


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USSR SURVEY
17 SEPTEMBER 1953

- 3 -

Korea



NR

KOREA: North Korean Recovery Dominates Attention

Moscow's concern with the immediate post-war problems in North Korea is reflected in overwhelming attention to the visit of the North Korean delegation to Moscow and to the related topic of Korean reconstruction--accounting for 90 percent of total volume on Korea during the second week under review. The speeches of Kim Il Sung and Nam Il are widely broadcast as is the PRAVDA editorial of 11 September devoted to the importance of Soviet-Korean relations. Kim underscores the Korean expectation of additional Soviet assistance which will lead to the rapid restoration and development of the devastated Korean economy and gives separate praise to the Soviet Union for the one billion rubles already allocated. (There are no indications of the form of the one-billion ruble allocation--whether a loan or an outright gift.)

Despite widespread attention in the Home Service to the Kim visit and to the apparent Soviet willingness to assist Korea, Soviet broadcasts show a disinclination to reveal domestically the extent of present Soviet and Satellite participation in Korean rehabilitation. Reports of this assistance are however widely broadcast internationally as evidence of Soviet generosity, perhaps to counter U.S. offers of assistance to South Korea.

Soviet caution regarding the U.S. assistance to South Korea is demonstrated by failure to contrast Soviet and U.S. efforts directly. Separately-broadcast allegations of U.S. exploitation of South Korean resources and people are beamed only to Korean and Chinese audiences. Failure to disseminate these charges widely may stem from recognition of the role of the United Nations in Korean rehabilitation work.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USSR SURVEY
17 SEPTEMBER 1953

- 4 -

U.S. Accused of Obstructing the Political Conference: The limited attention accorded Chou En-lai's 13 September message to the United Nations--it has been broadcast only five times--suggests a Soviet desire to avoid jeopardizing its claim to neutral status at the political conference. Low-level attention was similarly accorded Chou's 24 August statement concerning the U.N. debate on the political conference. Independently, Moscow has virtually ignored the 15-nation resolution adopted by the United Nations, but has provided a running criticism of U.S. attempts to manipulate and obstruct the political talks. The principle vehicle for this type of comment is provided by Korianov's denunciation of Secretary Dulles' 2 September American Legion speech. Korianov underscores America's "hypocritical" peace talks and charges that the American plan to force the acceptance of Rhee's rule throughout Korea is an impossible conception of Korean unification. The commentator avoids specific definition of the Communist plan for unification, but he does maintain that "real peace" in the Far East is dependent upon settlement of the problems of U.N. membership for China, the question of Taiwan and the economic blockade of China. As usual, the comment does not link these problems to the political conference.

A limited appeal to Indian opinion is apparent in the broadcast of Korianov's comments to India, as well as in the broadcast of an unidentified item stressing the danger that the U.S. proposals will encourage Rhee to make "renewed attempts to unite Korea by military means." Low-level accounts of the moral defeat of the United States in the U.N. vote on Indian participation in the political conference receive particular stress to India and Southeast Asia.

Moscow has avoided any advance comment on the Eighth General Assembly session.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~