

~~TOP SECRET~~

ED

15 May 1955

Copy No. 94

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE  
HISTORICAL  
COLLECTIONS  
DIVISION  
HR-70-14  
4-18-2012

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**

DOCUMENT NO. 34  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ( )  
( ) DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 9/1/80 REVIEWER:

Office of Current Intelligence

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

This document contains information within the meaning of Public LAW 513-81st Congress. It is to be seen only by US PERSONNEL especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive Special Intelligence information. The security of this document must be maintained in accordance with SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY REGULATIONS. No action may be taken by any person on the Special Intelligence presented herein, regardless of any advantage which may be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

~~TOP SECRET~~


**SUMMARY**

**FAR EAST**

1. Foreign policy differences loom as obstacle to Japanese conservative merger (page 3).


**SOUTHEAST ASIA**

2. Viet Minh reported willing to be patient on unification (page 3).




**WESTERN EUROPE**


4. French Communists may gain some Socialist support for united action (page 5).



7. Comment on combined Soviet bloc military command (page 7).

\* \* \* \*





\* \* \* \*

7. Comment on combined Soviet bloc military command:

CIA/FBIS  
14 May 55

The Warsaw agreement of 14 May provides for creation of the much-publicized combined military command for the USSR and its East European Satellites.

The location of the headquarters at Moscow and the appointment of Konev as commander will provide firm Soviet control over its day-to-day operations. Creation of a permanent staff, composed of representatives of the general staffs of the participating countries, will be an administrative improvement over the present Soviet system of bilateral control over Satellite military activities. The text obscures, however, an apparently unwieldy command relationship among Konev and the Satellite defense ministers, each of whom will act as or appoint a deputy to Konev.

The agreement implies that not all Soviet bloc military units will be allocated to "the complement of the joint armed forces." A provision for the disposition of forces in

15 May 55

~~CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN~~

Page 7

~~TOP SECRET~~

the territory of participating countries "in accordance with the demands of mutual defense" is probably the expected legal justification for indefinite retention of Soviet forces in East Europe.

East Germany's release from providing armed forces to the joint command until an unspecified future date is probably motivated by a desire not only to avoid furnishing immediate justification for West German rearmament but also to be in a position to continue strenuous objections to it. Also the formal creation of an East German army would have dashed German hopes for unification, and probably would have created an unnecessary obstacle to possible direct negotiations between East and West Germany.

The failure to announce officially the creation of an East German army is probably intended as another hint that Moscow is interested in entering into negotiations for a settlement of the German problem.

The dovetailing of recent Soviet tactics on Austria, Germany, and Yugoslavia reflects a major effort to encourage Western speculation that the present Soviet leaders want a neutral belt which would include Germany.

15 May 55

~~CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN~~

Page 8

~~TOP SECRET~~

