

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated.

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Source: Department of State Files, INR/IL Historical Files, Congo, Sept. 1962-
Dec. 1963. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text.

[DOS, NSC, CIA]

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The paper is apparently a covert annex to an undated memorandum to President Kennedy entitled "Operating Plan for the Congo," printed as document 362 in *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, Vol. XX, Congo Crisis, pp. 743-746. The annotation to document 362 states that the source text bears no drafting information and that National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy received a copy from the Department of State on December 17, 1962. For information about Kennedy's discussions of the plan with the NSC Executive Committee on December 17, see documents 363 and 366 in Vol. XX (pp. 747, 750-752). In a December 23 memorandum to Rusk (Document 381 in Vol. XX, pp. 779-780), Assistant Secretary Williams recommended to Rusk that Ambassador Gullion be instructed to advise the men around Adoula to permit him to rule by extra-parliamentary means. He noted that this would mean that the CIA would proceed to implement the covert annex to the NSC paper approved the previous weekend. Footnote 1 to document 381 states that the covert annex was not found.

3 In telegram 07059 to Leopoldville, December 22, CIA authorized the station to undertake, in close coordination and with the concurrence of the Ambassador, the following actions outlined in the covert annex: 2A-2D, 3A-3D, 4A-4B. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78-435, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 12,)
Operations)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

COLO 165/1
10/19/68
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REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

COVERT ANNEX

file Congo

CIA Capability to Support Government of the Congo Actions to Dissolve Parliament

2

1. Assumptions

A. That key members of the Government of the Congo (GOC) will decide to prorogue, recess, or otherwise disperse the Parliament in order to create an environment for the undertaking of positive actions to resolve the Katanga secession within the framework of the U. N. Reconciliation Plan, and to take constructive steps to stabilize the internal situation in the Congo.

B. That actions against Parliament, whether legal or otherwise, will be fully backed by the Congolese National Army and the Surete, using force if required.

C. That the GOC decision to take such action will be contingent upon prior assurances of U. S. support of such action, of all phases of the U. N. Reconciliation Plan, and of other pressing internal matters.

2. Pre-Coup Actions

A.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)(b)(1)
(b)(3)(b)(3)

B.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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C. [Redacted]

D. [Redacted]

subsequent to contemplated actions.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

3. Coup Actions

A. [Redacted]

[Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3)

B. [Redacted]

C. [Redacted]

D. [Redacted]

4. Post-Coup Actions

A. [Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

B. [Redacted]

C. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* D.

[Redacted]

E.

[Redacted]

* F.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

5. Coordination

All actions will be taken in close consultation and with the concurrence of the Ambassador.

6. Budget

A. All items except those marked with an asterisk fall within programmed activities for which funds are available.

B. [Redacted] in unprogrammed funds is required to stage the Congolese Air Force to North Katanga, as noted in memorandum to Special Group, dated 7 December 1962.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

C. An estimated [Redacted] in unprogrammed funds is required for a training and support program for the [Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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