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Liquid-Propellant Missile Developments

Delivery System - Annex B

 

 

2.1 Al Samud Program

In 1993, Iraq began developing liquid-propellant ballistic missiles. The program began as the Ababil-100 liquid-propellant missile program, which later became known as the Al Samud. This missile was based on SA-2 and Scud technology and manufacturing techniques; it was monitored closely by the UN. Research and development continued until 2001 when the program was terminated and replaced by the Al Samud II.

Figure 3. Al Samud short diagram.
Figure 4. Al Samud long diagram.

 

Table 3
Original Al Samud Parameters
Subsystem Parameter Characteristic Units Data Notes
Missile Overall Length m 7.6  
Diameter mm 500  
Lift-off mass kg 1,500 Approximate figure
Inert mass kg 340 +/- 30kg
Warhead Mass Total kg 270  
Explosive kg 160 60% TNT, 30%
RDX, 10% Al
Length Overall m 1.68  
Cylindrical m 0.23  
Conical m 1.45  
Material Wall mm 3 Carbon steel
Propulsion Engine Thrust t 3.5  
Burning time s 68* Nominal
s +2* Contingency
Tanks Ullage volume % 5 Up to 8%
Ox, length, overall m 2.600 Domes each
0.335 high
Ox, length, parallel m 1.930  
Fuel, length, overall m 1.691 Domes each
0.335 high
Fuel, length, parallel m 1.021  
Thickness mm 2 Aluminum
Propellant Oxidizer ----- AK-20K  
Oxidizer flow rate kg/s 11.5*  
Total mass kg 724* Usable, for 63s
burning time
Fuel ----- TG-02  
Fuel flow rate kg/s 3.5*  
Total mass kg 220* Usable, for 63s
burning time
Air supply Air bottle Diameter mm 300 Spherical,
one only
Pressure bar 300-360  

*Parameters are known to be inconsistent.

 

2.2 Al Samud Static Test Data

Table 4
Static Tests Supporting the Al Samud Program
# Date Fuel Oxidizer Filling Site Notes
(residual
fuel,
oxidizer)
Filled Fired Type Source Vol. (l) Type Source Vol. (l)
01 00.10.96 00.10.96 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 IZ chamber
& injector head
02 14.04.97 00.04.97 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Structural
test of
missile
03 00.08.97 00.08.97 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Structural
test of
missile
04 10.04.98 15.04.98 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76  
05 20.04.98 22.04.98 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76  
06 00.06.99 07.06.99 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Check IZZ engine
07 00.07.99 00.07.99 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Check IZZ engine
08 21.07.99 22.07.99 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360    
09 06.08.99 07.08.99 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Check
IZZ purge
system
10 22.11.99 23.11.99 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Check telemetry
11 04.12.99 05.12.99 TG-02 Bat. 76 210 AK-20K Bat. 76 360 Bat. 76 Check telemetry
12 13.07.00 15.07.00 TG-02 Karamah 210 AK-20K Karamah 360 Bat. 76  
13 05.08.00 08.08.00 TG-02 Karamah 242.5 AK-20K Karamah 402.5 Bat. 76 (10, 41)
14 06.09.00 07.09.00 AZ-11 China 267 AK-20K USSR 463 Bat. 76 Tb 61s,
(2, 2.5)
15 11.10.00 12.10.00 AZ-11 ? 267 AK-20K USSR 430 Bat. 76 IZ regulator, tb 69s
(2.5, 2)
16 16.10.00 17.10.00 TG-02 USSR 267 AK-20K USSR 431.5 Bat. 76 Tb 61s
17 17.03.01 18.03.01 AZ-11   266 AK-20K USSR 428 Bat. 76 Repeat
of 16
18 03.04.01 03.04.01 TG-02 USSR 275 AK-20K USSR 442 Bat. 76 IZZ turbo-pump
19 25.04.01 26.04.01 TG-02 USSR 285 AK-20K USSR 460 Bat. 76 IZZ vanes [TVC]
20 11.06.01 12.06.01 TG-02 USSR 271 AK-20K USSR 451 Bat. 76 Tb 58s, original engine
21 16.10.01 17.10.01 TG-02 USSR 216 AK-20K USSR 357 Bat. 76 IZZ turbo-pump, tb 49s,
(22, 8)
22 28.11.01 29.11.01 AZ-11 ? 191 AK-20K USSR 352 Bat. 76 Tb 45s,
(10, 40)
23 16.02.02 17.01.02 AZ-11 ? 190 AK-20K Al Qa’qa’a 350 IAH Tb 49s,
(8, 19)
24 01.04.02 02.04.02 TG-02 USSR 210 AK-35K Ibn-Sina’ 350 Bat. 76 Test effects of AK-35K

Figure 5. Al Samud Flight tests (1997-2000).

Figure 6. Al Samud flight tests (2001).

 

2.4 Al Samud II Static Test Data

Table 5
Static Tests Supporting the Al Samud II
# Date Fuel Oxidizer Filling Site Notes
(residual
fuel,
oxidizer) (in liters)
Filled Fired Type Source Vol. (l) Type Source Vol. (l)
01 31.07.01 01.08.01 TG-02 AK-20K 347 AK-20K USSR 557 Bat. 76 Tb 74s,
(15, 12)
02 07.03.02 08.03.02 AZ-11 370 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 597 IAH Tb 85s,
(14, 18)
03 26.03.02 27.03.02 TG-02 Raya 364 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 601 IAH Tb 75s,
(33, 10)
04 07.04.02 08.04.02 TG-02 Raya 386 AK-20K Raya 605 IAH Stabilizer test (70, 35)
05 15.05.02 16.05.02 TG-02 Raya 371 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 603 IAH T-pump test,
tb 30, leak!
06 01.07.02 01.07.02 TG-02 Raya 375.5 AK-22K Qa’qa’a 612 IAH IZZ chamber, (66, 15)
07 08.07.02 08.07.02 TG-02 Raya 375 AK-20K Qa’qa’a ? IAH Failed,
oxidizer pipe leak
08 16.07.02 16.07.02 TG-02 Raya 370.9 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 609 IAH IZZ vanes,
orig engine - Fail
09 31.07.02 01.08.02 TG-02 Raya 371 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 609 IAH Tb 81s,
IZZ vanes (36, 2)
10 07.08.02 07.08.02 TG-02 Raya 370 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 607 IAH IZZ gas generator
11 29.08.02 30.08.02 TG-02 Raya 370 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 614 IAH IZZ chamber, ok
12 05.09.02 06.09.02 TG-02 Raya 375 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 614 IAH Engine burnt - Fail
13 09.11.02 n/a TG-02 Raya 372 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 598 IAH IZZ t-pump, (13, 20) OK
14 16.11.02 16.11.02 TG-02 Raya 372 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 598 IAH IZZ t-pump
(37, 36)
15 24.11.02 25.11.02 TG-02 Raya 370 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 605 IAH IZZ engine, tb20s,
(436 ox) F
16 04.12.02 05.12.02 TG-02 Raya 368 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 601 IAH Tb 78s,
(3, 12) OK
17 02.01.03 02.01.03 TG-02 Raya 368 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 601 IAH Orig engine, IZZ vanes
(25, 27)
18 11.01.03 12.01.03 TG-02 Karamah 369 AK-20K Raya 606 Taji IZZ engine, (15, 55) OK
19 26.01.03 27.01.03 TG-02 Karamah 365 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 602 IAH IZZ engine,
(0, 48.5) OK
20 03.02.03 04.02.03 TG-02 Karamah 368 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 605 A Ghraib Tb 81s, IZZ vanes
(28, 26.5)
21 22.02.03 23.02.03 TG-02 Karamah 366 AK-20K Qa’qa’a 605 A Ghraib New TVC vane material

 

2.5 Al Samud II Flight Test Data

Figure 7. Al Samud II flight tests.

 

2.6 Al Samud II Missile Material Balance

Materials Balance

To determine the likely number of missiles that could potentially remain in an inventory, the technique of materials balance can be employed. This involves the collection of data associated with all aspects of the production and consumption of the missiles concerned. The production numbers may be gleaned from the factory producing the hardware or where the missiles are integrated or even loaded with propellants. Consumption numbers can be derived from tests, either static or flight, deliveries to the armed forces or those withdrawn due to damage or other causes.

If a materials balance of complete missiles cannot be accomplished, an equivalent might be derived from the many subsystems that make up the complete missile—such as warheads, engines, or even propellants. This latter approach has been used in an attempt to account for both Scud and Al Samud II missile inventories.

ISG believes that a complete material balance for the Al Samud II missile may not be possible due to various factors. Documentary data indicating the total number of missiles produced have not been recovered by ISG and the disposition of the missiles is unknown. However, a very good estimate of the total number produced can be achieved based on the knowledge that the Iraqis had a production rate goal of 10 per month, according to an official in Iraq’s missile program. This rate varied month to month due to availability of parts. The missile began production in late 2001 with the first 10 being delivered to the Army in December 2001. Assuming these production figures were maintained between December 2001 and December 2002, ISG believes a likely total of 130 Al Samud II missiles may have been produced during this period. According to a former senior official at Al Karamah, Iraq produced approximately 20 missiles during the first quarter of 2003. Another source claimed that, after UNMOVIC inspectors departed the country in March 2003, Iraq was able to assemble about 4 Al Samud missiles from remaining parts, which had been placed in mobile trucks to avoid destruction. These 24, in addition to the 130 previously mentioned, yield a total of 150 Al Samud II missiles produced.

According to multiple sources, Iraq expended up to 27 missiles during experimental tests (flight and static tests). Beginning 1 March 2003, UNMOVIC began a destruction program, which accounted for 72 missiles destroyed. ISG have obtained information given in Table 6, which shows serial numbers associated with 62 of the 72 missiles destroyed. However, the dates of destruction do not appear to correlate to those dates provided by the UNMOVIC spokesman during the period of destruction. According to reporting, Iraq launched five Al Samud II missiles during OIF. Table 7 details some of the additional al Samud subsystems destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Coalition forces may have been responsible for the destruction and recovery of up to 15 missiles based on available data. According to a foreign government service, two Al Samud II missiles were taken to Iran.ISG has not been able to confirm this claim. Taking these figures into account, ISG has developed possible scenarios for material balance for the Al Samud II missile given in Table 6.

Table 6
Al Samud II Missiles Destroyed Under UNMOVIC Supervision in 2003
Date Serial No. Date Serial No. Date Serial No.
03 Mar 03 020279 06 Mar 03 020294 TE 11 Mar 03 020233
03 Mar 03 020272 06 Mar 03 020297 TE 11 Mar 03 020283
03 Mar 03 020228 06 Mar 03 020302 TE 11 Mar 03 020232
03 Mar 03 020226 07 Mar 03 010206 TL 12 Mar 03 020237
03 Mar 03 020236 07 Mar 03 020310 TL 12 Mar 03 020236
03 Mar 03 020229 07 Mar 03 020308 TL 12 Mar 03 020292
04 Mar 03 020296 08 Mar 03 020280 13 Mar 03 020314
04 Mar 03 020295 08 Mar 03 020288 13 Mar 03 020313
04 Mar 03 020286 08 Mar 03 020287 13 Mar 03 020316
05 Mar 03 020217 TE 08 Mar 03 020306 14 Mar 03 020311
05 Mar 03 010227 TE 08 Mar 03 020209 14 Mar 03 020312
05 Mar 03 020264 TE 08 Mar 03 020303 14 Mar 03 020299
05 Mar 03 020284 TE 09 Mar 03 020285 14 Mar 03 020315
05 Mar 03 020277 09 Mar 03 020282 15 Mar 03 020235
05 Mar 03 020278 09 Mar 03 020281 15 Mar 03 020234
05 Mar 03 020273 09 Mar 03 020304 TE 15 Mar 03 020290
05 Mar 03 020274 09 Mar 03 020291 TL 16 Mar 03 020220
05 Mar 03 020293 09 Mar 03 020289 TL 16 Mar 03 020242
06 Mar 03 020222 10 Mar 03 020225 17 Mar 03 020240
06 Mar 03 020227 10 Mar 03 020224 17 Mar 03 020221
06 Mar 03 020275 10 Mar 03 020298    

 

Table 7
Additional Al Samud II Subsystems Destroyed Under UNMOVIC Supervision

No. Engine
Serial No.
Fuel Tank
Serial No.
Oxidizer
Serial No.
Tail
Serial No.
Warhead
Serial No.
1 57013 FU-125 Ox-115 109 130
2 56820 FU-132 Ox-120 118 133
3 89834 FU-113 Ox-127 121 134
4 88240 FU-123 Ox-102 120 135
5 50413 FU-115 Ox-126 102 136
6 57007 FU-129 Ox-132 111 122
7 82439 FU-117 Ox-121 112 124
8 57918 FU-111 Ox-124 113 120
9 82551 FU-134 Ox-123 119 121
10 27736 FU-114 Ox-125 126 115
11 31414 FU-121 Ox-118 117 132
12 53005 FU-130 Ox-140 124 131
13 53401 FU-138 Ox-135 126 128
14 82626 FU-142 Ox-138 128 118
15 54115 FU-139 Ox-136 131 116
16 82414 FU-140 Ox-129 123 119
17 89720 FU-145 Ox-122 132 126
18 55404 FU-116 Ox-131 130 113
19 51725 FU-133 Ox-117 127 117
20 54108 FU-135 Ox-128 125 103
21 80120 FU-127 Ox-130   114
22 89925 FU-126 Ox-133    
23 113741 FU-128 Ox-134    
24 52916 FU-103 Ox-141    
25 55017   Ox-092    
26 54418   Ox-104    

 

Table 8 ISG Assessment of Al Samud II Missile Accountability
  Worst Case Likely Case Best Case
Missiles Produced 150 130 121
Used in tests 22 25 27
Destroyed under UNMOVIC 72 72 72
Launched during OIF 5 5 5
Damaged/Captured/to Iran 15 15 17
Unaccounted for 36 13 0

 

 

 

The Liquid Fuels Committee (LFC)

Until April 1998, both the Air Defense and the Naval Defense and the Naval Defense forces had supplied Al Karamah with whatever propellant was required for testing on an ad hoc basis. Both felt unable to continue this relationship as it was adversely affecting their own propellant stocks. On hearing this news, Staff Lt. Gen. Muzahim Sa’b al-Hasan Muhammad Al Nasir called a meeting of representatives from the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), the Army (Surface-to-Surface Missile [SSM] Command), Air Defense Forces, Al Karamah, and the Naval Defense Forces. The armed forces could satisfy their own propellant requirements but, for Al Karamah’s new development program, there was none available. Thus, arrangements had to be made to satisfy this need whilst maintaining stock availability to the other armed services.To do this, a committee called the LFC was set up by the MIC in 1998 to manage and coordinate the requirements of all liquid-propellant research, production, and supply (regeneration, manufacture, or importation) to the various users.

There were three goals of the LFC:

  1. Now - To ensure the continued supply for current requirements of TG-02 and AK-20K
  2. Near Term - The production of AZ-11 and AK-27P
  3. Far Term - The production of Hydrazine, Unsymmetrical Di-Methyl Hydrazine (UDMH), Nitrogen Tetroxide, and Hydrogen Peroxide

By the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), objective 1 was achieved, some movement was in progress toward objective 2, and most of the candidate propellants in objective 3 were at least being researched.

The LFC consisted of the following personnel:

Name From, Position Notes
Dr. Muzhir [Modher] Sadiq Saba’
Khamis Al-Tamimi
Al Karamah, DG Chairman
Jasim Muhammad Salman al-Tamimi Al Karamah Deputy Chairman
Dr. Yusif ‘Ulwan Hammadi Al ‘Ithawi Ibn-Sina’, DG  
Dr. Hikmat Na’im Al Jalu Ibn-Sina’, former DG  
Dr. Thabit Jasim Ibn-Sina’, former DG  
Ghazi Faysal Najm-al-Din Al Basil  
Dr. Zuhayr Mahmud Al Qazzaz Al Basil  
Dr. Jalil Rahif’ Akal Al Basil  
Dr. Agil ‘Awad Al Basil  
Dr. Jasim Al Kindi  
Fu’ad Muhammad Basim Al Qa’qa’a  
Sami Da’ud Sa’d Company Al Zahrawi Center
Dr. Hamzah Yasin ‘Issa MIC Center  
Dr. Ghanim Maqbul ‘Ulwan Al Amin  


2.7 Liquid-Propellant Material Balance

Closure of the material balance for liquid propellants is extremely difficult because of the amount of regeneration due to the effects of aging on propellants. The records kept concerning regeneration do not make reference to the sources of fresh material acquired in the regeneration process. Instead, they provide only an input-output picture.

The Liquid Fuels Committee (LFC) was initiated in August of 2000 to analyze performance capabilities for various propellants, research techniques for producing candidate chemical propellants or their pre-cursors, and study synthesis routes and manufacturing capabilities of various companies. Through studies of companies and capabilities, the LFC awarded contracts to companies to begin manufacturing. The projected production capabilities were 50 tons/yr of Di-methyl amine (DMA), 20 tons/yr of DETA, 50 tons/yr of TEA, and 50 tons/yr of xylidine. Schematics of liquid-propellant production and research are shown in Figures 8 and 9. This production when combined with the imported quantities of propellant far surpassed the requirements of the Al Samud II program. A schematic materiel balance of the liquid propellant used for the Al Samud II program is shown below in Figures 10 through Figure 12, with the production or sources along the top, above the total and consumption along the bottom of each table.

Figure 8. Liquid-propellant production.

Figure 9. Liquid-propellant research.

Figure 10. Oxidizer materiel balance (1995-2003).

Figure 11. Fuel materiel balance (1995-2003). 

Figure 12. High-energy propellant materiel balance (1995-2003).

 


Posted: Apr 23, 2007 09:21 AM
Last Updated: Apr 23, 2007 09:30 AM