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Suspected WMD-Related Dual-Use Goods and Procurement Transactions

Regime Finance and Procurement - Annex I

 

The following is a list of procurement transactions, contracts, attempted transactions, or contract tenders of products of suspected dual-use goods. The section below lists terms used by ISG throughout the report and this particular annex, as well as summarizes specific UNSCR affecting member states’ obligations in exporting dual-use and military goods to Iraq.

  • Permitted Goods: UNSCR 661 limited exports to Iraq to medical supplies, foodstuffs, and other items relating to humanitarian needs, but the UN nonetheless required that all dual-use goods requested by Iraq be reviewed and approved by the UN Sanctions Committee prior to the exportation of such humanitarian goods. Regarding the importation of foodstuffs and medicines, the Iraqis notified the Sanctions Committee.
  • Dual-Use Goods were subject to UN approval:From 1990 through 1996, UN member states were allowed a free hand in interpreting what goods they considered to be suitable for export to Iraq. In 1996, UNSCR 1051 (1996) established an import/export monitoring system for Iraq. Under UNSCR 1051, Iraq and countries exporting to Iraq were obliged to notify the UN of any “dual-use” items as described by the 1051 List. This list of dual-use goods was subsequently modified by UNSCR 1409 (passed in 2002) that became the basis of the Good’s Review List (GRL). From 30 May 02, the date of UNSCR 1409, member states were permitted to sell dual-use goods not included on the GRL with the approval of the Sanctions Committee, while exports of goods described by the GRL had to be submitted to the UN for their consideration and approval.
  • Prohibited Military Goods: UNSCR 661 and 687 prohibited UN member states from exporting military goods to Iraq. Therefore, any goods “specially designed” or “modified” for military use were banned for export to Iraq (prohibited). “Goods” included equipment, component parts, technology, and software (including software used for the development and production of military goods).

The goods described below appear to be dual-use as specified by the 1051 or the GRL, and consequently could have been of use to Iraq for the development, production or use of WMD. However, without full technical specifications of the items or knowledge of whether UN approval was granted for these exports, ISG cannot determine whether UN sanctions were actually breached with the procurement transactions summarized below. Investigating possible breaches of sanctions relating to the export of dual-use goods is outside the scope of ISG.

 

Chemical Dual-Use Related Procurement

Possible Violations of UN Sanctions by French Companies

2002—French Company Carbone Lorraine Supplied the MIC with Chemical Warfare Raw Materials
As of August 2002 the former Iraqi Regime and the French company Carbone Lorraine had been cooperating for many years in the procurement of high-tech industrial equipment, some of which had WMD applications.


2001—Attempt To Procure Mobile Laboratory Trucks

A French firm known for violating UN sanctions submitted a request for bids to a South Korean and a German company for 20 mobile laboratory trucks in August 2001. The end-user for the trucks was purported to be the Iraqi General Company for Water and Sewage.

 

Possible Violations of UN Sanctions by Indian Companies

1999—NEC Company Assists Iraq in the Purchase of Chemical Equipment and Precursors
Reportedly, the Indian company NEC and the Iraqi company Al-Basha’ir combined resources in 1999 to set up a front company called Technology Trading S.A. (TTSA). TTSA appeared to conduct research on herbicides, pesticides and other agriculture-related issues. Baghdad could have directed TTSA to research and development of chemical dual-use programs for the Iraqi government.

  • Iraq used TTSA and NEC to purchase chemical laboratory equipment and precursors from India.
  • These items were shipped by land via the Syrian and Jordanian borders using false cargo manifests and bribes to preclude customs inspections.

 

Biological Dual-Use Related Procurement

Sales of Biomedical Equipment Technology and Services by Swiss Companies

1995—Purchase of Reagents by an Iraqi Front Company
Reportedly, an Iraqi front company called Al-Eman purchased a kit of reagents worth $5,000 from the Swiss firm Elisa on behalf of an organization named El Ibaa in 1995. El Ibaa was a special unit in the Iraqi MoA.

  • El Ibaa was directly connected with Saddam, had a special research facility, and was granted an “unlimited” budget.
  • Its stated research areas were the breeding of animals such as cows and sheep and certain types of crops.

 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Austrian Companies

2001—Negotiations To Procure Autoclaves
AGMEST and the Al Rafad Scientific Bureau for Promoting Drugs and Medical Appliances, both located in Baghdad, negotiated a contract for the Iraqi Ministry of Health for autoclaves from an Austrian firm in early 2001.

  • Two of the autoclaves were reportedly intended for the Vaccine and Serum Institute in Baghdad, a probable reference to the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute (ASVI).
  • In July 2002, Sabah N.M. Ali of AGMEST in Baghdad, Iraq, Firas Kadhum of the Iraqi Al Rafah Scientific Bureau for Promoting Drugs and Medical Appliances, and an official from a Jordanian firm negotiated a contract for autoclaves, sterilizers, and vacuum pumps from the Austrian company with the end user being SDI.

 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by German Companies

2001—Attempts To Acquire Biotechnology and Biological Weapons-Related Technology and Expertise
The Amman, Jordan office of the Iraqi front company Winter International forwarded offers for dual-use laboratory equipment from a German firm to the Winter International office in Baghdad, in March 2001. The end-user of this equipment was purported to be the Iraqi MoI. The equipment offered included:

  • An electrophoresis system including a special atomizer with rubber bellows for producing reagent mists. This system can be used for recombinant DNA process-cloning and many other molecular biology applications.
  • A refrigerated ultracentrifuge, a microcentrifuge, a low temperature freezer (between -30 and -80 degrees Celsius), and an automatic DNA-analysis system with mono-laser. This equipment is on the UN dual-use monitoring lists and would have required verification.
  • A moisture purging vacuum pump and electroporator. This equipment is used for plasmid cloning.


2002
Attempts To Procure a DNA Synthesizer
From August 2002 through February 2003 representatives from a Jordanian trading company with links to Iraq attempted to purchase a DNA synthesizer from a German based company. This equipment was restricted under the UN GRL.

  • An official claiming to be the managing director of the Jordanian firm Al Theker forwarded the information to Iraq. The report stated that it appeared that the Jordanian firm’s official was forwarding information back to the Baghdad-based Wateera Company.

 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Italian Companies

2002—Attempt To Procure Biotechnology and Bio Weapons Related Technology and Expertise
In January 2002, the Al-Mazd Group for Medical and Engineering Systems and Technology (AGMEST) in Baghdad requested a quotation for 10 freeze dryers through the Iraqi Ministry of Health from an Italian firm.


2002—Attempt To Procure Dual-Use Autoclaves

In March 2002 the Iraqi firm Al Mutasem Engineering used a Jordanian intermediary company, to contact an Italian firm and receive a price quote for dual-use autoclaves.

  • Autoclaves are commonly used in laboratories to sterilize equipment. They are not a vital part of a BW program as there are other means to sterilize equipment.

 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Turkish Companies

2002—Procurement of CBW Protective Equipment
A Turkish firm sold and transferred atropine autoinjectors to the Iraqi government starting in August 2002. The company also provided coordination in response to Iraqi requests for chemical protective equipment, unspecified laboratory chemicals and biological growth media.

  • In December 2002, the same firm continued to work with the Iraqi government on a new order for atropine autoinjectors and was also working to fill Iraqi orders for additional CBW protective equipment; specifically 600 microbial decontamination systems, 600 CBW protective kits including protective masks and garments, and 10 sterilizers.

 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Indian Companies

2002—Attempt To Procure Biotechnology Equipment
According to reports, an Indian export company provided a quotation for a dry powder injection-filling project at the Al-Anaam Pharmaceutical Company packaging plant in Baghdad.


2002—Attempt To Procure Biotechnology technology

According to reporting, in late 2002, Iraq’s State Company for Vegetable Oil issued tender no. 649/2002 to several different Iraqi trading firms in an attempt to procure detergent production facilities that included high-capacity spray drying equipment and cyclone filters. An Indian firm was the only supplier to present Iraq’s State Company for Vegetable Oil with an offer.


2003—Attempt To Procure Dual-Use Drugs

In January 2003, an Indian firm offered to deliver 10 metric tons of bulk Ciprofloxacin to the Iraqi State Company for Manufacturing of Drugs and Medical Appliances, Kimadia’s Samarra Drug Industries.

  • Ciprofloxacin is a widely used antibiotic that could also be used to treat Anthrax infection. It was specifically added to the UN Goods Review List (GRL), pursuant to UNSCR 1454.
  • Iraq’s procurement and stockpiling of Ciprofloxacin would have facilitated the country’s employment of BW against coalition forces, Iraq’s neighbors, and/or its own citizens.
  • There is insufficient data available to confirm the completion of this deal.


2003—Transfer of Hormone Tablet Production Manufacturing Technology

An Indian firm working through representatives of the Syrian Group Company (SGC) Baghdad offices, provided an offer for a hormone tablet facility to Iraq in late January 2003. The client for the facility was identified as “M/S Al-Amin” which is very likely the Al-Anaam Pharmaceutical Company.

 

Nuclear Dual-Use Related Procurement

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Belarusian Companies

2001—Contract for Ferrite Materials Including Magnets
The MIC company Al-Tahadi had a contract with the Belarusian company, Balmorals Ventures, for ferrite materials, including permanent ferrite magnets.

  • Some of the equipment was received from this contract, to include, a press machine and a mixer.
  • The MIC initiated direct contact with the Belarusian company and therefore neither Al-Sirat nor Al-Najah were involved in this procurement attempt.

 

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Romanian Companies

2000—Production Lines of Anisotropic and Isotropic Cast AlNiCo Magnets
The MIC company Al-Tahadi had two contracts for production lines for magnets. The first contract was signed in approximately 2000 with a Romanian company, Uzinimportexport, for production lines of both anisotropic and isotropic cast AlNiCo magnets.

  • The contract was worked through the private front company Al-Sirat.
  • Al-Tahadi received other offers for this production line. For example, an Indian company, NEC bid on the contract through the front company Al-Najah, but the Romanian company had a better price.
  • Al-Tahadi did not receive equipment or materials from this contract.
  • The contract included an output capacity of one ton of magnets per year, raw materials for two years, training for two years, and equipment. The equipment included a 25kg induction furnace, electric furnaces for heat-treating, facilities for producing molds, facilities for measurements and magnetization, and magnetic annealing furnaces.

Al-Tahadi did not have a plan for acquiring the raw materials after the two year contract expired because these materials were readily available. The AlNiCo production lines did not include the sintering process. The magnets specified in the contract were ring magnets, cubicle magnets and cylindrical magnets with a mass of 0.5 to 500 grams.

 

Delivery Systems Procurement

For a listing of Iraq’s illicit procurement of missile delivery systems commodities, see the Delivery Systems Procurement Chapter.


Posted: Apr 23, 2007 07:56 AM
Last Updated: Apr 23, 2007 07:56 AM