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Support to Countering Foreign Intelligence

I have nothing but contempt and anger for those who betray the trust by exposing the names of our sources.  They are, in my view, the most insidious of traitors.

President George H. W. Bush -- Dedication ceremony for the George Bush Center for Intelligence, April 26, 1999

During FY2002 the President affirmed Presidential Decision Directive 75 (PDD-75) committing the US Government to creating a national-level counterintelligence system that would be positioned to deal with the asymmetric threat environment and other realities of the global, interconnected information age of the 21st century.  The Intelligence Community as a whole supported the counterintelligence mission through focused analysis and reporting of espionage threats, improved information management and sharing, and by providing more and better training to at-risk groups.  A major focus has been on protecting sensitive nuclear weapons-related information within the Department of Energy.

  • The Office of the National Counter Intelligence Executive (NCIX) initiated development of the National Counter Intelligence Strategy mandated by PDD-75 and developed a risk assessment methodology for identifying critical national assets.  The NCIX completed two damage assessments and continued work on seven others, including those of former FBI Agent Hanssen and former DIA analyst Montes.  CIA, in cooperation with foreign governments, collected and reported intelligence that assisted US law enforcement agencies in conducting operations against the Cuban intelligence apparatus.

  • The DCI Foreign Denial and Deception Committee (FDDC) published a landmark study of damage caused by unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence, in support of the Attorney General's report to Congress (per Section 310 of the FY2002 Intelligence Authorization Act).  Per DCI direction, FDDC began an Intelligence Community-wide initiative to provide denial and deception (D&D) briefings to Senior Intelligence Service-level managers.  FDDC also launched a major training initiative in partnership with the Joint Military Intelligence College for senior IC analysts to better counter foreign D&D. 

  • The FBI's Security Division protected FBI facilities, personnel, and information systems against compromise by foreign intelligence services.  Using a layered "defense-in-depth" strategy, the Security Division improved the FBI's ability to make accurate and timely judgments of the trustworthiness of applicants, employees, contractors, and task force members who have access to the FBI.  A pilot financial disclosure program and an expanded personnel security polygraph program were developed to support this effort, as was a comprehensive security policy, education, and training function.  The Security Division also created a comprehensive, centrally managed Information Assurance (IA) program to safeguard the integrity and confidentiality of FBI information systems while providing them with full lifecycle security.  This IA capability strengthens the FBI's ability to guard against the compromise or misuse of its information systems by a trusted insider, defends against external attacks, and addresses the potential for inadvertent compromise through ignorance or carelessness.

  • DIA implemented a major information assurance initiative, the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system, which enables intelligence analysts to create subject-specific or case-specific sites on a shared network and enforce a "need-to-know" security policy by limiting on-line access.  In FY 2002, the DoD Intelligence Information Systems (DoDIIS) community installed the PKI program at more than 50 sites and enrolled over 800 users.  The system is expected to encompass all of the DoDIIS community's 25,000 users.

  • The AFOSI created a revolutionary information management system that acts as a warehouse, consolidating investigative, operational, and intelligence information.  The Investigative Information Management System was adopted by the Defense Computer Intelligence Information System (DCIIS), now known as PORTICO.  AFOSI's concept, structure and code allowed DCIIS/PORTICO to hit the ground running with a functional tool, adapting it to service all customers: Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, NSA, DIA, NIMA, and CIA.  Once operational, PORTICO will standardize the collection, storage, and dissemination of intelligence information reports, as well as source information, analysis, and production, thereby creating a seamless system in which all items and agencies interact to support the national CI structure.

  • NSA presented over 175 Defensive Information for Counter Intelligence Espionage (DICE) briefings to over 40,000 attendees.  A companion video "DICE 2002, Now It's Personal" was produced and distributed to reach customers who could not attend the briefings.

  • NSA, DIA, CIA and the NIC analyzed and reported on the threat to information systems and networks posed by intelligence operations of foreign governments and a multitude of transnational groups.  The purpose of this mission is to identify the threats faced by IC customers, enabling them to implement information assurance security measures to counter the foreign intelligence threat by protecting information systems and networks.

  • NSA assessed and reported on the principal intelligence threats confronting US military operations around the globe.  NSA also provided US policymakers and law enforcement agencies with foreign intelligence information that contributed to the conduct of sensitive activities by the CI community.  The CI community used NSA products to help build defensive security programs and activities designed to protect against both foreign intelligence collection efforts and unauthorized access to, or disclosure of, protected facilities, information, and material.

  • Through an improved sharing of information between NSA and both the CI and Law Enforcement Communities, NSA was able to turn lead information into actionable intelligence for those who are responsible for deterring, detecting, and neutralizing foreign intelligence service activities against the United States and its interests.

  • The DOE OCI/ODNCI Investigations Program supported FBI counterintelligence investigations involving DOE and NNSA personnel, facilities, programs, or information.  The program provided technical experts to evaluate information developed by the FBI relating to WMD and other areas within the technical domain of DOE/NNSA. 

  • The DOE OCI/ODNCI Investigations Program also provided CI coverage for nuclear facilities under the joint control of the US Navy and DOE.  The Investigations Program continued liaison with federal, state, and local law enforcement and CI agencies.

  • The DOE OCI/ODNCI Analysis Program produced country threat summaries and in-depth country threat assessments evaluating the threat of foreign intelligence collection against DOE/NNSA laboratories, personnel, and information.  These products served as the basis for CI-awareness briefings for laboratory personnel who interact with foreign nationals within the United States and overseas.  CI analysis provided focused assessments to support specific treaty-related overseas deployments of DOE personnel.

  • During FY2002 there were significant increases in the numbers of the DOE/NNSA population reached through CI course and seminar offerings; 1,760 individuals attended 104 mobile training courses provided by the CI Training Academy based in Albuquerque.  In concert with the Office of Security, OCI/ODNCI provided CI material via a web-based module that is included in DOE security refresher briefings.

  • The OCI/ODNCI Counter Intelligence Evaluation Program (CIEP) completed more than 5,700 evaluations on individuals with required access to DOE's high risk programs.  The CIEP has continued to conduct liaison with other federal agencies maintaining access to sensitive source information.

  • DIA expanded the scope of its anomalies recognition and reporting program, introducing it to new organizations including USTRANSCOM.  This program complements the office's parallel focus on insider threats and is an active tool to connect the DIA work force and other organizations to an interagency CI enterprise.  The anomalies briefing brought new levels of CI awareness to well over 2,500 people and responds to earlier guidance by the DCI and the Foreign Denial and Deception Committee.

  • The Defense Security Service (DSS) received 1,715 suspicious contact reports (an 85 percent rise over FY2001) from defense industry, of which 975 warranted in-depth analysis.  One of these reports resulted in the January 2002 arrest of Klaus Buhler, a German national who was attempting to illegally purchase and export military aircraft engines to Libya.  The DSS experienced a 116 percent rise in reports received regarding potential foreign collection activities.


Posted: May 01, 2007 08:09 AM
Last Updated: Jan 03, 2012 12:54 PM