Arthur B. Darling Interview:

SOUERS; Sidney

.

data (d)

÷

.

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date DEC 1991 14.2 HRP

000188

٧.

Interviews	with	Admiral	Souers

Souro/ 1

Pages

1-6-2

JL/52

6-8 1 1 25 II/(1)

I/57(i) II/14(2)

8-11 Cited in Pres

-m /s

TTE 19(1)

TR/13:2)

11-16

Cetid in

Dorier all. 17

Cited Ly in

16-17 T/-1(1)

1.3/2

___/ 55 (') ___/ 53 ('), >

January 25, 1952 - Answers to Questions of December 7, 1951

Eberstadt - McCormack - The Shoreham Conference -Bureau of the Budget - Truman's Choice - Leahy's Role

January 30, 1952 - Talk over the Telephone $C_{tal} \pi / 4s (1)$

The Services and McCormack - The "Leak" in 1945 -Individual v. Collective Responsibility for Estimates -Donovan's View - Its Weakness - Need of Opposition

April 3, 1952 - Telephone Conversation on "NIA No. 1"


Capabilities and Intentions of the United States -Souers Not "Naive" - See Chapter I for Donovan's Experience - "Sensitive Material" - Byrnes and Truman -The Daily Summary - First Things - Truman's Desire -A Central Service

April 16, 1952 - Conference on Chapter III

Opposition to Central Intelligence - The Group - The Director of Central Intelligence - Donovan's Insistence -Close to the President - Sabotage of the President's Directives - McCormack's Anticipations - See Chapter I -Capabilities and Intentions of the United States - Army and Navy - "NIA 1" - Byrnes and Truman - Souers' Nature -His Purpose - Central Planning - Appointments - The Choice of Vandenberg - Magruder's Illness

April 23, 1952 - Talk Concerning His Papers and the First Organization of CIG

> Souers' Papers - Brownell Committee Fall of 1945 -Congress - The Defense Project of 1946 - Lovell



Interviews with Admiral Souers

June 30, 1952 - Conference

Brownell - McCormack's Failure - Admiral King - Right of Inspection - Suggestion to Departmental Agencies -Difficulty of Appointments - Experts on Russia -Vandenberg and Supervision - Concerted Action - Admiral Inglis and General Vandenberg - Admiral Hillenkoetter -The Choice - Admiral Leahy and Secretary Forrestal -Access to Papers - National Security Council - Joint Chiefs of Staff - General Smith - The Dulles Report -Dewey's Campaign - Reasons for Choice of the Committee -Robert Blum on Hillenkoetter - The President's Position -Smith's Power - Louis, Johnson and Communications -Carter Clarke Fitt/36 (3)

July 1, 1952 - Telephone Conversation


Leahy and the Navy's Idea - Leahy's Conviction - His Dislikes - Marshall and China - Leahy's Role - Choice of Hillenkoetter - See the Interview with Leahy July 3, 1952

September 8, 1952 - Conference

. TI(111)

.

Cety Dinte Secretary of Defense - "Principal Assistant" - The Council - The Executive Secretary - Souers and the Council - Souers and the Agency - Truman and the Council - "No Minutes" - USCIB - NSCID 5 - The Intelligence Advisory Committee as a Governing Board -Vandenberg High-handed and Angry - General Smith in Contrast - Hillenkoetter's Situation - The Investigation of Hillenkoetter - The "NSCIDs" - "Primary Interest" -Forrestal's Part - Blum's Work - McNarney's Assignment -Leahy and Souers - Presidential Snoopers -Hillenkoetter's Inheritance - Truman's Interest in his Personal Service - Origins - General Wright - Cause of Difficulties - Peter Vischer - Forrestal's Conscientiousness - Selection of Smith by Truman - Souers on "Coordination" by the Secretaries - Access to Papers



Pages

18-23 III /8 I/ 50 (2) I/48 (1) X

cited Anding It/2 (3) I / 4 (2)

1 / / 15



Interviews with Admiral Souers

November 4, 1952 - Questions on Chapter VI - Hillenkoetter's Administration : Intelligence


CTed dian 33-41 TX TX/150. Covert Operations - Smith's Anxiety - Smith and the Election of 1952 - The Advisory Board and the Director -The Council as a Cabinet on National Security - The Minutes of the Council - Opinions of the President's Secretaries - The Tradition of the Secretary of State -The Concept of National Security - Aggressor - Invasion -The "IAB" on November 20, 1947 - Editorial Assistance to Hillenkoetter - Hillenkoetter as "DCI" - Souers Provoked -Beginnings of the Investigation - The Rank of the "DCI" with the Joint Chiefs of Staff - Forrestal's Meeting with Chamberlin and Inglis in December, 1947 - The Right of Inspection and the Survey Group - Blum's Determination -Departmental Understanding - Hillenkoetter's Plan for an Advisory Committee - "NSCID 1" - The Action of the Council - Smith and the "IAC"

November 6, 1952 - Telephone Conversation Regarding NSC 50

McNarney and Humelsine - Sourrs and Hillenkoetter - JCS and AEC - The FBI and the IAC - Clark and Hoover - IIC and ICIS - Wright's Influence in CIA - See Interviews with Wright April 10, May 28, 1953 - Internal Organization under the Control of the Director - Leadership -Covert Operations and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

December 9, 1952 - Conference

Subversive Practices and Secret Collection -Psychological Warfare - Marshall and Guerrilla Tactics -Leahy on Murder - Souers' Panel of Guidance - Ignorance for the President's Benefit - Houston's Argument on Mecessity to Consult Congress - State-Mar-Navy Coordination Committee - Study of Psychological Warfare - The Psychological Strategy Board - Souers' Disappointment in Allen and Gray - Marshall and Royall against the Panel of Guidance - Lovett for Marshall -Feeling in the Agency - Forrestal's Position as Umpire -Forrestal to Chamberlin and Inglis - Cassady - Kennan and Hillenkoetter - "NSC 10" to "NSC 10/2" - "OPC" under "Guidance" - Hillenkoetter's View - Souers' Insistence -Allen's "Coat of Whitewash" - Hard to Take - Access to Papers - Smith to Souers



42-45 CITA Barling IX/21 (2) IX/22 (2) 45-53 IX/

Pages



Souers, S. W.

mmi

Interviewo '

1

January 25, 1952

ANSWERS TO MEMORANDUM DATED DECEMBER 7, 1951 ATTACHED

Since I have none of my file papers, the following information will have to be checked for dates and for accuracy.

1. I first became interested in and connected with the movement within the Navy to establish a National Intelligence Service around August, 1944.


2. I opposed the Donovan plan because I felt that in peace time as well as in war time it was necessary for the DCI to serve not only the President but also the cabinet members responsible to the President for national security.

3. As Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence in charge of Plans, I assisted the Director in connection with his work on the JIC.

It was the JIC that recommended the plan which in substance was approved by the JCS.

4. I did not participate in the deliberations of the Lovett Committee as that was an intra-army committee. It is my understanding that Mr. Lovett's committee was intended to arrive at a decision as to what the position of the Army should be with respect to Intelligence coordination. Mr. Lovett was a representative of Mr. Patterson on a committee consisting of two represent-

	Decument No.	[atives of Mr	Byrnes.	two	representatives	of	t ha	Segnation	.	+
	No Change In Cla	ss		<i>v</i> - <i>y</i>	••••		01	one	Decretary	01	tne
i	🗇 Declassified										
	Class. Chaoged to	1 14 3) 6									
ĺ	Next Review Date			_							
1	66th.: Ha 70-3		ACIELEC								
	Vole: 21auce	10	089159		-1 -1						
Ľ			Jy								



ं

Eberstadt


3000

Navy, Mr. Forrestal, and two representing the Army. It is my recollection that a Reserve General by the name of Brownell represented the Army with Mr. Lovett. Mr. Matt Correa and I represented the Navy and Messrs. McCormack and Russell represented the Secretary of State.

In June, 1945 Mr. Forrestal requested Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt to make a study and prepare a report relative to the unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head together with recommendations as to what form of post war organization should be established to enable the Military Services and other Government Departments and agencies to provide for and protect most effectively our national security. Mr. Eberstadt designated me as a committee of one to prepare a study on intelligence and to make recommendations thereon. My recommendation that there be established a CIA was incorporated in the report of Mr. Eberstadt to Mr. Forrestal dated October 22, 1945. This report was printed by the U. S. Government Printing Office for the use of Committee on Naval Affairs, U. S. Senate.

5. I am unable to answer this question.

6. The President was keenly interested in creating a CIA. I do not know why he instructed the Secretary of State to take the lead in developing the program, except that the Secretary of State was the senior cabinet member and it would be logical to charge him with that responsibility.



Under Number 4 I referred to the Committee representing the three secretaries. This committee was appointed largely at the instigation of the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War. They were urging the Secretary of State to permit them to participate in the consideration of the problem posed by the President. This committee was at work before the McCormack plan was submitted. Navy and War had been interested in a CIA before State showed any interest. In any event War and Navy desired a more autonomous type of CIA than State. It was State's desire that if they had a CIA that it be under the domination of the State Department. This was opposed by War and Navy.

7. In War and Navy there were many who opposed the McCormack plan, but the leadership for the opposition devolved on Mr. Lovett and me representing War and Navy.

8. The Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War finally agreed that they would recommend to the President a plan which was almost identical with that recommended by the JCS. They went to Secretary Byrnes on a Sunday afternoon in the Shoreham Hotel, I believe, and after making one or two minor changes succeeded in obtaining the signature of the Secretary of State to a letter prepared for the signatures of the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy. You asked if this amounted to accepting the Lovett report. I do not recall having ever seen the Lovett report because, as stated above, it was an Army report, but it must have been favorable to the plan which the Navy had approved in the JIC

The Shoreham Conference

1990

McCormack



Bureau of the

Budget

Truman's Choice

mmili

and JCS and I know they approved the plan which Mr. Lovett and I, representing the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, were recommending.

9. The letter submitted by the Secretaries of State, War and Navy to the President was considered by him at a meeting attended by Mr. Smith, Director of the Budget, Mr. Rosenman, Special Counsel to the President, Admiral Leahy, Commodore Vardaman, Naval Aide to the President and me. The Director of the Budget preferred the McCormack plan and expressed dissatisfaction with the draft submitted by the three Secretaries, but at the end of the conference the President stated that the plan submitted was what he wanted and he meant to go through with it. He agreed that Mr. Smith should have one or two of his intelligence men meet with me and representatives of the Department of Justice to make such changes in the draft directive as might be necessary to conform to budgetary or legal requirements.

(1) It is my recollection that it was at the meeting of the group last named that the name was changed from agency to group. Since this was not a statutory unit the Budget felt that it had to be called a group rather than agency which has certain legal connotations which made that necessary.

(2) Since the unit was not to be called an agency, it was necessary to change the title of the head of the group to Director of Central Intelligence.

(3) The President was keenly interested in having a strong and effective intelligence unit. He was aware that many in the State, War and Navy Departments were opposed to any high level intelligence agency. His Chief of Staff, Fleet Admiral Leahy was a strong advocate of the plan submitted by the three Secretaries and it was for these reasons the President insisted on naming Admiral Leahy on the National Intelligence Authority as his personal representative. He indicated this move would give additional support to the Director.

Leahy's Role

Whether or not the DCI had a vote was not important, inasmuch as unanimity was required. The NIA was charged with performing certain specific functions by the President, and the DCI was charged with doing the job, under the direction and control of the NIA.

10. From 1929 to 1940 I was in the Intelligence Reserve of the Navy. From July 1940 to November 1946 I was on active duty in Intelligence. My last duties in the Navy were Assistant Director in Charge of Plans and as Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence. All of my files in connection with the subject under discussion are in ONI.

11. (Answer will require recheck of NIA Actions.)

12. Created a new Office of Reports and Estimates.

13. SSU was liquidated and funds turned over to CIG. Personnel were individually selected for CIG.

14. (I don't remember.)

7 December 1951

W DEIGNS FO' ADMINAL SOULES

- 1. When did he first become interested in and connected with the movement to establish <u>Central Intelligence</u>
- 2. His view on the Donovan Plan of 1944.
- 3. Did he participate in discussions of <u>JOS</u> and their sub-committees (Joint Intelligence Committee and Joint Strategic Survey Committee)? January 1945
 - JCS. 1181 (Director OSS memo to President 18 Nov 1944) - J.I.C. 239/5 (Objections to the Donovan Plan)

- JCS. 1181/5 (19 Sept 1945)

- 4. Did he participate in the deliberations of the Lovett Committee? October - November, 1945
- 5. Who wrote the report of the Lovett Committee? 3 November 1945 Magruder and Katz? (SSU heads)
- 6. Why had President Truman instructed Secretary of State Byrnes on 20 Sept 1945 to "take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program?"

(Result: McCormack Plan)

Byrnes to War & Navy 10 Dec 1945

Scpt 20, 1945 was the same day that Trusan wrote

Donovan

Did War Department move before State intentionally

7. Does he know who were the determining persons, and what were their <u>convincing</u> arguments, against the McCormack Flan?

·	
	Page # 2 7 December 1951
	QUESTIONS FOR ADMIRAL SOU RS (continued)
	E. What influenced the "Three Secretaries" to propose their
	"Directive" of Jan 7, 1946?
	Did this account to accepting the Lovett Report?
	9. Who drafted the President's Directive of January 22, 1946
, 	Why these changes from the preceding proposal:
	1) Group instead of Agency?
	2) Director Contral Intelligence instead of
	Director of Central Intelligence Agency?
· .	3) Addition of "my personal representative" besides
	the DCI?
•	Was non-voting the point? or
	Was D.C.I - servant of the group?
	/
ana a dh	
- -	
	Λ

 ${\bf r} = {\bf 1}$

7 December 1971

Paje #3

把時間

UF FIGNS FOR ADMIRAL SOULES (continued)

10. His work on Intelligence for the Navy

prior to becoming D.C.I.

- Has he any reports, minutes, or papers -

having to do with the proposals

of the Navy, counterparts of the

work of the Army and war Department?

11. His opinion regarding the most significant actions of the National Intelligence Authority.

12. Did C.I.G. take back H & A (O.S.S.) from State or create
a new office (personnel and functions)?

13. How were the personnel and operations of S.S.U. taken over from War?

14. Now was the transfer of property from State and War effected?

15. Were these transfers completed while he was D.C.I.?

16. Did he think at that time that C.I.G. should be merely

a "coordinating group" of intelligence officers

or should undertake also extensive clandestine

operations, espionage and counterespionage

17. What is his view, as a former D.C.I., with regard to the issue:

"individual v. collective responsibility" (Director) (Soard or Connittee)

18. Did the testimony before the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee

of Congress have more than general influence toward

creating a Central Intelligence Agency?

---- Were there specific provisions

directly resulting from that experience?

Page ∦h

7 December 1951

QUESTIONS FOR ADMIRAL SOUTES (Continued)

19. Does he know the origin of the provision regarding

services of "common concern" ?

(3c in President's Directive

of Jan 22, 1946)



15. (I don't remember.)

16. Both

17. Individual responsibility based on coordinated

effort.

18. Only general influence, so far as I can recall.


19. I believe this was contemplated in the original JIC "proposal.

January 30, 1952

Talk over Telephone re JIC Plan - 1945 DCI's Position with IAC under NSC

Souers spoke again of the part which he had for ONI in JIC (JCS) (1945). Nimitz and other ranking Navy men did not want a central intelligence service. They preferred, however, the Souers plan to Budget's plan and .McCormack's plan (State). Souers said that he thought McCormack derived his plan from the "basic proposal" of Budget. Souers spoke of Mr. George Schwarzwalder in Budget. I thought he said that Schwarzwalder was opposed. Secretary Forrestal, according to Souers, was on the fence, but came down on the side of a central agency with his service, Navy, rather than have State backed by Budget take over. Souers mentioned Correa as confidential adviser to Forrestal, and apparently one who would help Souers in opposing the McCormack plan.

It seems that Mr. McCormack antagonized almost everyone even within his own department. Souers mentioned Russell and joked about it as if McCormack were "ganged." Regarding the



The Services and McCormack

OFORE

Then Souers turned to a discussion of individual versus collective responsibility for estimates. He made a very clear statement in favor of the DCI's individual responsibility with support by the representatives of the respective agencies concerned, Army, Navy, Air, State. The idea was well presented that dissenting opinions should accompany the majority opinions in estimating so that the President and the various heads of departments would have the "same" intelligence estimates available for their policy-making. Admiral Souers did not say, but it seemed to me that the conclusion was that the policy-maker should have not a single, but several estimates <u>if</u> they were feasible; even then he might reject them all and rely upon his own intuition. I had better talk this over specifically with him when I show him what we have written on the subject. He explained further the weakness in Donovan's view that the DCI should be directly and solely

Donovan's View

The "Leak"

in 1945


Individual

v.

Collective

Responsibility for

Estimates



Its Weakness

Need of Opposition responsible to the President. As a practical matter in politics, and the science of government, such an officer as the DCI needs the support of other parties who are interested in the same matters. The negative of this is true, too. He needs the opposition on occasion to make his position clearer and stronger though opposed. If he is influential of <u>himself</u>, said Souers, the DCI can reach the President <u>directly</u> regardless of opponents. If the DCI is not, he needs support.

April 3, 1952

Telephone Conversation Regarding the First Draft of NIA Directive No. 1

I asked Admiral Souers why it was that in line 4, paragraph 7, page 4, the clause concerning plans and capabilities of the United States was deleted. He had made such a recommendation in the first NIA meeting. There was no record of discussion. I told him that I had asked Mr. Lay this morning, but he could not remember. Admiral Souers laughed and said, "That's quite an omission." He could not remember either. I read to him what I have tentatively written about it, to the effect that if it had been retained it would have greatly accelerated the production of national estimates, considered the major purpose of CIA today. Admiral Souers agreed but laughingly urged me not to leave the impression that he was "naive." As he remembered it the omission was made because such information concerning plans, capabilities, intentions of the United States was not "intelligence."

Capabilities and Intentions of the United States

Souers not "Naive"





This led us to discuss my presumption, which I read to

See Chapter I for Donovan's Experience

"Sensitive

Material"

d III III

him, that those who had been reluctant to give to OSS "intercepts" and other sensitive information were no more willing to furnish Admiral Souers with such information. He demurred to that. He said that his trouble was with State at that time and he went off into the story of Byrnes and Truman. He suggested that I read "Mr. President." This episode regarding "NIA 1," said Souers, was background material for that affair. Then he came back to the question of sensitive material. He said Army and Navy admitted that he was entitled to it. His problem was to get it from Army and Navy. (Apparently, it still is.) Souers said that none of the three wanted to give up "plans." He kept saying to me, "Do you get it?" I kept replying, "Yes, I get it." He repeated again that he did not wish me to think him naive or to give that impression in my writing, and so I said that I would make a draft of this story and leave it with his secretary for him to look over. In the meantime he will try to find any records that he or Mr. Lay may have. Souers was surprised, really, that there had been no discussion, at least recorded discussion. For he readily agreed that it was quite an omission. In short, the preceding word "all" did not adequately comprehend so specific a dependent clause as that specifying plans, capabilities, intentions of the United States. I have no doubt that in February, 1946 the word "intelligence" was not generally understood to include such matters. But it did, at least for the President of the United States, it would

V withan Hill man's books (mpc)

ç

CLUIL

Byrnes and Truman

The Daily Summary


seem; because President Truman insisted upon the daily summary from the new CIG over the protests of Secretary Byrnes that it was the function of the State Department. This issue was discussed in the first meeting.

Byrnes protested that the Department of State was responsible for reporting to the President on matters of foreign policy. -According to Admiral Souers over the phone today, Byrnes went so far as to see the President in person. Truman said that he wanted Souers to put together in a single summary all the dispatches, cables and press notices that piled up on the President's desk. It might not be considered intelligence, said Souers, quoting Truman, but it was intelligence to the President. That is to say, it was information which he wished to have. The amusing result, according to Souërs, was that President Truman had two daily reports on his desk, one from State and the other from CIG. That was better than having 30 reports anyway, said Souers, or words to that effect.

Admiral Souers took considerable pains to make clear in this talk on the telephone that he was endeavoring as the first DCI to get established a central service for the Departments and the President. The very first thing in mind seems to have been the personal request of the President that he be supplied with this daily summary. The idea of national estimating was present, yes, but it was not uppermost. He insisted too that I understand that the Army and Navy recognized that he was "entitled" to their

First Things

Truman's Desire





information but were as determined as ever to withhold their own "plans." They expected the CIG to render service to them. They did not think of it as yet as an institution which might require the reverse process of departmental service to it.

ABD: Note that in this conversation over the telephone you did not go into the analysis of the duties and responsibilities of the DCI which you have made at the end of Chapter II.

April 16, 1952

Conference Regarding First Draft Chapter III, C.I.G. (J. S. Lay, Jr., present for half an hour)

<u>First sentence</u>: Souers did not like my use of the word "choose." It seemed to imply that he could have overlooked the opposition to a central intelligence organization. The inference to him was that I had missed the point. He took pains therefore to go back into the previous year when the Army and the Navy were battling with McCormack in the State Department as well as with each other. Souers stressed that within the Navy itself, for example, there still were forces opposed to a central intelligence organization. He told me how he had prevailed upon Inglis to persuade King. His story rambled. I asked later if he could not send me the documents. As I was leaving he said that he would try to get them. I had said that the stories of the Army (Lovett Committee), the Budget, the State plan, the Donovan plan, those things were on record in "CIA." There was very little here about the Navy plan.

Opposition to Central Intelligence

A Central

Service



The Group

The Director

of Central

Intelligence

Donovan's

Insistence

Close to the President

Sabotage of the

President's Directives

.

Souers did not wish to antagonize the opponents of CIG. He wished to get the Group started on the President's Directive and to create no obstructions to legislation by Congress. The idea then was to coordinate the Armed Services. See the Eberstadt Report to Forrestal on unification. Souers' point is that his first obligation was to get the Group established. He knew the potentialities in the office of the Director of Central Intelligence. (ABD: I still think however, though it is only conjecture, that had Souers stayed on, he might never have sought to develop those powers as Vandenberg did.) Souers declared that General Donovan had defeated his own ends, however good, by insisting upon being next to the President. Sours remarked that the present head of civilian defense was trying to do the very same thing, that Gordon Gray too had wished to be close to the President. This led Squers to discuss the ability of the President's subordinates to ignore his directives. With a laugh, he said it was often done. As a practical matter, of course, it is easy to see that the President cannot hear everybody. There are not hours enough in the day. He has to have secretaries, boards, authorities to take the load. Souers used for illustration the power of the Secretary of State to thwart lesser persons and agencies though he did not specify cases.

Down in the second paragraph a word similar to the word "choose" above is the word "bound." This, too, Souers did not like. He had less ground for his argument here because of the phrasing of the Directive.

Souers was amused by the reference to Lay and said in Mr. Lay's presence, "He is pretty kind to you, Jimmy." I did not get what he meant at the moment. I said that both Lay and Montague, by reason of their experience with the JIC, seemed to be "naturals" for this new organization. It came out later that he was referring to the fact that both Lay and Montague at the moment were in the State Department in McCormack's organization. I had not mentioned that fact. The text makes it look as though Lay came over straight from JCS, which he did not do. Later I asked Souers if it were true that McCormack had picked both of these men. Lay and Montague, to work with him in the new central intelligence organization which McCormack expected to head under the auspices of the State Department. Souers said yes. When McCormack found that he was not going to head the organization, or even to have his plan adopted, he gave, as it were, both Lay and Montague to Souers as the contribution of the State Department. Souers likes to tease Lay about working for McCormack against the Joint Chiefs' plan to which both Lay and Montague had contributed in the Joint Intelligence Staff.

See Chapter I

Capabilities and


Intentions of the

daren (

McCormack's Anticipations

> been in mind when the clause concerning capabilities and intentions was stricken from Article 7 (draft of first directive). As they reconstructed the scene they believed that they had left the clause out to avoid objections to "CIA" at its start. The objections, of course, would have come from the Army and the Navy. United States

Both Souers and Lay could not remember exactly what had



Souers insisted, however, that the Services knew that he was entitled by the Directive even to "communications intelligence." He kept referring to my remark concerning Navy "intercepts." The point seems to be that the Services knew of his legal right to all intelligence. Lay stressed the word "all." He said that they wished to leave such matters as capabilities and intentions "implicit" in the first directive and not state them "explicitly." I did not argue the point but asked merely if I had made the proper analysis. They agreed that it was all right. Souers did say toward the end, however, that the Navy would never separate "capabilities" from "intentions." That is what I had implied. Souers obviously wanted me to have it clear in my mind and express it properly that he had a diplomatic job to do. First things should come first. The first thing was to get the Group established,. Then estimating and other matters could be settled later.

TONE

Souers said that he was pleased that "Jimmy"(Lay) had got in his first minutes so much about Byrnes. Evidently Secretary Byrnes caused a lot of trouble by telling the President what he wished to tell him and withholding other matters as he saw fit. This, according to Souers, was the reason why President Truman wanted a daily summary from the new C.I.G., from "his own man." Truman wanted to be sure that he had the comprehensive view, that nothing which he wanted to know was left out of the summary.

Admiral Souers objected to the quick relation which I have made between the daily summary and the process of national

Byrnes and Truman

Army

and Navy

"NIA 1"

5 JF

intelligence estimates. I still think that there is a connection but I had better work this over more carefully.

Souers**'** Nature

His Purpose

I asked him if he objected to my remarks regarding his nature, his desire to remove issues rather than to create them. He said that he did not mind making issues if there was some end in view, that is, he did not seek a fight for fight's sake. By this time, I think, we mutually understood his major purpose and its corollaries. He set out to establish the Group as a small body of experts drawn from the several Departments, and serving them. The Director of Central Intelligence should wait to develop his power.


I read sections of the revised draft, particularly those pertaining to the Executive Order, the flexibility of the Intelligence Advisory Board, and Souers' use of <u>ad hoc</u> committees. He offered no objections to these sections. I thought that he appreciated my reference to his Central Planning Staff. He was having, he confessed, great difficulty in getting competent men. I gather that he did not consider some of his appointments too good. He almost said "Fortier" and checked himself.

.

Appointments

Central Planning

The Choice of Vandenberg In the course of our talk he gave me reasons why he had picked Vandenberg. I have no doubt that his advice to Truman stood high in the President's thinking. Souers said he himself did not want the job and he took it only to get it going. He had recommended Magruder, and apparently the job had been offered to Magruder. According to Souers, Magruder declined because he was



ill. Vandenberg was selected early. These were reasons:

glamour, (2) high rank, (3) nephew, (4) his forthrightness and desire to get things done. Souers said he knew that Vandenberg was not much of an "intelligence man." The glamour, I suppose, was to attract public attention to the new agency. High rank, accordingly, would overpower lesser men in the armed services.
Being nephew of the Republican senator appears to have appealed to President Truman on grounds of bipartisanship.

Magruder's Illness

> Souers' Papers

Brownell

Committee Fall of 1945

.

April 23, 1952

Talk Concerning His Papers and the First Organization of CIG

Most of the time was spent going through the file of the documents which Miss Christensen had sent over to him from the Director's Office. Other papers which she returned earlier to the Navy apparently have been destroyed, but these promised to have some things in them which I have not yet been able to obtain, such as minutes of the Secretaries' meeting and the Joint Army-Navy-State Committee of which I know very little. It consisted of Brownell, Lovett, Souers, Correa, McCormack, and Russell. Admiral Souers reiter ated that they had been very much annoyed by McCormack's highhanded manner. It seems that McCormack was determined to have the whole new organization dominated by the State Department. Army and Navy liked that no better than Donovan's plan.



I suggested that we might say almost in so many words that Donovan's idea of a "Fourth Arm" and McCormack's determination to make the State Department superior to all other Departments drove the Army and Navy to abandon their opposition to a central intelligence organization and accept CIG. Admiral Souers said that was just about it. He stressed also that they were moving as steadily as possible toward establishing the organization by Act of Congress. I referred to the Eberstadt Report on unification in that connection. He said again that the President's Directive was just a transitional move.

I asked him about the Defense Project and Col. Lovell. He was quite interested, seemed to remember, however, but little of it. He called Lay and Gleason (Lay was out) to see if they knew where Col. Lovell now is. He agreed that we should follow this out and use it in our story, not only for subject matter (Russia's potential) but its importance in the construction of a coordinated and cooperative intelligence system. I read the first three or four revised pages of Chapter III. He was interested and appreciative. They now have his motive and procedure properly focused. He said it was right.

Admiral Souers is to get an appointment with Admiral Leahy for me sometime soon.

The Defense Project of

1946

Congress

Lovell

June 30, 1952 Conference

Souers opened the conference by referring to our previous conference and his papers. So I did not ask my questions but let him proceed. He spoke of the Brownell Committee again. Apparently it was more important than the so-called Lovett Committee on which Magruder sat. Souers' claim to construction is to be discounted somewhat, no doubt; but he was unmistakably in the center of things as the President's personal friend. He asked me if I had noticed that the Army wavered toward the McCormack Plan. He said that some of the Navy also played with it. Souers' point still is that McCormack might have done a lot better if he had not antagonized everyone so much. Besides, and I think more important from other evidence, McCormack's plan really was very soft. Souers agreed that the armed services would have been able to "push it over." (My comment.) He referred again to Admiral King's apparent willingness to accept the Souers "plan."

I spoke of the right of inspection as confined by NIA to consent of the respective heads of the intelligence agencies. Before I could develop my question Souers took the lead and explained what they had in mind when they drafted this provision. He used George Kennan for an example as the type of outstanding person whom they hoped to have at the head of the respective intelligence agencies, who should rise to a mere suggestion from the DCI with regard to intelligence and what the Group wished to


Brownell

McCormack's Failure

Admiral King

Right of Inspection

Suggestion to Departmental Agencies




But, said Souers, they were never able to get such men find. appointed. In this same connection he remarked that he had tried before he left office to get each one of the Departments to send him an expert on Russia. - I asked if he had Colonel Lovell in mind, but he did not seem to recall. I did not open the matter of the Defense Project this time. Souers went on from that to speak of his great difficulty in getting people generally from the Departments. He said that he told Vandenberg that as DCI and Lieutenant General he might be able to get the Army to send over the men whom they had not let Souers have. But, said Souers, Vandenberg had just as much trouble as he did.

I spoke of Vandenberg's effort to establish coordination and control of the intelligence work done by the Departments by means of "supervision." I said that it seemed to me there was a close connection between the concept "right of inspection" and what Vandenberg endeavored to accomplish. Souers agreed, and said that it was something that they had never been able to accomplish. He thought that General Smith was doing better with it. We were not talking about physical tours of inspection, but supervision by concerted interpretation of the functions of the agencies in close collaboration with the central intelligence organization.

Admiral Inglis and General Vandenberg

Using the fact that Puleston spoke of estimating within the Group, I asked Souers what was his idea of Inglis' stubborn resistance to Vandenberg. Was it retrogression on the part of



Concerted Action

Difficulty of

Appointments

Experts on

Russia

Vandenberg

and

Supervision

the Navy? Did the Navy regret having gone so far? Or was it reaction to Vandenberg's personality? Souers said that Inglis, a personal friend and close associate in ONI, was a dogged fellow who never gave up his ideas. He was honest but determined and persistent. I replied that his papers showed just that - an honest but strongminded man. I spoke of his persistent effort in ther spring of '47, even after Vandenberg had been made Executive Agent for the Secretaries, to establish control by the Intelligence Advisory Board. Souers replied that even after the National Security Council had been established by law and there was no provision in the statute for the "IAC," Inglis still kept talking as though it had a legal right to exist as the equal, practically speaking, of the Director.

Admiral Hillenkoetter

The Choice

20

In the course of our talk somewhere I remarked offhand that it seemed strange to me that Admiral Hillenkoetter should have been brought in after General Vandenberg unless there was a plan to hold back the development of the Director's Office. I said that after a Lieutenant General it seemed to be a let-down. Souers talked at length and very rapidly so that I doubt that I can remember all that he said. The gist of it was: a. He himself did not choose Hillenkoetter although some people thought that he had and later expected him to defend Hillenkoetter. b. It could have been Admiral Leahy. Hillenkoetter had been suggested to Souers before Vandenberg, if not before that. Souers thought however that the idea might have been Forrestal's. I remarked that it seemed more likely to me that it was Admiral Leahy's. And I asked if the theory was tenable that they deliberately chose a less-known man in order to play down the issue until after the armed services had gotten used to the new Department of Defense and unification. Souers did not know. If he did, he did not tell me. He said that they kept pushing Hillenkoetter. I asked if he thought that Admiral Leahy might tell me and Souers said, "Well, he might."

This led to my asking if he could arrange for an appointment with Admiral Leahy for me and he said "Why, of course, I shall be very glad to do so."

I then asked him if I would have any difficulty in obtaining NSC documents later on. Souers threw a quick look at me and asked "Which ones?" I said of course only those which pertain to CIA. Then I remarked that a certain amount of reluctance was apparent among the lesser men in the Agency to let me have access to them and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's papers. Souers said he did not see why I should not if I needed to know certain things in writing the history of the Agency. And he said, "Why, I should think General Smith could attend to that for you." I replied, "Yes, he could, but I have not been able to see him." Souers registered no reaction. I do not suppose that there was any particular reaction in his mind. He was stopped by the remark but it did not pass unnoticed. I then asked if there would be any difficulty if I were to call Mr. Lay for his

Admiral Leahy and Secretary Forrestal

Joint Chiefs

of Staff

Access

to

Papers

National Security

Council

General Smith

permission in case I needed to see papers over in the files of the NSC concerning, for example, the McNarney Report. He said that there would be no difficulty.

From the reference to McNarney, we turned to the Dulles Report and the situation which gave rise to it. It was in this discussion that he asked for my opinion, (much to my amusement and doubtless pleasure) concerning the choice of the Dulles Committee - Dulles, Jackson, and Correa. It seems that Dewey early in the campaign of 1948 began to criticise the CIA and make a political issue of it. This annoyed President Truman and his close adviser, Admiral Souers. So they appointed a political committee to make the investigation.

Souers recalled that Mr. Dulles was chosen because he was a Republican, brother of John Foster Dulles, close adviser to Dewey, and a "Donovan man." (That is, old OSS.) Jackson was picked because he was not associated with politics one way or another and was an expert on the British Intelligence System. Correa was chosen because he was a Democrat. Besides that, he was a close friend and legal adviser to Secretary Forrestal. Dulles asked if he should stay on the Committee as he wished to "go on Dewey's train." Souers said "Why not? You work for us by the day. When you work for us you are loyal to us. Then you can go with Dewey." Blum, one of the second-flight investigators, wished of fhand to have Admiral Hillenkoetter fired. Souers told him that the President would not allow it, that the next man

Campaign

Dewey's

The

Dulles Report

Reasons for Choice of the Committee

illiilli

Robert Blum on Hillenkoetter

might be just as objectionable to the critics. Souers thinks that the influence of the Dulles brothers probably quieted Dewey. As Souers put it, "CIA" should not have been taken into politics anyway and thrown before the public. It was one affair of public interest which should not be aired publicly.

Souers said in the midst of this discussion that General -Smith had more power, actually, than Donovan possessed. Souers arranged at once for Smith to have a regular weekly conference with the President, deliberately passing by the Council and the Secretaries of the Departments to the White House.


At one time Louis Johnson (Secretary of Defense, March, 1949 - September, 1950) planned to take over communications (USCIB). As this would check the vital flow, Souers went to Truman. Through the Budget Officers Truman stopped the interference. Souers did not tell me just when this was.

Also, Souers spoke of Colonel Carter Clarke as one who was powerful enough to stop his chief's (Vandenberg) efforts. It was an allusion which Souers did not develop beyond illustration of his point that subordinates can often sabotage.

July 1, 1952

Telephone Conversation

Admiral Souers called to say that he had arranged with Admiral Leahy. I am to get in touch with his aide some morning, tomorrow or later, at the Admiral's convenience. Admiral Souers said that he had told Admiral Leahy of the history and had



The President's Position

Smith's

Power

Louis Johnson and Communications

uniñul

Carter Clarke

assured Leahy that he himself was back of it. This, said Souers, he did in order to get the Navy's idea over. He told Leahy that to date I did not seem to have many of its papers and of course they should see to it that the Navy got into the history properly. Souers said this with a laugh over the telephone and remark that the Admiral is an "old sea dog" who does not know much about the origin of the Agency but does have clearly in mind several convictions: (1) That State should not be allowed to control the Agency. (2) That neither should the Army. (3) That it should be a cooperative enterprise. (h) That he was the personal representative of the President. (5) That Souers was too. (6) That together they were to hold against all the rest of the interested parties.

Leahy did not like Donovan and wished to abolish OSS completely. He wanted also to liquidate SSU entirely. Souers humored him but kept what was necessary for the future central organization. Leahy did not like Byrnes or Marshall. He felt that Marshall was throwing away China. He would do anything to keep China. He would even fight for China. Souers said that I would find Leahy a charming man who wanted simple things simply put. But, of course, said Souers, all things were not simple. So, "they" did not tell Leahy everything. "They" did not let him in the "finesse." He might, however, have some very good notes and he might be very willing to let me see them. I should by all means have a talk with him. It was all arranged. I was just to



Leahy's Convictions

His Dislikes

WEED

Marshall and China

Leahy's Role

Leahy and the Navy's Idea

call his aide. Souers asked him why they had chosen Hillenkoetter. Leahy could not remember. He said that Hillenkoetter was a good man. Probably that was the reason. He still thinks that Hillenkoetter is a good man.

. September 8, 1952

The interview opened with some discussion of what I had been just doing, the legislative chapter on the establishment of the Agency under the National Security Council. The first point which Souers made was that President Truman never did accept in practice the stipulation in the Act that the Secretary of Defense should be the "principal assistant to the President" in regard to national security. Secretary Forrestal therefore was at some disadvantage. He was supposed to be the presiding officer of the Council in the absence of the President. This interests me particularly in view of the fact that the Secretary of State is the senior officer in the Cabinet.

Admiral Souers did not elaborate the point, however, but turned to his own situation as Executive Secretary. It seems that Forrestal, thinking in terms of the Eberstadt Report of 19h5, expected Souers to be virtually a Director of the National Security Council. There is a very great difference, as Souers said at once, between an Executive Secretary and a Director. Souers declined to act in that capacity, very wisely no doubt, as the statute hardly justified such an interpretation of his office. I thought I got a flimpse here, nevertheless, of the possibility

Choice of Hillenkoetter

See the Interview with Leahy July 3, 1952

Secretary

of Defense

"Principal Assistant"

The Council

The Executive

Secretary

Souers

and the

Council

that President Truman intended to have Souers run the National Security Council in his own absence. I must have other evidence, however, to support such a conclusion. Anyway, Admiral Souers was too shrewd and clear-headed to step into that situation.

Souers said to me that if he had been Director of the National Security Council he would have been expected to "run CIA"as well. This he expressly declined to do; he insisted that the DCI should do so under the direction of the National Security Council. Souers did not wish to be anything more than the Executive Secretary for a council of the top ranking men in government. He remarked that President Truman seemed to be more interested in his intelligence agency than in the Council. Souers told him however that the National Security Council was one of the greatest achievements of his administration, a body where all phases of national policy could be blended. (My word. ABD)

Very early, the members of the Council decided that they would not make stenographic record of their discussions but would merely record actions. Apparently this is so. I did not believe it when I first heard that the Council had "no minutes." It does, however, have files of working papers preparatory to such discussions and actions. Admiral Souers arranged with Mr. Gleason for me to have access to those which were relevant to the history of CIA. I went upstairs later and talked to Mr. Gleason for a moment. He is to have someone go through them for me and let me know what is there. I shall be welcome to use them, with the

Souers and the Agency


> Truman and the Council

"No Minutes"

possible exception of those having to do with USCIE. About communications there seems to have been quite a controversy and some very hard feelings. So at least Admiral Souers intimated as he remarked, "But you of course would probably not want to put that into your history." It seems also that NSCID 5 is considered very secret in the National Security Council's office. We may have some of the papers relating to it in our own files.

Admiral Souers talked at length about the IAC and Admiral Inglis' determination to make it a governing board. Souers said that of course they should have such an advisory board but that it should not become in any way a board of consent. He felt that the DCI should have ample power and then, as Souers put it, say "Please." Souers felt that Vandenberg probably had been too high-handed and dictatorial. The Armed Services were very put out with him when he obtained designation as "executive agent." Souers agreed that Vandenberg too was angry.

This led to discussion of General Smith and Admiral Souers felt that the General was successful because he was about "40% showman" and the rest hard and determined executive. He probed two or three times to see if I might say whether or not Smith were successful within the CIA. Evidently Admiral Souers has heard that General Smith occasionally rides hard on the IAC and yet is able to accomplish his purpose. This may be because the IAC representatives know that General Smith has access to the President of the United States regularly. This point Admiral Souers stressed again today as he has before in talking with me.



The Intelligence Advisory Committee as a Governing Board

USCIB

NSCID 5

Vandenberg High-handed and Angry

IAMAN

General Smith in Contrast

In the meantime there had been several references to Admiral Hillenkoetter. I asked why he had abandoned the position as "executive agent." Souers answer was to the effect that the Army and Navy had become extremely provoked with Vandenberg. Hillenkoetter accordingly felt that as a younger officer he would accomplish little unless he started afresh. After all he was outranked by Inglis and Chamberlin. Besides that, however, Souers seemed to feel that Hillenkoetter was just too easygoing. He said that he was "mentally lazy." I asked why it came about that the investigation was begun. Souers said that he started it. I asked why again and he replied that everything Hillenkoetter was sending over seemed so "loose."

This referred to the proposals for "NSCIDs" one through three at least. I remarked that they seemed to me descendants directly from the CIG's in Vandenberg's struggle with the Board over collection, NIA Requirements - China, and others. Souers referred particularly to NSCID 3, I think, which had to do with definitions. He said that the intelligence officers wasted more time over those matters such as whether one Department or the other would have primary right of collection. What difference did it make, said he, if they were going to exchange information with each other when they got it?

I asked him if the National Security Council changed its attitude toward CIA during Hillenkoetter's regime. He replied that he became worried over what was going on. He talked it

Hillenkoetter's Situation

The "NSCIDs"

The Investigation of

Hillenkoetter

......

. Hereiter

"Primary Interest"

over with Secretary Forrestal and told him that he should do something about it as Secretary of Defense. This was in connection with the question of whether or not Admiral Souers as Executive Secretary might be, for practical purposes, Director of the National Security Council. Souers in short declined the opportunity and urged-Forrestal to take over as Secretary of Defense. The result was the Dulles Committee or Intelligence Survey Group.

Forrestal's Part


> Blum's Work

McNarney's

Assignment

Admiral Souers did not refer again to the political phase of this investigation, but talked about Robert Blum. It seems that he was drafted from Forrestal's staff, as it were, to do the "staff work" for Dulles, Jackson, and Correa. At one point, Souers spoke of Correa as the central figure. Apparently this was because Correa was so close to Forrestal. But then he stressed the work of Blum as the one who actually "wrote" the Dulles Report. I was not to understand, however, that Dulles, Jackson, and Correa did not work.

McNarney's part in this investigation, said Souers, was simply to head a committee which digested the Dulles Report for NSC and made recommendations. Souers sat in it on occasion. The amusing point about it was that McNarney used Blum as his guide. The result was, to Blum's amusement, that he made recommendations with regard to his own findings. Of course, this is not to be taken to mean that Blum was anything more than a brilliant staff man for the men who made up the Dulles and McNarney Committees. (ABD - Recall Souers' previous statement that Blum thought "Hillenkoetter should be fired.")




Þ

I asked Admiral Souers if the President, after the National Security Council Act, still thought of the DCI as his own personal intelligence officer. I recalled for Souers the luncheon which the President gave to Admiral Leahy and him. Souers remembered and agreed that President Truman always thought of Admiral Leahy and himself as his personal "snoopers." -In fact, the President seemed still to be more interested in the intelligence service (CIA) than in the interdepartmental council of policy-makers (NSC).

I gathered from Admiral Souers' replies that President Truman did not have so much personal interest in Admiral Hillenkoetter. But I am not too sure of that impression. Souers was more interested at the moment in talking about the two institutions than in responding to my inquiry with regard to personalities. But it is likely that Admiral Hillenkoetter, although selected as early as February, rather rapidly fell short of expectations. He suffered from being a junior officer and a newcomer to Washington. It doubtless was hard also to follow Vandenberg and inherit the animosities which his forthright determination to have power intensified among the intelligence officers of both Army and Navy.

I asked if President Truman might not be interested in expressing his ideas for this historical study in view of the Truman's Interest fact that he considered the Group his personal information serv-Personal Service ice. Admiral Souers' response was somewhat evasive. He



Hillenkoetter's Inheritance

in his

<u>Manin</u>

Presidential Snoopers

Leahy und

Souers

remarked in reply that the President and Admiral Leahy always thought that they had instituted central intelligence. As for Leahy, according to Souers, he never cared much for the idea; Leahy went along loyally with the President as his Chief of Staff. (ABD - See interview with Leahy, July 3, 1952.) The impression Souers chose to give me was that other people, himself included, really established CIG against the opposition in State, War and Navy. I suggested that origins lay back at least in OSS. Souers readily agreed. I do not know whether he will endeavor to prevail upon the President or not. He smiled but did not commit himself except to say that President Truman seemed to be more interested in CIA than in NSC. He suggested that I look in "Mister President."

Origins

General Wright

2100

H

Cause of Difficulties I asked about General Wright. Souers said that he was stronger than Hillenkoetter and caused a great deal of difficulty by interfering with "intelligence," often for financial, budgetary and similar reasons. To me, Souers was arguing here rather than stating fact. Souers said that he urged Hillenkoetter to keep his own hand upon intelligence and let his deputy attend to administrative matters. But, according to Souers, Hillenkoetter seems to have been inert rather than indifferent, lazy rather than ignorant. Besides, he may well have been trying to restore harmony with the Armed Services, as Souers indicated with respect to Hillenkoetter's abandonment of Vandenberg's position as "executive agent" of the Secretaries.



I asked if Souers thought I might see General Wright. Souers said that of course I should if I wished to do so. (See further remarks on November 6, 1952.)

Peter Vischer came into the talk early. It appears that he inserted himself into the service of a Congressional Committee and made a report. It shows in the Secret Hearings of 1947.-With regard to them I simply remarked to Admiral Souers that fortunately I had access to them and I said nothing more about them. I gathered that Souers no longer has much regard for Vischer, if he ever did have. We agreed that although in the State Department he probably was "operating" for G-2.

As a Navy man Souers took pleasure in reiterating that OMI and G-2 were often at odds. On one occasion, with regard to an issue which Souers did not elaborate, Secretary Forrestal stalled upon making a decision against the Navy. Souers remarked that he told Forrestal that he should go ahead and make the decision. The Navy, Souers said, did not much care. They were just resisting apparently for the sake of resistance. This episode seems trivial but to me it throws light upon Forrestal's difficulty and his own conscientiousness as Secretary of Defense.


Selection of Smith by Truman

Peter Vischer

Forrestal's Conscientiousness

-Hereiten)

I asked why General Smith was selected. Admiral Souers replied that he was the President's own choice. They were talking of successors and Truman said General Smith was the man for the position. Smith did not want it. I raised the question if



it were not State's turn. Souers said yes, but State was not popular on Capitol Hill. State could get money for CIA from Congress when it could not get funds for itself. Then, said I, it was practical politics? Souers said: "Why, certainly. But they wanted a strong man after a weak one." General Smith was the President's choice. I asked about Rusk and Bruce. Souers replied that Rusk would not have done but Bruce was a good one. I gathered that Bruce did not wish to take the job. This does not mean, however, that it was offered to him. Souers did not say. He merely expressed approval of Bruce and disapproval of Rusk.

"Coordination" at the level of the Secretaries, according to Souers, is almost impossible. They do not "know." They are advised by their technical subordinates. The working level is the place for reaching common ground among those who do "know."

I went from his office to Mr. Gleason's, following up Souers' telephone conversation. Mr. Gleason is to let me know in a few days. Mr. Farley called on the next day, September 9. I began work on the CIA papers, Wednesday, September 10.

November 4, 1952

Questions on Chapter VI - Hillenkoetter's Administration Intelligence

The conversation opened with reference to the present turmoil over covert operations, particularly in Germany. Souers said that he never had favored so close a relationship. He knew



"Coordination" by the Secretaries

Souers on

ិញ

Access to Papers

•

of course that secret intelligence and counterespionage are intimately related with psychological - political - economic warfare, and with physical subversion. But he did not want to see paramilitary action tangle with clandestine intelligence. He said that General Smith was worried too. The intimation was that Smith got into this situation against his own better judgment. Souers said that intelligence is to him essentially a "staff" job. As soon as "operations" get involved, he said, the men engaged in them forget that their primary purpose is to collect information. "Operations" should be only incidental to collection.

After some fifteen minutes of this discussion, which was interrupted by a long telephone call from "Bedell" about current matters, having to do with the events of this day, Election Day, we got down to the business of my questions concerning Hillenkoetter and the establishment of CIA in the first days of the National Security Council. We began with Hillenkoetter's recommendations of September 11. Souers was much interested in recalling many things which he had forgotten, particularly the llth directive of "NIA." He read page after page of the manuscript with running commentary. He said that the IAB of course had no right to discuss affairs with the DCI in advance if he chose not to refer such matters to the Board. He liked the idea of the subcommittee of Secretaries - although any member of the Council, he said, by reason of the statute, had the right as



Smith and the Election of 1952

Covert Operations

Smith's

Anxiety

The Advisory Board and the Director 3Ŀ

Royall insisted to take part is directing the Central Intelligence. Agency. Souers called to my attention that the Council has directive powers with respect to the Agency whereas elsewhere it is advisory to the President. I asked if I might call it a new Cabinet. He said that is exactly what it is. This led to a digression on the Council.

The Council actually sits in the Cabinet's Room in the White House and not in the conference room in Old State. That is the scene of the Staff's meetings. The Council is a Cabinet and so treated by the President. Souers remarked that some oldtimers in the White House did not like to see the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room. It is nevertheless the President's Cabinet with respect to matters of national security. On occasion other Cabinet members than those designated by the Act are summoned by the President if their presence is pertinent. Souers spoke of even the Secretary of Agriculture as appearing on some occasions, and the Secretary of Labor on others. He did think that the Postmaster General had very little reason for attendance.


The Minutes of the Council


The Council as a

Cabinet

National Security

There are minutes, as I presumed, but they are not open to view except as the President allows. They were written as memoranda to the President. He of course has right to have a record of his advisers' opinions. This is stated in the Constitution. What the Council does therefore is submit such memoranda to the President and record its actions. The actions





Opinions of the President's Secretaries


t The Tradition of the

Secretary of State

are in print and available to those who need to use them. The give and take of discussion, opinions of the participants, and such intimate data are the property of the President.

Souers repeated what he said the other day. Truman never did like the provision in the National Security Act of 1947 that the Secretary of Defense should be the principal assistant – of the President in matters pertaining to national security. It probably was not personal or he would not have appointed Forrestal. Very likely it was in deference to the tradition that the Secretary of State is the ranking officer next to the President in any Cabinet meeting.

This discussion of the Council led me to ask Souers for his understanding of the concept "hational security." He said that the distinction was quite clear in his mind and everyone else"s who sat in the Council; That foreign affairs were separated from national security in many respects. It was not the province of the Council to discuss, for an absurd example, the presence of the hoof and mouth disease in Mexico in terms of "national security." It is of course obviously national interest to keep any scourge out of the country if possible. National security means defense against an aggressor. And of course in the atmosphere of the cold war this means Soviet power, the Soviet Union and its satellites. Security is defense against invasion. (Souers did not discuss the next thought which comes to mind - Korea.) I remarked that this



The Concept of National Security

appen

Aggressor

Invasion

meant the defensive posture of which Washington spoke in his Farewell Address in 1796. Souers agreed.

Souers was very interested and somewhat amused, but more disgusted than amused, with the actions of the intelligence chiefs in the November 20 meeting. He agreed that I was right in saying that he and Lay "cleaned up" Hillenkoetter's original proposal. They did it to help, Souers said, not to direct him. Hillenkoetter however seemed quite willing to accept direction from the Executive Secretary. This recalled to me what Souers had said previously in regard to Secretary Forrestal's position as one of discomfiture. According to Souers, at one time it seemed as though the Executive Secretary might be a sort of Director for the National Security Council. He did not repeat that point today but he did say that many expected him to "run CIA" from his position as Executive Secretary of the National Security Council which did have the power of direction.

Souers was at pains therefore to have Hillenkoetter understand that he was DCI and that he should run the Agency. And so Souers was somewhat provoked when Hillenkoetter went back to the intelligence chiefs and said that the Executive Secretary had decided to do certain things. This morning Souers said Hillenkoetter was stupid in doing that. However, Souers did take responsibility, as I have written, for eliminating the favorite provision of Inglis that the recommendation of two or more members of the IAC should go directly to the

Editorial Assistance to Hillenkoetter

研究的出

The "IAB"

on November 20, 1947


> Hillenkoetter as "DCI"

> > Souers Provoked

National Security Council. Sours read the paragraph carefully and said that it is correct.

Reference to Ohly in regard to Royall's rejection of the Hillenkoetter plan led Souers to speak of the subsequent investigation of the Agency, commonly known as the Dulles Report. I remarked that I thought the investigation had really begun before Christmas 1947 with Blum's request of Ohly on the basis of Lay's memorandum. I said that it seemed to me as though Hillenkoetter had inherited a whirlwind from Vandenberg. Souers agreed in part although he had previously told me that he was led to start the "survey" because Hillenkoetter seemed so uncertain. Anyway, investigation was in the making before Hillenkoetter had really established himself on the new directives of the new Council.

I remarked that he was at great disadvantage in being only a Rear Admiral. Yes, said Souers, he should have dropped his title of Rear Admiral and stopped signing his letters that way. The point is that he should have taken the high level which the office of DCI gave him regardless of his rank in the Navy. I asked Souers if Hillenkoetter really were not on the same level of responsibility as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Souers said yes. We then looked at my statement regarding the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If Leahy had not retired, he was in the chair as the senior officer. There was no chairman in the present sense. The Act of 1947 provided for



Beginnings of the Investigation

The Rank

mannin

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff

of the "DCI"

the Joint Chiefs of Staff but not the position which Bradley held after the amendment of 1949. In this connection I asked if the Secretary of Defense were really a coordinating officer as provided in the National Security Act of 1947. Sources said yes.

Sours himself was present in the meeting which Forrestal had with the chiefs of intelligence and Hillenkoetter sometime between Friday, December 5 and Monday, December 8. He said that my comment on it was accurate in essence. He did not offer to quote Forrestal. I have noticed before this that Sours is not given to quoting other people. He is a diplomat. as Leahy said on July 3rd.

I asked him to read the Armstrong episode. This recalled his efforts to get the right of inspection used more effectively. He said that he wished the "Dulles Committee" to have that right and to use it in the intelligence units of the Departments. He got the Secretaries to agree. They were both members of the Council which was instigating the investigation of CIA and they were heads of the respective Departments concerned. But, said Souers, the Dulles Committee did not use the right of inspection in the Departments. He ascribed the focus of attention primarily on CIA to Robert Blum's determination to get Hillenkoetter fired. Sours repeated that the Dulles investigation was political. It was in the election year of 1948. Dulles was a Republican. This led me to ask him if my



Forrestal's

Meeting with

Chamberlin and

> Inglis in

December, 1947

Blum's Determination

statement was sound. The statement is with regard to centralized inspection of activities. Souers read the phrase "still too much for the Departments to grasp" and said that it was all right. He thinks that they still do not understand, about as much as they do not wish to understand.

Souers asked me what happened to the Hillenkoetter plan for an IAC. I had just called his attention to Section 303 in the Act of 1947. Apparently he had forgotten it. I said that as I saw it the intelligence chiefs had resisted so strongly that they had been able to force the independent plan of Hillenkoetter into the ad hoc committee along with the NSCIDs. Anyway, provision for an IAC appeared in the text of NSCID 1 and remained there through the action by the Council on December 12. To my way of thinking Hillenkoetter had been deprived of his plan for an advisory committee subject to his full control. I said that I thought the Council had left it indefinite and uncertain. I continued to say that the ad hoc committee followed by the Standing Committee persisted in assuming that they could dictate. At the working level, therefore, there was a good deal of sabotage. Sours listened without further comment. I don't know whether he was informed and did not choose to say or whether he was content with my remark that the Council for practical purposes left the matter undecided. We went off on a tangent from that to discuss General Smith's present situation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

Hillenkoetter's Plan for an Advisory Committee

"ISCID 1"

··· ······

ing Bill

Departmental

Understanding

The Action of the Council

Smith towers over the members of the IAC with regard to matters of policy, administration, and other concerns of CIA. Souers said that, for example, Smith had just "beaten them with regard to 'communications' intelligence." He is permanent chairman of USCIB now. The armed services have to defer, apparently. I remarked that I would need to get more information about "NSCID 9" but Souers did not rise to the suggestion this morning. He knows of course a good deal more about USCIB than he has yet been willing to say. But as for estimating, Smith is still in the same position as Hillenkoetter. The DCI does not control all of the resources of intelligence. He is not able to force the intelligence chiefs of the armed services to disgorge with regard to "capabilities and intentions." Souers said that it was ridiculous to think that an esti-

mating staff could meet a request for an estimate without receiving from the requestors necessary information which they themselves controlled. I told him General Smith had admitted recently to the IAC that he was dependent upon them in the matter of estimating. Souers was interested, possibly surprised, though I doubt it. He then told me the story of a mere Brigadier General with one star (Souers demonstrating) endeavoring to tell General Smith something. Smith turned upon the one star, I suppose with all four, and said "I don't have to pay any attention to you."

Smith and the "IAC"

山

November 6, 1952

Telephone Conversation Regarding NSC 50

I asked how it was that McNarney got on the committee appointed to report upon the Dulles Report. Souers replied that he was Johnson's representative. Humelsine represented Acheson. Armstrong also attended, and so did Souers and Lay on occasion. Robert Blum was the executive secretary. McNarney dominated the committee so much that State Department tended to give in to him. This bothered Souers because State, he said, was "giving up too much." State did this because it was so anxious to check Hillenkoetter. Souers found himself at a disadvantage in supporting State against McNarney because he was accused of defending his own "man." Hillenkoetter, however, was not Souers' selection as he told me before my interview with Leahy. Souers was rather distressed, he said, by Hillenkoetter's willingness to "give in to anybody for a little peace."

I asked why the Dulles Committee recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Atomic Energy Commission lose representation in the IAC. Souers did not know why. He said that there could have been technical reasons doubtless in the Dulles Report, but there may have been some political reason of which he was not aware. Anyway, the suggestion was not accepted by McNarney. Souers did not favor the Dulles suggestion, for the very good reason that he had endeavored to get



McNarney and Humelsine

Souers and Hillenkoetter

JCS and

AEC

<u>inthini</u>

the AEC closely related with CIA. He had made a special study and report to the storic Energy Corrispion for Strauss. Regarding the Joint Chilfs of Staff, I recalled the effort in Vandenberg's administration and the more recent plan for Hillenkoetter to sit in the Joint Intelligence Committee. Souers did not remember, he said, very much about that affair.


I spoke of the expectations expressed in the McNarney Report on pages 4 - 6 with regard to the membership of the FBI in the IAC. This led Souers to say that Attorney General Clark called him on the telephone to express exceedingly strong resentment of the remarks in the Dulles Report. This amused Souers because Correa was responsible, he said, for that part of the report; Correa was known as a friend of the FBI. But the Justice Department seems not to have appreciated the specific suggestions. Souers repeated that he had talked the matter over with J. Edgar Hoover and had urged him to accept the position in the IAC only as observer. He would be useful in this post even with respect to emergency estimates. The FBI's interests are often involved. Hoover agreed and eventually accepted the position. Souers said that Hoover was not so concerned to be on the Committee; he did not want to be thrown off. This was interesting in connection with the establishment of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and its companion "ICIS" at this time under the sponsoring of the Department of Justice, to control "internal security" and more, if possible.

The FBI and the IAC

and Hoover

Clark

IIC and ICIS



...3

How we got on to General Wright's influence over Hillenkoetter I do not recall. But Souers said in no uncertain terms that Wright had stayed too long. He had the typical military attitude. Hillenkoetter was too willing to let Wright run the Agency. Souers urged Hillenkoetter again and again to take charge and not let Wright and the "finance boys" restrict him. As he said this I thought of the section in the McNarney Report specifically referring to military personnel in key positions (page 13). I asked Souers if it were advisable to seek an interview with General Wright who is in Washington. Souers laughed and said, "Why, yes. Although I should hate to have his concept influence your study."

See Interviews with Wright April 10, May 28, 1953

相關調


Wright's Influence


> in CIA

Internal Organization under the Control of the Director

Leadership

I then called Souers' attention to McNarney's Report, page 10, third paragraph, where it is recommended that the NSC direct the DCI to carry out recommendations concerning the internal organization of the Agency. I asked Souers if that were not outside the jurisdiction of NSC, on the ground that the DCI by inference at least, if not specific statement in the National Security Act, as head of an organization had control of its internal mechanisms such as ICAPS, for example. Souers said, "why, certainly," the NSC was to direct him only with regard to matters of policy and things of broader concern. I recalled Vandenberg's statement that he had established ICAPS as his own working staff for liaison with the IAB. The Dulles Report, however, and the McNarney Report also





endorsed the idea which would reorganize ICAPS, OCD, and OFE as directed from without. This is to be considered with the criticism of Hillenkoetter for poor leadership.

Souers spoke of the section in the McNarney Report on covert operations as having been tangled with the recommendations of the JCS. He said that he did not know how the controversy had come out and the matter settled. I replied that I thought General Smith had taken a hand and cleared the situation within the last year.

At the end of the telephone conversation I asked if any papers concerning these matters in NSC files could be made available to me. Sours thought so.

> December 9, 1952 Conference

We had before us the draft of part of the chapter on covert operations during Hillenkoetter's administration. As he read the first page or so Souers remarked that General Smith would agree with the point of view. This meant to me that.


would agree with the point of view. This meant to me that, like Hillenkoetter, Magruder, evidently Marshall, and many others, Smith did not enjoy having sinister operations involved with the collection of clandestine intelligence. Souers himself did not say whether he did or did not approve of using guerrilla tactics. He is essentially a practical man. His view probably is that if the work has to be done it should be handled by the men best qualified and under the most

Covert Operations and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

> Subversive Practices and Secret Collection

(**j**....)


Psychological Warfare



suitable cover. Souers did say that they had to look around for a place to put it, meaning psychological warfare. The National Security Council itself was not properly equipped. The Secretaries would be badly compromised if there should be any publicity.

Besides that, às appeared later in our conversation, Secretary Marshall was positively against any operations of that sort in the State Department. As I thought this over, it seemed to me quite logical for Marshall to take the position as he was endeavoring with his "Plan" to rehabilitate Furope by economic cooperation. This was before the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Mutual Security Administration. Even so, if I understood Souers correctly, Secretary Marshall's character was opposed to sinister practices. I thought later also of Admiral Leahy's statement that he did not believe in guarrilla warfare. It was not war, it was "murder."

Anyway, Marshall was opposed to Souers' plan for a panel of "guidance." By this Souers meant that the Secretaries or their under-secretaries should advise the DCI and even request that he engage in some underhanded activity; but they would leave the conduct of it entirely to him. This of course would give them the opportunity later, if things went badly, to disown the DCI and disclaim any knowledge of the operation. Souers remarked that he himself, as Executive Secretary of the



Guerrilla Tactics

Marshall and

> Leahy on Murder

Souers' Panel of Guidance

-c.on

National Security Council I presume, did not wish to know how the covert operations were conducted because, he said, he did not want the President to know about them. That is to say, if Souers knew he would have to tell the President.

When we came to Houston's legal argument, Souers made the point that Congress, for all practical purposes, validated the action by allotting unvouchered funds for the action. Ho said, however, that they were probably very close to the edge of their legal right. He thought that Houston's argument about the restriction upon the Agency was weak. All functions of the Agency, said Souers, were subject to direction by the Council. This was no change, as a matter of fact, from the President's Directive. He said that Houston evidently was "mumbling in his beard," one of Souers' favorite expressions. He had never seen Houston's opinion of September 25, 1947. He presumed that it never got beyond the DCI. It looked to him as though Houston were making an argument to support Hillenkoetter's reluctance to undertake covert psychological operations.

With regard to the report of "SSE" in September, 1947, Souers did not think that it had in mind some particular person for the job. He said that Army was afraid of State, and probably the military men thought that a single director in time of war would be made answerable at once to the Joint Chiefs. State was more likely to have control of a

Houston's Argument on Necessity to Consult Congress

Ignorance

for the President's

Benefit

· · · · •

State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee

Study of Psychological Warfare

The Psychological Strategy Board

Souers' Disappointment in Allen and Gray

nnuun

committee. Souers said that the same issue came later when they set up the Psychological Strategy Board. He had a great deal to do with establishing PSB. His idea was that its Director, thought answerable to the Board under the chairmanship of the DCI, would in time become the real force.

Souers expected PSB to develop into an effective instrument under a single head. He was very dissappointed that it had not done so. He ascribed the failure primarily to the blundering of first Gray and then Allen. Souers said that Gray was not supposed, when he took the job, to treat it as a part-time job. Allen too was expected to stay. Souers was surprised to discover that Allen was planning to leave PSB even before he became head of it. Then, Allen wished to stay after Souers had gone ahead with the selection of Admiral Kirk as his successor. It appeared that Mr. Allen's plan to take over the University of California at Los Angeles was not working out as he had originally thought. In PSB Souers saw the same concept of a panel to give "guidance," such as he hoped to establish with respect to the covert psychological operations conducted by the Director of Central Intelligence. At this point he said that NGC 10 came out of that situation. We returned to this subject later.



3Ц

With respect to the Panel, which Souers proposed on December 16 and which did not appear in the directive to the DCI from the Council on December 17, Souers said that Secretary Royall and Secretary Marshall stopped it. In spite of the wishes of the Army Planners, Secretary Royall said that he did not want to have anything to do with such an organization. Souers' conclusion was that Royall just did not wish to be "responsible." Presumably, if the work had to be done, the DCI could attend to it, after he had been directed by the Council. Royall saw no reason for a panel between the Council and the DCI.

Sourrs' theory was that the panel of under-secretaries could supply the "guidance" to the Director and later, if there was an unpleasant exposure, the Secretaries, relatively uninformed, could repudiate and disown. It was at this point, as I recall it, that Souers spoke of Lovett's work under Marshall. Webb, Director of the Budget, came to Souers about a request to transfer vouchered to unvouchered funds. The request was not from Hillenkoetter. He said he had enough money. It proved to be from Lovett. This would have been difficult to explain to Congress.

Secretary Marshall did not wish to have such a panel because he was opposed to the program. He did not want covert operations to compromise the foreign policy which he was advancing at the time - the Marshall Plan. Souers



Lovett for Marshall

umente

Marshall and


Royall against the

Panel of Guidance

stressed that at the "working level," the Armed Services and even the State Department wished such a panel, not necessarily to control the Director but to give him "guidance." I remarked that in the Agency, according to the papers which I had been reading, the opinion seemed to be that the panel would be too much like the "IAC" which Inglis and Chamberlin ... were trying to make the governing board of the Agency.

From his memory of Forrestal, Souers said that Forrestal was careful to avoid giving the impression that he was trying to run the Agency or the departmental intelligence agencies in the National Military Establishment. Souers stated that the understanding in the Council was that if its members could not arrive at an agreement, they would refer the decision to the Secretary of Defense. He was by law a sort of umpire. Souers' memory of the famous meeting in which Forrestal told Inglis and Chamberlin that Hillenkoetter was running the Central Intelligence Agency confirmed and enlarged the view of it which I have received from Admiral Hillenkoetter. Souers made it clear that Forrestal was in no way aiming his remarks at the representative of the State Department. He was talking straight to the two intelligence officers representing the Army and the Navy.

Souers said that my statements with regard to the Armed Services and the State Department as interfering with Hillenkoetter's organization and plans were correct.



Forrestal's

Position as

Umpire

10

Feeling

in the Agency

High Hall

Forrestal to Chamberlin and Inglis

As for the investmation of Hillenkoetter's covert operations by the Consultants and Allen, Souers had a different view. He thought of the investigation as the opening toward NSC 10, with the idea that Hillenkoetter would be more effectively supported. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense themselves would serve as a sort of "panel of guidance." Souers expected Hillenkoetter to assert himself more effectively. Souers claimed that Hillenkoetter was expected to direct the new Assistant Director of Special Projects. The DCI as well as the Secretary of Defense was to have the right to approve the nomination by the Secretary of State. Thus the DCI would be in position, with his Secretarial advisers, to control the covert operations.

The practical matter proved to be, and Souers readily admitted it, that the Assistant Director in charge of "Policy Coordination" came over from State as the representative of Kennan and proceeded at once to behave in that manner. The way in which the office was set up made it



"NSC 10" to "NSC 10/2"

'HHHH

51

autonomous for practical purposes. The Director of Central Intelligence soon found himself obliged either to accept advice which came to him through the "ADPC" from State or to insist upon having another head of the office.

In this struggle for power, as Hillenkoetter saw it, he could not defy both State and Defense. However much they might oppose each other they stuck together against the DCI, for neither State nor the Armed Services wished the Agency to have a free hand in conducting covert operations. I presented this view to Souers but he insisted upon looking at the situation as one in which Hillenkoetter had the right and therefore should have exercised it. He should have required that all advices should come first to the Director and then go from him to his Assistant Director in charge of "Special Projects." Souers remarked that a very recent directive has placed Smith in this exact position between the PSB and Wisner's covert operations. Sours did not wish to be too critical, he said, but he thought that Admiral Hillenkoetter should have fought in defense of his position.

The other phase of the investigation by Allen and the Consultants was what Souers called a "coat of whitewash." The Agency was commended for having accomplished so much in four months. But I demurred to the report. In the first place, it seemed to me that Allen was presumptuous, in fact


Allen's "Coat of Whitewash"

"UqO"

under "Guidance"

Hillenkoetter's View

Souers' Insistence




insulting, to "admonish" Hillenkoetter and the Agency. Souers' reply was that in all probability Allen was igno-

I remarked, however, that it was hard to take in view of the fact that Allen's own organization was no better off than Hillenkoetter's. Souers acreed, but the point did not stir him. His mind was on the plan for the new Office of Special Projects and his own project for a "panel of guidance."

This brought us right to the policy paper of the Council known as NSC 10 and related documents. I asked if I might not be allowed to see these papers in the Council's files as they are hard to find in the Agency. Soucrs called Lay's office and talked with Gleason. The plan is to make an appointment with Mr: Lay himself.

General Smith has asked Admiral Souers to stay on as a Senior Consultant of the Agency. He therefore will be accessible even though he will of course go out of office with President Truman. The inference from the remark was that General Smith was likely to continue, for a while anyway, as Director of Central Intelligence under President Eisenhower.



Smith to Souers

Hard to Take

Access to Papers

111111

rant;