
moment creation. However, if the secret speech had been planned
in advance as one step in the timetable of de-Stalinization, it
is difficult to understand why it was not given earlier in the
congress when it had become apparent that a new policy in regard
to Stalin was being inaugurated—if not following Khrushchev's
speech, then immediately following Mikoyan's. Moreover, in view
of the facilities available in the party secretariat and its
apparatus and in the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute it would
appear that the secret speech could have been prepared in two or
three days. There is, therefore, some reason to suppose that,
though an anti-Stalin campaign had been planned before the con-
gress, Khrushchev's secret speech had not.

There has been some speculation that Khrushchev decided
to blast Stalin after he had witnessed a very favorable response
of the congress delegates to Mikoyan's more extreme statements.*

* Some publicists (e.g. Myron Rush, The Rise of Khrushchev,
Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958, pp. 52-53) have
taken the view that Mikoyan's incidental reference in the course
of his discussion on the need for a revision of history to
Kossior, Khrushchev's predecessor in the Ukraine, was an attack
on Khrushchev. Such an argument appears to be poorly conceived
for it assumes either that Khrushchev was directly responsible
for Kossior's purge and that such a fact was generally known
by at least high party people; or, as Rush asserts, that Khrush-
chev profited so greatly from Kossior's downfall that the mere
mention of Kossior's name conjured up visions of Khrushchev as
a terroristic tyrant. There is no evidence to support the first
premise; even Rush is constrained to throw Khrushchev's respon-
sibility for the purge of Kossior into question. As for Rush's
own argument, the Ukrainian party post, hundreds of miles from
Moscow, was not likely to appear such a political plum for the
party boss of the combined Moscow oblast and city party organi-
izations, Khrushchev's job before the transfer to Kiev, as to
give Mikoyan's remark in February 1956 the meaning Rush alleges
it had.
Khrushchev, with his penchant for monopolizing the initiative and the public spotlight, it is argued, was piqued by the success of Mikoyan's approach and decided to do him one better with an all-out cataloging of Stalin's sins. It is true that Mikoyan's speech, according to the published versions, was more frequently interrupted by applause than that of any other leader and that the parenthetical notations at the end indicated audience response exceeded only by Khrushchev's and Bulganin's speeches, but it may be questioned whether Khrushchev would be apt to react so childishly in such a potentially serious matter. While undoubtedly underestimating the effect his speech would have, he must certainly have been aware that the exposition of Stalin's crimes would jolt the faithful and create confusion and consternation throughout the Communist world, and hence was a decision not lightly made. The reception given Mikoyan's speech would hardly seem so dangerous to Khrushchev's position or damaging to his ego to warrant his taking the risk of a unilateral decision on the conduct of the anti-Stalin campaign. Moreover, if Khrushchev were seeking to undercut Mikoyan, it is curious that he not only treated him respectfully in the speech but in fact credited him with standing up to Stalin:

On one occasion after the war, during a meeting of Stalin with members of the politburo, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan mentioned that Khrushchev must have been right when he telephoned concerning the Kharkov operation and that it was unfortunate that his suggestion had not been accepted. You should have seen Stalin's fury...

Mikoyan was the only top leader, other than Khrushchev himself, and Marshal Zhukov, made a candidate member of the presidium two days later, to emerge from the speech with creditable virtues in his relations with Stalin. Most were treated as passive actors in a bad drama; Malenkov, however, was specially treated as Stalin's spokesman.

Thus it was most likely a collective decision in response to pressures generated at the congress that Khrushchev delivered his speech in denigration of Stalin. Several reports from Western Communist sources agree generally with this interpretation. According to these sources, some of whom were at the congress (but excluded from the secret speech session) and others who allegedly received their information from central committee members, the delegates to the congress, surprised by the open criticisms of Stalin in Khrushchev's and Mikoyan's speeches and not satisfied with their explanations, either insisted that...
the Soviet leaders justify the attack; or the Soviet leaders, seeing the confusion created by the speeches at the congress, decided to give a fuller exposé of what transpired under Stalin's rule. Two of the reports suggest that rehabilitation prior to the congress of a number of individuals purged by Stalin played a role in creating confusion and questioning among the delegates. On the face of it, this is more apt to have been the delegate's reaction than the spontaneously enthusiastic support for a sharp attack on Stalin suggested by the applause notations in the published versions of Mikoyan's speech.

Political Miscellany--The Speeches of Bulganin, Kaganovich, Pervukhin, Malenkov, and Molotov

If range of subjects covered, doctrinal innovations introduced, or important policies inaugurated in congress speeches are measures of personal influence in the presidium, then it would appear that Bulganin was a less important figure than Mikoyan. Bulganin delivered the report on the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960); as chairman of the Council of Ministers it was his responsibility and he did an adequate, if uninspired, job of it, but the report was largely a restatement of well-known economic themes and a rather heavy, unimaginative presentation of the directives for the new plan. There were virtually no indications of individuality; only once did he venture to introduce a change in theory--discarding the traditional Soviet economic doctrine that "obsolescence of machines is a phenomenon inherent in the capitalist economy alone, and that in the socialist economy the development of technology does not give rise to obsolescence," and castigating "some" Soviet economists for holding that view.

The speeches of Kaganovich and Pervukhin cast some additional light on their respective positions and degree of influence which reinforced the view that Kaganovich had slipped and that Pervukhin had inherited at least some of Kaganovich's former sphere of responsibility.

Kaganovich's speech contained a rather superficial discussion abounding with Stalinist phrases and formulations of problems and policies in what were apparently his primary fields of responsibility--transportation, labor, and wages. The Stalinist usages could have been simply an unconscious use of language that came most easily to him; but that he still held to his previous conservative bent of mind was clear in the obvious reservations with which he endorsed the new doctrines enunciated at the congress. He declared, for example, that struggle against the cult of the individual was "not an easy question," and in
agreeing with Khrushchev that theory should not be divorced from practice, he emphasized the value of theory whereas Khrushchev had been emphasizing the value of practice.

Judging from Pervukhin's preoccupation with the heavy industry sector of the Soviet economy in his speech to the congress he had most likely succeeded to Kaganovich's former responsibility of supervising the heavy industry complex, and this would bring with it at least some increase in his influence on Soviet industrial policy. There was nothing in his speech, however, to suggest that he disagreed with any of the economic policies enunciated by Khrushchev or with the Five-Year Plan directives presented by Bulganin. That he was in general agreement with regime policies is virtually certain in view of his rising stature as an industrial administrator.

Malenkov's speech was apparently intended to convey a message of complete capitulation to Khrushchev's leadership and willingness to serve as a junior member of the presidium. The bulk of his speech was devoted to the electric power industry, which was his field of direct administrative responsibility, but he reserved substantial space for indicating his complete agreement with major regime policies and making generous, almost sycophantic references to Khrushchev:

Comrade N. S. Khrushchev summed up in the central committee's report the great constructive work the Soviet people have carried out...Comrade N. S. Khrushchev was fully justified in noting in his report that in the period under review the party central committee's leadership was at the necessary high level...it is essential to draw attention again and again to the important thesis put forward by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev in his report as justification for the assertion that war is not inevitable...we want to hope, as Comrade N. S. Khrushchev said, that our peaceful aspirations will be more correctly appraised in the USA.

Molotov, too, made generous references to Khrushchev and, in contrast to the dogged conservatism and inflexibility he had earlier exhibited in the foreign relations field, he appeared to accept the fact that conditions had changed and that the policies and tactics of Stalin's day were not appropriate in the atomic age:
We still suffer frequently from an underestimation of the new possibilities which have opened up before us in the postwar period. This shortcoming has also appeared in the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was pointed out in good time by our party central committee....We must stop underestimating the enormous opportunities we possess for defending peace and the security of peoples.

This was the extent of Molotov's self-criticism but his speech was sprinkled with phrases and formulations that had appeared in the lead editorial of Kommunist Number 14 in September, indicating that he had been impressed with the editorial's message, and he was careful to approve the Austrian peace treaty and the rapprochement with Tito and to refer several times to the USSR as a socialist state.

IV. THE NEW LEADING PARTY ORGANS

Continuity and Change in the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission

In the three years and four months which lay between the 19th party congress in October 1952 and the 20th congress in February 1956, a large number of shifts in personnel assignments affecting high level party and government officials (members of the central party organs--central committee and central auditing commission--elected in October 1952) took place. By the time of the 20th congress, just under 100 of the 273 members of the central party organs* had lost the party and government posts which presumably entitled them to central organs status. Some, of course, were dead. Whether

* In the analysis that follows, both full and candidate members of the central committee and members of the central auditing commission are lumped together despite the fact that they represent three different protocol and prestige levels. This is justified on the grounds that the only known time (June 1957) when any of these groups was called on to exercise real power of decision, the combined membership participated.
the others had been formally replaced on the central committee or auditing commission is not known—the promotions from candidate to full member of the central committee of N. N. Shatalin

Central Party Organs, 1952-1956, Continuity and Change

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<th>1952</th>
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<td>Members in 1952 dropped in 1956</td>
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<td>176</td>
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<td>Members in 1952 re-elected in 1956</td>
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<td>142</td>
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<td>New in 1956</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>318</td>
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in March 1953 and G. K. Zhukov in July 1953 are the only changes in the composition of those bodies mentioned in Soviet sources. But whether formally replaced or not, it is virtually certain that they were no longer functioning as members of the central party bodies.

It would appear that the men and women selected to replace the purged and demoted as government officials and republic and oblast secretaries and the like had, by virtue of their assignments, achieved the central party status once enjoyed by their predecessors. If this did not involve formal election to the central committee and auditing commission at the time, it may well have carried the right of informal participation and, if the new appointees successfully retained their jobs, should have assured election to the central party organs at the 20th party congress.

The congress elected the new central committee and auditing commission presumably at the closed session on the night of 24-25 February at which Khrushchev delivered his secret speech. Available information provides few clues to the method of election other than the statement in the official stenographic report of the congress that the members of the central bodies were elected by the "delegates with deciding vote" by secret ballot. In view of past practice it may be assumed that the delegates were simply called on to approve a slate previously prepared by the Soviet leaders. This was the method used by the congress in "electing" its presidium, secretariat, credentials commission, etc., and it is the method used by each new convocation of the Supreme Soviet in "electing" its Presidium and the Council of Ministers. However, the belated inclusion of L. A. Govorov on the central committee in 1952—"A check has shown that Comrade L. A. Govorov actually was elected a candidate member of the central committee," said the announcement in Pravda, signed by the central committee secretariat—if taken at face value, would suggest that the
delegates voted on each name individually, and that there were more names considered than the actual number elected. The 15-day delay in "discovering" the error which had kept Govorov off the central committee was surely excessive, however, and makes it difficult to accept the Pravda notice at face value. Moreover, there is little evidence of serious competition for delegate votes either before or at the congress. The new central party organs, then, were most likely preselected by the party presidium, which had to decide on the size of the central committee and auditing commission and make the final selection of names.

Actually, the composition of the new central bodies was already pretty well established, the more important party and state jobs apparently carrying with them a slot on the central committee or auditing commission. Perhaps as much as 80 percent of the composition of these bodies was determined in this way, though in some cases the question of whether the slot was a full or candidate member of the central committee or, at the third level of importance, the central auditing commission, probably depended on a separate decision of the party presidium. The other 20 percent, the slots for about two thirds of which were created by the decision to expand the central party bodies, were probably the subject of negotiation among the top leaders at or shortly before the congress.

The new central party bodies should, therefore, reflect the political relationships established earlier as a result of Karushchev's rise. In this connection, the single most remarkable feature of the new central committee and auditing commission is the degree to which their membership was carried over from the bodies elected at the 19th party congress in October 1952. Sixty-five percent of the membership of the 1952 central party organs was carried over in 1956, with 70 percent of the more important full (voting) members of the central committee being retained. These percentages are larger than at any time since the 17th party congress in 1934 when 68 percent of the membership of the 1930 central committee and central auditing commission was carried over.
There is no measure of "normal" turnover available so it is difficult to evaluate the full significance of this degree of continuity with the 1952 central organs."* It may be noted, however, that the rate of attrition between 1952 and 1956 on a per month basis was exceeded in the last 30 years only by the period of the great purges (1934-1939). Rate of attrition may, therefore, be a better indicator of the significance of high-level personnel actions in the political maneuvering following Stalin's death. Even so, the conclusion seems inescapable that remarkably few of the politically more important individuals in the Soviet Union in October 1952 were purged or seriously downgraded as a result of the death of Stalin, the arrest and execution of the number two man in the post-Stalin collective leadership, the disgrace and demotion of the number one man, the censure and public humiliation of the number three man, and the rise of Khrushchev from the fifth-ranking position in March 1953 to that of unchallenged "first among equals" in February 1956. That such cataclysmic changes in the Soviet top party leadership could occur in such a short period of time without a greater turnover in the secondary leadership is a real tribute to Khrushchev's political finesse, and it brings into question the commonly accepted view that he "packed" the central committee with his supporters.**

* Some basis of comparison between Stalin's last years and the period between the 19th and 20th party congresses in rate of turnover is afforded by the republic central committees. An average of forty-five percent of the membership of the republic party bodies elected at the republic congresses in late 1948 and early 1949 was carried over in the 1952 republic bodies as compared with fifty-two percent of the 1952 bodies re-elected in 1956.

About a third of the new members of the central party bodies elected in February 1956 received the job assignments that conferred central organs status on them before the June plenum 1954. During most of this period, group rule appeared to be a reality and this no doubt entailed some compromise and diffusion of influence among the top leaders on personnel assignments. (See above pp. 23-24) Khrushchev, it is true, was more successful than any of the other members of the collective leadership in getting his friends and protegés placed in strategic posts, but this was only a relative advantage. Only 11, possibly as many as 15, of the new appointees appeared to be in his interest, two suggested Mikoyan's influence, and one may have been supported by Kaganovich. The other appointments, perhaps as many as 50, are difficult to ascribe to the influence of any one of the top leaders and they may best be thought of as compromise or neutral in nature.

In the next year—the period between the June plenum 1954 and the July plenum 1955—there was a sharp drop in the number of assignments of new personnel to jobs conferring central organs status. Khrushchev apparently profited from three of 14 such appointments, Kaganovitch may have been instrumental in two, and Mikoyan in one. The other eight appear to have been neutral or compromise candidates. The fact that so few personnel shifts affecting central organs status were made in the seven months preceding and five months succeeding Malenkov's demotion underlines the view expressed above (p. 22) that Khrushchev relied more on personal influence than on "packing" party bodies with his protegés. Even in the seven-month period immediately preceding the 20th party congress, when he was clearly the dominant member of the presidium and when an increasing number of
personnel assignments show his hand, less than half of the new appointees seem to have had prior political connections with him, and the same is true concerning those whose appointment to the central committee or auditing commission was made possible by the decision to enlarge those party bodies. In all, only about a third of the new members of the central committee or auditing commission had discernible ties with Khrushchev—hardly evidence of "packing" in the usual sense of the term.

Khrushchev's Strength in Central Party Bodies

It may be assumed that any individual coming from the Ukrainian party organization is pretty apt to be favorably disposed toward Khrushchev. This assumption would probably hold whether he had actually been a high-level official in the Ukrainian organization during the time when Khrushchev was party boss—January 1938 to December 1949 (except for a few months in 1947)—or had developed later under L. G. Melnikov and A. I. Kirichenko, since Khrushchev's successors in the Ukraine probably acted as his political stewards. Moreover, the Ukraine has certainly profited from Khrushchev's rise. Its territorial jurisdiction was increased by the transfer of the Crimea from the Russian Republic, and the 400th anniversary of its union with Siam was celebrated with great fanfare, and in a more practical vein, many of the officials developed in its party organization and government service have been transferred to more important jobs elsewhere.

During Khrushchev's three years as Moscow oblast party boss he presumably developed another group of officials on whom he could depend, but there is somewhat less certainty in placing Moscow officials in his camp than those whose careers were developed in the Ukraine. The fact that all the top leaders worked in Moscow and had a vital interest in the party organization of the area makes it rather difficult to distinguish their respective spheres of influence.

Khrushchev's rather obvious interest in Leningrad and the "Leningrad Case" and the subsequent careers of some of the men associated with the changes in leadership in the oblast and city in 1953 suggest that the Leningrad party organization (the third largest in the USSR, after the Ukraine and Moscow) had come under his control by late 1953. On Stalin's death, it was announced that N. G. Ignatov, a secretary and candidate member of the short-lived enlarged presidium elected in October 1952, would be "transferred to a leading post in the USSR Council of Ministers." He was never identified there; instead, he was elected on 1 April 1953 as first secretary in Leningrad city.
and second secretary in Leningrad Oblast. During the ensuing months he seemed to supersede Malenkov's protegé V. M. Andrianov, the oblast first secretary, in party activities in the area. In late November at a joint plenum of the oblast and city party committees supervised by Khrushchev, Andrianov was removed under fire and replaced by F. R. Kozlov, the former second secretary who had given way to Ignatov in April. Ignatov, his Leningrad assignment apparently successfully completed, was "transferred to duties in the central committee apparatus" and replaced by I. K. Zamchevsky as city party boss.

The election of Kozlov and Ignatov to the party presidium in 1957 appears in part at least to have been a reward for loyal service and suggests that Ignatov may have been despatched to Leningrad by Khrushchev to undermine Malenkov's authority and that Kozlov used his influence to put the Leningrad organization in Khrushchev's camp.

For the most part, however, Khrushchev's rise in influence and power developed primarily, it would appear, from his ability to impress others with the rightness of his views and to overpower them with his inexhaustible energy, dynamism, and powers of persuasion. Voroshilov, apparently impressed, emphasized these traits when he nominated Khrushchev for premier in March 1958:

With tireless energy...Khrushchev...has faithfully served...the cause of socialism and communism.... In all this great creative work...an outstanding role has been played by our dear comrade Nikita Khrushchev - by his unfailing creative talent and truly unending and inexhaustible energy and initiative. (Italics added)

Of all Stalin's lieutenants, Khrushchev had most clearly exhibited the characteristics of the leader personality.

These personality characteristics and his dynamic policies, particularly his efforts to invigorate the party, undoubtedly impressed others. The maneuver which secured for him the title of first secretary in September 1953 gave him an important psychological advantage. Not only could he match his "first" against Malenkov's "first" in presidium listings, but, for party officials at least, Khrushchev probably suggested the more traditional seat of authority. When alphabetical listing of presidium members was instituted in mid-1954, Malenkov's principal symbol of leadership was destroyed. Furthermore there apparently was an almost complete absence of
countermoves on the part of his opponents. With each demonstration
of Khrushchev's influence, authority, and capability, more
and more members of the central committee and auditing commis-
sion and even a few of the presidium probably began to follow
his leadership so that by the time the 20th party congress rolled
around, Khrushchev could probably count as his adherents a good
many more than is suggested on the basis of past associations.
Unfortunately there is very little information available which
will serve to indicate which members of the new central party
organs had earlier jumped on Khrushchev's band wagon, and vir-
tually none at all to indicate the degree of their loyalty.
Moreover, the mere fact of some past association or other evi-
dence of a patron-protegé relationship is no reliable guide to
loyalty or continued reliability, as is clear, for example, in
the case of Shepilov "who joined them."

For these reasons any listing of Khrushchev adherents, as
opposed to those of Mikoyan, Suslov, Bulganin, Molotov, Malenkov,
or other top leaders, except for a fairly small number of cases
where the evidence for continued close association and loyalty
is especially strong, is apt to be more misleading than enlight-
ening. Whatever may have been the individual (personal) reasons--
loyalty from past associations or favors granted, fear and in-
timidation, bureaucratic career-mindedness, or genuine belief in
the value of Khrushchev's leadership--when the showdown came in
June 1957, the combined central committee and auditing commis-
sion voted in favor of Khrushchev and against what was reportedly
a majority of the presidium. If the figures given by F. R.
Kozlov in a speech in Leningrad following the ouster of the
"antiparty group" can be taken at face value, nearly 70 percent
of the members of the central party organs signed up for Khrush-
chev before the plenum had got fairly under way.

Occupational Representation

The proportion of party officials and government admin-
istrators on the new central party organs was approximately the
same as in 1952 but among the government representatives there
was a shift from the police and military to other functionaries.
However, several of the party officials elected to the central
committee and auditing commission in 1952 had transferred to
work on the government side of things during the three years and
four months between the congresses, and a number of the govern-
ment representatives that were new to the central party organs
in 1956 had recently been transferred from party to government
work.
Central Party Organs, 1952-1956
By Major Occupational Categories

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<tr>
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<th>1952</th>
<th>1956</th>
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<tr>
<td>Party officials</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>148</td>
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<td>of which:</td>
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<tr>
<td>military</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>police</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>diplomatic</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>292*</td>
<td>329**</td>
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*Includes: 16 listed in both Party and Government categories
2 " " " Miscellaneous "
1 " " " Government and Miscellaneous "

**Includes: 9 listed in both Party and Government categories
1 " " " Miscellaneous "
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This infiltration of party functionaries into the government administration is a reflection of Khrushchev's campaign to reinvigorate the party and reassert its primacy in fact as well as in theory, but there is little evidence of any attempt to replace the engineer-administrator with the party man. The proportion of engineer-administrators in the central party bodies in 1956 was about the same as in 1952 and these were divided approximately 60 percent re-elected and 40 percent new. There is a hint in Khrushchev's congress report, however, that he may have been somewhat dissatisfied with this reliance on technicians. Castigating party leaders for considering "party work one thing and economic and state work another," he insisted that party officials should study technology, agronomy, and production.

The reduction in police representation from ten to four was in line with the reduced political role of the police in the post-Stalin period, and tended to show that the promotion in August 1955 of KGB chief I. A. Serov to the rank of Army General and Khrushchev's remarks to the congress cautioning against showing distrust of workers of the state security agencies, did not portend any resurgence of police power. The replacement of police careerist S. N. Kruglov as MVD head by party apparatchik N. P. Dudorov in January also seemed in line with the policy of maintaining strict party control over the police. However, this brought both police agencies, KGB and MVD, under the administrative direction of men indebted to Khrushchev for their career development, further strengthening the first secretary's control of the instruments of political power.
The cut in total military representation from 28 to 21 is a bit puzzling in view of the post-Stalin policy of increasing the prestige of the military and, in general, repairing the slights and other evidences of distrust which characterized Stalin's treatment of them. However, the effect of the cut was somewhat offset by a net gain of two professional soldiers among the full members of the central committee and the election of Zhukov as a candidate member of the party presidium where he was probably able to exercise increased personal influence on military policy.

The greatest cut was in the naval representation, from five in 1952 to one in 1956. To a certain extent this reflects the new Soviet estimate of the relative value of the navy in modern warfare, but a more immediate reason for the cut may be seen in the sinking of the battleship Novorossiysk in October 1955 with great loss of life after striking a mine in the Black Sea near Sevastopol. An investigation of the naval forces by Defense Minister Zhukov following the incident uncovered serious deficiencies in combat and political training and confirmed the fact that discipline was poor. According to one report, the party central committee issued a letter to all party and Komsomol members of the armed forces condemning the extremely poor state of discipline in naval units and stating that Admiral Kuznetsov had been relieved as commander in chief of the naval forces, reduced one rank, and retired, and that the commander of the Black Sea Fleet had been removed from his post and reduced one rank. Other naval officers were also disciplined.

The heads of the political directorates of both the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Navy were on the central committee in 1952, but there were no representatives from the Chief Political Directorate of the combined Ministry of Defense in 1956, despite the fact that A. S. Zheltov, head of the directorate, was a wartime collaborator on the Stalingrad military council with Khrushchev. This would seem to have been a sop to Zhukov and the professional soldiers who resented the interference of political officers in military affairs.

There were 12 ambassadors on the new central party organs, nine more than in 1952. A large number of these were former party careerists turned diplomat since Stalin's death and assigned to posts within the Sino-Soviet bloc. The total increase in diplomatic representation from nine to 17, however, probably reflects the change in emphasis in foreign relations from intransigent obstructionism to active diplomacy.
Stalin's successors, becoming increasingly aware of the stultifying effects of extreme centralization, sought to ameliorate the situation by some decentralization of decision-making and encouragement of greater initiative at lower levels in the administrative chain of command. This policy found expression in the representation on the new central committee and auditing commission of more republic and lower level officials than was the case in 1952. The increase in numbers of these officials coincides with the increase in size of the central party bodies, suggesting that the addition of these officials was one reason, at least, for the expansion. Most of those thus added were party officials, but the presence of two industrial enterprise directors, three industrial workers, and two kolkhoz chairman helped
to inflate the political prestige of production work in line with Khrushchev's complaint to the congress that "a substantial proportion of Communists are engaged in work not directly connected with the decisive sectors of production."

The Party Presidium

On 27 February the 133 full (voting) members of the central committee met in plenary session and "elected" the party presidium, which, according to the party rules, "directs the work of the central committee between plenary sessions" and the secretariat, which "directs current work, chiefly as concerns verification of the fulfillment of party decisions and selection of cadres." They also organized the party control committee, a sort of investigative agency and trials board on questions of party discipline, and the Russian Republic bureau, called for by Khrushchev in his central committee speech.

All full members of the presidium were re-elected. In view of the evidences of Khrushchev's primacy in the presidium and the very strong position he occupied in the central committee, Malenkov and Molotov, and possibly Kaganovich, would seem to have been retained at his sufferance. He may have become so confident of his ability to deal with these men and any threat that they might pose to his power or program that he saw little to be gained at the time by further actions against them. On the contrary, there would probably be some adverse reactions. Malenkov still enjoyed considerable popularity among the populace for his championing of consumer goods production, and Molotov was widely respected as an old Bolshevik who had given years of valuable service to the party and state. Moreover, the ouster of any of the top leaders, even though their shields were somewhat tarnished, would almost certainly have raised the specter of mass purges and arrests and gone a long way toward destroying rising public confidence in the sincerity of the regime's disavowal of organized repression and its intention to maintain "socialist legality" as a basic cornerstone of post-Stalin policy.

Khrushchev, too, may have been reluctant to part with the knowledge and experience these men could contribute to policy formulation. Conservation of scarce leadership talent and experience, though the individuals embodying them might be somewhat unreliable from a strictly political point of view, was one of the important departures of the new regime from Stalin's methods of rule and a policy with which Khrushchev appears to have agreed. It has already been noted that in the period between the 19th and 20th congresses the secondary leadership in
### USSR: Evolution of the Party Presidium 1952-56

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<td>Full-time Party Functionaries.</td>
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<td>Full-time Government Functionaries.</td>
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the USSR was remarkably stable despite the somewhat radical changes at the top. Moreover, of those who for one reason or another were excluded from the central party organs, over half have been assigned to other responsible work.

There is, of course, the possibility that Khrushchev wished to rid himself of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich but that his influence and power was not quite strong enough.* Mikoyan, Bulganin, Voroshilov, and others, though generally satisfied with Khrushchev's leadership and agreeing with him in the matters of Malenkov's demotion and Molotov's censure, may have balked at actually removing them from the presidium--possibly feeling that their exclusion might weaken the mechanism of collective leadership and expose themselves to the danger of increasingly unrestrained domination by Khrushchev.

Whatever limitations, external or self-imposed, may have figured in the selection of the full members of the presidium, Khrushchev was not restrained when it came to the candidate members. Five new candidates were added: Minister of Defense G. K. Zhukov, Kazakh party boss L. I. Brezhnev, Uzbek party boss N. A. Mukhitdinov, Pravda editor in chief D. T. Shepilov, and Moscow City party boss Ye. A. Furtseva. At least three of these were clearly Khrushchev adherents—Brezhnev (see above p. 31), Mukhitdinov (see pp. 32-33), and Furtseva. Shepilov, too, appeared committed to Khrushchev's camp, while Marshal Zhukov, who, in view of his personality, military standing, and personal popularity, may have held himself aloof from the usual patron-protegé relationships, was probably closer to Khrushchev than he was to any other member of the top leadership.

Madame Furtseva, the first woman in the Soviet Union to enter the circle of top leaders, had begun her party career in Kursk Oblast, but from 1936 on she was associated with the Moscow party organization. Although she had risen to first secretary of the capital's Frunze Rayon by 1948, her first big boost came in January 1950, shortly after Khrushchev's return to Moscow as oblast first secretary, when she was named second secretary in Moscow city. This position, which traditionally carried a slot on the central committee, was responsible for her election as a candidate member of the central committee at the 19th party congress in 1952. In March 1954 she succeeded

* The public admission of ideological error extracted from Molotov in September 1955 certainly appeared intended to undermine his prestige and popularity in preparation for demotion.
I. V. Kapitonov, who became oblast first secretary, as party chief in the Soviet capital. Khrushchev's continued interest in her career was underscored when he singled her out for honors at public fetes and receptions at various times during 1955.

The elevation of Madame Furtseva to the party presidium in February 1956 gave her a higher party status than that of Moscow Oblast first secretary Kapitonov, thus marking the independence of the Moscow City party organization from its previous subordination to the oblast leadership. Her promotion also made it appear that Khrushchev's lament to the congress,

One cannot overlook the fact that many party and Soviet bodies exhibit timidity about promoting women to executive posts. Very few women hold leading party and Soviet positions...

was intended to have a practical application. There had been little improvement in this regard for many years: women, for example, constituted 19.2 percent of total party membership in 1952, but only 12.3 percent of the delegates to the 19th party congress were women, while the percentage of women on the central party bodies elected at the congress was only 3.7 percent. The corresponding figures for 1956 were 19.6 percent, 14.2 percent, and 4.1 percent.

Shepilov, who had entered the secretariat in July 1955, had had an interesting career as a Soviet publicist, propaganda director, and editor. Before and for a short period after the war he wrote on agricultural subjects. He served as a political officer during the war, for a time on the First Ukrainian Front where Khrushchev was the top political officer on the military council. In 1947 he was assigned to the central party apparatus as deputy to M. A. Suslov, the new head of the Propaganda and Agitation Administration who succeeded Malenkov's protegé G. F. Aleksandrov in a shake-up in the administration. When the administration was reorganized and a department in July 1948, Shepilov became its head. He was criticized in July 1949 for failing to exercise control over the journal Bolshevik and for permitting N. A. Voznesensky's book on the USSR's economy during the war to be recommended by Agitprop as a textbook. Presumably as a result of this criticism he was removed as Agitprop head and assigned to undisclosed work as an inspector of the central committee. At the 19th party congress he was elected a member of the central committee, possibly anticipating his assignment in early November as editor in chief of Pravda, replacing L. F. Ilichev.
Marshal Zhukov rose through the ranks to become the Soviet Union's chief professional soldier. He had achieved great personal popularity during World War II as a military strategist and trouble shooter but was relegated by Stalin to positions of secondary importance for several years after the war, and removed from candidate membership in the central committee. In his secret speech, Khrushchev praised Zhukov as "a good general and a good military leader" and described Stalin's motives thusly:

...after our great victory over the enemy... Stalin began to downgrade many of the commanders who had contributed so much to the victory over the enemy, because Stalin excluded every possibility that services rendered at the front should be credited to anyone but himself.*

Zhukov was quietly returned to responsible military work in Moscow in 1950 or 1951, probably as commander in chief of the ground forces and, possibly, deputy minister of defense, and re-elected a central committee candidate at the 19th party congress. He did not publicly return to full favor until Stalin's death, however, at which time he was promoted to first deputy defense minister. Presumably as a reward for support against Beriya he was elected a full member of the central committee in July 1953, and when Malenkov was demoted in February 1955, he succeeded Bulganin as defense minister. Zhukov was listed first among the presidium candidates elected following the 20th party congress so was presumably next in line to become a full member of the presidium.

N. M. Shvernik, former chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and, since Stalin's death, head of the Soviet trade unions, was re-elected. He had been a candidate member of the politburo presidium since March 1939 and seemed destined never to be accepted as a full member. The central committee, however, also appointed him chairman of the Party Control Commission which, from the political standpoint, was a more important post than trade union head.

* In November 1957, however, when Zhukov was no longer in political favor, his 1946 demotion was attributed by implication to his failing to understand correctly the requirements and policy of the party in the leadership of the army and navy and in party political education of armed forces personnel.
The only casualty was P. K. Ponomarenko, whose assignment as ambassador to Poland in May 1955 had seemed a rather insignificant post for a presidium candidate. He apparently retained his position on the presidium, however, at least formally, until the party congress, for in the Pravda report of the concert at the Bolshoi Theater on 23 February dedicated to the 20th party congress, Ponomarenko was listed in the appropriate place of presidium candidate—after all full members and before the party secretaries. The exact reasons for Ponomarenko's fall from favor are not known but he had had close political connections with Malenkov, having served under him in 1938 in the central party apparatus and collaborated with him in 1944 in administering the program to restore the national economy in liberated territories. Ponomarenko, moreover, was appointed to the party secretariat in 1948 at about the time of Malenkov's return to favor after an apparent interlude of over a year. Continuing economic difficulties in Kazakhstan, where he was party secretary for over a year (1954-1955), suggest that he may also have been held responsible for the way Khrushchev's agricultural program was carried out there.

Khrushchev's Secretariat and the RSFSR Bureau

The six members of the old secretariat were re-elected and Brezhnev and Furtseva added. With five of the eight secretaries also on the presidium (two as full members and three as candidate members), a somewhat greater voice in policy-making had been granted the officials responsible for the party's day-to-day administration. Since these officials were responsive to Khrushchev's influence, the move had the effect of strengthening his hand in top party councils. (See chart on p. 57.) The added secretaries could also relieve Khrushchev of some of the burdens of party administration and enable him to devote more time to critical policy problems and political activities.

In the short space of a year, Khrushchev had built the secretariat from three in February 1955 (after Shatalin's removal) to eight in February 1956. This was the largest the secretariat had ever been except for the short-lived expanded secretariat elected at the 19th party congress. The executive duties of the secretariat appeared to be divided among the old members as follows: Khrushchev, of course, had general responsibility for the entire secretariat; Suslov, the second in command, had for several years had responsibility for relations with the satellite and other Communist parties and, judging from the emphasis on party organizational matters in his speech at the congress, may have had some responsibility for internal party affairs.
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EVOLUTION OF THE
PARTY SECRETARIAT
1952 - 1956 UNCLASSIFIED

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* Named First Secretary on 7 September 1953

matters.* Pospelov supervised propaganda and agitation activities and the party schools and academies for political and ideological research and training. Of the three secretaries added in July 1955, Aristov had been assigned responsibility for party organizational and personnel matters, and Belyayev for agriculture, but it is not clear what Shepilov's functions were. He had acted as special emissary to Nasir in July which suggests some involvement with foreign affairs, but this might not have been his special field of responsibility. All the secretaries

* Suslov may have had responsibility for this last field for a while prior to the addition of Aristov to the secretariat in July 1955 and he may have emphasized it at the congress because Aristov was otherwise occupied with the report of the credentials commission.
participated in protocol duties at diplomatic and state functions and, at one time or another, most had represented the regime in visits to foreign countries.

There were obviously other fields than those mentioned, and responsibility for them was presumably exercised by one or another of the existing secretaries. Aristov, for example, may have had responsibility for trade and finance bodies and the miscellany encompassed by the administrative department of the central party apparatus—courts, public prosecutor's office, organs of state control, the police and security forces, and health, social welfare, and physical culture organs. With the addition of Brezhnev and Furtseva in February 1956, some redistribution of responsibility was almost certainly contemplated. Brezhnev appeared fitted by training and experience for secretarial supervision of a variety of fields—agriculture, party organization, even industry—but his wartime service as a political officer and his post-Stalin assignment as a top official in the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense made him peculiarly qualified to supervise party control and political indoctrination in the armed forces. Unfortunately, Brezhnev's publicized activities as a secretary have not served to confirm this or any other as his specific fields of responsibility. Furtseva retained her post as Moscow City first secretary so she was able to devote only part time to central secretarial work. Her duties appear to have encompassed youth and women's affairs.

The central committee's "Bureau for the RSFSR," which Khrushchev told the congress should be organized to "provide more concrete and effective leadership of oblasts, krays, and autonomous republics of the Russian Republic," was a logical extension of
the organizational principle first employed in the creation in 1954 of departments of agriculture and of party organs for the RSFSR in the central committee apparatus. The new bureau corresponded somewhat to the party bureaus already existing in the other 15 republics (called "presidium" in the Ukraine) but differed in the method of its selection, i.e., it was elected by the all-Union central committee instead of a republic central committee. The RSFSR bureau was presumably intended to act as a junior presidium, making republic-level policy decisions for the Soviet Union's largest republic, and thus lightening the load on the all-Union party presidium, which had previously had the task of dealing directly with each of the RSFSR's 78 oblasts, krays, and autonomous republics as well as with the other 15 republics.

Political factors also played an important part in the creation of the bureau. From the very beginning it was dominated by Khrushchev. Not only was he made its chairman and one of his protégés, its deputy chairman, but with the possible exception of Puzanov, all the members were his friends and protégés. He thus strengthened his control of party affairs in the RSFSR, established a basis for direct intervention in the government of the republic, and assumed still another symbol of leadership.

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CONCLUSION

There seemed little doubt by the end of the congress that Khrushchev's position had been greatly strengthened. Malenkov and Molotov and, to a certain extent, Kaganovich had had to eat crow before the assembled representatives of party organizations throughout the Soviet Union; Khrushchev had strengthened his command of the party machine by packing the secretariat with friends and protégés; he had increased the voice of the party professional in top party counsels by adding four of his men from the party machine to the presidium as candidate members; and his policies had been given the authoritative stamp of approval by a party congress. With good reason, it would appear, Khrushchev was ebullient, self-confident, and seemingly secure in the knowledge of his power and influence.

The congress was thus an additional Khrushchev victory and an important step in his quest for dominion within the regime. At the same time, however, seeds of difficulty were sown for the first secretary. These, in the order in which they sprouted, were his secret "denigration-of-Stalin" speech, the adoption of a five-year plan which failed to recognize the seriousness of a number of economic problems or to provide sufficient flexibility for the economy to adapt quickly to changed conditions, and the retention on the party presidium of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich—men with adequate reason to hate him and fear the consequences of his leadership. Subsequent papers in this series will explore the development of the crises which stemmed from these acts and the changes in power relationships which accompanied the process.