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MEMORANDUM FO	OR: National Security A	Advisor		
FROM:	Director of Central	Intelligence		
SUBJECT:	(TS / /NI Interrogation Tech	Effectiveness of niques	(b)(1)	nterterrorist NatSecAc
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nterrogation technic f set forth below the	//NF) Action Required Dendent study of the fore ques. There is no way to be intelligence the Agency on providing any information.	eign intelligence eff o conduct such a s y obtained from de	ficacy of using study. What w tainees who, l	enhanced e can do,
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SUBJECT:	(TS / Technique		ess of the CIA Counte	erterrorist Interrogation
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- 5. (FS/ Results CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques:
 - The Karachi Plot: This plan to conduct attacks against the US Consulate and other US interests in Pakistan was uncovered during the initial interrogations of Khallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi and later confirmed by KSM, who provided additional information on the Karachi plot and confirmed al-Qa'ida's collaboration with local Pakistani extremists. KSM provided information on the Karachi plot after we showed him "capture" photos of Ammar and Khallad, and he confirmed al-Qa'ida's collaboration with local Pakistani extremists.
 - The Heathrow Plot: Initial interrogations of Ammar and Khallad resulted in information on this plot to hijack commercial airliners in Eastern Europe and fly them into Heathrow Airport. Using the information from Khallad and Ammar, we confronted KSM and uncovered details on the plot's evolution and the potential operatives involved. Khallad admitted that he had directed Saudi leader Hazim al-Sha'ir to begin locating pilots for the attack.
 - The "Second Wave": This was a KSM plot to use East Asian operatives to crash a hijacked airliner into the tallest building on the US West Coast (Los Angeles) as

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a follow-on to 9/11. We learned this during the initial interrogation of KSM and later confirmed it through the interrogation of Hambali and Khallad.

- The Guraba Cell: We learned of this 17-member Jemaah Islamiyah cell from Hambali, who confirmed that some of the cell's operatives were identified as candidates to train as pilots as part of KSM's "second wave" attack against the US.
- <u>Issa al-Hindi</u>: KSM first identified Issa al-Hindi as an operative he sent to the US prior to 9/11 to case potential targets in NYC and Washington. When shown surveillance photos provided by HVDs confirmed al-Hindi's identity. Al-Hindi's capture by the British resulted in the disruption of a sleeper cell and led to the arrest of other operatives.

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- Abu Talha al-Pakistani: Khallad and Ammar identified Abu Talha as the leader of the Karachi cell and the Heathrow Plot. The combined intelligence gathered from Khallad, Ammar, KSM, Hassan Ghul, and other HVDs resulted in Abu Talha's recent arrest in Pakistan and the disruption of ongoing plots to target Western interests in London.
- Hambali's Capture: During KSM's interrogation we acquired information that led to the capture of Hambali in August 2003 and to the partial dismantling of the Jemaah Islamiyah leadership in SE Asia. KSM first told us about Majid Khan's role in delivering \$50,0000 to Hambali operatives for an attack KSM believed was imminent. We then confronted Khan with KSM's admission and email intercepts confirming the money transfer and Khan's travel to Bangkok. Khan admitted he delivered the money to an operative named "Zubair," whom we subsequently identified and captured. Zubair's capture led to the identification and subsequent capture of an operative named Lilie who was providing forged passports to Hambali. Lilie identified the house in Bangkok where Hambali was hiding. When we confronted Hambali with details of what we knew from other detainees, he admitted that he was grooming the Guraba cell for US operations at the behest of KSM.
- <u>Jafaar al-Tayyar</u>: Tayyar is an al-Qa'ida operative who was conducting casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs. KSM confirmed that he recruited Tayyar--who is still at large--to conduct a major operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad Atta. Tayyar's family is in Florida and we have identified many of his extremist contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI quickly publicized Tayyar's true name and aggressively followed up with his family and friends in the United

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