Complete Table of Contents

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Volume I

Transmittal Message


Scope Note


Regime Strategic Intent

Key Findings
Who Made Iraq’s Strategic Decisions and Determined WMD Policy
     Saddam’s Place in the Regime
          The Apex of Power
          Personalized Rule
     Saddam’s Unsettled Lieutenants
     A Few Key Players in an Insular Environment
     Saddam Calls the Shots
     Saddam Shows the Way
     Harvesting Ideas and Advice in a Byzantine Setting
     Weaving a Culture of Lies
     Saddam Became Increasingly Inaccessible
     Saddam’s Command By Violence
Saddam’s Effect on the Workings of the Iraqi Government
     Suspicion of Structures
     Powerless Structures
     The Higher Committee
     The Foreign Policy Committees
     Saddam’s Grip on National Security and WMD Development
     Saddam Holding Court
     Saddam and Fiscal Policy
How Saddam Saw His Subordinates
     Mining Respect and Expertise
     Mutuality of Fear
     Dazzled by Science
How Saddam Saw Himself
     Saddam’s Psychology
     Saddam’s Personal Security
     Saddam the Dynasty Founder
     Saddam and His Sense of Legacy
Desire . . . Dominance and Deterrence Through WMD
     Saddam’s Role in WMD Policy
     What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successes of WMD
     What Saddam Thought: External Concerns
     The United States
     WMD Possession—Real or Imagined—Acts as a Deterrent
     Saddam’s Prioritization of Getting Out From Under Sanctions
     Efforts To Lift Sanctions
Realizing Saddam’s Veiled WMD Intent
     Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline
     Ambition (1980-1991)
     Decline (1991-1996)
     Scientific Research and Intention to Reconstitute WMD
     Reaction to Sanctions
     Husayn Kamil’s Departure
     Cooperating With UNSCOM While Preserving WMD
     Recovery (1996-1998)
     Impact of the “Chicken Farm” Documents
     Looking Ahead to Resume WMD Programs
     Guarding WMD Capabilities
     Iraq’s Internal Monitoring Apparatus: The NMD and MIC Programs
     Suspending Cooperation With UNSCOM
     Transition (1998-2001)
     Nullifying All Obligations To UNSC Resolutions
     Preserving and Restoring WMD Infrastructure and Expertise
     Pumping Up Key Revenue Streams
     Miscalculation (2002-2003)
     Renewing UN Inspections
     Iraq’s Other Security Concerns
     Sorting Out Whether Iraq Had WMD Before Operation Iraqi Freedom
     Alternative Hypotheses on Iraq’s Nonuse of WMD During Operation Iraqi Freedom


A. The Quartet—Influence and Disharmony Among Saddam’s Lieutenants
B. Iraq’s Intelligence Services
C. Iraq’s Security Services
D. Saddam’s Personal Involvement in WMD Planning


Regime Finance and Procurement

     A Word on the Scope of This Chapter
     Key Findings
     Chapter Summary
     The Regime Timeline
     Ambition (1980-91)
     Decline (1991-96)
     Recovery (1996-98)
     Transition and Miscalculation (1999-2003)
Directing and Budgeting Iraq’s Illicit Procurement
     President and Presidential Secretary’s Role in Illicit Procurement
     Presidential Diwan’s Role in Illicit Procurement
     Diwan’s Role in Supplemental Funding of Government Ministries
     Extent of Knowledge of the Former President of the Diwan
     Budgeting Iraqi Procurement
          General Government Budget
          Sources of Government Revenue
          Supplemental Budgetary Process
          Supplemental Budget Submission Procedure
          Approval and Authorization of Supplemental Funding
          Disbursal of Supplemental Funds
Financing Iraq’s Illicit Procurement
     Iraqi Economy’s Role in Illicit Procurement
          Economic Ambition (1980-91)
          Economic Decline (1991-96)
          Economic Recovery (1997-99)
          Economic Transition and Miscalculation (1999-2003)
     Iraq’s Revenue Sources
          Bilateral Trade Protocols
          Phases of the UN OFF Program
          Disposition of UN OFF Funds
          Oil Voucher Process
          Secret Voucher Recipients
          Iraqi Oil Vouchers Provided to International Leaders
          American and British Oil Voucher Recipients
          Benon Sevan’s Use of Iraqi Oil Vouchers
          Iraqi Intelligence Service Nominations for Oil Vouchers
          Oil Export Surcharges
          How Surcharges Were Collected
          Kickbacks on Commercial Goods Import Contracts
          Private-Sector Oil Sales
          Role of the SOMO
          SOMO’s Relationship to the MoO
          Official Oil Accounts
     Banking and the Transfer of Financial Assets for Procurement
          CBI’s Role in Licensing Money Exchangers
          CBI’s Role in Tracking Foreign Accounts for Iraq
          Iraqi Bank Holdings
          Funding of the Ministries
          The Use of Foreign Banks
          Use of Banks in Lebanon
          Use of Banks in Jordan
          Use of Banks in Syria
          Use of Banks in Turkey
          Use of Banks in Egypt
          Use of Banks in Belarus
          Regime Attempts To Recover Funds Prior to OIF
          The Role of Cash Transactions
          Iraq’s Gold Reserves
Executing Illicit Procurement in Iraq: Ministries, Commissions, and Front Companies
     Ministry of Foreign Affairs
          MFA-IIS Connections
          MFA’s UN Sanctions Counter-Strategy
          MFA and Iraq’s Bilateral Protocols
     Ministry of Trade
          MoT’s Role in Procurement
          Facilitating Illicit Procurement With Cover Contracts
          Facilitating Illicit Trade Through Commercial Attaches
     Ministry of Defense
          MoD Procurement Leadership
          MoD Procurement Directorates
          Budgeting and Financing Military Procurement
          MoD Procurement Process
     Procurement for the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard
     Military Industrialization Commission
          Procurement Leadership in the MIC
          MIC: Beneficiary of Illicit Funds
          MIC Banking and Financing
          Items Procured via the MIC’s Link to Iraqi Intelligence
          MIC Front Companies
          Iraqi Intelligence Service
          IIS Procurement Leadership and Mission
          IIS Procurement Cooperation with Foreign Intelligence Services
          Items Procured by the IIS
          IIS Front Companies
     Special Security Organization
          SSO Procurement Leadership and Mission
     Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
     Ministry of Transport and Communication
          Mission and Key Procurement Companies under the MoTC
     Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
          University Collaboration With MIC
          Exploitation of Academic Exchanges for Procurement
     Ministry of Agriculture
     Ministry of Interior
     Front Company Conglomerates: Al-Eman and Al-Handal
          The Al-Eman Network
          Al-Handal General Trading Company
Supplying Iraq With Prohibited Commodities
     Procurement Suppliers During the Decline Phase, 1991 to 1996
     Procurement Suppliers During the Recovery Phase, 1996 to 1998
          South Korea
          People’s Republic of China
          Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
     Procurement Suppliers in the Transition and Miscalculation Phases, 1998 to 2003
          North Korea
          Transportation Routes From North Korea to Iraq
          Payment Methods for North Korean Contracts
          Methods Used To Hide Transshipment to Iraq
          Polish-Iraqi Procurement Financial Flows
          Key Belarusian Individuals Linked to Illicit Trade With Iraq
          Materials, Equipment and Services Provided by Belarus
          Payments From Iraq to Belarus
          Opening Conventional Trade With Yemen for Oil and Cash
          Yemen Emerges as an Intermediary for Iraqi Illicit Imports
Importing Prohibited Commodities
Deceptive Trade Practices Supporting Illicit Procurement
     Use of Trade Intermediaries
          Disguising the Nature of Prohibited Goods
          Consealing the Identity of Commodities
          Discussing the Commodity’s Destination
Use of Illicit Smuggling and Transportation Networks
          Smuggling by Air
          Smuggling by Land
          Smuggling by Sea
          Smuggling via Jordanian Ports
          Smuggling via Syrian Ports
          Smuggling via the Arabian Gulf


A. Translations of Iraq’s Bilateral Trade Protocols
B. Known Oil Voucher Recipients
C. Iraq’s Budgetary Process
D. Iraq Economic Data
E. Illicit Earnings Sources and Estimation Methodology
F. Iraqi Oil Smuggling
G. Iraq’s Banking System
H. UN Security Council Resolutions Applicable to Iraq
I. Suspected WMD-Related Dual-Use Goods and Procurement Transactions
J. The Procurement of Conventional Military Goods in Breach of UN Sanctions
K. Suspected Intermediary and Front Companies Associated With Iraq
L. Procurement Acronyms
Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline Events


Volume II

Delivery Systems

Key Findings
     Evolution of Iraq’s Delivery Systems
          The Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline
          Ambition (1980-91)
          Decline (1991-96)
          Recovery (1996-98)
          Miscalculation (2002-2003)
     Resolving the Retained Scud-Variant Missile Question
     Liquid-Propellant Missile Developments
          Al Samud II
          Al Samud Warhead
          Al Samud II Warhead
     Solid-Propellant Missile Developments
     Al Fat’h Missile Program
          General Characteristics
          Guidance and Control
          Material Balance
     Al ‘Ubur Missile Program
          Guidance and Control
          Other Composite Solid-Propellant Systems
          Long-Range Ballistic Missile Projects
     Clustering SA-2/Volga Engines Designs
     SA-2 Conversions to Surface-to-Surface Missiles
     Large-Diameter Solid-Propellant Missile Project
          Program Development
     New Cruise Missile Projects
          HY-2 Range Extension
          Propulsion System
          Guidance and Control
     The Jinin [Jenin] Project
          Propulsion System
          Guidance and Control
     Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs)
          Brief History
     MiG-21 RPV
          Roles and Missions
     L-29 RPV (Al Bay’ah)
          Roles and Missions
     Huwaysh’s Accounting of the L-29 RPV Program
     Al Yamamah Project
     Ibn-Firnas UAVs
          Foreign Assistance
     Al Quds UAV Program
     Procurement Supporting Iraq’s Delivery Systems
     Infrastructure Improvements and Technology Developments
     Static Test-Firing Facilities
     Solid-Propellant Rocket Motor Case Manufacture
     Propellant Production
     Solid-Propellant Motor Casting Chambers
     Production of Solid-Propellant Ingredients
     Propellant Research
     Graphite Technology
     Carbon Fiber Filament Winding
     Ceramic Warhead Effort?
     Proscribed Activities
     Violations of United Nations Sanctions and Resolutions
     Equipment Restoration
     Undeclared Activities
     Role of the MTCR


A. Resolving the Retained Scud-Variant Missile Question
B. Liquid-Propellant Missile Developments
C. Solid-Propellant Missile Developments
D. People



Key Findings
Evolution of the Nuclear Weapons Program
     The Regime and WMD Timeline
     The Early Years: Ambition
     Decline (1991-96)
     Recovery and Transition (1996-2002)
     Miscalculation (2002-2003)
Results of ISG’s Investigation on Nuclear Issues
Investigation Into Uranium Pursuits and Indigenous Production Capabilities
     Foreign Pursuits
     Indigenous Production Capabilities
     Iraq’s Known Uranium Holdings
Iraqi Uranium Conversion Program
Aluminum Tube Investigation
     Elements of ISG Investigation
     Purported High-Level Interest in Aluminum Tubes
     Possible Association of Iraqi Nuclear Entities With the Tubes
     Tube Characteristics and Shipping Requirements
     Indigenous Tube Manufacture—A Possible Sign Baghdad Did Not Need High-Specification Tubes
     Iraqi Interest in 84-mm Tubes
Carbon Fiber
     Carbon Fiber and Iraq’s Pre-1991 Gas Centrifuge Program
Iraqi Concealment of Carbon Fiber-Related Activity, Materials, and Documents After Operation Desert Storm
     The MIC Carbon Fiber Project in 2001/2002
Flow-Forming Machinery
Planned Magnet Production Lines at Al Tahadi
     Procurement Details
Rotating Machinery Department
Investigation of Potential Centrifuge-Related Facilities
     Support Facilities
               Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility
               Al Karama State Company
               Al-Wazeriya Site
               Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-Haytham Missile R&D Center)
          Al Samud Factory (Abu Ghurayb Missile Facility)
          Badr and Umm Al-Marik State Companies (Khan Azad Military Production Plant)
          Al-Tahadi State Company
          Salah Al Din State Company (Samarra Electronics Plant)
          Al-Nida State Company
          Rashid State Company’s Tho Al-Fiqar Factory (formerly the Nassr State EstablishmentMechanical Plant)
          Ur State Company (An-Nasiriyah Aluminum Fabrication Plant)
Uranium Enrichment—EMIS
     Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS)
               Al Safa’a EMIS Plant at Tarmiya
               Al Fajr EMIS Plant at Ash Sharqat
               Al-Jazira (Mosul Feed Materials Production Facility)
               Al-Zawra State Company
               Al-Nida State Company (Zaafaraniya Mechanical Workshop Al-Rabiyah)
               Al-Radwan (Batra Military Production Facility)
               Al-Nassr Al-Adhim State Company
     Disposition of EMIS-Related Equipment
Laser Research in Iraq
     Laser Related Work After Operation Desert Storm
     Current Status and Future Potential
     Iraq’s Pre-1991 LIS Efforts
Rail Gun Summary
     Rail Gun Efforts
Issues Related to Nuclear Weapons Design and Development
     Casting Technology
     Explosive and Lens Fabrication Capabilities
     High-Speed Switches
     Fireset Development and Testing
     Neutron Generators
Migration of the Capabilities From the PC-3 Nuclear Weapons Project
IAEC Modernization
     Interest in the IAEC and Intervention by Saddam Husayn
     Increased Funding and Publicity of IAEC Activities
     Infrastructure Improvements at the IAEC: The Modernization Project
     Perceptions the Regime Was Preparing for Reconstitution of the Nuclear Program
     IAEC Work on Neutron Generators
University Programs
Hidden Enrichment Technology
Survey of Structures at Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center


A. Definitions Used by Teams During Survey
B. Team Results
C. Analysis of the Videotapes Compiled From Video Recce Mission 5/6 November 2003
D. Results of Mission Survey of Tuwaitha Nuclear Complex Over the Period 20-22 November
E. Summary of Known UN-Tagged Equipment
F. Photography Highlights: Tuwaitha Mission, 20-22 November 2003
G. Tuwaitha Maps, Buildings, and Numbers


Volume III

Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program

Key Findings
Evolution of the Chemical Warfare Program
     Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline
     The Early Years, 1960-1980: A Slow Start
          The Chemical Corps and Al-Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Research Foundation
     Full Capability, 1981-1991: Ambition
          Foundation of the Al Muthanna State Establishment
          Agent Production Begins and Al Muthanna State Establishment Takes Shape
          Early Weaponization: Simple Solutions
          CW—A Permanent and Pivotal Strategic Weapon
     The Decline, 1991-1996
     Destroying Iraqi Weapons
     Recovery and Transition, 1996-2003
     Miscalculation, 2002-2003
Command and Control
     Preamble: Muddling Through After the Gulf War
     Iraq Could Maintain CW Competence With Relative Ease
Infrastructure—Research and Development
     Creation of the Iraqi Industrial Committee
     The Power of the IIC
     The IIC’s Master Plan for Self-Reliance: The List of 1,000 Chemicals
     Dual-Use Chemicals on the List of 1,000 Chemicals
          Thionyl Chloride
     Chemicals From the List Move Toward Production
Infrastructure—Production Capability
     State of Chemical Industry at OIF—Limited Break-Out Capability
     Suspect Munitions Activities
     Disposition of CW Munitions Post-1991
     The 1991 Decision To Destroy Undeclared Weapons
     Iraq Unilateral Weapons Destruction in 1991
     Destruction of Chemical Munitions, Bulk Agent, and Precursors
Chemical Munitions—Searching Military Depots and Caches
     Investigating Ammunition Supply Points
     Investigating Captured Enemy Ammunition Points (CEA Consolidation Points)


A. IIS Undeclared Research on Poisons and Toxins for Assassination
B. Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex
C. The Iraqi Industrial Committee
D. Tariq Company’s Activities
E. Al-Abud Network
F. Detailed Preliminary Assessment of Chemical Weapons Findings
G. Chemical Warfare and the Defense of Baghdad
H. Summary of Key Findings at Captured Enemy Ammunition Consolidation Points
I. Review of 24 Iraqi Ammunition Supply Points


Biological Warfare

Key Findings
Evolution of the Biological Warfare Program
     The Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline
     Evolution of the Biological Warfare Program
     Ambition: The Early Years, 1960-1985.
     Renewed Ambition and Near-Realization: 1985-1991
     The Beginning of the Decline: Opportunity Through Ambiguity and the End of the Game (1991-1996)
     Recovery and Transition 1996-2003
Research and Development
     Building Human Capital
     Research Facilities
     Iraqi BW Agent Research
          Bacillus anthracis (‘Agent B’)
          Clostridium botulinum (Botulinum toxin, ‘Agent A’)
          Clostridium perfringens (‘Agent G’)
          Aflatoxin (‘Agent C’)
          Wheat Cover Smut (‘Agent D’)
          Camel Pox
          Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever
          Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis (Enterovirus 70)
     Other R&D Related to BW Development
          Single Cell Protein R&D
          Growth Media R&D
     Drying Process/Carrier/Particle size
     Production Capability
     Break-Out Production Capability Pre-OIF
     Mobile Assets
     Attempts at BW Weaponization
     The Gulf War
Concealment And Destruction of Biological Weapons
     Iraq’s Initial WMD Concealment Effort
     The Destruction of Iraq’s BW
     What Remained Hidden and Undeclared 1995-1998?
     Weaponization Related Activities in the Years Following Desert Storm
     Unresolved Issues
     Program Direction
     Research and Development
     IIS Laboratories
          Disposition of Iraq’s BW Program Culture Collection
     Agent Production
     Drying of BW Agents
     Bacterial BW Agent Production and Storage


A. Bulk BW Agents
B. BW Research and Development Facilities
C. ISG Investigation of Iraq’s Reported Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Capability
D. Trailers Suspected of Being Mobil BW Agent Production Units





Historical Document
Posted: Apr 22, 2007 02:21 PM
Last Updated: Jun 19, 2013 03:56 PM