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
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IAC-D-11

IAC-D-11/1



(b)(1)

IAC-D-12

Consolidated Statement of Intelligence  
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IAC-D-13

National Intelligence Surveys (6 Feb 51)

IAC-D-13/1

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IAC-D-13/3

Conflict Between NIE 40 and Sections of  
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(b)(1)

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IAC-D-9

19 December 1950

TERMS OF REFERENCE: IMPLICATIONS OF  
MAINTAINING A BEACHHEAD IN SOUTH KOREA  
(NIE-16)

1. This subject has been raised as a possibility for a National Estimate.

2. The IAC is asked to consider whether it wishes work to go forward on an estimate along the lines of the attached.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Acting Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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IAC-D-9

19 December 1950

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NIE-2

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IAC-D-9

19 December 1950

TERMS OF REFERENCE: IMPLICATIONS OF  
MAINTAINING A BEACHHEAD IN SOUTH KOREA  
(NIE-16)

The Problem:

To estimate the advantages and disadvantages of holding a beachhead in South Korea.

Assumptions:

That the United Nations Forces have the capability of maintaining a beachhead in South Korea.

Discussion:

1. Military Factors

a. Strategic considerations--effect on Chinese Communist and Soviet plans.

2. Politico-Psychological factors

a. Advantages

(Relating to: UN-US relations; USSR; China: CN and CC; Japan; S.E. Asia-Indochina, Burma, Thailand; Western European Allies; other non-Communist areas, e.g., India, Iran, Middle East area.)

b. Disadvantages

(Same sub-factors as under a.)

Conclusions:

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IAC-D-9

19 December 1950

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COPY NO. 10

**TOP SECRET**  
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11 January 1951  
(Corrected)

**SUMMARY OF THE**  
**SEMI-ANNUAL ESTIMATE OF THE**  
**STATUS OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM**

1. Reference IAC-D-10, dated 28 December 1950.
2. The dissemination of the semi-annual estimate of the "Status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program", CIA/SI 100-51, dated 5 January 1951, has been greatly limited by the Director of Central Intelligence. To permit a somewhat wider distribution, the summary of the original estimate has been extracted and slightly modified to remove the "Restricted Data" contained therein. The modifications occur only in the second paragraph of the Conclusions and the footnotes. This paragraph as now written conforms to its classification as Top Secret.
3. This summary is attached hereto for your approval as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. It is requested that this approval be expedited and that comments, if any, be classified "Not Restricted Data".
4. It is not proposed to discuss this summary at an IAC meeting.
5. After approval, appropriate dissemination of this summary will be made.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Acting Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Attachments:  
Summary of CIA/SI 100-51  
dated 5 January 1951

**TOP SECRET**  
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11 January 1951  
(Corrected)







### DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

**SOURCE**

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DOC. NO. IAC-D-10/1

DOC. DATE 11 Jan 1951

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## REGISTRY

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CIA 36131

**TOP SECRET**COPY NO. 20TOP SECRETIAC-D-10/2

20 January 1951

SUMMARY OF THE  
SEMI-ANNUAL ESTIMATE OF THE  
STATUS OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM

1. The dissemination of the semi-annual estimate of the "Status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program," CIA/SI 100-51, dated 5 January 1951 (IAC-D-10 dated 28 December 1950) has been greatly limited by the Director of Central Intelligence. To permit a somewhat wider distribution, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee has prepared a summary of this report.
2. IAC-D-10/1 of 11 January 1951 is hereby rescinded and recalled due to dissents by the Army and Navy members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee on the wording and concomitant technical implications of paragraph 2b, when in fact there is agreement on the ideas to be expressed among the members of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee as expressed in meeting on 19 January 1951.
3. IAC-D-10/2, a revision of IAC-D-10/1, is attached hereto for your approval as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. It is requested that this approval be expedited and that comments, if any, be classified "Not Restricted Data."
4. It is proposed not to discuss this IAC-D-10/2 at an IAC meeting unless a member feels such a discussion is advisable. It would be appreciated if you would telephone your concurrence to this office as promptly as possible.
5. After approval, appropriate dissemination of this summary will be made.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

TOP SECRETIAC-D-10/2

20 January 1951

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## SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET

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(b)(3)  
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IAC-D-10/3

6 February 1951

Feb 1 1951

The Honorable Brien McMahon  
Chairman  
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy  
Congress of the United States  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of 22 January 1951 in which you request a report on Soviet capabilities to counter the delivery of U. S. atomic weapons. An estimate of this scope will require the participation of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group of the Department of Defense, which I have requested. This Agency is willing to undertake the responsibility of preparation and of bringing the estimate into the current schedule of intelligence production. This will take some time as a detailed study will be necessary, but I believe we can have a satisfactory estimate ready for you by April 1.

Your letter also requests information as to the background of the semi-annual report which was recently delivered to you. Since this information is of a very sensitive nature, I have asked Mr. Walter Pforzheimer to discuss with you informally the best means by which it can be transmitted to you.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely,

(signed) Walter B. Smith

Walter B. Smith  
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

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IAC-D-10/3

6 February 1951

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IAC-D-10/3

6 February 1951

5 February 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Request from Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy

1. Senator Brien McMahon, Chairman, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, has requested a comprehensive estimate on Soviet capabilities "to impair, prevent, or frustrate the delivery of atomic weapons to targets inside the USSR."
2. This agency, with the assistance of the Departmental intelligence organizations, is willing to undertake the preparation of the necessary estimate, which we believe is desirable to insure Congressional support.
3. However, Senator McMahon's request necessitates an appraisal of Soviet defensive capabilities in terms of U. S. offensive capabilities, and this can only be done with the cooperation of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group because of its recent operational analyses in this field.
4. Therefore, I request your authorization for the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group to participate in this project. The finished product will be issued as a national estimate with the same limited distribution as that recently given to the report on the Soviet atomic energy program.

/s/

WALTER B. SMITH  
Director

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IAC-D-10/3

6 February 1951

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S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-10/4  
 6 July 1951

SEMI-ANNUAL ESTIMATE OF THE  
STATUS OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM

1. Attached hereto for your approval as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is the latest estimate of the status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program which has been prepared by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. Complete agreement of the Committee was not obtained. The Air Force member expressed some reservations, and the Navy member has submitted a minority report.
2. It is not proposed to place this report on the agenda for discussion at an IAC meeting unless such action is requested by a member. Your opinion on this is requested.
3. It is requested that your approval, with or without comments, be made to my office by close of business Thursday, 12 July, in order that formal dissemination may be effected without delay.
4. After approval, formal copies of the report will be disseminated on a very limited basis to you, the President, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, members of the National Security Council, and such other recipients as may require the information contained therein.

JAMES Q. REBER  
 Secretary  
 Intelligence Advisory Committee

Enclosure (IAC Agencies only):  
 Report of JAEIC  
 dated 3 July 1951

*miss [ ] to  
 get as soon as  
 IAC approval has  
 been received.  
 B*

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IAC-D-10/4  
 6 July 1951

(b)(3)

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~  
~~IAC-D-10/5~~  
23 July 1951

SEMI-ANNUAL ESTIMATE OF THE  
STATUS OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM

1. In accordance with the instructions of the Director of Central Intelligence at the meeting of the IAC on 19 July 1951, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee has reconsidered its estimate of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program (ref: IAC-D-10/4 dated 6 July 1951) and has secured agreement of the committee members on a revised version.

2. Attached hereto for your approval as a member of the IAC is the revised estimate of the Status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program which has been prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee.

3. No further discussion of this estimate by the IAC is proposed.

4. It is requested that your consideration of this paper be expedited and that your approval, with or without comments, be made to my office by the close of business 26 July 1951, in order that formal dissemination may be affected without delay.

5. After approval, formal copies of the report will be disseminated on a very limited basis to you, the President, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, members of the National Security Council, and such other recipients as may require the information contained therein.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Enclosure (IAC Members only):  
Report of JAEIC  
dated 23 July 1951

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~~IAC-D-10/5~~  
23 July 1951

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IAC-D-10/6  
29 February 1952

**INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

**SEMI-ANNUAL ESTIMATE OF THE  
STATUS OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM**

1. Attached hereto for your approval as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is the latest estimate of the status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program which has been prepared by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. Complete agreement of the Committee was obtained.

2. It is proposed to place this report on the agenda for discussion at the IAC meeting on 6 March 1952.

3. After approval, formal copies of the report will be disseminated on a very limited basis to the President, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, members of the National Security Council, and such other recipients as may require the information contained therein.

**JAMES Q. REBER**  
Secretary

Enclosure: (IAC Agencies only)  
Report of JAEIC  
dated 27 February 1952

**TOP SECRET**  
IAC-D-10/6  
29 February 1952

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~~IAS-T-107~~  
21 December 1952

**INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

**SEMI-ANNUAL ESTIMATE OF THE  
STATUS OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM**

1. Attached hereto for your approval as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is the latest estimate of the status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program which has been prepared by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. Complete agreement of the Committee was obtained.

2. It is proposed to place this report on the agenda for discussion at the IAC meeting on 8 January 1953.

3. After approval, formal copies of the report will be disseminated on a very limited basis to the President, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, members of the National Security Council, and such other recipients as may require the information contained therein.

**RICHARD D. DRAIN**  
Acting Secretary

Enclosure: (IAS Members only)  
Report of JAEIC  
dated 22 December 1952

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~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~IAS-T-107~~  
21 December 1952

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**TOP SECRET**  
IAC-D-10/8  
28 January 1953

**INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
FORWARDING LETTER FOR ESTIMATE OF THE STATUS OF THE  
SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM**

1. In accordance with the desires expressed at the meeting on 8 January 1953, there is circulated herewith for your concurrence or comment a draft of the letter of transmittal to be used by the Director of Central Intelligence in forwarding the Report on the Status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program to the Chairman of the Joint Committee of Congress on Atomic Energy.

2. It would be appreciated if your concurrence or comments could be made available to Mr. Herbert I. Miller of the Central Intelligence Agency (telephone extension ) before the close of business on 30 January 1953.

(b)(3)

3. With reference to the proposed modifications to certain paragraphs of the Estimate, it is noted that concurrences were received from all members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee by 15 January 1953.

RICHARD D. DRAIN  
Acting Secretary

Enclosure: (IAC Members only)  
Draft as stated above.

**TOP SECRET**  
IAC-D-10/8  
28 January 1953

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~~TOP SECRET~~VIA TS No. 100594Copy No. 10*20 copies**Obtain**New***TOP SECRET  
IAC-D-10/9  
10 February 1954****INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE****ESTIMATE OF THE STATUS OF THE SOVIET  
ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM**

1. Attached hereto for your approval as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is the latest estimate of the status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program which has been prepared by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. Complete agreement of the Committee was obtained.

2. It is proposed to place this report on the agenda for discussion at the IAC meeting on 16 February 1954.  
*12 APRIL 1955*

3. After approval, formal copies of the report will be disseminated on a very limited basis to the President, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, members of the National Security Council, and such other recipients as may require the information contained therein.

**RICHARD D. DRAIN  
Secretary**

Enclosure: (IAC Members only)  
Report of JAEIC  
dated 10 February 1954

Document transmitted  
herewith contains  
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IAC-D-10/9  
10 February 1954****TOP SECRET***300/63*

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Mr. McQuay	McQuay	3/22	1640				
Cy #1 - DCI Attachment Cy #1 of TS 100593 #2 - State (YAC) " " #2 " " #3 - Army " " #3 " " #4 - Navy " " #4 " " #5 - Air Force " " #5 " " #6 - ABC " " #6 " " #7 - Joint Staff " " #7 " " #8 - FBI " " #8 " " #9 - OIC No Attachment #10 - NEB/RT " "						Document transmitted herewith contains RESTRICTED DATA	
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IAC-D-10/10  
30 April 1954

Summary Version of  
The Soviet Atomic Energy  
Program to Mid-1957



1. At its meeting of 16 February 1954, the IAC agreed that the JAEIC prepare a summary version, containing no Restricted Data, of subject estimate, and propose a dissemination list for this version (IAC-M-141, 16 February). This version is attached. The JAEIC proposes dissemination [redacted]

2. IAC members will please notify [redacted] Chairman, JAEIC, [redacted] by 6 May 1954 as to their concurrence or comment on this proposal.

3. In accordance with the IAC's instruction, another version of this estimate has been prepared in cooperation with the AEC. This version was transmitted [redacted]

[redacted]  
RICHARD D. DRAIN  
Secretary, IAC

Enclosure (IAC Members only)  
TS #100607  
Series C



IAC-D-10/10  
30 April 1954

TOP SECRET

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## DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

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28 December 1950

SEMI-ANNUAL ESTIMATE OF THE  
STATUS OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM

1. Attached hereto for your approval as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is the latest estimate of the status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program which has been prepared and agreed to by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee.

2. It is proposed not to discuss this report at an IAC meeting unless major comments are received or unless the members feel such a discussion will be necessary. Your opinion in this matter is solicited.

3. After approval, formal copies of the report will be disseminated on a limited basis to you, the President, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, members of the National Security Council, and such other recipients as may require the information contained therein.

4. As it is intended to make formal dissemination of the report by 4 January 1951, please do not delay your consideration of it.

JAMES C. BRUSH  
Acting Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Enclosure:  
Report of JAEIC  
dated 27 December 1950.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~IAC-D-10~~

28 December 1950

When Detached from Enclosure  
Treat as ~~TOP SECRET~~

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**SECRET**

IAC-D-10/10.1

14 May 1954

## INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Proposed Release to [redacted] of NIE-11-3A-54,

(b)(1)

"Summary - The Soviet Atomic Energy Program to Mid-1957"

1. By IAC-D-10/10, 30 April 1954 (distributed to IAC Members only), the JAEIC proposed dissemination of subject summary estimate to [redacted]

(b)(1)

All agencies have concurred in the proposed release to [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

2. G-2 and ONI believe that MIC policy prevents dissemination to [redacted] inasmuch as the estimate is classified "Top Secret." No other agency has interposed objection to the proposed release to [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

3. In view of the above, the IAC will consider the proposed release to [redacted] at an early meeting.

(b)(1)

RICHARD D. DRAIN  
Secretary

MAY 14 1954  
NE-IAC

IAC-D-10/10.1

14 May 1954

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**SECRET**

**20 September 1955**

**INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

**To Holders of IAC-D-10/11, dated 15 September 1955,**

**Subject: "Designation of Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee"**

**Please change the number of this document to IAC-D-10/12.**

  
**WILLIAM O. WEBB**  
**Acting Secretary**

(b)(3)

**SECRET**

*300/68*

IAC-D-10/~~5~~/2  
15 September 1955


INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Designation of Chairman

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

Effective 13 September 1955 the Acting Director of Central Intelligence designated Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence, CIA, as Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee vice Mr. Herbert I. Miller.

(b)(3)

  
PAUL A. BOREL  
Secretary

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IAC-D-10/13  
3 October 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Soviet Nuclear Explosions

*3.1*  
The attached memorandum will be on the agenda of  
the IAC meeting on 4 October.

(b)(3)

WILLIAM O. WEBB  
Acting Secretary

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**IAC-D-10/14**  
**14 November 1955**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

**SUBJECT: Soviet Nuclear Explosion**

The attached memorandum has been added to the agenda of  
the IAC meeting on 15 November.

[Redacted Signature Box] (b)(3)

for **WILLIAM O. WEBB**  
Acting Secretary

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IAC-D-10/15  
28 November 1955

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

**SUBJECT: Soviet Nuclear Explosion**

The attached memorandum has been added to the agenda of  
the IAC meeting on 29 November.

  
WILLIAM O. WEBB  
Acting Secretary

(b)(3)

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

IAC-D-10/15  
29 November 1955  
(Revised)

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

**SUBJECT: Soviet Nuclear Explosion**

The attached memorandum has been added to the agenda  
of the IAC meeting on 29 November.

(b)(3)

**WILLIAM O. WEBB**  
Acting Secretary

**SECRET**

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IAC-D-10/15  
29 November 1955  
(Final)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Soviet Nuclear Explosion

The attached memorandum was approved by the IAC on  
29 November 1955 for dissemination on a need-to-know basis.

[Redacted Signature]

WILLIAM O. WEBB  
Acting Secretary

(b)(3)

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


IAC-D-10/16  
29 November 1955

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Soviet Nuclear Proving Ground Site

1. Pursuant to paragraph 5 b of the IAC minutes of the 15 November 1955 meeting (IAC-M-219), the Chairman, JAEIC, reports the following for the information of the IAC:



(b)(1)

b. The classification of the information contained in the above paragraph has been determined to be SECRET, not Restricted Data. This information may be disseminated in normal intelligence channels and publications bearing this security classification.



WILLIAM O. WEBB  
Acting Secretary

(b)(3)

**SECRET**

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IAC-D-10/17  
8 December 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Proposed Amendment to DCID 11/1:

Control of Information Regarding Foreign Nuclear Explosions

Pursuant to IAC-M-220, Item 6 c, 29 November 1955, the attached recommendation has been prepared for consideration by the IAC, and will be placed on the agenda of the 13 December meeting.

(b)(3)

PAUL A. BOREL  
Secretary

*Approved by IAC  
13 Dec 1955 (IAC-M-222, Item 5)  
Memo to OCR - 16 Dec 1955*

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IAC-D-10/17  
8 December 1955

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Proposed Changes to [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

1. As requested at the IAC meeting of 29 November 1955, the recommendation below is forwarded.

2. It is recommended that paragraph 5 of [REDACTED] be superseded by the following:

(b)(3)

"5. The JAEIC will prepare a statement which protects intelligence sources and methods and which is suitable for immediate dissemination to unified and specified commands under provisions of paragraph 4 above.

"6. The Chairman of the IAC will authorize the Chairman of the JAEIC to make dissemination of the statement referred to in paragraph 5 above through normal U. S. intelligence channels whenever a national decision to make a public release has been reached, or whenever the Chairman of the IAC deems such dissemination to be warranted in the national interest. The release to foreign nationals of this statement or a modified version thereof will be an automatic agenda item for the next IAC meeting."

3. It is further recommended that present paragraph 6 of the present [REDACTED] be renumbered paragraph 7 and that the last sentence thereof be eliminated inasmuch as this procedure is included in the recommended paragraph 6 above.

(b)(3)

/s/ HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Chairman  
Joint Atomic Energy  
Intelligence Committee


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IAC-D-10/18  
15 December 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Proposed Terms of Reference for the  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)

Attached are the proposed terms of reference for the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC). This item has been placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 20 December.

  
PAUL A. BOREL  
Secretary

(b)(3)

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YIAC-D-10/18  
15 December 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Terms of Reference and Membership for the  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

1. Pursuant to the general provisions of NSCID No. 3 the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee was constituted as a working group under the Scientific Intelligence Committee on 21 November 1949. Later, under provisions of DCID 3/4, in August 1952, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) was reconstituted "as a permanent interdepartmental committee with the same structure and functions as before."

2. The present JAEIC membership is as follows:

- a. CIA, Chairman
- b. State Department
- c. Atomic Energy Commission
- d. Army
- e. Navy
- f. Air Force
- g. JCS
- h. FBI

Ad-Hoc

- i.
- j. OSD
- k. NSA

(b)(1)

3. The JAEIC approved terms of reference are forwarded herewith as enclosure 1. The functions listed are essentially identical with those transmitted to the SIC on 24 March 1950 and under which the JAEIC has been operating since that date. It is recommended that enclosure 1 be published as Annex C to DCID 3/4.

/s/ Herbert Scoville, Jr.  
Chairman  
Joint Atomic Energy  
Intelligence Committee

Enclosure





*-Pole*  
*10/18*  
*7-7283*

19 DEC 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Briefing Memorandum on JAEIC Terms of Reference,  
IAC Agenda Item

1. The proposed Terms of Reference for JAEIC have been approved by all the full members of JAEIC. The functions are essentially the same as those agreed upon in the past, but in some cases they are spelled out a bit more clearly. The definition of atomic energy intelligence, see Footnote 1/ to the Terms of Reference, is new and limits JAEIC activities more than the old NIA Directive 9 which defined it as follows: "All intelligence information related to foreign atomic energy intelligence developments and potentialities affecting the national security." The present definition is acceptable to O/SI.

2. There has been considerable discussion within JAEIC on this definition and it is possible that the Joint Staff or some other military member might attempt to still further restrict JAEIC fields of interest by recommending changes at the meeting. In particular, they may wish to add at the end additional items to be excluded from atomic energy intelligence. These might be tactics and techniques of employment of nuclear weapons by armed forces, or the political and strategic implications of various weapon developments. He may also try to insert "scientific and technical" between "is" and "intelligence" in the first line. Although JAEIC does not intend to concentrate or do any extensive estimating in these fields, these limitations are not considered desirable. These fields must be considered in making an over-all evaluation of the Soviet nuclear program.


3. It is considered that these proposed JAEIC functions are good guide lines for other similar committees which may be set up under the IAC. For example, we would recommend that the proposed Guided Missile Committee have identical functions. Likewise, if the charter of the SEC is revised, these functions might be satisfactory for it as well.

*Copy to Sectip. 1/19*

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
SUBJECT: Briefing Memorandum on JAEIC Terms of Reference,  
IAC Agenda Item

4. It is recommended that you endorse these Terms of Reference at the IAC meeting and make every effort to prevent any weakening of either the functions or the definition.

  
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Assistant Director  
Scientific Intelligence

(b)(3)

Distribution

Orig & 1 - fwd  
1 - DD/I  
1 - AD/RR  
1 - AD/NE  
1 - AD/CI  
1 -  (ONE)

(b)(3)

IAC-D-10/18  
20 December 1955  
(Final)

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Terms of Reference for the

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)

The attached terms of reference for the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) were approved by the IAC on 20 December.

[Redacted Signature Box]

PAUL A. BOREL  
Secretary

(b)(3)

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IAC-D-10/18  
20 December 1955 (Final)  
Amended  
24 January 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Terms of Reference for the

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)

1. At its meeting on 24 January 1956 (IAC-M-227, 24 January 1956, Secretary's Note 6), the IAC agreed to amend paragraph 1 a of the terms of reference for the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (IAC-D-10/18, 20 December 1955, Final).
2. The terms of reference as amended are attached herewith.

(b)(3)

PAUL A. BOREL  
Secretary

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(b)(3)

TS #102420  
IAC-D-10/19  
30 March 1956  
Copy No. 11

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report on Soviet Nuclear Weapon Test Activities in 1956

The attached JAEIC report will be considered in connection with  
item 5 on the Agenda for the IAC meeting scheduled for 3 April 1956.



(b)(3)

WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
Secretary

*Distribution:*

*1 copy only to each  
IAC member (7)  
2 copies to [redacted]  
for DCI, DDCI, DD/I  
1 copy IAC Files*

(b)(3)



(b)(3)

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TS # 102420-a  
 IAC-D-10/19.1  
 3 April 1956  
 Limited Distribution  
 Copy No. 38

# INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

## Report on Soviet Nuclear Weapon Test Activities in 1956

Attached is the revised JAEIC report noted by the IAC on Tuesday, 3 April. This is the "limited distribution" edition, and is being sent in two copies to IAC members. In accordance with IAC direction, JAEIC is preparing an edition suitable for general distribution.

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
 Secretary

*Distribution:*

*2 copies to each IAC member*

*1 copy each to:*

*William Anderson, NSC  
 William Jackson } White  
 Col. Goodpaster } House*

*With covering memo  
 signed by*

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

*3 copies to*

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

*2 " " AD/NE*

*15 " " Dir. Scoville, OSI*

*1 copy IAC/S Files*

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IAC-D-10/19.2

6 April 1956

## I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Revised Version of the Summary of Soviet NuclearWeapon Test Activities in 1956

Subject report, dated 4 April 1956, is a sanitized version of the Summary of Soviet Nuclear Weapon Test Activities in 1956, previously distributed on a very limited basis (IAC-D-10/19.1, 3 April 1956). JAEIC has prepared subject report (attached as Tab A) for more general distribution pursuant to the direction of the IAC at its meeting on 3 April 1956 (IAC-M-235, item 6 a).



WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
Secretary

(b)(3)

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IAC-D-10/20  
4 June 1956


INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Joint Statement by GMIC/JAEIC

Reference: Memorandum for Chairman, IAC, from  
GMIC/JAEIC,, 4 June 1956

1. Subject statement, signed jointly by the Chairman, Guided Missile Intelligence Committee, and Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, has been distributed to GMIC and JAEIC members, on a limited basis, and therefore is available to members of the IAC through their representatives on those committees. If any IAC members should require additional copies they may be obtained through the IAC Secretariat.

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 8 June 1956 for appropriate action.

  
WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
Secretary

(b)(3)

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~~SECRET~~IAC-D-10/21  
12 July 1956

## I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Proposed Revisions for [REDACTED] 13 December 1955

(b)(3)

Attached is a memorandum from the Chairman, JAEIC, dated 12 July 1956, which refers to certain revisions in [REDACTED] proposed by JAEIC pursuant to the direction of the IAC on 3 April 1956 (IAC-M-235, item 6c). This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 17 July for appropriate action.

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]  
WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
Secretary

(b)(3)

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Attachment to  
IAC-D-10/21  
12 July 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Proposed Revisions for [REDACTED]  
13 December 1955

(b)(3)

1. At its meeting on 3 April 1956, the IAC requested JAEIC to propose revisions of [REDACTED] in order to simplify the procedures on the control of information regarding foreign nuclear explosions. The following are the proposed revisions agreed upon by JAEIC.

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

3. Delete present paragraph 4 and substitute new paragraph 4 as follows:

(b)(1)

4. Delete present paragraph 5 and substitute new paragraph 5 as follows:

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Attachment to  
IAC-D-10/21  
12 July 1956



(b)(1)

5. Delete present paragraph 6 and then present paragraph 7 becomes new paragraph 6.

[Redacted Signature]

for

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Chairman

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence  
Committee

(b)(3)

12 July 1956

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IAC-D-10/22  
28 August 1956

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

**SUBJECT: Sanitized Version of NIE 11-2-56, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program".**

1. The attached memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, deals with this subject. The sanitized text forwarded with the memorandum is available from your JAEIC representative or, if necessary, by arrangement with the Secretary of JAEIC [redacted]  
[redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

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[redacted]  
**WILLIAM P. BUNDY**  
Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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ATTACHMENT  
IAC-D-10/22  
28 August 1956

JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

24 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary,  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT: Sanitized Version of NIE 11-2-56

1. The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee has reviewed NIE 11-2-56, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, to determine which portions must be deleted or changed to take the estimate out of the Restricted Data category. Forwarded herewith, with deletions and/or changes recommended, is a sanitized version of the estimate. The classification, after the deletions and/or changes are made, would be Top Secret.

(b)(1)

s/ HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Chairman  
Joint Atomic Energy  
Intelligence Committee

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
~~SECRET~~IAC-D-10/23  
31 August 1956

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Additional JAEIC Statement falling within DCID 11/1

1. In connection with item 8 of the Agenda for 5 September, we have been advised by JAEIC that it has issued a second statement, dated 30 August, dealing with a later explosion. This statement, available from your JAEIC representatives, will be placed on the agenda for the 5 September meeting.

2. In connection with both statements, the IAC should consider, in compliance with the paragraph 5 of DCID 11/1 (as revised 17 July 1956), the question of release to foreign governments. We are informed that JAEIC has made no recommendation on this question, which appears to involve issues both of security and of policy in the dissemination of information on nuclear matters which is withheld from the US public.

  
WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
Secretary, IAC

(b)(3)

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**Limited Distribution  
IAC-D-10/24  
25 July 1957**

**I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E**

**Scope of Part II of NIE 11-2-57 and Scope of Future IAC**



(b)(3)

The issues reviewed in the attached memorandum will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 30 July, for discussion and appropriate action.



(b)(3)

**JOHN HEIRES  
Secretary**

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Attachment  
IAC-D-10/24  
25 July 1957

JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE


MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT: Scope of Part II of NIE 11-2-57 and Scope of Future  
IAC Responsibility for Nuclear Weapon Allocations

1. In an attempt to accomplish the task of preparing a Part II for NIE 11-2-57 an Ad Hoc Working Group was formed and has held a number of meetings during June and July. This group has encountered basic differences of view concerning the scope of the estimate and, in discussion of the issues, has uncovered what appear to be basic differences as to the responsibility the IAC should assume in the field of estimating Soviet nuclear weapon allocations. At a joint meeting of the Senior IAC representatives and JAEIC members on 24 July these issues could not be resolved. We therefore regretfully submit the problem to the IAC for resolution.

2. The immediate issue concerns whether Part II should be done at all, or whether, if it is done, it should include merely illustrative examples or should include a broad high-low range of possible allocations divided broadly by missions and delivery systems. The alternatives are:

Alternative A: no Part II at all.



(b)(1)

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4. Agency Positions. The tentative Agency positions appear to be:

a. On the immediate issue of Part II of NIE 11-2-57:

State, Air Force, and CIA favor going ahead with Alternative D, for IAC approval.

AEC and JIG favor going only as far as Alternative B, but would accept Alternative C.

Army and Navy favor Alternative A, or Alternative B at most. In the event Alternative B is adopted, the Army would oppose the inclusion of Section I-IV and favor solely the statement on mathematical possibilities.

b. On the long-term issue of IAC responsibility:

State, Air Force, and CIA -- in the event that the present exercise does not produce an Alternative D result -- favor the IAC taking responsibility for an appropriate project to produce an Alternative D result at the earliest possible time, whether as part of NIE 11-4-57 or as a separate project. Such a project would include explicit discussion of possible Soviet strategy, relevant delivery systems, and war-gaming factors (with outside advice as needed).

AEC favors the IAC taking responsibility for an appropriate project to produce an Alternative D result at the earliest feasible time, provided that Soviet strategic policy can be outlined in sufficient detail to provide meaningful guidelines.

Army, Navy, and JIG do not favor the IAC taking responsibility at any time for an Alternative D result in the absence of a clear and convincing showing of consumer requirements, particularly at the NSC level.

/s/  
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Chairman

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
IAC-D-10/24.1  
13 December 1957  
(Limited Distribution)

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Nuclear Weapons Allocation Section  
for NIE 11-2-58, THE SOVIET NUCLEAR  
ENERGY PROGRAM

Reference: IAC-M-300, Item 5

The attached memorandum will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now scheduled for 17 December, for review and action.



JOHN HEIRES  
Secretary

(b)(3)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

13 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Allocation Section for NIE 11-2-58,  
THE SOVIET NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM

1. In accordance with the instructions of the IAC (IAC-M-300, paragraph 5, 30 July 1957) a Working Group of your representatives continued work during August and September on a Part II draft for NIE 11-2-57, the March 1957 estimate on the Soviet nuclear program. Early in October, this work was suspended as it became clear from the progress of NIE 11-4-57 and the GMIC and JAEIC contributions to this estimate and to NIE 11-10-57 that there were sure to be substantial changes in the estimates both of nuclear weapon development dates and of development and production dates for major delivery systems.


2. The Board of National Estimates and the Chairman, JAEIC, now believe that every effort should be made to complete a section on nuclear weapon allocation for inclusion in the forthcoming new estimate on the Soviet nuclear energy program, NIE 11-2-58, now

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scheduled to reach the IAC in mid-January. We recognize that there may remain disagreement over the scope of such an allocation, but we believe that (a) this disagreement can best be resolved in the light of an actual draft reflecting the different viewpoints, and (b) that the Working Group is in a position to adapt its past work to present such a draft, probably concurrently with the submission of the basic estimate to the IAC.

3. Accordingly, we recommend that the IAC direct that the Working Group continue its work and prepare to submit a draft (reflecting the various scope alternatives), in the light of the proposed conclusions of NIE 11-2-58 as to the supply of fissionable materials and weapons types, as nearly concurrently as possible with the completion of the balance of NIE 11-2-58.

  
WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

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TAB A  
IAC-D-10/25  
3 April 1958

JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

2 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Release of Soviet Nuclear Test Data

REFERENCE : DCID [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(3) (para 5)

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend IAC  
approval [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(1)

3. All members of JAEIC concur in this proposal except the AEC. The AEC representative has reserved his position inasmuch as transmittal of this data to foreign nations appears to be in conflict with some phase of AEC general policy on releases of information.

/s/  
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Chairman

Attachment:  
Lists of Tests

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IAC-D-10/26  
3 April 1958

**I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E**

**Coordination of Intelligence Guidance and Collection**

**Activities at the Geneva 1958 International**

**Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy**

At the meeting scheduled for 8 April the IAC will be asked to note the attached memorandum from the Chairman, JAEIC, and take appropriate action with respect to the recommendations contained therein.



**JOHN HEIRES**  
Secretary

(b)(3)

**SECRET**

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2 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Coordination of Intelligence Guidance and Collection  
Activities at the Geneva 1958 International Conference  
on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

1. The second Geneva International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy scheduled for 1-14 September 1958 offers a unique opportunity for the intelligence community to acquire a great deal of information on Soviet nuclear energy activities via the information released by the Soviets as well as additional data by an exploitation of overt and covert sources. A wide range of subjects that are important from an intelligence standpoint have been included on the Provisional Topical Agenda published through the United Nations for this conference, and extensive Soviet Bloc participation is assured. There will be opportunities for extensive overt coverage and only a small overt effort against several key areas of information appears necessary.

2. A particularly timely exploitation of this conference is needed to assure prompt reporting and evaluation of the information obtained in order for JAEIC to complete its annual NIE on the Soviet atomic energy program during October and November 1958. Information derived from Geneva should make a substantial contribution to the Estimate as was the case in 1955.

3. Interested analytical and collection elements are already planning a number of actions and the AEC, Division of Intelligence, has initiated some steps to coordinate these efforts. It is believed that the sizeable intelligence effort required, if carefully coordinated, can be carried out without interfering with, or deterring, the basic US objectives.

4. Under NSCID No. 2, the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force as well as CIA all have responsibilities for the collection of scientific and technical intelligence that is obtainable through this conference. In addition, the AEC is vitally interested in this intelligence, and has a responsibility for collecting intelligence through its representatives to the conference. The best possible community approach is needed to satisfy these complex intelligence interests and preserve the sanctity of the intent of the Conference.

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5. It is the opinion of JAEIC that the IAC should take cognizance of this need for concerted, but carefully coordinated, intelligence effort, and should sponsor the needed coordination. We recommend that the IAC note this memorandum and approve the following:

a. There shall be a concerted and carefully coordinated effort under IAC auspices to exploit the second International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy for intelligence purposes. This effort shall in no way jeopardize the basic US objectives of this conference;

b. The responsibility for coordinating all aspects of this intelligence effort is assigned to JAEIC on an ad hoc basis, and JAEIC shall advise the IAC as soon as practicable after the completion of this conference of the intelligence gain and experience acquired from a collection standpoint.

6. It is my intent that this coordination effort will be handled by an ad hoc working group under Dr. Charles Reichardt, the Atomic Energy Commission JAEIC member, and that the group include working level representatives of both collection and evaluation elements to the extent desired by member agencies. Any formal coordination of clandestine collection found necessary can be accomplished via existing mechanisms for that purpose with the aid of collection guidance generated by this working group.

(b)(3)

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Chairman, JAEIC

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JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

3 APR 1958

FR file 7

BRIEF FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Coordination of Intelligence Guidance and Collection Activities at the Geneva 1958 International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

1. The attached recommends that the IAC assign to JAEIC, on an ad hoc basis, the responsibility for coordinating intelligence exploitation of the Geneva atomic energy conference, 1-14 September 1958.

2. All members of JAEIC have agreed to this proposal but there may be some reluctance on the part of the AEC when the matter comes before the IAC. The AEC-JAEIC member, Dr. Reichardt, agreed to the attached text only after exhaustive argument concerning the intent of language in [redacted] He favors the formation of a steering group under his direction as we propose, but has argued that this group should be directly under IAC rather than JAEIC.

(b)(3)

3. The AEC declined to accept responsibilities for atomic energy intelligence collection abroad during the rewrite of [redacted] While some effort may be made to interpret present wording to include this responsibility for the Geneva Conference, I do not believe the intent of the present directive can be thus interpreted.

(b)(3)

4. I strongly recommend that the JAEIC proposed plan be adhered to and approved. It is needed to provide coordination of the many diverse requirements and collection problems which will arise as planning for the conference proceeds. We were not satisfied with our "take" from Geneva in 1955 and believe that stronger coordination will produce better results.

(b)(3)

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Chairman

Attachment:  
Geneva Memo

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IAC-D-10/27  
6 June 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Revision of JAEIC Estimate of the Soviet  
Nuclear Power Program as Previously Reported  
in NIE 11-2-57

Attached is a memorandum from the Chairman, JAEIC (Tab A) dealing with the revision of the JAEIC estimate of the Soviet nuclear power program as previously reported in NIE 11-2-57. A Board of National Estimates memorandum commenting on and making certain recommendations with respect to the JAEIC paper is attached as Tab B.

This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now scheduled for 10 June for appropriate action in the light of the JAEIC and Board memoranda.

  
JOHN HEINES  
Secretary

(b)(3)

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
TAB B to  
IAC-D-10/27  
6 June 1958

C E N T R A L   I N T E L L I G E N C E   A G E N C Y

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Memorandum From the Chairman, JAEIC, Dealing with  
Revision of Certain Parts of NIE 11-2-57, 5 June

1. The Board of National Estimates has reviewed the referenced memorandum with a view to whether any new NIE should be issued in the immediate future to take account of the revisions stated. It is our conclusion that the subject is not of such crucial importance as to call for such action, either through a new NIE or "Memorandum to Holders" such as was recently used for SNIE 11-10-57 (ICBM).
2. However, we believe that policy-makers concerned in the subject should have the benefit of the current JAEIC view. Accordingly, we recommend that the IAC note the attached memorandum and direct that JAEIC distribute its more detailed memorandum on the subject, now available, to all holders of NIE 11-2-57 and NIE 11-2-58.

  
WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
Deputy Assistant Director,  
National Estimates

(b)(3)

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IAC-D-11

29 December 1950

ASSISTANCE TO THE VOA  
AND OTHER ASPECTS OF SOVIET JAMMING

1. Attached is a letter (TAB A) from Mr. Armstrong, Chairman of USCIB, transmitting the report (TAB B) of that Board with respect to intelligence support to the VOA and other aspects of Soviet jamming.

2. The IAC is asked to:

a. Approve the report and its transmittal to the National Security Council;

b. Agree that USCIB should be the coordinating body for the program; and

c. Note the State Department's willingness to provide funds for the initial establishment and agree to the principle that thereafter responsibility for fund procurement will be allocated appropriately by agreement among the interested agencies.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Acting Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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29 December 1950

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IAC-D-11

29 December 1950

December 14, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

SUBJECT: Assistance to the VOA and other Aspects of Soviet Jamming

Enclosure: (A) Report of USCIB Ad Hoc Committee to Consider the Problem of Soviet Jamming of VOA Programs and other Aspects of Soviet Potential for Interference with Radio Communications of the United States

1. As a result of United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) consideration of the subject problem, pursuant to a request by the Director of Central Intelligence, the attached report (Enclosure (A)) has been prepared, and approved by USCIB in principle.

2. If approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the members of USCIB recommend that the attached report be submitted to the National Security Council (NSC) for consideration, with a view to implementing action by the Department of Defense.

3. It is further recommended by the members of USCIB that, if and when implemented, USCIB be designated as the coordinating body for the program, in view of the communications intelligence aspects of this problem.

4. If the program is approved for implementation, the State Department has indicated that it will endeavor to secure funds to cover requirements for its initial establishment, and that thereafter responsibility for fund procurement will be allocated appropriately by agreement among the interested agencies.

FOR THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD:

/s/ W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.  
Chairman, USCIBCopy furnished:  
Members of USCIB (without encl.)**SECRET**~~SECRET~~

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29 December 1950

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29 December 1950

REPORT OF USCIB AD HOC COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET  
JAMMING OF VOA PROGRAMS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF SOVIET POTENTIAL FOR  
INTERFERENCE WITH RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

THE PROBLEM

1. (a) To determine the requirements in facilities, personnel and funds necessary to obtain and provide information on current Soviet radio communication activities, as they relate to potential ability to interfere with radio broadcasts and communications of the U. S. Government, which will assist the VOA in its program and assist other U. S. Government communications services in combatting present and future Soviet radio interference, and
- (b) to determine what organization should be responsible for this function in the event it should be deemed practicable, and
- (c) to determine what assistance to the VOA can be rendered with existing Service facilities and personnel.

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM  
(for facts, see Inclosure 1)CONCLUSIONS

2. In blocking the reception of VOA broadcast programs in territory within the U.S.S.R. and Satellites, the preponderant advantage and possibility of success lies with the Russian jamming organization due to inherent, inescapable physical factors. Improvement in the extent to which the VOA can be made accessible to Russian listeners can be achieved by informed manipulation of the broadcast and relay frequencies and directional aspects of the VOA transmitters based upon knowledge of the Russian jamming ability at the time. This knowledge can be partially obtained by a monitoring organization capable of identifying and locating the Russian transmitters and frequencies available for interference operations. The ultimate success of the jamming operation versus the penetration effort would be determined by Russian decision as to the scale of their jamming effort.

3. An effort in support of the VOA program would provide valuable information concerning Russian potential to block or interfere with other communication services of the U. S. government and possibly lead to the development of techniques for combatting such interference.

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4. Under present intelligence priorities and service operational requirements, existing facilities of the military services and AFSA are not available for application on the required scale to the problem of obtaining adequate information on present Russian jamming of the VOA and potential Russian ability to interfere with other U. S. communications. The facilities of the Services and AFSA now installed overseas are not technically suited to a solution of this problem. No other agencies of the U. S. maintain suitable facilities where they are required.

5. A program for obtaining information on Russian jamming and potential for radio interference, such as suggested in Inclosure 2, could be initiated at an estimated initial cost of \$5,000,000 for the first year and the provision of 355 trained technicians. The effectiveness and success of this undertaking would be gradual and in proportion as equipment and personnel became realities and experience was gained, but the ultimate degree of success cannot be predicted.

6. Operational direction of a program such as that envisaged in Inclosure 2 could be conducted most effectively by AFSA which now has the most complete store of information on Russian communications activities, is continuously acquiring this information, has communications with and operational reporting from several of the

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monitoring sites in the suggested program, and has had wide experience in the field of monitoring and transmitter location and identification.

7. It is possible to render a minor amount of assistance to the VOA program with existing Service facilities and personnel. This amount of assistance to the VOA will not appreciably improve the penetration of Soviet jamming and other interference nor will it materially increase the amount of information obtained which will assist other U. S. Government communications services in combatting present and future Soviet radio interference.

8. If a program such as that indicated in Inclosure 2 is undertaken, full advantage and use should be made of the experience and technical knowledge of other agencies which have previously dealt with this or similar problems, e. g., the FCC.

9. A program of obtaining information on Russian jamming potential by direct intercept, D/F, and signal analysis would in no way diminish the need for obtaining intelligence on the problem by other means, such as covert operations, COMINT, and reporting by diplomatic missions suitably located.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

10. That a program along the lines of that suggested in Inclosure 2, for monitoring and locating Russian jamming and other possible interfering transmitters and of conveying the resulting

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information to appropriate collating and control centers, be considered as the initial program for the purposes stated.

11. That if this program and operation is approved it be placed under the operational direction of AFSA and appropriate provision be made for service procurement of the necessary equipment and personnel.

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29 December 1950

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29 December 1950

INCLOSURE 1FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Intentional jamming of the radio relay circuits and broadcasting channels of the VOA programs is being carried out by Russian radio transmitters with the result that only an estimated 10% of the Russian language broadcasts of the VOA can be received in the U.S.S.R. There is similar Russian interference with VOA programs designed and engineered for reception in the European Satellite States of the U.S.S.R., Greece, Iran, and China. There has occurred in recent months sporadic intentional interference with U. S. Service communications and International Commercial radio communications, apparently created by Russian or Satellite organizations.

2. The effectiveness, skill and occasional misdirection of this interference with the VOA indicate the existence in the U.S.S.R. of a carefully engineered, well operated and lavish system of radio jamming under competent control and probably under central direction.

3. The capability and effectiveness of this Russian jamming organization are such that it could create serious interference with, if not total blocking of, communication circuits of other U. S. government services, particularly the armed forces' trans-oceanic circuits and other radio channels serving forces afloat and ashore in Europe, Africa, the Western Pacific islands and the main-

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29 December 1950

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land of Asia.

4. The number of Russian broadcast transmitters has been increasing in the recent past, particularly in Western Russia, the Satellites and the Russian occupied zones of Germany. The frequencies of these broadcasters interfere with those of the VOA Western German stations and Armed Forces Network stations in Germany and it appears certain that the purpose of many of these transmitters is not to deliver Russian government programs but to block programs of other governments, such as the VOA and B.B.C.

5. In the case of radio broadcasting there is no way now known to science of combatting jamming interference created by jammer signals of approximately equal or greater strength than the broadcast signal in the area of intended reception other than by avoiding the frequencies on which it is possible for the jammer to produce such interference.

6. In the case of radio relay to the broadcasting point (as is necessary for the VOA) or in the case of point to point radio communication (as for government service or commercial circuits) the effect of jamming interference can be diminished by knowledgeable manipulation of the transmission frequency; in effect "dodging" the jamming.

7. In either case the degree of success in evading interference is dependent upon (a) immediate knowledge by the transmitting

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agency of the frequencies, locations, types of signals and effective ranges of active and available jamming transmitters, (b) the ability of the jamming organization to "follow" frequency shifts by the point-to-point or broadcasting transmitters and (c) availability of jamming transmitters so located and employing power and frequencies such as to produce an effective jamming signal at the receiver.

8. A considerable amount of information on Russian transmitters of all Russian communications services is available in AFSA and is being continuously and systematically expanded; much less information on Russian broadcasting and active jamming transmitters is available and information on these two types is not being systematically developed.

9. Little or nothing is known of the Russian organization responsible for this operation or of the method of control of the jamming operations. Information on these subjects is essential to the planning of adequate counter measures.

10. The Navy Security Branch can, with existing facilities, render the following assistance to the VOA: daily, but at times which would be dependent upon operational commitments (of first priority), obtain and transmit by rapid means to a designated center D/F bearings of Russian jamming transmitters from stations as follows:

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29 December 1950

12. The Air Force Security Service considers that its existing facilities are insufficient for its primary mission and could not, therefore, be committed to any continuing program of assistance to the VOA. The AFSS can, however, accept specific D/F missions from the VOA and attempt to locate specified transmissions within the limitations of available facilities and after satisfying other assignments of first priority.

13. Technically, the problem of separating and taking bearings on several Russian interfering radio signals transmitted simultaneously on the same frequency from different localities is extremely difficult. Employment of suppressed carrier or other unusual techniques will add to the difficulty. The Navy maintains only one D/F in the Atlantic net favorable located outside the Continental U. S. which severely limits the accuracy of positions of transmitters in Russia located by this D/F network.

14. The FCC has provided a limited amount of information on Russian jamming transmitters and has had considerable experience in the type of D/F and monitoring operations required for the VOA problem. Certain British organizations have had similar experience of value.

15. Additional facilities to obtain information on Russian jamming activities and on radio transmitters capable of interfering with U. S. communications could be provided and maintained far more

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economically at existing sites of U. S. activities, suitably located, than at locations where no U. S. activities exist.

16. An organization of monitoring, direction finding, signal analysis and rapid communications facilities for the purpose of assisting the VOA in the present problem of increasing its penetration of Russian jamming and for providing information of value to the military and other government communications services in combatting future Russian interference with U. S. radio communications could be provided at an estimated initial cost of \$5,000,000. This would include equipment, installation and operating costs for the first year. Additionally, there would be required 355 trained technicians. Such an organization is outlined in Inclosure 2.

17. There is a deficit of trained personnel, direction finder, intercept and signal analysis equipment, communications equipment and frequencies for any effective program for obtaining information on Russian jamming potential. The approved programs for the expansion of AFSA facilities and those of the service cryptologic agencies would be in conflict or competition with an effort to alleviate the jamming problem, present and potential, from the standpoint of procurement of trained personnel and facilities.

18. The cryptologic agencies of the military services maintain and operate monitoring and D/F facilities at some, but not all,

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29 December 1950


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29 December 1950

of the locations necessary for the effective operations of such an organization as is suggested in Inclosure 2.

19. AFSA has operational direction of Army D/F stations in



(b)(1)

 via service controlled and operated circuits, exist from all service monitoring and D/F stations to AFSA and to the service cryptologic headquarters. These communications, with exception of the Navy D/F control and reporting circuits, are not adequate for solution of the problem under consideration.

(b)(1)

20. The monitoring, D/F, and communications facilities now serving AFSA, under either AFSA or Service control, are inadequate to enable AFSA to carry out fully its currently assigned missions and responsibilities. The approved programs of expansion of these facilities will not be completed until at earliest the middle of FY 1952.

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29 December 1950



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C.

D.

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**II. Operational Arrangements****A. Monitoring.**

Monitoring assignments will be made by Control Centers and will be such as to provide search of communications spectrum or concentration in certain frequency bands as required. Monitoring stations will report to Control Centers the information desired over direct radio circuits.

**B. Direction Finding.**

Control Centers will coordinate the taking of bearings over direct radio circuits and collect results over the same circuit. Any combination of simultaneous bearings from two or more stations, or systematic taking of bearings by individual D/F equipments as directed by local search can be achieved.

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C. Control.

1. Control Centers will determine from station reports and their own calculations such information as
  - a. Number and location of jamming or interference producing stations.
  - b. Effectiveness of jamming in given areas.
  - c. Optimum frequencies for avoiding jamming or other interference.
  - d. Cumulative data on existing Soviet and Satellite transmitters.
2. Control Centers will convey pertinent information to VOA broadcasting control stations to effect improved reception in desired areas.
3. Control Centers will forward accumulated data to AFSA headquarters for further analysis and collating with other information available to AFSA.

III. Administrative and Operational Relationships

- A. Provision and maintenance of D/F and monitoring stations, staffing of these stations, and provision of essential communications will be a

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military service responsibility.

- B. Provision, staffing, and maintenance of Control Centers will be an AFSA responsibility.
- C. Operational direction of the Control Centers and of the Monitoring Stations through the Control Centers will be an AFSA responsibility with VOA assistance and liaison.
- D. Intelligence and technical back-up for the operation will be furnished by AFSA.

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29 December 1950

INCLOSURE 2Appendix A

## 1. Equipment required at each station.

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Highly directive antennae oriented in direction of most likely Russian target areas. Well installed rhombics would be satisfactory. Antennae of lesser gain but of higher directivity would perhaps be more satisfactory.

- 5 H/F Receivers for monitoring (Collins 51J or Hammarlund 600JX)
- 2 M/F Receivers (superhetrodyne type - Navy Model RAA, RAS or RAH)
- 2 Model M-2 Signal Splitter (McLaughlin type or General-Electric Single Sideband Selector Model YRS-1)
- 2 Magnetic Tape Recorders (Magne recorder type)
- 3-5 Panoramic adaptors for HF Receivers
- 1-2 Sonograph (Kay Electric type)
  - 1 Sonolator (Kay Electric type)
  - 1 Panoramic Sonic Analyzer (Panoramic Corporation type)
  - 1 H/F D/F Equipment of aural type
  - 1 M/F D/F Equipment of aural type
- 1-2 H/F Receivers for circuit (net) communications
- 1-2 H/F Transmitters for circuit (net) communications

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29 December 1950

(500-1000 watts).

2. Personnel required at each station for continuous operation.

- 1 Supervisor in charge
- 4 D/F operators
- 4 Maintenance technicians
- 12 Monitoring and signal analysis operators
- 8 Circuit operators and coding personnel.

3. Personnel required at each Control Center.

- 1 Supervisor in charge
- 1 Ionospheric wave propagation expert
- 4 Watch supervisors
- 4 D/F bearing plotters
- 8 Circuit operators and coding personnel.

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29 December 1950



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IAC-D-11/1

3 January 1951

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR THE VOICE  
OF AMERICA WITH REGARD TO SOVIET JAMMING

1. The attached memorandum (TAB A) to the NSC has been prepared to cover all of the aspects required in the assignment regarding Soviet jamming and assistance to the VOA including the recommendations of the USCIB Report.

2. It is recommended that this Report be approved and transmitted to the NSC with the USCIB Report as a detailed study on some of the aspects.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Acting Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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IAC-D-11/1

3 January 1951

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TAB A

MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL  
SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for the Voice of  
America with regard to Soviet Jamming

Reference is made to my memorandum of September 7, 1950, on the above subject, forwarding the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Voice of America Jamming, and noting that Recommendation 3 of the Report regarding establishment of an additional monitoring facility would be referred to the U.S.C.I.B.

The Chairman of USCIB has now forwarded to me the attached report which recommends, in brief, that an additional monitoring facility be established under the operational direction of AFSA and delineates the requirements in terms of facilities, personnel and equipment for the establishment of such a facility. This U.S.C.I.B. report and its recommendations have the unanimous approval of IAC.

In the light of the USCIB report and further consideration of the problem, the IAC now submits, for the consideration of the Council in connection with NSC 66, the following final recommendations which incorporate the recommendations of the USCIB report and the recommendations of the earlier IAC report, appropriately revised:

1. That a readjustment of priorities among existing intelligence tasks or a reallocation of the use of existing intelligence facilities should not be undertaken.

2. That there should be established an additional monitoring activity to obtain and provide information on current Soviet radio communication activities which will assist the VOA in its program

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and assist other US Government communications services in combating present and future Soviet radio interference, and that this additional monitoring activity be established, coordinated and operated as follows:

- a. The initial program for this activity should be undertaken along the lines suggested in Enclosure 2 of the USCIB Report of 28 November 1950.
- b. This activity should monitor and locate Russian jamming signals and other interfering transmitters and should convey promptly and continuously to the VOA and other interested US communications services such resulting information as will assist them to improve their reception.
- c. This activity should not interfere with existing monitoring programs, particularly from the standpoint of equipment and personnel.
- d. This activity should be thoroughly coordinated with existing monitoring activities.
- e. In view of the COMINT aspects of this program, USCIB should be assigned responsibility for overall coordination of this activity and of its relation to such other monitoring activities as will contribute to this program. In the performance of this responsibility, USCIB should be governed by the provisions of NSCID #9 as they apply to COMINT activities.
- f. This activity should be placed under the operational direction of AFSA, and appropriate provision should be made for Service procurement of the necessary equipment and personnel.

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3. That the CIA assume overall responsibility to:

a. Coordinate the collection of information concerning Russian jamming from all non-monitoring sources.

b. Serve as the collection point for this information and assure that such of this information as will assist the VOA and other government communications services to improve their reception on a daily basis is passed promptly and continuously to these services. The CIA, with the assistance of the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, should determine and establish such security arrangements and channels of dissemination as may be required to pass this information to the VOA; these arrangements and channels to be determined in the light of materials made available.

c. Undertake, in conjunction with the other intelligence agencies, a coordinated program for the collection, evaluation and dissemination of such information as will be useful in the long-range analysis of Russian radio interference and in the development of counter-measures.

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PROPOSED REVISION --IAC-D-11/1

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR VOICE OF AMERICA  
WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET JAMMING

1. The following revisions are recommended to clarify the paper and CIA's responsibility to this project:

Paragraph 2, line 3, strike "radio communication," substitute "electromagnetic warfare."

Paragraph 2, sub d. should read: "This activity should be thoroughly coordinated by CIA with existing non-AFSA monitoring activities."

Paragraph 2.e., strike in toto.

Paragraph 3.a., strike "non-monitoring."

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D-12

8 February 1951

## AGENDA ITEM NO. 2

Intelligence Objectives in the Field of Atomic Energy (IAC-D-12)

1. This list of objectives in atomic energy stems from a letter from General Cabell suggesting the need for a statement which would give greater direction to collectors in this field. This list (IAC-D-12) could be considered an elaboration in the field of atomic energy of DCID 4/2, which is the IAC approved list of National Intelligence Objectives (attached TAB A).
2. As background it might be pointed out that the State Department and AEC probably think of this atomic energy list as useless to them but not objectionable. The military will probably attach significance to it claiming that it will enable their collection offices in the Pentagon to draft better collection directives.
3. With respect to production, it is quite probable that no IAC member would assert that his activities will be closely geared to this list.
4. Indications are that similar lists of objectives will soon be prepared in other scientific intelligence fields. It is suggested that the IAC should seek to appraise the practical (as opposed to the theoretical) validity of this approach.

RECOMMENDATION:

5. That this paper be approved even though it is doubtful that it will have any identifiable effect upon either the production or collection effort.

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IAC-D-12

12 January 1951

CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF  
INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES IN THE FIELD OF ATOMIC ENERGY

1. Attached hereto (TAB A) is a Consolidated Statement of Intelligence Objectives in the Field of Atomic Energy prepared in response to a letter from Major General C. P. Cabell, USAF, to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 16 November 1950. This statement was prepared by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, which is a subcommittee of the Scientific Intelligence Committee.

2. In addition to the IAC, the following agencies were asked to submit statements of specific requirements which should be included to meet their needs:

National Security Resources Board  
Munitions Board  
Research and Development Board  
Military Liaison Committee to the AEC

3. All replies to the request were consolidated into a single statement approved by the JAEIC. The objectives are stated in the approximate order of priority.

4. Your approval of this statement of objectives is requested. After approval this statement will represent the National Intelligence Objectives in the field of atomic energy and will form the basis for the establishment of priority collection requirements and the framework for estimates in this field.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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IAC-D-12

12 January 1951

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6 February 1951

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEYS

1. The attached report of the National Intelligence Survey Committee is submitted for consideration at the next IAC meeting. The report recommends that the rate of NIS production be increased to 15 per year so that studies on the 60 high priority areas may be completed by 30 June 1954.

JAMES Q. REBER

Secretary

Intelligence Advisory Committee

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IAC-D-13

6 February 1951

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25 JAN 1951

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE NIS COMMITTEE

1. The NIS Committee has for some time been concerned over the general situation in respect to basic intelligence collection, maintenance, and production for the NIS Program. In view of the increasingly critical international situation, the Committee is of the opinion that much greater emphasis must be given to the NIS Program to provide the essential basic intelligence on strategically important world areas at the earliest practicable date. The Committee has therefore examined this matter and has arrived at certain conclusions, set forth hereinafter, which it desires be laid before the Director of Central Intelligence for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

2. The actual operations of the NIS Program have extended over the past two years. The experience of this period confirms the essential soundness of the Program as a means of developing the basic intelligence needed by the Government. There has been a vacillation of support by the Intelligence Agencies, however, which has greatly complicated the task and weakened the production effort. Moreover, the uneven quality of NIS contributions indicates a serious lack of qualified personnel available for NIS work. The NIS Committee considers that no real measure of improvement in the NIS Program can be realized at any level of effort without first effecting a fundamental improvement in these aspects of the Program.

3. Recently the Secretary of Defense has directed the Armed Forces Agencies to assign support sufficient to maintain NIS production at the equivalent rate of eight NIS a year on a long range, continuous basis. At this rate of production there should be available by the end of this fiscal year the approximate equivalent of 18 NIS. Considering only the 60 high priority areas contained in the JCS list, there will still remain the equivalent of 42 NIS to be produced beginning with fiscal year 1952. How soon this job should be done is determined by the national security interests. How soon this job will be done is determined by the amount of support which is directed toward its accomplishment.

4. At a sustained rate of production of 8 NIS a year the NIS on all high priority areas will be completed and placed fully on a maintenance basis sometime during fiscal year 1957. This is nearly 5 years beyond the original target date approved in 1948 by the IAC, the JCS, and the NSC. In spite of the urgency of the present situation, the Committee feels that too much time has already been lost to make the original target date a feasible goal. The Committee therefore agrees that an intermediate target date

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should be set on the basis of a reasonably attainable augmentation of NIS production capabilities within the CIA and the IAC Agencies. This is indicated in the following table and sets the completion of the primary requirements by the end of fiscal year 1954. There will also be needed additional capabilities for the maintenance of published NIS.

	<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Equivalent NIS</u>	<u>Total</u>
Previous production	{ 1949	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$
	{ 1950	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	10
Present authorized level of production	{ 1951	8	18
Proposed level of production	{ 1952	12	30
	{ 1953	15	45
	{ 1954	15	60

5. In order to achieve the foregoing NIS production schedule, it will be necessary to build up a competent staff in each agency actually capable of this production at the beginning of the fiscal years involved. To do this needs more than mere authorization. It needs the assignment of a priority for the NIS Program in each agency commensurate with its importance and sufficient to ensure the acquisition of this staff both through new recruitment and through re-alignment of agency capabilities. Moreover, there will be needed a greatly increased collection effort to fill the serious gaps which now exist and to keep the basic intelligence up to date. The NIS Committee therefore recommends:

a. that the NIS on all JCS high priority areas be completed and placed fully on a maintenance basis by 30 June 1954;

b. that the Intelligence Agencies assign to the NIS Program a degree of priority which will ensure the summary attainment of adequate production and maintenance capabilities for this task; and

c. that the collection of NIS requirements on high priority areas be afforded the necessary increased support.

FOR THE NIS COMMITTEE:

/s/ K. A. Knowles

K. A. KNOWLES  
Chairman

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25 JAN 1951

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE NIS COMMITTEE

IAC - D-13

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2. The actual operations of the NIS Program have extended over the past two years. The experience of this period confirms the essential soundness of the Program as a means of developing the basic intelligence needed by the Government. There has been a vacillation of support by the Intelligence Agencies, however, which has greatly complicated the task and weakened the production effort. Moreover, the uneven quality of NIS contributions indicates a serious lack of qualified personnel available for NIS work. The NIS Committee considers that no real measure of improvement in the NIS Program can be realized at any level of effort without first effecting a fundamental improvement in these aspects of the Program.

3. Recently the Secretary of Defense has directed the Armed Forces Agencies to assign support sufficient to maintain NIS production at the equivalent rate of eight NIS a year on a long range, continuous basis. At this rate of production there should be available by the end of this fiscal year the approximate equivalent of 18 NIS. Considering only the 60 high priority areas contained in the JCS list, there will still remain the equivalent of 42 NIS to be produced beginning with fiscal year 1952. How soon this job should be done is determined by the national security interests. How soon this job will be done is determined by the amount of support which is directed toward its accomplishment.

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5. In order to achieve the foregoing NIS production schedule, it will be necessary to build up a competent staff in each agency actually capable of this production at the beginning of the fiscal years involved. To do this needs more than mere authorization. It needs the assignment of a priority for the NIS Program in each agency commensurate with its importance and sufficient to ensure the acquisition of this staff both through new recruitment and through re-alignment of agency capabilities. Moreover, there will be needed a greatly increased collection effort to fill the serious gaps which now exist and to keep the basic intelligence up to date. The NIS Committee therefore recommends:

- a. that the NIS on all JCS high priority areas be completed and placed fully on a maintenance basis by 30 June 1954;
- b. that the Intelligence Agencies assign to the NIS Program a degree of priority which will ensure the summary attainment of adequate production and maintenance capabilities for this task; and
- c. that the collection of NIS requirements on high priority areas be afforded the necessary increased support.

FOR THE NIS COMMITTEE:

/s/ K. A. Knowles

K. A. KNOWLES  
Chairman

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**SECRET**Executive Registry  
425240-5524

D-13

3 February 1951

MEMORANDUM TO: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THROUGH : Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination

FROM : Assistant Director for Research and Reports

SUBJECT : The NIS Program

REFERENCE : Special Report of the NIS Committee dated 16 January 1951.

1. There is forwarded herewith the "Special Report of the NIS Committee" pursuant to the request of the Committee that it be laid before the Director of Central Intelligence for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

2. Reference report sets forth proposals of the NIS Committee which would involve increasing NIS production to the equivalent of 12 NIS a year for fiscal year 1952, and to the equivalent of 15 NIS a year for fiscal years 1953-1954, in order to complete and to place fully on a maintenance basis NIS on all JCS high priority areas by 30 June 1954. General estimates of the necessary departmental capabilities to meet this proposed production goal are being prepared by the members of the NIS Committee for their respective Directors of Intelligence. Since the NIS Committee's proposals would also require increased support by the CIA in funds and services, there follows a general estimate of requirements affecting this Agency.

3. The services which the CIA directly provides for the NIS Program are:

a. The Basic Intelligence Division, O/RR, which performs the over-all coordination for the NIS Program and provides facilities for review, editing, and publication of the National Intelligence Surveys.

b. The Geographic Division, O/RR, which is responsible for the preparation of the NIS maps and serves as coordinator and partial producer of Chapter IX (Map and Chart Appraisal) of the NIS.

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c. The Office of Special Operations, which has the production responsibilities for Section 56 (Intelligence and Security) of the NIS.

d. The Office of Scientific Intelligence, which serves as coordinator and partial producer of Chapter VII (Scientific) of the NIS.

e. The Office of Collection and Dissemination, which prepares the original NIS Gazetteer sheets by IBM process, and is charged with the responsibility for the dissemination of the published NIS.

4. Other agencies which receive CIA fiscal support for the NIS Program are:

a. The Special Services Unit of the Government Printing Office for the printing of NIS and Gazetteers.

b. The staff of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names for the development of NIS standard geographic names and for the geographic name editing of NIS material.

c. The Intelligence Agency of the Department of State for the principal production of NIS Chapter IV (Sociological), Chapter V (Political), and Chapter VI (Economic).

d. The Department of Agriculture (Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations and Forest Service) for the principal production of NIS Section 61 (Food and Agriculture).

e. The Department of the Interior (Bureau of Mines and Fish and Wildlife Service) for the partial production of NIS Section 61 (Food and Agriculture), and for the principal production of NIS Section 62 (Fuels and Power), Section 63 (Minerals and Metals), and Supplement V (Petroleum).

5. The additional support in services and funds which the CIA would be required to furnish under the proposals of the NIS Committee cannot be fully determined until the various contributing agencies have indicated their requirements. This matter will be taken in hand as soon as policy determinations have been made. In general terms, however, it is estimated that for fiscal year 1952 the CIA services would need to be increased about 30%, and the CIA fiscal support to other agencies about 40%, over present commitments. There would probably be required an additional 15% increase in both services and fiscal support by the CIA for fiscal years 1953-1954.

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6. There is a severe shortage of personnel in the Government qualified to do intelligence work. This makes it urgent that the priority to be attached to an accelerated NIS program relative to other work for which such personnel is needed be carefully considered.

7. Attention might be given to the possibility of having some parts of the Surveys done by contractual arrangements with Universities or other private research groups. Such a procedure would not remove the necessity for a priority determination however, since such private groups can also be employed on other urgent research for the Government, and constitute one of the principal remaining pools of people from which recruitment of intelligence personnel can be made.

[Redacted Signature]

(b)(3)

**MAX F. MILLIKAN**

Enclosure:  
Special Report of the  
NIS Committee

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CIA 36144

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IAC-D-13/1

13 March 1951

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEYS

1. On 8 February the IAC decided to postpone consideration of the recommended increase in the rate of production for the NIS program until certain matters could be investigated (IAC-M-19).

2. The conclusions of these investigations are presented herewith for information in connection with further consideration of the recommendations of the NIS Committee (IAC-D-13).

3. Attached are:

TAB A. A memorandum from the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff - setting forth a revised priority list.

TAB B. The findings of the NIS Committee with regard to:

(1) Estimated completion dates for the NIS on the revised priority list.

(2) The possibility of omitting portions from the standard NIS.

TAB C. The findings of CIA with regard to:

(1) CIA assistance to the military on recruitment.

(2) Contracting NIS sections to private institutions.

(3) Training additional personnel.

4. The question for decision remains whether or not to authorize an increase in the rate of production of NIS from 8 to 15 per year.

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 No Change in Class. ☐  
☐ Declassified  
 Class. Changed to: TS (S) C  
 Next Review Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Auth.: KR 70-3  
 Date: 10/17/91

JAMES Q. REBER

Secretary

Intelligence Advisory Committee

By: [redacted]

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IAC-D-13/1

13 March 1951

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IAC-D-13/1  
13 March 1951THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP

DDIM-23-51  
21 February 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Subject: Priority List and Production Rate for National  
Intelligence SurveysReferences: a. DDM-236, dated 20 March 1950  
b. IAC-M-19, dated 8 February 1951

1. The "Priority List of N.I.S. Areas for use of C.I.A. in Preparation of Basic Intelligence Studies," dated 15 March 1950, has been reviewed by an Ad Hoc Committee composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Strategic Plans Group (JSPG), Joint Logistics Plans Group (JLPG), Joint Intelligence Group (JIG), and the State Department. All agencies have concurred in the recommended changes.

2. The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, recommends that:

a. The present HIGH PRIORITY GROUP I with certain additional areas be placed in a new group to be accorded HIGHEST PRIORITY. Also that the new HIGHEST PRIORITY GROUP be further sub-divided into priority groupings as follows:

HIGHEST PRIORITY

a. China-Manchuria	b. Norway	c. East Germany
Indo-China	Sweden	Czechoslovakia
Yugoslavia	Denmark	Hungary
Greece	Thailand	Austria
Turkey	India	Poland
Iran	Pakistan	Bulgaria
U.S.S.R.	Burma	Rumania
	Malaya (British	
	Indonesia)	
	Finland	
	Albania	

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IAC-D-13/1  
13 March 1951~~TOP SECRET~~

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13 March 1951

b. The capabilities for the production of surveys in the HIGHEST PRIORITY GROUP be increased sufficiently to insure a much greater production rate.

c. Studies currently in progress be continued if it is determined that personnel employed on these studies can be utilized on them without detriment to the preparation of studies of areas recommended for inclusion in the HIGHEST PRIORITY GROUP.

d. The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, re-examine the N.I.S. Priority List semi-annually with a view to determining if changes should be made in the List.

/s/ V. E. Megee

V. E. MEGEE  
Brigadier General, USMC  
Deputy Director for Intelligence  
The Joint Staff

cc: Spec. Asst, Intel.(State)  
A.C. of S., G-2, U.S. Army  
DNI  
D/I, USAF

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IAC-D-13/1  
13 March 1951

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TAB B

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IAC-D-13/1

13 March 1951

NIS COMMITTEE FINDINGS

1. The following questions were asked the NIS Committee:
  - a. At the presently authorized T/O of the contributing agencies, which is based on the production of the equivalent of 8 NIS a year, when will the NIS be completed on the 24 Highest Priority Areas contained in reference memorandum?
  - b. Assuming the rate of production proposed by the NIS Committee in its Special Report of 16 February 1951, when will the NIS be completed on the 24 Highest Priority Areas contained in reference memorandum?
  - c. What portions of the NIS outline do the IAC Agencies consider could be omitted with a view to reducing the production load?

Completion Dates

2. The Committee feels that, while a certain amount of production on the new Highest Priority Areas is already being accomplished, it will require an appreciable length of time before maximum effort can be directed to these new Highest Priority Areas. In many instances, area specialists will have to be recruited. In other instances, current production will have to be completed before starting work on some sections of the Highest Priority Areas in order that the large amount of production work already accomplished will not be wasted. In other words, it takes time to realign NIS production to new priority objectives. Moreover, the existing staffs in the contributing agencies include area specialists concerned with other high priority areas who should continue NIS production in the interests of realizing the maximum production capabilities of these agencies. There is no assurance, either, that some of these other high priority areas may not be raised in priority at some later date.

3. Taking into account the above factors, and based on the assumption that adequate staffs can be recruited within a reasonable time, the NIS Committee considers that the NIS on the Highest Priority Areas can be completed with the presently

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IAC-D-13/1

13 March 1951

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TAB B

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IAC-D-13/1

13 March 1951

authorized T/O by 30 June 1953. The NIS Committee further considers that, while the NIS production rate proposed by the Committee in its Special Report of 16 February 1951 will be capable of a much greater "across-the-board" production of the 60 High Priority Areas than with the presently authorized T/O, the completion of the NIS on the new 24 Highest Priority Areas will be accomplished with the proposed larger staffs about six months earlier, or 30 December 1952.

Portions That Could Be Omitted

4. The NIS Committee members stated that their agencies did not consider that any substantial reduction in the NIS outline should be made. The Air Force is eliminating certain Order of Battle data in Section 83, Chapter VIII (Armed Forces), but since this information is maintained by the Directorate of Intelligence as a standing requirement, its exclusion from the NIS will not appreciably reduce the amount of effort necessary to produce this NIS section. The NIS Committee has kept NIS requirements under continuing revision since the inception of the NIS Program, and the Committee considers that any major reduction in the present requirements would be prejudicial to the NIS Program.

K. A. KNOWLES

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TAB C

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IAC-D-13/1

13 March 1951

CIA FINDINGS

1. CIA was requested to consider the following questions relating to the NIS program:

- a. How can CIA be of assistance to the military services in their recruitment for NIS positions?
- b. Could sections of the NIS be prepared under contract by Universities or private research groups?
- c. Could training programs be instituted to provide more analysts with the special kinds of competence required for NIS work?

Recruitment Assistance

2. The CIA personnel office is in touch with the Army NIS people and will endeavor to render such assistance as they can. Upon preliminary examination CIA believes it can be most helpful by making available the services of CIA's recruiting teams and by drawing on extensive CIA application files. This can best be done by getting the Army's specific qualification requirements. Although the matter is still under study, it does not now appear that CIA can be of much assistance with regard to the civil service aspects of the problem or financial support.

Contract Research

3. Arrangements of this kind have been tried in the past with somewhat unsatisfactory results. There is a tendency for academic experts to reflect in their contributions special points of view which are not in keeping with the purely objective and factual tone required in the Surveys. An understanding of the precise specifications, requirements, and editorial character of the NIS can be acquired only by a contact between the writer and the editorial group closer than that which is possible when the work is done in a distant city by people not familiar with the program. Finally, in many cases a good deal of classified material must be used in the preparation of the Surveys which cannot easily be made available to private groups. The possibilities of having completed sections ready for publication farmed out on contract do not, therefore, look promising.

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IAC-D-13/1

13 March 1951

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TAB C

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13 March 1951

4. On the other hand, a real saving in the time and effort needed for final preparation in Washington may be possible by having done at Universities background studies which assemble some of the basic material and which can then be edited and blended with classified data by the Washington agencies. The extent to which this can be done depends upon the availability in private institutions of qualified analysts and information relating to the high priority areas. The External Research Staff maintained jointly by the State Department and the CIA is currently conducting an inventory of the research facilities of 90 leading colleges and universities throughout the United States. When this survey has been completed it will be matched with the list of NIS sections still to be done on the high priority areas to determine the specific possibilities of contract research. It is believed, however, on the basis of a preliminary comparison of the sections to be done and the probable research facilities available that only a few contracts of this kind will turn out to be feasible or desirable.

#### Training

5. The problem of training analysts for NIS work is inseparable from the broader problem of training people capable of doing competent research on various areas of the world. The principal requirements for NIS analysts are a sound grounding in one or more of the major disciplines (e.g. economics, political science, history, military science, etc.) and some academic study in the language, institutions, and characteristics of an area of the world. No short program of special instruction can supply these qualifications, which can be furnished only by appropriate academic training. Such special skills as are peculiar to NIS production are best acquired by on-the-job training in the NIS program itself.

6. Any increase in the number of area specialists being turned out by the colleges and universities, and any improvement in methods of drawing such people into intelligence work will benefit the NIS program. The problem of ways of encouraging the universities to expand their area programs is one which CIA is considering jointly with the State Department.

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13 March

S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-13/2 13/3  
15 August 1951

CONFLICT BETWEEN NIE 40 AND SECTIONS OF THE NIS

Attached hereto is a memorandum from the Chairman of the Economic Intelligence Committee submitted for consideration at the IAC meeting on Thursday, 16 August 1951, with the purpose of obtaining a resolution of the conflict described.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-13/2 13/3  
15 August 1951

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S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-13/2 13/3  
15 August 1951

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Conflict Between NIE 40 and Sections of the NIS

I have been instructed by the Economic Intelligence Committee to request from the IAC a statement of the relative priority of NIE 40\* and certain sections of the NIS program. At the last meeting of the EIC both the Army and the Navy representatives indicated that preparation of their assigned sections on NIE 40 would cause considerable delay in their submission of certain NIS assignments. In view of this conflict and in response to the Navy's request the detailed terms of reference for the economic sections were pared down to the absolute minimum necessary to answer the central question raised by the estimate. The Army and Navy representatives indicated that in spite of this revision a delay in the submission of sections of NIS studies in the highest priority group would result which might be as much as one and a half to two months. The EIC Working Group on NIE 40 feels that the assignments now proposed for the Army and Navy relating to such items as ship-building, transportation, weapons productions, electronics, and the like cannot be satisfactorily secured from any other source and it is the opinion of this group that these assignments are an integral and vital part of the study.

\*NIE 40--Potential Military, Economic, and Scientific Accretions to the USSR Resulting from the Acquisition of Western Europe before Mid-1952.

/s/ MAX F. MILLIKAN

S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-13/2 13/3  
15 August 1951

S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-13/2 13/3  
15 August 1951

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JAMES Q. REBER  
Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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IAC-D-13/2 13/3  
15 August 1951

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S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-1372 13/3  
15 August 1951

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Conflict Between NIE 40 and Sections of the NIS

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/s/ MAX F. MILLIKAN

S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-1372 13/3  
15 August 1951

S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-13/2  
18 June 1951

NIS PROGRAM

The attached memorandum, received from Captain Knowles,  
Chairman of the NIS Committee, is distributed for information.  
It will not be considered at an IAC meeting unless one of  
the member agencies so requests.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

JUN 1 1951

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IAC-D-13/2  
18 June 1951

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S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-13/2  
18 June 1951

NIS PROGRAM

1. The augmentation of NIS production proposed by the NIS Committee in its Special Report of 16 February 1951 was considered by the IAC on 15 March 1951. Essentially, the IAC agreed that, for the remainder of this fiscal year, the Intelligence Agencies will devote their efforts to building up their capabilities to at least an 8 NIS-a-year level. The IAC further agreed that at the end of this fiscal year this matter would again be considered with a view to determining the extent to which further augmentation should be carried.

2. The NIS Committee examined the production situation at its meeting of 29 May 1951. Current NIS production is roughly 50% of commitments, or at the rate of 4 NIS a year. Recruitment of personnel is slow in all of the Intelligence Agencies and it appears that authorized strength will not be reached before the end of the first quarter of fiscal year 1952. In consequence, the full production of these staffs will not be reflected in the finished contributions from the Intelligence Agencies until the middle of next fiscal year. The NIS Committee anticipates, however, that the production schedule for fiscal year 1952, which calls for the equivalent of approximately 10 NIS, will generally be fulfilled. In this respect, attention is invited to paragraph 6 of NIS Committee Meeting No. 106, of 29 May 1951, which indicates the general production situation of each agency. (Excerpt attached)

3. The NIS Committee, therefore, believes that further reconsideration of the NIS Program by the IAC should be deferred until the capabilities of the presently authorized staffs in the several Intelligence Agencies can more accurately be appraised. Furthermore, the NIS Committee is of the opinion that no material advantage would be gained at this time from any current revision of the JCS Priority List, since scheduled NIS production for the next fiscal year will be proceeding on as broad a front as possible, including all highest priority areas and a large number of high priority areas.

S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-13/2  
18 June 1951

S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-13/2  
18 June 1951

State - Expects to have authorized personnel on board by October 1951 in which event State should be able to complete its allocations in NIS areas by the end of FY 1952.

Army - The personnel situation is uneven, particularly in some of the Technical Services where recruitment has been slow. In general terms, however, Army should be able to complete its allocations for at least 8 NIS areas during FY 1952.

Navy - Does not expect any substantial increase in production until authorized personnel have been recruited, which should be sometime during the summer. Navy expects to produce at the rate of 4 NIS during the first six months of FY 1952 but anticipates that its allocations in 8 NIS areas will be met by the end of FY 1952.

Air Force - Expects that its authorized strength will be reached by September 1951. In this event Air Force should complete its allocations in approximately 10 NIS areas by the end of FY 1952.

Scientific Intelligence Committee:

The SIC has scheduled 4 Chapters VII (Scientific) for FY 1952 and may be able to produce one more before the end of the year. Since there are relatively few countries which have a real scientific potential, the slower production of Chapters VII will not unfavorably affect the overall completion dates for the highest priority areas.

S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-D-13/2  
18 June 1951

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Executive Registry

2-0419

15 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Assistant Director, Research and Reports

SUBJECT: Item 3 on the IAC Agenda for 16 August, Conflict between  
NIE-40 and sections of the NIS

1. This issue was raised by the Navy, which has been somewhat opposed to having an Estimate of Soviet gain from the seizure of Western Europe done at all. They now say they can't do their share without seriously delaying the NIS program. My guess is that they have somewhat exaggerated the conflict.

2. The conflict is nonetheless real. Army, which believes in the importance of the Estimate, also faces this difficulty.

3. My recommendations as to the CIA position are as follows:

a. NIE-40 is very definitely of sufficient importance to justify some delay in the NIS program. Dr. Langer and Dr. Kent of ONE agree with this view.

b. This particular conflict is illustrative of a general problem which the IAC might profitably discuss. The military services, especially the Army and Navy, are not now staffed to do an adequate job both on the NIS and on support for the National Estimates Board. One or the other will inevitably continue to suffer until they build up their capabilities further.

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MAX F. MILLIKAN

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8 February 1951

## AGENDA ITEM NO. 4

Exploitation of Captured Sources (IAC-D-14)

1. This matter has been placed on the agenda at the request of General Megee who is desirous of having IAC approval of the DCI's reply to the Secretary of Defense. It was thought wise at the same time to seek approval by those agencies concerned of the agreement by which CIA would represent the interests of State and the AEC in this matter. The FBI has declined to be associated with the Department of State, the AEC and CIA in this matter preferring to utilize its existing channels of information with the Department of Defense.

2. It is likely that the broad question of CIA representation in Theaters of Operations will be precipitated collaterally with the discussion on this subject unless it is held to be out of order in the present context. Coordination thus far achieved has been without prejudice to the problem of overall CIA representation in Theaters of Operations. The CIA position has been that it was not necessary to solve this problem in order to move ahead with the exploitation of captured sources, and that the ultimate decision on CIA representation in the Zone of the Interior and in Theaters of Operation should be made at another time.

3. The memorandum of the Secretary of Defense pertains to the overt exploitation of captured sources for intelligence purposes and does not enter the field of CIA covert operations. However, to reserve CIA's concern in the operational aspects, Paragraph 5 has been inserted in the memorandum of reply as a precaution against curtailment of CIA operations of this character.

4. The following is attached as TAB A for IAC approval:

Memorandum from the DCI to the Secretary of Defense embodying the principles of non-military participation in the proposed agencies. (This memorandum should not be considered as committing this Agency to approval of the detailed texts of either the directives or the manuals related to this problem.)

5. The following is attached as TAB B for approval by the representatives of the Department of State and the AEC:

A draft Memorandum of Agreement among these agencies providing for CIA representation in this connection.

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IAC-D-114  
6 February 1951EXPLOITATION OF CAPTURED SOURCES

1. On 6 December the Secretary of Defense requested the DCI to coordinate with the other interested non-Defense agencies the JCS recommendations for the exploitation of intelligence from captured sources.
2. These recommendations have been thoroughly explored by CIA in conjunction with the Department of State, the FBI, and the AEC, and with the designated team of the JIG.
3. The JCS recommendations cover directives establishing in the Zone of the Interior two agencies of the JCS for the exploitation respectively of such documents (ASDIC) and personnel (ASPIC) as may come under military jurisdiction in a Theater of Operations, and a third agency (JMIA) to coordinate the exploitation of material. Manuals detailing the operation of each of these agencies and providing for their functioning in Theaters of Operation are under preparation by the Joint Staff in consultation with CIA.
4. The following is attached for IAC approval:  
  
A memorandum from the DCI to the Secretary of Defense in reply to that cited in Paragraph 1, embodying the principles of non-military participation in the proposed agencies. (Tab A)
5. The following is attached for approval by the representatives of the Department of State, the FBI and the AEC:  
  
A draft memorandum of agreement among these agencies providing for CIA representation of their interests in this connection. (Tab B)

JAMES Q. REBER  
Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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**IAC-D-14**

6 February 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Directives for the Exploitation of Intelligence  
Derived from Captured Sources

1. The proposed intelligence projects referred to me with your memorandum of 6 December 1950 have been taken up with the Department of State, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Department of State, the AEC and the CIA have a common interest in being assured that documents, personnel and materiel will be readily accessible to these agencies for foreign intelligence exploitation. The FBI feels that its primary responsibility for internal security can best be met through direct liaison with respect to these sources.

2. The Department of State, the AEC, and the CIA agree that their common interest can most effectively and efficiently be served by being represented through the CIA in both the Theater of Operations and the Zone of the Interior. This representation is considered necessary in order to insure, through participation of the CIA within the Theater of Operations, that the selection and exploitation of documents, personnel, and materiel are accomplished as required by the intelligence needs of the non-military agencies and that appropriate items are consigned through Joint Centers in the Zone of the Interior to other suitable locations for non-military exploitation.

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6 February 1951

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3. For the purposes of exploitation by the non-military agencies it may be necessary from time to time to associate personnel from the Department of State or the AEC with the CIA representation at appropriate facilities in the Zone of the Interior, and to detail personnel from these agencies to CIA for representation in the Theater of Operations. It is moreover to the interest of these agencies for the CIA to maintain the closest possible liaison with JMIA in the allocation and consignment of materiel for non-military exploitation. Consignment for non-military exploitation would be without prejudice to the right of the Armed Services to control the final disposition of the documents, personnel, and materiel selected. This fact would not be permitted to interfere with complete non-military exploitation of materiel.

4. CIA representation for these purposes in Theaters of Operations will require certain administrative and operational support by the Department of Defense, particularly with regard to subsistence, quarters, transportation and communications.

5. It should be recognized that in addition to the common interest which the CIA shares with the other agencies in exploiting

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intelligence derived from captured sources, this Agency has a special operational concern with these sources. CIA concurrence with the projected intelligence exploitation program extends to the common interest cited above, but should not be construed as a modification of this special interest.

6. This Agency greatly appreciates the establishment of the proposed centers for the exploitation of captured documents, personnel, and materiel since these arrangements will very considerably assist it in discharging its present functions in these fields for the benefit of the other agencies of the Government;

7. The Intelligence Advisory Committee approved the principles set forth in this memorandum at its meeting on 8 February 1951. On the basis of this concurrence, it is recommended that the Department of Defense proceed in accordance with these principles with the establishment of the organizations proposed in your memorandum.

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IAC-D-14

6 February 1951

PROPOSED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENTMEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,  
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

1. As a matter of common concern and in order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will represent the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in the exploitation for foreign intelligence purposes of documents, personnel, and material acquired in Theaters of Operations by the military forces. In its representative capacity the CIA will:

a. Arrange with the Defense Departments for CIA representation, in association with Department of State and AEC personnel as appropriate, at the Armed Services Document Intelligence Center (ASDIC), the Armed Services Personnel Interrogation Center (ASPIC), for CIA liaison with the Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency (JMIA) and for CIA participation in the Joint Intelligence Centers or analogous organizations established or to be established in Theaters of Operations;

b. In so far as funds are available, provide budgetary support for all such exploitation except that which is of interest to only one agency, in which instance the CIA will arrange for that agency to underwrite its particular project;

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c. Devise procedures which will ensure the establishment of agreed priorities for exploitation purposes;

d. Arrange for agency participation, where required, in the exploitation processes, whether in a Theater of Operations or in the Zone of the Interior. Within a Theater of Operations, representatives of the Department of State or the AEC will be detailed for these purposes to the CIA, under the overall theater command.

2. The foregoing arrangements will in no wise affect normal liaison relationships between the Defense Departments and the State Department or the AEC.

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6 February 1951

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3 March 1951

EXPLOITATION OF CAPTURED SOURCES

1. On 6 December 1950 the Secretary of Defense requested the DCI to coordinate with the other interested non-Defense agencies JCS recommendations for the establishment of joint agencies in the Zone of the Interior for the exploitation of intelligence from captured documents (ASDIC), personnel (ASPIC), and materiel (JMIA).

2. On 8 February 1951 the IAC decided to defer action on this matter pending resolution of the related question of CIA representation in Theaters of Operation.

3. By memorandum of 15 February, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, invited reconsideration of this decision on the ground that CIA representation in the Theaters of Operation does not bear closely enough on the matter under discussion to warrant delay and recommended that the IAC recommend forthwith to the Secretary of Defense that he approve the directives covering ASDIC, ASPIC, and JMIA.

4. Since the presentation of this subject to the IAC on 8 February, the proposed reply to the Secretary of Defense has been modified in two respects:

a. To eliminate all reference to the Theaters of Operation, except in a general statement (paragraph 4);

b. To provide for CIA to name an Assistant Director in ASDIC and ASPIC and a special adviser in JMIA, in order to ensure that the non-military aspects of these operations will receive adequate attention.

5. The following is attached for IAC approval:

A memorandum from the DCI to the Secretary of Defense in reply to that cited in Paragraph 1, embodying the principles of non-military participation in the proposed agencies.  
(TAB A)

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6. The following is attached for approval by the representatives of the Department of State, the FBI and the AEC:

A draft memorandum of agreement among these agencies providing for CIA representation of their interests in this connection. (TAB B)

JAMES Q. REBER

Secretary

Intelligence Advisory Committee

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3 March 1951

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3 March 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Directives for the Exploitation of Intelligence  
Derived from Captured Sources

1. The proposed intelligence projects referred to me with your memorandum of 6 December 1950 have been taken up with the Department of State, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Department of State, the AEC and the CIA have a common interest in being assured that documents, personnel and materiel will be readily accessible to these agencies for foreign intelligence exploitation. The FBI, while associating itself with the principles set forth in this memorandum, feels that its primary responsibility for internal security can best be met through direct liaison with respect to these sources.

2. The Department of State, the AEC, and the CIA agree that their common interest can most effectively and efficiently be served by being represented through the CIA. This representation is considered necessary in order to insure that appropriate items are made available at suitable locations for non-military exploitation.

3. For the purposes of exploitation by the non-military agencies it may be necessary from time to time to associate personnel from the Department of State or the AEC with the CIA representation at appropriate facilities. It is moreover to the interest of these agencies for the CIA to maintain the closest possible liaison with

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JMIA in the allocation and consignment of materiel for non-military exploitation. Consignment for non-military exploitation would be without prejudice to the right of the Armed Services to control the final disposition of the documents, personnel, and materiel selected. This fact would not be permitted to interfere with complete non-military exploitation.

4. The Department of State, the AEC, and the CIA believe that in order to meet their responsibilities with respect to intelligence of concern to the non-military agencies it will be necessary for CIA to have representation in theaters of operation. Recognizing, however, that this broad question is now under discussion as a separate matter, it is not proposed to hold up the current directives pending its resolution.

5. Accordingly, CIA has the following changes to suggest in the wording of the directives so as to take account of the non-military needs:

a. ASDIC and ASPIC, paragraph 4, add to section b: "and one appointed by CIA, to represent the interests of CIA, the Department of State and the AEC."

b. JMIA, paragraph 3(c), change to read: "c. Insure that close liaison is maintained between JMIA and the various ZI intelligence exploitation agencies of the Armed Services as well as CIA so that:"

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c. JMIA, paragraph 4, add new section d: "The CIA, on behalf of the State Department and the Atomic Energy Commission, will name an adviser to the Director, JMIA, to ensure that the non-military aspects of the operation will receive appropriate attention."

6. This Agency welcomes the establishment of the proposed centers for the exploitation of captured documents, personnel, and materiel since these arrangements will very considerably assist it in discharging its present functions in these fields for the benefit of the other agencies of the Government.

7. The Intelligence Advisory Committee approved the principles and specific changes set forth in this memorandum at its meeting on 5 March 1951. On the basis of this concurrence, it is recommended that the Department of Defense proceed in accordance with these principles with the establishment of the organizations proposed in your memorandum.

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3 March 1951

PROPOSED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENTMEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,  
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

1. As a matter of common concern and in order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will represent the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in the exploitation for foreign intelligence purposes of documents, personnel, and material acquired in Theaters of Operation by the military forces. The FBI will arrange for the exploitation of such sources for internal security purposes. In its representative capacity the CIA will:

a. Arrange with the Defense Departments for CIA representation, in association with Department of State and AEC personnel as appropriate, at the Armed Services Document Intelligence Center (ASDIC), the Armed Services Personnel Interrogation Center (ASPIC), for CIA liaison with the Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency (JMIA) and for CIA participation in the Joint Intelligence Centers or analogous organizations established or to be established in Theaters of Operation;

b. Insofar as funds are available, provide budgetary support for all such exploitation except that which is of interest to only one agency, in which instance the CIA will arrange for that agency to underwrite its particular project;

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c. Devise procedures which will ensure the establishment of agreed priorities for exploitation purposes;

d. Arrange for agency participation, where required, in the exploitation processes in the Zone of the Interior and within Theaters of Operation. In the latter case representatives of the Department of State or the AEC would be detailed for these purposes to the CIA, presumably under the overall theater command.

2. The foregoing arrangements will in no wise affect normal liaison relationships between the Defense Departments and the State Department, FBI, or the AEC.

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