REMARKS BY BRIGADIER GENERAL E. K. WRIGHT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AT THE AGF INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE HELD
AT THE GROUND GENERAL SCHOOL CENTER, 16 JUNE 1947.

The Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Roscoe H.

Hillenkoetter, wishes me to convey his disappointment in not being present at this conference -- and to stress his positive interest in this further indication of the advance of intelligence training.

You are all aware that the Central Intelligence Group is an agency operating under the National Intelligence Authority — consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the personal representative of the President. The Director of Central Intelligence is, in effect, the Executive of the National Intelligence Authority and as such is their supervisory official in connection with the broad over-all coordination of departmental intelligence activities. In this position the Director has the continuing advice of the Intelligence Advisory Board which, at the moment, consists of General Chamberlin (Director of Military Intelligence), Admiral Inglis (Chief of Naval Intelligence), and Mr. Eddy (Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence).

As a general statement the mission of Central Intelligence is one of directed coordination of intelligence activities and the performance of such services of common concern as can best be accomplished

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centrally. There is also inherent the mission of correlating, evaluating, and disseminating national policy intelligence.

these missions from another angle. To the average soldier, sailor, or airman, intelligence means essentially the search for tactical or strategic information in a strictly military sense. To the vast majority of laymen, unfortunately, intelligence suggests espionage and counter-espionage in its more sensational aspects. To those conscious of the broad national requirements, intelligence is evaluated information of all subject matter which serves to influence national decisions and actions.

While our primary concern as a Central Agency is the provision of national policy intelligence — we strictly adhere to the necessity for adequate and complete departmental intelligence, since here are the main sources of information which provide the foundation of National Intelligence. Furthermore, we must retain and continually energize the system which provides technical, tactical, and strategic intelligence under any and all conditions. Under existing conditions it is difficult to divide intelligence requirements on the basis of a War period as against a period of Peace. The Clausewitzian theory that "War is the continuation of Policy by other means than Diplomacy" has greater meaning today than ever before.

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We all realize that success in war is a relative term and it is increasingly difficult to determine where diplomacy stops and war begins. Our intelligence agencies, therefore, must be geared and trained at all times for any eventuality. There are other types of casualties than human life and every commander knows, in his heart, that his casualties vary in inverse ratio to the completeness of his intelligence.

I would like to take this opportunity of touching briefly on the question of clandestine intelligence, without discussing the detailed technique of its procurement. As mentioned before, a vast majority of people connect the word "intelligence" with a complete "cloak and dagger" type of operation and the whole thing has been grossly overemphasized by many of the newspapers and magazines.

One authority has said that intelligence is no more nearly synonymous with espionage than bread is with salt. Certainly, of the total usable information, that gained by clandestine methods might normally be comparable to the amount of salt in a loaf of bread.

We must not depreciate the importance of clandestine intelligence, properly organized and operated. In many cases the intelligence picture cannot be completed without those items of information which foreign governments wish to withhold at any cost. But we must not exaggerate its importance.

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The procurement of clandestine intelligence, which requires many specialized techniques, is laborious, serious and systematic. It has an important place in our over-all requirements even under "normal" conditions. But, most important, it provides the framework for the collection of information during critical times, when curtains of secrecy are dropped around various areas. And — in time of war — practically all information of the enemy must be obtained by clandestine or semi-clandestine means.

There is one more item of extreme importance to the success of intelligence — the closer integration of planning with intelligence. Throughout the war and at this very moment there was and is a reluctance on the part of planners to let the intelligence staffs "in" on the planning to any great degree. I am afraid this exists at all levels. The result is too often not only a faulty plan but an expensive one. And too often the plan is based on spotty intelligence "off the cuff" instead of well rounded intelligence developed in parallel with the development of the plan itself. Those of you who have been on duty with G-2 of the War Department know of the too frequent four o'clock deadlines on a paper presented by the planners at ten in the morning — and in connection with a plan which had been in development for weeks. Actually, a lot of planning, as a result of this condition, is based on information instead of intelligence — and there is a world of difference!

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Again I want to express the appreciation of the Central				
Intelligence Group for being invited to this conference.	25X1			
of our organization, will be present throughout the conference for any				
assistance he may afford to the various committees. We hope, as time				
goes on, to efficiently prove our value in the field of national policy				
intelligence, and to provide a valuable service to the field of departmental				
intelligence.				