HR70-14

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO NO. KM-50-224 Date: 11 December 1950

To : Board of Directors

From : President

Subject : French Indo-China CAT Progress

When discussions were first initiated with the French authorities in French Indo-China six months ago, CAT offered to the French twenty or any lesser number of aircraft and also to move its entire maintenance base including the LST, barge, etc., to Saigon and to assist the French in their own maintenance problems in addition to conducting air transport with CAT's own planes.

The offer to the French in approximately these same terms (except that there has been a recent reduction in the number of planes from twenty to twelve) has been kept current and continuous through various channels up to the present. As of the time of writing this Memorandum, we do not know what program the French will desire, but it is assumed that one of the most important considerations in the approval of any program is CAT's ability to furnish maintenance assistance for French aircraft and/or American aircraft transferred to the French under the military aid program. Were it not for the present involvement of CAT in the so-called "Booklift" operation CAT could clearly at this point fulfill their highest previous offer to the French and, in fact, do even more than previously offered. Since last June when the original offer was made CAT has increased its fleet by lease of outside aircraft to a point where its position is as follows:

	Total	C-46	C-47	Cessna (single engine flight pl
Active Fleet	31	23	4	4
Inactive Fleet	15	8	7	
Estimated Active Fleet by:				
30 December	36	25	7	4
30 January	44	29	11	4
15 February	46	31	11	4

The total CAT active fleet of forty-six aircraft could not all be made available by February 15 to [redacted] and/or to French Indo-China, but in round figures it is safe to say that available for these purposes by that date would be approximately 35 to 40 airplanes. (See attached memorandum prepared by our Chief Engineer, Mr. Hugh Grundy, dated 10 December 1950 giving the entire detail as to the present and potential fleet.)

The present CAT maintenance set up is at least 300% better that it was last June when the offer was made to the French - a time when CAT was cut down to the bone for economy reasons. However, the set up is at present inadequate to fully support CAT's own present requirements on a maximum basis. CAT is at present flying approximatel

3500 hours per month and 90% of this is on [redacted]. We are doing this with twenty-seven active twin-engine airplanes in the fleet. At the peak of CAT's former China operations we were able to do 4000 hours per month with approximately 20 aircraft in the fleet. In other words, CAT's utilization is today approximately 150 hours per month per airplane in the fleet as compared with a former record of 200 hours per month. The present lower rate now prevailing results from a combination of circumstances. One large factor is the less efficient utilization possible under the [redacted] contract where we are carrying for the U. S. Air Force and our planes are being called for and loaded by them, as compared to the China situation where all these matters were entirely under our own control. Our average turn around at present due to loading and other delays inherent in our Air Force arrangement, requires approximately four hours which, assuming two eight hour flights, means that 16 hours a day is the theoretically maximum utilization for the average plane. Under our own China set up the turn around was an hour or less and the theoretical maximum 22 hours per day. The foregoing, however, is not the whole story. When the [redacted] contract started in September, CAT was operating only 50% hours per month and all out six of its aircraft had been idled for many months. Its engineering staff had been cut down to less than a third of the strength required for a three or four thousand hour operation and the supply of spare parts and necessities due to economy been altered to decrease to a comparable level. Under these circumstances, it is fair to say that the present rate of performance which has been so rapidly achieved is quite creditable.

Since the first days of [redacted] no effort or expense has been spared to build up the engineering personnel and the supply of spare parts. But achievement of the ideal final results cannot be accomplished without the elapse of more time and is rendered highly difficult by the overall very tight supply situation prevailing worldwise as a result of the Korean war emergency.

From the foregoing it is realistic to say that if CAT policy instructions are to perform a maximum effort on [redacted] it has no facilities at all for French Indo-China.

The writer has today discussed with General Crabb, Deputy for Operations for FEAF, the future FEAF requirement for CAT [redacted] work. General Crabb advised that FEAF's stacking for FEAF has been so creditable that CAT is now considered by FEAF as a very important and integral part of FEAF's overall strength. For the next six months to a year, as General Crabb personally sees the situation, every possible facility of CAT will be needed by FEAF in the Japan- area theater. This is true regardless even of the possiblity that area itself will have to be completely evacuated by the U.S. forces or that a small area is held on a stabilized basis. In fact, General Crabb said he would like to see CAT increase its maintenance facilities by setting up an additional CAT set of shops and obtain more C-46's. At this conversation, General Crabb was told the full background of the requirement for CAT in French Indo-China, and his foregoing remarks should not be

interpreted as any opposition on his part to having us do any work in French Indo-China that we could do even if there is some detriment to the [redacted] operation. However, it is clear that General Crabb would like more help than we are now able to give FEAF in Japan and Korea.

The foregoing conference with General Crabb occurred because the writer wished background from him on a recent request received from J-4 of FEAF (General Aldrich) for CAT to move its C-47 and entire maintenance set up to Japan. General Crabb stated on this point that the request came as a result of his desire to help CAT do more work on [redacted] There is no insistence on General Crabb's part that CAT has to move to Japan, but he certainly would like to see it happen because he knows that we will be from 15 to 25 percent more efficient on [redacted] when the move is finally accomplished.

The basic problem posed by the foregoing situation is how to reconcile the requirement of [redacted] with French Indo-China work, particularly on the maintenance angle. If the problem was simply to operate a dozen or so airplanes in French Indo-China, no great question would be presented. By using facilities of the Hongkong Aircraft Engineering Company (HAECO) (formerly CNAC and PAA) part of the maintenance of these aircraft could be fairly satisfactorily taken care of and the balance could easily be handled by routing of the aircraft in our fleet so that they would all periodically come through the new Japanese maintenance base. Some increase of "dead" flying would, of course, occur which would make the French Indo-China operation less effective if not unprofitable, but under those circumstances, this would be a relatively minor consideration. So much then for the simple problem of an air operation of 12 planes in French Indo-China.

However, the only way to make any large contribution to the French Indo-China overall maintenance problem would be to either move CAT's C-47 and main maintenance base to Saigon or to create a new facility for that purpose at that point. If the CAT maintenance base and HAECO go to Saigon now, CAT's effectiveness under [redacted] will decrease a minimum of 40%. The reason is obvious. The [redacted] operation will be 2500 miles, or the equivalent of across the United States, from its supporting major maintenance. The point will become clear if it is realized that under any proper maintenance set up aircraft must return to the major base at least once every 200 hours, and preferably once every 150 hours. The round trip from Tokyo to a Saigon maintenance base would take a minimum of 30 hours which would mean that 30% of the effective time between 100-hour checks would be occupied in flying primarily for maintenance purposes. The balance of the loss would result from the inevitable complications attendent on distance and scattering of effort. The actual maintenance loss might be held down to 15 or 20 percent in the event that we compromised by returning to base only every 200 hours although the grade of maintenance would suffer.

Were we only operating about 12 airplanes in Saigon with our maintenance still in Formosa or in Japan, this percentage would apply to but a few of our airplanes as pointed out above, and some of our problems could still be partially taken care of in Hongkong as pointed out above.

It has been suggested that a better solution than is presented above could be accomplished by doing 100 and 200-hour checks by a detached set up for that purpose to be created in Tokyo. It is the considered opinion of our Chief Engineer, Mr. Grundy, in whom the writer and the management of CAT have implicit confidence, that such a division of CAT's present engineering staff and facilities would be the ruination of our operation and that the net result would be that CAT's total monthly revenue flying time during the next six to ten months would average 1500 hours per month instead of the present 3500 which we expect to build up to 4500 or better if we can continue to work hard on a proper increase of our maintenance facilities and locate them at or near our major operational effort, i.e., in Japan or Formosa.

The management of CAT is prepared, nevertheless, to go ahead with this obviously inefficient program if it is instructed to do so by the Board of Directors for higher policy reasons than those having to do with the efficiency and consequent financial soundness of CAT's operation.

If the foregoing price in efficiency is deemed to be too high a one to pay for the policy considerations involved, then there are two other possible solutions to the [redacted] job and a substantial contribution to the French Indo-China problem. The first solution is to reduce the present [redacted] from 90% of CAT's work to approximately 25%. Obviously, this solution is completely inconsistent with the needs of the Japan theater as described in the above conversation with General Craig. However, here again the policy decision is for the Directors rather than the management of CAT. The other solution which is the one we most sincerely recommend, is to start at once and build for French Indo-China a maintenance set up to do the required job in addition to CAT's own problem. This would involve the improvement of the present CAT set up which is already planned for CAT's own purposes, and the re-duplication of it on another airfield near Saigon. Since CAT does not have the capital to build this new facility, it is obvious that such a solution is only practical if the United States Government can be persuaded that this is the way to best serve the objectives of Far Eastern aid. A discussion of the policy problem for use in possible negotiations with U.S. authorities will be set out below.

Such an [redacted] re-duplication program could be accomplished in two ways. The first is assuming adequate priorities for procurement to proceed on such a program in the United States. We conservatively estimate that the re-duplication program under this method might be completed in six months from the definite "go ahead" point. The second

possibility is presented by the situation as to HKAECO. There exists with this company in Hongkong all the essentials of the duplicate set up required for the Saigon job. While no approach has been made to the owners of the HKAECO, it is believed that the enterprise could be purchased for a figure which would be cheap enough to be classified as a bargain. Without any negotiations the writer would think that the purchase would require a maximum of U.S. dollars two million and might possibly be accomplished at a considerably cheaper figure by the exercis of appropriate pressures and other devices which have been discussed orally during recent conferences.

Accordingly, the only conclusion which can be reached is that either CAT must concentrate at least 75% on French Indo-China or 75% on [redacted] and there is no middle ground unless CAT's facilities are to be increased by a further substantial investment in maintenance.

In the event that the proposal for purchase of HKAECO is adopted it would, of course, be planned to transfer the equipment immediately to an LST set up. We estimate that this would take three months from the date when the purchase has been made. It should be pointed out in connection with the possible purchase of HKAECO that in addition to the shops required for general maintenance there is contained in the equipment a complete engine overhaul shop. Obviously, a theoretical way of making the proposed HKAECO investment substantially less than the above maximum figure would be to purchase everything that HKAECO has excepting the engine overhaul shop. It is the writer's opinion, how however, that HKAECO would never sell its other equipment separately because the writer as a former director of HKAECO's affairs, knows that such a split would render the remaining overhaul shop into an economically unsound proposition. The writer's opinion in this respect is completely supported by our Chief Engineer, Mr. Grundy.

However, since the proposed expense of a new LST set up would have to be financed ultimately by the U.S. as part of its Defense Aid Program, it should be pointed out that ownership of an engine overhaul shop either directly by the U.S. or through CAT and controlled by the U.S. would be a great asset to the overall strength of the U.S. in the Far East. Except for the overhaul shop of Philippine Airlines at Manila which is well occupied with their own work, this is the only other thing of its kind in the Far East. Except also for the ex-CNAC shop which the Chinese Reds (or Russians) now have.

There is attached a memorandum by Chief Engineer Grundy discussing more details of the overall maintenance question now at issue. It is submitted that it is to the interest of the U.S. Government's overall war effort to develop the LST floating maintenance concept for its needs in the Far East. It is further submitted that it would be both efficient and logical to entrust this project to CAT, although such is not the only possible solution, of course.

On the general desirability of the LST set up, it should be pointed out that in none of the countries of the Far East is there

an indigenous source of aviation fuel in the interior. Therefore, since aircraft must have fuel they will almost inevitably need to have a base at a seaport. Accordingly, it will invariably be convenient to have a floating repair base. The details of this point can be further refined as to each country in the Far East, but it seems unnecessary to more than state the conclusion in this paper.

Any future war or aid program in the Far East will rely heavily on air transport. Experience in China and Korea, has proved that Communist methods of disrupting surface transport is one of the great red weapons. A floating maintenance and supply base means that the mobility of air transport is made doubly mobile by mobility of its supporting facilities. CAT has several times proved this in its own operation.

For the sake of members of the Board who are not thoroughly familiar with what is meant by CAT's mobile LST base, a brief description is here required. Housed on the tank deck, in the water tight compartments and side bays below and alongside the tank deck, and under cover of quonset hut roofing on the outside deck of one LST, CAT has installed and operates all of the shops essential to maintenence of a fleet of approximately 50 twin-engine aircraft (except engine overhaul). CAT's supply is likewise housed aboard a steel cargo with plans to change to another LST because of space restrictions and to allow mobility without a tugboat. Once created, such shops can move at will. There is no delay for building or layout and installation of machinery necessary in any move. Thus a move of a major base which under present methods means perhaps a six-months minimum job, can be done in the time required to sail from the old to the new location.

Almost as important as the foregoing is the complete guarantee against loss to the enemy.

Assuming the general principles as to advisability of LST installations for the Far East are accepted by the United States Government authorities whom we will have to approach if the Board decides to proceed on such a plan, I will now proceed to a specific discussion of solving the French Indo-China problem by the creation of a new base.

In the first place, the writer and it is also believed, all United States attaches and military advisory officials feel that the present French supply and maintenance for aircraft set up in French Indo-China is hopelessly inadequate and unless it can be build up a very low utilization of any aircraft furnished to the French or owned by them already in the French Indo-China theater of operations will result, in hopeless inefficiency and lack of utilization. In short, a plan for taking care of the French maintenance problem is submitted to be an essential "must" to go along with the furnishing of the proposed military aid airplanes to French Indo-China. Under present day practices the French are trying to use in French Indo-China

even a more stupendously inefficient kind of supporting program than is visualized in the wildest plans for expanding CAT facilities. In short, the French shops which are, as pointed out above in connection with CAT, so essential to utilization and maintenance, located in North Africa and metropolitan France - a distance of approximately [illegible]500 miles from Saigon.

<u>It was just because of this situation that the interest has been shown by all concerned on the American side in having CAT establis a maintenance base in French Indo-China.</u>

I have pointed out already that CAT is still available for this purpose. However, the asset of CAT is already being 100% used for another high priority purpose in the [redacted] contract. If CAT is removed from [redacted] to do the French job, the equivalent facilities of CAT (with attendant large financial investment of the U.S. Governmen will by hypothesis be required for [illegible] operations. Accordingly, one way or another the U.S. Government has got to spend enough money to duplicate a large proportion of CAT's flying and maintenance facilities if it desires to satisfy the needs of both the Japan-Korea problem and the French problem. In other words, somebody has got to maintain the [illegible] fleet and somebody has got to maintain the French fleet. CAT facilities as presently constituted cannot do both jobs without extra investment.

Because of the peculiar opportunity presented by the possibilit of the purchase of [illegible] and the demonstrated ability of CAT to create and operate a floating maintenance and supply base, it is submitted that the cheapest possible way for the U.S. Government to solve its problems is either to loan the money to CAT to create another floating maintenance base or to contract with CAT to create and operate such an installation for the U.S. Government account.

Whiting Willauer
President

Attachments

[redacted]:

A. Japan Area Base:

Inasmuch as the inherent efficiency of an operation loosely integrated (as our present one is) must be low, one of the first steps must be to consolidate the maintenance shops section and service section, source or point of supply and the focus of operations. This should be accomplished by:

1. Moving the LST containing the present shops to Kizarazu. The anchorage should be immediately adjacent to the wharf back of Hangar 135.

2. Moving the supply barge alongside the LST. Development of the stocking facilities aboard the barge is imperative.

3. Moving the aircraft service base along with its supporting service supply and auxiliary or service unit shops to Kizarazu. The aircraft service section should be located in and around Hangar 135. One adjacent hangar should be allocated and rendered serviceable. The building now housing base operations should be assigned as a maintenance headquarters and office building. Adequate ramp area to handle the aircraft mentioned in Problem 4. should be allocated in front of the two assigned hangars. Buildings adjacent to Hangar 135 and between it and the seawall should also be assigned for auxiliary needs such as inflammable stores, etc. All shop service units now assigned to aircraft service would (except in special cases be absorbed into parent shops aboard the LST, its proximity making direct support to aircraft service by the LST shops entirely practicable while substantially improving efficiency. The buildings across the road aft of and directly opposite the unserviceable hangar to be assigned should be allocated for service supply. Repair would be necessary.

4. Transferring all personnel both American and Chinese (and otherwise) now attached to the Taihoku maintenance and supply base to Kizarazu. Only a line station complement would remain.

5. By substantially increasing the maintenance and supply personnel complement by drawing from local (Japanese) reserves of presumably well qualified aviation technicians and from locally available reserves of American aviation personnel. American personnel requirements which could not be satisfied locally should be imported from time to time. The object would be to train the base up to strength, then supplement its personnel for "on the job" training in anticipation of furnishing some qualified and adjusted personnel to the new operation at a later date.

6. By gaining permission from the USAF to make full use of local USAF supply facilities to support the increasing CAT overhaul and service program.

7. By moving a substantial part of the maintenance and supply organization which now exists at Tachikawa to Hizarazu leaving Tachikawa as a line station.

8. By gradually (but as rapidly as possible) shifting the aircraft service and component overhaul activities now used by CAT at KaiCC (Kowloon) and PAL (Manila) to Hizarazu.

This consolidation would materially improve the production of aircraft and better the quality of maintenance. Some sag in production and quality might be caused temporarily by the move but the almost immediate improvement thereafter would be greatly speeded up as a result of closer and wider range of materials and improved morale.

B. The Area Base:

Before specific plans and recommendations can be made in this connection, it is necessary that a decision on point A. immediately above be reached, so closely related are the two phases. Therefore, for the purpose of this proposal's presentation it is being assumed that the plan outlined in A. will be executed. Insufficient knowledge of the Saigon situation, local markets, (labor and material) facilities, space, utilities, etc., will undoubtedly affect the eventual development of the plan outlined here.

The following steps are proposed:

1. Another LST should be procured, taken to Japan, and developed there with all possible speed to a set up similar to our present LST. It is anticipated that necessary structural work on the ship, alteration of configuration, fabrication and installation of special facilities such as CAT-manufactured arrangements and machines could be handled by local Japanese contractors. Sufficient experienced supervisory technical personnel would be readily available at the Hizarazu base to offer advice on the development. The presence of a similar installation would be of immeasurable value, particularly in the inevitable cases of inability to meet certain specifications but where substitutes are available.

2. Shop Equipment: Arrangements should be made with the U.S.A.F. for procurement of machinery, specialized aircraft shop equipment, etc., from their stocks or through their facilities. Delayed deliveries or non-availability of the required equipment on the commercial market, even with priorities, would probably preclude

the development of the shops within a reasonable time, could this arrangement not be made. Equipment available from the Japanese market or the Japanese or surplus market would, of course, be taken advantage of. The matter of equipment would not, of course, be left entirely up to local procurement sources, but rather, we would make use of their facilities only where required.

3. Stores: Another LST or large barge should be procured and converted to a supply main store complete with binning arrangements. This would support the LST shops in their overhaul activities and furnish a reserve store to support service supply which would be, it is anticipated, shore based in this particular base arrangement. The conversion and initial stocking of this store should be done at Japan concurrently with the development of the LST for shops.

4. Service facilities: It is assumed that at Saigon:

   a. A tropical climate (year around) and reasonably good weather is a fact.
   b. Adequate space for service installations and aircraft parking would be provided on the Saigon airfield.
   c. That the LST and supply barge or LST could be positioned within a few miles of the airport and in a readily accessible location but not immediately adjacent to the airfield.

   Therefore, the following would be required:

   a. Procurement of sufficient Pacific Iron and Steel Company or equivalent prefabricated steel aluminum standard buildings to house service shops units, service supply, offices, etc. Aircraft would be serviced in the open, therefore only service docks would be required and those only in certain cases. Building area required to be determined later.
   b. Provided concreted space should not be available then such would be required for the aircraft service area. Other suitable level ground could be used for parking areas if required.
   c. Utilities (electrical, power, water, air, drainage) would have to be provided.
   d. Service equipment should be drawn from local Japanese markets, from the LST as proposed for shop equipment in 3. above, and from U.S. markets. Little could be spared from the Alaskan base in view of its proposed work increased.

5. Personnel: Supervisory, master and key personnel would be provided from the Alaskan base. The numbers would be limited, however, depending on the carrying out of the plan under proposals for meeting requirements in 5.

at least a reasonably substantial part of the required staff would be furnished. For political reasons it is believed better to use Chinese personnel at our Japan base and Japanese at the PIO base, to the extent possible under the restrictions of immigration regulations of Japan and PIO. It would be necessary in both the case of Japan and the case of PIO, to arrange for approval of the occupation authorities to permit the use of Japanese personnel on aircraft work. It is not feasible to import an American staff over and above those who can be selected carefully and who are needed for specific supervisory or key positions. Indigenous personnel would be used to the extent available and politically expedient. It is understood that a limited number of qualified French technicians and some airline experienced indigenous personnel are available at Saigon. Manpower requirements will be based on the criterion of an average of 20 men per plane. This will be expected to provide for a reasonable utilization, some development, reasonably good quality production, and for a minority of four-engine and single engine aircraft. Overhead manpower such as planning officers, clerical staff, etc., are included.

c. Tentatively, it is suggested that [illegible] Kong might be persuaded to sell their maintenance installation. If so, it would be a rich prize insofar as equipment which is so difficult to obtain is concerned. It has a major advantage of being locally situated and of a generally correct and balanced selection. A good reservoir of trained personnel would automatically become available, probably as a core or less or seized group. This installation would have only to be moved aboard the [illegible] (proposed) and to the service base (proposed) to constitute a major key toward completion of the project. It is suggested that it would be necessary and advisable to include the engine overhaul shop in any takeover, even should it necessitate the purchase of an additional LST to house it. It is believed to be virtually certain that Hongkong will eventually be lost and if the subject shop is still there it will be lost also. Its facilities might, in times of great need and non-availability of engines from other sources, be of great value. The equipment is good and could be nicely set up on one LST. A test stand could be installed aboard. It is believed that it is one of the only two engine overhaul shops in this area. Therefore, it is of potentially greater value than it may seem. The other one in mind is in Manila and a doubtful situation of production availability, particularly in time of greatest need, exists.

ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES:

a. As an alternate to a Japan area base:

1. Situation as the civil time set up would be the most logical

plan, it is believed. However, extensive development, improvement and expansion of existing facilities would be an immediate requirement. The existing arrangement is inherently low in efficiency due to the relative geographical locations of the maintenance base and the focal point of operations. Local markets, living conditions, utilities, space, etc., are decidedly inferior with a resultant serious effect on both efficiency and quality. It is exceedingly difficult to persuade qualified foreign personnel to go to Tainan. Further, it has proven to be most difficult to import sufficient qualified Chinese technicians for political or administrative reasons. The local labor market is almost nil except for the lowest class unskilled workers. It is strongly recommended that this alternative would not be as good as the establishment of a Japan base.

2. Moving of the Tainan Formosa base to Saigon FIC and attempting to:

   a. Accomplish alternate No.2 (100 hour) services at a sub base to be developed at Tachikawa.
   b. Fly alternate No.2 service due airplanes to the Saigon base for pickup of items not called for at the sub base on first No.2 services.
   c. Develop another LST water borne supply and major service installation at Kisarazu while following plan steps A. and B. immediately above during such development.

   This alternate is considered to be grossly inefficient and illogical. Its implementation would see an immediate and serious decline in both quantity and quality. The time requirement for completion of step c. would almost surely be unreasonable due to the confusion and inefficiency resulting from such a disorganized and sprawling set up otherwise.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. It is estimated that one month to six weeks would be required to accomplish the move of the existing maintenance base, LST, and floating supply to Kisarazu after such things as permission to remove the real property from Formosa, immigration problems and assignment of required facilities at Kisarazu have been cleared and final instructions to execute the move are given.

B. The time required to procure, modify, equip, man and put into operation another LST, supporting floating supply and service base would require an estimated minimum six months providing

the required priorities, USAF support and funds were available. Unforseeable delays such as non-availability of an LST would necessarily affect any time schedule. Initial operation would be expected to be relatively poor in production and quality as it would not be feasible to delay starting any utilization of such a development until all points were complete. Indeed, more than a year could be expected to elapse before a reasonably full realization of potential benefits would be attained.

C. The problem of supply, especially for the Saigon phase of the operation, is worthy of careful consideration. In view of the several kinds of aircraft, of a purely military type, concerned, it would be almost imperative that adequate parts and supplies be furnished along with the airplanes.

D. The project of moving and expanding our present maintenance and supply facilities plus the project of creating a new, larger and more versatile base will require large expenditures and will probably detract from the efficiency and quality of the present operation for an interim period. However, ultimately, the operation will benefit extensively.

OC [illegible]: (in summary)

A. Decide upon the overall plan to be used.

B. Assuming that plan would provide for moving the existing base to Japan and developing a new one for FTC, the following should govern:

1. Execute the move to Japan.
2. When the move is substantially complete, start development of the Saigon base LST supply ship and equipment complement at the Japan base. While step 1. is being executed, procurement of the necessary bottoms could be made.
3. Move the equipment and facilities to Saigon as rapidly as completed to provide a gradual buildup to the target base.

C. Once a plan is decided upon, provide the means with which to execute it and adhere to it except as a last resort.

H. L. GUNDY

cc: (6)