

Dozens — at times hundreds — of C.I.A. men have been employed on Taiwan to train men who will be smuggled into Communist China and to interview defectors and refugees who come out; to train Chinese Nationalists to fly the U-2; to identify and befriend those who will move into power after the departure of the Nationalists' President, Chiang Kai-shek; to beam propaganda broadcasts at the mainland; to organize harassing operations on the islands just off the shore of the mainland, and to provide logistic support for other C.I.A. operations in Laos, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia.

Promoter of Fronts

Not so melodramatically, the agency runs dozens of other operations throughout the hemisphere.

It provides "technical assistance" to most Latin nations by helping them establish anti-Communist police forces. It promotes anti-Communist front organizations for students, workers, professional and business men, farmers and political parties. It arranges for contact between these groups and American labor organizations, institutes and foundations.

It has poured money into Latin-American election campaigns in support of moderate candidates and against leftist leaders such as Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana.

It spies upon Soviet, Chinese and diplomats and attempts to thwart their programs. In the C.I.A. learned last year that a Brazilian youth had been killed in 1963, allegedly in an auto accident, while studying on a scholarship at the Lomonosov University in Moscow, it mounted a massive publicity campaign to discourage other South American families from sending their youngsters to the Soviet Union.

In Southeast Asia over the past decade, the C.I.A. has been so active that the agency in some countries has been the principal arm of American policy.

It is said, for instance, to have been so successful at infiltrating the top of the Indonesian government and army that the United States was reluctant to disrupt C.I.A. covering operations by withdrawing aid and information programs in 1964 and 1965. What was presented officially in Washington as toleration of President Sukarno's insults and provocations was in much larger measure a desire to keep the C.I.A. fronts in Indonesia as long as possible.

Though it is not thought to have been involved in any of the maneuvering that has carried President Sukarno's power in recent months, the agency was well poised to follow events and to predict the emergence of anti-Communist forces.

Links to Power

After helping to elect Ratanak Magsaysay as president of the Philippines in 1953, buttressing the government of Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu in Vietnam in 1954 and assisting in implanting the regime of the strong-man Phoukouvong Savan in Laos in 1960, the agency is responsible for

... when the Kennedy administration came into office ... the President concluded that the C.I.A. had so important American interests to ... Nosavan that there was at first no alternative to dealing with him.

... cover, the C.I.A.'s skill at quickly and in relative secrecy drew for it many assignments in Southeast Asia ... would normally be given to the Defense Department. ... able, for instance, to fly ... to the Meo tribes in Laos to help them fight against the pro-Communist ... Lao at a time when treaty obligations forbade the assignment of American military advisers to the task.

... South Vietnam, the C.I.A.'s possession of energetic young men with political and linguistic skills proved much more successful in wresting mountain and jungle villages from Communist control than the Pentagon's special forces.

... But the C.I.A. was also deeply committed to the Ngo brothers and was tricked by them into supporting their private police forces. These were eventually employed against the Buddhist political opposition, thus provoking the coup d'état by military leaders in 1963 that brought down the Ngos.

... In Thailand, the C.I.A. has now begun a program of rural defense against Communist subversion. Working through foreign aid offices and certain airlines, agents are working with hill tribes along the Burmese and Laos borders and helping to build a provincial police network along the borders of Laos and Cambodia.

Furtive Operations

Few Americans realize how such operations as these may affect innocent domestic situations — the extent to which the dispatch of a planeload of rice by a subsidized carrier, Air America, in Laos causes the agency to set furtive operations in motion within the United States.

When Air America or any other false-front organization has no other financial resources, the agency has used its influence in Washington and throughout the United States to drum up some legitimate sources of income.

Unknown to most of the directors and stockholders of an airline, for instance, the C.I.A. may approach the leading officials of the company, explain its problem and come away with some profitable contracts.

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