Intelligence Report

YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE

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YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:

This study calls attention to particularist forces which have decentralized political authority and control within Yugoslavia to an extent unequaled in any Communist society. Whether these forces will undermine centralism is now at issue in Yugoslav debate, and the outlook for post-Tito stability will not become clear for some time. Nonetheless, Yugoslavia's character is in process of change, and the consequences of the eventual outcome -- federalist-centralist, tyrant-collegium -- are of growing moment for the Yugoslavs, the Russians, and the West.

This Staff and this study are indebted to the many constructive comments received from The Office of Current Intelligence, The Office of Economic Research, The Office of National Estimates, the Central Reference Service, The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and The Clandestine Services. The judgments of this study nonetheless remain those of this Staff and of the author, Mr. James V. Ogle. This study contains information available through 1 November 1970.

Hal Ford
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff
"In Yugoslavia, it is not only that the ruling League of Communists is no longer Marxist-Leninist, but it is not even a Yugoslav party. Corresponding to the federal divisions of the country, the League of Communists dissolved itself into six 'republican' parties which most often cannot even reach verbal agreements.... The untimely replacement of outworn structures with new ones opens the possibility for Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia...."

-- Milovan Djilas, New York Times, 30 October 1970
YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE

Contents

SUMMARY .................................................. i
PROLOGUE .................................................. 1

THE MANY FACES OF "SELF-MANAGEMENT"

The New Myth ............................................. 3
Self-Management As Direct Democracy ............. 6
Economic Self-Management ............................... 7

THE DECLINE OF CENTRALISM

The Fall of Rankovic and the Division of Cadre Control ........................................ 14
Formalizing the Autonomy of the Republic Parties ......................................................... 19
Reaction and Extremes .................................... 23

THE ADVOCATES AND INFLUENCE OF PLURALISM ........... 26

"COMINFORMISM": INTERNAL DISARRAY OR EXTERNAL THREAT?

The Central Campaign ................................... 34
The Campaign in Zagreb .................................. 36
The Soviet Threat: The Fire Behind the Smoke .... 39

THE TURNING POINT ....................................... 43

GLOSSARY AND BIOGRAPHIC NOTES ....................... 51
YUGOSLAVIA

International boundary

Republic boundary

Autonomous area boundary

National capital

Republic or autonomous area capital
YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE

Summary

The hysterical nature of charges and counter-charges concerning "Cominformism" in the first months of 1970 brought to light the existence of new and severe strains in Yugoslav political life. For these polemics embodied not only concern vis-a-vis Soviet activities in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, but also a public, "Aesopian" reflection of a fundamental reassessment of the Yugoslav political structure which had begun among top Yugoslav leaders. This regionalist-centralist reassessment has since become public. It has not yet been resolved. It may not be for some time.

Tito's towering status has obscured the fact that "Yugoslavia" is an invention of this century. The constituent republics -- Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia (with its autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo), Montenegro, and Macedonia -- continue to be distinct nations in their own right, with different histories and ethnic and cultural compositions. Each has different strengths in its struggle for identity within the federation: some elements profit from particularism, others from integration. A number of other forces, such as the relative dominance of leading personalities, different rates of economic growth, and dissent outside of the Communist establishment, cut across national lines and make Yugoslav stability particularly dependent upon strong and continuing central control.

The point is that much of such control has eroded in the past four years or so. The principal influences were let loose with the fall of Vice President Rankovic in July 1966. At that time the constituent republic Communist Parties, which had feared Serb hegemony in
Rankovic's centralism, became more free to develop their own power. In effect following the logic of Titoism, they succeeded in abolishing the central secretariat of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), emasculating as well the LCY's key cadre affairs department, and distributing much of the secret police's powers to the republics. Some republic officials have subsequently even pressed for a role in the sacrosanct areas of foreign affairs and, at least to some extent, defense. But in any event, the result has been a decentralizing of Communist authority and control unprecedented in Communist history.

At the same time, the uniquely Yugoslav concept of "self management," always prone to varied definition and consequence, has begun to reveal that it has too little substance in fact to constitute a basic cohesive for post-Tito Yugoslavia. This has been especially the case with respect to the Yugoslav invention of workers councils in local enterprises: many of their powers have been steadily whittled down because of the need to accommodate an ever larger market and the activities of ever larger production units being integrated across republic borders.

It was always recognized by internal critics of the Yugoslav system that what was becoming in effect a multi-party arrangement based on national constituencies threatened the state's integrity. Ever since the early 1950's, when Djilas was purged after proposing such ideas, Yugoslav intellectuals, with sporadic encouragement from some forces within the Party, have used the myth of self-management to argue for a pluralism on a different, non-geographical basis. Some hoped to cause pluralism to grow by giving life to the Party's traditional "transmission belts," the trade unions or the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWYP). Some thought it might evolve out of factions within the LCY. The Prague Spring of 1968 encouraged these dissident intellectuals to believe that their time had come, but the Soviet intervention blunted any such confrontation for the moment.
These were the chief issues, against the backdrop of Dubček's fall, which formed the context of the early 1970 Yugoslav furor over "Cominformism." In the arts, charges of "Cominformism" revealed simply the extreme sensitivity of the authorities to any public re-examination of Yugoslav history or its multinational composition. In Serb Belgrade, charges of "Cominformism" were leveled against those intellectuals whose advocacy of pluralism threatened the control which the Communists still exercised. In Croat Zagreb, "Cominformism" was reserved as a charge against those who sought other constituencies than the republic Party -- in other words, those who sought to dilute the power of the autonomous republic Party organization. Some of this furor included opportunistic and probably slanderous charges that certain political figures were virtual Soviet agents. The falsity of these accusations, however, cannot obscure evidence that Soviet subversive activities have indeed somewhat increased, against and within Yugoslavia. At the least this involves direct approaches by Soviet officials to discontented Yugoslavs; it may also include the renewal of "offensive" intelligence operations which exploit local particularist sentiments.

By mid-1970, the many troubles with the "self-management" system, the increased fear of Soviet imperialism, and the necessity of paying increased regard to the succession question, had made urgent the countering of particularist instability. Accordingly, in September 1970 a special Party group, led by Edvard Kardelj and backed by Tito, began a fundamental restructuring plan for the Yugoslav political system. Their most urgent matter is the creation of a collective presidency (consisting of two or three leaders from each republic, plus an as yet undetermined number of representatives from other socio-political organizations) which can pave the way for the succession. Even if this new organ does come into being in early 1971, at the expiration of President Tito's present term, it will of course not threaten Tito's primacy or constitute more than a precondition for more far-reaching change. It is Kardelj's apparent desire to guarantee the autonomy of the republics in every tolerable sphere, but to prevent them from being
able to paralyze the central government in matters deemed essential to the federation. In the interests of this change, Kardelj may be prepared to create political forces outside of the contending republic leagues of Communists, and may even be prepared to enforce republic acceptance of the restoration of key central powers by administrative diktat. In the latter case he would of course either have to restore the prerogatives of the central Party apparat, or to rely upon the Army.

The next few years may see a more open and even more bitter debate along the lines of those to date. The principal issue will be the survival of the federation. There is a real potential for catastrophe -- the contingencies of Croatian secession, Serbian military rule, civil war, and Soviet intervention will haunt the debate. Precisely because the alternatives are so bleak, Tito, Kardelj, and other centralists will continue to search for means through which the federation structure can survive. The republic Parties may accordingly yield powers in the interest of this overriding goal, and new power centers may consequently evolve, perhaps even more different from the original Soviet model. But whether Yugoslavia thus evolves, or comes to other structures through more revolutionary means -- the result, say, of the particularist genie remaining stubbornly outside of the bottle, and/or of Kardelj attempting to impose a centralist military solution -- significant consequences may be in store for Yugoslavia and, accordingly, perhaps for East and West.
The dominant person of Tito and the history of his Yugoslavia have obscured for outside observers a fact which Yugoslav politicians never forget: that their constituents are not Yugoslavs, but Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Slovenes, Albanians, Moslems, Catholics, or Orthodox. Yugoslavia has existed only since 1918, the constituent nations for a thousand years before that. Any discussion of Yugoslavia must begin with a reminder of this basic fact, especially important in present Yugoslav debates over questions whose definitions change as internal borders are crossed.

The basic cleavage between the developed northwest -- Slovenia and Croatia -- and the underdeveloped southeast republics -- nearly all of the rest -- builds on the heritage of cultural differences, Roman Catholic and Orthodox (or Moslem), respectively. Slovenia is by far the richest republic but it is by itself too small to threaten the life of the federation. It is the Croat aspiration for an autonomous Croatia that has been the chief source of strain in the Yugoslav political system; with only half the population of Serbia, Croatia almost equals Serbia in its contribution to Yugoslavia's wealth. But it is ancient Serbia, the core around which the artificial "Yugoslavia" was created, that is the natural leader of any integral Yugoslav state. Even with the historic factors of the Serb royal house and Orthodox Church removed, over 50 percent of the Yugoslav Communists are Serbs. Serbia's chief ally is tiny Montenegro, a fiercely independent miniature Serbia, which has always provided, and still provides, a disproportionate number of Belgrade's high officials. For the time being, multinational Bosnia-Hercegovina follows the conservative, unitarian Serb. The sixth republic, Macedonia, the "apple of discord" lying between Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania, and
Greece, has chosen in recent years to ally itself with the developed north.*

These differences account for the many currents of particularism which have run through the history of Yugoslavia. Anomalies have always existed. A leading politician at the center can come to espouse centralism regardless of his nationality, and both the centralist and the particularist arguments can be put forward in defense of "progressive" economic policies. Yugoslav intellectuals and the representatives of various interest groups can and have argued for a pluralism, opposed to the power monopoly of the Communists, on an all-Yugoslav basis which has nothing in common with and is often explicitly opposed to geographic particularism.

Over 1,700,000 Yugoslavs lost their lives in the Second World War, more often than not killed by other Yugoslavs. When the proletarian brigades of Belgrade took to the Bosnian hills, Tito's Partisans became the only refuge for anti-fascist Serbs persecuted by Croats or anti-fascist Croats persecuted by Serbs. This sudden multi-national influence, reinforced by Stalinist discipline and under the personal union of Tito, could possibly have overcome the pulling power of the national units making up Yugoslavia. But when the Cominform expelled Tito in 1948, and he sought justification in national rights thereafter, the way was opened for a further evolution of the centrifugal forces inherent in Yugoslavia's multi-nationalism.

*See "Glossary and Biographic Notes" for a brief statistical and historical description of the several republics.
THE MANY FACES OF "SELF-MANAGEMENT"

At the Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party in July 1948, three weeks after Yugoslavia had been expelled from the Cominform, Tito ended his speech with the words "Long live the Soviet Union, long live Stalin!" This was neither so suicidal nor so naive as it appears. In a certain sense he might have been taken aback by the turn of events, since he had been one of the founders of the Cominform and was busily building a state on Stalinist patterns. But by the same token he knew how to protect his state and himself in a Stalinist fashion. At his bidding, and under the guidance of Party Secretary Aleksandar Rankovic and State Secretary for Internal Affairs Svetislav Stefanovic, local "Cominformists" were rounded up for imprisonment on Tito's Adriatic Devil's Island, Goli Otok: 4,000 in 1949, over 3,000 in 1950, 2,500 in 1951, and over 1,000 in 1952; in March 1956, after the first Soviet Yugoslav rapprochement, the National Assembly was told that 15,800 "Cominformists" had been prosecuted between 1948 and 1955.

Perhaps more important than neutralizing these actual or potential enemies was the need for a new myth, a new ideological framework. In justifying his closing words at that Fifth Congress, Tito noted, according to his biographer Dedijer, that loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union had been the myth which had supported the Partisan resistance, and that he could not drop it overnight. Yet he could not persist in encouraging so treasonous a loyalty. Thus he now needed the support of the workers and the republics against Stalin and the Soviet Union. The formulation which eventually emerged, "self-management," has become the touchstone of Yugoslav Communism. Indeed, the mere suspicion of opposition to
self-management has since merited the immediate charge of "Cominformism." But the haphazard way in which this has come to pass is underscored by the fact that Rankovic, who rounded up the 15,000 "real" Cominformists, and Milovan Djilas, who invented self-management, are now in retirement and disgrace -- both building seaside villas in Dubrovnik.

The dissident Yugoslav Communist Djilas has described how he and Edvard Kardelj (the other of Tito's three lieutenants, and the only one still in favor) conceived self-management. Djilas' inspiration had been Marx' "free association of producers." At first, Kardelj approved of the idea only in principle, but later, when the trade union leaders proposed abolishing the workers councils which had sprung up spontaneously, Kardelj suggested that Djilas' idea be associated with the workers councils. On this basis Tito accepted it, and "The Basic Law on Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by Working Collectives," the Magna Charta of Yugoslav self-management Communism, was adopted on 27 June 1950. The Party of course remained in command and even the ostensible democracy of the workers councils did not extend beyond the framework of a single firm. The new system could not solve any of the key questions of society and the nation. Not only has Djilas acknowledged this since, but the entire thrust of recent developments in Yugoslavia testifies to the leadership's acceptance of such charges against the self-management system.

One of the chief impediments for an outsider in understanding this recent Yugoslav re-evaluation has been the fact that self-management has come to mean many things. At the most abstract level it is everything that Yugoslavia is and the Soviet Union is not. It is a value judgment. It means "good," just as "Soviet" means "good" in the Soviet Union.

The term self-management is also used with at least four completely different meanings by different forces in Yugoslav society with special axes to grind.
First, for Communist Party functionaries throughout Yugoslavia, it is a sanctifying phrase meaning roughly "direct democracy," justifying the reality of non-democratic Communist rule over non-Communists. The more-or-less equivalent slogan in the USSR is the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Secondly, for Yugoslav workers, self-management is an economic concept referring to the degree of autonomy they have been granted in the control of their local enterprises through their local workers councils. This is the meaning with which the term was used by Djilas. Unfortunately, self-management in this sense is a form of economic administration which for several reasons has grown increasingly obsolete.

Thirdly, self-management is the label used by the Communist Party leaders of the different Yugoslav republics to justify their own aspirations to increase their local authority at the expense of the powers of the central Party and government apparatus in Belgrade.

Finally, the phrase self-management has been used by many Yugoslav intellectuals as a shield behind which to agitate for a pluralistic, representative, multi-party social democracy.*

The first two of these meanings are the original and basic ones, and will be considered first. The latter two -- as used by the republic Party leaders and by the

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*Some would also include under "self-management" the decentralization of decision-making and reliance on the market mechanism in economics and freedom of expression in cultural matters. But these appear in societies which lay no claim to self-management and even, to a limited extent, in Communist countries which actively condemn self-management. Besides, these aspects also involve "technocratism" and "elitism" which the Yugoslavs condemn as being opposed to self-management.
dissident pluralists -- will be examined later, as part of the ongoing Party struggle since the fall of Rankovic.

Self-Management as "Direct Democracy"

Representative democracy involves an organized, legitimate pluralism made up of competing political parties or interest groups with access to the polls and the communications media. Although there is much more freedom of expression in Yugoslavia than in any other Communist state, pluralism remains proscribed by such official ideologists of self management as LCY Executive Bureau member Edvard Kardelj. As chief ideologist under Tito and as Tito's most likely successor (at least for the short term), Kardelj's views are of crucial importance.

Kardelj's reputation for supposed liberalism stems in part from his defense of nationhood against the Cominform in 1948, his espousal of self-management in 1950, and his cultivation of the federal legislature in the first half of the 1960's. It springs also from the fact that Kardelj has always kept open his lines of communication with West European Social Democrats. He is detested by the Soviets, who regard him, with some reason, as the most revisionist theoretician in power in any Communist country. He is willing to accept political pluralism in advanced, Western countries, as is required by the parliamentary road to socialism, a doctrine which he espouses.

Nevertheless, Kardelj is not considered a liberal by many of his colleagues who feel that his theorizing could lead him as easily in authoritarian directions. His opposition to political pluralism in Yugoslavia (which he has termed a "reactionary" concept) could be documented at length. One recent example is a revealing interview with the editor of Die Neue Gesellschaft, reprinted in Borba, 10 January 1970, in which Kardelj states that "the problem now is to broaden the existing forms and find new, democratic ones which will grow organically from self-management; that is, to ensure that the classical representative democratic system is replaced by a democratic system based on the forms of a direct self-managing democracy at the social base." Asked: "Is not this a utopian goal? How should it function?" Kardelj replied:

-6-
"You ask too much." Most recently, in introducing the
new proposals for a collective presidency to succeed
Tito, Kardelj emphasized that the changes in the assembly
system should not change it "into an organization of the
conventional parliamentary type."

Thus "direct democracy," one of the meanings of
self-management, is indeed utopian. To ask how it would
work is indeed to ask too much, for in practice it has
been pretty much a fraud. Despite multiple candidates
and relatively free parliamentary debate, classical
Communist results are generally provided for, in that
the elections and the nominations are controlled by the
front organization, the Socialist Alliance of Working
People of Yugoslavia, SAWPY, which is the transmission
belt for the Party.

Many Yugoslavs would like to see SAWPY develop
into an independent political force, competing with the
Party, but this has not happened. And while the Com-
munist Parties of the various republics do compete with
one another in Belgrade, the injunctions against faction-
alism, as embodied in the principle of democratic cen-
tralism, are still enforced by the republic parties in
regard to their own members. These qualifications will
be discussed in greater detail below, but the point here
is that self-management, in the sense of "direct demo-
cracy," does not provide the citizen any leverage at the
polls. There is, as yet, no mechanism whereby an issue
can be taken to the people for decision.

Economic Self-management

In its narrowest sense, self-management means a
form of economic administration by the workers councils
of individual enterprises. Part of the function of the
local workers' council has been to decide about some mat-
ters which in the Soviet Union are the nominal concern
of the same trade unions, in fact of the state. The social
services provided the workers and the collective contract
under which they worked have thus been determined by the
workers council, with the Yugoslav trade unions playing
little or no role at the factory level. To the consider-
able extent that local worker control of the workers
council has not been diluted by Party interference, the
Yugoslav worker has indeed had rights denied his fellows
in other Communist countries. The workers councils have
also had some role -- a much more limited one -- in helping
to determine the composition of management. This function
is unique both in the East and the West. To this extent,
self-management by the workers councils is not fraudulent.

The heart of economic self-management, however,
the control by the workers councils over the disposition
do profits, is another matter. Here a combination of
factors -- the growing rival power of the factory managers,
the politics of state institutions, and the requirements
economic rationality -- have united to whittle down
the powers of the workers councils and the reality of
self-management.

From 1950 to 1954, at a time when the amount of
profit which workers councils could freely dispose of
was small, there were few regulations governing how the
workers councils were to dispose of their share of the
income. Frequently the councils spent all their freely
disposable profits on extra wages, bonuses, holidays,
and sprees for the workers, making no provision for de-
preciation or for accumulation of capital for investment.
New laws in 1954, while extending the system of workers
councils to every kind of economic enterprise, tightened
control over the financial activities of the councils.
The funds available for local distribution have since in-
creased fairly constantly, but centrally-set regulations
have structured this distribution. For example, the
egalitarianism of the early years (in 1955, for example,
a manager earned only twice as much as a skilled worker)
was largely eliminated by 1957 when wages were divided
into a fixed portion (set by workers council, trade union
branch, and local People's Committee), and a variable
portion (essentially a profit share). Enterprises began
to compete with each other by offering higher basic wages
to attract skilled workers.

The reforms of 1965 decreased decision-making by
the state, increased enterprise responsibility, and
increased reliance on the market, all without increasing the powers of the workers councils to distribute "surplus value." These changes did, however, increase the power of the technocrats and managers: e.g., in 1963, in the more developed republics, the federal, republic, and local governments were making 48 percent of the investments, while the enterprises and banks made 44 percent; in 1969, the government share had dropped to eight percent while enterprises (with 32 percent) and banks (with 54 percent) controlled 86 percent of the investments in the more developed republics. There has been a similar trend in the less developed republics as well, but here the federal government still, in 1969, controlled 28 percent of investment, a proportion exceeded only by the banks (with 37 percent).*

Nevertheless, the disposal of "surplus value," a managerial function not exercised by workers elsewhere in the world, is the vital link tying self-management to Marxist theory. According to the Yugoslavs, the capitalist in the West and the bureaucrat in the East dispose of the producer's profits which are thus "alienated" from the producer. The Yugoslav system pretends to attack this injustice at its root. The violation of this theory in practice (the siphoning off of "surplus value" through federal or republic taxes, obligatory loans, or "bureaucratic" management) was formerly explained by the Party as a transitional matter, deriving from Yugoslavia's need to catch up. In the end, it was said, this "alienation" would be overcome through self-management. The Yugoslavs are now facing up to the fact that self-management, in this sense, becomes even less feasible as backwardness is overcome, for it is completely incompatible with large scale production and marketing problems of modern industry. Worker council control of the distribution of income can continue only in the smallest enterprises, such as bakeries and repair shops, which are uninfluenced by the world market.

*See ER IM 70-61, May 1970, "Regional Conflicts in Yugoslav Economic Development," for a detailed discussion of these problems.
Leadership speeches and LCY resolutions increasingly ignore the empty promise of a future without "alienation"; they concentrate on the need for integration and a new meaning for self-management. Examples:

a. Tito to the Ninth Party Congress in March 1969:

In conditions where the laws of the market and goods production are operating and where rapid changes in modern technology are taking place, only strong economic organizations can be the real motive forces and bearers of material progress.

b. The introduction to that congress’ resolution, titled "Further Development in Yugoslavia on the Bases of Self-Management":

Stress should be placed on economic integration rather than autarky; the technological revolution is changing the mode of production from top to bottom.


There is a difficult task in maintaining an equilibrium between self-management, with its implied particularism, and the need to avoid any delays in technological advances which require broad integration of 'supra-company' structures.

d. LCY Executive Bureau member Miroslav Pecujlic, at the 15 December 1969 meeting of the LCY Presidium:

The Yugoslav community is proceeding through a process of technological modernization, creation of greater integrational entities, and the introduction of 'richer' forms of self-management. Therefore, the LCY can no longer be satisfied with solutions that were applied during the initial phases of self-management.
e. The ideological theses published after the 22 April 1970 LCY Presidium meeting:

There is an increasingly rapid transition to technological modernization, including the formation of large integrated entities; the earlier forms of self-management cannot deal with these complicated currents.

f. Dusan Petrovic, president of the Council of the Yugoslav Trade Union Federation, at a 1 June 1970 session of the Conference of the Serbian League of Communists:

According to certain of our analyses, in many cases in integrated work organizations not only is there no further development of self-management, but the existing self-managing structure is being eroded. There is a tendency for integration to limit the direct self-managing rights of workers.

g. A three day conference which opened on 14 May 1970, organized by the Belgrade Association for Research in Self-managing Activities:

The problem of the self-managing establishment of rules in integrated enterprises is completely neglected. With the integration of work organizations large business systems are being formed in which large amounts of funds are concentrated. These systems lack stable organizational, self-managing, and business foundations. On this basis centers of power are being built which oppose self-management as the system governing social relations.

Furthermore, the problems created by integration are compounded by the still-unresolved problems stemming from the 15th Amendment to the Constitution passed in
December 1968, a change authorizing the creation of the business boards which could take over specific management functions, as decided by the workers council. Party leaders (including Kardelj) have since complained that the "incorrect interpretation" of the 15th Amendment has led to a technocrat resurgence, that technicians and experts have come to dominate the new business boards, a development which threatens the Party aktiv in an enterprise more than it does the workers. By late March 1970, trade union criticism of the 15th Amendment had received legislative and judicial recognition, but not whole-hearted support. The trade unions had charged that only directors and heads of departments were being elected to the new business boards, which created "a dangerous bureaucratic-technocratic base in the self-government system." The Federal Assembly instructed its constitutional commission to look into it, and the Yugoslav Constitutional Court delivered a judiciously ambiguous opinion: It was not to be concluded, the Court said, that self-management was the exclusive right of working organizations; on the contrary, self-management was a system of "integrated structures" in a "vertical and horizontal sense."

Very recent authoritative statements by Tito, Kardelj, and others make it clear that the needed overhaul of self-management is not a matter restricted to economic enterprises and development, but a broad one referring to the entire social-political sphere. Kardelj has called this (10 July 1970) a "turning point" in the further development "not only of self-management but of our society in general." Tito made it obvious (21 September 1970) that the debates on self-management which
have taken place in recent months have been intended in part to prepare for "a completely new sphere" of questions. A new turning point in economics, politics, and government structure has indeed been reached.*

*The feedback between the economic crisis and the political one is illustrated by the fact that the medium-term plan for 1971-1975, which should have been submitted by 30 June 1970, will now not be adopted before October 1971. Both Premier Ribicic and an October 1970 conference of economists have gone on record to the effect that any economic plan adopted before the reorganization of the political system would be rendered meaningless. In the meantime, lack of certainty in economic planning and the high rate of inflation threaten to compound the political crisis. The price freeze announced at the end of October 1970 was only a stopgap measure.
THE DECLINE OF CENTRALISM

The Fall of Rankovic and the Division of Cadre Control

The developments concerning self-management achieve proper, heightened, significance only against the backdrop of the marked particularist forces which have been at work over the past four-eight years. As Yugoslav political figures have admitted, two different concepts -- integration versus regional particularism -- have been present from the outset of attempts to apply self-management. High-level debate on just these issues occurred at least as far back as 1962, at a then secret three-day session of the LCY Executive Committee and Secretariat. For several years thereafter, both Tito and Rankovic (at that time his designated heir, Vice President, and LCY Secretary) strongly supported centralist integration.

Tito's enthusiasm for centralism was temporarily lost when Rankovic was found guilty, at the Brioni Plenum in July 1966, of misusing his control of the Administration for State Security. The main point was that Rankovic was using these powers to build up a degree of central authority which, considering his strength in the Serbian and Montenegrin parties, seemed to constitute an intolerable threat to the other republic leaders. The widely-accepted story that Rankovic was conspiring with the Soviets and/or was planning to push Tito aside did not figure in the public charges. Although there is reason to believe that such fears motivated those, including Tito, who united against Rankovic, the fundamental issue was centralism versus particularism and the reluctance of the central apparatus, controlled by Rankovic, to carry out the decentralizing economic reforms authorized by the Eighth Congress in 1964 and the plan modifications introduced by the Federal Assembly, under Kardelj, in 1965. The immediate result of the forced resignation of Rankovic was the abolition of the central LCY Secretariat and the distribution to the republics of many of the powers of
the Administration for State Security, which lost half its personnel. Even more important for the long run was the fact that in the years to follow the central Yugoslav apparatus was systematically divested of that locus of central Communist power which traditionally resides with the organizational secretary and the cadre affairs department of the Central Committee -- i.e., the custodians of the "nomenklatura," the right of the Party leadership to appoint all leaders in the Party and state apparatus.

From the beginning this function had been given a different cast in Yugoslavia by the necessity of apportioning the very top jobs among representatives of the various constituent republics: this still involves bargaining among them.* But the federal apparatus fell under the organizational secretary of the LCY, Rankovic, and it was packed, and still is packed, as the minority republic leaders publicly complain, with Serbians and Montenegrins.**

*Since the Ninth LCY Congress in March 1969, this bargaining over top federal jobs has apparently taken place in the 15-man Executive Bureau of the LCY Presidium, created by the Congress, in which all republics are represented.

**The charges and counter-charges in this regard were dramatically illustrated by two reports made public on 7 July 1970. The Zagreb Domestic Service noted that the Croatian Assembly Commission for Elections and Appointments had discussed federal cadre policy and expressed the conviction that the principle of parity should extend to all federal administration departments. At the same time, the Belgrade Domestic Service reported the trial of a professor in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, for having made "false statements by claiming that Serbians and Montenegrins are predominantly employed in the federal organs and in higher schools in Mostar." What was an official demand in particularist Croatia was a crime to support in pro-centralist Bosnia.
In May 1967, the man who had headed the LCY Commission for Cadre Affairs under Rankovic was removed and the commission itself was apparently abolished in mid-1968; in any event, it did not figure in the list of new appointments published after the March 1969 Congress. Today, what are left of central cadre functions are taken care of by a Commission for the Development of the League of Communists, a commission which had existed previously alongside the cadre commission to deal with other matters such as the recruiting of Party members.* There is every indication that this vestigial LCY cadre commission has few of the appointment powers possessed by the central cadre departments of other Communist countries.

The turning point seems to have been the LCY Central Committee resolution on cadre policy adopted on 17 July 1968, when Rankovic's cadre commission was apparently abolished. This resolution hailed a change toward a more public cadre policy, and sharply limited the authority of what were referred to as special cadre organs (otherwise unnamed). In the most significant break with the universal practice in other Communist states, the resolution condemned the selection of cadres by a hidden, small group of leaders. The resolution also urged a reduction in the absolute number of federal and republic cadres, and called for equal or "proportional" (not yet "parity" as was later demanded) representation of nations and republics in federal bodies. Cadre policy, the resolution said, was to reside in the hands of self-management organs and representative bodies; Party offices were to be filled by election and the most important role in election of LCY (federal) organs was to go to the "communal [county] conferences" and "the organs of the republic leagues [parties]." The LCY Congress was to retain only a verification role in such election.

*The same reorganization took place in all the republic parties which use the same terminology--except in ultra-conservative Montenegro, where the commission is called "Commission for the Development of the League of Communists and Cadre Policy."
The latest LCY document on cadre policy, drafted between July and September 1970, is based on the parity principle and concludes that "the chief protagonists of the cadre policy in the federation should be the republics and the provinces." In presenting this draft to the Presidium on 18 September, LCY Executive Bureau member and new "cadre" commission president, the outspoken young Croat Mika Tripalo, stressed that "not a single official who does not enjoy the support and the consensus of his republic should be elected to carry out federation political functions," although he specified that the initiative for an appointment could come either from the republics or from the federal organs; where "parity" could not be achieved, the formulation "more uniform" was to be applied because "at present the greater majority in the federal administration comes from one republic." Tripalo did not name Serbia in this regard but he did name the most sensitive federal organs involved -- the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs, and the Yugoslav People's Army. It seems clear that the federal apparatus no longer controls appointments in the republics and is being challenged regarding federal appointments as well.

The question of who chooses the top republic leaders, especially the presidents of the central committees, remains. In the case of most republic parties this also seems to be very largely an internal affair -- again, a sharp contrast with the practice in other parties in the Communist world. One glaring exception, however, exists: the present President of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, Marko Nikezic, does not seem to have been the first choice of the Serbian apparatus. The election of Nikezic in November 1968 was generally evaluated as a defeat for the pro-Rankovic forces, and it apparently precipitated a crisis in Serbia. While a genuinely "democratic" election (at the Serbian Central Committee or Congress level) probably would not have resulted in the election of Rankovic to this post neither would it have resulted in the election of a liberal whose entire career had been outside the Serbian party.
In all other republics, the current presidents of the central committees appear to be the choice of the local powers in the republic apparatus from whence they come, subject to Tito's approval.* The explanation for the Serbian anomaly must be sought in Tito's continuing overriding influence and in the disarray caused by the removal of Rankovic only two years before (Nikezic was the fourth person to head the Serbian Party since the Brioni Plenum in mid-1966). With the passage of time and the passing of Tito, the Serbian Party can be expected to reassert its prerogatives on a par with those exercised by other parties already. Given the size of the Serbian Party, and the minority republic fear of Serb hegemony, this will introduce a new disturbance into Yugoslav political life. Indeed, by October 1970 there were reports that Nikezic had succeeded in "modernizing" the Serbian Party to such an extent that it was competing with the Croats on their own ground and extending Serbian economic influence into Croatia.

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* Tito's creation of the Executive Bureau of the LCY at the Ninth Congress called a number of republic leaders to Belgrade, but apparently for the time being, at least, did not curtail their power in the republics. In Croatia, Vladimir Bakaric was replaced by Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, formerly President of the Croatian Executive Council. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, Cvijetin Mijatovic was replaced by Branko Mikulic, formerly President of the Executive Council of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In Macedonia, Krste Crvenkovski was replaced by Angel Cemerski, formerly Secretary of the League of Communists of Macedonia. The republic congresses prior to the LCY Ninth Congress had already elected new presidents of the central committees in Montenegro (Veselin Djuranovic, with an almost exclusively Montenegrin career) and in Slovenia (Franc Popit, with a purely Slovenian professional background) as well as in Serbia.
The changes since mid-1968 cast doubt on the ability of the LCY center in Belgrade to control political life after the passing of Tito. There is still an LCY "apparatus" -- the LCY Presidium continues to have a Department for International Relations, a research center, 14 permanent and several temporary commissions, and other auxiliary organs. The formal drafting of Presidium resolutions rests with these commissions still. But the filling of offices, the essential political function in any system, now lies largely with the republic parties, subject only to the intervention of Tito and independent of significant centralized institutional control.

Such a radical transformation, unparalleled in any other ruling party, could not help but be disruptive. As the senior Serb politician and LCY Executive Bureau member Mijalko Todorovic was to recall at the Third Plenum in May 1969, the political atmosphere of 1968 was tense, "pregnant with disputes, convulsions, and bitter polemics" which created favorable ground for "strengthening antagonistic and centrifugal tendencies."

**Formalizing the Autonomy of the Republic Parties**

As later noted by LCY Executive Bureau member Krste Crvenkovski, it was the Ninth Congress of the LCY, in March 1969, which "rounded off" the emancipation of the republic party organizations.

For the first time, congresses of the republic party organizations preceded this congress of the LCY itself. The ostensible, publicized reason was that this was the democratic thing to do. The real reason may well have been that the republic congresses could no
longer be counted on to ratify the LCY resolutions without argument.* But even with such embarrassment avoided, the Ninth Congress was stormy. The Congress commission hearing on the resolution on Socio-Economic Relations was attended by 482 of the some 1,000 delegates. They were not passive: 73 of them spoke, 107 presented their views in writing, and 58 amendments were presented of which 10 were adopted in toto and 13 in part. This active participation was praised as a fruit of self-management. But it also reflected a conflict between the decentralizing statutory changes on the one hand forced through the Congress by the republic party leaders with Tito's consent, and on the other the mood of the Congress delegates themselves, only a minority of whom came from those republics whose party apparatuses benefited from the changes.**

The statutes adopted at the Eighth Party Congress in 1964 had already been modified in the republics' favor at the Fifth Plenum in 1966, after the fall of Rankovic. The 1964 statutes had spelled out the organization and function of republic party organizations; the 1969 statutes now permit each republic party (or league) to adopt its own statutes and form its own organizations. And whereas

*It should be noted that the congresses saw a far-reaching rejuvenation of the republic parties and the removal of many of the old "partisans" who had been so heavily represented in the central committees. All the central committees were reduced to about half their previous size and almost 70 percent of the members of the new central committees were holding such office for the first time.

**The delegates were elected by communal conferences on the basis of one delegate per 1,000 members, giving the Serbs, who account for over 50 percent of the LCY membership, a majority which they enjoy in no other Party organ. The Congress and the Conference (where the permanent delegates, constituting one quarter of the total, are elected on a parity basis) are the only federal LCY organs not composed of equal numbers from each republic party regardless of size.
the 1964 statutes had recognized the autonomy of republic congresses, the 1969 statutes emphasize the rights of republic parties to create their own policies and programs.

This is a fundamental change, reminiscent of a similar evolution in Yugoslav constitutional treatment of republic governmental rights. The original post-war state theory had given the republics only one moment of sovereignty, when deciding to join the federation, after which independence was treasonable. Now, the republic governments, thanks to Constitution Amendment 16, adopted in December 1968, are sovereign in all matters not reserved to the federation. The 1968 amendment specifies the following as federal functions: enacting legal codes; establishing sources and types of revenues obtained through taxation of assets, products, and services; and guaranteeing basic liberties, the unity of the economic system and market, and the uniform foundations of the socio-economic and political system. The Constitution is now being given a very strict construction in this regard by the advocates of republic autonomy.

According to the Ninth Congress resolution titled "Ideological-Political Bases of the Further Development of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," which Yugoslav commentators say should be read in conjunction with the statutes, the new role of the LCY "supercedes one-party political monopoly and at the same time eliminates the bases for a multi-party system." By re-emphasizing democratic centralism (the interdiction against factionalism), while recognizing that "a self-managing society presupposes the existence of a large number of centers of decision making," the resolution significantly concludes: "One of the essential aspects of the reform of the LCY is manifested in the need to further strengthen the role, influence, and responsibility of the Leagues of Communists of the socialist republics, as independent organizations within the united LCY." Although the statutes specify that members of the republic leagues are concurrently members of the LCY, it is the republic leagues which are the highest court of appeal in membership issues. In exceptional cases a central organ of the LCY can expel a member, but a member expelled by a lower party organization
has no appeal to Belgrade.*

By long rearrangement, the LCY Central Committee was dropped. The new leading organs are the Congress, meeting every five years, a 280 member Conference, meeting annually, and a 52 member Presidium with equal representation from the various republics and a smaller representation from Kosovo, Vojvodina and the Army. As the result of a surprise proposal by Tito, a 15-member Executive Bureau of the Presidium, also based on equal representation (the President of the LCY, two each from the republics, and one each from the provinces, but none from the Army), is placed at the head of the Party. This has been widely interpreted in the West as a guarantee of collective rule in the succession period, as insurance against another Rankovic episode. But it can also be seen as an effort to separate republic leaders from their regional power bases, because those elected to the Executive Bureau could not remain at the head of their republic parties. This necessitated the election of new republic leaders in those republics (Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia) where a new leader had not been elected by the preceding republic congresses.

In the light of most recent developments, it can be seen that Tito's concern in 1969 was as much for the system as for the succession. The creation of the Executive Bureau was a first organizational recoil from centrifugal tendencies. But by September 1970, a year and a half later, Tito seemed uncertain that this first attempt had succeeded.

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*The Congress resolution titled "Further Development in Yugoslavia on the Bases of Self-Management" also called for "strengthening the role, independence and responsibility of the republics."
Reaction and Extremes

At the March 1969 Congress, only one important leader unambiguously defended the integral concept of "Yugoslavism." Milos Zanko, then Vice President of the Croatian Parliament, introduced an amendment urging that Yugoslav "socialist patriotism" be developed as an internationalist (i.e., inter-republic) awareness of membership in the "socialist community of workers of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia." And reference to that amendment was drowned out, at one point, by applause, from what one participant has called the "iceberg of conservative opinion" -- the Serbian centralist majority which was otherwise unable to express itself at the Congress.

Nonetheless, succeeding months saw the advocates of republic autonomy push their advantage, divesting the central federation of more and more functions. Whatever their resentment or misgivings in this regard, the Serbs were not able to stem the tide. And whereas Kardelj, in August 1969, could successfully rebuke his fellow Slovenes for going too far, he apparently failed, in December 1969, in an attempt to intervene on behalf of the integrationist Zanko when the Croat Party decided to settle their score with him.*

Another principal centralist-particularist hassle concerned Slovene road projects, when in July 1969 the Federal Executive Council excluded them from the upcoming installment of a loan financed by the International Reconstruction and Development Bank. The Slovenes thereupon mobilized public protests. The August session of the LCY Executive Bureau backed the Federal Executive Council, which then rejected the Slovene request for reversal. Kardelj, in Ljubljana, (August 1969) called the Slovene revolt the straw that broke the camel's back,

*For the Zanko case, see below, in the section on "The Campaign in Zagreb."
adding that strikes in factories or even student demonstrations were much less harmful than the directed pressures he saw "organized, directed, and implemented by the leading structures of our society itself, from the communes, through the republics, to the Federation." It is noteworthy that Kardelj took this occasion to warn against the great danger of "ultra-radical liberalism" which he said had weakened the Party leadership in Czechoslovakia.*

The central background to this Slovene affair has been the feeling on the one hand that, for years, the developed republics have been footing the bill for the underdeveloped, while on the other, the belief in the underdeveloped areas that the vast disparities in standards of living have been aggravated by the Ninth Congress rejection of "egalitarianism." Such conflicting sentiments came to a head in early 1970 in regard to Kosovo, the poorest area in Yugoslavia and the one most vulnerable to outside agitation; for, though a province of Serbia, Kosovo (67 percent Albanian) was a burden the Serbs could not bear alone. A Presidium plenum action of 22 April 1970 brought a promise from Slovenia and Croatia to help in the development of Kosovo, but it also resulted in a restatement of minimum powers for the federation and in promises of cadre policy changes favoring the developed minority republics. The terms of the new agreement on aid were not announced immediately. One of the concessions seems to have been the provision of favorable terms to enterprises in

---*Kardelj did not argue for increased central powers in the economic sphere. On the contrary, he said that, in order to avoid political crises "all of us together should set ourselves the task of resolutely reducing the functions -- and with them the responsibilities -- of the Federation." In closing, however, Kardelj urged that in residual matters "let the Federation truly be able to make effective decisions, when necessary by the majority principle."
developed republics which are willing to merge with enterprises in underdeveloped areas. Another concession, rather defensively voiced by Slovene and Croat spokesmen, is that aid to underdeveloped areas cannot be at the expense of the standard of living in the developed areas. On the contrary, an even higher pay scale for Slovene and Croat skilled workers and experts is being urged in order to woo them back from jobs in Western Europe.

This Kosovo outcome scored another victory -- as have, successively, the Brioni Plenum (where Rankovic was ousted in July 1966), the Constitutional amendments adopted in December 1968, and the Ninth Congress in March 1969 -- for those forces pressing for republic autonomy. And republic leaders have since kept up such pressures. Even the sacrosanct matter of defense and foreign policy have not been immune from efforts to secure a greater local voice. The policy of "all-people's defense," first announced in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, has created virtual territorial armies, albeit with a guerrilla warfare orientation and with an ostensible central control diluting republic control.* Republic claims for an increased foreign policy role were put forward in Croatia and Bosnia in February 1970, in Serbia in March 1970, and in Montenegro in April 1970. It of course remains questionable whether the republics will really be able to achieve a significant foothold in either foreign affairs or defense.

*Colonel General Viktor Bubanj, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army, addressing the First Conference of the LCY on 29 October 1970, noted that the Yugoslav People's Army would be "inconceivable" without "Yugoslav socialist patriotism" and warned that it would be a "most dangerous" deviation for anyone to consider only the defense of his own village or republic.
THE ADVOCATES AND INFLUENCE OF PLURALISM

The official interpretation of the self-management myth, as previously sketched, has traditionally rejected all pluralism which might lead to Western-type representative democracy. But from the time of Djilas on, the polemics with the Soviet Union have permitted a certain latitude to advocates of pluralism, that is, of organized group interest representation on a non-geographic basis. Despite some obstructionism and occasional censure, the freedom for political theorists in Yugoslavia goes far beyond that permitted in any other Communist country. This in itself might be considered a form of genuine pluralism. But even in Yugoslavia, there have been jails for those whose theories embarrass or threaten the regime, for those who go so far as to propose a "political platform." The central question now is whether the political system debate which began in September 1970 might not lead the opponents of the regional particularism of the republic leaders to a new reliance on non-geographic pluralism.

A discussion of such theories should begin with Djilas even though the new advocates of pluralism do not appear to derive their inspiration directly from him or to look to him as an example. For present-day reformers to use Djilas' name would be to take sides in a battle which is not theirs. Some remember Djilas' own Stalinist past. Nevertheless, Djilas continues in his pioneer role and through various intermediaries he and the other dissidents struggle with the same issues. And since he publishes in the West while they publish at home, he may be saying clearly what they can say only obscurely. It cannot be entirely ruled out that in some future crisis the dissidents could enter the mainstream of Yugoslav political life in some kind of relationship to Djilas.

In his latest book, The Unperfect Society--Beyond the New Class, the very title revealing its anti-utopian
thrust, Djilas condemns the "young Marx" revisionists who seek to eliminate the "alienation" of man from society by reversion to primitive communism.* He opts instead for modern science; and this involves a new New Class. The sum and substance of this new stratum of society, Djilas writes, are specialists of all kinds: artists, engineers, teachers, technicians, managers, and skilled political people. Djilas holds that this emerging class has no ideology of its own, but is the class of the future: "I feel that I am in a sense its spokesman, because I can at least envisage the inevitability of its progress."

This technocratic bias could be utopian in its own way. But in addition, Djilas' vague ideas about how to realize his notions as a political program run directly counter to the strong LCY injunction against factionalism. In a private and confidential conversation in May 1969, in which he did not have to consider the sensibilities of his (Western) public, Djilas repeated the ideas he had introduced at the time of his fall in the early 1950's: A multiparty system should be introduced, while at the same time maintaining a strong central authority to prevent disruptive forces from destroying the Yugoslav state; and all of the new parties must be socialist and must grow from factions within the LCY.

Another proposed Yugoslav approach to socialist pluralism involves the vitalization of the Party's erstwhile "transmission belts," such as the trade unions or SAWFY, the electoral front organization, rather than factionalization of the LCY. Theoretical questioning of the basis of Yugoslav society has been led in recent years by "creative Marxists" in the philosophical faculty of Zagreb University, particularly the magazine edited by some members of that faculty, Praxis. This journal started publication in 1964, reportedly with the

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*This book did not appear in Yugoslavia. It was published in the West in conscious violation of the understanding on which Djilas was permitted to leave Yugoslavia in 1967.
encouragement of the Croat party leader, Bakaric, and has subsequently received the support of a number of Belgrade professors and publications. Of course rejecting capitalism, the Praxis writers and their allies have nevertheless absorbed much Western thought, even though their views appear to be chiefly inspired by their total rejection of Stalinism. This rejection of both capitalism and Stalinism gives them an established place in Yugoslav society, but it also involves a rejection of the actual practices of the LCY.

One of this group's chief members, the Belgrade professor and Party member Svetozar Stojanovic, holds that the current system presents a mixture of self-management at low levels with a rather rigid state bureaucratic structure above, and that what is indispensably needed are democratic, autonomous political organizations which would unite the non-Communists and give them an effective voice in Yugoslav political life. This, in his view, would be an acceptable socialist pluralism, but he adds that the Yugoslav revolution would be endangered by the creation of several parties, especially if formed on "the worst possible basis, i.e., on a nationality basis."

Such writings by members of the LCY (which many of these intellectuals have been) are the quintessence of revisionism, and have provided targets for Soviet criticism of the LCY on numerous occasions. A distinction must be made, however, between Communist intellectuals and Communist leaders, and many observers feel that the Praxis and similar groups are no more relevant to the LCY leadership than, say, Havemann is to the East German leadership or Lukacs to the Hungarian. There is some evidence, however, to suggest that the Yugoslav Party may be an exceptional case.

Just as it was the conflict between the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which provided an opening for the pluralist intellectuals, so the recurring clashes between centralists and particularists within Yugoslavia have provided these pluralists with added leverage. This, rather than any innate liberalism, is the likely explanation of the
strange regard and encouragement which various LCY leaders have given these intellectual "creative Marxists" since at least 1964. The Croat party leader Bakaric probably encouraged Praxis at that time as part of his attempt to build a liberal image and a stronger power base against Rankovic.

Even Tito himself backed off, in February 1966, from initial condemnations of such "deviations", stating that there must be no witch hunt and that "administrative measures" must not be used. At this juncture, Tito was reassessing his previous support for centralism. Central Party secretaries Kardelj (Slovenia) and Vlahovic (Montenegro) seconded Tito's attack in February. The only other Party secretary, the Serb Rankovic, took no public position. The hypothesis has been entertained, although there is little proof, that Rankovic hoped to convince the intellectuals that centralism, not rampant particularism, offered the most modern solution to modern problems.

A more explicit regard for the pluralists was shown in May 1966, when three months after Tito's criticism of Praxis, the Croatian republic government awarded a prize to the editors of Praxis. Mika Tripalo, then a member of the Croatian Executive Committee and soon (in October 1966) to become its Secretary, stated in public: "We must admit that certain ideas and criticisms published in Praxis... have been inspired by mistakes and adverse trends in our society and by a lack of understanding of certain problems justifiably posed by part of the intelligentsia. It is to the credit of Praxis that it has prompted us all, and perhaps the League of Communists as well, to take up a more intensive theoretical discussion of many open problems." When Rankovic fell in July 1966, he stood condemned as the enemy of liberalism. No intellectuals came to his defense and it was only at the beginning of 1970 that an attempt was made to depict some of them (the Belgrade philosophers) as regretting his fall.

The debt owed to the dissident intellectuals by the LCY leaders who ousted Rankovic was most clearly expressed by the then Political Secretary of the League of Communists of Macedonia, Krešte Crvenkovski, who had
headed the committee investigating Rankovic. In October and November 1966, Crvenkovski defended pluralism and minority rights in a series of speeches, interviews, and articles in Borba, Kommunist, and Politika. He condemned the pretense of a monolithic unity and called for a pluralistic party and legalized factions, functioning as a loyal opposition. In his Politika interview (23 October 1966), Crvenkovski made a scarcely veiled allusion to the role played by Praxis and similar journals in the struggle against Rankovic, and drew some heretical conclusions:

Thanks to the existence of powerful information media, these ideas were gradually accepted on an increasingly large scale by our society, despite the fact that there was an opposing trend in the League of Communists.... One should not expect a minority which defended a different opinion to struggle unconditionally for the views of the majority.... New ideas, progressive ideas, always emerge first within the circle of a minority.... We must give enough scope for the minority and individuals to manifest their ideological and political creativeness.... We must support the development of those basic attributes of the bourgeois democracy which in our country were undeveloped because of a lack of tradition and because of bureaucratic resistance.

Although the Party leadership lapsed into silence on these issues after the victory over Rankovic was assured, the intellectual advocates of pluralism continued, in 1966-1968 to defend factionalism in a one-party system, as an acceptable alternative to a two-party system, and to defend a public minority opposition.

The Prague Spring of 1968 proved to be of crucial importance to the environment for pluralist thought. Czechoslovak events awakened in the dissidents (including Djilas) the hope that the evolution they had argued for was now within their grasp. The Czech intellectuals who had applauded the Yugoslav debates were now in turn
applauded by the Yugoslav philosophers. Tito's support for Dubcek, who, it should be remembered, was not as liberal as his supporters, permitted some of them to predict a second Yugoslav revolution. But the August Soviet intervention necessitated a Yugoslav re-evaluation of all this. Whatever the long-range meaning of the intervention for Yugoslav-Soviet relations, it left the dissident intellectuals far out in front of the LCY in their degree of condemnation of the Soviet Union and in their disillusionment with everything which had occurred under the name of Communism. Stojanovic voiced these views most strongly in the spring of 1969, listing a long history of Soviet crimes, beginning with the 1920's collectivization in the Soviet Union, and condemning this "system of exploitation which stubbornly presents itself as socialism." In his view, a Communist Party based on the monolithic principle of democratic centralism cannot escape from these errors, for even if a progressive wing should take power, its members would start attacking Communists who are more progressive than they are. In short, "it is a great error to believe that real democracy could be achieved monolithically."

Such pessimism reflects the fact that the pluralist intellectuals have as yet had little practical effect on the evolution of the Party. They have, however, profoundly affected Yugoslav students. Following numerous examples elsewhere in the world, the students of Belgrade took to the streets on 2 June 1968, initially in behalf of improved living conditions and more self-government in the universities, and soon thereafter advancing to explicit denunciations of the Yugoslav regime. This student current spread quickly to Zagreb and Sarajevo, some dissident professors joining in. Tito sought conciliation; he recognized the non-ideological demands for education reform, financial aid, and jobs; the students returned to class chanting "We are Tito's, Tito is ours." The Belgrade City Party Committee explained the ideological aberrations of the incident by alleging that the students had been infiltrated by (the mixed-bag of) Rankovicites, Djilasites, Cominformists, Maoists, and New Leftists influenced by Marcuse.
In the September-December 1969 issue of Praxis, Zagreb, Stojanovic described a quite different and more credible influence:

The action program of the Belgrade students in June 1968 was identical to the ideas of the Praxis group. All the people associated with Praxis took an active part in the June events, and the largest portion of them were expelled from the Party organization because of this activity. The Party organization is constantly trying to isolate the Praxis group, keeping it away from all mass media; it has, however, not succeeded in isolating it from the students.

It remains a moot point whether the student protests in 1968 could have forced the dominant forces in the Communist establishment to make concessions to those voices which had been arguing for a genuine pluralism. Under normal conditions this would have been as unlikely in Yugoslavia as in any Communist state. But the international situation was critical: Tito was publicly supporting Dubcek and training Czech cadres in Croatia. In the opinion of Drago Kunc, Head of the LCY Department for International Relations, Dubcek's socialism with a human face could have proved very attractive in Western Europe. If the Yugoslav leadership, in 1968, was planning to capitalize on this new impetus it might have proved very difficult not to introduce a degree of real social democracy in Yugoslavia itself. But with the Soviet intervention, Yugoslavia was suddenly alone and felt very much threatened. The fundamental issues of how a Communist state is to face the second industrial revolution and to cope with the competition of pluralistic forces had to be shelved for the moment.

Despite this setback, the advocates of pluralism inside and outside the Party continued to publish their views and eventually again became involved in power confrontations within the Party. In the winter of 1969-1970, they were again attacked, their resistance to Party intervention in cultural matters bringing the incredible
charge of "Cominformism" against them. By the fall of 1970, however, statements by the very highest LCY leaders (particularly Kardelj) had begun to suggest that central Party forces might at last be toying with the notion of encouraging some limited degree of all-Yugoslav pluralism as a weapon against the regional particularism entrenched in the Party. This possibility is today enhanced by the fact that some former republic party leaders, especially Tripalo and Crvenkovski, who in the past professed some sympathy for heretical pluralist notions, now hold key posts in the center.
"COMINFORMISM": INTERNAL DISARRAY OR EXTERNAL THREAT?

The Central Campaign

The late 1969-early 1970 debate on "Cominformism" took on different forms for different purposes, but in nearly all cases presupposed the reality of a Soviet threat to Yugoslavia. There is some evidence (considered later in this section) that Soviet interest in exploiting Yugoslav instability after Tito's death has indeed grown in the last two years. But this has furnished only the menacing background for a struggle of internal Yugoslav forces.

The "Cominformism" debate sprang primarily from internal disarray, a predicament which of course could not be discussed openly at the time. By the beginning of 1970, Yugoslavia had what no Communist country is supposed to have: a multi-party system, albeit one based on monolithic, monopolistic republic Communist Parties. The Yugoslav leadership took pride in the degree of participation it offered its subjects even though most Party leaders were still unwilling to countenance any organized expression of group interests outside the Party. Meanwhile, the development of a more complex economy was rendering irrelevant the doctrine of local self-management on which the system has been based and which contributed to its legitimacy. Yugoslavia faced an uncertain future after Tito. The Soviet danger, if not imminent, lay more visibly on the horizon. Such hazards cried out for a scapegoat.

This Tito apparently attempted to provide in late 1969 when he raised the specter of domestic "Cominformists." At the time he had a specific target in mind: Yugoslav playwrights, poets, and novelists who dared obliquely to question Party authority and policy. In a speech delivered on 25 October 1969, at a time when he was expressing publicly his outrage against the "pressures" being brought to bear on the federation, Tito
suddenly departed from a discussion of what the LCY was
doing in regard to economic problems to condemn "alien
concepts" among the intelligentsia. He specifically
attacked a play, "When Pumpkins Bloom," as slanderin4
the social system: "The author tries to prove at any
cost that our society is not good. And who is the one
who speaks this way? This is spoken by those who were
on Goli Otok."*

Neither the author, the play, nor the character
involved was "pro-Soviet," though the fact that the play
criticized, in passing, the Stalin-like severity of the
Party's past actions against pro-Soviet Yugoslavs made
it convenient for the Party to tar critics of Party
power generally with the pro-Soviet brush. Nonetheless,
many of the diverse troubles of Yugoslavia soon came to
be grouped under the charge of "Cominformism."

In Belgrade, the Serbian party authorities falsely
branded as "Cominformist" not only artistic works which
they thought hinted at criticism of their power, but
also the local Party philosophers who had supported the
notion of pluralism and a dilution of Party authority.
By attacking some plays and films which had previously
been approved by the Croatian party leaders and success-
fully shown in Zagreb, the Serbian Party chiefs may have
also hoped to persuade Tito that their Croatian rivals
were overly soft toward non-Communist dissidents, and
that Croatian Party autonomy, in addition to all its
other vices, was thus dangerous to Communist hegemony
in Yugoslavia.

*Actually, it was not the author but one of the
characters in the play who had been on Goli Otok and
who condemned the behavior of the Yugoslav Communists
between 1948 and 1953 as "worse than the Germans."
This is only a minor theme in the play, or at least
in the novel, although audience reaction -- a tradi-
tional Communist gauge of political content -- may
have given it added significance.
An early example of the foolish course anti-Cominformism took was an attack in February 1970 by the Montenegrin and the Bosnia-Hercegovinian Central Committees on the Titograd journal, Ovdje, for spreading "anti-self-management" and "Cominformist" ideas. The offensive item in this case was the poem, "But You Know Where I Am," by the Sarajevo poet, Izet Sarajlic, whose poem had merely sarcastically stated that if one wants a pension he should worship Ancient Greece and not Russia. In the Montenegrin context, with the centuries-old tradition of pensions for Russian service, this might be Russophile but it certainly was not Cominformist -- especially when the author later explained that his poem was part of a larger work which condemned Stalinism, and that Russia was the country not only of Stalin, but of Pushkin, Blok, Mayakovskiy, Yesenin, and Pasternak.

This general, and rather mild, cultural crackdown prompted the Serbian Philosophical Association to protest, in November-December 1969 against Party intervention. In so doing, they committed a number of crimes against the regime's ideological shibboleths. Some of the speakers at their meetings, even though they were condemned by the philosophers themselves, defended those who had been imprisoned as Cominformists in 1948. Worse, the philosophers were challenging Party intervention, blessed by Tito, which had been implemented through the self-management organs in cultural institutions. Worse still, the Party could -- and did -- condemn the philosophers of "trying to organize a political platform."

The Campaign in Zagreb

While this baiting of heretical intellectuals was going on in the Serbian capital, the course of events in Croatia was quite different. The three day Tenth Plenum of the Croatian Central Committee, 15-17 January 1970, was a virtual trial of the Croatian political figure Milos Zanko, ostensibly for having criticized Croatian
nationalism. This plenum brought "Cominformism" to Croatia, and cast light on the central problem facing Yugoslav politics, the problem of the powers of the separate republic parties.

Zanko was a Dalmatian who had begun his career as the intimate associate of the Croat elder Party statesman, Bakaric, but who, by 1969, was completely identified with the central LCY and government apparatus. In February 1969, Zanko attacked the Croatian nationalism of a Zagreb literary journal, and the Croatian Party leaders felt obliged to retreat before these charges and to echo them. As noted earlier, it was a Zanko proposal at the Ninth LCY Congress a month later which gave the Congress delegates a rare opportunity to voice the still profoundly felt Yugoslav patriotism which had been so offended by the particularist decisions of those running the Congress. Zanko continued to defend this all-Yugoslav concept throughout 1969, in the context of economic integration and in his rejection of the republic's right to dictate to delegates in the federal assembly, i.e., to veto offensive legislation.

In November 1969, Zanko returned to his public attack on Croatian nationalism. The Croatian Party Conference, meeting at the end of November, took no public notice of his charges but the new Croatian Party leader, Savka Dalcevic-Kucar, began a secret exchange of letters with Zanko concerning them. Someone in Belgrade (Zanko denied that it was he) circulated copies of this correspondence. This implied centralist intervention in Croatian Party affairs and served as a basis for Zanko's case. Zanko was not invited.

The fact that this eleventh-hour meeting was convened after the Croat leadership had hesitated for so long to take up Zanko's challenge raises the issue of the nature of Zanko's support. The meeting was attended by Evard Kardelj, who had come to Zagreb for the LCY Presidium meeting which opened there a couple of days
later. Zanko's statements on integration in the months preceding his "trial" were in line with Kardelj's own remarks on the same subject. Zanko noted this in his defense at the Croatian Tenth Plenum in January. Kardelj afterward criticized the treatment of Zanko in a discussion of the Croatian Plenum at an LCY Executive Bureau meeting on 16-17 March 1970. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it seems fair to assume that Kardelj did intervene on Zanko's behalf in December 1969.

We know that at the LCY Executive Bureau meeting of March 1970 the Macedonian Krste Crvenkovski and the Serb Marko Nikezic professed full support for the Croatian Tenth Plenum -- i.e., for the Croats' right to rule their own party house, but the Bosnian Serb Cvjetin Mijatovic voiced integrationist opinions and stated that he was not clear what the decisions of the Tenth Plenum really represented. Tito, apparently not yet willing to support an attack on the Croats, intervened and cut Mijatovic short, but the incident at least suggests that Zanko had recruited support in Bosnia.* Also, charges brought at the Tenth Plenum, subsequent reports of a purge of Zanko supporters in Split, and comments made at a Dalmatian conference in July 1970 point to support for Zanko in Dalmatia. As for Rankovic, the Croatian premier Dragutin Haramija has stated that there was no connection between Zanko and Tito's fallen heir, although Zanko, "for his own reasons," had reached the same anti-Croatian, integrationist conclusions as had the Rankovic elements.

It must be presumed that Tito remained neutral, although the evidence is conflicting. The same who provided so much of the information used here has reported also that Bakaric, the elder statesman of the Croat Party, and Pero Pirker, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Croatian Central Committee, afterward claimed that the attack on Zanko had

*The Bosnian Conference had immediately picked up his condemnation of Croat nationalism in November.
been ordered by Tito at a meeting of top Yugoslav leaders in Brioni at the end of September 1969. Zanko, this report alleged, was the leader of a pro-Soviet underground group which also included the Serb and LCY Executive Bureau member Mijalko Todorovic. Despite the source, the details of this report do not seem credible. It must be presumed that either Bakaric and Pirker or their immediate associates were deliberately spreading this story for reasons of their own: to discredit their integrationist enemies by tarring Zanko (and trying to tar Todorovic) with the Cominformist brush. But it can be accepted, as was reported in other contexts, that Tito had indeed ordered a general attack on "Cominformism" (i.e., on all those who could be depicted as enemies of the existing Yugoslav system) at a meeting in September 1969. The Croats may have taken advantage of this to carry out a purge they had long wished to make, and then to depict it as an anti-Soviet move.

In any case, Kardelj's apparent last minute intervention failed. Without a determined stand by Tito, there was no power which could check the Croat Party in settling its own affairs. The Croatian Tenth Plenum excluded Zanko from the LCY Conference as a permanent member and, three months later, he was recalled from his seat in the federal assembly. In July 1970, Pero Pirker, Secretary of the Croatian Party, told Zanko's erstwhile Party colleagues in Dalmatia that anybody who said that they could not understand the Tenth Plenum "cannot remain" in the Party.

The Soviet Threat: The Fire Behind the Smoke

The Zanko case also had broader dimensions: the question of possible Soviet influence at work within Yugoslavia. In a March 1970 interview, Pero Pirker stated that Zanko was the exponent of an idea which transcended Croatian matters and clashed with the overall federation policy of the Yugoslav Ninth Congress. To underscore the seriousness of the threat, Pirker referred to anonymous leaflets and threatening letters which he said had been sent since the Tenth Plenum to those who had participated
in it. These, he said, showed that a Cominform platform was being propagated in an organized manner. An earlier (February 1970) Zagreb newspaper account had claimed that the threatening letters to which Pirker referred had been sent from abroad; this was one of the first attempts to substantiate the case of foreign involvement in the new Cominformism threat. According to this article the threatening letters, hundreds of them, had been filled with "vulgar" Cominformist slogans and had been signed by a self-styled "Communist Party of Croatia."

The fact that the Cominformism polemics were serving domestic political purposes justifies a critical approach to such stories. But there do seem to be sufficient data to conclude that the Soviets may have resumed "offensive" intelligence operations against Yugoslavia in 1969, as part of contingency planning connected with the succession struggle expected after Tito's death or retirement.

The credibility of Soviet involvement in individual cases is of course complicated by the diverse complexion of subversive elements in Yugoslavia. The two most notorious types of subversives are the separatists descended from Croat fascism, and the unreconciled Stalinists dating from 1948 -- who were even reported at one time to have sought Chinese support. Both these elements, however, have little influence in Yugoslavia today.

Another problem is whether Soviet purposes would best be served by the break-up of Yugoslavia or by the restoration of Serb hegemony, by the preservation of peace or by fomenting civil war. Such evidence as exists suggests that the USSR is now actively testing the strength of the conflicting Yugoslav forces, while keeping all its options open. Reports of alleged successes already achieved by the Soviets in subversive efforts, however, must be discounted.

The Soviets have always supported a few Cominformist emigrees such as Vlado Dapcevic, the Montenegrin colonel who was sentenced as a Cominformist in 1948 and who escaped to the Soviet Union, via Albania, in 1958. The Yugoslav press reports that the ranks of such emigrees were swelled by new ones following the Czechoslovak intervention in 1968. From among these groups, the Soviets
might well find the nucleus for a Yugoslav Communist Party in exile. Yugoslav sources report that such a party has been created, but these reports provide no uniform name for such a party, no names of its leaders, except for Dapcevic, and no credible account of its program. Nonetheless, the Soviets probably have not gone beyond holding this option in reserve.

On the other hand, the cumulative weight of reports in the Yugoslav press, from Croat emigre leaders in the West, and from a Czech knowledgeable in intelligence matters, suggests that the Soviets have made approaches to Croat separatists in Western Europe. Western press reports and the Czech also speak of subversive Soviet operations in Montenegro and in the Yugoslav Army. This allegedly involves a two-option Soviet strategy: (a) the Soviets foresee that the federation will be held together, if at all, by the Army; in this case they would hope to increase their influence among the Serbian and Montenegrin officers, with at least half an eye to a restoration of Rankovic; (b) if this proves impossible, or if the Soviets cannot influence the forces holding the federation together, then they might encourage or acquiesce in the creation of two or three Yugoslav states, abandoning Croatia and Slovenia to the West, while attempting to gain a foothold in Montenegro and Serbia, perhaps awarding Macedonia to Bulgaria. It is conceivable that the Soviets are considering such options, although it is doubtful that they have yet concluded that they have a good chance of success with either alternative.

What can be regarded as established, in addition to Soviet approaches to emigre Croats, is that Soviet economic, cultural, and diplomatic officials have made private offers of aid to Yugoslav firms, especially in Serbia and Bosnia, and did conduct increased propaganda activities throughout Yugoslavia in the spring of 1970. A multitude of such Soviet contacts have been reported by the Yugoslav press and radio, and confirmed privately by LCY and Yugoslav media officials. The Yugoslavs, seeing a deliberate attempt to provoke a clash between "socialist" and "counter-revolutionary" forces in post-
Tito Yugoslavia, lodged official protests. In an unusual interview made public in April 1970, the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs and the Army Security Service condemned these "intensified hostile activities."

One such hostile activity in which Soviet intelligence has apparently engaged has been the spreading of demoralizing reports about Yugoslavia. The April 1970 interview specifically mentioned one "fabrication" published by the West German Der Spiegel in January 1970 concerning an alleged manifesto presented to Tito by Yugoslav generals. The aftermath of this case included the arrest, in March 1970, of the East German emigree Hans Peter Rullman, accredited to Belgrade as correspondent of Der Spiegel, for espionage. There is some reason to believe that he was a Soviet agent. It is credible as consistent with Soviet behavior generally, that the Soviets have sought to exacerbate what they believe to be a real Yugoslav crisis by disseminating fabrications intended to strengthen divisive sentiment.

Although it is possible that the Yugoslavs are over-reacting to all this, available evidence suggests that they are reacting to something real. The Soviets may well be more appreciative than many in the West of the dangers of diminished central control in Yugoslavia. The untimely replacement of outworn structures will certainly create situations which they can exploit to advantage; they will certainly do so. And both the Soviets and the Yugoslavs know that intervention can take many forms in addition to tanks crossing the border.
THE TURNING POINT

On 21 September 1970, in a speech to the Zagreb political aktiv two days after an LCY Presidium meeting, Tito made public a plan to share his burdens with a new collective presidency. Although there had been no public discussion of this prior to his speech, the move was not entirely unexpected. If nothing further had been said, this proposed change might have seemed merely a counterpart reform on the government side to the changes introduced in the LCY at the Ninth Congress in March 1969. But even this first speech made it clear that much more was involved.

There were overtones of bitterness in Tito's announcement. He indicated that the burdens of his office were becoming too much to bear, that he had been in office a long time, and that he wanted time to do other things, especially to concentrate on foreign affairs. Tito spoke of disintegration and grave crisis, and said that his own rights under the Constitution were being violated. He spoke disparagingly of the existing top Party collective, the LCY Executive Bureau, as "not exactly a happy combination... not really very happily composed." He concluded by declaring that he was making all this public lest "someone think that if this proceeded now without me the intention would be to remove me."

A turning point had been reached. The showdown which Kardelj and others had previously hinted at in speaking of the crisis in self-management, and which was implicit in the intensity of the Cominformism polemics, was now at hand. A confidential report to a Western diplomat immediately after Tito's speech suggested that the crucial issue was indeed a showdown with the republic parties. The hurried creation of a collective presidency was only the most urgent task, a pre-requisite for an all-encompassing restructuring of the Yugoslav political system. And, although Tito remains and presumably will remain at the head of Party and government as long as he physically can, there are hints that his hand may have been forced.
In spelling out the new proposals in a report made public on 30 September 1970, Kardelj noted gently that Tito was "not responsible" for the new formulations, although he had been "consulted." Another source, a Slovene who claims to be a personal friend of Kardelj, told an American diplomat in the first week of October that "we [i.e. Kardelj and his friends] have been telling Tito for a long time" that he had to face up to the succession problem. This source indicated that Tito was finally won over by arguments about the danger of Soviet intervention following his death.* At the beginning of 1970, the evidence of the Zanko case suggested that Kardelj was already longing to curb some of the powers of the republic parties, while Tito was not yet persuaded. It was only after Tito's consent was obtained in the fall of 1970 that the expansion of the powers of the republic parties at the expense of the center, which had been going on with Tito's tacit approval since the fall of Rankovic in 1966, could be halted and the pendulum made to swing back for the moment.

The new formulations, on which Tito had been "consulted," were the work of a previously secret group, headed by Kardelj, working within the framework of the LCY Presidium Commission for Internal Political Questions and Development of Social Relations and cooperating with the Federal Assembly Constitutional Commission.** According

*This source foresaw a strengthening of central authority, but added that the danger that this might be equated with Serbian control would lead to much bitter conflict.

**The LCY commission involved is headed by Krste Crvenkovski, the Macedonian who publicly advocated toleration of a loyal opposition in 1966, who read the indictment against Rankovic, and who drafted the major resolutions at the Ninth Congress. In his first statement in the debate, at the First LCY Conference on 29 October, Crvenkovski seemed to straddle the central issue. He came out in favor of the principle of parity of representation of the different republics in the topmost organs of the federation, as the Croats have been demanding. At the same time, he warned, like Kardelj and the Serbs, against what he termed "initial manifestations of regionalization in the LCY."
to Kardelj, this special group has five sub-groups dealing with self-management (in the political rather than the economic sense); socio-political organizations; assembly decision-making; political administration (including the judiciary); and relations between the Federation and the republics. This last sub-group, according to Kardelj, was "set up only recently." This fact at least suggests that the first steps were taken without consulting the republic leaders. Now that the work of Kardelj's group is in the open, he has pledged to cooperate closely with similar groups in the republics, but according to a source highly placed in the federal apparatus, the first official report of Kardelj's body had been given "very restricted circulation." The general framework of debate, however, is already public.

The new collective presidency is to consist of two or three representatives from each republic, on a parity basis, with the chairmanship rotating annually among the republics. This institution has already been approved in principle and presumably will be installed early in 1971. It may include representatives of various socio-political organizations such as the trade unions and the Socialist Alliance. It will take over some of the functions of the present Federal Executive Council (headed by Premier Mitja Ribicic). It will probably also include representatives from the LCY Presidium, an organ which Kardelj said was not itself suitable to function as a collective leadership. The inclusion in the top government organ of Party representatives as Party representatives -- in lieu of the traditional interlocking directorate pattern -- would be an unprecedented departure from Yugoslav or any other Communist state practice.

Kardelj promised to respect the autonomy of the republics in every possible sphere; he even made them new offers, in regard to control over education, for example. The number of areas in which the federation has primary responsibility is to be further curtailed. But the ability of the republics to paralyze the federal government in matters essential to the federation is to be tolerated no longer. Kardelj specifically warned, in his September 1970 report, against the "very bad historical fate" of state systems based on "the right of veto."
In the federal assembly, Kardelj said, the only democratic method in deciding critical matters is by majority rule. Both Tito and Kardelj seem to feel that the federal assembly, as presently constituted, will not be able to overcome its paralysis. One function of the new collective presidency will be to bypass it and to assume a legislative role. In his 21 September speech, Tito spoke of the "disoriented reactions" of unspecified persons who saw this as the creation of a "directorium" or dictatorship. Kardelj in fact conceded the danger of "deformation" in such a concentration of power, but he considered such a concentration preferable to any of the alternatives. And he also hinted that he would strive to ensure that the republic thrust for parity representation in the federal administrative apparatus would be turned aside. "This apparatus," he said, "must still be responsible to the federation organs and not to the republics."

The challenge to the power of the Party barons in the republics is clear. But from what power base can the challenge be made good? In the long run, Kardelj may hope to develop alternative "centers" to which federal assembly deputies will be responsible. He has spoken of institutionalizing a hierarchy of socio-political organizations as such centers: first, the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance, the trade unions, and the Youth Federation; second, the self-management organs, the workers councils, republics, and communes; and, third, science and culture. Although this could become a realization of the socialist pluralism so long advocated by philosophers and political scientists outside the establishment, these organs are, for the moment, weak reeds on which to build. In the immediate future, Kardelj must find a federation-wide power still responsive to central control. Having dispersed LCY control over cadre appointments, and having dispersed much of the security apparatus to the republics in the wake of the victory over Rankovic, Kardelj has only Tito's personal authority and the Army available as instruments of coercion to use against the republic Party leaders. After Tito's death, only the Army will be left.

The debate on the new political system, which may not run its course until the next federal assembly
elections in 1973, is now proceeding along predictable lines, with the forces of regional particularism stubbornly defending their position against the centralist attack. On the one hand, the Croats (e.g., Croat Party secretary Pero Pirker, 4 October 1970) speak of referring the question to a "plebicite" within their republic, and they continue their defense of the veto; the Slovenes are also resisting the call for Constitutional changes; and the Macedonians (e.g. Macedonian Party secretary Slavko Miloslavlevski, 23 October 1970) reject the argument that republic emancipation means disintegration or that the demand for parity in the federal cadres means republic control of the federal apparatus. On the other side, the Serbs speak of the need for strong federal organs and condemn the veto, while their Montenegrin allies deplore the continuing drift in federal affairs.

This debate is not being conducted in a vacuum: deepening economic problems give urgency to it, as does uncertainty concerning Soviet intentions. The Yugoslavs are fearful of a Munich psychology developing in Western Europe, e.g., in the wake of U.S. troop withdrawals. They are fearful of unknowns in the event of leadership changes in the Soviet Union. Again and again they query their American and British contacts about the possibility of a spheres-of-influence agreement between the Soviet Union and the West: Yugoslavia, they recall, was once to be divided "50-50".*

*The "50-50" agreement was made public by Churchill in his The Second World War, "Triumph and Tragedy." The agreement with Stalin, reached in Moscow on 9 October 1944, involved, according to Churchill's subsequent account, "only" the "immediate war-time arrangements." The percentages assigned to the Soviet Union were: Romania, 90 percent; Greece, 10 percent; Yugoslavia and Hungary, 50 percent; and Bulgaria, 75 percent. The agreement indeed lapsed soon thereafter in all these areas. But the Yugoslavs have never forgotten it.
All these anxieties are compounded by the prospect of Tito's passing. The creation of a collective presidency will not resolve the problem of succession. It is simply not possible that power will be shared equally among some 25 members of the new organ. Some one or two or three of them will emerge to put a personal stamp on the immediate post-Tito years.

Of those once spoken of as possible successors to Tito, most seem to be out of the running. Rankovic could not make a comeback on his own and according to the overwhelming bulk of Yugoslav opinion he would not come back relying on Soviet support, although some Soviets may think that he would. Mijalko Todorovic is out of favor, reportedly for having opposed Tito's foreign policy decisions such as the all-out support for the Arabs in June 1967. Until recently, Todorovic might have played a role as Serb champion but he may now have been replaced in this role by Marko Nikezic. The Montenegrin Veljko Vlahovic, considered a likely successor in 1966, apparently also fell out of favor in 1967. Vladimir Bakaric is a Croat first and foremost, always tried to avoid Belgrade posts, and probably would have no support for nor ambition to assume the leadership of the LCY. He is probably also in ill health. Certainly he has been strangely silent of late. The long series of Croat victories had been trumpeted on the national stage not by Bakaric but primarily by the very outspoken young Mika Tripalo. Two party leaders now in top government posts, President of the Federal Executive Council (Premier) Mitja Ribicic (a Slovene, born in 1919) and President of the Federal Assembly Milentije Popovic (a Serb, born in 1913, and by office still immediate successor to Tito's government post), will play key roles but are not usually thought of as successors to Tito's Party post. The same guarded prognosis might be made for State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mirko Tepavac, a Serb, born in 1922.

The one remaining grand old man of Yugoslav Communism (with Tito soon to depart, and Rankovic and Djilas eliminated) is Edvard Kardelj. Despite the lack of a
personal power base, even in his native Slovenia, his reputation as an ideologist and as an expert on foreign affairs and his life-long close association with Tito have brought his name up again and again in speculation on the succession. In January 1970, the treatment accorded him by Tito again made it appear that he was Tito's personal choice. He is devoted to the integrity of the Yugoslav state and is a stubborn opponent of Soviet hegemony and would thus make a good choice to guide Yugoslavia through the troubled times of Tito's death or retirement. He could probably count on the support of the Army in a crisis.

Kardelj's new role as proponent of change in the Yugoslav political system raises many problems. Although it clearly places him in a key position to dominate the succession struggle, it has forced him to disavow some positions and alliances he had maintained in earlier years. He is no longer the ally of the "barons" in the republics, as he was against Rankovic; he is now their enemy. He is no longer the defender of the federal assembly; he is its critic. Despite his guarded public statements, he has put himself into a very exposed position, and appears to have undertaken what can be only a transitional role. The new political system may be his creature, but he many not survive its creation.

Of the possible dark horses among younger leaders, the Macedonian Krste Crvenkovski seems to have the lead, and it may be he who will eventually succeed Kardelj. As early as July 1969, Crvenkovski was described as the most ambitious member of the Executive Bureau. A report on the 16-17 March 1970 Executive Bureau meeting, which allegedly discussed the possibility of Tito's retirement, added that in the opinion of a number of progressives in the LCY, Crvenkovski would be the best choice to succeed Tito. The Macedonian Crvenkovski has more of a following than the Slovene Kardelj, he is an intellectual, anti-Soviet, and favors better relations with Albania. It is in his favor that he is neither a Croat nor a Serb. He is an outspoken champion of republic autonomy, but he also professes to recognize the need to preserve Yugoslav integrity; in this respect he would also be a compromise figure. He also has in the past defended the concept of pluralism, including the possibility of accepting the existence of a loyal opposition in the regime's central institutions.
Many scenarios could be written for the interplay of these issues and these personalities. The potential for catastrophe is real, particularly if Tito should die before the showdown is resolved. The present Croat leaders seem unlikely to yield their newly-won prerogatives easily. If, after Tito's death, Kardelj (or Crvenkovski) should demand the resignation of these Croats, they might prove capable of moving toward secession. If this happens before the central authorities have restored their prerogatives or won the loyalty of significant interest groups in Croatia, then the only check on secession would be military action, under Serb and Montenegrin generals. Carried to its extreme conclusion, this trend of events could mean civil war. Such a prospect could well prove irresistible to the Soviets, who might offer support to one or another faction in the interest of influencing the outcome, of recouping the loss which has so rankled since 1948.

The realization that the Soviets are waiting in the wings to profit is the chief factor making for moderation by both central and regional Yugoslav authorities. For there is no present Yugoslav front-rank leader, whatever his other aspirations, who seems likely to countenance or encourage Soviet intervention. It is upon this brink, however, that the bargaining will take place; it is the potential for catastrophe which will probably force the republic leaders to yield. It is at least conceivable that in the process new power centers may then emerge in post-Tito Yugoslavia in what are now unimportant central organizations controlled by the Party. If so, the theories of the advocates of pluralism would at last be tested to some degree in practice, and the new Yugoslavia could take on some aspects of "bourgeois" democracy, after all.
BAKARIC, Vladimir -- A member of the Executive Bureau and Presidium of the LCY, Bakaric was for years head of the Croatian Party; he is probably the most powerful influence over the Croatian Party still and might be considered the architect of the post-Rankovic system, especially of the new autonomy for republic parties. Bakaric was born in 1912 and has a long history of ill health.

Bosnia-Hercegovina -- with 18 percent of the Yugoslav population, is dominated by Serbs (accounting for 43 percent of its population) but is given its distinctive character by its Moslem population (34 percent of the republic population and 7 percent of the Yugoslav population). The Bosnian Moslems are not Turks (as the Macedonian Moslems are) but Slavs (Serbs or Croats) who adopted the faith of their Ottoman conquerors. Underrepresented in LCY (12.5 percent), trade union (13 percent) and organs of self-management (11 percent) alike, Bosnia-Hercegovina is counted among the backward republics of Yugoslavia despite a high concentration of federally allocated investments in the early 1950's. Politics in Bosnia-Hercegovina is dominated by loyalty to Serbia and fear of Croatia, and, sometimes, by an almost petulant insistence on its right to be considered an independent republic in its own right.

Brioni Plenum -- Although the leadership continues to meet from time to time on the island of Brioni, "The Brioni Plenum" (also known as the "Fourth Plenum") was that of 1 July 1966 at which the LCY Central Committee heard the charges against Rankovic and accepted his resignation.
Central Committee -- Traditionally, the Central Committee has been the supreme organ of any Communist Party between Congresses. Except on rare occasions, its formal plenary sessions only ratify the decisions of the leadership but the departments of the Central Committee constitute the most important part of the central "apparat." The LCY no longer has a Central Committee; its functions have been taken over by the Presidium and the annual Conference. The republic parties, however, have both central committees and conferences (except for Montenegro, which has no conference).

Chamber of Nationalities -- The most important house in the Federal Assembly, The Chamber of Nationalities has 140 members, 20 from each republic and 10 from the two autonomous provinces of Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo).

Cominform -- The Communist Information Bureau, organized after the Second World War with the active participation of Tito, took the place, on a more limited scale, of the disbanded Comintern (in which Tito had served). The Cominform expelled Yugoslavia at Stalin's behest in 1948. The Cominform was disbanded in 1956.

Commune -- The Commune (or Opstina) is the smallest territorial-administrative division of Yugoslavia. There are 501 communes. The communal assembly, in the government hierarchy, elects the special chambers of the republic assemblies and the special chambers (Economic, Educational-Cultural, and Social-Health) of the Federal Assembly (representation in these chambers apportioned as in the Social-Political Chamber, which see). The communal Conference, in the Party hierarchy, elects delegates to the Republic congresses and conferences and to the LCY Congress. The communal conference also elect three quarters of the delegates to the LCY Conference, the other quarter being "permanent" delegates.
elected by the LCY Congress. Despite these constitutional and statutory powers, however, the evidence of recent years is that the communes cannot resist the republic parties (and governments) in matters of interest to the republic leaders. One goal of the current political system debate seems to be to call attention to this anomaly, and eventually to strengthen the communes.

Conference -- The annual meetings of the LCY and of the republic Parties (except Montenegro, which has no Conference), the conferences are an intermediate stage, halfway between the Central Committees and Congresses of other Communist Parties.

Congress -- The supreme organ of all Communist Parties, including the LCY and the republic parties, congresses are convened, by statute, every five years.

Croatia -- For nearly a thousand years Croatia was ruled from Vienna or Budapest, as a military frontier against the Tatar and the Turk, but one of its present parts, Dalmatia, which is also Croat by virtue of race, language, and religion (Roman Catholic), had a quite different history. Dalmatia was a land of pirates, traders, and city states and for a long time a colony of Venice. The militant nationalism of Croatia proper is not shared so strongly by the more cosmopolitan Dalmatians who, between the wars at least, were more inclined to credit the Serbs as the winners and guarantors of independence from foreign (non-Slav) domination. With large Serb enclaves, 80 percent of the population of Croatia as a whole is Croat (there are also Croat enclaves in Bosnia). With 22 percent of the population of Yugoslavia, Croatia accounts for 28 percent of the industrial social product, and has a per capita personal income even further above the national average (126 where the average is 100). Croats are underrepresented in the LCY (17.3 percent of the LCY members are Croats although Croats -- in and out of Croatia -- account for 23 percent of the population) but as is the case in
Slovenia, Croatia -- as a republic -- is overrepresented in the trade unions (26 percent) and in the organs of self-management (25 percent). This history and these strengths explain Croatia's traditional preference for particularism and hostility to Yugoslav centralism which would require her to support less developed republics.

CRVENKOVSKI, Krste -- A member of the Executive Bureau and Presidium of the LCY, Crvenkovski was formerly head of the Macedonian Party (until his promotion necessitated his dropping this post) and is probably still the most powerful influence over the Macedonian Party. He headed the temporary LCY Commission which investigated Rankovic and he headed the temporary commission for drafting the major resolution of the Ninth Congress. Born in 1921, Crvenkovski exerts a major influence on Party affairs today and must be considered a leading contender in the post-Tito succession.

DABCEVIC-KUCAR, Savka, Mrs. -- President of the League of Communists of Croatia.

DAPCEVIC, Vlado -- A Montenegrin colonel convicted as a Cominformist in 1948, Dapcevic escaped to Albania in 1958 and resided thereafter in the Soviet Union. He is now reported to be in Western Europe as either a Soviet or a Chinese agent.

DJILAS, Milovan -- During the war, Djilas was (together with Kardelj and Rankovic) one of Tito's three lieutenants; all three, co-founders of the regime, were originally devoted to the Soviet Union but, each in his way, they were also instrumental in freeing Tito of Soviet influence before and after the Cominform expelled Yugoslavia in 1948. In the early 1950s, the Montenegrin Djilas drew the consequences of the break with the Soviet Union and condemned the "new class" of Communist rulers in Yugoslavia itself. He was purged after the Party charges were read against him by Kardelj and he has served two terms in prison since.
Executive Bureau -- The 15-man supreme organ of the LCY, the Executive Bureau is roughly equivalent to the Polit- bureau and Secretariat of other Communist Parties but seems especially designed as a court of last resort in disputes among the republic parties and as a collegial organ to handle affairs after Tito leaves the scene.

Federal Assembly -- The Federal Assembly (Skupstina) consists of a Social-Political Chamber (elected directly by the people), a Chamber of Nationalities (elected by the Republic Assemblies), and three special chambers (elected by the communal assemblies -- see "Commune"). The Chamber of Nationalities must be a party to all legislation, the other chambers originating and passing on such legislation as is appropriate to their special spheres.

Goli Otok -- An island in the Adriatic on which "Comin- formists" were imprisoned after the 1948 break with the Soviet Union, Goli Otok has become a symbol of "Stalinist" methods used in the struggle against Stalin.

KARDELJ, Edvard -- A member of the Executive Bureau and Presidium of the LCY, Kardelj is the only one of Tito's three wartime lieutenants (see "Djilas" and "Rankovic") to remain in power. Kardelj is close to many Western Social Democrats and is anathema to the Soviet Union. Despite his many years as Party theoretician and as adviser to Tito on foreign affairs, he lacks a local power base and many Yugoslavs, including Djilas, doubt his ability to advance further on the liberal path. Nevertheless, he remains devoted to the idea of a free and united Yugoslavia and is thus opposed to separatism, including that of Slovenia, where he was born in 1910.

Kosovo -- See Serbia.
LCY -- The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Serbo-Croatian initials, SKJ), is the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the name having been changed for propaganda reasons in 1952. The various republic parties are also, officially, "leagues."

League -- see LCY.

Macedonia -- Macedonia was, together with Kosovo, the heart of Old Serbia. Whether or not a Macedonian nationality exists is still subject to dispute; the Bulgarians, whose medieval empire preceded that of the Serbs in this area, claim that the Macedonians are really Bulgarians. Nevertheless, Macedonia plays a vital role in Yugoslav life today -- as a bulwark against the Bulgarians and as the underdeveloped but anti-Serb ally of the developed north. The republic accounts for 8 percent of Yugoslavia's population and 71 percent of its inhabitants list themselves as Macedonians. Favored by federally allocated investment since 1963, Macedonia, until recently at least, has enjoyed an economic boom which gives it a 5 percent share in the total and industrial social product despite a per capita personal income (67 where the Yugoslav average is 100) just above that of Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina (at 64 each). Macedonia is slightly under-represented in LCY, trade union, and organs of self-management.

Montenegro -- Montenegro, a Serbian state which successfully resisted the Turks for centuries while enjoying Russian patronage, accounts for only 3 percent of the Yugoslav population and only 2 percent of the total and industrial social product. Only 81 percent of the population of Montenegro consists of Montenegrins but another 105,000 Montenegrins live in Serbia, equally divided among the three parts. But Montenegrins make up over 6 percent of the LCY members, 12 percent of the Foreign Service personnel, and over 15 percent of the leading cadres in federal administrative organs. Ten percent of the Army officers major general and above come from Montenegro.
NIKEZIC, Marko -- President of the League of Communists of Serbia, Nikezic is now credited with having modernized the Serbian Party to the point where it can compete with the Croats in the new de-centralized political framework. His career, however, had been in the federal government. He was born in 1921.

Opstina -- see Commune.

Party, the -- see LCY.

Politburo -- Traditionally the leading policy-making body of a Communist Party, the Politburo has been replaced in the LCY by the Presidium and the Executive Bureau.

Presidium -- The supreme organ of the LCY (the 15-member Executive Bureau is made up of Presidium members and meets more frequently), the Presidium's 52 members are proposed by the republic congresses and their membership is ratified by the LCY Congress.

RANKOVIC, Aleksandar -- One of Tito's three wartime lieutenants (see "Djilas" and "Kardelj"), the Serb, centralist, long-time security chief Rankovic fell in 1966 when his control of the central apparatus and the security forces, and his pretensions as Tito's successor, so frightened the non-Serb leaders that Tito foresaw the disintegration of the state. Tarred with the pro-Soviet brush, Rankovic now lives in obscure retirement, his name still used as an epithet to condemn "statism," "centralism", and the sins of the Belgrade bureaucracy. The Serbs have not yet found a new patron of his stature and the Soviets may still dream of his heading a regime more friendly to them. Rankovic was born in 1909.
SAWPY -- The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (in short, Alliance) is the mass front organization of the LCY and plays the key role in preparing lists of LCY-approved candidates for public office. Each republic has an "Alliance" of its own which, in combination, form the SAWPY.

Secretariat -- Traditionally, the supreme executive organ of a Communist Party, the Secretariat no longer exists in the LCY (its place having been taken, more or less, by the Executive Bureau). The Serbian, Slovene, and Bosnian parties have secretariats still; an organ playing the same role, but called an "executive committee" or "board," exists in the Montenegrin, Croatian, and Macedonian parties.

Self-management, organs of -- "Organs of self-management", as listed in Yugoslav statistics, include the elected workers councils (and their superior committees in larger enterprises) in industrial, agricultural, trade and service enterprises and in cultural, educational, and social institutions.

Serbia -- It was the Serb struggle for independence which led directly to the creation of the modern Yugoslav state, and an integral Yugoslavia could always be seen as a Greater Serbia. Medieval Serbia fell after the battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the Serbs remained under Turkish rule until the revolt of 1804. Although the coming to power of the multi-national Communist Partisans under the Croat Tito after the Second World War removed the Serbian royal house and the Serbian Orthodox Church from their dominant positions, the Roman Catholic Croats remain sensitive to any suggestion of Serb hegemony. Belgrade is the capital of both Serbia and Yugoslavia. Serbia as a whole (including its two autonomous provinces) accounts for 41 percent of the Yugoslav population; 75 percent of Serbia's population are Serbs. Vojvodina, accounting for 10 percent of Yugoslavia's population and considered with the "developed" regions for cultural
rather than strictly economic reasons, is 55 percent Serb and 24 percent Hungarian. Kosovo, on the other hand, is 67 percent Albanian -- in fact, half as many Albanians live in Yugoslavia as live in Albania itself. Serbia proper, accounting for 26 percent of the Yugoslav population, is 92 percent Serb. Taken as a whole, Serbia accounts for 33 percent of the industrial social product, has a per capita personal income slightly below the national average and is proportionally represented in the LCY, trade unions, and organs of self-management. But these figures hide the drag which Kosovo, the most backward area in the country, represents for the republic. With 5 percent of the population, Kosovo accounts for only 2 percent of the total and industrial social product and has a per capita personal income of 29 (where the Yugoslav average is 100). As a nationality Serbs account for 42 percent of the Yugoslav population. But they account for over 50 percent of the LCY members, 53 percent of the Foreign Service personnel, 60 percent of the Army LCY members, and 66 percent of the employees (albeit only 39 percent of the leading cadres) in federal agencies and organizations.

Slovenia -- Slovenia, the most homogeneous of the republics (96 percent of the population is Slovene), is also the most "Western" (due to its 1,000 year rule by Germans) and the richest, accounting for 19 percent of the industrial social product and enjoying the highest per capita personal income (199 where 100 represents the Yugoslav average). It accounts for only 9 percent of the Yugoslav population. Slovenia is underrepresented in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) with only 6 percent of the total membership but, due to its high industrial development, is overrepresented in the trade unions (14 percent of the members) and in "self-management" (16 percent of the organs of self-management are in Slovenia). Apprehensive of Croat nationalism in the years between the wars, the Slovenes tended then to support a strong regime in Belgrade. Under the Communists, however, Slovenia has had to foot a large share of the bill for development of underdeveloped areas, and this has created a community of interest with the other developed republic, Croatia, despite the persistence of traditional animosities.
Social Political Chamber -- The only house in the Federal Assembly elected directly by the voters. The Social Political Chamber has 120 members -- 21 for Bosnia-Hercegovina, 27 for Croatia, 9 for Macedonia, 3 for Montenegro, 50 for Serbia (including the autonomous provinces), and 10 for Slovenia.

STEFANOVIC, Svetislav -- Long-time State Secretary for Internal Affairs, Stefanovic was purged with Rankovic in 1966.

STOJANOVIC, Svetozar -- A Belgrade professor and Party member, Stojanovic is one of the most articulate spokesmen for a genuine political pluralism which would end Leninist Party rule in Yugoslavia.

TODOROVIC, Mijalko -- A member of the Executive Bureau and Presidium of the LCY, Todorovic is one of the leading Serb political figures still active. After the Brioni Plenum he was assigned the thankless task of redefining the role of the LCY. In 1968 he was criticized by the LCY Executive Bureau -- presumably as a result of Croatian complaints -- for assuming "attitudes beyond the guidelines indicated by the Central Committee and Presidium." Todorovic was born in 1913.

TRIPALO, Mika -- A member of the Executive Bureau and Presidium of the LCY, representing Croatia, Tripalo is a protege of Bakaric, an outspoken intellectual, and the leading spokesman in recent years for the new-won autonomy of the republic parties. His career, however, now seems to be closely tied to the fate of the central LCY apparat. Tripalo was born in 1926.

Unitarianism -- The doctrine that Yugoslavia is one state rather than six, unitarianism is roughly equivalent to "integral Yugoslavism" and thus, through guilt by association, equivalent in non-Serb minds to Serb hegemony.
Vojvodina -- see Serbia.

ZANKO, Milos -- A Dalmatian long prominent in the Croatian Party and the federal apparatus, Zanko was virtually "tried" by the Croatian Tenth Plenum in January 1970 and found guilty of attacking Croatian nationalism from a unitarian position.