

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

## Intelligence Information Brief

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CHRONOLOGY OF STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE BERLIN CRISIS FOR THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 1, 1959 TO JANUARY 31, 1960

Prepared by
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
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This document resumes the series of chronologies covering the Berlin crisis. Previous publications in this series were:

IIB-42	October 24, 1958 - November 30, 1958
IIB-58	December 1, 1958 - December 18, 1958
IIB-100	December 19, 1958 - February 16, 1959
IIB-100S	(supplement to IIB-100)
IIB-114.1	February 12, 1959 - March 25, 1959
IIB-114.2	March 25, 1959 - April 21, 1959
IIB-114.3	April 22, 1959 - May 11, 1959
IIB-114.4	May 11, 1959 - May 26, 1959
IIB-114.5	May 27, 1959 - June 24, 1959
IIB-114.6	June 25, 1959 - August 8, 1959
IIB-114.7	August 9, 1959 - November 5, 1959

This document contains summaries, excerpts and texts of the more important statements by leaders in the West and in the Soviet Union and East Germany, related to the Berlin situation, for the period November 1, 1959 to January 31, 1960.

The period was marked by considerable travel on the part of heads of government, including trips to Asia by President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, a Western summit meeting at Paris, and visits by Chancellor Adenauer to London, Paris and Rome.

The West German Government, and as appropriate the Berlin leaders, stressed the view that the West must hold strictly to the status quo in West Berlin at the summit meeting scheduled for May 1960. There was a common feeling among Germans in general, extending to the press, that the UK was enamored of detente sufficiently to consider concessions to the Soviets on the Berlin issue, that the US might be inclined to go part way with the UK, and that while France stood firm for the status quo, French policy towards NATO weakened the chances for the West to neogtiate from a position of strength.

While the West German-Berlin efforts were in favor of a hard line, the Soviet-East German efforts were highlighted by a campaign to demonstrate that West Germans (especially Adenauer) were a growing source of danger to world peace. The outbreak of a series of swastika incidents in the FRG and Berlin (which quickly spread about the world) was exploited by the East in the campaign to defame the FRG and its leaders.

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#### PART ONE

STATEMENT AND DOCUMENTS FROM SOVIET BLOC SOURCES

Nov. 11

Soviet Note to US of November 11 Protesting Establishment of FEDREP Radio Station "Deutschland-Funk" and Other Alleged (Confidential) Illegal Activities: On 30 September the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany approved and sent to the Bundestag for its consideration draft legislation on radio broadcasting which provided for the establishment in West Berlin of the West-German radio station "Deutschland-Funk". According to the draft legislation the radio station would be run by representatives of the Federal Republic and of the Laender.

This decision of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is illegal because it is incompatible with the existing statute of West Berlin. As is generally known-and was con-firmed by the participants of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers—West Berlin has never been a part, and is not now a part, of the state territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, may not be governed by organs of the Federal Government, nor does the jurisdiction of Federal Republic of German authorities extend to it.

It must be noted that this is not the first time the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has attempted illegal interference in the internal affairs of West Berlin. The Soviet Government has already called the attention of the Government of the USA to this fact particularly in connection with the of the USA to this fact, particularly in connection with the holding of elections in West Berlin for president of the Federal Republic of Germany. Recently the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany again selected West Berlin as a place for holding elections, for purposes of show-this time for president of the West German Bundesrat.

The creation of the radio station in West Berlin now being undertaken by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be looked upon as other than an attempt to intensify subversive activity and hostile propaganda from the territory of West Berlin, which testifies to its lack of desire to take into consideration the readiness expressed by participants of the Geneva Conference to resolve the question of not permitting such activity.

The plan for the creation of a West German radio station in West Berlin, in the center of another state, clearly has as its purpose the intensification of hostile activity against the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet Government considers the aforementioned activities of the Federal Republic of Germany as a new provocation which is calculated to make the atmosphere in Berlin and all of Germany more tense and to fan the flames of the "cold war" in the center of Europe. These activities of

Nov. (Cont.)

the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be considered as anything but a premeditated attempt to interfere with the (Confidential) successful conclusion of forthcoming negotiations on the Berlin question at a time when more favorable foundations for the attainment of an agreement on West Berlin have been created as a result of conversations between the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. S. Khrushchev and the President of the USA D. Eisenhower.

In connection with the foregoing the Soviet Government expects that the Government of the USA -- which has repeatedly declared that it, together with the Governments of Great Britain and France, bears responsibility for the situation in West Berlin--will take the necessary measures to preclude the possibility of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany conducting such illegal activities with respect to vmcarron to of West Berlin, odd overned by organs of the Federal Government, nor

Similar notes are also being sent by the Soviet Government to the Governments of Great Britain and France.

Note: A note with similar text was given the German Ambassador at Moscow on November 13. This note closed with the sentence: "The Soviet Government considers it necessary to advise that similar notes have been sent the Governments of the USA, Great Britain and France, which are directly responsible for the situation in West Berlin."

12

US Mission Berlin Analysis of USSR-GDR Campaign on Use of FEDREP Flag in Berlin: Since initiation in November 1958 of (Confidential) Berlin crisis, Soviet Zone propaganda sporadically campaigned against Federal Republic activities in West Berlin. A high note was reached at the Presidential election on July 1 and thereafter attacks were limited mainly to denunciations of statements made by political leaders referring to West German-To educate Berlin ties. Toxa deemlose eneva Conference to resolve the question of not permitting

Coincident with the GDR retreat (November 7) from their intention to fly the GDR flag in West Berlin, all Soviet Zone media began a stepped-up attack against the use in West Berlin of the Federal Republic flag with the superimposed Prussian eagle. The major theme of attacks was that the Federal Republic has no rights in Berlin.

Reference was often made to Couve de Murville's statement during the Geneva Conference on status of Berlin to "prove" ar" in the center of Europe. These activities of

Nov. (Cont.) the GDR view that West Berlin is not part of the Federal Re-12 . sifuso abpublic.org foam one sonerW fish of ore sw nood . (.tno) .wow

(Confidential)

While the campaign timing was linked to the reversal of the GDR plan on displaying their own flag, it is obvious that subsonor and no stantively it reflects the GDR-USSR policy to sever relationmon ago ser ships between FRG-West Berlin. any collisions or disapreements between us and France.

Nov. Khrushchev Speech at Kremlin November 14 to Soviet Journalists 14 (excerpts): Comrades, we take pride in our great Lenin, in (Unclassified) Leninism, in the successes achieved through the work of the Soviet people. Today the forces of socialism have established themselves in the world more firmly and strongly than ever before. The Soviet Union has advanced a plan for total and made and a universal disarmament. We are ready to start honest disarma-But let the imperialists know that we have proposed this not because of our military, economic, or political weakness. No, we are doing this because we are aware of our duty to do all we can to safeguard and consolidate universal peace; - I because we are aware that wars bring suffering to all nations, and we want peace for our people and for all peoples ....

In walms as You can boast, but you must boast in such a way that all the wild should see what you are boasting about. When we made mend also such a "boast," all the world saw how our rocket soared to the moon and landed there!

So this is no empty boast; these are real facts. I think, dear comrades and members of the Presidium, that I will reveal secrets, and at the same time I want to be understood correctly: We do not want to frighten anyone, but we can tell the truthnow we have such a stock of rockets, such an amount of atomic and hydrogen warheads, that if they attack us we could wipe our potential enemies off the face of the earth....

begge as a Our policy is not a position of strength policy. We proposed total and universal disarmament at the UN General Assembly this load only a Limbyear and we are ready to dump all rockets. By the way, I shall reveal -- and let the people abroad know it, I am making no secret of this -- that in one year 250 rockets with hydrogen warheads came off the assembly line in the factory we visited. This represents millions of tons in terms of conventional explosives. You can well imagine that if this lethal weapon is exploded over some country there will be nothing left there at scrious or decisions of some kind the citils on in this or or other areas of the globe. Unreasonable actions can only reNov. (Cont.) 14

Soon we are to visit France and meet President de Gaulle. We attach great significance to that trip. The Government of the (Unclassified) Soviet Union considers that we can attain mutual understanding with France. Nowhere do our paths cross. The economy of the Soviet Union is self-sufficient. It is not based on the riches of other countries and, therefore, there are no reasons for any collisions or disagreements between us and France.

Of course, our positions on the question of Germany are different, but I believe that this is more a difference of form than of substance because French sympathies for German revenge seekers are no greater than ours. President de Gaulle understands the danger of revival of German revanchism. But, of course, there are many complex tangles in the German question which should be taken into account. I believe that the forthcoming visit to France will be useful, will help us to attain greater mutual understanding. But why guess? We shall wait and see, as the Russians say.

Chancellor Adenauer is now planning a bad thing. In my two latest speeches I have not mentioned his name, and the journalists have taken note of this. On this third occasion I cannot avoid it. A plan to build their radio station in West Berlin has been announced in Bonn. We regard this plan as unlawful, as a provocation. The Bonn revenge seekers are apparently provoking us to a sharp rebuke. They want us to help them aggravate the "cold war." Well, gentlemen, if you embark upon this road there is nothing ahead of you but failure. We have never recognized, we do not recognize, and we shall never recognize your rights to West Berlin. Do not forget this, Messrs. Bonn Revanchists. In order not to complicate this situation, I will not speak on concrete questions which may be the subject of discussion at a summit meeting.

It is not my fault that I have to speak on these matters. We are forced to do this by others. On such occasions we cannot and shall not abide by the commandment that if you are slapped on the left cheek, turn your right one. We shall act in a manly way -- if we are hit on the left cheek, we shall strike back with such force that no one will like to try it again. We should like for the Bonn revenge seekers to cool their spirits and act less like pugnacious people. Let us rather sit down to talks. West Berlin, it is known, does not belong to the German Federal Republic and is situated in the territory of the GDR. It would be a good thing if no one tried to exacerbate by actions or decisions of some kind the situation in this or or other areas of the globe. Unreasonable actions can only result in aggravation of the tension, not in the settlement of disputed issues.

20 (Unclassified)

Nov. First Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Winzer (German Democratic Republic) Comments to ADN on Adenauer's London Visit of November 18: Adenauer, Strauss, and Brentano are worried by the fact that the man responsible for US foreign policy has expressed the opinion that the West must have the courage to build up a new relationship between the different systems and observe peaceful competition. Subsequent to Khrushchev's talks with Eisenhower at Camp David, Herter demands a political understanding between East and West on the basis of recognition of the facts created by World War II. Washington diplomatic circles consider the renunciation of force as a means of solving problems as the central theme of Herter's statement. Adenauer, Strauss, and Brentano, however, are afraid of a political understanding between East and West as this would put obstacles in the way of revanchist policy and nuclear arming. This is why Adenauer allied himself at the so-called German-US conversations in Godesberg with those forces in the United States who want to carry on the cold war and to increase to the extreme the risk of an atom war with its unimaginable destructions. This, to be exact, was an attempt on the part of Adenauer to ally himself with the aggressive forces of US opposition against the policy of easing tension, of Camp David; in other words, also against Eisenhower.

Question: In what way, Comrade Secretary, is this connected with Adenauer's visit to London?

Answer: Insofar as Adenauer went to London with the same intention, namely to torpedo the summit conference and the understanding between East and West. In an interview with the Sunday Times, Adenauer declared shortly before his arrival in London that the Western Powers must attend a summit conference only after achieving complete unity, and this would take time. The clear aim was, therefore, prevention or at least delay of a summit conference.

It is obvious that Adenauer did not come nearer to this aim in London. The summit conference will take place, and earlier than Adenauer likes. But even if he was unable to prevent the summit conference, Adenauer wanted to see that negotiations would be confined to disarmament as he sees it. In this he has also failed. The West German paper we mentioned earlier wrote that Adenauer had "to accept the unpleasant fact" -- unpleasant only for him -- that Macmillan and the British Government are Berlin problem, whose best solution demands the conclusion of advocating that the summit conference also deal with the West a peace treaty with Germany.

Nov. (Cont.)

20
(Unclassified)

Question: Has Adenauer not voiced any new ideas, at least on the German question?

Answer: No. Even now, when there is a certain improvement in international relations, Adenauer and Brentano adhere stubbornly to the frozen positions of the cold war which was shown in the recent foreign affairs debate in the Lower House. Adenauer again raised in London the obsolete demand that a four-power committee should deal with the German question, with the Germans at their beck and call. But there is no such thing as an abstract German question. The point here is quite specifically the elimination of the remnants of World War II. In other words, the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

If the practice of a political understanding between East and West as demanded by Secretary of State Herter were also applied to Germany, the Bonn Government would at long last have to agree to talks and negotiations with the GDR Government to prepare a peace treaty to set up an all-German committee.

The four-power committee proposed by Adenauer and the free decision by the German people are incompatible. Adenauer abuses this concept only to hide his unfulfillable wish to outvote and violate the GDR. In London Adenauer proposed long discussions on the West Berlin question at the experts level. He wanted to prevent a change of the anomalous situation in West Berlin and to preserve the bridgehead of the cold war. It has already been said that he has failed in this, too. Adenauer and Brentano were particularly worried during their London negotiations by the idea of a zone of diminished armaments, supported by the British Government, as its realization might prevent the stepped-up West German nuclear arming.

It is no coincidence that even before Adenauer's return from London, Strauss went to Paris--as was announced by the Bonn Ministry of War--to negotiate with NATO General Norstad about lifting the bans contained in the Brussels treaties, in other words, to officially lift all barriers which might hamper nuclear arming in West Germany. The main worry of Adenauer, Strauss, and Brentano is the continuation of nuclear arming. For this reason alone they are bitter enemies of a zone of diminished armaments in Central Europe. However, in this question, too, Adenauer failed to receive the hoped for assurances in London.

Like all socialist countries, the GDR is in favor of complete and general disarmament. It is, however, ready to support any serious measure for a partial or geographically limited Nov. (Cont.)

disarmament. On Ulbricht's proposal the People's Chamber has even submitted specific proposals for measures of disarmament (Unclassified) in the two German states.

Question: So far you have spoken only of great political problems. What are the results of Adenauer's London visit in the economic field?

Answer: At a final press conference in London, Adenauer spoke with some forebodings about the danger of an economic war in Europe and about economic struggles among the European states which threaten the most sacred goods of the monopolists. The only result he was able to announce was that possibilities were considered which must be discussed further with the partners of the two West European economic blocs, whose main powers are West Germany and Great Britain. There is no doubt that contrasts in the economic field continue unabated, and Adenauer brought nothing home but the assurance that he would do everything to avoid a trade war in Europe. This says more than enough.

Question: May I ask you to sum up our conversation?

Answer: To sum it up shortly, one can say that Adenauer went to London to lay mines against the easing of international tension and to do his best to torpedo a summit conference. But the British people gave a particularly clear expression of their demand for understanding, easing of tension and peace. During the Adenauer visit this also found its expression in lively parliamentary debates. This had to be taken into account by the British Government. It is also high time for the people and the Lower House in West Germany to bring a policy of common sense to the fore.

Nov. US Mission Berlin Analysis of GDR Press Coverage of American TV Appearance of Walter Ulbricht: All East German national papers (Official on November 25 front-paged reports on a TV-radio broadcast Use Only) carried in the US on November 23. The program originated with the Westinghouse TV Company and consisted of a filmed interview between Mrs. Betty Adams and SED 1st Secretary Walter Ulbricht. Typical headlines were:

Neues Deutschland: "Five Million Americans Hear Truth about GDR"; Tribuene: "Ulbricht on American TV-Radio: Summit Conference Must End Cold War". Importance of broadcast was most bole in West

Nov. (Cont.)

25
(Official
Use Only)

clearly revealed by <u>Neues Deutschland</u> which devoted entire front page to story, including large photo Ulbricht being interviewed with exaggerated map of "GDR" in background showing Berlin as enclave; major current activities, such as tour of Czech delegation now in East Germany, including speeches of Grotewohl and Siroky, were pushed to third.

The Mission found the following points made in the interview to be of particular interest:

- "l. Ulbricht interpreted policy view of President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter as agreeing that end must be made to World War II. "For situation in Germany that means cold war must be ended"; re Berlin ("and when you speak of Berlin you obviously mean West Berlin") this means elimination of espionage, propaganda, diversionary operations centers and conversion of West Berlin into demilitarized Free City would be best solution.
- 2. Ulbricht was silent on point recently admitted by Moscow that Western rights in West Berlin derived from unconditional capitulation of Nazi Germany. In contrast, Ulbricht advanced argument that Western forces occupied West Berlin in 1945 only because Allied Control Commission had its seat in Berlin; since that Commission has ceased to be active, "there is no real basis for an occupation statute in West Berlin or for presence of foreign troops." GDR therefore desires that all foreign forces be withdrawn from "all Berlin and all Germany." Also, would it not be proper "if, instead of military liaison missions of the Western Powers, normal diplomatic relations were finally established?"
- 3. Relationship of reunification to peace treaty, Federal Republic Remarmament and to ultimate Communist objectives in Germany was clearly postulated. "We ask American people to understand why we insist so much on conclusion of peace treaty since peace treaty is of decisive significance for reunification of Germany." Atomic armament and rule by militarist elements in West Germany "hinder reunification" for "Germany can only exist as peace-loving state." East German formula still calls for treaty with "two German states" and preparation thereof is task for summit talks.
  - 4. East Germany already is fully sovereign in contrast to Federal Republic whose sovereignty is limited by Paris Convention. "Secretary Herter himself witnessed how GDR at Geneva not only represented standpoint of sovereign German Democratic Republic but also represented peace-loving people in West

Nov. (Cont.) (Official Use Only)

Germany." Ulbricht stress of this point showed keen sensitivity of GDR leaders to regime's lack of legitimacy and to importance of convincing East German people such legitimacy being acquired through increased Western acceptance of that regime.

5. Ulbricht made frankest statement to date re loss of population through refugee flow, saying reporter "may be correct" in referring to weekly East/West flow of 2,000 persons. He attempted to counter by claiming significant change has developed this year with 31,400 moving to GDR first six months of 1959.

Nov. no noise

East German Radio Commentary on Secretary Herter's Remarks of November 24 (summary): Herter stated on November 24 that (Unclassified) Soviet policy was not threatening West Berlin; that a new settlement of the West Berlin question may well be better than the present state of affairs; and that a summit conference should not be delayed beyond next spring. "What Secretary of State Herter said reflects not only his personal views but also those of Eisenhower and the latest reasoning of the US Government. Herter has thus administered another public rebuke to the obstinate attitude of his predecessor Acheson and all those in the United States who continue to make speeches against an easing of tension and propagate the notorious Dulles policy of balancing on the brink of war.

"He clearly demonstrated, above all to Bonn and Schoeneberg, that US foreign policy does not in those questions propose to take its cue from Adenauer and Brandt, but that it means to take account of the facts of the situation prevailing throughout the world and of the tremendous pressure brought to bear by world public opinion in favor of an easing of international tension, peace, and coexistence. "In the editorial offices of West Berlin's frontline city press, Herter's speech evidently came with the effect of a searing flash of lightning which simply made their pens and printer's ink dry up because not a single line recorded this fact today. Yet what Herter said represents one of the first fruits of the great rethinking process that is going on in the world today; the growing awareness that we should not fight each other today, but seek businesslike arrangements to get rid of dangerous inflammable matter and live with one another."

Nov.
25
(Unclassified)

GDR-Czechoslovak Joint Communique on Negotiations of Party and Government Delegations (excerpts from text): "On the invitation of the SED Central Committee and of the GDR Government, a delegation of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic headed by the first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and president of the Czechoslovak Republic, Comrade Antonin Novotny, visited the GDR from November 19 to November 25, 1959. The Czechoslovak party and government delegation was received by the GDR president, Comrade Wilhelm Pieck, and carried on a friendly discussion with him.

"I. Both delegations are of the opinion that a summit conference should be convened as soon as possible. The agenda of this conference should include such problems as are of first-rate importance for the consolidation of peace. It is imperative to discuss the disarmament question. Finally, a discussion on the peace treaty with Germany and the normalization of the West Berlin situation cannot be further delayed.

The absence of a peace treaty is being exploited by the imperialist and militarist forces in West Germany to stir up the cold war and to prepare an atomic war of aggression. The conclusion of a peace treaty would put an end to this disastrous development, would close the chapter of World War II and remove its remnants. This is in the interest of all nations. The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic is willing, in accordance with the proposal of the Soviet Union, to conclude a peace treaty with both German states or with that German state which is willing to do so.

Both sides emphasize that it is necessary to solve, in accordance with the proposals of the Soviet Union, the problem of West Berlin, which is on GDR territory and serves as a bridgehead for the cold war and the preparation of aggression against the GDR and other socialist states.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic supports the proposals submitted by the GDR on October 1, 1959, for an understanding between the two German states on such questions as the renunciation of atomic armament; the agreement on an armament moratorium; the advocacy by both sides of a step-by-step withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany; the elimination of foreign military bases; the conclusion of a nonaggression pact, and the establishment of a German committee made up of an equal number of representatives of both Governments to prepare a peace treaty and to create the preconditions for the reunification of Germany. The Czechoslovak partner is convinced that the opening of negotiations between the two German states

Nov. (Cont.) that the opening of negotiations between the two German states on these problems is indispensable and necessary in the inter-(Unclassified) ests of peace. The Czechoslovak nation regards the solution of the vital problems of the German people as the latter's very own concern.

The Czechoslovak delegation attaches great value to the peaceloving aspirations of the GDR, which has become an important pillar of peace in Europe and a bulwark of democracy and socialism. The GDR appreciates the consistent and uncompromising struggle of the Czechoslovak Republic against West German imperialism and militarism which is, at the same time, a great help to all peace-loving forces of the German people.

Both sides are convinced that all controversial and international problems should and can be solved by the parties concerned in negotiations on an equal footing, given good will on all sides. This will should also manifest itself in the governments by avoiding everything which might obstruct the lessening of international tension and continue or even intensify the cold war. The efforts of all governments should be exclusively directed toward promoting the already noticeable improvement in the international climate, ending the cold war completely, and safeguarding peaceful coexistence.

Both sides note that there are still forces stubbornly endeavoring to obstruct the process of international detente and to continue the policy of cold war. The present West German Government has a leading role among these forces. It is making every effort to prevent a successful holding of the summit conference. It is making desperate efforts to sabotage an understanding between the countries of the two camps on the basis of the factual situation resulting from World War II; sabotage which is also contemplated by leading representatives of the US Government.

The ruling circles in West Germany wish to change the results of World War II which were sealed with the blood of the peoples. They are making all possible preparations to achieve the old goals of conquest by German militarism and imperialism. For this reason they are doing everything possible to increase the tension in international relations and to speedily complete the equipping of the West German army with mass destruction weapons. Mass destruction weapons are thus being given into the hands of those militarist forces which have their share of responsibility for the criminal policy of Hitlerite Germany, which are again active in leading positions of the state apparatus of the

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Federal Republic and which control public life in West Germany. The Federal Government, which in a Hitlerite spirit has banned (Unclassified) the Communist Party of Germany and numerous other democratic organizations, is now preparing a ban on the association of persecutees of the Nazi regime. It thus aims at eliminating one of the last organizations of the peace-loving, antifascist forces in West Germany. On the other hand, the Bonn Government persistently protects war and Nazi criminals of Oberlaender's stripe who retains his position as a minister in the government though his participation in mass executions during World War II has been proved.

Revanchist territorial demands are openly being raised in the Federal Republic against quite a number of European countries. The two governments very determinedly reject the increasingly outrageous provocations by the West German revanchists. They condemn the fact that members of the West German Government and leading officials in the state apparatus hold leading functions in revanchist organizations which are carrying on intensive subversive activity against the Czechoslovak Republic, the People's Republic of Poland, and other socialist states.

The policy of the revanchists damages and jeopardizes the vital interests of the West German people, including the former resettlers who are being misused for preparation of a new aggressive war of the German militarists. The policy of the West German militarists and revanchists is not only directed against the socialist states but also threatens the security of all other European nations. For the British, French, and American nations in particular, this policy conjures up the danger of being drawn into a new world war by the German militarists.

This imperialist policy is also directed against the Asian and African countries. The Federal Republic is trying to pose in these countries as a noncolonial state allegedly interested only in their economic development. Actually, however, this so-called aid is imperialist economic expansion based on misleading the peoples of these countries and aimed at their exploitation and, in final analysis, directed against their national liberation movement. In contrast, the policy of the GDR, aiming at peaceful, friendly relations with all nations and states, is directed at furthering the newly developing countries with its unselfish support.

It is obvious that the harassing and sabotaging policy of the Bonn militarists and revanchists is doomed to fail because it is opposed to the will of the nations and disregards the balance

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of power in the world. It would be in conformity with the interests of peace and the wishes of all nations if the ruling (Unclassified) circles of West Germany would at last draw the logical conclusions from the present international balance of power, end the cold war, and take the road toward understanding and peaceful cooperation.

II. The peoples of the GDR and the Czechoslovak Republic, whose close and friendly relations are developing on the basis of proletarian internationalism, are allied through the principles of Marxism-Leninism, through the struggle for the victory of socialism and for the preservation and strengthening of world peace. This fact is being expressed in the policy of their revolutionary Marxist-Leninist parties, which are the leading forces in the building of a new social order and in the shaping of a happy future of their peoples.

The representatives of the SED and of the Czechoslovak de la Communist Party exchanged information, views, and experiences concerning the work of their parties and of the socialist building in their countries. Questions of further cooperation beof czechoslovakia as well as current questions of the international workers' movement were discussed. The exchange of views between the representatives of both parties revealed full agreement on all questions which were discussed.

Both parties noted that since the adoption of the Moscow declaration of the communist and workers parties of November 1957, the international communist movement has made immense progress and that the correctness of this declaration has been fully borne out in practical life. They noted with satisfaction that the regular exchange of views and information as well as the close cooperation of the SED and the Czechoslovak Communist Party has been of benefit to both parties. Both parties consider it their duty to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism. They are determined to fight any manifestation of revisionism or opportunism resolutely in the future. They will also continue the fighting alliance between the SED and the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

The Czechoslovak Communist Party assesses as very important the efforts of the SED to convince the social-democratic working people and their organizations in West Germany of the need to establish united action of the working class. United action will turn the whole German working class into a decisive factor in molding the future of the German people in the spirit of peace, democracy, and socialism."

Nov. 25

SED 1st Secretary Ulbricht Comments to Berlin Rally at the Conclusion of GDR-Czechoslovak Party and Government Negotiations. (Unclassified) (Summary with excerpts): "The reactionary forces are pursuing tactics similar to those used by Hitler in preparing World War II. They raise demands for revenge and proclaim a so-called policy of liberation toward Czechoslovakia. It will be recalled that Hitler carried out his annexation of Czechoslovak territory under the slogans of 'liberation' and 'return to the Reich.

"Today members of the Bonn Government and leaders of so-called Sudeten German associations in West Germany are again making propaganda for a 'new order for Europe.' They set up military formations of their own and prepare for military provocations on West German territory." Ulbricht called on the West German population to help put an end to this playing with fire.

"The results of World War II which was brought about by German monopoly capital and its Hitler government, cannot be undone." The resettlers cannot be helped by hate propaganda, but only by the granting of normal and orderly living conditions. It is particularly deplorable that leading Social Democratic functionaries join in this revenge hullabaloo because they hope to win a few votes.

"The revenge politicians in Bonn and the leaders of West German regional associations, after all, know perfectly well that neither the United States, Great Britain, nor France are ready to support their demands and sacrifice a single soldier for West German revenge plans. There is only one way, to put an end to the cold war and to talk frankly and honestly to the resettlers," Ulbricht said amidst strong applause. He expressed his pleasure that throughout the world there was growing realization of the fact that contested international issues can be settled only by negotiation between states.

"It is because the longing for peace is of the essence to socialism that we deem peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems necessary and possible. The fight for the consolidation of peace is to us not a tactical move, but essential to our policy." Ulbricht stressed that the peaceful economic competition would prove the socialist order to be better for the working people than the capitalist order. Referring to the fact that certain imperialist powers for a long time had worked to achieve a decisive point between the two world systems by military means and that the West German militarists were still doing so today, Ulbricht noted that the entire policy of the imperialist circles of West Germany and their Hitlerite generals was bound to fail.

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LL be a new step

"The German question is insoluble only as long as nuclear arming and rearming go on in West Germany. If there is a change under pressure from the West German population and the summit conference, if a peace treaty is prepared, the German question can be solved." The last Lower House meeting confirmed once more that West Germany is the only state in Europe making revanchist and annexation demands on other states. Every West German citizen should ask himself this question: What would happen if the Bonn Government renounces the demands for revenge and continuation of the cold war and agrees to an immediate halt to armaments and a renunciation of nuclear arming with the GDR? "The West German citizen would derive only advantage. He would no longer be kept in suspense by the alarming reports of the warmongers. Billions which are today thrown away for armaments could be employed for social purposes in the interest of the population."

Ulbricht referred to the talks between Prime Minister Macmillan and the Bonn Chancellor who had suddenly rediscovered the people's right to self-determination. "What hypocritical mockery? Herr Adenauer sold to the Western powers the West German population's right to decide for themselves on negotiations on reunification."

Recalling the many proposals made by the GDR to come to an understanding, Ulbricht described it as contradiction and pure cynicism if Adenauer spoke of the German people's right of self-determination by opposing an all-German committee, which would prepare a peace treaty and initiate reunification. "Herr Adenauer speaks of a 'free decision of the Germans.' But surely it is impossible under the pressure of nuclear armament and militarism in West Germany to bring about a free decision of the people. Bonn is today still the center of the cold war and of international forces of reaction. The time will come, however, when the warm current of a detente policy will reach Bonn. The time will come when the majority of West German capitalists will realize that the policy of peaceful economic competition is more favorable for them than arming for war," Ulbricht exclaimed.

He stressed that the GDR was making its contribution in curbing German militarism and imperialism in a peaceful manner, proving to all the people of West Germany by its actions that the German people can live in peace, prosperity, and happiness if West Germany renounces revenge, frontier demands, and any imperialist policy. "We want the West German people to convince themselves that the worker-peasant power affords the German people secure long-term prospects; prospects of peace and growing prosperity."

Dec. (Unclassified)

Khrushchev Speech to Seventh MSZMP Congress at Budapest. (excerpts): It is certain that the importance of the struggle of the broad masses of the people for peace and security has become immeasurably greater in the present situation. We shall continue to fight consistently for peaceful coexistence, for total disarmament, for universal security. We hope that the impending meetings at the highest level will be a new step along this road. As for those who still try to fan up the along this road. As for those who still try to fan up the flames of the cold war and think of acting from "positions of strength," we can repeat that the stick will not help them. There are two ends to every stick. If it is raised against the socialist countries, its other end may fall upon the heads of those who brandish it.

We are now at the time of the year when the last days of autumn are giving way to winter. In political life, however, the temperature is definitely rising. It is not yet warm, it is not spring, but signs of warmer weather are there. The aggressive forces are very much concerned about this and are taking every measure to reduce the temperature, to bring on the frost.

Early this spring I had a very useful meeting with Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister of Britain. It made something of a start on an international thaw.

Recently, I had a meeting with President Eisenhower of the United States. This meeting took place in the warm American fall, and I would say that we had warm conversations. We in the Soviet Union consider -- and others agree with us -- that a certain relaxation of international tension has now been achieved. In any case, we go to such meetings with a good desire to discuss urgent questions ripe for solution, to find correct, mutually acceptable, and, above all, reasonable agreement in the interest of strengthening peace.

A meeting is to take place in March next year at the invitation of the President of France, General de Gaulle. Some voices are heard in the foreign press now saying that we have abandoned the idea of an early meetings of the heads of government. These assertions do not accord with reality. We have always considered that meetings of the heads of government are useful and that the sooner they are held the better. But this is our point of view. The other sides which will take part in this meeting are of a somewhat different opinion.

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We should not, of course, act like the heroines of Chekhov's "The Three Sisters," who wanted to go to Moscow at any cost. (Unclassified) We have long been in favor of a meeting of the heads of government in Geneva or some other place. We want this meeting, be abliful but we want it to be fruitful, to benefit the peoples.

But we have to approach the question of a meeting in a reasonable way and to take account of the wishes of our partners. We must reckon with them. The Soviet Government is ready to has a benefit attend such a meeting at a time and place acceptable to all -ord dama valuits participants. The fact that I am to meet President has not take to de Gaulle on March 15 in no way means that a meeting of the heads of government cannot take place before my meeting with and to him, de Gaulle. It could be held before my visit to France, Issued to but General de Gaulle himself wants to have an exchange of views with me prior to a meeting at the summit. And this desire of his is not unreasonable. We understand this and regard his wishes with due consideration. Perhaps this will wake for better understanding at a meeting of the heads of areanon in government. even wiestagg at it bedaringang

see that need to One should search for all kinds of possibilities to solve dissome soot puted problems on a reasonable foundation, and that is why one to about a must take into consideration the wishes of one's partner. We and ded do our utmost to speed up the melting of the "cold war" ice. Two tendencies are now distinctly appearing in the inter-The rollege and national situation. On one hand, not only the peoples, but To not seep also many statesmen and many political leaders recognize the necessity of liquidating the cold war. On the other hand is the desire of certain quarters in the Western powers to halt the process of easing international tension that has begun and -camp miss end to preserve the state of cold war. I sometime

This is also borne out, for instance, by such facts as the attempts to once again involve the United Nations in a discussion of the so-called Hungarian question.

Who needs this provocative question? Do those who raise the question really believe that by discussing this question in and about a liquidation of socialist gains in Hungary and a restoration of the Horthy regime there?

I think that those representatives of the Western Powers who raise this question do not believe themselves that their proposals are sensible. Those who raise such questions cling reveneba rolles to the old, to the outmoded. And the sooner such leaders understand that they bet on a dead horse, the sooner will

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tension be liquidated. This will help to improve mutual understanding and strengthen the cause of peace. They mourn over the defeat of counterrevolution in Hungary. Let the enemies mourn, shedding tears over a small handful of reactionaries. Meanwhile, the working class, the working peasantry, all the working people of Hungary who consolidated their socialist gains triumph. And we rejoice in these successes and warmly applaud them.

Comrades, all political leaders who have a sense of reality now acknowledge that international tension has weakened. And from now on every political leader and each country must promote a further improvement of the international situation and liquidation of tension. One must until the knots, remove from the road the obstacles accumulated as a result of the cold war and hampering a normalization of the international situation.

One such abnormal feature is the situation in Europe, where troops of both camps, the capitalist and the socialist, are concentrated. It is precisely here in Europe that concern must be displayed for normalization by all who are interested in peace, who indeed want to improve relations between states. It is common knowledge that an abnormal situation took shape in West Berlin. We hold different views on the methods of breaking the Berlin deadlock, but all states admit that the situation in that city is abnormal, except one state and one political leader—West Germany and West German Chancellor Mr. Adenauer. The Chancellor is most active on the question of West Berlin though, as is well known, he has no ground for his claim to intervene in the affairs of that city.

The Chancellor declares in his statements that the main question which should be solved at a heads of government meeting is the question of disarmament. I fully agree with the Chancellor. Indeed, the question of disarmament is the main question; it is of tremendous international importance because literally all countries, all mankind, are interested in disarmament.

I am pleased to note that Chancellor Adenauer understands this now. If the Chancellor took the trouble to study our position in 1955 at Geneva he would become convinced that it is precisely the Soviet delegation that raised the question of disarmament as the main question.

It is true, at that time another "main question," the German question, was imposed upon us, primarily by Chancellor Adenauer

Dec. (Cont.) through his allies. He said that the disarmament problem could be solved only simultaneously with solution of the so-(Unclassified) called German question.

That is how they understood this question: liquidation of the GDR and the extension of the power of the Government of West Germany to all of Germany. That is, it was a question of strengthening the capitalist system and liquidating the socialist system in that country. That is precisely what Chancellor Adenauer wanted and still wants!

But as you know, Hitler was fighting socialism, and what was the result? Hitler shot himself while socialism flourishes! Chancellor Adenauer should know that he now represents the Government of West Germany which must remember Hitler's atrocities. He, the Chancellor, says that he is not responsible for what was done by Nazi Germany. But where are the men who led the fascist soldiers against the Soviet Union, who were in Stalingrad, who waged war against other countries? No field glasses or other optical means are needed to locate them. Everyone understands that one should not search for them in the GDR. These men hold prominent positions there. Some of them are organizing the West German Army, while others are already in command of NATO troops. That is the situation if one looks at it soberly, and we Communists always look soberly at life.

The apparent thaw in the international climate and the Soviet Government's active efforts directed toward a further strengthening of the peace obviously do not suit the present leaders of the Federal Republic, and they seek to do everything to prevent an improvement in relations between states and to discredit the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

Chancellor Adenauer is most active in this respect. His latest speech, delivered a few days ago in the Rhineland at a congress of a CDU local organization, shows that Mr. Adenauer does not disdain even obvious concoctions, direct distortions of facts known to all. "No other country," said the Chancellor, "has been waging so many wars and seizing so many countries in this century as the Soviet Union."

Reading Chancellor Adenauer's speech one might think that it was the Soviet Union and not Nazi Germany which unleashed World War II, that cost the peoples tens of millions of lives and inestimable material losses. One might think that it was the Soviet Union which attacked Germany and not Nazi Germany which launched a piratical attack on our country. Or, maybe,

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(Unclassified)

Chancellor Adenauer will assert that it was Soviet Russia that invaded Germany, Britain, France, the United States, and Japan in 1918-1920?

But who will believe him when everyone knows that it was precisely these states that took up arms against the young land of the Soviets which called for universal peace, and were participants in foreign intervention during which the troops of 14 states invaded our country. In his attempts to distort the policy of the Soviet Union, the West German Chancellor brushes aside not only logic, but elementary commonsense too. And this is understandable. Indeed, Chancellor Adenauer's designs with regard to the GDR can in no way be considered as peaceful. His latest speech furnishes new proofs to this effect. What is the value, for instance, of his statement "instead of reunification we should make recourse to another expression, namely the restoration of freedom to 17 million Germans."

The juggling of the word "freedom" will not deceive anyone. The point is that Adenauer wants to make the working people of the GDR toil for capitalists and landlords again, wants to cover the territory of the republic with NATO atomic and rocket bases, as is the case with West Germany. Only thus he conceives the reunification of Germany. But these plans, of course, are built on sand. It is not to permit someone to destroy everything that has been achieved through the purposeful and selfless labor of millions of people that the working people of the GDR have spent 10 years creating a new socialist society and strengthening their people's state.

We shall never support the demand to renounce the socialist gains in the GDR. And it is common knowledge that problems can only be solved at international conferences and meetings if the interests of both sides are taken into consideration. A unilateral decision is only possible through war, while disputes can be solved through negotiation only if mutual interests are taken into account. But where are such interests taken into consideration if one demands peremptorily the liquidation of socialist achievements of the first workerpeasant state in German history, the liquidation of the GDR.

This is, to put it mildly, an unrealistic approach to the matter. And Mr. Adenauer was right in defining it as a policy of "positions of strength," positions of threatening war.

Times change and hence the tune changes, too. Now, Mr.

Adenauer strikes a new tune. He already sees that nothing can be achieved through war and the positions-of-strength policy, that such a policy has utterly failed.

Dec. (Cont.) With the death of the chief conductor of this policy, and even 1 before his death, the policy of threats and blackmail became (Unclassified) completely deadlocked. However, the assistants of the chief conductor, his "yes" men, who with him sang the "cold war tune," keep it up even without the conductor. And this note obviously sounds a discord and begins to irritate even the allies of the obstinate soloist.

We proceed from the principles of a policy of coexistence. The Soviet Union submitted disarmament proposals, and we are willing at any moment to sign such an agreement and to start implementation on the basis of the most comprehensive and profound control, under the aegis of the United Nations or any other international agency. We are in favor of effective disarmament with real control, which would prevent any state from secretly reviving its army and beginning war.

But in order to have confidence in both sides, we must settle the issue of West Berlin. Why do we raise the issue of West Berlin? Because West Berlin has now become a source of conflicts, an apple of discord. When we say that the issue of Berlin must be settled, this means that we propose to remove the splinter that got into a sound body after World War II and to liquidate the hotbed of the occupation regime.

How can this be done? The only way is to sign a peace treaty with Germany. And that is what we propose. A peace treaty cannot be evaded if the other countries on which the signing of a peace treaty depends stand on the position of peace and coexistence. One must, at last, liquidate the remnants of World War II, since they are a breeding ground of the incendiaries of a third world war.

We do not speed up a solution of the problem of West Berlin, at milital we set no deadlines, present no ultimatums, but at the same time we will not relax our energy in striving for agreement with our allies.

If we try all means and they do not lead to the desired results, we shall have no other way out except signing a peace treaty with whichever of the two German states want it. And in such a case we shall bear no responsibility for the refusal to sign the peace treaty. It will be borne by those who had an unreasonable approach to the solution of this problem, who did not take the road of easing tension in relations between states but, on the contrary, wanted to preserve the dangerous source threatening the outbreak of a third world war.

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(Unclassified)

That is why we tell Chancellor Adenauer: if you really are against revanchism and against Hitlerism—and you declare this often—prove it by deeds. Do not oppose a liquidation of the remnants of Hitler's war.

Or do you want to resume it? To judge by your statements, you do not want to! Then, acting as the ally of our allies in the war against Hitler Germany, facilitate a solution of this question at heads of government conference in the interest of all peoples, so that no one would win and no one would lose, and only the cause of peace would benefit.

A peace treaty must be signed and the status of a free city introduced for West Berlin. Matters might go to the utmost absurdity if the present situation in West Berlin continues. It is common knowledge that all countries approved in principle our disarmament proposals. A committee has been set up of a party basis and the United Nations resolved to refer this question for discussion to the "10-nation" committee. Let us assume the best outcome we strive for-that our proposals will be accepted, and they will be accepted sooner or later. The world is heading towards this because man's intellect progresses and human reason will triumph. The disarmament proposals are most reasonable, and reflect the desire of all people, of all mankind. What is to be done then with West Berlin?

Our former allies insist on their termless occupation rights. They wish to perpetuate the occupation regime, to keep their troops there. Consequently, if an agreement on disarmament is signed, if everyone begins to disarm, if all the armies are disbanded, what will happen to the troops in West Berlin?

If we abide by the present logic of the West, which is particularly advocated by Chancellor Adenauer, West Berlin is the only place in the world where armed forces should be left. But this is an obviously absurd desire, contradicting commonsense. This is, so to say, bovine.

How can the question of disarmament be solved with such logic? Continuation of the occupation regime completely contradicts the idea of disarmament. This is why every sober-minded person realizes that this illogical, unwise policy contradicts commonsense.

The Soviet Government's policy pursues the purpose of doing away with the state of war by signing a peace treaty with Germany. We are for coexistence, and this determines our

Dec. (Cont.) correct line in international relations. We repeat over and l over again: coexistence means noninterference in the affairs (Unclassified) of other states, recognition of every nation's right to choose the regime and social system under which its peoples wish to fulensed to volllive.

Proceeding from this, we propose to set up a free city in West Berlin. This, indeed, will not upset the political order there, will not violate either its social or political principles. We are ready to provide this free city with every guarantee of independence and integrity to which our allies agree; guarantee them by our participation under the aegis of the United Nations or any other acceptable means. We see no oldsnows other way if we are to be guided by the formula of coexistence and noninterference in the affairs of other states.

The desire to preserve the occupation regime and forces in West Berlin means a desire to pursue a policy directed against the socialist states. This means to heat the atmosphere, to continue the positions-of-strength policy. But it is an open secret that every material has a heating limit. When it reaches it, it suddenly snaps, and this may produce a catasseeb notal tel trophe!

This is why, Mr. Adenauer, you assume a very thankless and ignoble task. The past is disappearing never to return. Even if you proceed from positions of strength, Mr. Chancellor, can you not see that this strength, on which you wish to rely, has been lost, is nonexistent.

Every sober-minded person today realizes that the balance of forces has been tilted in favor of the socialist nations. Both strength and justice are on our side! In this case, justice goes along with strength because we, despite the tilting of the balance of forces in favor of our socialist camp, do not alter our peace-loving policy. We do not propose inacceptable alternatives to our partners, but, on the contrary, continue our policy of justice and reason.

We are doing our utmost to make the Soviet proposals acceptable. We do not impose them, but wish to reach agreement through negotiations, though we have every right to sign a peace treaty with the GDR if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany does not wish to sign a peace treaty.

We have before our eyes the example of the United States of America, which has signed a peace treaty with Japan without us. However, it cannot be held that one side can unilaterally sign

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treaties while the other cannot, though a peace treaty with Japan was signed earlier to its detriment. So the moral and legal rights and the right of reason for that matter are on our side, because our proposals do not harm any state, do not harm anybody, because they arise from our policy of peaceful coexistence and noninterference in the affairs of other states.

The Soviet Union could have signed this treaty, but we wish to do our best not to strain relations. The liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin will undoubtedly be conducive toward this. This is why we do not fix any time limits. We want the solution of this question to improve and not worsen our relations. The Soviet Government is ready to try out any conceivable peaceful means to secure a reasonable solution of the German problem, to promote the improvement of the international atmosphere, and to create conditions for disarmament and the establishment of eternal peace on earth for the sake of mankind's happiness.

But if we do not meet with understanding, if the forces backing Chancellor Adenauer obstinately insist on the "positions-of-strength" policy, we shall have no other choice left but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. The Soviet Union does not intend to connive with those who are for the continuation of the "positions-of-strength" policy. We and our allies would readily sign a treaty with West Germany, but if we do not succeed in this, we shall be compelled to sign a unilateral treaty with the GDR.

Chancellor Adenauer believes that unification means the solution of the German question. The desire of the German people to unite, to establish a single German state, are understandable. But this question assumes particular importance in the existing situation, when Germany is divided into two states with different social and political systems. It can be solved only by the Germans themselves, because everything depends on the social and political system which will exist in the united Germany.

Who must settle this? Some other countries? The allies?
No, this is the right of the Germans themselves. And you,
Mr. Chancellor, do not even want to meet the representatives
of the GDR, you want us, that is, the former allies that
warred against Hitler, to unite Germany. But we, former
allies in the war against Hitler Germany, have differing
views on this score: some like capitalist Germany, that is,
its Western part, and some like socialist Germany, that is,
the GDR. How can we, the allies, solve this question then?

It is said that the concluded agreements should be honored. But the allies have never had any agreement, any commitment (Unclassified) on this score. After its defeat and capitulation Germany was divided into four zones; three zones were subsequently merged and started developing on capitalist lines, while Eastern Germany, as it was then called, the present-day GDR has chosen the socialist road, and we acclaim the GDR. It is very successful in its development.

So, the question of which way Germany will go can be solved only by the Germans themselves. You, Mr. Adenauer, cannot avoid this. Sooner or later you or some other person who will head the Government of West Germany, if he is realistically minded, will arrive at this only correct conclusion.

The Soviet Union and the GDR wish to take realistic account of the prevailing situation. West Berlin has a capitalist way of life and we do not wish to break or coerce the will of the West Berlin population when they choose their social and political system. We give them the right to solve everything by themselves.

Adenauer strives for another solution. But this means to solve the question in the interests of some one country or group of countries against some other country or group of countries. This is either a win or a loss in an important political question, a win or a loss in someone's favor, or vice versa. But neither side will agree to this. Only madmen can hope to solve this question by force, by way of war. Sober-minded people know what a war is like and will do everything to prevent it. Some people may say why does Khrushchev raise this question when agreement on a summit meeting to discuss this question when agreement of a cached. I agree with this view and I would not have raised this question if it were not for Mr. Adenauer's statements.

I cannot leave unanswered the questions raised by Chancellor Adenauer. So, I am not the initiator here and I was only compelled to answer the statements of the West German Chancellor.

> In its policy the Soviet Union will always abide by the great principles of peaceful coexistence. We do not beg for peace. However, the desire for peace is by no means a sign of our weakness. The strength of the Soviet Union and all the socialist camp is growing with every day. We possess everything necessary to ward off any blow. But we do not want losses,

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we do not want destruction and the perishing of millions of beronod espeople. stressers bebulonce ent tank biss at II

In one of my recent statement I said that we have stockpiled such a quantity of rockets, so many atomic and hydrogen warheads, that if attacked we shall be able to raze to the ground all our potential enemies. It is not because of our weakness, but because of our principled Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence, a policy meeting the interests of the broadest popular masses throughout the world, that we are ready to immediately destroy all these stockpiles if a program for universal disarmament is adopted. Let the imperialist propaganda mongers talk about the clandestine designs of the Communists. We are sure that the consistency and clarity of our peace-loving policy will be winning ever new supporters with each passing day, with each passing hour.

Dec. GDR Volkskammer Resolution on Berlin and the German Question. ? (Report by US Mission Berlin): GDR "People's Parliament" (Official (Volkskammer) met on December 2 and adopted resolution dealing Use Only) with Berlin and German question which reiterated most standard Soviet/GDR proposals. Resolution was framed as reply to To appeal by Supreme Soviet which was made to all parliaments of the world on October 31".

Volkskammer resolution as summarized in East press December 3 proclaimed GDR dedication to Soviet proposal for total disbelow armament and restated "8 point proposal" by Volkskammer on October 1 to Federal Republic Bundestag. Re Berlin, resoluand salar tion repeated phraseclogy often seen earlier in Berlin crisis, and stating "The West Berlin problem will find its resolution through the (German) Peace Treaty". Also stated "We expect Jon erow as Summit Conference will discuss, above all, question of disarmament as well as question of peace treaty with Germany by which anomalous West Berlin situation will be settled".

The CDR expectations re participation Summit Conference were also reiterated in point which stated "We assume that at Summit Conference all questions involving Germany will only be discussed with participation of both German States."

necessary to ward off any blow. But we do not want losses,

Dec. 2

US Mission Berlin Analysis of GDR Propaganda Program Since the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers of 1959: "An (Confidential) analysis of the propaganda program developed in relation to the Conference and to the subsequent celebration of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the East German Democratic Republic reveals the following themes have been developed persistently; they are listed in order of the apparent priority assigned by the East German regime:

- There is a continuously growing acceptance of the GDR internationally and the scope of that acceptance already has reached significant proportions.
- 2. East Germany, particularly during the last few years, has made rapid economic progress and has become one of the five leading industrial producing countries of Europe.
  - 3. The GDR is moving rapidly and inevitably towards completion of the transition to a socialist form of society (by 1965) and the achievement thereof has become a prerequisite for the reunification of Germany. This achievement is expected to exert increasing pressure on the Federal Republic and attract West German workers.
  - 4. East Germany's peaceful internal and external policies stand in sharp contrast, on the one hand, to a restored monopolist-capitalist society in West Germany and, on the other hand, to a revived, aggressive intent on the part of West Germany vis-a-vis other countries in general and Eastern European countries in particular.
  - 5. East Germany is firmly integrated into the socialist bloc and, in turn, enjoys not only tremendous economic advantages but also is assured of an unyielding political and military support, first from the USSR and secondly from the united bloc.
  - 6. The world balance of power already has changed in favor of the socialist bloc and will continue to do so at an accelerating rate. This changed balance of power has special significance for East Germany since that change is now forcing leaders of Western capitalist countries to face realities (e.g. the existence of two German States).
- 7. Sufficient progress already has been made to demonstrate to the East German population in the first instance and to the West German population secondarily that socialism is a superior system which will guarantee not only peaceful political conditions in Europe but a better life for the average citizen within the foreseeable future.

Dec. (Unclassified)

GDR Finance Minister Willi Rumpf Claims 50% of FEDREP Budget Is for Military. An ADN story on the presentation of the draft bill on the budget plan for 1960 to the GDR Volkskammer contained the following paragraph: The most decisive feature of the budget plan is the fact that it reflects the peace policy of our Government. Whereas in the GDR expenditure for the National People's Army again remains stable and will amount to about one billion deutschemarks in 1960, the Bonn budget officially shows an armament expenditure amounting to more than 11 billion deutschemarks. SPD Lower House Member Ritzel, however, estimated that even in 1959 the actual amount of armament expenditure was 19 billion deutschemarks since a considerable part of the armament expenditure is hidden. This means that in the GDR less than one billion deutschemarks is being spent on the National People's Army, while in West Germany 19 billion deutschemarks is spent, or 19 times as much. Whereas in the GDR expenditure for the National People's Army amounts to 2 percent of the budget, the expenditure in Bonn is 50 percent, said Minister Rumpf.

Dec.

Radio Moscow Claims Adenauer Attempting to Sabotage Summit. The following Vladimirov commentary was beamed at Germany in (Unclassified) German at 1900 GMT: One can already say that 1959 will go down in history as the beginning of a turn in international relations. What a short time ago seemed unbelievable has become reality this year. The head of the Soviet Government visited the United States. The United Nations unanimously approved the Soviet-American resolution on total disarmament. Noticeable progress was made at Geneva on the cessation of nuclear tests. The East-West summit conference is within reach. We are witnessing, as Nikita Khrushchev said yesterday in Budapest, a time when the last days of autumn are ending and winter is approaching. In political life, however, a noticeable warming can be felt.

All states and all governments should show, in this historic hour of responsibility, more good will than ever and should All states and all governments should show, in this historic search for solutions acceptable by both sides in order to further ease international tension.

I fully agree, therefore, with Hans Zehrer's statement in Die Welt. He says that it is not a rewarding task to stand as a troublemaker and center of unrest in the middle of a tensionfree world. The latest report from Bonn, however, indicates that ruling circles of the Federal Republic are keen on playing precisely this role. Let us, for instance, take the latest statements of Chancellor Adenauer, his speech at the CDU party congress in Duren, and his interview in Le Monde. The Chancellor's speech and interview are in the worst traditions

Dec. (Cont.) of the cold war and are full of rude and hostile attacks 2 against the USSR and the Soviet Government. I would not like (Unclassified) to deal with the lack of tact and the provocative manner of the Chancellor's statements on what is agreeable to East European peoples. In this it is not Adenauer but the people of East Europe who make the decisions.

The Chancellor's statements on international problems cannot be accepted without contradiction. Adenauer's surprising attitude toward the forthcoming summit conference is particularly striking. The question is not that he is in favor of the most careful preparation for the conference; no one has anything against this. The question is that they insistently demand in Bonn that preparations should be made in the old spirit of the cold war. It is characteristic that the world "strength" is used frequently in the Chancellor's latest speech. At the same time, one notices that the ruling circles of the Federal Republic are using every means to prevent a factual treatment of the questions connected with Germany.
As is known, Bonn is insistently opposed to a peace treaty with Germany.

Before his departure for Paris, Von Eckerdt declared: Chancellor Adenauer is also against any change of the present, obviously abnormal, conditions in West Berlin. The Chancellor himself announced in his speech in Duren that he would avoid using the expression "reunification" -- one should speak of the "restitution of freedom to East Germany." All these statements can only be considered as a deliberate sabotage of the forthcoming negotiations.

As far as Chancellor Adenauer's statements about "liberation"-or to put it more correctly, devouring the GDR--are concerned, they are, as Nikita Khrushchev said yesterday, an unrealistic approach to the matter. The issue, however, is not the statements of Bonn politicians, but the entire diplomatic activity which the government circles of the Federal Republic, with the Chancellor himself in the fore, have displayed lately. Nikita Khrushchev stated in Budapest that the warming of the international climate and the active efforts of the Soviet Government for the strengthening of peace obviously do not suit the present politicians in the Federal Republic. For this reason they are striving with all their might to prevent the improvement in international relations.

I do not want to deal with the Chancellor's last visit to London. It is well known that he insistently opposed there all concrete disarmament measures and the settlement of the Dec. (Cont.) (Unclassified)

Berlin question. Yesterday the Chancellor went on a new state visit to Paris. The French and the West German press agreed that this time also Adenauer would campaign against the peaceful settlement of international disputes, especially the Berlin problem. Pravda said today very aptly that Chancellor Adenauer was trading in receipts for the aggravation of international tension.

Moreover, it emerges from press reports that at the Paris talks Adenauer aims at achieving a further intensification of West German armament. Frankfurter Rundschau, for instance, says that under the pretext of fighting communism, Adenauer will propose that all special provisions regarding the Federal Republic should be waived and that the Bundeswehr should be equipped with atomic and rocket weapons without restrictions.

It is premature to attempt to forecast the results of the Paris visit of the Federal Chancellor. There is strong opposition in France to the dangerous policy of the intensified arming of West Germany. Whatever may be the case it has been proved beyond dispute that Bonn, to use Hans Zehrer's words, stands at present as a troublemaker and center of unrest. Hans Zehrer titled his article "What is to Become of Germany?" This question should be food for thought for the Bonn politicians, who are dragging the country along the old road of the cold war and the bankrupt policy of strength.

Radio Moscow Claims Adenauer Aggravates European Climate; Only a Soviet Solution Possible on Berlin. The following extract (Unclassified) is taken from an English-language broadcast on the Soviet North American Service at 2300 GaT: There are two ways to settle the question. It is either Adenauer's way or the USSR's way. Adenauer's way means a Western settlement, to the detriment of the peace-loving socialist countries. Naturally, that is unrealistic. If the Chancellor cherishes hopes of settling the Berlin issue by force, by war, it is a mad hope because sensible people are doing everything to prevent it. What the USSR proposes is settlement in the interests of all nations so that the cause of peace will win. That can only be done by concluding a German peace treaty and making West Berlin a free city. That would not interfere with the government, social, or political systems there. The USSR would provide the free city all guarantees of independence and inviolability under the United Nations or in any other mutually acceptable way.

only established two obvious facts; first, some governments actually do not desire reunification, and second, the Govern-

Dec. (Cont.) (Unclassified) Mr. Khrushchev said in Budapest that the USSR is not pressing a time limit for settling the question of West Berlin. It is not presenting any time limit or ultimatums, but neither will it relax its energy for reaching agreement. Mr. Khrushchev also stressed that if the USSR exhausts every means without achieving results it will have no other way out but to conclude a peace treaty with the German state which desires it.

You see, a solution of the West Berlin problem in keeping with the peace now depends entirely on Dr. Adenauer and the West, which has every opportunity to make him toe the line of reason and commonsense.

Dec. (Unclassified)

Ulbricht Praises Nehru's German Policy. Excerpts from a statement released through a radio announcer by SED 1st Secretary Walter Ulbricht: "On December 3, 1959, a Western journalist asked the Indian Premier at a press conference in New Delhi whether he felt it would be better not to have German reunification discussed at the forthcoming summit conference as one of the chief topics but that attempts should first be made to reach a certain understanding on the disarmament problem.

In his reply Premier Nehru stressed the outstanding importance of the disarmament question. Simultaneously, however, he unmistakably voiced his opinion on the present state of the German problem. Nehru said that he was very puzzled by the question of German unity. There was so much talk about it. So far, however, he had only been able to establish that no one wanted it. According to press reports, Nehru mentioned the United States, the Soviet Union, West Germany, the GDR, France, Great Britain, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in this connection.

In reply to a supplementary question as to whether it is a grave and unfortunate development that no one wants it, Nehru explained his words, according to the press reports as follows: No. I think it is the recognition of certain fundamental facts which exist today. From this viewpoint I think that people want it in theory, but the recognition of certain facts and the fear of certain consequences lead to people just not wanting it. When I say that they do not want it, this means of course that everyone wants a solution according to his own ideas and is 100 percent certain in this connection that it will not come in this way. Thus it happens that people do not want a solution. This is what it amounts to.

Dec. (Cont.)

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(Unclassified)

Another statement by Nehru outside this press conference declares: I said that no government desires German reunification under existing conditions except on its own terms, which are unacceptable to other governments. The result is a standstill which cannot be lifted as long as conditions do not change....

We regard Premier Nehru's statement as an altogether factual and well-considered pronouncement, the importance of which is not impaired by the fact that it was prompted by the question of a Western journalist. This is also confirmed by the fact that, according to a report of a big West German newspaper, an official high-ranking Indian Government spokesman stressed after the press conference that by his statement Nehru had only established two obvious facts: first, some governments actually do not desire reunification, and second, the Government of the Federal Republic cannot be in earnest with reunification when it insists that the two parts of Germany should only be reunited on the conditions of the Federal Republic, as these conditions are unacceptable to other powers concerned.

We understand the Indian Premier as meaning that he cannot now see any real possibility for reunification and that he is convinced that the governments of the great states too do not take any such real possibility into consideration under the present circumstances, particularly as the Government in Bonn is not abandoning its completely unrealistic concept of the conquest of the GDR. It must be said that the conditions which are put forward for reunification by the German militarists and the 25 groups of combines ruling in West Germany are completely unacceptable.

On the other hand, Premier Nehru also knows that the GDR Government does not adopt any rigid attitude of "all or nothing" in this question. The GDR is a worker-peasant state. It has, however, not demanded that West Germany become socialist, that the social system of the GDR be extended to West Germany. It merely insists that by means of negotiations between the two German states a way be found to create a peace-loving democratic Germany, in which German militarism is finally curbed....

One must ask what it was that upset the Bonn Government so and caused it to react with such nervousness and lack of relevance to the remarks of the Indian Premier. The Bonn Government and the circles behind it are upset because, as they have already

Dec. (Cont.) (Unclassified)

admitted, it is clear from Nehru's statement that he neither recognizes Bonn's claim to the exclusive representation of Germany today nor intends to recognize it in the future. After all this is no more than natural. In international questions of the utmost importance the position of the Indian Premier is one of neutrality. For this reason alone he cannot identify himself with the claim to exclusiveness of the West German Government.

Any other attitude would amount to siding with West German militarism, against the German people's interests. After all, the essence of the German people's national question lies in the existence of an unbridgeable gulf between ruling militarist forces in West Germany and the peaceful interests of the German people....

We would warmly welcome it if the Indian Government and the governments of the other Bandung conference states would press for the peace treaty with Germany being prepared at the coming summit conference and the chapter of World War II being closed at long last. This would usher in the new era of a peace-loving, democratic Germany."

points a more realistic approach. "Above all, I mean Dec. GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Koenig on the German Problem. (ADN release): "Ambassador Johannes Koenig, Deputy Foreign Minister (Unclassified) of the CDR, told Jacques Jean-Marie, the chief correspondent of AFP, in an interview, that the GDR was willing to contribute to the best of its ability to an understanding on the conclusion of a peace treaty and toward the lessening of international tension. Koenig replied positively to the question of whether the viewpoints of the two sides on the Berlin statute had come closer to each other. "I hold the view that the chances of bringing about a solution of the West Berlin problem, which already existed at the Geneva Conference, have further improved."

Koenig said: "President Eisenhower's statements that a solution must be found for the West Berlin problem which also takes into account the interests of the GDR, as well as Secretary of State Herter's recent statement that the position in West Berlin must be improved by an agreement, are valued by us because of their importance. However, it must be said that contrary to these gestures efforts have been made, especially in recent times, by Bonn and West Berlin circles to prevent the elimination of the abnormal situation in West Berlin."

Dec. (Cont.)

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(Unclassified)

ates would . . .

Koenig emphasized that the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states and the transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized, free city linked with it, would serve the justified interests of all concerned and of peace. The GDR Government has stated its view on this point with perfect clarity.

Ambassador Koenig described the impending visit of Nikita Khrushchev to France as an event of far-reaching importance toward a further lessening of international tension. "In this respect we agree with General de Gaulle, who recently voiced the expectation that in the course of 1960 a great human hope regarding the cause of peace would be fulfilled, and who pointed to the many indications of the beginning of a period of lessening of tension. In the national interest of the German people, the establishment of closer friendly relations between the Soviet Union and France could only be welcomed. It would undoubtedly constitute an important contribution toward the safeguarding of peace in Europe and in the whold world."

Koenig remarked that it must be noted that the statements of de Gaulle at his last conference concerning Germany showed on many points a more realistic approach. "Above all, I mean the confirmation of the definite character of the Oder-Neisse frontier between the GDR and the People's Republic of Poland, a view previously expressed by General de Gaulle in March 1959 in a quite definite manner. We, too, hold the view, that it is in the interest of our two peoples, the German and the French, to reject any revision of the results of World War II."

With reference to Adenauer's recent conversation with de Gaulle, Ambassador Koenig said to the correspondent: "Chancellor Adenauer came to Paris, and one of his purposes was to torpedo the summit conference, or at least to prevent a discussion of the German problem; that is to say, of the question of the peace treaty and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin. In this respect, as in other respects probably too, the result of the talks has by no means measured up to Adenauer's expectations."

The Ambassador emphasized that a summit conference would help liquidate the remnants of World Var II, and thus facilitate the conclusion of the peace treaty with the two German states. "As to the reunification of Germany, it can only be achieved if one proceeds from the fact of the existence of two states on the territory of Germany. Reunification can only come about by way of a rapprochement of these two states. The right of self-determination of the nations demands that this question, too, be solved by the Germans themselves, without interference by other states."

Dec. 14

Soviet Representation on WEU Relaxation of Certain Restrictions on FEDREP Armament. (Text from TASS): On December 14, a.m., (Unclassified) Timoshenko, the Soviet Charge d'affaires Ad Interim in the Federal Republic of Germany, called at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic and, on behalf of the Soviet Government, made the following statement:

The Soviet Government has appealed to the Federal Government more than once not to complicate international relations by all kinds of military and other activities and not to hinder the solution of important international problems.

It is common knowledge that the adoption of the decision on the arming of the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons and missiles has led to a dangerous heightening of tension in Europe and continues to impair international relations by obstructing the settlement of unresolved problems, including that of the unification of Germany, which is so important to the German people,

At the same time, this decision has by no means improved the international position of the Federal Republic of Germany, but has instead increased the European people's mistrust of its policy. policy.

One cannot fail to notice that as a rule the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany becomes more active in the military field just when a certain lowering of international tension is in evidence and when a prospect opens for closer contact between Eastern and Western nations. This is just the way things galass at are today. on fast severied susangevol felvol

A number of decisions to speed the rearming of Federal Germany have been taken lately within the framework of the West European Union. On October 21, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany received the consent of the Council of the Western European Union to West Germany's manufacturing certain types of rockets which, under the Paris agreements, the Federal Republic had undertaken not to make. Shortly before the decision of the Council of the West European Union was taken, the Federal Republic of Germany concluded an agreement with the United States on the delivery to Western Germany of equipment for the launching of missiles with nuclear warheads and on training Bundeswehr soldiers and officers in handling nuclear weapons.

> It has further come to light that the Government of Federal Republic of Germany proposes to start building large warships and submarines as well as various sea mines, this being

Dec. (Cont.) (Unclassified)

accompanied by an intention to equip the new warships with missiles. Judging by press reports, the Government of the Federal German Republic is seeking permission from its partners in the Western European Union to produce these armaments. Reports have also come to hand about the plans of the West European Union to set up so-called "joint European nuclear forces" to include the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Earlier, in an effort to justify West Germany's entry into the Western European Union and NATO, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany claimed that it would accept of its own free will some drastic cuts in the armament of the Federal Republic and would place them under effective control by its West European allies in those military groupings. Yet, the facts just cited indicate that in reality the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is using its membership in the Western European Union and NATO for the unceasing buildup of armaments and is resorting to any means in order to wipe out, one after another, the few limitations originally envisaged in the Paris agreements with respect to the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet Government emphasizes once more that these actions by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany run counter to the efforts of other states which strive to end the cold war and the armaments race and are in no way square with the Federal Government's own statements about advocating general disarmament as the major requisite for the reduction of international tension.

The Soviet Government believes that some successes in easing tension achieved in recent months have been a promising start in creating conditions for an enduring peace and establishing normal relations between states. Important discussions lie ahead which may take the states farther along in solving urgent international problems, including the most important of them-the problem of disarmament. The governments must relieve the relations between states of the burden of accumulated differences, to lay the foundations of enduring peaceful coexistence between states with differing social systems.

It would seem that on the eve of these discussions the efforts of all governments ought to be concentrated on removing the obstacles which might prevent success. At least it would be natural to expect each government to refrain from any steps which lead to fresh difficulties hampering an understanding.

Dec. (Cont.) This also fully applies to the Federal Republic of Germany The which should be no less interested than other countries in a (Unclassified) peaceful adjustment of postwar problems. However, the policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany gives no ground to believe that it would indeed want such an adjustment to be achieved at the coming summit meeting.

The Soviet Government, like the governments of other peaceloving states, believes that international security must not named no seem rest on the shaky foundation of the arms race and the socalled military balance, but on the sound foundation of fruitful and mutually advantageous cooperation, confidence and friendship.

The Soviet Government would like to draw the attention of the Federal Government to the responsibility it assumes before its own people and the peoples of other countries by seeking to keep up the arms race and to create obstacles to the liquidation of the vestiges of the world war caused by German recommended the militarism. a salat of V

It hopes that the Federal Government will consider once again the consequences to the interests of peace and the national interests of the German people which might arise from the armament measures taken in the Federal Republic of Germany. (Similar representations were made to other members of MEU).

Doc. Premier Otto Grotewohl on German Attendance at Summit. (State-14 ment read on East German Radio by announcer): "West German (Unclassified) Chancellor on December 8, 1959, declared before the CDU-CSU Is not smill and group of the Lower House that he wished to forego any participation in the East-West summit conference from the outset.

In the West German press this declaration has frequently been -sh and associating interpreted as indicating the German representatives will not take part in the summit conference. Such a presentation is not in accordance with the facts. First it must be pointed out that it is the inalienable right of the German people to participate in consultations on all questions touching on their interests. This right cannot be renounced, and no one, not even Herr Adenauer, can make such a renunciation.

The legitimate interests of the German people-- and this cannot be denied-can be expressed only by representatives of both German governments taking part in the solution of all questions concerning Germany. If Adenauer wants to forego

Dec. (Cont.) 14

participation in the summit conference, even though this conference will deal with German questions, the GDR Govern-(Unclassified) ment will speak for the citizens of the GDR and for all of Germany and will alone represent our people.

The GDR Government emphatically demands to be called into consultation dealing with any question concerning the GDR and the German people. The great powers have several times acknowledged that the representatives of both German states should participate in consultations of international conferences on German questions. This was laid down in the agreed communique of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in 1959.

The interruption of the deliberations in Geneva took place subject to the stipulation that they were to be resumed with the same attendance. In the interests of easing international tension, of concluding a peace treaty with both German states. and of removing the anomalous situation in West Berlin, the GDR Government will safeguard the national rights of the German people and will be ready to take part in the summit conference,"

Dec. and mort es 22

Deutschlandsender (Von Schnitzler) Commentary on Western Summit Results. (Excerpts): Bildzeitung calms down the gentlemen in (Unclassified) Bonn and Schoeneberg by saying that not an inch of ground has been yielded over Berlin. Telegraf thinks that during the Paris negotiations the Western powers reaffirmed their firm attitude regarding Berlin. Newspapers and radio stations in West Germany and West Berlin try to persuade their readers that the West is determined to leave everything in Berlin as it now is. We have heard enough of such protestations. especially when Eisenhower and Macmillan said something totally different. Invariably sentences were torn from context -- for instance, that the freedom of West Berlin must remain assured, or that the Western powers insisted on free access to West Berlin. From this the gentlemen in Bonn and Schoeneberg deduced that nothing would be changed in West Berlin.

However, since freedom in West Berlin has never yet been menaced from the East, since in not one of the proposals for settlement of the West Berlin problem was the possibility of disrupting free access even hinted at, such vigorous statements are very nice and very noncommittal. They do not invite contradiction from any side. To try to deduce from such questions the assertion that in West Berlin nothing need be or will be changed is a daring conclusion and is harshly contradicted by those passages of Western statements, which the press, calling for intransigence, prudently withholds from its readers.

## SECRET/NOFORN

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Dec. (Cont.) Couve de Murville said in Geneva that "West Berlin was not 22 part of the Federal Republic." President Eisenhower said at (Unclassified) his first press conference after the negotiations with Khrushchev that "the situation in Wast Berlin was abnormal." Christain Herter said a few weeks ago that "the new concept of US foreign policy consisted of an avowal of a policy of peaceful coexistence and aimed at laying down, along with the Soviet Union, some rules preventing a murderous atomic war."

The approximation between these points of view and those of the Soviet Union and the GDR is as unmistakable as the contradiction and the difference between the point of view of the West, veering more and more toward reality, and the attitude of Bonn and Schoeneberg...

The Brandt slogan, "The fate of 2 million Berliners is at stake," is a mistaken one. The fate of all of us is at stake. Hence - his proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin does not meet the point. To begin with, West Berlin is not part of the Federal Republic. The Western powers have expressly withheld their consent to paragraph two of article one of the West Berlin constitution, according to which West Berlin was to be a land of the Federal Republic. Secondly, Berlin is undeniably situated in the territory of the GDR, including its Western suburbs.

But the main point is that: A plebiscite on the question as to whether West Berlin is to be part of the Federal Republic or not lacks not only every legal basis and every basis under international law, but would be exactly the same as a plebiscite in Hanover to decide whether it should belong to Great Britain, or if the citizens of Aachen were to vote on Aachen becoming French. It is not only a matter of the wishes of the West Berliners, but at least as much the matter of the will of the 18 million Germans living around Berlin.

There will be negotiations about West Berlin, whether the Chancellor of the anti-Soviet zone, or the Buergermeister of the anti-Soviet sectors like it or not. Let the West Berliners To wise as live as they have lived hitherto, or whichever way they like. But the function of their part of the city as troublemaker must teem al noute be ended. " oblanco reve

Doc. ? GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Winzer on Western Summit Results. (Excerpt from interview carried in Neues Deutschland): "With (Unclassified) reference to the negative attitude of Chancellor Adenauer concerning German participation in the summit conference, State

Dec. (Cont.) (Unclassified)

Secretary Winzer says: "Discussion at a summit conference on Germans, on questions of a peace treaty with Germany, and on the question of West Berlin can only be held in the presence of Germans, and in genuine, free negotiations with the representatives of both German states. Fifteen years after the end of the war this claim of the German people is an inalienable part of their right to self-determination. This national claim ... we shall certainly not abandon. Provided this legal claim of the German people is met, the choice of the venue for a summit meeting is a secondary issue. At any rate the GDR Government is not prepared to leave it to foreign powers alone to settle the vital national issues of our people."

Dec. 22 (Unclassified)

Friedrich Ebert on a Solution to West Berlin Problem: (Excerpts from Mayor Friedrich Ebert's speech to city deputies of Greater Berlin on December 21). "In his speech at the ninth session of the City Deputy Assembly Friedrich Ebert said among other things: There are still unteachable persons who do not understand the signs of our times and who either refuse to understand or cannot understand because of mental impotence that the barometer points to peace and understanding. They want to continue to dance on the ice of the cold war. In Germany these forces are represented by the names of Adenauer and Brandt. They are outdoing each other in their hectic efforts to stop the wheel of history, to extinguish the spirit of understanding which they hate so much, and to torpedo a summit conference. They are secretely concerned that a "shift in emphasis" in the West Berlin question is beginning to be revealed and that there is a growing tendency among leading Western circles to treat the West Berlin question as an "isolated" problem and to see West Berlin no longer in connection with the Federal Republic, as the gentlemen in Bonn and in Schoeneberg would like.

Man and master alike:

In the Western world there is no longer a responsible statesman who does not call the situation in West Berlin abnormal. US Secretary of State Herter has also recognized the necessity of a new agreement on West Berlin. The governing administration chief of Schoeneberg, however, considers the situation in West Berlin as absolutely normal; as so wonderful that it should be preserved by all means. Obviously, Herr Brandt is still very sorry that he once hypocritically repudiated his role as a "troublemaker."

cerning Cerman participation in the number conference. State

Dec. (Cont.) In any case, he and his close party friends no longer make a secret of their intention to continue this role with all (Unclassified) energy. Their views were expressed, among others, by the Montagues as of Social Democratic Bundestag Deputy Schuetz who said at a party meeting in Reinickendorf that West Berlin must be and remain a troublemaker, even at the risk that the Western Powers will show little understanding for this fact. This is the view of the rightist SPD leaders in West Berlin and the basis of their policy. In this policy, they have assigned the tragic role to prevent the reunification of Germany to that part of the capital of the GDR which is dominated by them. This is the true view and the true policy of the rightist SPD leaders in West Berlin! This is the policy of Willy Brandt which is being demonstrated to him by his master, Dr. Adenauer.

The "Social Democrat," Willy Brandt is making one obeissance after the other to this Federal Chancellor who, according to a remark by the Social Democratic Bundestag Deputy Erler, does not want cooperation but demands submission. Obviously, the Federal Chancellor has given him a hint to stress even more the alleged affiliation of West Berlin to the Federal Republic.
To Brandt, Adenauer's wish is an order. Promptly, he again takes often refuted arguments from the old repertoire. Thus the season was the reasserted recently that West Berlin is an integral part of the Federal Republic. The otherwise so willing student of the Western occupiers should take more lessons from them. Article one, section two of the West Berlin constitution, according to which West Berlin is to be a land of the Federal Republic, has not been implemented to date. The Western Powers have expressly refused to approve this article. The violation of the Potsdam agreement and the old agreement on Berlin would be too striking. The same applies also to a similar attempt which was made in the Bonn basic law.

But most important for Herr Brandt and his followers seems to non no many be: "The internal security of the city" -- as he like to put it-- against elements hostile to freedom must be guaranteed with all available means." This means in good German increased notation terror against all forces which advocate peace and a peaceful and reasonable solution of the West Berlin problem, which will -alb anima and do justice to the interests of the people of Berlin. To this end, Brandt would like, at least for the duration of his life. to retain the Western occupiers in West Berlin.

Frontline city must become free city:

The City Deputy Assembly of Greater Berlin assumes the role of interpretor of the wishes which the entire population of Berlin Dec. (Cont.)

addresses to the statesmen who will participate in the summit conference, now proposed for April 1960. May they, in view (Unclassified) of the fact that Berlin is situated on the territory of the GDR; that the Western sectors of the city, 15 years after the termination of hostilities, are still subject to an occupation regime; that an abnormal and therefore very dangerous situation to the peace of the world has resulted from this unique case in the world, on the strength of the proposals of the GDR Government and Soviet Government, aspire to a solution of the West Berlin problem which will be in keeping with the interests of all people of the GDR capital and of peace in the world. The frontline city must be transformed into a demilitarized free city of West Berlin.

The reactionary forces in West Germany and in West Berlin, the imperialist and militarist German big bourgeoisie--whose miscalculations have already plunged the world twice into a murderous war and the German people into two national catastrophes, despite all tricks of psychological warfare and of stirring up revanchist and anticommunist feelings in a demagogical manner, will have to be convinced slowly but surely of the absolute hopelessness of their aggressive policy. The socialist camp and the forces of peace have meanwhile grown too strong. The longing for a permanent peace is too deeply rooted in the hearts of the people. Today, permanent peace is no longer a Utopia just as socialism evolved to reality from medit mort Utopia. eron sist bisode greigrood nastes

Dec. Soviet Broadcasts on Western Summit Results: Several commenta-23-24 tors interpret the Western summit communique reference to (Unclassified) German questions to mean that the West has returned to the "discredited package plan" presented at the Geneva Conference. A Sturua article in Izvestiya, read in Russian to Europe, says that Western refusal to discuss Berlin apart from the German problem amounts to making "solution of the Berlin question contingent on the unification of Germany" and thus "blocking such a solution." Pravda's Paris correspondent, quoted by TASS, says that the Western stand on Germany and Berlin makes "solution of any of these problems impossible." A German-language commentary by Vladimirov states that Adenauer's insistence on making disarmament dependent on the decisions taken on political matters shows that the Chancellor "obviously does not want disarmament either," and a New Times article reviewed by TASS says that Adenauer "tried hard" to make the West "denounce some of the positive results" of the Geneva Conference. he City Deputy Assembly of Greater Berlin assumes the role of

: interpretor of the wishes which the entire population of Berlin

Jan. GDR Premier Grotewohl on Adenauer Berlin Visit: (Summary of interview in Neues Deutschland) Grotewohl claimed Adenauer (Unclassified) planned visit to West Berlin "which lies in the territory of the GDR and neither belongs to the FRG nor is subject to being governed from Bonn" as a "renewed provocation" intended to hinder anew "the normalization" of the situation. The urgent need to solve the West Berlin problem is emphasized by the numerous Bonn and West Berlin efforts to prevent normalization of the Berlin situation. Among these are the intensified efforts to treat Berlin as a part of the FRG.

Referring to anti-Semitic incidents Grotewohl declared the support and promotion by Bonn of the many militaristic revanchist groups existing in West Berlin, together with the anomolous situation there, make it a ready ground for Fascist and anti-Semitic incitement. In addition he charged West Berlin spy organizations with attempting to carry on "Fascistanti-Semitic actions" in East Berlin and in the GDR.

In a speech in Gera on January 8 Grotewohl said that the Foreign Ministers! Conference at Geneva showed the impossibility of resolving German questions without the GDR and continued that if Adenauer does not appear at the Summit "we will represent the interests of all Germany there."

Jan.

GDR on Status of West Berlin: A spokesman of the GDR Foreign Ministry on January 20 made a statement in connection with (Unclassified) Bonn's efforts to justify the unlawful policy of the inclusion of West Berlin in the Federal Republic with "legal arguments." The spokesman placed unequivocally on record that the whole of Berlin is part of the territory of the GDR, since Berlin has at no time been a fifth occupation zone in Germany but was situated on the territory of the then Soviet occupation zone.

The spokesman stressed that at the Geneva Foreign Ministers! Conference French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville expressly confirmed that West Berlin has at no time been a part of the three Western zones of occupation in Germany. In agreement with US Secretary of State Herter and British Foreign Secretary Lloyd, Couve de Murville stated: "The Government of West Berlin has no direct link with the Government of the Federal Republic. The territory of West Berlin is not a part of the territory of the Federal Republic." chat West Berlin do with West Berlin a

The West German representative at the Geneva Conference did not contradict this. On the occasion of his visit to Bonn on (Unclassified) August 27, 1959, US President Eisenhower also pointed to the fact that West Berlin is situated 110 miles from the Federal Republic.

The GDR spokesman recalled that as early as the time of the setting up of the separate West German State in 1949, and in the years following, the Western Powers repeatedly confirmed in numerous documents that West Berlin is not of the Federal Republic.

Nor did the treaty dated May 26, 1952, and revised on October 23, 1954, between the Western Powers and West Germany on the rights and duties of foreign armed forces and their members in the Federal Republic refer to Berlin as belonging to the Federal territory. The GDR spokesman noted that the Bonn Government has been forced to acknowledge in documents which are binding under international law the fact that West Berlin is not part of the Federal Republic. For instance, the consular treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic does not include West Berlin within its ambit.

The spokesman declared with emphasis: "The whole of Berlin is part of the territory of the GDR for Berlin was at no time a fifth zone of occupation in Germany but was situated on the territory of the Soviet occupation zone. This follows unequivocally from the agreements of the four powers on the occupation and future treatment of Germany. With the foundation of the GDR and as a result of the declarations of the Government of the USSR of October 10-11, 1949, the functions incumbent upon the USSR within the territory of the Soviet occupation zone, developed on the organs of the GDR also in Berlin.

Both the March 1954 declaration of the Soviet Government on the relations between the USSR and the GDR and the agreement of September 20, 1955, on the relations between the GDR and the USSR and the correspondence pertaining to these documents proceed from the fact that Berlin is part of the GDR."

In view of this unequivocal legal position, the GDR spokesman described the untenable assertion made in Bonn and West Berlin as an attempt by means of the cold war to prevent an understanding on the normalization of the situation in West Berlin. The Geneva Conference made it clear that Bonn has nothing to do with West Berlin and unmasked the assertion that West Berlin is part of the Bonn state as a deceitful trick on the part of Bonn.

Jan. (Cont.) The spokesman emphasized in conclusion that the liquidation of 20 the anomalous situation in West Berlin is indispensable now as (Unclassified) before in the interest of the peace of the peoples of Europe.

Jan. GDR on Status of West Berline GDR Foreign Office published declaration entitled "West Berlin does not belong to Bonn," (Unclassified) Among the documentations cited to support this claim and not included specifically in the article next above were the

"" established a separate currency, set up the state of Western

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- 1. Documents from March 2 and April 8, 1949, in which Western occupation powers opposed integration West Berlin into FEDREP.
- and date to 2. Approval of Bonn Basic Law May 12, 1949, which stated West Berlin has no voting membership in either Bundestag or Bundesrat and will not be governed from the Federation.
- 3. Suspension by Western occupation powers in West Berlin on August 29, 1950 of West Berlin Constitution clause which would have declared Berlin is a State of the FEDREP.
- meed and one 4. Western High Commissioners' letters of October 23, 1954, to Chancellor included in Paris Treaties -- reiterating validity of Western reservations of May 12, 1949 to Basic Law.
- 5. Troop Stationing Agreement between Western Powers and FEDREP of May 26, 1952, as amended October 23, 1954 in which Berlin was not mentioned as being included in FEDREP territory.

Declaration also cited FEDREP-USSR consular treaty as evidence because Berlin was not included in territory in which treaty declared valid.

Soviet-GDR agreements cited were Soviet declarations of October 10 and November 11, 1949, when GDR "founded", statement of March 1954 on GDR-USSR relations, and GDR-USSR Treaty of September 20, 1955.

Jan. Ulbricht Letter to Adenauer: (excerpts) To the Chairman of the CDU/CSU, Herr R. Konrad Adenauer, Bonn:

(Unclassified)

The changeover in world politics from the cold war to coexistence which is becoming apparent and the especial need for us Germans to make a contribution toward an easing of tension have persuaded me to address myself to you.

I have--and I would like to say this guite frankly--no illusions about your past policy and about the aims of the Government directed by you. Since the time when the leading political forces of West Germany under your leadership established a separate currency, set up the state of Western zones, and embarked on rearmament, the clouds of a national misfortune have been gathering over Germany.

As far back as 1950 we proposed to you the setting up of an all-German council and the preparation of a peace treaty, since there is no other way to achieve reunification. Unfortunately you rejected at the time even the joint preparation of all-German, free, democratic elections, because you believed that rearmament and a policy of military pressure would force the annexation of the GDR. You replied to our proposals for a peaceful solution of the German problem with a coup d'etat by arbitrarily signing the Paris treaties and by joining West Germany to NATO, thus dismembering Germany.

In recent years and especially last year, the leadership of the CDU/CSU has sacrificed every chance of a reunification of Germany and every possibility of an international detente by its--I must say--very shortsighted armament and revenge policy. Everything that would serve the attainment of peace has been rejected by you. You have not failed to notice that this policy has resulted in the increasing isolation of West Germany,

Of course I am not writing to you because I am worried about the increasing isolation of your regime. Nor do you expect this from me. However, since you and your party leadership are still exercising power in West Germany, I must address myself to you. I do this because I want to leave nothing, absolutely nothing, undone to induce you and the members of your party from a road which is highly dangerous to the national interests of the German people and the peace of Europe.

The immediate occasion for writing this letter was the appearance of your Minister Strauss before NATO. This speech was in conformity with the political concept of the report of the work of your Government in 1959. Hardly had our people arisen from the catastrophe of the Hitlerite war when the Government of the West German Federal Republic once more began to lead the West German state onto this road. Unfortunately, your Government is setting to the West German army the same tasks which in the past were set to the Wehrmacht. Is it so very difficult to calculate that a policy of ruling militaristic circles, which has failed in two world wars, can only end in a still more terrible catastrophe during the present period?

It would be obviously futile to attempt to convince each other in regard to this, but I would still like to assume that it is not absolutely impossible to bring about a certain rapprochement on some fundamental questions which concern all Germans.

Jan. (Cont.) Is this actually your view, Herr Adenauer? Are you really

I am referring, for instance, to the life and continued existence of the German nation which is being endangered by your policy. I am referring in particular to the question of a nuclear war on German soil, in the prevention of which all Germans with common sense, irrespective of their ideology and party affiliation, ought to be interested. I still resist the assumption that you—like many of your closest collaborators—deliberately include in your political calculation a nuclear war on German soil, and this also means the physical extermination of a large part of the West German population, as Hitler in the past "had taken everything into account," which included, as you know, the downfall of the German people.

I think that everything must be done to prevent Germany becoming for the third time the starting point of a world war.

You will answer that you do not want a war. This is quite possible. Political rulers of the past have said the same. Even Hitler held the view that he could, step by step, without war subjugate one country after another to the rule of German militarism and fascism.

It is a contradiction to speak of peace and to speed up atomic armaments in West Germany. The experience of the German people teaches that such a process of rearmament, aiming at revenge, leads to ever greater conflicts and to war. But this time it is not a question of a war which can be compared with earlier wars. German rearmament and the war provocation inevitably emanating from West German soil as a consequence of the revenge policy means that, like a magnet, the inevitable counterblow is drawn to Germany. This would mean the destruction of the majority of the German people.

If I recall what your War Minister, Herr Strauss, said on December 16, 1959, at the Conference of Ministers of NATO about this decisive point, it seems to justify the worst fears. Herr Strauss declared in Paris, in connection with the demand for the atomic arming of the West German NATO army and the storing of nuclear warheads on German soil, the following: "Despite the dense population of the Federal Republic, we are ready to assume the burdens connected with it and to justify the risks arising therefrom before our own people."

Is this actually your view, Herr Adenauer? Are you really ready to defend before the German people, for instance, the risk of the physical extermination of a large part of the West German population in a nuclear war on German soil? Have you then, like your War Minister, taken account of all this in your political plans? I would like to demand a definite answer to this question.

But please do not come out with the stale nonsense that West
Germany needs atomic armaments because it is threatened or
because by means of atomic bombs it wants to avoid atomic war.
Nobody is threatening West Germany. Not one simple person in
the world believes that the Soviet Union or the GDR are
threatening West Germany. If you were to believe it yourself,
surely you are in a position to support such far-reaching
plans of general and complete disarmament as were expounded
by Premier Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev at the United Nations
and by taking part in the preparations for a peace treaty with
Germany, propose guarantees insuring a peaceful future of
Germany. Instead, you are the only Premier of Europe to make
frontier and revanchist demands...

Herr Adenauer, you have declared on several occasions that you are in favor of disarmament. I take you at your word. It is known to you that the Soviet Union through Premier Khrushchev submitted to the UN General Assembly a motion for general and total disarmament. Toward this proposal, the Soviet Union unilaterally gave the example of a reduction of the military forces by one-third. Is it not time that, in a situation where the leading statesmen are dealing with general and total disarmament and are taking serious steps to achieve disarmament and to eliminate foreign military bases, Germany undertook in particular an initiative of its own in regard to disarmament? Would it not spell good fortune for our German people if both states were to agree on complete disarmament?

What would be the consequences? The German people would live in peace. Thanks to their capacities they would achieve great things in peaceful work and therefore arrive at great prosperity. If in this way the book of the past is closed, friendly relations between the German people and all nations and states would develop. Our two German states, situated in the middle of Western Europe, would under the conditions of disarmament and the conclusion of a peace treaty achieve reunification by the shortest route.

artsing therefrom before our own people. "...

assume the burders connected with it and to justify the risks

the existence of facts whose existence everyone can see for

Jan. (Cont.) What about both German states agreeing to hold a referendum about general and complete disarmament and the bringing about (Unclassified) of a peace treaty on the basis of the UN Charter? ...

We judge as very grave the fact that you do not show any willingness whatever to play a part in a German contribution for the maintenance of peace and to take part in placing international relations in Europe on a sounder footing. If you, as you declare, desire peace, then it is lunacy to train the West German forces for a war of attack against the East and to store nuclear weapons on German soil. If you really do not want a nuclear war on German soil, then please prove this by deeds and help to see to it that atomic and hydrogen weapons of every kind are banished from German soil. Pious words are no good; only deeds will be recognized.

Let us discuss the subject frankly. For 10 years you have been conducting the cold war with the aim of obtaining, by undermining the GDR and by organizing a civil war in Germany by surprise attack, an occasion for a military march toward the East. You will not be able to deny that you have not achieved the aim of the cold war. Nor is it possible to achieve it. The population of the GDR is proudly looking on its 10 years of work and is firmly standing by its achievement, the first worker-peasant state of Germany.

From the historic struggle between the reactionary and the progressive forces in Germany, two states have emerged. One of the states embodies the traditions of German militarism and the policy of revenge. The other state embodies the finest humanist traditions of the German people and the realization of the aims of the German workers movement, which was founded under the leadership of Marx, Engels, Bebel and Liebknecht...

I do not want to argue with you as to which is the rightful German state, the state which represents the true national interests of the German people. The rightful German state can only be the one which is fighting according to the ideas of the anti-Hitler coalition against any resurgence of German militarism and fascism and by bringing about a peace treaty which makes possible the reunification of our German fatherland.

I fully understand your wish that there should be no GDR, for the fact of the existence of the GDR is for you and your political friends the greatest obstacle to continuing the old predatory and conquering policy of German imperialism. But you, too, ought to know that it is obviously senseless to deny

the existence of facts whose existence everyone can see for himself. I do not regard you foolish enough to assert that a rock on which you have dashed your nose does not exist. Nor does the rock need your recognition for its existence. Your Government is spending hundreds of millions to send gangs of spies and criminals to organize crimes in the GDR; this obviously is not a burden to your Christian conscience.

All these statements that you cannot negotiate with the GDR because you would thereby support an "impossible theory of two states" are surely empty words. It is not a matter of some kind of theory but of the fact that as a result of the Hitlerite war and the struggle for the liquidation of militarism and fascism in Germany two states have come into being. If you reject negotiations with the GDR you do so for the sole reason because you want to keep your hands free for a military aggression, for war. We know the plans of your war minister to step up atomic armaments in order to make a sudden attack on the GDR by way of a blitzkrieg...

First speak only of peace so as to push through rearmament; the opposition must be oppressed or its back so broken that it can no longer come forward. Foster the idea of revenge and propagate the aims of conquest of the time, linking them with protestations that these aims are only to be achieved by peaceful means. Finally, when the stage of completed rearmament has been reached, there follows the psychological preparation for the use of force and war.

Do you not also find, Herr Dr. Adenauer, that your regime has taken over this recipe without making much of a secret of it? First of all, you spoke only about peace and something was even said of the hand that should wither if it ever grasped the weapon. Then--to the accompaniment of tirades about peaceyou feverishly pressed forward with rearmament. In the beginning you indignantly rejected any idea of an atomic arming of the West German NATO army. Then followed the policy of atomic rearmament, coupled with the banning of the KPD and the banning and the persecution of many democratic organizations.

Hand in hand with it went the fostering of the idea of revenge and the propagation of aims of conquest while it was asserted at the same time that you only wanted to work for these aims with peaceful means. Who will believe that?...

It is inevitable that many people in West Germany who do not quite grasp the finer shades of your tactics feel encouraged who of and by your revanchist policy and even now display the true face

Jan. (Cont.) of German militarism and its racial hatred. If we take into account that this policy of yours is largely carried out by (Unclassified) persons who once before carried it out under Hitler, you need not be surprised that not only the citizens of the GDR but many nations and their governments are watching every step you make with the greatest suspicion and are marking the necessary preparations to nip in the bud a new aggression of German imperialism or -- in the case of governments in close relationship with you-are taking precautions so as not to be drawn into a suicidal adventure by you.

Herr Pr. Adenauer, you generally reject with indignation any comparison of your policy with the policy of the Hitler Government. You stress that you had not been a supporter of Hitler and that you had even been involved in certain conflicts with the Nazi regime. I do not mean to deny that. The fact, however, that you were not an open supporter of Hitler is for you, as can be seen, no obstacle for continuing Hitler's and bas policy of revenge and conquest with slightly different methods and partially taking into account the completely different international situation.

anotas and on the fertile soil of your militarist-clerical regime, fascist restoration and anti-Semitism are growing. Nearly all sections of your state apparatus, including the police and the judiciary and also schools, colleges, literature, and so forth, are gripped by this fascist restoration.

The fact that your government is not openly professing anti-Semitism is most certainly not to be regarded as its merit. Anti-Semitism has discredited Germany to such an extent that only hidebound fascists are putting their money on that horse. But the swastikas on synagogues, desecrated cemeteries, and defiled monuments of the victims of Hitlerism are showing all too clearly how thickly this weed is growing in your allegedly liberal and democratic garden of roses...

I would like to say quite frankly: The aggressive imperialist and militarist plans pursued by you, your Government, and your general staff are a menace to the national future of the German people. It is absolutely incomprehensible to me how you can believe that you can achieve any kind of success with such an aggressive policy. The ruling circles of Germany have plunged our people into two war catastrophes. Is it not obvious that Germany can never prosper on the road of force and of war?

I have told you already that your plans are well known to us and that not only the GDR but also our allies are taking the requisite security measures. Since it seems that you do not want to listen to the warnings of the Soviet Government and the Government of the GDR and are wrongly interpreting our desire for peace, I would like to tell you in front of the public: If the Government of the West German Federal Republic does not cease its atomic armament within a short time and apply the armament ban, the Government of the GDR will be compelled to take the requisite defense measures and will request its allies to place rocket weapons at its disposal. By atomic war armaments and revenge policy, you are driving us straight into a position where we must take protective measures..

If you cannot be convinced by other arguments, it is to be hoped that the presence of modern rockets on the soil of the GDR will help you to realize that all your revenge plans are once and for all condemned to failure. No person gifted with reason who is able even to some extent to estimate soberly the balance of strength in the world can doubt that only a few minutes after a military attack on the GDR, Bonn and some other military centers in your West German state would cease to exist.

What is it you want to achieve with your policy of aggression? Do you absolutely want radically to speed up the end of capitalist rule over West Germany? We certainly have no reason to prolong the rule of monopoly capitalism over West Germany or to regret the downfall of this rule. We do not fight for peace to prolong this rule. But we do not want a war. We want to preserve the German people from the misfortune of an atomic war on German soil.

For this reason we are entering into discussions even with you, although we correctly estimate your plans. For this reason we try to persuade you to turn back. And if human reasons will not meet with any response from you, we still hope that you have retained the ability of realistically appraising the balance of strength.

I would like to give you a piece of advice: Throw your plans for a campaign of conquest against the East into the wastepaper basket. Consider for once seriously the atomic inferno you would bring on the West German population and also on your children and grandchildren if your policy were to work. Do not play with atomic war; revoke the atomic arming of the West German NATO army. Allow the West German population the right to decide on atomic arming and on the peace treaty ...

You should at long last see reason and give up playing the part of the eternal troublemaker in regard to the preparation and holding of the summit conference and possible subsequent international conferences at which the question of a detente and an understanding would be discussed. If the representatives of the United States realize that the continuation of the policy oriented toward war is tantamount to national suicide, that it is necessary to shape a course toward the peaceful competition of countries with different orders of society, then it ought to be possible for you and your political friends to see reason...

It is difficult for us to understand that you and your War Minister Strauss are taking up a position against the German national state. Obviously you are guided by the interests of the 25 industrial groups in West Germany which under the cloak of supranational union are striving for foreign regions for the purpose of exploitation. What good do your relations with the capital groups of Western countries do to the German people? What has the joining of West Germany to NATO brought for the German people but the deepening of the division of Germany?

Please think for once of Germany. Here in Germany and not in Paris within NATO are the roots of the strength of the future, the peace-loving democratic Germany. Listen to the voice of the West German population yearning for a peaceful solution of the German problem. It runs counter to the national feelings of our people that you are orienting yourself toward "little Europe" and have abandoned the cause of the reunification of Germany.

What good would a supremacy of the Bonn Government in Western Europe be to the German people, which after all would only be built on sand? The peaceful solution of the German problem is the greatest national task facing the German people. Think of Germany; help to make use of the great chance given to the German people by the summit conference and the international conferences likely to follow ...

The proposal of the Soviet Union to provide by a peace treaty the basis so that the German people themselves can carry out reunification on a peaceful and democratic basis is in conformity with the national interests of our people and renders possible a peaceful future of our nation.

President Eisenhower said in his speech at New Delhi that wars are made by men, by men influenced by a complex of the past, the dead past, by men who believe that it is possible to settle

the problems of mankind by force. The political leaders in West Germany must free themselves of the dead past. They must, as President Eisenhower said, forget the past and jointly advance into the future...

We demand that the bog of agents and spies in West Berlin is eliminated and that this potential focal point of a new war is turned into a peaceful free city of West Berlin, whose inhabitants themselves decide about the order in their city. This aim will be achieved sooner or later in the interests of the security and freedom of the West Berliners and in the interest of peace in Europe.

Even though you have rejected all proposals, we have always endeavored to arrive at cooperation between the two German states. We have even invited you to pay a visit to the GDR in the assumption that a return visit by Otto Grotewohl, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, to West Germany could take place. All these proposals you have rejected...

We are willing to conclude, in connection with a treaty about the renunciation of force and the setting up of an all-German committee, an agreement about mutual noninterference. This would be useful for a rapprochement of the two German states.

I assume that you understand very well that, with rocket technology having reached such a high level, the question is war
or peace. You know very well that after the stand made by
your War Minister Strauss and the revenge policy developed in
West Germany you cannot say that you are not responsible for
the military provocation, just as you now say that the Bonn
Government had nothing to do with the anti-Semitic campaign
of the Nazis...

Consider thoroughly whether it is not also in your interest if representatives of both German states seek as early as possible an opportunity to deliberate in an all-German committee, composed of equal numbers of representatives, how peace for Germany can be insured, a peace treaty prepared, and the division of Germany overcome step by step.

In the hope that this letter will induce you to think over matters seriously and will promote an open and sober exchange of views on "peace or war" and about the reunification of our German fatherland into a peace-loving, democratic, progressive state, I remain, W. Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR.

(Unclassified)

Ulbricht Comments to Press on His Letter to Adenauer: Last Monday my letter to Herr Adenauer, Chairman of the CDU/CSU, the ruling West German party, was delivered. This was done by post, since at present the only relations between the two parts of Germany are postal relations. I had to write this letter because the military plans of the leader of the West German CDU/CSU, who is also the head of the Government, threaten great dangers for our German people. No sooner have our people risen from the catastrophe of World War II than the leading political forces in West Germany are again leading the West German state onto the same disastrous path. Herr Adenauer assigns to the West German armed forces the same tasks that Hitler assigned obulonce of to the Wehrmacht...

GDR workers and members of the intelligentsia have understood that the letter "ruthlessly exposes the plans of the militaristic circles of the Federal Republic." One worker said: "Herr Adenauer should learn to come at last at a realistic appraisal of the balance of power. Walter Ulbricht has told him that quite clearly and plainly."

Some West German SPD papers are right in pointing out that the letter was couched in very outspoken terms. Indeed, the situation makes it necessary that its entire gravity should be impressed upon Herr Adenauer and the West German people in outspoken terms. Herr Adenauer speaks to the GDR and the people's democracies in the language of atomic armaments. We have spoken to him in a human language, suggesting negotiations with us on total disarmament. In view of the fact that the GDR Government and People's Chamber has so far addressed 108 offers of conciliation to the Bonn Government and the Lower House, the time has now come to depict in impressive terms the great peril with which West German militarism and fascism are threatening the German people.

The immediate occasion for my letter was the stand taken by West German War Minister Strauss at the Paris meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers and the directives for the West German maneuvers in the autumn of 1959. There was, too, Herr Adenauer's statement against West German participation in the Summit Conference and his opposition to reunification. There was also last week the Government's emergency bill and the draft plans for the evacuation of large parts of the population from West Germany...

The West German General Staff starts from the concept of the "offensive military alliance between the United States and West Germany." Herr Strauss blurted out in Bonn what this means.

I am quoting his very words: "To begin with we shall make our military contributions to NATO. But once the <u>Bundeswehr</u> is ready for action we shall talk in plain German to the harebrained Moscow fellow travelers and apostles of a detente, and we will show them who is really in charge of NATO."

So this concept is aimed at securing for the German militarists a predominant position within NATO by 1960-61 at the latest. Herr Strauss said in this connection of October 31, 1958, that it is necessary in the first place, until 1960 to create the impression of West Germany being the keenest and most willing advocate of the concept of full military and economic integration until such time as West Germany is ready to conclude a military assistance pact with the United States. By acquiring military strength--I am again quoting Strauss' words-"West Germany will be the most clear-cut military and economic power in Western Europe and will exert decisive influence."

In this policy the Bonn Government relies on the cooperation in the army of the former Nazi officers, who formed the majority of officers, and on the cooperation outside the army on the political and military reserves of a variety of paramilitary organizations. The political actions of the HIAG organization, the welfare association of members of the former Waffen SS, throws into relief the part fascism is playing in West Germany...

The speech delivered by Meyer, the so-called panzer Meyer, chairman of the HIAG, contained the following remarks about the Bonn state: "We wish to enter the state by the front door since the democratic principles of the constitution give us this right." Meyer also said: "The Waffen SS insists that democracy should at last live up to its theories so that we can all believe in democracy. We promise this democracy that we shall step hard on the toes of its enemies." When this speech was made, Poehler, member of the SPD Lower House group, and Zoglmann, member of the FDP group, were present on behalf of their parliamentary parties.

It is fully in harmony with the spirit of the HIAG that West German Minister of the Interior Schroeder recently introduced the emergency bill which authorizes the militarists to suspend essential democratic provisions of the basic law. This emergency bill and the draft decrees were already applied at the staff command post exercise held at the end of 1959. This proves that it is not parliament, but the so-called Federal Defense Council has the decisive say in Bonn. It may be stated that the leaders of the West Germany army have not learned anything from Hitler's war...

The Soviet Government's proposal for general and complete disarmament which was made by Soviet Premier N. S. Khrushchev (Unclassified) at the meeting of the UN General Assembly, the more recent decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet to cut the size of the forces by one-third, and the proposal for the conclusion of a peace treaty with West Germany show that nobody in Europe intends to attack West Germany.

The GDR Government and people welcome the decision of the Supreme Soviet. They are in favor of a peace treaty being concluded as soon as possible, so that all foreign troops can be withdrawn from Germany and foreign bases removed. We ourselves in the GDR have reduced the size of our forces to 90,000, and we are not taking part in the arms race. The Bonn Government has no valid case for its policy of atomic armament.

Today, when militarists and fascists in West Germany are on the point of determining political developments in order to bring a third catastrophe upon our homeland, we conscious of our patriotic responsibility, are calling upon all peace-loving Germans, all parties and organizations, to come to an understanding and arrive at a national compromise, a compromise uniting the forces of the peace against the forces of militarism and fascism. We suggest to Herr Adenauer that he avail himself of the big chance arising from the preparations of a summit meeting to bring about a lessening of tension in Germany, too.

I suggest that negotiations should start within two weeks between representatives of the Federal Government in Bonn and the GDR Government in Berlin on ending the cold war, on refraining from atomic armaments in Germany, on a cessation of armaments, on refraining from the possession of rocket bases, on a nonaggression pact, and on the strength and stationing of the armed forces of the two states. By a nonaggression pact we mean a contractual agreement by which the two German states renounced the use of force against each other and undertake to do everything to bring about a peaceful solution of the German question.

We ask Dr. Adenauer, as the Chairman of the CDU/CSU, to give serious consideration to these proposals. We have not made any proposals which are linked to the philosophies or the political objectives of the parties, but merely proposals which any party that claims to be a German party will consider sloon was a suitable basis for negotiations in accordance with the national interest of our people. It is now up to the Bonn Government to reply. ..

Ulbricht recalled that Hitler, too, had wanted to swallow one country after another. In a similar way the Adenauer Govern-(Unclassified) ment is counting on being able to conquer first the GDR and then other countries. It is speculating on the possibility of a geographically limited blitzkrieg, hoping that the world would stand for this. Ulbricht stressed: "But the international situation is not what the plans of the West German General Staff and Government assume it is." Any attack on the GDR would spark off an immediate devastating counterblow. His letter to Adenauer was published, among other reasons, to help the West German people in their efforts to dampen the fire of the hotheaded aggressors.

A correspondent asked the meaning of the term, "nonintervention," which appeared in the letter to the Bonn Chancellor. Ulbricht replied that once the two German states set up an all-German committee and end the cold war and once the two sides renounce the use of force there will no longer be a reason for the GDR to bother about conditions in West Germany.

Walter Ulbricht reemphasized that the setting up of a confederation of the two German states is the only way to reach an understanding and a rapprochement. The two German states can certainly make economic and cultural agreements. Ulbricht emphatically reiterated that he has never intended to introduce communism in West Germany. "We do not even have communism here in the GDR. We shall be completely satisfied if militarism is curbed in West Germany."

When asked when and where the negotiations between the representatives of the two German states should be held, Ulbricht said agreement on this could be reached very quickly since postal contacts exist and since interpreters would not be required. He said he was convinced that despite the previous negative attitude of the West German Government, there would certainly be an exchange of letters. He said he was prepared to publish in the GDR the full text of a letter Adenauer might write to him, but this presupposed that his letter would be published in West Germany ...

With the statement "we cannot pick and choose our partners for negotiations," Ulbricht reaffirmed the readiness of the GDR to discuss questions concerning peace and German unity with anybody prepared to work for the peaceful solution of the problems concerned. To the correspondent of the West Berlin Telegraf, who referred to suggestions regarding a zone of limited armaments which the SPD had made in the Lower House, Ulbricht said: "Such problems can best be clarified by people sitting at a roundtable."

When asked by the woman correspondent of the Daily Worker about the reaction of the Western powers to the Bonn war plans, (Unclassified) Ulbricht pointed out that the Western powers were recognizing the existence of two German states. They had shown this at the Geneva Conference and had indicated that they were not inclined to support the West German revenge plans and demands for frontier revisions ...

We have previously stated that we favor a zone of thinned-out armaments. As to what countries should be included, this is something that could be left for the negotiations.

As regards the withdrawal of foreign troops, I think it would be simplest to tackle this question by reaching an understandwind and ing on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the European countries and the liquidation of all foreign bases. This, I end no basis withink, would be the simplest method. Nobody would be at a disadvantage and nobody at an advantage.

All foreign troops withdraw, all foreign bases are eliminated, and the peoples themselves can settle in a democratic manner their internal order and their relations with other countries. If they wish their various countries, for the time being, to remain members of the respective blocs, all right. This is something on which understanding can be reached. It is blow and branch correct to say that the Bonn Government will be compelled to give serious thought to our proposals and to the balance of forces.

In my view, what matters now is not the precise text of the individual proposals; the most important thing is that the representatives of the countries concerned sit down together pological for talks, such as has already been initiated on an inter-- remod when a national level ... sold log- remod when a componer

If one honestly wants reunification, one must first create a basis, that is to say, a common basis. The only possible basis for reunification is a peace treaty. I cannot imagine that reunification could come about without a peace treaty, -december of without the creation of such a common basis. That is why we have welcomed the fact that the USSR has raised the question of a peace treaty, not only from the point of view of the preservation of peace, but also because a peace treaty (would provide?) the basis for reunification, rapprochement, and understanding between the two German states ...

Where is the way out? What is the long-term prospect? The peaceful solution of the German question begins with the (Unclassified) renunciation of any policy of revenge and the use of force. Hence, we turn to the West German people to tell them openly: Fifteen years after World War II the chapter of war must be closed. That means that the hotbeds of danger created by the cold war and West German atomic armament must be removed by an understanding between the two German states. It is pointless and dangerous for West German politicians to try to reverse the defeat of Hitler Germany and its consequences. The two German states must adopt a realistic attitude and give up the idea of one enforcing its social system on the other.

What decisive action can lead to the solution of the national problem of the German people? The new starting point can only be the conclusion of a peace treaty. The two German states, assuming equal rights and duties, thus take their stand on the ground of peace, renouncing military armament and the use of

The peace treaty would be the real basis for successful work by an all-German council -- or an all-German commission, irrespective of what name is given to this body. Cooperation could begin with the questions of safeguarding peace, of bringing about a rapprochement and understanding on current questions of foreign policy. Gradually an understanding would come about on internal German questions.

How are the two social systems to cooperate? The two parts of Germany can arrive at cooperation and, subsequently, reunification by forming an all-German council or an all-German commission reflecting the character of a confederation of the two German states. If leading West German political circles renounce their power-politics aims and overcome their powerpolitics fears, cooperation is possible, even though two different social systems exist. For instance, trade in Germany could be expanded. Joint major investments could be made in Asian and African countries with the GDR acting as go-between...

If President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, the representatives of two states with fundamentally different social systems, discuss the necessity of a detente, why is this not possible between the premiers of the two German states? Once a point has been reached when the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany and the transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city are a subject for discussion at the Summit Conference, is it not then the duty of the responsible

politicians in Germany to get together to arrive at rapprochement between the two German states before the Summit Conference meets? Only a national compromise can insure a peaceful and happy future for Germany...

We appeal to Herr Konrad Adenauer, Chairman of the ruling West German party, the CDU, to get off the thin ice on which he and his friends are standing and to take up a position on the foundation of peace and democracy.

We began in 1945 to set up a firm basis for peaceful development in Germany. In Berlin an antifascist, democratic administration was set up after 1945 without active Nazis and without blood-judges. We began to form a grand coalition comprising not only Communists and Social Democrats, but even German nationalists like Professor Sauerbruch, Dr. Schiffer, former Prussian Minister of Justice, Hermes, former leader of the center party and later CDU Chairman, and so on.

Today after the West German Government has again chosen the road of war preparations, we are addressing a timely appeal to all peace-loving Germans, to all parties and organizations, to bury their ideological and political differences in reaching agreement on the joint struggle for the safeguarding of peace, so as to make a German contribution to the preparation of the Summit Conference. We consider a national compromise between the forces of peace on the formation of the confederation of the two German states to be both possible and necessary. We regard the realization of this national compromise as our most urgent patriotic task...

Jan.

Khrushchev Note to Adenauer on Disarmament: (Delivered at Bonn by Ambassador Smirnov.) Esteemed Herr Federal (Unclassified) Chancellor: I have received and carefully read your letter of January 8. Mindful of your advice, I reread your previous letter, too. Now I want to tell you what I think of some points in your last letter and, partly, of those of the previous one. ofgreened and to some transla fact.

> In messages to you I have already referred to the way we look at the solution of the general disarmament problem. May I repeat that we regard this as the primary issue before all mankind today.

The issue of war or peace depends, above all, on the solution of the problem, and should a war break out in the present con-(Unclassified) ditions it would develop into a world war. This is why disarmament has assumed so supreme an importance. Not only does the Soviet Union recognize the supreme importance of this issue, but it is taking concrete steps toward settling it.

At the last session of the UN General Assembly the Soviet Government put forward a proposal for complete disarmament. We made our position clear. The Soviet Union stands for complete disarmament under comprehensive international control so that no nation which might be untrue to its commitments could secretly raise armed forces and jeopardize other peoples by confronting them with a fact of armed aggression.

To our satisfaction the General Assembly has received the Soviet proposals sympathetically, approved the idea of general and complete disarmament, and submitted our proposals for consideration by the 10-nation committee. At the present time the Soviet Union is preparing to take an active part in the work of the 10-nation committee and hopes that other nations will approach the question of general and complete disarmament in the way the interests of peace require.

However, the Soviet Union's position is not one of wait and see. Although little time has passed since we submitted the proposal for general and complete disarmament, we, unilaterally, of our own accord, adopted at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on January 15 the decision to refuce our armed forces by one-third, without waiting for a meeting of the 10-nation committee. How many instances have there been lately of other countries taking such concrete steps indicating their sincere desire to attain international agreement on complete disarmament and create all the conditions for it, except the aforementioned decision of the Soviet Union? I believe there have been no such instances as yet.

Unfortunately some statesmen are trying to downgrade the international significance of this peaceable act of the Soviet Union. They contend that this is not disarmament but rearmament -merely a switch from one kind of armaments to another -- on the grounds that as a result of manpower cuts the firepower of the Soviet Union will not diminish.

> Submitting the proposal to reduce the armed forces of the Soviet Union by 1.2 million men, we ourselves said outright that we would have been unworthy of the confidence of our people had

our unilateral disarmaments measures weakened the defense potential of our country, which would tempt aggressive forces (Unclassified) to attack the Soviet Union and other socialist countries--our allies.

One need not be too wise to see the simple truth: A nation contemplating an act of aggression would never start reducing its armed forces. Any military man will agree that whenever an attack is being prepared no company is one too many.

While reducing the numerical strength of the armed forces we do not intend to reduce their firepower without such a reduction and with the same firepower the Soviet Union would, naturally, be a more powerful military force. I think this must be clear not only to the military but also to any person capable of sound reasoning and willing to understand properly the crux of the matter.

These are practical, far-reaching acts of the Soviet Union in the field of disarmament. Naturally, we are expecting other states to react accordingly and to take similar practical steps in this field. Only given the great and earnest determination of all the parties concerned and their willingness to go over to concrete action will a solution assuring total general disarmament be achieved.

To get on with the issue of disarmament, I want to reply to a specific question in your letter, that is, why under the Soviet proposals, international control should be widened as disarmament progresses. Our proposal on this subject is quite natural and logical. I shall explain it. -mi ton a

The Soviet Government considers that an agreement on total general disarmament should be accompanied by the institution of stringent international control over the progress of disarmament, rather than "control" in itself, isolated from disarmament; for all such control could lead to under present conditions is a mutual gleaning of intelligence information without ever bringing about disarmament at all. We believe that the purpose behind international control is to see whether all the nations really carry out the disarmament measures provided for by the treaty at any given moment, the inspection being extended to the very establishments covered by these measures, and not anything else which has nothing to do with this.

In view of the fact that with every new phase in the implementation of the treaty disarmament measures will become ever wider and far-reaching, it is but natural that control, too, will become ever wider.

This is how we pose this question in our proposal. As to the demand for establishing comprehensive control from the very beginning, regardless of disarmament measures being carried out, such a demand is absolutely unrealistic in the present conditions and can have only one purpose: to prevent agreement on disarmament.

Now about your position on the German question: It goes without saying that for Germans this question is of particular importance. It interests many other peoples as well, although naturally not to the same degree as the question of general disarmament. Whatever one may say, in comparison with the task of general and complete disarmament, whose solution literally all states of our planet are vitally interested in, the German question is a specific question in which chiefly the German people are concerned. We sympathize with the German people and want the German question to be solved, and on a just basis at that. That would also help to improve the climate in Europe.

However, Herr Federal Chancellor, we differ in our understanding of the German question as well as of ways to settle it.
In your letter you raise the question of self-determination of
peoples and quote my words to the effect that in each country
the people themselves decide their destiny and choose the road
of their development and that the Soviet Union does not impose upon anyone the way it has chosen. I am ready to repeat
this now.

The Soviet Union practically demonstrates its respect for the right of Germans to self-determination. Take for instance the proposal of the Soviet Government to sign a peace treaty with Germany. Would not the signing of a peace treaty in the present situation be a concrete expression of the recognition of the Germans' right to decide themselves the road of their national development? Withdrawal of foreign troops, Germans' entry into the United Nations, unlimited possibilities for peaceful economic development, restoration of the Germans' complete sovereignty in their domestic and foreign affairs and insurance of their right to decide independently problems of vital importance to the German people, creation of prerequisites to bring together the two German states and thus facilitate the possibility of restoring the country's unity—that is what a peace treaty means to Germany.

Consequently, it is precisely the principle of selfdetermination that makes it necessary to sign a peace treaty with Germany, and since there is no single German Government, the peace treaty has to be signed with the two German states to end the vestiges of World War II.

To reunify Germany into a single state is a matter which the Germans alone are in a position to settle. The historical conditions which developed since World War II have brought two German states with different social systems into existence in Germany.

You, Herr Federal Chancellor, do not recognize the German Democratic Republic and you shrug it off whenever anyone reminds you of its existence. Yet the GDR does not cease to exist because of that. This republic is successfully developing, and, if the demands of commonsense are to be reckened with, the real facts of history must be recognized and a policy shaped accordingly.

To be frank, I find it difficult to understand the meaning you read into the principle of self-determination. If you mean the reunification of Germany, then how do you propose to settle this question while opposing the establishment of contacts between the two German states and governments? You evidently want this question of vital concern to the Germans to be settled not by themselves but by representatives of other countries.

But where does self-determination come in then? What you urge in fact is that the will of some nations should be imposed on others, which is diametrically opposed to the policy of self-determination. Self-determination means that the people of one nation or state should themselves decide the destiny of their state. But since there are two states in Germany today the population of either of them is entitled to shape its destiny as it sees fit; that is, in the way that most suits its interests.

Legislative bodies have been elected more than once both in the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR. People's Chamber and local government elections in which the people are free to express their will are periodically held in the GDR. Voting is by secret ballot. Some 11,717,000—that is, 98.9 percent of the electorate, took part in the last People's Chamber elections in 1958. Some 99.87 percent of the votes were cast for the candidates of the National Front of democratic Germany and 0.13 percent against.

Is this not, to you, a sufficiently convincing expression of the will of the population of the GDR, which has firmly embarked upon the road to socialism?

You say the Government of the Federal Republic is dissatisfied with the existing situation and would like to create a united German state. It would be natural in this respect to establish contact with the Government of the GDR and to find by agreement a mutually acceptable solution to the problems affecting both German states.

Since the Government of the Federal German Republic is unwilling to meet the Government of the GDR, and even recognize it,
I for one cannot very well see at the moment how you are
going to achieve reunification. That you do not want so much
as to meet is the first sign of there being no way of
achieving agreement.

I am a private individual so far as reunification is concerned, just as, incidentally, you are when it comes to solving the Berlin problem. That is why I can speak my mind quite freely without committing myself to anything, since reunification is not a matter for some third states to settle but the task before the two German states and the German people as a whole—one before the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany.

No can I fail to comment on your position with respect to the peace treaty. Why is the Soviet Union insisting on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany? We believe that as the war ended, and it is now 15 years since then, there is no reason for delaying the signing a peace treaty. You say that in many cases former enemies have become even intimate friends. This is right. But why then not get over with all that is left of the last war-sign a peace treaty and set things right in this way?

Your Ministers and other officials of the Federal Republic often insist in their public speeches that Germany's present frontiers should not be recognized. These pronouncements may perhaps be said to be at variance with your opinion. But how then is one to square their actions with your remark that you would never tolerate a revenge-seeking Minister in your Government?

General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, has recently stated that Germany's frontiers are final. He came under much fire from the Federal Republic for that statement.

In that case, what is the Federal German Government contemplating? A revision of the frontiers? But you cannot fail to know that the frontier drawn as a result of the war and fixed in the allied agreements cannot be revised at the signing of a peace treaty. Indeed, can anyone seriously believe that Czechoslovakia or Poland will give up, all of a sudden, their Western territories? Certainly that will never happen. So there is only one conclusion, and this is that those who reject a peace treaty and propose re-drawing the frontiers hope they will have a chance to settle the issue by force. But that means starting a war. If you say you do not want that, why are you, then, hesitating to recognize the existing frontiers and sign a peace treaty, there can be no two opinions on this.

Maybe you expect to persuade Poles, Czechs and Slovaks to renounce their western lands? That is your affair. If you really have this idea, contact representatives of these states. Universally known, however, are the repeated statements of the governments of these countries to the effect that they, like ourselves, consider their frontiers to be final, permanent and not subject to any revision.

As I see it, the objections of the Federal Government to a peace treaty are largely prompted by the fear that it would destroy the basis for a revenge-seeking policy. You refuse to recognize facts although you say that you are not inimical to socialism and even communism. But how can these words of yours be reconciled with the stubborn refusal of the Federal Government to establish normal relations with socialist countries? Is it not a fact that now you do not have diplomatic relations with either the Czechoslovak Republic, the Bulgarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, or any other socialist state except the Soviet Union?

Nothing but enmity for and fear of communism permeated your latest pronouncements in Italy when you once more resorted to the notorious "communist menace" bogey. Your talk about West Germany's "special mission" in the fight against communism cannot but evoke memories of the most sinister aspects of Germany's recent past.

No, Mr. Federal Chancellor, you hate socialism and communism. And this is just why you pushed through dragon-like antidemocratic laws, which in essence differ little from those that existed under Hitler. You have outlawed the Communist Party; you put people on trial for their thoughts, for their

progressive convictions. Recently, I had a conversation with your Ambassador and he gave me a rather peculiar explanation of this matter. He said that members of the peace committee who have been put in the dock in the Federal Republic use this committee only as a cover and in reality are members of the Community Party. I do not know who they are--Communists or simply progressives who take the national interest of the country close to heart. Be that as it may. But are members of the Communist Party outcasts? Communists are representative of the working class who have their own views on the social and government system. Why should they be deprived of elementary human rights? In your state they are deprived of these rights because on this question, the question of the state system, your positions are essentially those which Hitler held, although you declare that you yourselves were martyrs of the Hitler regime. Yes, it is true, Hitler's terror did not spare you. But it was much more cruel to Thaelmann and other German Communists. Apparently Hitler's treatment of people of your circle differed from the treatment he meted out to active fighters for a democratic Germany.

Mr. Adenauer, in the conditions which have been created in West Germany, fascist, Hitlerite elements have been spurred to activity and are making themselves increasingly felt. They are spreading the poison of hatred and anti-Semitism. The spider of the swastika is again crawling out of its nest.

This evoked the indignation of the peoples. I repeat that this could have happened only in the conditions of a favorable attitude to and encouragement of fascist elements. I believe, Mr. Federal Chancellor, that you understand this question right. However the leaders of the Federal Republic make smearing allegations to the effect that Communist organizations are conducting a racist anti-Semitic campaign, that Communists are distributing anti-Semitic leaflets, making fascist inscriptions, etc.

Such contentions show the hard position you have found yourself in, Mr. Chancellor, if you and other Federal Republic leaders are using such unworthy methods and tell in your speeches such ludicrous, to say the least, stories.

Sober-minded people throughout the world know that Communists have always fought against fascism, always defended the interests of the working people, the equality of all peoples, and no slander will refute that. No one will believe that Communists engage in provocations. noughts, for their

Jan. (Cont.) I should not like to make any reproaches or say any offending words. If I frankly told you my opinion about the order (Unclassified) obtaining in West Germany, I believed that would only help us understand each other better.

In your letter, Mr. Federal Chancellor, you raise the question of West Berlin. I will allow myself a few remarks in this connection.

You write that the reunification of Germany would automatically solve the Berlin question. In this I fully agree with you. Of course then there would be no such question and no need to create a free city of West Berlin. But there is no united Germany while the question of West Berlin does exist and calls for a solution.

And we want to settle this question so that West Berlin should no longer be the source of grave dangers and surprises of all kinds which it is today.

Properly speaking, you have nothing to do directly with the solution of this question. It belongs, in the first turn, to the competence of the four powers, which after the defeat of Hitler Germany, have occupied Berlin. Now occupation exists only in West Berlin and it is the business of the four powers to do away with this anachronism. The Berlin question concerns you only indirectly, as a German, and as a representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Although the Federal Republic is not an active party in the negotiations, given a desire on its part, as an ally of our former allies in the war against Hitler Germany it apparently could make its contribution to the solution of the question of West Berlin in the interests of insuring peace and relaxing tension. That would be noble.

So far your position on West Berlin is a strictly negative one. You are laying some claims to West Berlin; that is, to a territory within the GDR. You permit yourself to use West Berlin as a tribune for incendiary political speeches against the GDR, against the socialist countries. It goes without saying that all this serves no good purpose and prevents the evil of war from being averted.

Now we stand on the threshold of a meeting of heads of government where the question of West Berlin will be discussed. Our partners admit that the situation in West Berlin is abnormal; that it must be changed for the better. This gives grounds

for definite hope that in the final analysis the four powers will be able to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution and (Unclassified) settle the situation in West Berlin to general benefit. If you, Mr. Federal Chancellor -- insofar as we have touched upon this question in our correspondence about other ways of radically improving the situation in West Berlin in the present conditions except by making it a free city--do prompt us, we see no other way.

The strength and vitality of the Soviet proposal reside in the fact that it proceeds from the conditions as they are, from the fact of the existence of two German states between which there are no negotiations on reunification and, furthermore, such negotiations are hardly foreseeable.

So what should we do about West Berlin if the prospect of Germany's reunification remains indefinite? Your opinion, Mr. Chancellor, apparently is that it is necessary to preserve the occupation status in West Berlin and the abnormal situation existing there. We cannot accept this viewpoint, for to leave the Berlin question open would also mean to postpone a peace settlement with Germany.

We highly appreciate the wisdom of the GDR Government and are grateful to it for having made certain sacrifices in agreeing to the establishment in the heart of the GDR of a free city of West Berlin. I consider that it acted with foresight and correctly, because in the present conditions there is no other better solution. To tell you the truth, I do not see what you could suggest on your part as an alternative to a free city.

Why a free city? This was already explained. I repeat: Because the Soviet Union, loyal to the principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states and peoples, does not want to impose the socialist system upon anyone. Only the people, the population itself, can adopt socialism. Since the capitalist system exists in West Berlin, we accept this as a fact; and in order not to interfere with the West Berlin population living under the system they have, the Soviet Union suggests that West Berlin be given a special status that is, that unhindered ties with all countries be guaranteed.

The Soviet Government will try to prove the advantages of such a solution to leaders of other powers upon whom agreement on West Berlin depends. We strive to assure a correct solution that it must be changed for the better. This gives grounds

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of this problem to clear the atmosphere and create conditions to ensure good relations between all countries and to promote (Unclassified) trade, culture and science-everything needed for normal life on earth, to consolidate peace for the peoples. But what if we do not meet understanding? Could it be that we should live forever without a peace treaty, and forever resign ourselves to an abnormal situation in West Berlin?

Of course, we cannot reconcile ourselves to such a situation. If the Soviet Union does not meet understanding it will have no other recourse but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all the ensuing consequences, including those for West Berlin. That treaty would settle the frontier questions of Germany with the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic. With the signing of a peace treaty it would be clear to all that to strive to alter the existing frontiers means nothing else but to bring matters to a war. We shall not abet aggressive forces which cherish the dream of pushing German frontiers to the east. If some states refuse to sign bad evil a peace treaty it will also be clear to all what they stand for peace or war, for relaxation of tension and friendly relations or for cold war.

That will be clear because to start a struggle against countries which have signed a peace treaty would mean to pursue aims that are not peaceful.

The Soviet people want friendship with the people of the Federal German Republic, the same friendship they have with the people of the GDR. Establishment of friendly relations aread Israel would be a boon both to the peoples of the Soviet Union and the two German states and all European countries whose interests demand lasting peace in Europe and throughout the world. d like not to

As to your contention about the "cold war language" allegedly miniot at to used against the Federal German Republic, it would be appropriate to ask: Whence come constant appeals for a position of strength policy, where is the "strategy of intimidation" preached with special zeal, who is it that rejects the idea of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems? You should know better than anyone else that such a language is used in the Federal Republic and not -noo meliate in the Soviet Union. I am not aware of a single fact to warrant the conclusion that the ruling circles of the Federal Republic are in any degree objective regarding the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union. There hardly has been an instance when the official propaganda of the Federal German Republic did not distort proposals of the Soviet Government aimed at a peaceful solution of major international problems or

refrained from ascribing to it most fantastic designs. And when we begin to defend our proposals and smash the arguments (Unclassified) of our opponents they are ready to put any label upon us. The Federal Government is evidently displeased with the fact that the Soviet Union not infrequently and quite frankly expresses its attitude and mistrust of certain measures taken in West Germany. Well, one might say that in this case the Federal Government is only reaping the fruits of its own labors.

I shall say outright that sometimes you compel us to state our views, to state our attitude toward some of your actions even when we should not like to do that. For instance, in many respects, I liked your previous letter and its promising tone. We expected that it would soon be followed by concrete deeds which could really introduce a calmer and warmer element into the relations between our states. But it turned out differently. You and members of your Government again reverted to crude attacks upon the Soviet Union and its allies. We had to reply.

You will probably agree that aggravation of polemics is not conductive at all to mutual understanding. Frequently it does not give anything, is only harmful, and of course, it would be desirable in the interests of improving our relations to avoid everything that results in unnecessary heat and excessive sharpness. Your Ambassador told me that the Federal German Republic's Government would not object to the establishment, as he put it, of civil peace. We agree to that, but such a peace could be established only on a bilateral basis.

I found it necessary to state frankly my views on the questions you have touched upon in your letter. I should like not to relinquish the hope that the governments of our countries eventually will be able to find a point of contact in joining their efforts for strengthening peace.

Respectfully yours, N. Khrushchev, January 28, 1960.

Jan. GDR Notes Protesting Bonn-Berlin Ties: Notes of similar content were delivered to the UK, US and French Governments on (Unclassified) January 29 via the Czech Foreign Ministry in Prague. There follows the text of the note to the US: The Government of the German Democratic Republic has the honor to inform the Government of the United States of America of the following:

The Government of the German Democratic Republic feels obliged to point with concern to the endeavor of certain circles in (Unclassified) West Germany and West Berlin to oppose the positive tendencies towards the relaxation of international tension, seen in the last few months, and to prevent the elimination of the hot-bed of danger in West Berlin.

At a time when responsible statesmen of the Western Powers themselves prepared to negotiate in order to normalize this situation, the Government of the German Federal Republic, together with certain forces in West Berlin, is continuously taking measures to frustrate the solution of the West Berlin issue and even to exacerbate the situation in West Berlin.

At the 1959 Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference the French Foreign Minister M. Couve de Murville declared, in agreement with the American and the British Foreign Ministers: "The Government of West Berlin has no direct connection with the Government of the German Federal Republic." This statement is undoubtedly based upon the agreements reached at Potsdam between the Allied Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition.

> The attempts which West Germany has made for a considerable period to treat West Berlin as a part of the Federal Republic crudely violate the existing clear legal situation.

The present official visit of the President of the West German Federal Republic, Luebke, to West Berlin is a challenge to the German Democratic Republic. It is on the same line as such provocative actions of the Federal Government as the session of the Bundesrat held in West Berlin on October 23, 1959, and the claim made there by the President of the Bundesrat, Roeder, for the incorporation of the German Democratic Republic in the Federal Republic.

Another example of such provocative actions was the meeting of the so-called Curatorium for an Indivisible Germany, held at the end of November 1959 in West Berlin. At this meeting not only were openly hostile statements made against the German Democratic Republic and those states being friendly with her, but members of the Federal Government and competent politicians of West Berlin have demanded the further development of West Berlin as a front-line city.

> Speaking in West Berlin in January this year, West German Federal Chancellor Adenauer did not hesitate to put forward claims hostile to an easing of tension and aimed at aggravating the situation in Germany. The statements which he

made to the West Berlin House of Deputies indicate that the Federal Republic wishes to annul the rapprochement of the (Unclassified) viewpoints of the two sides on the West Berlin question, reached at the Foreign Ministers! Conference in Geneva, and to prevent further steps towards a positive settlement of this problem.

The increasing establishment of offices of the Federal Republic in West Berlin is designed to challenge and to defy the German Democratic Republic, on whose territory West Berlin is situated. In this connection, the resolution of the Federal Government of September 30, 1959, to establish a West German radio station in West Berlin, the transmission range of which is to cover the territories of the German Democratic Republic and her socialist neighbor states, is a further proof of the aggressive character of the policy pursued by the West German Government.

The continuation of this policy seeking to retain West Berlin as a front-line city of cold war affects the prospects of a successful course of the forthcoming East-West negotiations and precipitates consequences dangerous to peace and the security of all nations.

The illegal steps taken by the Federal Government with regard eldstehless to West Berlin have deepened the tension and have contributed to increasing the danger resulting from the abnormal situation in West Berlin.

In this connection, the Government of the German Democratic Republic refers in all seriousness also to the fascist practices and excesses in West Berlin which became known very recently. They are the result of a policy by means of which the militarist and fascist elements and organizations have been systematically favored and encouraged in West Berlin for years. These facts underline the dangers emanating from West Berlin and the urgent necessity of solving the West Berlin question.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic regards the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states and the establishment of a free city of West Berlin as a suitable way in order to do away with the atmosphere of a front-line city in West Berlin and to make possible a peaceful development in West Germany and West Berlin.

> The Government of the German Democratic Republic rejects decisively the continuation of provocations in West Berlin

carried through by West Germany. It declares that it can no longer be an idle spectator of the continuation of provo-(Unclassified) cation of the Federal Government.

> The Government of the German Democratic Republic expresses the hope that the Government of the United States of America will recognize the urgency of the settlement of the West Berlin problem in agreement with the statement made in Geneva that the territory of West Berlin does not form part of the territory of the Federal Republic.

> The Government of the German Democratic Republic has submitted notes of similar content to the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic.

> The Government of the German Democratic Republic avails itself of this opportunity to express to the Government of the United States of America the assurances of its highest consideration.

## PART TWO STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS FROM WESTERN SOURCES

Nov. FRG Spokesman on US Reaction to Adenauer's Baden-Baden Speech: Referring to an October 30 Die Welt story, the spokesman de-(Confidential) clared Bonn had no indications that US Government circles reacted poorly to Adenauer's Baden-Baden speech (October 26). He stated that the FRG agreed wholely with the consultation and cooperation recently developed within NATO and holds these procedures to be the most practical for the future. The FRG considers it necessary to participate in Western Summit talks only, for example, on the Berlin question, eldlounded disarmament and reunification, i.e., on those matters which rewood a of concern the FRG. deponds paralled , swottidas bas

Nov. and Jeon Adenauer Letter to De Gaulle on Summit Meeting: Starting on 3 a lo sample this date, considerable press coverage was given a letter from (Confidential.) Adenauer to de Gaulle (which remains unpublished) and it was discussed at a press conference where the Federal Press Chief of admitted he was not familiar with the letter. Foreign Service end reports indicate that, contrary to most press reports, the letter was friendly and contained only an explanation of why Adenauer should not be excluded from certain (unspecified) - conversations at the Western Summit meeting. The Oder-Neisse askilled and question was not raised in the letter. 10 some There is no opposition from any side to the principle of such

Excerpts from General de Gaulle's News Conference November 10: Nov. After many years of international tension, it appears that 10 -od ed some signs of an easing of the situation are visible on the (Unclassified) part of the Soviet world ... The second it would

No doubt Russia, having acquired colossal power and knowing bluode evalored that the West is in possession of the equivalent, recognizes that a conflict, however it may arise, can end only in general vereved ed annihilation, and that, if war is ruled out, there is no alternative but to make peace.

eards edges No doubt the Communist regime applied to Russia for the last forty-two years, whose whole ideology is in opposition to the free world, is losing some of its sting under the influence of anolds for the deeprooted striving of the people toward man's natural edsta to absent aspirations -- a better life and freedom. on tem

No doubt this same regime, which Russia made use of to govern the territory of its European neighbors by force and through on electric own intermediaries, now recognizes that while it may reign eved bloods some over Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaris,

Nov. (Cont.)

10

(Unclassified)

Albania, Yugoslavia, Prussia and Saxony, it has not won them over and there is no doubt that if the populations of those countries could express themselves freely, they would reject the regime by an enormous majority.

No doubt Soviet Russia, in spite of having aided communism to take root in China, recognizes that nothing can change the fact that she is Russia, a white nation of Europe which has conquered part of Asia, and is, in sum, richly endowed with land, mines, factories and wealth, face to face with the yellow masses of China, numberless and impoverished, indestructible and ambitious, building through trial and hardship a power which cannot be measured and casting her eyes about her on the open spaces over which she must one day spread.

Finally, there is no doubt, and it is perhaps the most important thing of all, that a decisive part in the beginning of a new orientation will be played by the personality of the present head of Soviet Russia, discerning, as he does, that at the supreme level of responsibility, service to man, to his conditions and his peace is the supreme realism, the supreme policy.

From all these circumstances, the idea was born of a conference of the heads of states with world-wide responsibilities.

There is no opposition from any side to the principle of such a meeting.

France is in favor. But precisely because she hopes that the proposed meeting will result in something positive, she believes it necessary not to rush into talks which might be superficial...

If, on the other hand, the view is that such a conclave should open the door to the practical settlement of the problems which beset the world, such as the armaments race, the poverty of the under-developed countries, intervention in the affairs of others, the destiny of Germany, the dangerous situation in the East, in Africa and in Asia, then, before it meets, three conditions must be satisfied.

The first is that the improvement in international relations must continue during the coming months, so that heads of state may be able to talk in an atmosphere of relaxation and not of crisis...

The second condition is that the Western heads of state who are to take part in the coming East-West conference should have

(Unclassified)

Nov. (Cont.) reached understanding beforehand on the questions to be dealt with and the common position they will take up on each item ...

The third condition is personal contact between Mr. Khrushchev and myself, M. Debré and our Government. We, for our part, attach the utmost importance to this meeting and to the explanation which Russia and France will thus be able to exchange on the world problems which beset both countries. Moreover, it can be valuable for Russia's leader to gain first-hand knowledge of France...

Question: What is France's position in the atomic field?...

Answer: I must say that this suspension of tests took place at the moment when the two rivals are in possession of all that must be had or known to be able to wipe out life wherever it might be, and besides this suspension of tests comes at a time when both powers have collected a stock of knowledge through tests, have collected a stock that allows them, without carrying out new explosions, to improve almost infinitely their nuclear armament. In these conditions France cannot but approve that the Anglo-Saxons and Russians should agree between them to stop their tests, but if there is a wish to ask her to renounce atomic arms for herself while others have them and make enormous quantities, there is no chance that she will agree to the request.

> No doubt the sort of equilibrium that exists between the atomic powers of the two camps is for the moment a factor of world peace. But who can say what will happen tomorrow? ...

In truth, France, in equipping herself with a nuclear weapon, will render a service to world equilibrium.

If the United Nations Organization shows itself capable of effectively ending this threat and, as a beginning, succeeds in placing under international control the missiles of death, as France has sometimes proposed through its disarmament delegate, M. Moch, then France will accept the international law immediately and without hesitation. But if the organization cannot and does not wish to do it, then what a derisory evasion it would be to seek a quarrel today with France.

attach the utmost importance to this meeting and to the ex-

Nov. 10 (Secret)

Lloyd-Wigny Discussion on Summit Conference: Wigny thought that to concentrate nearly exclusively on Berlin would be wrong for the result might be that the West would be pressed to make undesirable concessions to the USSR. Lloyd expressed the best and the UK view that in addition to Berlin, disarmament and Germany should be discussed, with Berlin representing the best prospect for agreement. He felt summit could instruct vederations be undertaken.

Nov. Excerpts from Secretary McElroy's Press Statements on Defense: Secretary McElroy told newsmen that there had also (Unclassified) been some discussion of an eventual reduction in the number of troops and other forces overseas.

But, he said, "nothing drastic" is contemplated now on this question or that of reducing the over-all size of the services. Although the two questions must be faced now, there is no intention of reducing overseas commitments for several years, the Defense Secretary said.

He explained: "For one thing we have certain foreign commitviolentes ments. On all of these questions you come up to them and then start backing away. They have to be considered as part of our international position and we must do nothing that might weaken the NATO alliance.

and data account "However, it's possible that other NATO countries may want to increase their contributions of military strength to their own advantage so that our own forces can be deployed elseof mode and money where in the world." ... to the world and the world an

The Defense Secretary was asked whether Soviet Premier Khrushchev's call for world disarmament had exerted any influence on the new defense budget. No, he said, and added:

"And it can't have unless he comes forward with some concrete proposal. Until then it is the responsibility of the absorbed military and the Defense Department to keep on reminding the public that the maintenance of a strong military position is the only basis for a really satisfactory disarmament agreedelegate, H. Moch, then France will so". trem a international

tion cannot and does not wish to do it, then that a derisory

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(Unclassified)

Address by Secretary Herter on US Principles in East-West Negotiations: (Excerpts) That "competition is the life of trade" is a saying that has stood the test of time. Today, we face a test no society has ever fully met: how to make competition the life, not death, of nations.

The problem is urgent as never before because of two facts. One is a revolutionary movement based on great and growing power, which seeks to polarize all international competition around social survival. The other is that, hanging over this conflict, are the means of vast destruction.

How can we meet such competition, yet keep it safely back from the abyss of universal ruin? I will take the second point first.

The paramount question facing our world today is how the great rivalry between political systems can work itself out in the course of history without exploding into thermonuclear war.

Such an explosion has been uncomfortably close more than once in recent years, most lately over Berlin. Last summer, it became clear that the Soviet Union, despite its protests to the contrary, was still engaging in duress in an effort to bring West Berlin under its influence.

Then, President Eisenhower, concluding that the outlook for peace was darkening, determined to turn the course of history away from war and toward a lasting peace. He began by inviting Chairman Khrushchev to visit our country. You know of the meetings to follow. What do all these mean?

So far, the element of duress over Berlin has been submerged; but otherwise, there were few tangible results of the Khrushchev visit, nor were such to be expected. Indeed, it may be better so, for early successes tend to breed self-deceptive euphoria.

The real meaning of the series of high-level meetings is that a new process of communication may be developing through them. I say "may" because only time can tell whether we shall have learned to talk somewhat less at cross-purposes than in the past, and with better understanding of opposing points of view.

Mr. Khrushchev has said that we need to develop a common language, despite the ideological conflict to which he

Nov. (Cont.)

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(Unclassified)

stanchly adheres. Many will find this hard to believe after the years of baffling double-talk. Yet, I believe that on certain fundamentals we can find a common language because we have a common interest.

That interest lies simply in the basic will to survive, shared by free men and Communists alike. I think the Soviet leadership is reaching a conclusion similar to our own—that unless the course of events is changed and changed soon, both sides face unacceptable risks of general nuclear war, which would approximate mutual suicide.

Thus, the one area in which a common language has best chance to grow is that of ground rules for the great competition which dominates our time—some "rules of the game"—to keep it within bounds set by the conditions of co-survival.

Such rules must be devised to temper acute political problems which cannot now be fully solved, and to bring under control the spiraling arms race which those problems goad onward. That is the main task for the negotiations that lie in the months and perhaps years ahead.

There are other areas in which a common language can take root, thereby mitigating to some extent the underlying conflict. Shared interests in the arts and sciences, in the essentials of sciences, in the essentials of human welfare and everyday life, are now being fostered through many kinds of exchange which we are prepared to expand as fully as the Soviets will reciprocate. In these fields, we are even finding ways of turning competition into cooperation, through such common ventures as the International Geophysical Year. We should never miss a bona fide opportunity to expand the area of cooperation.

Competition will continue to be rugged, however, despite any ground rules or exchanges. Mr. Khrushchev makes no bones about his ultimate aims, and we can certainly expect many sorts of lures and pressures inall parts of the free world, backed with mounting industrial power, designed to confuse, subvert and take over. The need to keep a firm grasp on both sets of facts—the necessity for common ground rules and the aggressive competition—will be a severe test of our political maturity as a people.

It was much simpler when we could think in black and white terms of sheer confrontation with 100 per cent hostile communism. Even today, though the present arms race is

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(Unclassified)

dangerous beyond description, it still seems easier to continue on the familiar path than to try to break new ground.

Thus, it will take courage of a high order and strong nerves over a long time to construct a new relationship between the antagonistic systems. But that must be done if civilization is to survive. It is nothing less than this immense and long-term project on which we are now engaged.

I now turn to the other part of my opening question: How can we, while combining in restraint of war, meet the most ruthless competition the world has seen?

It will take our most strenuous, devoted and persistent efforts. Nothing could be more fatal than to confuse relaxation of tensions with relaxation of ourselves, and one of the most serious dangers ahead is that people will be tempted to do exactly that.

Intelligent visitors to the Soviet Union have noted the zeal there for "catching up" with the United States. We will not fare well in competition with the Soviets unless we can match their enthusiasm for achievement.

The common effort will require continued and possibly increasing claims on our treasure, our intelligence and our patience.

Most importantly, it will require much wider participation and support by the great majority of all Americans. It is not enough to pay our taxes and leave the rest for "these people in Washington." The cause of peace and freedom is too important to be left to the few.

We have, of late, been too much absorbed, I feel, in the mere enjoyment of a prosperous life behind our defensive curtain of nuclear power. We must realize instead that the fateful competition with communism has placed a first claim on the energy and interests of us all. That means subordinating our private interests to the paramount public interest. It also means using our economy less for the things which do not really matter, and more for the things which do for the uses which would train and inform our minds, promote the health of our society and keep our country free.

Our greatest advantage in the world struggle is that we are not alone. Many countries are with us wholeheartedly and confidently. Many others are with us in spirit, even though they can not say so.

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Nov. (Cont.) One of the most heartening sights in recent years has been the revivial of the economic strength of our free-world (Unclassified) partners in Western Europe and Japan. They are now able to offer their peoples the prospect of continuing economic growth and of sustained high levels of economic activity. In so doing, they demonstrate the continuing vitality of free societies ...

Chairman Khrushchev sees the future as competition between rival social systems by means other than war. We Americans welcome competition, and we are ready to join him in finding ways of making it securely peaceful.

But perhaps Mr. Khrushchev will agree that each of us has a right to see the future in his own way. We, in the United States, believe that we share with millions of our fellow men, in East and West, a vision differing from his. However. various we are in creed, race and culture, we are united in welcoming just this variety. We believe in the God-given multiformity of man, and man's future.

From our point of view, the competition is not between two uniform, but opposite, social systems. It is a contest to decide whether the great problems of our age can be met better in a free variety of cooperating ways, or in the single starkly monolithic way of communism.

Thus, I would put the challenge differently from Mr. Khrushchev.
But I would agree with him that it is profoundly urgent. It calls for every ounce of sacrifice and devotion that you and I, and all like-minded men and women, can muster in the years ahead.

As we move forward in what may become a new era of competitive peace, our chief source of strength will lie not in material things--but in our faith in freedom. The Communists repeatedly proclaim their belief in their creed and system, and its eventual triumph. We must match their expressed belief with faith in our own principles, which spring from man's millennial striving toward freedom.

As against Marxist materialism, we uphold a universal humanism which stresses man's spiritual nature without ignoring his physical needs. We reject materialism as the main shaping force in human affairs, whether embodied in economic determinism, statism, or in any other system externally imposed upon the individual. We believe that the real

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dynamic of human life is inner spiritual force working in a cosmos ruled by divine power, law and purpose.

Our main concern is not that the Soviets are trying to outproduce us in pigs, or milk or even steel. We rejoice at their progress to the extent that it makes for human betterment and for peace.

What we most need to fear is the loss of our own vision and sense of destiny—of our belief in the eventual spread of democratic freedom to all peoples on our planet. In this, we should have a faith as deep and intense as that of the most devoted disciple of communism. We should, above all, demonstrate that faith in action.

Freedom thrives on competition. Therefore, we do not need to look with foreboding on the era ahead. Ours is no perfected system, incapable of further growth. America is still in the making. The most inviting of all frontiers lies ahead. To accept the challenge with courage—yes, with buoyant hope—is to be true to the traditions that made America great.

Nov. 16 (Confidential)

Adenauer-Brandt-Von Brentano-Klein Discuss Berlin: The Federal Chancellor, the Foreign Minister, the Governing Mayor of Berlin and the Berlin Senator for Federal Affairs held talks on the Berlin problem in the previous week. According to Klein, the talks were overshadowed by the fact that nobody was able to come up with any new ideas as to how the Berlin and German problems should be dealt with in the forthcoming rounds of international negotiations. Chancellor Adenauer expressed uncertainty about the development of US foreign policy but von Brentano rose to the defense of American policy, saying that it was fundamentally unchanged, although the style was new. The Chancellor was also somewhat unhappy about pressure being exerted on the Germans by the Allies to come up with "new ideas" when in effect none of those present could think of anything better than a defense of the status quo with respect to Berlin.

The Belgian Foreign Minister, who recently visited London, had conveyed to von Brentano his impression from conversations with Macmillan and Lloyd that the British hoped to pacify the Soviets with "minor concessions" on Berlin. Although nothing specific was said about the nature of these concessions, the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister, as well as Brandt and

Nov. (Cont.)

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(Confidential)

Klein, were worried that these concessions would go beyond the paper of June 16, which all four considered as an irreducible minimum.

Klein then reiterated a point previously made by the Governing Mayor, i.e., that the curbing of so-called propaganda activities in West Berlin would be a most dangerous undertaking because the Soviets obviously would choose to interpret as propaganda the spreading of any kind of information about the GDR. Freedom of expression was an essential element of the spirit of free Berlin. Any muzzling, or curbing, of that freedom of expression would have detrimental psychological consequences not only because it would be regarded by leading elements of the population as the first step toward the abolition of the Western position in Berlin, but also because the Berliners would feel that an important aspect of their mission in life was being eliminated.

Chancellor Adenauer and Willy Brandt were both happy about the French delaying tactics on the Summit meeting because they felt that one important Western objective at the moment was to gain time. Adenauer said he did not expect great results from the first Summit in the spring of 1960 and thought that the second Summit meeting could not be held until the spring or summer of 1961 because of the necessity for the new American President to acquaint himself fully with international affairs.

Nov. 13 (Unclassified)

Speech by Dean Acheson to NATO Legislators in Washington: (Excerpts) I wish to talk with you this afternoon about a matter which seems to me to be of great seriousness and which lies at the very heart of the organization of NATO and a matter for which all of us are responsible.

And I would like to start out, if I may, by imagining with you for a few moments what the future historian will have to say about the period in which we live as he looks at the decade of the Nineteen Fifties as they came to a close. What is it that would be in his mind?

First of all, I think he would say the decade of the Nineteen Fifties were a turning point in history. He would look back over the prior half-century, and he would see this as the prologue of violence, of revolution, of change, a prologue which destroyed the world order of the nineteenth century, destroyed it along with the great empires which had made it and which maintained it.

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He would look further into the nineteenth century, and would see what an extraordinary period of stability that was. And then he would also see something very significant. And this significant thing would be the steady march eastward in Europe of the center of power...

He would have seen something else. He would have seen not the emergence but the great development of the power really begin to flower, would have seen its economic power really begin to flower. He would have seen the vast military power of the Soviet Union. He would have seen also the beginnings of new power in China, and I believe that that historian would say as he looked at the year 1959, the conclusion of this decade, that events were hurrying to a decision, that the moment was coming which would be decisive.

But that decision would be at this point not clear to him, although he would have known from the time at which he wrote what it was. And of course the decision would be whether there was to be a new equilibrium of power in the world upon which some stability could be built, upon which we could live with hope through the period in which we all together got hold of the great dangers of the nuclear age and brought them under control.

This was one way that the decision could go. The other would be that the equilibrium of power would not be created and that the decade which was about to open would be the decade of the beginning of Soviet power, and perhaps it would mean that the historian whom I am imagining would be a Soviet citizen, because he would see that the situation in a nutshell was this:

There was a Western Europe and in North America the productive capacity and the manpower three times that of the Soviet Union to create a counterbalancing power to that of Russia. There was the power with which that could be done. It would be quite clear that Europe was unable to do this by itself. It would be quite clear that the United States by itself could not create a spacious enough area for freedom.

He would see that the coalition of Western Europe and North
America was a necessity to both, and he would say there is
the capacity to do this, there is the possibility to do this,
but at this turning point was there the will?

Nov. (Cont.) And, judging from the policies which are in operation at the 18 present time, he would believe, I conclude, that that will (Unclassified) does not exist. Perhaps it is because the necessary measures are not understood. This I think unlikely because the necessary measures are so clear that anyone must understand them. It isn't possible really not to understand them.

And these measures -- of course, I am not only talking about the ones which concern NATO--there are others in the economic and other fields which are interesting but which do not involve us today. These measures are, first of all, to recreate and maintain a nuclear parallel, by which we mean a nuclear power of such dimensions that regardless of who is to strike the first blow the nation having that power could respond with unacceptable injury to the aggressor.

That would be regarded as the first necessity, and that would be necessary until by agreement, by the operation of international machinery, we were able to bring this vast weapon under control. But until that is done this is an absolute necessity. And he would see that this is not being done.

Then he would see, too, that there must be a defense force in Europe, a defense force in which all the allies participate, all of them together; and he would see that this defense force is for the purpose of letting anyone else to see that in order to impose an alien will or purpose, in order to threaten, in order to be the dominant power in Europe, it must be prepared itself to raise violence to such a level that it will have to consider a nuclear strike, which by hypothesis, they would not want to do. This force gives reality to the nuclear deterrent, and without this force the nuclear deterrent is not a deterrent at all.

The historian, I think, would see that this also has been neglected, and I think he would conclude that this double neglect had resulted in a shift of power in favor of the Soviet Union and against the North American and Western European coalition, the great alliance which is attempting to create stability in the world and to give a foundation for an area of free life.

Now, there are two ways in which this change in power, this shift in power, may be met. One way is to remove the cause. The other way is to say that it is without significance, and the only way in which one can say that it is without significance is to believe that one could be complacent about a

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very considerable increase in Soviet capacity, because a reappraisal of Soviet intentions would lead one to believe that these intentions were benign, or if not altogether benign at least not so dangerous as to require precaution against the capacity to carry them out.

Apparently some such conclusion as this is prevalent in most of our countries. And it is this I think, which leads to such a demand at the present time to go forward with what is called a negotiated settlement...

The essential thing is what you confer about -- not whether you should confer but what you confer about. This is essential ...

The sensible attitude is that we are perfectly willing, every-bodyalways has been, all of those of us in public life, who have been in public life, have spent days and hours and weeks and months conferring and conferring with the Russians.

We're always willing to confer where the object of the conference may produce mutually beneficial results.

But it is so easy to confuse or to use this word "negotiation" as a cover for a surrender that one must be very careful about it.

If to negotiate means to put the facade of consent upon a defeat, then I think it is not something which should recommend itself to us.

If there is to be a defeat, which I think is wholly unnecessary, if we take the proper measures, let it be an honest defeat and a clear defeat, that all of us can understand and can learn from. Do not let us smooth it over with this slimy servience of consent.

Now, let us look for a moment at what it is we are asked to confer about.

We will note in the first place that it is Mr. Khrushchev who is drawing the issue. It's not us, it's Mr. Khrushchev. This in itself is a very considerable diplomatic victory. The man who can frame the issue has gone a long way toward a successful conclusion of it.

And what is the issue?

Mr. Khrushchev has framed the issue exactly a year ago last month, and this issue I want you to note very carefully, goes

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to the heart of the possibility of creating a counter-power to Russian power.

What this issue is, as stated by Mr. Khrushchev, is that the Potsdam Agreement is void and illegal, that the presence of Allied troops in Berlin is illegal and detrimental, that they should be immediately withdrawn. The city should be a free city under international guarantees. And that all of this should be done against what Mr. Khrushchev calls the background of a demilitarized Germany from which all foreign troops should withdraw, East and West, and which should withdraw itself from NATO and East Germany from the Warsaw Pact.

Now, that is the issue which has been framed. You will notice in this that Berlin stands out as both the symbol and the prelude of the collapse which Mr. Khrushchev hopes to bring about.

Over and over again he has stated that the object in his policy is the withdrawal of foreign troops from overseas bases...

Now, I ask you to think about negotiating these issues, negotiation in the sense of conferring with the idea of coming to terms. What terms can suggest themselves to you as coming out of a conference about Berlin?

Do we want Berlin guaranteed by the United Nations? The United Nations is in this sense only all of us and a few other states.

The strength of the United Nations as a guarantee to Berlin is here. It isn't increased by any additions to it. Is it going to be increased by Mr. Khrushchev's guarantee?...

What conditions more beneficial to the people of Berlin can he think of than the ones that now exist? What conditions more in the interest of the West can he think of than now exist? What conditions more worthy of preservation can he think of than those that now exist?

What he would say, I am sure, is: "Surely I can think of some, and the ones I think of are to purchase the unification of Germany by the withdrawal of American troops." He would say "from Germany." But "from Germany" means from Europe.

Why does it mean from Europe? It means from Europe because all of you are surely aware that there is no other strategic position for these troops west of the Rhine...

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Nov. (Cont.) Let's look at it, really, from the point of view of what it means. It means, in the first place, that the whole attempt (Unclassified) to create a counter-force to the Soviet force is ended. We cannot create such a counter-force with ground forces in Europe, and in the United States separated by the Atlantic Ocean.

> It would mean that the only possibility of a defense of Europe would be a nuclear one. And is that really sensible? ...

Therefore, would we not find that what we had done by all of this was to take all possibility of meaning out of those central words in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which, broadly speaking, say that an attack upon any one of the bas ad bentala members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall be regarded as an attack on all of them? ...

Therefore, I think at the threshold of its second decade MATO should decide, and decide for a decade, that it does want to create a defense force in Europe, a solid defense force, one in accordance with the recommendations of SHAPE, and it will make the effort and the sacrifice to do it, and that all the decisions which are inconsistent with that decision must be put aside ...

Do not dig this tree up every year and look at its roots. Do not try to make everything consistent at the same time. Make the basic decision and let the subsidiary decisions find their almotfeenade ed own way."

My second suggestion would be that NATO should look at Eastern Europe and that NATO should come quite clearly to the con-clusion that it looks forward to the time and its policy is to look forward to the time when government throughout Europe will have a decent basis in national acceptance.

I'm not talking about liberation; I'm not talking about applying force to overthrowing regimes in Eastern Europe. But I'm saying we must publicly deny and make it clear that we have denied what Mr. Khrushchev is wanting us to do, which is to accept the division of Europe and believe that the future is going to be based upon the acceptance of that division ...

> Now, the third decision which I would hope NATO would make is that there is room for negotiation, that there's not only room for negotiation but there is a great need for negotiation and that this lies in the field of control of armaments

Nov. (Cont.) 18 (Unclassified)

and that it is to be approached practicably and sensibly. Not these fanciful ideas of universal disarmament in four years. This is not only possible; it's undersirable. You would create greater instability by that than you would relieve yourself of. askers both we edt at bus ego

Nov. 20

Adenauer-Macmillan Talks, London November 17-19: Reports on these conversations, in which Foreign Ministers Lloyd and von (Confidential) Brentano participated, indicate that the British sought to convince Adenauer that they did not wish to talk only about Berlin and Germany at a summit meeting, but they were sure Berlin would be discussed and thought it might be only the topic on which agreement possible. Adenauer maintained he and Willy Brandt agreed negotiations with Soviets would not lead to improvement present situation in Berlin and might worsen it. The British also reassured Adenauer that they stand on Western position of Geneva and do not support disengagement or Rapacki-like schemes. They consider, however, that inspection zones and arms limitation might sometime prove a useful device, but one that should be applied without discrimination against Germany and with effective controls.

Nova 24 (Official Use Only)

FRG Rejects Soviet Propaganda Charges That Adenauer Seeks to Worsen East-West Relations: The semi-official Deutsche Korrespondenz carried a piece, reportedly from the Chancellor's office, stating that the Soviet reproach that the Chancellor. by reminding the Western Powers that they must decisively defend their rights and obligations re Berlin, creates tension raises the legitimate question of the kind of detente Moscow really envisages. If Soviet thoughts on the subject are carried to their logical conclusion, then it is clear that detente is only possible if the Western Powers abandon their present rights in Berlin. For the West this is not detente--it is only the beginning of capitulation. If there is to be real detente, then it is necessary that a truce be restored between the USSR and the FRG. This surely would be consistent with Khrushchev's recent repeated protestations about the spirit of Camp David.

Nov.
24
(Unclassified)

Secretary Herter on Acheson Speech to NATO. The following excerpts are from the Secretary's Press conference:

Question: Mr. Secretary, former Secretary Acheson gave a speech before the NATO parliamentarians last week in which he said it was a mistake for the Allies to talk to the Russians about Berlin at all because almost any arrangement that might come up now would be worse than the one we now have. What do you think of this view?

Answer: Well, I don't necessarily share the view. I read the speech very carefully. And it seems to me that what Mr. Acheson had done was to build up a number of straw men, and then knock them down. The assumption he made was that the Russians would be insisting still on the same position that they held a year ago last November, when this crisis was first precipitated. Actually, they have come a very long way from that.

In addition, I don't think that he had any grounds for assuming that we were necessarily going to make concessions which would be detrimental. I think that was entirely speculation on his part...

Question: Mr. Secretary, what do you mean when you say the Russians have come a very long way from their position on Berlin last year?

Answer: Well, last year, in November, when Mr. Khrushchev made his first speech precipitating the Berlin crisis, he stated that we had no legal rights in Berlin, that they were planning to throw us out and that this was something that they had planned to do as a unilateral action. Since that time they have admitted our legal rights, admitted them several times, and completely. They have furthermore moved away from the threat of taking unilateral action...

Question: Mr. Secretary, is it then your position that you think a new arrangement can be reached on Berlin which is better than what we now have?

Answer: It can be. I'm sure that it will be. I wouldn't predict that it necessarily would be. I think we would like to make a better arrangement if we could. I think that probably those who are satisfied with the present status quo worry lest an effort to make a new arrangement would lead to what has been called I think the status quo minus.

24

Nov. (Cont.) Question: Mr. Secretary, have you seen any basic change in the substantive position that Mr. Khrushchev took a year ago (Unclassified) and as of today, or are the changes that you see merely procedural? Has he changed, in other words, in his basic demand that we get out of Berlin or has he merely changed in the way we will do it and the timing and the threat and all the rest? Has there been any change on that, that he is going to get us

Answer: His objective is still that he is going to get us out.

Nov. 11 moisi 25-28 Use Only)

Fifth Congress of Council for Indivisible Germany (Summary): Addressing the fifth annual congress of the Indivisible Germany (Official Committee in West Berlin, Mayor Willy Brandt stated on November 26 that the plot against Berlin's will to selfdefense was warded off with the help of the West, including the West Germans. The Soviets failed in their attempt to isolate Berlin and the city has become an international symbol of freedom in this case, Brandt said, the reliability of the Western community is of greater importance than the destiny of a few million human beings. A new danger has, however, to be faced, the temptation to shelve the German question since it cannot be solved at present.

The director of the committee, Dr. Wilhelm Wolfgang Schuetz, pointed out that the will to reunification has grown stronger during the past year, that this congress was a powerful demonstration for the restoration of German unity, and will contribute toward mustering youth as sponsors of German unity. He added that the committee will fight for its aims with peaceful means only. Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) Chairman Willi Richter assured the audience that not only the DGB but the international labor union movement will also determinedly demand German reunification.

> In a telegram to the congress, Foreign Minister Brentano expressed appreciation of the growing importance of the activities of the organization, saying that with its work the committee has not only reminded all Germans individually of the injustice of German partition but has also solicited the interest of foreign nations in the matter.

Schleswig-Holstein Premier and CDU Deputy Chairman von Hassel in his address to the congress rejected recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, saying that it is useless to lure the East

Nov. (Cont.) with such concesssions. Adenauer's remark that Germany has to pay for the war should not be interpreted as his intention to (Official sacrifice the expellees, von Hassel said, and the German Govern-Use Only) ment will never put its signature to a dictated peace. Certain wrong concepts on German rights in the East should be countered, and the Federal Republic would greatly welcome French assistance in this field.

According to von Hassel, the Potsdam Agreement is still the sole basis for final settlement of the German-Polish frontier. Hassel rejected proposed diplomatic relations with Poland since the Federal Government is solely entitled to decide on German affairs, must therefore oppose the two-state thesis, and appointment of a German Ambassador in Warsaw who would be treated as the representative of only one of two German states would constitute an advanced concession just when the German question is the subject of decisive political discussions. Von Hassel also strongly rejected the plans for a free city of betteva Berlin.

SPD Chairman Erich Ollenhauer stressed the outstanding importance of the reunification issue, adding that partition is a continuing violation of the right of self-determination of the peoples. He pointed out that direct political negotiations between East and West Germans would only blur responsibilities of the big powers.

Ollenhauer advocated a normalization of West Germany's relations with the East bloc countries, adding that this suggestion implies no change of mind on frontier questions, the right to the homeland, and other claims which must be settled prerequisite to a peace treaty. He believed that normal relations with the East could, however, remove many misunderstandings, that the presence of a West German ambassador in Prague would, for example, have been most beneficial to the two Bundeswehr pilots now jailed in that country.

Ollenhauer rejected the Soviet plan for a free city of Berlin. He said that German reunification is an international problem of the greatest importance, that it is imperative to keep its baucoom on the agenda of international discussions, and that no was 10 the solution of the German question must be linked with the European security problem. Ollenhauer said that those bedelicates of V lieving in membership in NATO must realize that such a policy is incompatible with an active reunification policy.

country were mistaken.

Nov. (Cont.) 26-28 (Official Use Only)

At the final meeting of the "Curatorium Indivisible Germany" in Berlin on November 28, its various political working groups in a joint declaration called for a common German policy of the Federal Government and Lower House. By its signature of the UN declaration on human rights, the declaration says, the USSR had undertaken to respect the right to self-determination of all nations, yet the continued existence of the dictatorship in the Soviet occupation zone withheld this right from the German people.

The declaration goes onto demand that the German question must not be removed from the agenda of international conferences. At these conferences the Berlin problem would have to be discussed within the context of the German question. To deal with the Berlin question in isolation or to give way in any respect would lead to a chain reaction at the expense of the free world. The solidarity of the free world is essential for the preservation of freedom. The danger of free Europe splitting into competing economic blocs must be averted. The declaration stresses that the population of the Federal Republic emphatically refused to relinquish the legal claim to the German eastern territories.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and countries of the Eastern bloc would be of considerable importance for the solution of the German question. There was "near unanimity," the declaration says, that such relations should be established regardless of the political regimes of Germany's eastern neighbors.

The working groups were unanimous that if and when diplomatic relations are established with Poland, there would have to be legal reservations concerning the Oder-Neisse line. Any recognition of Pankow by third powers must be discouraged. The declaration also rejects any revanchism or unfriendly attitude toward East European countries. Political talks between individuals from the communist and free world, as distinct from such talks between institutions, would be useful.

The Lord Mayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt, in his concluding address stressed that a new world policy must on no account start on the basis "of capitulation and a breach of law on the Berlin question." The world had realized, he said, that one could liquidate old-style colonialism merely to establish a new-style colonialism. People who thought that the German people would resign themselves to the division of their country were mistaken.

Nov. 27

Adenauer Speech at Dueren: (Summary) Addressing participants in a CDU meeting in Dueren, Chancellor Adenauer stated that he (Unclassified) is still convinced that communism has not changed and that Russian communism is especially dangerous because it is imbued with Russian nationalism. Khrushchev had told him, among other things, that all Western states will perish and communism will rule the world. Adenauer said, however, that if the free peoples act in unity, Russian communism will never succeed in enslaving Europe. There is only one test to prove communism's alleged change: A "yes" to the controlled disarmament of nuclear and conventional weapons.

Commenting on German-French relations, Adenauer admitted that France has made some mistakes in recent months, but that these trifles are nothing compared with the fact that two nations which have been enemies for hundreds of years are now genuine friends. Adenauer called agreement with France the cornerstone of the German European policy. Adenauer said he believed those statements false which hold that Great Britain does not support the joint actions of France and Germany. He pointed out that during his last visit in Great Britain, his old friend Churchill said that France, Great Britain, and Germany will jointly save Europe.

Adenauer said the CDU must make a strong effort to win the next Bundestag elections, since many people are of the opinion that after 12 years of CDU government a little change will do no harm. Scrutiny of the SPD's Germany plan explains Khrushchev's desire for a different party majority in West Germany, Adenauer said, and that despite the new SPD platform, the man behind it remains the same.

Adenauer suggested abandoning the "reunification" concept and replacing it with the idea of a "return of freedom to 17 million Germans in the Soviet Zone." He appealed to the world: "Give the German people the same right you are willing to give to any African people, the right to guide their own fate in peace and freedom."

(Official Use Only)

Mende on FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei) and French Oder-Neisse Stand: Speaking at the South Baden FDP Bezirk congress Dr. Erich Mende, Deputy FDP Chairman, sharply attacked President de Gaulle for his remarks on the Oder-Neisse line. The Germans realized the difference between a legal title and the possibility of giving effect to it, he said. But de Gaulle was Nov. (Cont.) 29 (Official Use Only)

surrendering German territory without insisting on the least political consideration. He was doing this in advance of the summit conference and a peace treaty. To act thus was not to render a neighborly service to the Federal Republic or to support the common policy of West European solidarity and French-German friendship.

Mende urged Chancellor Adenauer not to adopt the French arguments in his coming talks with de Gaulle but to uphold the German arguments with great emphasis. To de Gaulle he appealed not to revive, in his proposed conversation with Khrushchev, the French-Russian alliance of 1944. Germany had made many sacrifices for the policy of uniting Europe and a French-German understanding, which must not be jeopardized by a "relapse" of French policy.

The world policital situation, Mende continued, looked as if the four powers responsible for the fate of Germany wanted to come to terms on the back of the Germans by retaining the status quo. None of these powers was interested in German unity. Bonn had neglected to seek timely talks with Moscow. Now Washington, Moscow, London, and Paris were engaged in conversations instead. A barter deal threatened between Moscow and Paris: for the sake of securing the status quo in Germany the Soviet Union would extinguish the fire in Algeria.

Dr. Mende told the press that a visit to Moscow by a Bundestag delegation, which has been postponed several times, would probably take place in the spring of 1960. Asked about his party's "Eastern policy," he said the Federal Republic should establish diplomatic relations with Warsaw, Prague, and Belgrade as soon as possible. Trade with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia should be intensified. Visits by parliamentarians would help improve relations with the East.

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Adenauer on Reunification: (in US News and World Report). (Excerpt). To some extent that impression (i.e., that many (Unclassified) Germans do not care much about reunification) has gained ground because the fight for reunification is being led with moderation and patience and without loud-voiced rhetoric. That attitude, born out of the memory of our unfortunate past with its many loud-voiced national claims, should not be misread as lukewarmness. Rather it is the manifestation of a feeling of responsibility toward the European community of nations.

Dec. Adenauer-de Gaulle Talks at Paris: French and German sources 1-2 report that the Adenauer-de Gaulle conversations embraced the (Secret) following: Adenauer was reassured that de Gaulle supported NATO while thinking preparations should be made for possible future withdrawal of US troops from Europe following the development of long-range missiles and as a result of the US financial position. Debré emphasized the importance of the Franco-German Alliance should the US withdraw. Adenauer defended NATO, stating Europe indefensible without US help. Later de Gaulle reassured Adenauer re NATO and concurred that the US was necessary for the protection of Europe.

De Gaulle and Adenauer agreed that the following matters were suitable for Summit discussion. (a) Disarmament: De Gaulle felt that control and limitation of launching sites and missiles was the only practicable measure. (b) On Berlin: Both sides agreed the Allies should stand absolutely firm on Berlin since the USSR would not go to war over it. Negotiations on Berlin should be underplayed as part of the German problem, there should be no change in the current legal status noid shows of Berlin and no movement towards recognizing the GDR. (c) Disarmament: De Gaulle stated the French were against thinning out forces or other forms of disengagement. On inspection schemes de Gaulle considered feasible zones might be either all of Europe or zones of equal distance extending to the Atlantic and the Urals, respectively. tetements of this sort not met by

Dec. The Executive of the SPD Parliamentary faction recommended periodic meetings of the (Unclessified) Bundestag in Berlin in 1960 to underline the Berlin-FRG ties. Dr. Karl Mommer, chairman of the faction, stated that rebas modeled nunciation of the Parliament's right to meet in West Berlin would be tantamount to capitulation to the threats from and in esoil Moscow and Pankow. Leon of Fred and to not some and

Dec. L

Governing Mayor Brandt's Views on Berlin as Reported to Ambassador Dowling by Berlin Senator Gunther Klein: "From the (Confidential) standpoint of Willy Brandt, the Berlin Government, and the people of Berlin, the paramount issue is the maintenance of present Federal Republic ties with West Berlin. He expressly placed this first and said that the question of the level of Allied troops in Berlin was secondary. He said that in his opinion Khrushchev was bending every effort toward splitting off Berlin from its West German connections and was advancing free city theories and UN supervision as alternatives to the present situation while softpedaling the issue of maintenance of Allied forces in West Berlin. He said that while the economic consequences of a withering away of Berlin-West German ties would be serious, they might be made tolerable, in the economic sense, by a stepped up subsidy system. His fear, however, lies on the psychological side. In his view, such a change in status would cause some Germans to look to the future and seek some accommodation with the East Germans or the Soviets. Another and, in his estimation, larger group would liquidate their interests in Berlin and leave. The mass of people, however, would presumably be apathetic enough to let events take their course and seek, although reluctantly, an accommodation within this new context of themselves and their affairs.

He said that he felt the three Allied powers should not let Khrushchev's remarks in Moscow on November 14 and in Budapest on December 1 advocating a new status for Berlin go unchallenged He feels that repeated statements of this sort not met by Allied counterstatements may be creating an atmosphere favoring such an arrangement prior to the Summit Conference. He feels that responsible Allied statesmen should state publicly our position regarding Berlin. He said that while he has the greatest of respect and confidence in Hammerskjold it seems obvious that any free city arrangement under United Nations guaranty would radically alter the whole Berlin position and that the United Nations would never be as firm in resisting the erosion of the Berlin position as the Allies whose rights there rest firmly on occupation."

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Dec. 8 (Limited Official Use)

SPD Report on Merchant-Grewe Conversation: SPD press statements indicating their doubt of the present strength of the US stand on Berlin culminated in an article in the "confidential" press service PPP that Deputy Under Secretary Merchant had set forth four alternatives on Berlin to FRG Ambassador Grewe: 1. To maintain the present four-power status, with occupation rights terminated; 2. A four-power body for Berlin with authorities from East and West Berlin sitting with equal rights; 3. Cooperation of East and West Berlin authorities with the four powers becoming engaged only when the Germans were unable to agree; 4. A United Nations administration with municipal authorities having only a supervisory voice. The article alleged that the US preferred the status quo but wished to negotiate for improvements on Berlin arrangements to prevent further Soviet pressure. Merchant is supposed also to have said that it was impossible to avoid the Berlin question at the Summit and if no broader solution was possible the US would be willing to consider the Berlin question by itself to seek arrangements blocking pressure on Berlin.

Doco (Official Use Only)

Prime Minister Nehru on German Reunification: An FRG Foreign Office spokesman told the press on December 9 that the FRG now considered the incident growing out of a Nehru press interview of December 3 as closed. Nehru was quoted in the German press as having said: "So much is said about this problem, and up to now I can only establish that no one wishes German unity. I simply cannot explain this to myself. America, England, France, West Germany, East Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland -- no one wants it. I just can't understand that. What should I say about it? If I say no one wants it, I mean, not in the distant future; I am speaking for the foreseeable future... As an ideal they may wish unity, but recognition of certain facts and a fear of certain consequences leads to the conclusion that people do not wish unity. When I say they don't want it, this obviously means that everyone wisnes a solution but a hundred percent in accordance with his own conception. If it (unity) cannot be brought about in accordance with their own conceptions, they don't want this solution."

After a clamor arose in the German press, Nehru sent a telegram to the publisher of Die Welt, published in part December 6, in which he "recognized the desire of the German people for re~ unification" and stated his "belief that unity is the only solution for a great people", but he indicated that "governments and current circumstances prevented such a development".

Dec. (Cont.)

9

(Official
Use Only)

In announcing that the FRG considered the incident closed, the Foreign Office spokesman said that the FRG Ambassador in New Delhi had presented a memorandum setting forth the FRG's position on the problem of German reunification to the Indian Secretary for External Affairs.

Dec. 10 (Official Use Only)

Secretary Herter on NATO-Berlin-Germany: In response to a general question on problems expected at the NATO Ministerial Conference the Secretary stated inter alia: "The NATO members of course have more than idle curiosity. Certainly, insofar as the matter of our relationship with Germany and Berlin is concerned, they have a very direct interest in that the NATO members, in the guarantee clause with respect to Berlin, have agreed among themselves that an attack on the Allied troops in Berlin is an attack on all members of NATO, so that they themselves have a direct interest and, of course, have every right to be fully informed as to any plans which one might have or one might discuss with respect to the whole German situation."

The Secretary was referring to the Tripartitie Declaration of October 3, 1954 and to NAC Resolution of October 22, 1954 associating other NATO members with the Tripartite Declaration."

Doc. 15 (Unclassified) Text of US Note in Reply to Soviet Note of November 11, 1959
on the Establishment of a FRG Radio Network "Deutschland-Funk":
The Government of the United States received the Soviet
Government's note of November 11, 1959 with some surprise, for
it appears to have been prompted by certain misapprehensions
about those procedures and safeguards which have long been in
effect regarding the application of Federal German legislation
and the operation of Federal German agencies in Berlin. The
importance which the United States, as one of the occupying
powers, attaches to the maintenance of the special status of
Berlin has been dealt with in numerous communications to the
Soviet Union.

The Government of the United States wishes to reaffirm the principle of four power responsibility for Greater Berlin and notes that the desire of the Soviet Government to avoid interference with Berlin's special status is reflected in the reference note.

In view of the experience of the past ten years, it seems superfluous to remind the Soviet Government of the arrangements

Dec. (Cont.) which the occupation authorities have long kept in force to 15 insure that the relationships of the German Federal Republic (Unclassified) and Berlin are compatible with the special status of the city. The Government of the United States is not aware that any proposal raised to date for the establishment of a Deutschland-Funk contains features which are incompatible with the special status of Berlin. o svened Land ent at beni

In view of the foregoing, the Government of the United States believes that the considerations expressed by the Soviet Union ed Misow of in its note are not valid. The bas beats acceptable, however, for UN representatives to see that the

FRG Reply to Soviet Protest on "Deutschland-Funk": The FRG
Ambassador in Moscow delivered a note rejecting the Soviet Cfficial protest, saying that the proposed FRG Federal Radio Law was Use Coly) not in contradiction with the four-power status of Berlin. The end vd bed note said: "The Soviet Government's note is based on an - games were error because the proposal for a federal radio law does not wor all red no envisage setting up a radio transmitter in Berlin." It added nolandia withat the Soviet Government knew the measures which the British, French and American Governments had been taking for years in order to insure that the relations of West Germany to West Berlin remained in accordance with the special status of Berlin,

Doc. o Bolanda FDP Spokesman on Berlin and German Problems: Speaking in Ansbach, Erich Mende called for FRG political parties to agree (Unclassified) on the aims of German foreign policy and the ways and means to achieve German reunification. He calls specifically for agreement by February 10, 1960 (the date for a Bundestag foreign policy debate) on (1) renewal of the acknowledgment of the Potsdam agreement by the four victorious powers; (2) convocation of a new Germany conference at the highest level; (3) appointment of a permanent Germany conference to deal with agreements on a gradual merging of the two German states; (4) agreements on Berlin, which in the long run cannot exist under the present abnormal circumstances; and 5) efforts to set up a time schedule to bring about German reunification through various phases and via free elections. of West Berlin into the FEREP developed with concurrence of

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Dec. Governing Mayor Brandt on the Berlin Problem: Speaking to the 15 SPD Land Committee Brandt said: (1) He and Adenauer agreed on (Official the position to be taken at the conferences scheduled; (2) Use Only) The FRG and Western Allies must insure that West Berlin remains an integral part of the FRG; (3) The statements contained in the final Geneva communique were the limit of what could be accepted. Brandt warned against making this position the starting point for the next conference; (4) Guarantees by the four powers on traffic between Berlin and the West must be maintained and not replaced by UN guarantees. It would be acceptable, however, for UN representatives to see that the four-power commitments are carried out.

Deca Governing Mayor Brandt on Soviet Peace Treaty Proposal: In 16 conversation with Ambassador Dowling Brandt recognized the (Confidential) practical certainty that the Soviets would eventually sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and apparently appreciated that in the end such action could not be prevented by the Western Powers. He gave the impression that a new arrangement of whatever type would not lessen pressure on Berlin for long, therefore it was unlikely that the present situation 

Dec. 15

FRG Defense Minister Strauss on the Spirit of Camp David: In his speech before the NATO Ministerial Conference at Paris (Unclassified) Minister Strauss said inter alia: "Out of the confusion of very recent time I cite one concrete and well known example: There is no spirit of Camp David which prevents us from viewing communism realistically, which prevents us from strengthening NATO and which prevents us from looking over the enslavement of countless European people. This expression 'Spirit of Camp David' has become a Communist propaganda trick which has as its aim the liquidation of the cold war in the sense of liquidation of resistance to communism..."

(Official Use Only)

Dec Governing Mayor Brandt on Berlin-FRG Relations: In a budget speech to the Berlin Parliament Brandt said that the integration of West Berlin into the FEDREP developed with concurrence of the Western Powers, but so as not to intrude on the Western position in Berlin he called for continuation of the integration under the umbrella of the Western Powers' unchallengable rights in Berlin. He then stated "if the USSR wishes to determine the desires of the population of Berlin concerning its belonging

Dec. (Cont.) (Official Use Only)

to the FRG, the Berlin Senat would be ready at any time to support a four-power agreement on a plebiscite in Berlin. (Note: It was probably deliberate when Brandt referred here to "Berlin" rather than "West Berlin"). Brandt also stated that regardless of the respect in which the UN was held by Berliners there would be no political sense to the creation of a third state on German territory under UN supervision.

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Text of the Final Communiqué of the Western Summit Conference at Paris: The President of the United States of America, the (Unclassified) President of the French Republic, the France Republic of United Kingdom and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of an Republic on the 19th, 20th and Germany met in Paris and at Rambouillet on the 19th, 20th and 21st of December, 1959, and exchanged views on various subjects of common interest.

In the course of these meetings consideration was given to the views expressed by the member governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the meeting of the Council held in Paris from the 15th to the 17th of December.

Among the subjects discussed were East-West relations, disarmament and problems relating to Germany including Berlin. On the last point the heads of state and government reaffirmed the principles set forth in the four-power communique of the 14th of December, 1958, and the declaration of the North Atlantic Council of the 16th of December, 1958, on Berlin.

The heads of state and government agreed on the desirability of a four-power conference with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The purpose of this conference would be to consider a number of questions of mutual concern. President Eisenhower, General de Gaulle and Mr. Macmillan have sent letters to Mr. Khrushchev proposing such a meeting beginning on the 27th of April, in Paris. These letters were delivered in Moscow this morning.
The texts are being immediately released.

The heads of state and government have agreed on the procedures to be followed in preparation for the proposed meeting and have issued the necessary directives to this end.

> The North Atlantic Council will be informed of the results of the present conversations at the ministerial meeting which will take place on the 22nd of December, and the Council will

Dec. (Cont.)

be regularly consulted during the course of the preparatory work.

(Unclassified)

The heads of state and government express the hope that the proposed conference will contribute to the strengthening of peace with justice.

Dec.
21
(Unclassified)

Text of President Eisenhower's Letter to Khrushchev on a Summit Conference: Dear Mr. Chairman: As you are aware I have just met with President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan. Among the subjects we discussed was the possibility of our having a meeting with you to consider international questions of mutual concern.

We agreed that it would be desirable for the four heads of state or government to meet together from time to time to discuss the main problems affecting the attainment of peace and stability in the world. I therefore wish now to express my readiness to meet with you, President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan at the earliest feasible time. In view of the engagements of all of us, as they are known to me, we had thought that the opening date for the proposed conference could be April 27 and that Paris would be the most appropriate place for the first meeting.

I very much hope that this proposal is acceptable to you.

Unclassified)

Text of NATO Council Communique: 1. The North Atlantic Council completed its ministerial session on December 22.

2. The Council heard an account by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, speaking on behalf of the Governments of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, of the conclusion reached by the heads of the state and government during their discussions in Paris from December 19 to 21 in regard to East-West relations. During the detailed discussions which followed, the Council recognized that the views expressed by the four Governments fully reflected those which had been expounded by its members December 15. The Council gives its full support to the position adopted by the four Governments.

will take place on the 23nd of December, and the Uttnoil will

Dec. (Cont.) (Unclassified)

- 3. The Council takes note of the arrangements proposed to the Soviet Government for the opening of negotiations in Paris in April. It agrees with the arrangements made to secure full consultation with all member Governments during the preparation of these negotiations and undertakes to play a constructive part in insuring their success. It instructed the permanent Council to insure that member Governments are informed and consulted, and to make the necessary arrangements to that end.
- 4. The Council heard a report from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, on behalf of the five Western members of the Committee of Ten on Disarmament (Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States), regarding the decisions taken by them. It agrees with the five governments that March 15 should be proposed for the meeting of this committee. It approves the arrangements made in regard to prior consultation and instructs the permanent council, calling as it desires upon the NATO military authorities, to consider what further approves the arrangements made in regard to prior consultations assistance it can give to the consideration of plans for con-trolled disarmament.
- 5. While welcoming the new prospects of negotiations and agreements, the Council thinks it necessary to reaffirm the principles which it set out in its statement on Berlin December 16, 1958, and to emphasize once again that the alliance must remain vigilant and strong. The Council shares the hope of the heads of state and of government that the forthcoming conference will contribute to the strengthening of peace with s lo oup a justice. In before smooth flants ow bis included

Doc. Doc alonuney (Unclassified)

Foreign Minister Von Brentano on Western Summit Meeting: On conclusion of the Paris meeting, FRG Foreign Minister von Brentano told a correspondent of Die Welt that the FRG was now convinced the Western Powers were determined to take a firm stand. He emphasized that the Western Peace Plan, tabled May 14, 1959, at Geneva would be the starting point for summit negotiation. Von Brentano considered it possible that negotiations might lead to an improvement of the present status of Berlin but that a new arrangement would have to be based on the present legal arrangement and recognize Allied rights in the city, including access.

 $\frac{\text{Dec.}}{22}$  (Cont.) (Unclassified) In response to a specific question he indicated that a UN guarantee, protecting these rights, was entirely possible, but he ruled out a plebiscite as an interim solution except as a possible last resort. In this connection he stated that any Berlin solution would require approval of the Berlin Senat.

Dec.
23
(Unclassified)

SPD Leaders on Berlin and Reunification: (Statement in the Christmas issue of Vorwaerts, central organ of the German Social Democratic Party)

Party Chairman Ollenhauer and Vice Chairmen Wehner and Knoeringen put themselves on record in favor of maintaining the "political, economic and financial status" of West Berlin.

Ollenhauer declares that if the "chances of seeing any progress toward the development of peace are slim, the German people are, nevertheless, following with keen interest the efforts of the two principal world powers—the United States and USSR—to establish peaceful coexistence by means of agreements on the limitation and control of armaments and a lessening of international tension.

"It is only on these conditions," Ollenhauer recalls, "that progress can be made toward settlement of the German question. If the Federal Government continues to cling to outmoded ideas it is to be feared that the German question will become disassociated from the talks on disarmament and relaxation of tension, and we shall become rooted in the status quo of a divided Germany."

On the other hand, Ollenhauer points out that the renunciation of war as a "political instrument" will not solve the "antagonism between freedom and totalitarianism," and that the "struggle cannot be waged by means of anti-Soviet propaganda, but only through the example of a better social order."

Dec. 24 (Unclassified) Governing Mayor Brandt on Bonn-Berlin Relations: (excerpts)
In an interview with Frankfurter Rundschau, editor Conrad
Ahlers, Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt declared that "we must preserve the Bonn-Berlin unity front under all circumstances."

(Unclassified)

Dec. (Cont.) "This is necessary because final clarification regarding the West's Berlin policy does not yet exist. West Berlin is Federal territory, and it must remain Federal territory although it has a special status. The political relations between Berlin and the German Federal Republic have developed with the knowledge and the intention of the Western Powers. The German Federal Republic's obligations regarding Berlin were set down in the German-Allied treaties of 1955. With regard to the Berlin question, the Western Powers, therefore, have no freedom of action vis-a-vis the Russians. They are bound by these commitments.

"It is my impression that the Soviets are no longer concentrating their attacks against the presence of Western troops in Berlin but rather against the relations between Bonn and Berlin. Berlin, however, can only exist as a part of the Federal Republic's territory with a uniform currency and law system. A separation of Berlin would have disastrous economic and political consequences."

Berlin Senat Five-Point Policy: In a Berlin Parliament de-7 bate, Governing Mayor Brandt reiterated the basic tenets of (Unclassified) Berlin Senat policy as follows: (1) Presence of Western Powers in Berlin and their rights re Berlin based on total capitulation of Germany. There is no reason for Western Powers to give up their secure legal position in Berlin before reunification of Germany. Any new agreement on Berlin should have as basic recognition by USSR of legal position of Western Powers.

- (2) West Berlin is part of free Germany. Berlin's integration into legal, financial and economic system of FEDREP, which took place with knowledge and approval of Western Powers, is a cornerstone of city's freedom. Berlin can only fulfill its to monow bas at tasks as "vise" holding together both parts of Germany if ties with FEDREP are maintained.
- (3) Free access to and from Berlin must not be restricted; rather it should be perfected and improved. Free access for Western Powers is essential part of their occupation rights; free access for civilian traffic rests on secure legal foundation of agreement of May 4, 1949 and Paris Four-Power decisions of June 20, 1949. These agreements not only restored status quo ante blockade, but also contained pledge to improve traffic of goods and persons and communications between West Zones and Soviet Zone as well as between Berlinall of Berlin -- and individual zones. Senat would welcome

Jan. (Cont.)
7
(Unclassified)

reinforcements of right of free access to Berlin through more concrete agreements.

- (4) Any agreement re Berlin must take into account right of self-determination of population of Berlin.
- (5) Berlin must remain meeting place for people from both parts of Germany.

Jan. 15 (Unclassified) Adenauer Reply to Khrushchev Letter of October 15, 1959:

Esteemed Mr. Premier: I have not previously replied to your letter of October 15 for well considered reasons. At that time, Mr. Premier, you had just returned from your journeys to the United States and the Far East. Subsequently, an exchange of views developed between you and the Western heads of government on the convening of a conference on the same problems which you had raised in your talks with the US President and in your letter of August 18. A few weeks ago, I had the opportunity in Paris of discussing this conference plan with the heads of state and government of the United States and the United Kingdom. I considered it appropriate, and in both our interests, to wait with my reply until these current talks had come to a certain measure of conclusion.

I think this moment has now arrived. In view of the fact that a conference of the heads of state and governments of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the USSR is likely to take place in May 1960, I consider it particularly urgent to clear up some errors and misunderstandings which are to be found in your letter and to comment on some views which you voice in your letter. I am doing this in an attempt, of which I shall never tire, to also clear up those problems for which I have repeatedly given explanations. The problems concerned are too important to permit any shrinking from repetition. I deduce from the contents and tenor of your letter that you are of the same opinion.

May I, therefore, ask you to once again read those sentences in my letter of August 27 in which I explained to you that I do not harbor any feelings of hatred for socialism or communism. Nothing in my words justifies your inference that this attitude was of a more recent date and differed from prejudices shown so far. I note with satisfaction your assurance that in the Soviet Union ideological differences are not regarded as an obstacle to cooperation between states, particularly since I emphatically voiced this view in my

Jan. (Cont.)

letter of August 27.

(Unclassified)

I am glad that you attribute the greatest importance to this attitude which the Federal Republic has held at all times.

In full agreement with you, I see in this attitude, assumed by both of us, a possibility for establishing a relationship of trust and cooperation between our peoples. I have told you on earlier occasions that I had hoped for such a development as early as 1955. Unfortunately, such a development has not yet taken place, but it is never too late to make a change for the better.

I regard it as an important prerequisite that we agree on an important point in our political aims: The conviction that mankind must be preserved from a new war and that therefore, in the present world situation, the disarmament problem is of front-rank importance. I regard this concord of our judgment as a valuable element on the road toward an improvement of the world situation and our mutual relations.

I fervently hope that you and the heads of state and government of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom at your meeting in May will succeed in achieving progress regarding this problem.

On various occasions, I have given you the assurance in the most outspoken form that the Federal Republic will undoubtedly join in a disarmament agreement concluded by the big powers. There is, however, no justified reason to demand advance gestures in the sphere of disarmament specifically from the Federal Republic, whose armed power is negligible compared with yours and even compared with the armed forces of other Eastern states.

I must tell you quite frankly that I cannot regard as a serious contribution to our exchange of views your example of the people who after drenching their house with gasoline declare that they had done so in order to avert the danger of fire. Were I to reply in the same style I would have to tell you that the gasoline is not being spilled in our country but elsehwere. I suggest that in our correspondence we refrain from such arguments; this would be in keeping with the intention not to indulge in polemics voiced by you in another paragraph of your letter, an intention which I share.

The disarmament proposals made by you, Mr. Premier, to the UN General Assembly in New York, of which you notified my government, were studied by me with the same care which I gave to

Jan. (Cont.)
15
(Unclassified)

other suggestions made at the same General Assembly meeting. I am of the opinion that all these proposals should be examined carefully and soberly and that future negotiations should be based on those proposals which offer the best prospects for early implementation and practical effectiveness.

I must confess that I am unable to understand the logic of your suggestion in one essential point. You write that the disarmament process would take place under constant international control "in which all states throughout the world would take part and whose extent would increase to the same degree to which general disarmament progressed. An agreement on universal and total disarmament would do away with one of the difficulties which arose during all disarmament negotiations so far, namely, the problem of control. After complete disarmament has been carried out, when no state has anything to conceal from another, control can be complete and comprehensive."

In my opinion, the more objects for control there are in existence—that is, above all at the beginning of disarmament—the more complete and comprehensive must be the control of the disarmament process. This problem is among those which, I hope, will soon be clarified in the impending negotiations.

You speak, Mr. Premier, of attempts to present the solution of the disarmament problem as a precondition for the settlement of other political questions which do not brook delay, in the intention to prevent their settlement. The examples which you cite are the signing of a German peace treaty and the setting up of a so-called "free city" of West Berlin.

I regret to be compelled to tell you, Mr. Premier, that I resent these accusations as being particularly unfounded and arbitrary. The Federal Government for a while held the view that the solution of the disarmament problem presupp sed the prior solution of serious controversial political problems such as, for instance, the partition of Germany. At that time, my Government was accused, particularly by the Soviet side, of obstructing disarmament by raising political conditions. Today, after we have done everything to remove the foundation for any such misinterpretation of our intentions, you level the opposite accusation against us; namely, that we are making the disarmament problem the precondition for the solution of political problems which allegedly brook no delay.

Jan. (Cont.) You are doing so at the very moment when you evidently want to give priority to your proposals for a peace treaty and the (Unclassified) creation of a so-called "free city" of West Berlin over the disarmament problem.

Both accusations which you level against the Federal Government's policy are unfounded. They contradict each other. It and accorde of mo was neither then or is it now our intention to make our tasks was the more difficult by raising preliminary conditions and priorities. I do not deny that I am convinced -- and you, Mr. Premier, will and also have to admit this -- that the problem of armaments and their limitation and reduction cannot be examined in complete some separation from the political tensions and quarrels which unfortunately exist in this world of today.

In my opinion, it would be unrealistic to lay down from the outset a rigid sequence for the solution of the problem bas salmonamo facing us.

I believe that a certain progress in the disarmament problem would facilitate the solution of important political problems. Similarly, I believe that we shall finally solve the disarmament problem only if we succeed in clearing away matters of political conflict, thus creating greater mutual trust. It would be a proof of practical common sense if we were to let the quarrel on preconditions and the chronological or logical sequence of the problems rest and turned to those talks which appear to be urgent at the moment and soluble, given good will,

The problems of the peace treaty and the setting up of a sodisky prices and called free city of West Berlin, which you place in the foreground, are not among them, in my opinion. The absence of a formal peace treaty nearly 15 years after the end of the war is painful, but not unbearable, as the state of war has long since been ended among all concerned and relations have been normalized. In many cases, former enemies have become close friends. Naturally, it would be very desirable to finally put an end to the chapter of the last war by means of a peace treaty. It is up to you and your Government, Mr. Premier, to make this possible and to do away with one of the worst injustices left behind by the war--the partition of Germany and the artificial isolation of her capital, Berlin.

seasonal and drawfire Premier: You have repeatedly advocated in public the principle of self-determination. In your fundamental speech to the 21st CPSU Congress on January 27, 1959, you said with regard to this problem: "In every country, the people

Jan. (Cont.)
15
(Unclassified)

determine their fate and choose the direction of development. The Soviet Union does not impose on anyone the road which she herself has chosen."

In the speech which you made on December 1, 1959 at the 7th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist-Workers Party, you emphatically stated: "We repeat again and again: Coexistence is noninterference by a state in the affairs of other states and the recognition of the right of every nation to choose the regime and the social system under which it wants to live."

At the very moment when you give your consent to the solution of the German problem on the basis of the German people's right to self-determination, the way to the conclusion of a peace treaty will be free and the Berlin problem will settle itself without the need for the artifice of a "free city"—artifices which in our century have conjured up conflicts and tensions.

We are convinced that we should then achieve a compromise and lasting relations of a good-neighborliness also with respect to our mutual interests with our Polish and Czech neighbors whom we have repeatedly assured that we desire a peaceful solution of pending problems.

At the end of your letter, Mr. Premier, you discussed the mutual relations of our two countries. You acknowledged that there are positive elements to be found in them. You appreciated the measures instituted by my Government in order to build up relations between our countries to our mutual advantage. You indicated possibilities for further extension, possibly in the sphere of commerce or scientific and cultural exchanges. I welcome these statements, which are indeed in keeping with the actual state of affairs. I would welcome it very much if we could make further progress in this direction.

Unfortunately, I cannot help stating that these efforts are being made extremely difficult by the Soviet side in view of the fact that the Soviet Government and Soviet press are conducting a continuous campaign of defamation against the Federal Republic. The fact that this campaign was interrupted for a number of weeks after the delivery of my last letter and was then resumed with full vigor clearly shows that this is obviously a planned action.

Permit me to say quite clearly, Mr. Premier, that this language is not suited to achieve our aim, the improvement of our mutual relations. The Soviet Government, which claims to have liquidated the "cold war," continues to use the language of

Jan. (Cont.) the cold war toward the Federal Republic. Who is to be served 15 by this? I do not believe that the Soviet interests are (Unclassified) served thereby. If the Soviet Government sincerely wanted an international detente, it must realize that such a detente is indivisible and that one cannot exclude one nation from it.

medant of Mr. Premier, you cannot expect the German people to believe in the sincerity of a policy of detente which is linked with continuous insinuations against, and vilifications of its Government, indeed, all its political, military, economic, and spiritual leaders.

This is why I appeal to you, Mr. Premier: If you want a detente, then also speak to the Germans in a language which is suited for this purpose.

I am convinced that, given good will on both sides, it will be possible in this year to make progress on the road to a general improvement of the world situation, to an improvement of German-Soviet relations, and to a strengthening of peace wrong by the beginning of universal controlled disarmament. With expressions of highest esteem.

Jano

Adenauer's Rome Visit: Joint Communique: The talks took 24 place in that atmosphere of cordial friendship and cooperation (Unclassified) which is characteristic of the relations between the two countries.

The preparation of the coming Summit Conference occupied a large part of the working sessions. Both heads of government expressed their conviction that the complete unity of the Western Allies, as again confirmed in the decisions of the NATO Council of Ministers of December 1959 in Paris, must continue to remain in being as a prerequisite for future negotiations between West and East. In the view of the two Governments, the Berlin question must also be solved on this basis.

> Federal Chancellor Dr. Adenauer agreed with the view of the Italian Government that the solutions of the political problems are to be effected on the basis of complete equality and require the agreement of the peoples concerned. The developments which may result from the policy of an international detente were discussed.

Jan. (Cont.)

Both sides were agreed in the desire that everything possible should be done to bring about a mutual understanding between (UNCLASSIFIED) the peoples, to solve the grave problems which are at present besetting the world, and to safeguard the advantages of effective disarmament on the basis of security.

The German and Italian statesmen were agreed that it is necessary to maintain and safeguard the defense of the Western countries in order to reach an agreement on universal disarmament which is based on an effective system of controls and international guarantees. Premier Segni and Federal Chancellor Dr. Adenauer stressed the necessity of continuing European policy also by an expansion of political consultations. The meeting of the two heads of government also offered an opportunity to note with satisfaction the present state of German-Italian relations. It was agreed to bring about a quick conclusive solution of certain questions resulting from the past. s of bear ent no esergore sham of resy that it eldiscop so

Jan. 28 (Confidential)

Bonn Considers Berlin Part of FRG: Answering a press query, the FRG Foreign Office Press Officer Von Hase stated his Government considered Berlin a part of the Federal Republic. He pointed out the tie is enunciated clearly in the Basic Law and that the FRG Constitutional Court had endorsed it. For years and with Allied approval West Berlin has been treated "legally" and "de facto" as a Land and the procedure whereby West German legislation is applied in Berlin is recognition of this relationship.

He stated that four-power responsibilities in Berlin were not violated by such integration and explained this view on the grounds that the Allies maintained reserved powers solely for the reason that Berlin was temporarily not under complete FRG sovereignty. onthing to remain in being as a prerequisite for future . . negotiations between West and East. In the view of the two

problems are to be effected on his basis of complete equality and require the agreement of the peoples concerned. The developments which may result from the policy of an international detents were discussed.

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PART THREE
PRESS COMMENTARY

Nov. FRG Press Comment on Khrushchev Address of October 31 to the Supreme Soviet: Editorials generally reflected cautious but (Official realistic acceptance speech's moderation. Frankfurter Neue Use Only) Presse: Main purpose of Khrushchev's foreign policy statements obviously was to stabilize climate of Camp David. Khrushchev much more of a realist than many Western political leaders. While some of latter have accused Eisenhower and de Gaulle of sabotaging political thaw because they against precipitate Summit meeting, Khrushchev virtually praised de Gaulle despite latter's responsibility for postponement of Summit Conference. Khrushchev obviously seeks French partnership while we, who possess it, hardly miss opportunity to lose it. His statement that the problem of foreign military bases in Europe must be solved first, indicated once again how eager he is to see Americans leave Europe. German problem relegated to second place. This gives rise to conclusion he had agreed with Eisenhower at Camp David price for generally desired partial disarmament to be Western recognition of status quo.

Frankfurter Allgemeine: He obviously eager to keep road to Summit open. He not only refrained from criticizing de Gaulle's Isolados bemoves to delay Summit, but complimented de Gaulle and Debre for their "realistic" views on the Oder-Neisse border. This statement seems to have been secretly addressed to Germans, whom Khrushchev obviously wanted to give reason to ponder "Paris-Bonn axis". Especially noted was his indicated readi-- Ismood to mess for compromise on disarmament, which gave rise to hope Moscow wishes help to prepare Summit meeting by making gestures . nate las e of detente. complement ent new visa

Die Welt: At the moment Khrushchev wants to appear to West only as statesman aiming to bring about detente, not as Bolshevist party leader. However, his conciliatory language - Tobal at does not mean he has abandoned any of his goals. There is no doubt about his determination concerning German peace treaty and settlement of Berlin problem. In this respect has views obviously contradict those of Adenauer. However, this time he knows his requests will find more open ears in Washington than was ever before.

Sueddeutsche Zeitung: Especially noteworthy in Khrushchev's foreign policy speech was restraint toward de Caulle. Concerning Germany, Khrushchev'described conclusion of German peace ed blow of treaty as one of major topics for Summit. Present status of Berlin and Germany is full of legal ambiguities and elements and of political instability. There will be either progress or setback in our vital reunification issue. That latter more

The state of the s

Nov. (Cont.) (Official Use Only)

likely is made clear by eagerness with which Khrushchev currently insists on including German problem in Summit agenda. Now it is no longer Bonn but Moscow that says there can be no genuine international political detente without solution of German problem. Khrushchev has something to offer to each of Western powers. He can offer something in re disarmament, to peace in Asia and Africa, and re economic exchange. Offer he made indirectly to US, i.e., disengagement of atomic fronts in central Europe, has been rejected by Bonn. Now he will try to find out whether Washington, London and Paris are less rigid.

Nov.

Neue Zuericher Zeitung Analysis of the Berlin and the Summit: The coming Conference will decide whether (Unclassified) the West will at least keep the German question on its Neue Zuericher Zeitung Analysis of the Berlin-German Problem political agenda or shelve the question for an indeterminate time in favor of an attempt at reducing tension by means of a disarmament agreement. Chancellor Adenauer himself, who seems to have become a confirmed proponent of disarmament ideology, has now given clearly to understand that he agrees to a postponement of the German question at a summit conference in favor of disarmament negotiations. Sound technical reasons can be found for this attitude.

At the present time, neither the Bonn Government nor the Berlin Government want the Berlin question to become an object of barter for the big powers, and the talk of normalization of the Berlin situation sounds sinister to the German ear, especially when the Americans are doing the talking. For under the present circumstances, such talk unavoidably carries with it the idea of the rotten compromise. Mr. Adenauer's (interest in?) talk on general disarmament thus expresses his striving to avoid bartering on Germany and Berlin at the present time. Thus far his attitude is understandable.

However, continues the Neue Zuercher Zeitung, there are reasons to suppose that there is more involved in this whole question than certain conference tactics. It may be a matter of actually doing away with the German problem as an obstruction to the new attempt to coexistence based on disarmament hopes. The idea that the German problem would simply be put off for the present does not obscure the fact that in this manner a Western position of defensive importance would be sacrificed. The possibility of bringing the German problem out of mothballs at any time later on in negotiations with the Communists must be regarded with skepticism. Every foot

Nov. (Cont.) 10 (Unclassified)

of political terrain which the West gives up is immediately occupied by the Communist opponents. To be sure, the demand for German reunification has no serious chances of success at the present time. This is a long-range problem. But how does one intend to continue the fight against recognition of the Pankow regime, that is against the status quo, if the West ceases to demand that Germany become a free nation again. If the East German regime were ever recognized, then the last remains of resistance against totalitarianism and the last remains of trust in a better future would disappear in the Soviet zone. And what would happen in West Germany itself in case of a policy of renunciation cannot be foreseen.

Nov. sa sasw and 13 o.led for seoi (Unclassified)

Berlin Press Reaction to Soviet Protest of "Deutschland-Funk": The West Berlin press gave prominent coverage to the Soviet protest note, using headlines such as "Moscow Protests FRG Station in Berlin", "West Fears New Kremlin Note Will Aggravate Berlin Situation", "Kremlin Renews Pressure Against Berlin". Editorial comment was unanimous in viewing the note as an attempt to separate West Berlin from the FRG, with several papers noting that this was the first reference in a year by the Soviets to the Quadripartite status of Berlin.

The East Berlin press headlined the story with leads such as "A New Bonn Provocation - Incompatible with the Status of West Berlin - Intrigue of Cold Warriors Against Relaxation of Berlin - Intrigue of Cold Warriors Against Relaxation of Tension and Solution Berlin Problem". Editorials were not specifically tied to the note, but obviously were related and denounced Brandt for his alleged contention in the Bundestag debate that West Berlin is part of the FRG.

Nove 14 (Unclassified)

Berlin Belongs to the GDR - East German Radio Commentary by Theodor Schulze-Walden. (excerpts). The whole of Berlin belongs to the state territory of the GDR. Berlin is the capital of the GDR. West Berlin is no enclave of the Western zone republic and has nothing to do with it. So far West Berlin has been a relic deliberately exploited by the cold warriors for the struggle against democracy and socialism and to undermine the CDR. The Soviet Union, therefore told its treaty partners last year that it is necessary to liquidate this last relic of the cold war and made its proposals which you know. The GDR made a sacrifice in agreeing that West Berlin, although forming part of the capital of the GDR and belonging to the state territory of the GDR,

Nov. (Cont.) 14 (Unclassified) should receive the status of a demilitarized free city for the sake of peace.

For years the GDR has displayed truly angelic patience in face of the continued and ever more insolent provocations originating in West Berlin. But ultimately every state must defend law, order, and security in its territory. Hence the liquidation of the sabotage and infiltration headquarters in West Berlin is an urgent and inescapable task.

Moscow, Washington and London are in principle agreed on this necessity, though their views diverge on some points this West Berlin question, my listeners, will in all circumstances figure on the agenda of the coming Summit Conference, no matter whether this Conference is delayed by two, three or five months. At any rate one thing is certain. West Berlin has never belonged to the Federal Republic, does not belong to the Federal Republic, and will never belong to the Federal Republic. Berlin is today the capital of the GDR. One day the whole of Berlin will again be the capital of peacefully united Germany.

Nov.

FRG and Berlin Press Reaction to Secretary Herter's Address
on US Principles in East-West Negotiations: (Summary) The on US Principles in East-West Negotiations: (Summary) There (Unclassified) was general agreement that the talk contained the first new formulation of US foreign policy since "the Dulles era" and that it constituted a "change". According to Die Welt the speech buries "containment" and "massive retaliation", substituting vague words about "competition" and "ground rules". The aim is no longer to dam up the Communist power bloc, but to maintain contacts and develop a "common language" so that economic competition will replace armaments and thus avoid atomic warfare. The Frankfurter Allgemeine asserted Herter used blunt language to make clear Eisenhower is determined to lay the cornerstone for detente through disarmament...the US is trying to change the form of the cold war to bring about the abolition of cold war... The Rheinische Post called the keynote of the speech "successful survival", claiming the sum of the speech was an expression of hope that months or even years of negotiations would relieve the international atmosphere of its dynamite so that then one could cope more successfully with apparently insoluble international problems. The Ruhr-Nachrichten stated speeches give rise to the conclusion that "co-survival" means simply "coexistence out of fear". The General-Anzeiger (Bonn)

Nov. (Cont.) 18-26 (Unclassified)

opined that Secretary Herter said nothing sensational, but the manner in which he certified the Soviets have a certain degree of honesty, without any compelling reason to do so, was striking. His program amounts practically to maintaining the status que, thus corresponding to USSR policy. The seriousness with which the US tries to prevent nuclear war against American cities is understandable, but less understandable is the urge felt by American Secretaries of State to keep inventing new formulas for such commonplace necessities as securing peace, such as "containment", "roll-back" and now "rules of the game", for despite the slogans, US policy has fortunately remained the same in essence since 1945.

West Berlin press comment paralleled that in the FRG press, albeit in a somewhat more restrained fashion, evidencing some uneasiness about Washington's "new foreign policy doctrine".

East German press comment in the main was devoted to criticism of the West German reaction to the Herter speech. A sample comment from the National Zeitung reads: "Rules sought by Secretary Herter hint at the policy which will succeed in all of Germany. It is the policy of recognition of the present situation, of the existence of two German states, and of the need for relaxation of tension between them. Herter's 'rules' which the peace policy of the Soviet Union and the peace movement extracted from him are also 'rules for a change in Bonn's policy and for a democratization of Western Germany'."

Deco (Unclassified)

FRG Comment on Adenauer-de Gaulle Meeting in Paris: FRG Press Chief Eckardt stated that there had been agreement at Paris on the treatment of the Oder-Neisse problem and that de Gaulle shared the view that the defense of the West depended on NATO effectiveness. However, there was a question whether some organizational changes in NATO might be desirable militarily, although Eckardt denied that this meant de Gaulle sought basic changes in NATO tending toward more national forces. Admitting that integrated air defense was certainly desirable, Eckardt said that if some allies were in opposition to this, nothing could be done. He stated the Chancellor's opinion of the French atomic bomb project as one of not opposing French tests, but opposing the formation of the third atomic bloc between East and West. Von Hase of the Foreign Office interjected that the German voluntary renunciation of ABC weapons would not be affected by the recent WEU decision.

 $\frac{\text{Dec.}}{3}$  (Unclassified)

Eckardt stated that full agreement had been reached in Paris on Berlin and that it "legally belongs to the FRG", but later a Foreign Office spokesman said that the legal position of Berlin in a constitutional sense was not discussed, although agreement had been reached that any Berlin solution would be acceptable only if the present legal basis remained unchanged. Asked whether he agreed with Secretary Herter or Mr. Acheson, Eckardt said the Secretary is the US Government spokesman and that the FRG knew of no statement indicating the US Government did not want the connections between Berlin and the FRG maintained.

Dec.
3
(Unclessified)

Federal Republic Press Comment on Khrushchev Budapest Speech: FRG newspapers and commentators interpret Khrushchev's Budapest speech as a sign that the Soviets are still unwilling to give up their political maneuvers against the Federal Republic and contribute sincerely to a relaxation of tension.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung denounces Khrushchev's argumentation that the Western garrisons in Berlin are a handicap to disarmament...It is, nevertheless, noteworthy that the tone of Khrushchev's statement reveals a certain improvement in the international atmosphere.

An editorial of the <u>Muenchner Merkur</u> notes that the Budapest address once again contained the whole vocabulary of Soviet policy in the Berlin question, such as threats of a separate peace treaty, the abnormal Berlin situation, the free city plan, criticism of the policy of strength, and the claim that reunification can be attained only through Bonn-Pankow talks. <u>Merkur</u>, as well as the <u>Heidelberg Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung</u>, comments that the charges against Adenauer are obviously a well-planned political nuisance maneuver to counteract the influence of the Chancellor's visits to London, Paris and Rome.

Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, headlining its editorial

"Detente--But Not For Germans," claims that Khrushchev has
by no means given up his attempts to isolate the Federal
Republic, adding that it is, furthermore, a noteworthy new
argument that, according to the Budapest speech, no agreement
whatsoever binds the USSR with regard to the Berlin issue.

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Dec. Federal Republic Press Comment on Adenauer-de Gaulle Meeting: Points made in all reports included: (1) that agreement was (Unclassified) reached, according to Adenauer, on all essential questions; (2) that differences of opinion which remained or arose were in matters of secondary importance; (3) in contrast to de Gaulle's recently expressed view, Adenauer does not see signs of a detente on the part of the Soviet Union; and (4) despite Adenauer's urgent call for an integrated NATO defense, de Gaulle seems to insist on special French national rights.

Independent and pro-government observers tended to agree that the agreements reached at Paris could not be underestimated. Opposition newspapers inclined to point out omission in Adenauer's statement to the press at the conclusion of the conference. Allegemeine Zeitung (Mainz) stressed Adenauer's remark that German-French friendship is an irrevocable fact though the word irrevocable is usually not contained in his vocabulary. With this strong term, Adenauer obviously intends to forestall any possible deterioration in West German-French relations which would in his opinion adversely affect the Federal Republic in the future. The paper assumes that Adenauer was successful in his endeavors to bring de Gaulle -031 8 back to a more positive NATO policy, and the Chancellor now reckons with de Gaulle's support in the Berlin issue. The Soviets do not approve of German-French friendship, and Khrushchev will most probably try to estrange de Gaulle from Adenauer. The Rheinische Post (Duesseldorf) in an article based on Eckardt's press statement said it appeared that the most important result of the Paris talks is the fact that of blved one the Federal Government can quite obviously count firmly on de Gaulle's support in summit negotiations regarding Berlin. The French President will not approve an interim solution not see which does not contain a contractual recognition of the fourpower status of the city. At the same time, de Gaulle seems to take the very definite view that the communications lines milities was I to Berlin must be expressly guaranteed. bloom

Journalists gave von Eckardt an unusually hard time. The press eving of sales chief was put on the spot particularly when it came to questions about Adenauer's and de Gaulle's ideas of NATO. Eckardt's remark that the Federal Government would approve the examination of the question whether the now ten-year-old organizational form of NATO was still up-to-date was understood to indicate at least an indirect approval of de Gaulle's desire to make France leading power number three in the Alliance. However, it seems that de Gaulle is not seeking a change of the NATO structure in the immediate future.

Berlin Press Has Misgivings on Possible Effect of Negotiations: (Extracts from editorials)

Dec. Der Tagesspiegel in lengthy editorial by Chief Editor Silex 6 entitled "Between Plus and Minus" remarked: "We Berliners (Unclassified) find ourselves in dilemma when confronted with word status quo. For Berlin we wish unchanged status quo, but for Germany we reject status quo, because we know that lasting solution of Berlin question is only to be found in a reunified Germany." Silex went on to comment, "British and Americans would no doubt see status quo plus is obtaining Moscow's signature to interim solution sought at Geneva, and which might have been betamble obtained had Gromyko received authority to sign it ... After Camp David the West still had some hope (of obtaining this) but Khrushchev's Budapest speech indicates he wants to increase his price for interim solution. As far as France, the Federal Republic and Berlin are concerned, the best thing would be if absolutely nothing were changed in Berlin ... Matters are complicated enough as it is, and full of risks for future of Germany."

Berliner Morgenpost remarked, "Paris made a few remarks re office of an Oder-Neisse border, in Washington the Secretary made some dangerous remarks on possible US readiness for a new agreement on Berlin, and London has been in hurry to effect Khrushchev's coexistence proposals...All this encouraged Khrushchev to increase his demands re Germany and Berlin and he answered the lukewarm Western attitude with his Budapest speech which makes absolutely clear that West cannot expect any concessions from him at Summit Conference. It time for all who were inclined to believe in spirit of Camp David to realize this. Whoever thinks he can make a pact with communism will be devoured by it. If West goes one step back on the Berlin question, it will not only lose position here but will have to yield whereever communism sees its next chance-e.g., the new Afro-Asian countries. What nation could still trust West, and in particular US, if West Berlin were betrayed?"

Spandauer Volksblatt commented, "It would be a crime to give those who are responsible for city's present situation country remark that the Federal Government Would approve the

to indicate at least an indirect approval of de Gaulle's

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Dec. (Cont.)
(Unclassified)

(Soviets) a reward in form of deterioration of city's status. Therefore West's goal must be not to make concessions at expense of Berlin, but to attain status quo plus -- an improvement in our situation."

Telegraf cited Paris agreements of 1954 in arguing that West Berlin legally inseparable from Federal Republic. Paper went on to remark, "Therefore three Western powers are unable to make an agreement on Berlin which Federal Republic does not approve. Consequently, any agreement over Berlin which does not have consent of its population cannot be looked upon as anything else than a colonial statute."

submit this warning to the MATO Ministers in Paris and Adenauer will repeat it emphatically during the Western Summi meeting in Paris at the end of this week. Brentano intends to point out to the NATO Conneil that the West went to or even beyond the utmost limit in its deneva proposals for an interim solution for Barlin. Since Gromyko rejected these proposals, the discussion on Germany must now begin again with the Western peace plan.

It is considered possible that the West will decide to rewrite its phase-plan for Germany and perhaps to include in the new version seme of the concessions made by the West during the Geneva Conference. However, the German delegation intends to insist that the West's present legal basis in Berlin be maintained, that the Berlin problem be approached exclusively within framework of the German problem, and that the disarmament problem be placed in the foreground of discussions with the Soviets. The German delegation keeps empnasizing the close ties between progress toward disarmament and political progress.

FERRET Press Comment on Hisenhower Trip: Several papers associated Risenhower statements with German situation. Hamburger Abendblatt said: "Hisenhower called for crusade of paace. However, prior to this, existing crises must be disarmed, use of force outlawed, and principles of law respected. Latter include right of nations to freedom and selfdetermination. As far as Germany is concerned, this means reunification on basis of free decisions by Germans on both sides of iron curtain. This is how Elsenhower's New Delhi statements should be interpreted in Germany".

Dec.

FRG Press on NATO and Western Summit Meeting: In an interview with Die Welt, Foreign Minister von Brentano denied the (Unclassified) existence of controversies among the Western Allies, saying there were merely "nuances of assessment."

The British Government was described by Brentano as being somewhat more optimistic than the Federal Government concerning the prospects of an early settlement of the Berlin problem. Brentano confirmed that the Federal Government adheres to the view that disarmament must be tied to the solution of political problems.

In another report from Paris Die Welt said: The Federal Government will emphatically warn its Allies against agreeing to any change of the present Berlin statute. Brentano will submit this warning to the NATO Ministers in Paris and Adenauer will repeat it emphatically during the Western Summit meeting in Paris at the end of this week. Brentano intends to point out to the NATO Council that the West went to or even beyond the utmost limit in its Geneva proposals for an interim solution for Berlin. Since Gromyko rejected these proposals, the discussion on Germany must now begin again with the Western peace plan.

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Dec. (Unclassified)

FEDREP Press Comment on Eisenhower Trip: Several papers associated Eisenhower statements with German situation. Hamburger Abendblatt said: "Eisenhower called for crusade of peace. However, prior to this, existing crises must be disarmed, use of force outlawed, and principles of law respected. Latter include right of nations to freedom and selfdetermination. As far as Germany is concerned, this means reunification on basis of free decisions by Germans on both sides of iron curtain. This is how Eisenhower's New Delhi statements should be interpreted in Germany".

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Dec. (Cont.) Allgemeine Zeitung in more worried vein: "New rules of game prompt our concern. East-West economic competition in Africa (Unclassified) and Asia might cause world to forget German division. We also fear Khrushchev's standstill tactics in Asia and readiness for disarmament might be paid for by preserving German status quo. Sentimental idealism Eisenhower displayed in Asia Will have to be supplemented by NATO realistically reminding him of fact that despite Moscow's pro-American tones Khrushchev emailed as hard as ever."

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Dec. FRG Press on NATO Meeting: Koelnische Rundschau, trying to maintain neutrality in US-French dispute, called it (Unclassified) "deplorable" and said: "West simply cannot afford such quarreling and disunity at this time."

Der Mittag (Duesseldorf) less reserved, said: "No use denying de Gaulle's nationalist policy plunged NATO into crisis. Under present circumstances, integration of NATO armies necessary and de Gaulle's view that powerful alliance partner must stand on its own feet cutdated. Considering Khrushchev's foreign policy triumphs, de Gaulle's opposition to further integration constitutes considerable danger. To us controversy between Paris and Washington is particularly painful because our friendship with France is a European necessity. Moreover, de Gaulle alone fully supports Adenauer's stand on Berlin. But if German-American relations were to deteriorate, what good would Franco-German friendship do us?"

All commenting papers warmly welcomed Herter's declaration on Berlin. Many mentioned that his statement effectively has Ideatured some countered rather widespread belief that "new line" of US foreign policy based on illusions.

Frankfurter Neue Presse commented thus on Herter's statements: "He made clear US not unconditionally ready to pay bill for continuously lamenting Europeans. Assurance US troops will remain in Europe was given in such form and tied so firmly to certain conditions that it almost amounted to a threat. But he would not have listed these conditions so resolutely had he not been convinced of necessity to do so. What is really disquieting is that Herter expressly had to admonish certain members to display more loyalty toward NATO."

Dec. (Cont.)
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(Unclassified)

Frankfurter Rundschau said: "Herter emphatically stated US troops would not leave Europe. US thus reasserted its claim to leadership and fulfilled resultant political and military obligations. Stationing of US troops in FEDREP is very costly and of dwindling military significance in rocket age. But presence of US troops is political factor which in last analysis is decisive for NATO's existence. US withdrawal would spell NATO's doom."

Stuttgarter Nachrichten said: "Washington partly to blame for irritability of European partners (in matter of increased defense contributions). Paper referred to Alsop report on US troop withdrawals and to Mansfield statement that number of divisions in Europe unimportant because they had "only symbolic importance." Paper protested: This is not so. Extent of American commitments in Europe indicates to Soviets how seriously Americans believe in NATO. Only two NATO partners (FEDREP and Britain), paper said, apparently intend to honor their commitments without grumbling.

Die Velt (Hamburg) commented: "To ever increasing degree peaceful coexistence being considered new basis for East-Vest relations, in this situation it is difficult to call for increased military efforts. But those primarily responsible for NATO feel this should be done, because otherwise NATO would remain patchwork and thus invite military threats. It is difficult to formulate joint policy once fear, which heretofore marked joint efforts, dies down. But ideological competition for newly developing countries requires coordination of Allied economic and political efforts."

Doc. Tr (Official Usa Only) East German Party Organ on NATO Conference: Neues Deutschland commented, "divergencies this time touch the very foundation of NATO. Organization's dilemma is that this year world trend toward a detente makes existence aggressive military blocs such as NATO superfluous."

National Zeitung said, "only Bonn wants to maintain concept of cold war. Majority of 15 NATO members, including the US and Great Britain, are of the opinion that path towards a detente must be taken."

Dec. 21

At Surett Conference discussion of Berlin

FEDREP Press Comment on Western Summit Meeting: Papers generally agreed that decision to hold series of summit (Unclassified) conferences was most important result of Western Summit meeting. Quickness of reaching agreement on Summit agenda, and the fact that Western-proposed agenda largely coincided with West German views, was usually noted with satisfaction. But continuing substantive differences between various powers were also mentioned.

Dec. West and East Berlin Press on Western Summit Results: West

Press: Majority of West Berlin papers gave prominent cover-(Official age to windup of Western Summit meeting under such headlines Use Only) as: "Berlin's position strengthened," "Western Summit a success for Berlin", "successful conclusion Paris Conference," "Western invitation handed Kremlin." News reports emphasized Western chiefs and Adenauer agreed on three principles regarding Berlin: (1) no unilateral repudiation responsibility by Soviets, (2) continued maintenance of free access to Berlin, (3) no acceptance of East German authorities as substitutes for Soviet authorities regarding Western rights in Berlin. Editorials generally pleased with conference results.

East Berlin papers front-paged reports slanted to give impression (a) US approach based on appreciation of "anomalous" West Berlin situation, (b) FEDREP position found no supporters in Paris. Typical headlines were: "USA will undertake thorough review of its West Berlin policy," "Berding confirmed abnormal situation in Berlin," "Washington holds to its commitment at Camp David," "Blow for Adenauer." Neues Deutschland emphasized that US will reexamine policy on West servett to Berlin. banearoug duods betreen

Dec. French Foreign Minister's Remarks to National Assembly: 28 (Excerpts from Agence France Presse) In regard to the German (Official problem, the Minister said that the Western troops should Use Only) stay in Berlin to safeguard the freedom of the population and that the West has no right to reduce the German people to despair by destroying all hope of being united again some day.

As to the possible results of the Summit meeting, the Minister believes that one should be realistic and modest enough to understand that even such a conference can bring only limited agreement. He added: "It may be possible to achieve a settlement of the Berlin problem without touching on the principle of Dec. (Cont.)
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(Official
Use Only)

our rights. Possibly some practical agreement on some definite questions will be achieved with regard to the other two problems--disarmament and relations between East and West. That would be a success and would justify the meeting."

Jan. 8 (Unclassified)

Soviet Views on Berlin: The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung carried a feature based reportedly on information from a Soviet diplomat at the Berlin Embassy. Main points in the article were: 1. At Summit Conference discussion of Berlin question, Soviets will reject any repetition of Western package proposal. However, last Western proposals at Geneva for interim Berlin solution need not necessarily be starting point for discussion. Moscow has meanwhile developed some other proposals for Summit Conference. Soviets would persist however in demand for nullification of occupation statute and for a control of propaganda activity. Soviets also inclined to include in a new Berlin agreement legal elements of the four-power responsibility for Berlin and Germany

- 2. Demand of GDR Government for participation at Summit Conference, perhaps again with observer delegation, will be brought forward by Soviets at beginning of Summit Conference.
- 3. In reply to query about means of supervising alleged West Berlin propaganda activities, Soviet spokesman suggested that a four-power commission might be established with its seat in West Berlin. The Commission would observe whether hostile propaganda against the Soviet Zone and East Bloc countries, as well as "against FEDREP", is being undertaken in West Berlin commission is also to ascertain whether FEDREP or the Soviet Zone are intervening in internal political matters of West Berlin. Queried about propaganda attacks of Neues Deutschland against West Berlin Senat, the Soviet representative stated that Neues Deutschland is a party paper and not an official organ of the Zone government. The article then states that the Soviet aim is evidently to restrict so-called propaganda activity, particularly political efforts of RIAS and the activities of certain West Berlin organizations. In reply to query whether control council directives might be utilized by four-power commission, the Soviet representative replied: "Political circumstances in Germany and Berlin have fundamentally changed. There now exists two states, hence new regulations must be worked out which take account of these facts."

zereement. He added: "It hay be possible to achieve a settle-

Jan. (Cont.) (Unclassified) 4. Re access, Soviets are considering a possible new agreement which would be signed by four powers and Soviet Zone government. VOPOS would then not be responsible to Soviets alone but to all four powers.

5. A visit of Khrushchev in East Berlin, either after his visit to de Gaulle in March or after the Summit Conference. modera\_\_\_\_ is possible. and to insplead vastoned believes

GDR Radio Accues US of Espionage: (excerpts) Berlin-Jan.

GDR Radio Accues US OI Espionage. (Characteristics)

Wilmersdorf, Hohenzollerndamm 60, telephone number 892775, (Unclassified) is the address of the so-called Aid Committee for Russian Refugees. This is an emigre group supported by the US secret service. This emigre group is organizing espionage directed against the Soviet Union, attempting to organize provocations, and engaging in an unbridled anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. In cooperation with the NTS group in Frankfurt/Main, Kronbergerstrasse 42, the so-called Aid Committee is compiling incitement letters to Soviet citizens, among others, to writers. These letters are mainly handed to persons who are traveling to the USSR. Names of alleged NTS subbranches in Moscow or Leningrad are given as senders. However, these subbranches do not exist in actual fact. The intention is to make out that resistance groups of the NTS exist within the tael at ann USSR. as bas offdener ent mort bell one ansattic

By order and with the financial help of the US secret service, the NTS group in West Berlin built a launching site for balloons carrying incitement leaflets. Until the end of 1958, this launching site was in Berlin-Nikolassee, (Quanzstasse?), corner of Potsdam Chaussee. There, under the pretext of drying bananas as a private firm, the NTS rented a shed.

Lately, the NTS leaflet balloons are being launched from motor vehicles, with launching sites in West Berlin constantly being changed. The principal agent, Alexander (Danilo?) alias Wladimir Lange, is responsible for this type of enemy activity. The US secret service is supplying the NTS with all the materials needed for subversive activities, such as balloon covers, weapons and (diversionist?) equipment.

In addition the NTS has at its disposal a transmitter supplied and maintained by the US secret service. This transmitter is baradha winning in Berlin-Wannsee, Am Kleinen Wannsee 25. Contrary to all international regulations, this radio station is transmitting on frequencies allocated for radio messages to ships on the

(Unclassified)

high seas. Head of the West Berlin NTS is (Poli Peregroshtov?), who is working under the cover names of Stein and Ramm. He drives around in a dark blue Volkswagen, number DR 503.

In order to lend respectability to the despicable NTS activities, the US secret service had a clergyman appointed as so-called honorary president of the West Berlin NTS--Bishop Nathaniel of the (Karolovatsky?) church. In 1948 Nathaniel was arrested by the Paris police after being found in the street at night in a drunken state, behaving in a noisy fashion and clad only in his pajamas and a beret, and molesting women,

Within the West Berlin NTS group there is a so-called "closed" section, which consists of secret members who know each other by their cover names only. They live in secret quarters and meet their agents only at certain specified places. To this "closed" section belong, among others: Ivan (Agrussov?), alias Boris, alias Urban, alias (Rigge?); Sergey (Tarasov?), alias Konstantin, alias Jaob; Nikolay Petrov, alias (Hoeppner?); (Erhard Soeltin?), alias (Baronvskiy?), who owns a vegetable produce shop in (Suedenstrasse?); and a number of others.

The NTS agents working in the "closed" section recruit, apart from the spies sent them by (Peregroshtov?), mainly GDR citizens who fled from the republic and are staying in West Berlin.

Jan, Adenauer Speech to Berlin Deputies: (Summary) In an address 11 to the Berlin House of Deputies on January 11 Chancellor (Official Adenauer declared that the progress made in Berlin since the Use Only) lifting of the blockades has demonstrated to the entire world that political freedom is the basis for economic success. Adenauer pointed out that Berlin has received and put to good use 12 billion Deutsche marks of federal subsidies since 1950. "What you have achieved here since 1950 seems like a miracle," Adenauer said.

Adenauer said that the 1949 decisions on Berlin are directly opposed to the demands voiced by Khrushchev in November 1958. Nevertheless, the excitement following Khrushchev's November 1958 declaration has calmed down and the storm of the past year has abated. In 1959 the Berlin population firmly adhered to its belief in freedom and the reliability of the Western occupation powers. "Without the aid of the Western Allies,

Jan. (Cont.)
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(Official
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and America's aid in particular, we would never have sufficient strength to resist the pressure from the East and preserve European freedom."

Adenauer stressed that he and Berlin Mayor Brandt are agreed that a change in Berlin's status could only make things worse. Khrushchev is far from wanting to improve the status of Berlin. He clearly stated in 1959 that Berlin is to become the prey of communism, just as all Germany. "It is well," Adenauer said, "that he said this in such clear terms, for the better one realizes a danger the more resolutely one is prepared to make sacrifices to avert it."

Adenauer emphatically reiterated that Berlin's legal status must not be touched. He demanded that the population of Berlin and of the Soviet Zone be given the right to decide freely on their future. If the right of self-determination is recognized in other parts of the world it must also be recognized in Western Europe. In his opinion the Berlin proposals submitted by the West in Geneva in the summer of 1959 are no longer valid since they were rejected by the Soviet Union. "Nothing would be more erroneous than to start again from the point where the past talks ended. At that time the West had gone to the limit of what is acceptable."

"Believe me, if there is an East-West conference, the three Western Powers will clearly explain to Mr. Khrushchev that they have rights and duties in Berlin," Adenauer stressed to applause. These principles cannot and must not be shaken. One should not be afraid of threats. To deviate from the viewpoint that Berlin's legal status must be touched would be a surrender of freedom to slavery which would be followed by new capitulations.

Adenauer continued by stating that "after all, Khrushchev does not have so many rockets that he can arrange everything according to his will." Khrushchev, too, must know that nothing would be left of the Soviet Union in case of a nuclear war. One must not simply run over the precipice out of fear.

Adenauer called disarmament the chief topic of the present era. "We want peace, but we also want freedom." Germany has realized the dangers arising from dictatorship.

"I have come to Berlin to tell you that you can fully count on the help of the Federal Republic at any time. This visit, moreover, was to show the entire world how firmly the Germans are resolved to preserve their freedom." Adenauer said that 1960 would be a year of dangers of the first order, and he

Jan. (Cont.) 17 (Official Use Only)

could not stop stressing "that we are all standing on very thin ice. The Germans must now above all be watchful, vigilant, and, as far as possible, united." Adenauer stressed that he was not always in agreement with his party friends. "For this you know me sufficiently well, but we must agree on the most important questions on which the future of our people and that of Europe depends."

Referring to Mayor Brandt's recent five-point declaration on the preservation of Berlin's freedom, Adenauer said: "I can only say that I fully approve this declaration. Brandt is taking a realistic viewand sees the situation as it really is."

West and East Berlin comments on Adenauer speech in Berlin: West press (January 12): Chancellor's speech before West Berlin House of Representatives was top story in all papers under headlines such as, "Berlin status must not be changed," "Adenauer: freedom of Berlin is indisputable," "no capitulation before Soviet threats." News reports emphasized Adenauer's warning that (1) change of Berlin status would be surrender to Soviets and would soon be followed by further demands, (2) in new negotiations West must not start where Geneva Conference left off. Several papers carried full text of speech.

Some papers drew attention to qualification of Adenauer statements before Berlin Parliament which Chancellor made later in interview with Radio Free Berlin. Adenauer quoted as saying that while basic legal status of Berlin must be maintained possible minor adjustments "could be made and must be made"; "under certain circumstances," he continued, "such changes might be in Berlin's interest particularly where traffic and delivery of goods from the Soviet Zone are concerned."

Editorial comment on Chancellor's speech was heavy with all papers welcoming his firm stand on legal status. Der Tag remarked, "never before has anyone warned in such forthright manner against change of legal status of Berlin. Adenauer has swept whole agony of Geneva Conference over a new Berlin status from the table and has branded any steps towards change in status as a surrender to tyranny. He has made clear that FEDREP will stand or fall with victory or defeat on freedom in Berlin." Tagesspiegel observed, "Adenauer's speech revealed concern over a possible wrong start and he warned against beginning a summit conference where negotiations at Geneva stopped. There would be no freedom to negotiate if
West started at ceiling right off." Berliner Morgenpost said,
"nothing can express better fact that West Berlin and FEDREP

particle to the water to ever and other

Jan. (Cont.) (Official

belong together than the speeches by Adenauer and Brandt." Spandauer Volksblatt commented, "Adenauer's firm attitude, which he could hardly have shown without a favorable ending Use Only) of recent pre-summit conference in Paris, is a good omen for Berliners." Telegraf, while approving Adenauer's stand on international aspects of Berlin issue, criticized his appeal for unity of all (West) Germans as "out of place in this city which for years has been model for FEDREP, particularly since it was Adenauer who resisted the marshalling of all West German political forces."

East press (January 12): All papers carried reports on Adenauer visit and speech under headlines such as, "for Adenauer a summit conference is a danger of the first order." "Bonn Chancellor misuses Berlin again to agitate against a detente," "torpedoes against summit conference normalization of West Berlin," "frightened speech of cold warrior in Schoeneberg." Press reports, as well as radio and TV commentaries, strongly disputed Adenauer's right to be in West Berlin "which lies on soil of GDR" and showed particular sensitivity to Adenauer's statement that West should not begin where it left off at Geneva. Neues Deutschland, in front-page editorial, strongly attacked Adenauer's speech and declared, "even though Western Powers regard situation in West Berlin as abnormal, Adenauer demanded that nothing be changed and said there is no use in negotiating." Paper went on to warn West Berliners against the "military rubbish from Bonn, the center of fascism in Europe" and concluded: "West Berlin no longer should remain a dangerous pool in the middle of GDR territory. The nuclear-war-spectre-Adenauer has no business in Berlin now or in the future. West Berlin must become a demilitarized free city."

In the FRG heavy editorial comment invariably supported the Chancellor and assumed warnings directed at Western Powers. Several papers, in marginal comments, approved Adenaver's call to West German political parties to find common ground on basic foreign policy questions.

Jan, TASS Comment on Adenauer's Berlin Speech: West German Chancellor Adenauer's demonstrative arrival in West Berlin, (Unclassified) which never belonged and does not belong to the Federal Republic and which lies in the center of the GDR, is aimed at described approvating the situation and raising additional obstacles to the normalization of the situation in West Berlin.

Jan. (Cont.) (Unclassified)

Adenauer's speech before an extraordinary session of the West Berlin city assembly is evidence of this. The Chancellor spoke for the preservation of the occupation status of West Berlin. Touching on the Soviet proposals for the normalization of the situation, Adenauer alleged that the Soviet Union wanted to extend the "communist system" to West Berlin and all of Germany. The rest of the Chancellor's speech showed that the Bonn Government is not interested in the forthcoming summit meeting. He made it clear that the West German Government will do everything in its power to wreck a businesslike discussion of the West Berlin question at the impending meeting.

He urged the Western Powers to renounce even those results achieved on the question of Berlin at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference in the summer of 1959. The Chancellor said that nothing could be more wrong than to resume the talks on Berlin where they were left off in Geneva. Adenauer declared that at Geneva the Western proposals on Berlin had "approached concessions acceptable to them."

Urging the Western Powers to remain "firm" with regard to the Soviet Union, the Chancellor thought it fitting to utter a gross, provocative threat, declaring that "nothing would be left of the Soviet Union if it came to atomic war."

In conclusion, Adenauer expressed his complete solidarity with the program of West Berlin Mayor Brandt regarding West Berlin as part of the Federal Republic and setting the task of closer links between that part of the city and West Germany.

Jan. 1/1 (Official. Use Only)

West and East Berlin Press on US and British Reaction to Adenauer's Berlin Speech: West press: Several major papers (Die Welt, Tagesspiegel, Telegraf) carried reports from Washington and London on cool official reaction to Adenauer Berlin speech under headlines such as: "US officials perplexed over Adenauer's Berlin speech," "ill feeling over Adenauer, " "Adenauer to go to Washington middle of March." Stories based on UPI, AP and DPA reports stated that US officials were "surprised" and "embarrassed" by Adenauer's statement. West Geneva proposals on Berlin "no longer extant." Reports added both British and American officials had indicated Western proposals still valid.

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Jan. (Cont.) East press: All papers reported on reaction to Adenauer speech under headlines such as, "Western Powers refute (Official Adenauer lies," "London does not share opinion of Bonn cold Use Only) warrior," "official declaration Washington and London: now as before in favor of West Berlin negotiations." Reports cited UPI story that US and British would stick to Geneva medium a data approposals and also included quotes from Pravda and Western newspapers attacking or disputing Adenauer's Berlin stateof bool and parents. Particularly heavy play given to British press not by maintannereaction. bom at ventodaunth . aronne appregnab

Jan. FEDREP Press Comment re Khrushchev Speech Proposing Soviet Troop Reduction: Speech dominated German press today. Comment (Official emphasized Khrushchev's announcement indicated Soviet strategy Use Cnly) shift, not disarmament. Tone of reception varied. General-Anzeiger (Bonn) labelled it "an unfriendly speech." but Koelnische Rundschau said: Fact that his speeches are spiced with threats should not prevent West from examining Khrushchev's latest statements to see whether they contain positive points for coming negotiations.

Weinstein in Frankfurter Allgemeine said: It must be clearly said that Khrushchev's announcement is not the beginning of disarmament. Khrushchev himself stressed that after implementation of this troop reduction plan, the Red Army will not be weaker. What Soviets are initiating now is strategy who shift. Effectiveness of their rocket weapons and their stockpile of nuclear explosives enable them to substantially reduce number of soldiers. Americans have been coping with this problem of nuclear age for years but the US, not being a totalitarian country, cannot push through its military reform plans as recklessly and effectively as USSR. Khrushchev's announced troop reductions should be considered in light of Soviet strategic concept. Soldiers which Soviets intend to discharge will strengthen Soviet industrial potential. Nuclear strategy shift, reinforcement of rocket units, and economic concentration called for by seven-year plan supplement each other. Even attacks on FEDREP fit into enviably consistent Soviet strategy. No one will criticize Soviets for reducing their troops by 1.2 million men in near future. However, it must be recognized that this reduction will make them stronger. This form of disarmament actually is unilateral and unique. It makes genuine disarmament even more urgent.

Jan. (Cont.) Several West German and West Berlin papers commented similarly. Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin) said: What Khrushchev presents as (Official disarmament has nothing to do with disarmament. Troop cuts Use Only) are tantamount to grandiose increase of armament, hitherto most extensive modernization of its (Soviet Union's) armed forces. It is not only in military field that Khrushchev seeks to modernize Soviet system. In connection with a number of reforms, people in West frequently speak of "liberalization" of communism. This is total misunderstanding and can lead to dangerous errors. Khrushchev is modernizing communism with goal of squeezing more energy and efficiency out of system and people.

Neue Rhein Zeitung (Cologne) commented: planned Soviet troop reduction will have domestic and foreign political repercussions. It will enormously increase Soviet labor force - Interest to required for fulfillment of Soviet seven-year plan and make additional financial means available for Soviet foreign aid. Khrushchev knows argument that "we can save money" by cutting military expenditures will be received favorably in Washington and London, Eisenhower and Macmillan would gladly reduce enormous armament burden. However, genuine detente can only be result of negotiations. If these virge of de negotiations are successful, Western Powers, too, would be able to reduce their armament burden. In any event, Khrushchev's most probably will prompt new disarmament discussions in West prior to anticipated summit meeting. Khrushchev must recognize, however, that uncontrolled disarmament remains incredible. He will sound credible only if he not merely talks about armament controls but permits establishment of such control system.

will make them stronger. This form of disermament actually is unlikered and unique. It makes genuine disermament event

Jan. Mayor Brandt on Berlin Problems: Frankfurter Rundschau led with an interview with Willy Brandt, in which the Mayor declared, (Unclassified) among other things: "The united Bonn-Berlin front must be maintained, it is no secret that I do not share the Chancellor's points of view in numerous political questions, but in the matter of Berlin the Federal Government and the Berlin Senat must stick together.

> We have every reason to be satisfied with the renewal of the 1958 NATO declaration this year in Paris.

The responsibility of the Federal Government for Berlin and the close political, economic and legal ties between the Federal Republic and Berlin must be maintained. It is important to state this because the Berlin policy of the West is not yet definitively clear. The legal relations between Berlin and the Federal Republic have developed with the knowledge and the support of the Western Powers. The obligations of the Federal Republic regarding Berlin have been laid down in the German-Allied Treaties of 1955. Therefore, the Western Powers are not free in their negotiations with the Russians regarding Berlin. They are tied to these facts.

I have the impression that the Soviets are no longer directing the main weight of their drive against Berlin against the presence of Western troops in the city, but against the ties between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. But Berlin can live only as part of the West German economy. A separation would have disastrous economic and political consequences."

Frankfurter Rundschau went on to say Brandt does not see a possibility for a basic change of the legal status of Berlin without disadvantages and dangers for the city. However, improvements are conceivable in one or the other of numerous arrangements regarding Berlin, for example in the matter of access to the city.

Brandt does not see a chance for new negotiations on the German problem. Brandt said:

> "Berlin is part of the German problem and should not be treated in isolation. This statement does not exclude a discussion of the technical aspect of the Berlin question. But under the present circumstances and during the present conditions in Bonn (the reference is to full CDU control of the Government). I fail to see a chance for progress in the German question."

Jan. (Cont.) Brandt also said: "If the Soviet Union would recognize in principle that West Berlin belongs to the West, an acceptable (Unclassified) arrangement might be reached as time goes along. The West might set up a list of things which West Berlin, in contrast to the Federal Republic, must not do. However, one must try to secure the maintenance of some degree of the four-power responsibility for the city."

Bonn Changes Its Berlin Policy: Der Mittag (Duesseldorf) said the Federal Government will change its tactics at the Western (Unclassified) preparatory talks preceding the East-West conference and will emphasize the restricted sovereignty it has over Berlin. Heretofore Bonn invoked almost exclusively Berlin's four-power status and the resulting duties of the Western Allies. In revising its tactics, Bonn is following the advice of Berlin Mayor Will Brandt that both principles be emphasized. These new tactics of the Federal Government have become known on the eve of the Washington meeting of the Western working group on the Berlin and German questions. On this group the Federal Republic is represented by its Ambassador to Washington, Grewe, who is also a member of the coordinating council which includes Secretary Herter and to which the working group is responsible.

Bonn's new argument that Berlin is a land of the Federal Republic is designed to strengthen the German position in the face of possible attempts to come to a compromise with the Soviets to the disadvantage of West Berlin. This new argument implies the fact that the Western Powers, in addition to living up to their Berlin and NATO commitments, will be unable to conclude any Berlin agreements with the Soviets against Bonn's will. Bonn is basing its new claim on the fact that the former occupation powers, when they approved the basic law, did not explicitly exempt Berlin from the scope of this law. Allied reservations merely concerned the application of this law, Bonn argues. Accordingly, former measures for integrating West Berlin with the Federal Republic have been taken with Allied approval, Bonn maintains.

present circumstances and during the present conditions in Boff

Jan. ADN Report on Ulbricht Press Conference: At a big inter-27 national press conference in Berlin today Walter Ulbricht, (Unclassified) first secretary of the SED Central Committee and GDR Deputy prods and of Premier, explained the proposals contained in his letter to Konrad Adenauer. He also related some facts which prompted the dispatch of the letter.

The press conference reflected the extraordinary interest aroused in the public by Ulbricht's letter to Adenauer. Hundreds of journalists listened attentively to Ulbricht's statements. News photographers and radio reporters were present to cover the proceedings.

In his statement Walter Ulbricht expounded the concrete meaning of the proposals to the Adenauer Government which his letter contained. He suggested that negotiations between no as enough of representatives of the Federal and GDR Governments begin bedge and so within two weeks on the cessation of the cold war, on both German states refraining from nuclear armament, on an armaments stop, renunciation of possessing rocket bases, a nonaggression pact, and on the strength and stationing of the existing armed forces. Ulbricht added: "It is now for the Bonn Government to give a reply."

ns drive agon In the course of his statement Ulbricht again produced evidence showing on what scale the Bonn general staff is and delayed preparing a policy of aggression against the GDR. He proved aldages was that it is the aim of the Adenauer Government and the Bonn roque has emon militarists to secure for themselves by 1960 to 1961 a predominant position within NATO so as to carry out their aggressive plans. In this connection he quoted remarks made by Strauss and other leading Bonn politicians.

end of the and "Herr Adenauer is now compelled to show his colors to the world public which is watching his policy with growing concern," Dr. Dieckmann, president of the GDR People's Chamber and the said in a statement handed to ADN on Ulbricht's letter to the yd nevin ogew to West German Chancellor.

The People's Chamber President observed: "Herr Strauss, who oblivered for his palready sees himself sitting in the Chancellor's chair and of sidesog who is now acquiring the right of succession as a true war cases on minister, (omission) Christmas that he wanted peace 'in arms'. It is true that he wants arms. That he wants peace is untrue.

"Anyone who still wants arms today, as a matter of principle also wants to use these arms--including atomic arms. The GDR, by way of contrast, wants peace generally, peace without arms, either atomic or 'conventional'. Striving for this high aim we advocate an immediate armament stop--proposed by the

Jan. (Cont.)

-144--Edf-People's Chamber as far back as October 1, 1959, and the conclusion of a treaty on the renunciation of the use of (Unclassified) force. Motivated by our national responsibility for all Germany, we favor a referendum in both German states on general and complete disarmament and on steps to bring about a peace treaty based on the UN Charter.

"These clear-cut facts, supported by cogent arguments, are set forth by the first secretary of the SED Central Committee in his letter not only to Herr Adenauer but also to all citizens of the Federal Republic.

"Ulbricht tells Adenauer: 'only deeds can be believed!' Smooth and pious words can no longer save Herr Adenauer. If he really wants disarmament and peace he must prove it by accepting our proposals. If instead of doing this he and Strauss continue the direct threat to our German peace state by continuing to arm the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons at an increased rate, they will very soon find themselves confronted with the most up-to-date rocket weapons on GDR territory.

"It is our ardent and heartfelt wish not to have to resort to this means to bring Herr Adenauer and his supporters to reason, the reason of peace. The people in Bonn, must however, be told and told clearly, that we have the possibility at any time of meeting every one of their aggressive moves with an appropriate defensive move of maximum effectiveness. I implied this in an interview in December. Walter Ulbricht has now said it quite clearly, and those in West Germany capable of hearing will for this additional reason welcome and support our proposals for a referendum for disarmament and peace."

Jan, SED Tries to Justify Rocket Arming: Negotiations with the Soviet Union and the other states of the Warsaw Pact, as well (Unclassified) as a reorganization of the Soviet Zone army, are to make possible the stationing of rocket weapons in the Soviet Zone as threatened by Ulbricht. Hints to this effect were given by leading SED propagandists in a so-called "telephone forum," a television hookup of the Soviet Zone. The officials gave the assurance that even though the seven-year-plan did not provide for increased armament expenditure, it would be possible to finance rocket weapons without price and tax increases.

From the questions, it emerged that questioners from the Soviet to Bonn. In the end, replies to the rising number of questions ontrast, vanta peace generally, peace without arms,

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about the rocket armament of the zone were stopped with the remark that this measure, which was contemplated but not yet (Unclassified) resolved, had only amounted to "one fiftieth" of the Ulbricht letter to Adenauer.

The SED propagandists attempted to justify equipping the Soviet Zone with rocket weapons by asserting that this would make it impossible for the Bonn Government to launch "the planned blitzkrieg against the GDR." Bonn was drafting a plan for such end of the a blitzkrieg for the occupation of the Soviet Zone.

The SED officials also asserted that the arming of the Soviet Zone with rocket weapons would contribute to the success of the Summit Conference, since the Western Powers would then be more inclined "to lend their ear to the normalization of Berlin" and the need for the conclusion of a German peace treaty.

Jan. East Bloc Holds Peace Negotiations: It is learned from diplomatic sources in Moscow that the Soviet Union and several (Unclassified) other Eastern bloc countries have carried out preparatory negotiations with the Government of the Soviet Zone concern-ing the possible conclusion of a separate peace. The results reached in these negotiations are to be taken up if the Paris Summit Conference in May does not resolve the problem of a peace treaty with "both German states" as desired by the Soviet s wolf .fre Union.

According to these sources, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and "another state not belonging to the Soviet Union" have taken part in these negotiations. In the view of diplomatic observers, the statement of Khrushchev in the Supreme Soviet on January 14, that if necessary the Soviet Union would conclude a separate peace, with all consequences arising theredelde lov south from, with the Soviet Zone republic, can be regarded as the direct result of these secret negotiations. purpose of which seems to be "to got East German representatives

Jan., GDR Sends Prague Note for Western Powers: (ADN) GDR Premier Grotewohl made a statement on the West Berlin question at the (Unclassified) meeting of the Council of Ministers January 29.

In view of the continued provocations of the Federal Government Ministers decided to address a hear aseleddeever note to the Western Powers.

Jan. (Cont.) 29 (Unclassified)

The Premier informed the Council of Ministers about the contents of the letter sent by Ulbricht, first secretary of the SED Central Committee, to Adenauer, chairman of the CDU-CSU in West Germany, regarding the threat to peace in Europe and the grave situation in relations between the two German states caused by rearmament and by the stationing of rocket weapons in West Germany. The Council of Ministers welcomed Ulbricht's initiative and declared its complete agreement with the contents of the letter.

A note which the GDR Government has resolved to send to the governments of the three Western Powers because of Bonn's continued provocations in West Berlin was handed on January 29 through the Foreign Ministry of the Czechoslovak Republic to diplomatic representatives of states in Prague. A copy of the note has been handed to M. G. Pervukhin, Soviet Ambassador to the GDR.

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West Berlin Press Comment Re Ulbricht Letter to Adenauer and Press Conference: Most papers (January 27-31) carried editorials reacting to what they generally headlined as "Ulbricht's threat with rocket weapons." Der Kurier remarked, "Ulbricht's letter to Adenauer showed what kind of a man he is. Only answer to it, which Ulbricht will be intelligent enough to have expected, is wastepaper basket." Der Abend mocked, "For years rockets in German hands were declared to Soviet Zone population to be incarnation of greatest evil. Now a famous dialectic turn has come about - rockets in worker's fists are more peaceful than those in the claws of capitalists." Der Tagesspiegel said, "Ulbricht's letter contains nothing but the announcement that the Soviet Zone will have to ask for rockets if the Federal Republic continues to fulfill its defense commitments. Installation of rockets in GDR is, however, matter for Soviet strategy which is not interested in having Ulbricht at button that might unleash rocket war." Spandauer Volksblatt called Ulbricht's letter "alarming case of megalomania," purpose of which seems to be "to get East German representatives to top-level conference table in Paris." Paper went on to comment: "There is good reason to doubt that Moscow considers East German army reliable enough to be given rockets." Nachtdepesche suspected letter was "mere pretense to point out to public the already completed installation of the most modern weapons in East Germany." Telegraf carried three different editorials on Ulbricht's statements. While dismissing letter to Adenauer as "propaganda pamphlet" and strongly attacking press conference "ultimatum," paper nevertheless used

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Feb.

3
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occasion to criticize Federal Government armament policy remarking "Possibility of stationing rockets in East Germany should induce serious consideration on part of Federal Government and its allies. It can be neither in interest of Germany nor Western Powers to create an area already charged with political explosives into an arsenal of nuclear weapons."

REPORT OF INCIDENTS RELATING TO BERLIN

1

Bishop Dibelius Defies Threatened Ban to Preach in East Berlin: In face apparent Magistrate decision announced in (Confidential) East Press to ban further activity by Bishop Dibelius in East Berlin, the Bishop crossed the sector line on November 1 without hindrance and preached his scheduled Reformation Sunday sermon in East Berlin Marienkirche. No physical efforts made by regime to prevent him from appearing. Service attended by record crowds (2,000 of whom packed the church) who heard Dibelius preach on theme "Blessed are those who seek justice and peace ... " Following service in which entire assembly joined in with ringing voices, a large crowd of over 500 in spontaneous action gathered outside side entrance to wave to and applaud Dibelius as he drove away.

Reliable source has informed Mission officer SED officials in East Berlin were "amazed" to learn Dibelius had been permitted bedraged to preach again. According to these officials, they had been told that the Bishop "was through in East Berlin." Editorials bas was blohad also continued to denounce Dibelius October 30 and 31, nol satisfied indicating that regime was determined finally to ban him from preaching in East Berlin. SED officials who commented (one of whom is on the editorial staff of Neues Deutschland) reportedly bas snot at felt SED lost face and they were highly critical of East Berlin Deputy Mayor and Magistrate for failing to follow through on esd rolloomethreat. Id nilrad deal of field a anit ferit eins

Nov.

boolde East Berlin Government Retreats on Anti-Dibelius Stand: East Berlin Magistrate announced in East press November 11 that (Confidential) Bishop Dibelius' semi-public letter on Obrigkeit (authority) ntsm bas been banned in East Berlin. Reproduction, distribution, to some or any other form of popularization of pamphlet is prohibited, efore Action was taken, according to announcement, because "letter" violates city law. A copy has been turned over to city's attorney general for consideration.

Banning of pamphlet appears to represent face-saving device for Magistrate and Deputy Mayor Schmidt who had threatened to ban Dibelius from further preaching in East Berlin but failed to follow through with ban on November 1. One factor, according to Church estimates, which has deterred regime from not make implementing ban or initiating other political action against Dibelius, is certain knowledge any such action would result in veb dose funiting Evangelical Church factions behind Dibelius whereas naphyona and present internal disagreements within Church would appear to be working to regime's favor. A second factor which may well

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Nov. (Cont.) have been operative at time of "retreat" on November 1 is Soviet attitude. Although this factor might not apply to (Confidential) future action against Dibelius, the crisis about Dibelius' preaching in East Berlin November 1 came at time when Soviets clearly were keeping Soviet Zone regime on short leash. Decision not to follow through on ban came as surprise to local functionaries and apparently, as in case of flag retreat, represented a reversal of plans. In retrospect, therefore, it appears that reversal on Dibelius ban may also have been result of Soviet orders.

East Press Links Proposed Adenauer Visit to "Provocations": Nov. East Press Links Proposed Adenauer Visit to Provocations.

East press November 22 carried brief story stating Chancellor (Official Adenauer planning visit West Berlin January 11-12 to give Use Gnly) public exposition his foreign policy. This visit, described by East press as "new provocation," was attributed to Mayor Brandt's alleged objective of "stirring up the cold war" and linked to forthcoming West Berlin meeting of Committee for Indivisible Germany.

Comment: Although November 22 story was low-key in tone and not specifically developed by East press November 23, believe this first time a visit to West Berlin by the Chancellor has been labeled "provocative" prior to the fact. However, Federal Republic activities in West Berlin have received increasing attention in East German information media recently and were subject of lead editorial in Neues Deutschland November 23 which attacked "one-sided" orientation of West Berlin towards Bonn and accused "Adenauer and Lemmer offices" West Berlin of being principal source of cold war and main headquarters of underground work against GDR. Reference of November 22 story to meeting of Committee for Indivisible Germany was first such reference since that meeting was labeled "provocation" by East press November 18.

., of benefacted bad onwithtened toyet studed bas et Nov. East Press Sustains Line on "Provocations": Although East oress has maintained line developed November 18 that East (Official Berlin meeting of Committee for Indivisible Germany was Use Only) "provocative," tone and magnitude of East press attention after meeting convened (November 26-27) was relatively restrained. However, brief reports have appeared each day since November 27 under such headlines as "Committee Provides Stage for Revanchist Tumult," with specific accusations

Use Only)

Nov. (Cont.) levied against Minister Lemmer, Mayor Brandt, SPD leader 30 Ollenhauer and CDU leader von Hassel for attempting to keep (Official cold war alive and obstructing detente trend. General line developed alleged entire meeting was directed by Bonn revanchists, and notably by Chancellor Adenauer; however, considerable attention was given von Hassel for firm statement rejecting Oder-Neisse border as permanent boundary. Neues Deutschland editorial November 28 singled out Ollenhauer for objecting to proposals for official GDR-FEDREP negotiations, which position allegedly reveals SPD leaders as captives of Adenauer. Same publication back-paged summary of TASS story terming Committee meeting "provocation," alleging meeting was convened "with knowledge and approval" of Federal Republic Government leaders, and noting provocative nature of meeting of flags of former German Laender now part of Polish and At (who some Soviet territory.

Dec. Neues Deutschland Claims Bundestag Sessions in Berlin
"Provocations": Neues Deutschland on December 3 printed (Confidential) attack against December 1 statement by SPD leader Mommer in which he had proposed continuation of the past practice of occasional Bundestag sessions in Berlin. Neues Deutschland denounced Mommer's statement as "a new West Berlin provocation" and linked it to the recent Adenauer-Brandt meeting in Bonn.

Attack against Mommer statement represents continuation of campaign against Federal Republic activities in West Berlin.

Dec. Soviet Zone Customs Tighten Controls: Mission has received reports on several recent incidents of unusual strictness by (Confidential) Soviet Zone customs. On December a barge leaving West Berlin for Federal Republic was ordered back for reloading. On December 3 a barge headed for West Berlin was similarly turned back. In both cases Soviet Zone customs officials claimed method of loading made it impossible to carry out inspection. On December 4 Soviet Zone customs unusually strict with Autobahn passengers and truckers at Marienborn checking baggage and cargo in detail and requring more documentation than usual.

Autobakn incidents have been reported in West Berlin press. Soviet Zone press on December 6 countered with charge of "piracy" by West German authorities who allegedly detained and searched an East German truck near Ulm on November 30.

Dec. (Cont.)

Soviet Zone press charged West ignored this incident and tried to divert attention by carrying exaggerated reports of (Confidential) activities of East Zone customs.

Mission Comment: Mission feels that it is too early to assume foregoing incidents indicate reversal of Soviet Zone practice over past year which saw relatively few confiscations and only sporadic instances of excessive enforcement of customs procedures. Some observers feel that periodic harassments are designed to remind West Berliners that control powers still rest in hands of East Germans. Also current food shortages in East Germany may be cause of more severe inspection of travellers. Rigid inspections of commercial cargoes during pro-Christmas rush were noticeable last year. Check with Federal Republic customs at road, rail, and water border crossing points indicates normal controls (i.e., cursory) in effect since evening of December 5. ----

Jan-

American Duty Train Boarded by Soviet Officer--US Protest to Soviets: An incident involving an American military train and (Confidential) a Soviet officer was reported to me this morning, which I hereby direct to your attention: While stopped at a customary halt in the vicinity of Brandenburg at 0643 hours this morning, 8 January, the American military train en route from Frankfurt to Berlin was surreptitiously boarded by a Soviet officer who then proceeded to open compartment doors and inspect the interior thereof. Upon being discovered by the train commander, the said Soviet officer left the train.

Upon being questioned outside of the train, the Soviet officer refused to give his name, stating, however, that he was a member of the Soviet control point. He further stated that he knew that the train was an American military train and that he had been directed to search it by his commanding officer.

I vehemently protest this unwarranted and provocative interference with an American military train and ask that you take immediate and decisive measures to prevent recurrence.

Jan. French Duty Train and Ambassador Halted: French duty train (carrying French Ambassador Seydoux) was held for one hour on (Confidential) morning of January 9 at Marienborn because one car (cold storage car) had several Nazi emblems painted on it. Soviets refused to let train proceed until this freight car detached. French train commander, considering it undesirable have Allied military train with swastika markings proceed through Soviet Zone and into West Berlin, agreed to have car returned to French control point at Helmstedt. Markings were removed at Helmstedt and car attached to next Berlin bound French train which arrived here morning of January 11.

This is a continuation of IIB-114.8, April 20, 1960, which covered the period November 1, 1959 - January 31, 1960.

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#### PART ONE

STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS FROM SOVIET BLOC SOURCES

Jan. The Smirnov Memorandum to the SPD: The following text was 13 given to Erich Ollenhauer, SPD leader, on January 13, 1960, (Secret) by the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, Smirnov, as an undated unsigned memorandum representing the views of "responsible Teldo a circles of the Soviet Union". Smirnov told Ollenhauer orally that this phrase meant "the highest officials" of the USSR. The text:

to odd od don bi In responsible circles of the Soviet Union attention is being bedseen to the public statements by members of the SPD Executive and the Governing Mayor of West Berlin, W. Brandt, in which there seems to be a not entirely correct understanding of the essence of the Soviet proposals on the West Berlin question as well as a realistic assessment of the facts of the situation. In connection with these statements, these circles consider it useful to clarify again the Soviet Union's attitude on the West Berlin question.

The question of West Berlin was not brought under discussion because anyone wanted artificially to create a crisis. The question arose from the vital facts of the situation. At this moment, no one can deny any longer that the situation in West Berlin is abnormal and no one can fail to appreciate that a failure to resolve this question will block a further reduction in international tensions. If the Soviet Union proposes that West Berlin, in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, be transformed into a Free City, it aims at eliminating the abnormal situation in West Berlin and thereby liquidating a source of unrest and tension in Europe. The implementation of these proposals would place the status of West Berlin on a firm legal basis consistent with the needs of peace.

The conclusion of a peace treaty and the establishment of a Free City would mean the elimination of the present occupation regime in West Berlin as well as a withdrawal of foreign troops. As a result, the self-administering organs of West Berlin would be able to resolve all internal questions and maintain contact with the outside world without any kind of outside pressure being exerted. West Berlin would have its own democratic constitution, its own budget, its own police force, and foreign trade. The establishment of a Free City would not upset the social and economic order which has developed in West Berlin.

If one wants to probe to the heart of the matter, one must realize that West Berlin, following the elimination of the occupation regime and the establishment of a Free City, would

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for all practical purposes have to undertake two commitments: not to join in any organization or pact of a military or military-political character and not to permit from the territory of West Berlin the carrying on of subversive and hostile activity against the USSR, the GDR, and the other Socialist countries. Would compliance with such obligations be inconsistent with or encumber in any way the interests of the people of West Berlin? That obviously would not be the case. Serious consideration should be given to the fact that the Soviet Union, of course, would, along with other interested states, assume the obligation to guarantee its independent development, permit no interference in the internal affairs of the Free City of West Berlin, as well as assure West Berlin's full freedom of contact with the outside world, and, for this purpose, guarantee the undisturbed use of the means of access between Berlin and the Federal Republic. Mr. Brandt seems not to have properly assessed the significance of the steps taken by the Soviet Union.

Concerns about the possibility of violating the Free City status of West Berlin are without the slightest foundation. Along with the USA, England, and France, the Soviet Union could provide the most effective and most comprehensive guarantees for assuring the independence of the Free City of West Berlin and non-interference in its internal affairs and, if necessary, the United Nations could participate, too. It is obvious that once such an agreement is reached the guarantees and obligations would be seriously and promptly fulfilled. In this connection, it is possible to agree with the desires expressed by Mr. Brandt that to a certain extent the Four Powers would be responsible for assuring the undertaking and fulfillment of the stipulated guarantees.

> As far as the difficulties which might result from the fact that the Western Powers have no relations with the GDR are concerned, a modus vivendi could be found to overcome such difficulties.

It is the aim of the Soviet Government to do everything necessary to insure that, after the establishment of a Free City, the economic situation of the residents of West Berlin will not deteriorate in any way but rather be strengthened.

The repeatedly declared its readiness to place necessary It has repeatedly declared its readiness to place necessary orders to insure the delivery of raw materials and foodstuffs on a commercial basis. No one can deny that if the other countries fully meet their responsibilities, the economic situation in West Berlin can be maintained at an appropriate

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level. Moreover, no one is demanding that West Berlin, after its establishment as a Free City, sever its present economic (Secret) ties, including those with the Federal Republic. We fully understand that in practice West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic will be closer than with any other country.

By the terms of the Soviet proposal, the people and the administrative of West Berlin will retain everything they now have except that they will be relieved of the restrictions resulting from the occupation authority.

There is no doubt but that West Berlin as a Free City would play an important role in bringing about a rapprochement between the two German states and could provide for them a forum of contact in the interest of the solution of the national tasks of the German people.

In the Soviet Union it is greatly regretted that the leaders of the West Berlin Magistrate are not helping to advance the solution of the West Berlin question.

W. Brandt supports the Federal Government's position on the Berlin question even though there are only a few who doubt this position is hopeless and promises no results. This is proven by the fact that the Federal Government is calling upon the Western Powers not to relinquish their occupation rights in Berlin under any circumstances and not to permit the establishment of a more normal situation in the city in the interests of all the people involved even though it is wellknown that the statesmen of the Western Powers themselves have accepted that an abnormal situation exists in West Berlin.

There are also statements by Brandt to the effect that the question of West Berlin can only be resolved by incorporating the city into the Federal Republic. Here there is evidence of the same kind of thinking, since it would set back the negotiations on the question of West Berlin and make all further negotiations on this question senseless. It would be useful if the representatives of the West Berlin Magistrate had a clear picture of the actual situation in West Berlin since they therefore would not create unnecessary difficulties nor be carried away by illusions.

West Berlin was never a part of the Federal Republic. The Soviet Government had stated this clearly and emphatically many times. This was also confirmed at the Geneva Conference. Also, the fact should not be overlooked that by virtue of its geographic location West Berlin cannot in any way be part of the Federal Republic. If a solution to the basic problem is

Jan. (Cont.) level. Horeover, no one is demanding that West Berlin, alter

Jan. (Cont.) being sought on this basis, the problem is being posed falsely and unrealistically. Our proposal does not call for the in-(Secret) corporation of West Berlin into the GDR even though there are many sound reasons for this, notably the fact that West Berlin is in the center of the GDR. The question remains as to the kind of solution that can be found for converting West Berlin into a Free City and making it an independent political entity, while at the same time normalizing and not sharpening the situation. On the basis of what has been said above, the question of West Berlin must be resolved, and the sooner the these door better. Juoda gnighted at eler that routh as yaig

between the two German states and could provide For more than a year now the Soviet Government has shown tremendous patience in seeking the means for resolving the West Berlin question without intensifying the situation and at the same time giving due consideration to the interests of all the parties concerned. It might be considered whether it is possible to facilitate the solution to the question by creating the Free City of West Berlin in stages. In the event that it is not possible to resolve the question of West Berlin by negotiations between the interested states or it seems evident that negotiations are being carried on purely for the sake of negotiation, and without any intent of seeking a solution, the Soviet Union will have no other alternative but to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR and to solve the question of West edit ni vito Berlin on this basis. on a rom s to special lostes

nterests of all the people involved It is entirely clear that after the conclusion of a peace treaty, the German Democratic Republic will exercise full sovereignty over its territory and airspace as does every other independent state. It is also obvious that this will put an end to the uncontrolled communication between West Berlin and the Federal Republic and that all avenues of communication between them will come completely under control of the GDR. Under these circumstances, if the West would then revert to the idea of negotiating on Berlin, the GDR in such negotiations would be their only partner, and the latest

ation in Test Berlin had a clear picture of the actua We do not believe it would really serve the purposes of the West Berlin Magistrate to create a situation whereby the Soviet Union will be forced, along with other countries with which it is in agreement, to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. Perhaps in this case Mr. Brandt envisages direct dealings with the GDR on the question of reaching an understanding on the utilization of the means of communication. The Soviet Union quite obviously would welcome such a step. If, however, Mr. Brandt thinks he can ignore the sovereign rights of the GDR as well as the regulations it would introduce to control the

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Jan. (Cont.) avenues of communication, he is making a fundamental miscalculation. The Soviet Union as an ally would carry out its obligations to give the GDR the necessary support to defend its sovereignty.

Brandt has often emphasized that the residents of West Berlin are interested in a stable solution to the question of avenues of communication between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. It would be difficult to deny that this is completely and fully justified. The question of means of communication can and must be regulated, but this solution cannot be handled in isolation from the general solution to the West Berlin question, that means also to the solution of the question of concluding a peace treaty with Germany, but rather is only thinkable in close connection therewith. It is difficult for us to understand what the politicians who do not want a solution to the West Berlin problem by concluding a peace treaty and ending the occupation regime in West Berlin are counting on. One cannot consider seriously that the Soviet Union, the GDR and the other Socialist countries would agree to a solution of the Berlin question that was inconsistent with the task of stabilizing peace and would adversely affect the vital interests of the people directly concerned.

There is no doubt but that, if the leaders of the West Berlin There is no doubt but that, if the leaders of the West Berlin Magistrate desired to find a mutually acceptable solution to the West Berlin question and realistically examined the facts, the cause of European and world peace would thereby be served.

Feb.

East Germany Releases Brown Book on FRG Minister Oberlaender: (Excerpts from ADN report). A brown book on Theodor (Unclassified) Oberlaender, the fascist mass murderer and at present a minister in the Bonn Government, was presented to the world public on February 2 by the German Unity Committee at an international press conference in Berlin. This new comprehensive collection, entitled "The Truth About Oberlaender,"
is a compilation of evidence and contains much new proof and statements by witnesses on, among other matters, the preparation and organization of the murders in Lvov and on Oberlaender's activities in the fascist Bergmann battalion.

Prof. Albert Norden, Politburo member of the SED Central Committee, spoke at the press conference, which was presided over by Max Sefrin, deputy premier of the GDR....

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Feb. (Cont.) (Unclassified)

The preface to the brown book points out that in any country governed in accordance with democratic principles Oberlaender would have been dismissed within 24 hours of the revelation of his crimes. "Adenauer and the German militarists protect fascists like Oberlaender because they fit into their aggressive political concept," the brown book says. Oberlaender, who continues his old plans of revenge, is a key figure in 1 Republic. Adenauer's policy of remilitarization and fascization, just as he was a key figure in Hitler's war preparations."

The facts proved in the brown book by documentary evidence again confirm the statement made by Walter Ulbricht in his letter to Adenauer: "If we consider that your policy is largely conducted by persons who were active under Hitler, you need not be surprised that not only the citizens of the GDR but many peoples and their governments regard every one of your steps with the utmost distrust."...

The speaker (Prof. Norden) assessed: "Oberlaender is not an The speaker (Prof. Norden) assessed: "Oberlaender is not all exception but a logical phenomenon. His policy is the same as that of Adenauer, Strauss, and Brentano. To condemn the swastika daubers while allowing the intellectual murderers of . Jews and Slavs to rule at the very top of the state apparatus is a monstrous thing which has become reality in Bonn. People who give legal status to the SS, who protect the oral and written propaganda of Himmler's cronies and who place people like Oberlaender, Globke, and their accomplices in high official positions are fully responsible for the anti-Semitic fascist excesses in the Federal Republic."

Professor Norden referred to Bonn's mad plans for a blitzkrieg which were unmasked by Walter Ulbricht in his letter to Adenauer and proved that Oberlaender and his ministry are playing an important part in preparing this new version of Hitler's catastrophic policy. He noted that Oberlaender's ministry, which is in charge of 29 regional associations of resettlers, finances and directs, among others, the chauvinist League of Expellees, which has the task of inciting the resettlers in a spirit of revenge and of a revision of the eastern frontiers, With the aid of the Young Youth of the East (Junge Jugend des Ostens) organizations, which number 150,000 members, Oberlaender is implanting the idea of a revanchist war in the minds, of West German youth.

Professor Norden also referred to the shocking fact that at present 190 different inflammatory publications of the regional associations are appearing in the Federal Republic, with a circulation of more than one million copies. "All this is

unprecedented situation has emerged when the conclusion of a . . or to locate one a state which or at a beauter at whent ense

Feb. (Cont.) imbued from cover to cover with the evil pan-German spirit and claims to territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, (Unclassified) Hungary, and the Soviet Union," the speaker said. "It is no accident that more and more funds are allocated to Oberlaender's ministry to the extent that Adenauer's and Strauss' plans for a revanchist war are taking on more concrete shape. wir and that thebline

Within the last three years the funds of the ministry have more than trebled. While in 1957/1958, 29 million deutsche marks were available, this figure rose to 42 million deutsche marks in 1958/59; this year it is 115 million deutsche marks, part of which Oberlaender uses to support the chauvinist ... (ne offces organizations!" and estate manual rando ent shows opposes, the conclusion of such a treaty. An abnormal, a. t.

Feb. Declaration of Warsaw Treaty States: (Excerpts from text released at Moscow on conclusion of meeting). The member states (Unclassified) of the Warsaw Treaty note with satisfaction that a definite change for the better has become noticeable in the international situation since the latest conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in May ancel regults which were already achieve. . 8201mg the All Shi ni can nerotiations -- for instance, the marrown

"The NATO countries not only continue to maintain inflated armies, but actually increase their numerical strength, paying particular attention to the West German Bundeswehr, which is commanded by former Nazi generals and officers. The Bundeswehr has been equipped with rocket weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany has been enabled to start the manufacture of these ... nath, lon weapons ... I theer a re-negles and tadt nottensta

The Warsaw Treaty countries, having exchanged opinions at the present meeting concerning the prospects for the impending disarmament talks, have arrived at the conclusion that the situation now is more favorable than ever before for fruitful disarmament talks between countries of the East and the West. The disarmament proposal submitted by the Soviet Government in the United Nations reflects the common position of the Warsaw Treaty countries, of all the socialist states. All the countries belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization declare their desire to become parties to the future agreement on total and universal disarmament....

The participants in the conference had a thorough exchange of opinion on the German question. The states represented in the Warsaw Treaty Organization have experienced more than once what German aggression brings to the peoples. It is the

Feb. (Cont.) common concern of all these states that German militarism should never again imperil the security of Germany's neighbors (Unclassified) and world peace, and this makes them determined to move out for the signing of a peace treaty with Germany. The liquidation of the remnants of World War II and the conclusion of a peace treaty are imperative for the peaceful development of all Germany and for making the peoples confident that firm barriers have been set up against the outbreak of another war on's than trebled. While in 1957/1958; Segord in deutsche

eforgues noillin al of each and it sind aldelieve ende At a time when the GDR expresses its complete readiness to enter into negotiations and conclude a peace treaty at any moment, the other German state, the Federal German Republic, opposes the conclusion of such a treaty. An abnormal, unprecedented situation has emerged when the conclusion of a peace treaty is refused at a state which is a successor of the defeated side, the aggressor which surrendered uncondefine and ditionally 15 years ago. fonce of wood as

Lafor Treaty note with stimileb s san Island and The policy of the Federal German Republic is designed to obstruct successful talks between the powers and an adjustment of outstanding international problems. Attempts are also made to cancel results which were already achieved during the negotiations -- for instance, the narrowing of the gap in the views of the sides on the questions which was achieved by the parties to the Geneva foreign ministers conference in 1959.

to the West Comen Tendeavent, which as The West and Why does the Government of the Federal German Republic resist so stubbornly the conclusion of a peace treaty; it is above each to all because the peace treaty is called upon to consolidate the situation that has arisen as a result of the war, including the German state frontiers, and the Government of the Federal Republic is against this. Only one conclusion is possible: The Government of the Federal German Republic expects that an opportune moment may arise for altering the frontiers established in Europe as a result of the rout of Nazi Germany.

destrett bas ten In the present conditions, however, this message means a policy of preparing a new war, for none of the states on whom the Federal German Republic is attempting to make territorial claims will ever surrender its lands, as the Government of the Federal German Republic should realize. All sober-minded people understand that these frontiers are inviolable.

The Warsaw Treaty states declare with the utmost resolution end of bedge that these calculations of the West German Government are and doomed to failure. The GDR, like an impregnable bastion of peace, bars the road to new, aggressive gambles by German

Feb. (Cont.)

militarists. The Warsaw Treaty states declare that they names support the measures taken by the GDR Government to safeguard (Unclassified) peace against the revanchist policy of the Adenauer government. The joint right of the socialist camp is a firm guarantee against encroschment on the independence of the GDR, on a new seizure of Poland's western lands, or a violation of the integrity of the Czechoslovak frontiers. The conference participants express confidence that the plans of the West German revanchists will not be supported by the present allies of the Federal German Republic either.

Conclusion of a peace treaty, renunciation of all ideas of revenge or revision of the frontiers, renunciation of the policy of Germany's remilitarization and atomic arming-such is the best road to insure the security of all European nations and the peaceful future of the German nation. This road is consistently followed by the GDR. If the Federal German Republic also took to this road it would be its most convincing contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and facilitating total and universal disarmament.

The Government of the Federal German Republic turns down the proposal for a peace treaty because it does not want to allow the question of West Berlin to be settled on the basis of its conversion into a free city. It goes so far as to demand that West Berlin which lies within the territory of the GDR, be incorporated into West Germany, and since this cannot be done, it prefers to preserve the occupation regime there which enables it to use West Berlin as seat of unrest and military danger.

The Government of the Federal German Republic is an opponent of a peaceful settlement with Germany because it does not want the question of German unity to be settled peacefully through talks between the two German states and the conclusion of a peace treaty. Against all commonsense, it does not want to see that for over 10 years there have existed two German states which have chosen different roads of development. Disregarding the vital interests of the German people, the Government of the Federal German Republic rejects the only possible way to the country's reunification, that of talks with the GDR, which has been repeatedly offered by the GDR Government. The Government of the Federal German Republic does not want to hear of a peace treaty because it is afraid that its conclusion would eliminate the present situation in West Germany which enables it to try people merely for having the courage to stand by their progressive convictions and come out in defense of the national rights of the German people and the interests of peace.

Feb. (Cont.) Al (Unclassified) William.

All the actions of the Government of the Eederal German Republic show that step by step it is clearing the way for the establishment in West Germany of a regime which would appear to be a democratic regime but which is in effect close to the regime which plunged the world into a murderous war and led the German people to an unparalleled national catastrophe. Could the brazen Nazi and anti-Semitic outrages of the facist elements in West Germany, which the world has witnessed lately, have occurred if conditions were different? The Government of the Federal German Republic recently did not scruple to take under its wing the organizers of these disgraceful demonstrations, and some West German officials, in the best Nazi tradition, have tried to lay the blame for them on the communists...

10 th 1000 th 5 The countries represented at the present conference stand for The countries represented at the placeful contries represented at the placeful with all states, peaceful cooperation and neighborly relations with all states, including the Federal German Republic, and they spare no including the Federal German Republic, and they spare no effort to achieve such cooperation in practice. The Warsaw Treaty states are striving for a peaceful settlement with Germany, together with the other allied and associated powers which took part in the war against Germany. This means the conclusion of a peace treaty which, under the present conditions, can only be signed by both German states.

thin, the terrstoory of the .c. At the same time they cannot agree that the solution of these questions be postponed indefinitely, which can only encourage the militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany. If the efforts toward the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states do not meet with support and if the solution of this question comes up against attempts at procrastination, the states represented at the present conference will have no alternative but to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR, tegether with the other states ready for this, and to solve the question of West Berlin on this basis as well....

ir office our words war flater. Convinced that the task of concluding a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organization, far from losing its validity, is becoming steadily more important, the conference participants deem it necessary to declare that this offer still stands and that they are ready at any time to sign a nonaggression pact between states belonging to different military alignments and the establishment in Europe of zones free of atomic and nuclear weapons could also play a not inconsiderable part in improving the international situation.

A Later eate of peace.

The design transfer

Feb. \_\_\_\_ Legality of Bonn-Berlin Ties Disputed by Constitutional Expert: (Neues Deutschland editorial by Professor Herbert Kroeger) (Unclassified) (excerpts). In his letter to Adenauer, Walter Ulbricht drew attention with insistent admonitions and warnings to Bonn's brinkmanship policy which seriously threatens peace and the life of the German people. Precisely in the present situation when earnest efforts are being made by all responsible elements in the world to discover ways leading to the relaxation of international tension, and in view of the forthcoming summit conference, the Bonn militarists are daily intensifying their role as disturber of all attempts to bring about an understanding...

In July 1959, the election of the Federal President was carried out in West Berlin, and Herr Gerstenmaier, although he knew better, declared West Berlin to be a Land of the Federal Republic. In October the sovereign rights of the GDR were flagrantly violated by the tearing down of its state flags within the precincts of the S-Bahn. In November there followed the provocative plan for the establishment of a West Zone radio transmitter in West Berlin....

On December 17, 1959, Herr Brandt proclaimed before the West Berlin House of Deputies that West Berlin belongs to the Federal Republic. Illegal attemps are being made to transfer more and more Federal Republic offices to West Berlin, although there are already about 70 federal organs employing 18,000 to 20,000 persons in West Berlin.

On January 11, Adenauer made his inflammatory West Berlin speech in which he openly treated the Western powers brusquely by declaring that the readiness they had shown in Geneva to negotiate no longer existed and that he, therefore, had to put up with being branded by them as a liar. Then, according to a Sueddeutsche Zeitung report on January 22, Grewe, Bonn's ambassador to Washington, sharply rejected any possibility of a compromise on the West Berlin question. Finally, at the end of January, Herr Luebke appeared in the city--in the arrogated role, which is always stressed specially, "of head of state" with jurisdiction over West Berlin as well--and put forward the assertion that "Berlin" -- not only West Berlin--was a Federal Land of special kind."

Now a so-called "white book" on the Berlin question is being prepared, a book obviously designed to propagate two massive falsifications of history. It is alleged, on the one hand, that West Berlin according to the West German basic law is a Land of the Federal Republic and that the Western powers had

Feb. (Cont.) agreed to this; and from this follows, secondly, that agreements on West Berlin are valid in law only if the Bonn (Unclassified) government approves them. Todal and Management (Editors Long)

The effrontery of these falsifications of history, the transparent purpose of which Sueddeutsche Zeitung on January 27 aptly characterized as "Bonn's new brake on negotiations," is unmasked by a simple enumeration of the facts.

When the three Western occupation powers issued the directive for the formation of the separate West German state at the six-power conference in London in March 1948 -- the basic illegality of which is not to be discussed here--and gave a precise formulation to this directive in the Frankfurt document number one of the Western military governors of July 1, 1948, they addressed it solely to the premiers of the 11 Laender of the (Western?) occupation zones. West Berlin-or, for that matter, Berlin-was neither the addressee of this directive nor was it mentioned in the directive by a single word. Only in this form and on these conditions did the West German premiers accept the directives issued at their Coblenz conference in July 1958. Accordingly, deputies with the right to vote were elected only in the 11 West German Laender for the "parliamentary council" which adopted the basic/ The first drafts of the basic law therefore logically exclude Berlin from the (omission) Art. 27 of the so-called (Herrenchiemsee?) draft. Only after the second reading of the draft of the basic law in the main committee of the parliamentary council did the present formulation of Art. 23 of the basic law arise, which extends the area of jurisdiction of the basic law to Berlin. Now, however, the Western occupation powers immediately intervened under the constraint of their international obligations arising from the four-power agreement on Germany. They stated in a memorandum of the military governors to the "parliamentary council" on March 2, 1949:

"Finally, my colleagues (and I?) would like to inform you that we understand the anxious interest which the parliamentary council has shown for Berlin. Nevertheless, having regard to the present situation, that part of Art. 22 (which corresponded to the present Art. 23 of the basic law--Kroeger) referring to Berlin, must be suspended ...

Nevertheless, the basic law was passed and included Berlin in its area of jurisdiction. It constituted a deliberate usurpation of right by the "parliamentary council" notwithstanding the express contradiction of the Western powers,

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Feb. (Cont.) which the Western powers (omission). They therefore stated in a letter of their foreign ministers to the military (Unclassified) governors on April 8, 1949, which was conveyed to the "parliamentary council":

"The foreign ministers cannot at present agree to West Berlin being included as a Land in the original organization of the Federal German Republic." Accordingly, the Western powers by their official letter of approval of May 21, 1949, confirmed the Bonn basic law only with this express jurisdiction:

We interpret the content of Articles 23 and 144 (2) of the basic law as implying acceptance of earlier requests (meaning the above-mentioned demands of March 5 and April 8, 1949--Kroeger), according to which Berlin is not to become a member of the Lower House or Upper House with the right to vote, and is not to be ruled by the Federal German Republic either (stressed by Kroeger)..."

This made it completely and unambiguously clear that the basic law came into force only with the proviso that Berlin would not come under its jurisdiction, that is, that it would not form part of the Federal Republic.

Since then, the Western powers have always maintained and repeated this point of view, which alone accords with the legal position. Thus, the West Berlin commandants suspended by an "ordinance" of August 29, 1950, those articles of the West Berlin constitution which declared West Berlin to be a Land of the Federal Republic. They stressed that 'during the period of transition (this means, until Germany's reunification-Kroeger) Berlin will have none of the characteristics of a 12th Land (of the Federal Republic).

In a letter from the three high commissioners to Adenauer on May 26, 1952, which, in the version of October 23, 1954, forms part of the Paris agreements, the Western powers explicitly declared the adherence to their proviso on Berlin as a basic law. Correspondingly, the "armed forces treaty" and the "finance treaty" of the Paris agreements of October 23, 1954, unequivocally except Berlin from their sphere of application. (The Western powers?) adopted the same viewpoint in the "Berlin declaration" of the three Western commandants of May 5, 1955.

Let me finally draw attention in this context to the statement by the French foreign minister at the Geneva conference on

Feb. (Cont.) (Unclassified)

May 22, 1959, made with the approval of his US and British colleagues and accepted without demur by the Bonn delegation. This statement said in part: "Then the Federal German Republic was founded, some 10 years ago, we made it clear to this new Federal Republic that the Western part of Berlin...is not to be incorporated with it... The territory of West Berlin does not form part of the territory of the Federal Republic."

These facts are unequivocal and incontestable. They prove that West Berlin is not part of the Federal Republic and that the Federal Government has no right or authority whatsoever with regard to West Berlin, let alone Berlin as a whole; that its participation in a settlement of the West Berlin problem in keeping with the concepts of a peaceful understanding and international detente and in the interests of the West Berlin population and of all the German people, while being welcome proof of goodwill, can never constitute a legal or political prerequisite for an effective agreement between the four powers and the GDR Government, which is the only German government with jurisdiction in Berlin. Nor can this be otherwise, seeing that all of Berlin--as has been repeatedly and incontestibly proved by evidence adduced by the GDR, in a manner not to be gainsaid by any subterfuges or falsifications by Bonn--belongs to the territory of the GDR, on which it is situated, and is legally subject to its sovereign power. edf gt pl anvion

Bonn's present attempts to deny this clear legal position and to turn the facts upside down are nothing but part and parcel of Adenauer's policy of aggression, directed against the interests of the German people and against the wish for peace of all peoples.

> N. S. Khrushchev made this quite clear in his letter to Adenauer of January 28, 1960, when he said: "You are making some claims on West Berlin which is on a territory in the midst of the GDR. You permit yourself to use West Berlin as a tribune for political speeches of incitement against the GDR and the socialist countries. This can lead to no good and impedes efforts to prevent the evil of a war."

Justifiably, therefore, the GDR Government, in its note to the Western powers of January 28, 1960, stigmatizes the continual provocations of the Bonn militarists in West Berlin as attempts to maintain West Berlin as a frontline city of the cold war, to interfere with the summit conference, and to conjure up grave threats to peace. It therefore voices a warning against 5 the continuation of the provocations, a warning whose seriousness Bonn should not ignore. It points once more to the only

Feb. (Cont.) real way to a true solution of the problem of West Berlin in the spirit of international understanding and in keeping with (Unclassified) the right to self-determination of the German people; that is the creation of a demilitarized free city of West Berlin and the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states.

Khrushchev Speech at Italian Embassy Reception in Moscow Khrushchev Speech at Italian Embassy Reception in Moscow

(excerpts): We consider that in the first place one should (Unclassified) settle such problems as the liquidation of the remnants of World War II, the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, and, on the basis of this, the liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin. was a first star of the

Speaking figuratively, we ought to act in politics as a doctor who, when he begins treating a patient diagnoses his disease and decides on the method of treatment, whether to give him a powder or a mixture, or to remove the affected part in order to keep the disease from spreading through the whole organism. If doctors were merely to walk around the patient and chant incantations, the patient would not get better.

It is the same in politics. Good wishes and appeals are not sufficient. One must settle problems which give rise to unpleasant and dangerous relations between states. What are these questions in our times? To anyone who has the least understanding it is clear that one of these questions is the question of concluding a German peace treaty. It is necessary to establish a state which would settle the changes occurring after World War II and legally to fix the frontiers which have resulted from the rout of German fascism. If we do not solve this problem, there will remain dangerous centers of serious complications, and forces striving to alter the situation resulting from World War II will be activated. Neither Czechoslovakia nor Poland will tolerate a change in their frontiers. We, as their allies, understand and fully support them. 1. 1.8 /

How can we solve this problem? Tedium will not help here. What is required is realistic action. We shall do everything to sign a peace treaty with Germany.

Chancellor Adenauer does not agree to the conclusion of a German peace treaty. But it should not be forgotten that he represents a conquered country. Hitlerite Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union and during the last war fought adt , setara n

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Feb. (Cont.) against our allies. We fought against German fascism and 8 lost millions of men. The fascist armies got as far as (Unclassified) Stalingrad and Moscow. The Soviet armies routed the enemy and went to Berlin. Naturally, it is not for those who were at Stalingrad and at Moscow to dictate conditions to us. We look at things realistically. One must acknowledge the changes occurring after World War II, settle them, sign a peace treaty with Germany, and thus solve the Berlin question. This is precisely what we are striving for. We propose that the occupation regime in West Berlin be liquidated. In order not to force the will of the population of West Berlin, the political system existing there should be recognized and it should be allowed to have the necessary connections with those states with which it wishes to maintain them. We have put forward constructive proposals which are well known to all. We regard them as right and we see no other realistic proposals.

serong after If there exist any other rational proposals, put them forward. We shall consider them and if they truly lead to a solution of this problem, we shall welcome them. We know that there are people who would like to liquidate the socialist system in the GDR by having it absorbed by West Germany. But every sober man understands well that this is not realistic. We could propose another and more just solution which would correspond to the spirit of the times. It would be logical and useful if the capitalist regime in West Germany should be removed and all Germany were to embark on the path of socialist (development?).

In our opinion, this would be the correct solution, though we realize that many would not agree with us. This is why we are not putting forward such a proposal. Let the Germans in West Germany and those in the GDR live as they are living; We cannot foist upon them what social system they ought to have. The best that we and our allies in the last war can do is to acknowledge the existing situation and sign a peace treaty. If these problems are not settled, they will not solve themselves. We shall strive for a solution of the German question because we want to strengthen peace.

Feb. 11

Grotewohl Statement to GDR People's Chamber (excerpts): The determining trait of the present international situation is (Unclassified) the great peace initiative of the USSR and the entire socialist camp. This peace initiative found its telling expression in the proposal for universal and complete disarmament and the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states, the

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Feb. (Cont.)
(Unclassified)

formation of a free city of West Berlin, in the initiative to convene a summit conference and, last but not least, in the meetings between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and leading statesmen of the Western Powers, above all his talks with US President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Macmillan....

Small wonder that Bonn government circles are playing the most disgraceful part in this and that the West German press, directed by Herr von Eckardt, as always in such cases, cannot be surpassed in its distortions of Soviet policy. The embarrassment and fury caused the circles around Adenauer by the Soviet step becomes understandable when we recall the humiliation suffered by Adenauer who, in his provocative speech in West Berlin a few days before the Soviet disarmament decision, said tauntingly: "Merely to demand from others that they disarm is no proof of a desire for peace."....

I can give the assurance that the GDR Government will attentively watch the forthcoming disarmament conference in Geneva and will do everything to give suitable expression to the views and demands of the German people. The restoration of the power of German militarism in West Germany, which has been effected in violation of the Potsdam agreement, has brought into being a new dangerous war center in the heart of Europe. The nuclear arming of West Germany, which has been going on quite openly for two years now, aggravates the danger of war and raises for the German people as for all other peoples of Europe the danger of being annihilated in a nuclear war....

Even though Bonn plans for aggressions are quite hopeless, this should not induce anyone to underestimate the danger emanating from West Germany. The ruling circles of West Germany are attempting to play the part of the angel of peace. They reiterate publicly that their potential is not strong enough to wage new wars. Such maneuvers are very dangerous, because they constitute an attempt to deceive people about the real intentions and real dangers emanating from the German militarism....

Due to the dangerous developments in West Germany, a situation has arisen in Europe where even small incidents might cause a new world war. The question of a detente at the main boundary of the two blocs of states facing each other is therefore of the utmost importance for safeguarding and consolidating peace.

Measures to ease the situation in this dangerous center of crises might include setting up a nuclear-free zone, the gradual withdrawal of foreign armed forces, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO states and those of the Warsaw treaty, and, not least, measures to prevent a sudden attack.

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Feb. (Cont.) The GDR Government supports such disarmament measures and measures to ease tension as we have frequently emphasized, and (Unclassified) is at all times ready to join agreements to this effect.

Unfortunately, the present West German government is adopting a fundamentally different attitude toward these questions. Of course, this government never tires of speaking of its love for peace, but equally, it rejects every concrete proposal for easing tension and is preventing a plebiscite on equipping the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons. It wants to become strong so it can place on the agenda the forcible settlement of the reunification problem. This is what the ruling circles of West Germany want....

The German people also demand concrete steps toward disarmament in Germany. This is the decisive contribution the German people can make toward international disarmament, and which they must make. Germany's neighbors have a right to demand of the German people that they do everything in their power to stamp out the glowing embers of war, before the fire of an atomic war burns.

The Government of the GDR regards an armament halt in all of Germany as the most urgent question, one which must be solved immediately. This is the first step, this must be the starting point of all our measures.

On October 1, 1959, the People's Chamber in an eight-point program laid down the measures which in our view could be initiated at once to start disarmament in Germany. This program envisages: Both German states stand for the immediate cessation of all nuclear weapon tests for all times, no German participation in such tests, renunciation of nuclear armament, participation in a nuclear-free zone, agreement on an immediate armament halt, no military conscription, both German states work for phased withdrawal of foreign troops, both German states support the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty between NATO states and the Warsaw treaty states, and prohibit war and revanchist propaganda....

The declaration signed in Moscow February 4 by the Warsaw treaty countries most firmly states that the plans of the West German government are condemned to failure. When the ruling circles in Bonn increasingly force the pace of the arms drive, when they openly create conditions for attacking the GDR and other socialist states, we cannot stand idly by, but are compelled to take the necessary action for the protection of Wastal our republic and the sentent at sent and the sent at se

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Feb. (Cont.) 11 (Unclassified)

That is why the government is submitting a bill to the People's Chamber to set up a National Defense Council. We are firmly convinced that our attitude toward this question will meet with the full support of the GDR populace as well as all peace-loving people in West Germany and throughout the world. Only in this way will it be possible to protect and safeguard our peaceful socialist construction.

What do the German people expect from the summit conference? They expect the heads of government to arrive at appropriate specific agreements on disarmament, the most important issue at present confronting the peoples and their governments. As for the GDR, it will support all measures adopted by the heads of government for solution of the disarmament question.

The German people expect from the summit conference, above all, that it achieve progress in the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states and the setting up of a free city of Berlin. beef bloom has the thought

We consider it necessary that peace treaty negotiations take place only with the participation of both German states. The GDR government once more declares its readiness to take part in all conferences on questions concerning Germany and to cooperate to the best of its abilities in the attainment lo sally of positive results.

First and foremost in our struggle for peaceful solution of the German question is the demand to conclude a peace treaty with the two German states. By overcoming the dangerous militarist and revanchist development in West Germany, the peace treaty would safeguard peace for the German people and establish for other peoples the guarantee that they will never again be exposed to aggression from Germany. The best assistance which the four powers could render the German people would, therefore, be the decision to conclude a peace treaty with the two German states without delay.

Animated by the desire to continue their adventurous policy unhindered, West German ruling circles are trying by every possible means to prevent the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany, which under present conditions means with the two German states. Should the Bonn government not be willing in the foreseeable future to change its attitude and adopt a sensible point of view in this matter, the GDR in the interest of the nation as a whole, will be compelled to conclude a peace treaty with any state willing to do so. We take peace wherever we can get it, for all the German people, or for that part of the people who want peace.

Feb. (Cont.) It goes without saying that this peace treaty will also settle 11 the West Berlin question. We are ready to meet those govern-(Unclassified) ments of the anti-Hitlerite coalition that cannot at present see their way to concluding a peace treaty with the GDR.

In view of the dangers which the complete absence of a peace treaty has conjured up for Germany, these are matters of secondary importance. The chief problem is to insure that a peace treaty is concluded.

There are governments which do not wish to conclude peace treaties with the GDR. additional forces of the same o

it will wannert all measures adopted by the Of late we have heard with interest of a proposal that Western governments sign a peace treaty with the Federal Republic and those governments which are willing to do so, sign a peace treaty with the GDR. As both peace treaties must settle the same problems, they would be basically of the same content and would lead to the same results. Such a procedure would do away with the objections which are being raised by some governments to our proposal to conclude a peace treaty with Germany, that is, under present conditions sales of se with both German states. some desergeror and odly

Our concern in the conclusion of a peace treaty is the national existence of the German people, the safeguarding of peace, and the creation of the prerequisites for the eventual restoration of Germany's unity as a state. To this end we are willing to make any concession which can be made in the and regardinterest of peace.... and the white distribute and the artistical til allterter and revenue allter and the telephone and the til

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We must state emphatically that all of Berlin belongs to the territory of the GDR, and that West Berlin is not and never has been part of the Bonn state. This also emerges quite clearly from relevant international negotiations, and it was again confirmed at the Geneva foreign ministers conference at which French Foreign minister Couve de Murville stated in complete agreement with US Secretary of State Herter and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd that the West Berlin government has no direct link with the Government of the German Federal Republic. The territory of West Berlin does not form part of the territory of the Federal Republic.

the Bone government not be willing Our view remains the same. The best solution of the West Berlin problem would be the setting up of a demilitarized, free city of West Berlin in conjunction with the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states. In this way

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take neace wherever we can set it, for all the General people,

Feb. (Cont.) (Unclassified) West Berlin could be changed from a very dangerous hotbed of tension, a center of espionage and diversionist activities, into a city of tranquility and peace. The urgency of this is borne out by the fact that fascism and anti-Semitism are openly raising their ugly heads, not only in West Germany but also in West Berlin.

Feb. 13 (Secret)

Khrushchev to Gronchi on Berlin and Germany; (Reported by Embassy Moscow as coming from Italian Ambassador). Responding to Gronchi's stress on disarmament as chief problem, Khrushchev raised problem of Berlin and Germany. He declared the war was lost by Germany and the Elbe marked the boundary between the West and socialist countries. It was necessary to settle the Berlin problem, but it was the desire of the USSR to do so by agreement, not by imposed solution or ultimatum. Khrushchev indicated that a provisional settlement of the problem of Berlin was acceptable to the Soviets so as to allow an attempt by the two Germanies to settle their problem. Although he was agreeable to refrain from setting a deadline for such negotiations, they could not continue endlessly. Khrushchev accused the West of stalling on the German question and said this impermissible.

Feb.

Polish Foreign Minister on German Problem: We attach special importance to the development of friendship and comprehensive (Unclassified) collaboration with our western neighbor, the GDR. We value highly its uncompromising attitude towards West German militarism, border revisionism, and chauvinism -- the common enemies of the Polish and German peoples. Recent events in West German political life still more strongly emphasize the significance of the GDR for the peaceful development of the two German states and prove once again that our ties and collaboration with the GOR are a road to establishing good relations with the entire German nation and to finally settling the historic Polish-German problem. Our economic relations with the GDR are developing favorably and are of great importance to us, as is demonstrated by, among other things, by our cooperation in exploiting brown coal deposits in Lower Silesia ....

We understand why the West German Government does not want a peace treaty. We understand why cold war groups in various Feb. (Cont.)
16 (Unclassified)

Western countries do not want it. But why should it be rejected by the responsible groups in the West which see the need for a relaxation of tension and for peaceful coexistence?

Some people say one cannot conclude a peace treaty because it would confirm the fact of the existence of two German states. This is correct. This fact, however, is not in dispute; this is a fact which all clear-sighted Western politicians are increasingly taking into account. What is it all about, then? Is it a matter of yielding to those politicians who disregard realities? Does it mean yielding to politicians who are unable to recognize facts, politicians given to adventures?

Some people say that a treaty would exclude German reunification, but everybody knows that under present conditions, as long as the present policy of the Federal German Republic is being pursued, as long as considerable aggressive forces exist in West Germany, two opposite elements can hardly unite. This is a matter for the Germans themselves. This unification is no longer even wanted in the West. Why, then, should we sacrifice such concrete and great advantages as the treaty would bring to Europe and the world?

Well, people say in the West that one should not deprive the Germans of the hope of reunification. Who wants to deprive them of that hope? Who can deprive them of the right to reunite? Not the treaty, at any rate. The hope is natural. It may be realized through renunciation by West Germany of imperialist ambitions towards the world of territorial claims, of aggressive armaments, through the muzzling of aggressive internal forces, and through the establishment of effective guarantees that they will not revive.

Then conditions favorable for a decision on the reunification of the two German states could come into being. Then no European nation would have any reason to feel threatened. This is the only feasible prospect. Why disguise it? For the sake of whose hope? For the sake of what kind of Germany? But perhaps what is involved is the fear finally to confirm the borders. So again—for whose sake is avoided acknowledgment of facts whose finality is well understood?

We believe that it is in the interest of the nations--including the German nation--in the interest of peace, that matters should be put clearly. We believe that confusion can only be used for sinister purposes. The conclusion of a peace

Feb. (Cont.) treaty by all interested countries would be of tremendous 16 - importance. Poland fully supports the attitude of the (Unclassified) Soviet Government, which is also our own attitude; but if despite all, the forces of the cold war should insist on having their own way and prevent such a solution, there would be no other way open for socialist countries than, in harmony with the declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, to conclude together with other countries so desiring, a peace treaty with the GDR.

Feb. 29

Khrushchev Press Conference in Djakarta: Khrushchev: Many questions which could be solved now concern mostly the states (Unclassified) that will take part in the conference -- the German question, for instance, and several other problems. Moreover, one meeting, of course, will not be able to deal with all the issues under dispute. Therefore I think that the meeting To all on May 16, if the representatives of all parties to it exert efforts toward this end, will make a good start ....

Question (by Associated Press correspondent:) Did you actually say that you will insist on a Western withdrawal from West Berlin regardless of the concessions they may make to Russia's position on disarmament? Did you make this statement to President Gronchi of Italy?

Khrushchev: The question is put in a not too correct way. The Western powers are allegedly to make concessions to the Soviet Union on questions of safeguarding peace, while we are to make concessions to the West with regard to Berlin. This is incorrect. These are two independent questions, each of which requires a separate solution.

Is it only the Soviet Union and the socialist countries that are interested in disarmament, in safeguarding peace? All the peoples are interested in safeguarding peace. This is why it is necessary to consider the disarmament question and solve it in a way beneficial for all countries, for all the peoples, for the cause of peace.

The question of West Berlin is entirely different. This is a question whose solution has been dragged out for 15 years since the end of the war. How much longer can we wait? A summit conference will meet shortly to strengthen peace, but the leftovers of the last war have not been done away with yet. This situation contradicts commonsense. This is why we shall strive to wipe out the hangovers of war, shall try to

Feb. (Cont.)
29
(Unclassified)

convince our allies of the last war to sign a peace treaty with the two existing German states. If they fail to understand this need or if they realize it but refuse to agree, then we shall sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

When a peace treaty with the GDR is signed, all the consequences of the war against Germany will cease to exist on the territory of the GDR and with regard to West Berlin as well. West Berlin is on the territory of the GDR.

Question (by Antara correspondent:) The Western countries suggest an all-German plebiscite to solve the problem of this state divided into two parts. What could Premier Khrushchev say on this score?

Khrushchev: We explained our position on this question some time ago. We stand for noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. The question of a plebiscite, of arranging it in this or another state or states, concerns only the peoples living in these states. The Soviet Union and Germany are not even neighbors. If the question of a plebiscite arises, let the governments of the two German states meet, agree between themselves, and arrange what they like. The Soviet Union will recognize and respect their decisions. But we ourselves do not and shall not take part in settling such questions, and we are against any states interfering in the affairs of other countries.

Question (by London Times correspondent:) Do you still envisage the status of a free city for Berlin?

Khrushchev: We do not see any other way out. We want to settle the West Berlin issue in such a way as not to create difficulties for anyone. We only want to record the conditions obtaining in that city. Capitalist order exists in West Berlin and we do not want to interfere in the affairs of the West Berlin population, we do not demand changes in the social system existing there. But we press and we shall continue to press for ending the occupation regime in West Berlin. Consequently, we arrive at the conclusion that the only possibility that offers itself is to grant West Berlin the status of a free city. Therefore, we have adhered and still adhere to this position and we believe that this is the most reasonable stand. We want our allies to understand us correctly and to join us. This would be useful and would facilitate the settlement of issues awaiting solution.

## SECRET/NOFORN

- 26 -

## Mar. 1 (Unclassified)

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Soviet Spokesman on Berlin Air Lanes: A Soviet spokesman said today that the Western Allies must negotiate with East Germany and the Soviet Union if they wanted to fly above the Soviet-imposed 10,000-foot ceiling in the air corridors linking West Berlin with the west.

Sources in Washington disclosed Monday that the United States had decided to resume supply flights into the city above that ceiling, in agreement with Britain and France.

Yuri Beburov, First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin, said Allied flights to and from Berlin above an altitude of 10,000 feet would be considered "unilateral violations of East Germany's air sovereignty" unless an agreement was reached previously.

The West accepts no limitation on altitude in the corridors.

Answering reporters' questions, Mr. Beburov refused to say whether Soviet or East German fighter planes would be used to intercept Allied high-altitude flights.

In the two instances last spring Soviet jet fighters buzzed United States Air Force planes flying above 10,000 feet.

The Russians contend that the three air corridors over East Germany connecting Berlin with West Germany can be used by Allied planes only at heights up to 10,000 feet. They maintain that higher altitudes are reserved for Soviet and East German military aircraft.

The Soviet spokesman seemed to concede that the original four-power agreements establishing the air access routes to Berlin contained no limitation of altitude. However, he said the air ceiling had become "an established right by custom and practice."

Mr. Beburov said that to this knowledge Soviet representatives in Berlin had not been informed of Western plan to resume high-altitude flights.

Certainly any plan to change the altitudes of Allied flights, he said, would make negotiations necessary with East Germany and the Soviet Union.

"The East German Government would have to be thoroughly consulted on such a move," he added.

"Any other action by the Western powers must be considered a unilateral violation of East German air sovereignty and of existing four-power agreements."

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Mar. (Unclassified)

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GDR Deputy Premier Heinrich Rau on Economic Relations Under the Deutschland: In connection with Walter Ulbricht's letter to Adenauer it has again been emphasized that a fair, national compromise in the economic field is necessary. What is understood by such a compromise?

Rau: That is a serious question. There are two states in Germany, and neither German state could expect the other to submit to it. In his letter to Adenauer, Walter Ulbricht explained in detail why an overall nastonal political compromise is possible and desirable. We hold that such a national compromise can also be reached in the economic field. Since there are two different German states, there are two economic systems. In our country state property remains in the people's hands, and in West Germany the capitalist retain their holdings. We do not insist on changes in the ownership system. West Germans may make their own changes.

Associated Press: Is the GDR ready to compromise on the question of commercial relations between West Berlin and the Federal Republic under a free city status?

Rau: As a demilitarized city, West Berlin would be free to maintain economic relations with anyone it likes. If West Berliners want to maintain economic relations with West Germany, they may do so, and no objections could be raised to new economic contacts sought by West Berlin with other countries. However, it is obviously difficult for some people to realize that West Berlin is 200 kilometers from the Federal Republic and is located on GDR territory.

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Mar. Soviet Note to US on German Bases in Spain: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Unclassified) has the honor to inform the Embassy of the United States of America that on the fourth of March 1960 the Soviet Government sent to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany a note concerning plans for establishing military bases of the Bundeswehr on the territory of Spain.

The Soviet Government considers that the efforts of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to establish military collaboration with the Franco regime seriously complicates the situation in Europe and is contrary to the noticeable relaxation in tension in favor of which the governments of the USSR and the USA have spoken out. The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the USA, as one of to so the participating states in the allied agreements on Germany intended to eradicate German militarism, to prevent its rebirth and to set the development of Germany on a peaceful democratic course, will use its influence in order to prevent the realization of the dangerous military plans of the Government of the FRG.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR would be grateful to the Embassy for transmitting to the Government of the USA the present note as well as the attached copy of a note to the Government of the FRG. (Moscow, March 4, 1960.)

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Mar. Soviet Note to FRG on German Bases in Spain: The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it (Unclassified) necessary to inform the Government of the FRG of the following:

It has become known to the Soviet Government that the Government of the FRG is carrying on negotiations with the Government of Spain for the purpose of arranging the military collaboration of the two countries. As is apparent from press reports, the authenticity of which is also confirmed by the statements of officials of a number of Western countries, the Government of the FRG intends to use Spanish territory for the establishment there of air force and missile bases, military testing grounds, and of supply bases of the Bundeswehr.

It is necessary to assume that the Government of the FRG could not fail to note what wide-spread indignation and concern the to says steps of the Federal Government for the purpose of establishing military bases of the Bundeswehr on the territory of

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Mar. Franco Spain have aroused in circles of the public and in the parliaments of many countries, including countries adhering (Unclassified) to the same military bloc as the FRG.

The Soviet Government, for its part, calls the attention of the Federal Government to the fact that Western Germany, by entering into a military agreement with the Franco regime, crudely violates the act of unconditional capitulation of Germany, and the allied agreement on Germany, which were designed to guarantee that Germany never again would threaten its neighbors and the peace of the whole world and which apply to any German government and consequently also to the Government of the FRG.

It is known that the Federal Government is not just today entering on this dangerous course, the course of violation of international agreements providing for the peaceful and democratic development of Germany. deserge of table of seconits

At the present time the FRG is supplying its army with missiles adapted for the carrying of atomic warheads and is conducting its training in the use of atomic weapons. Plans for the construction of a naval fleet, also supplied with nuclear missiles, have been worked out by West Germany's military organizations. The personnel of the Bundeswehr is being indoctrinated in the spirit of revenge-seeking, hate mongering, and enmity towards Germany's Western neighbors above all. The soldier and officer corps of the Bundeswehr is being instilled with the idea of the special mission of the West German armed forces with regard to the countries of Eastern Europe. to colli

The character of the agreement which is being prepared between the FRG and Franco Spain indicates that the rearmament of West Germany has entered a phase in which the framework of NATO and of the Western European Union already hamper it and the Federal Government is endeavoring to circumvent even those halfway measures of control over the armament of the FRG on which the authors of the Paris agreement relied. It is appropriate to recall that the Soviet Government has more than once emphasized the insufficiency and illusory nature of such control over the rearmament of Western Germany and recent events only reemphasize the justness of this point of view.

The revelation of plans for establishing military bases of the Bundeswehr on foreign territory have opened the eyes of even those who still accept with credulity the peaceful

Mar.

declarations with which the Government of the FRG has never been stingy and who deluded themselves with hopes of holding (Unclassified) the military development of West Germany within some limits or other with the aid of the mechanism of NATO. It is precisely this which explains the concern and the forthright denunciation displayed with rare unanimity by public opinion of the most differing countries of both East and West in evaluating the latest actions of the Government of the FRG. There is scarcely anyone who does not now understand that, for the Government of the FRG, participation in NATO is only a stage on the way to the rearmament of West Germany which is necessary as a step by step approach towards the possession of nuclear weapons and missiles and their production, if not in Germany itself, then outside its boundaries.

The Government of the FRG today appeals to the Franco regime, not in the least embarrassed by the fact that the establishment of military collaboration between the FRG and Franco Spain will awaken memories of the darkest pages of history of the recent past. Indeed, on the eve of the Second World War, Spain's territory was used by Hitlerite Germany to conduct a dress rehearsal for preparing the German military machine for the commission of aggression. Even during the course of the war itself, Franco Spain was an actual participant in the Hitlerite military coalition.

Officials of the FRG try in an outmoded way to justify the steps they have taken on the basis of the inadequacy of the territory of West Germany for the further development of military preparations and on the interests of the security of the Federal Republic. If one follows this strange logic, he is forced to the conclusion that countries possessing less territory than the FRG should also endeavor to establish their military bases on the territory of other states. But this, as is known, is not the case. The fact is that this is not a question of the size of the territory of this or that country but of the direction of its foreign policy course.

It is understandable that the establishment of Bundeswehr bases on the territory of Spain cannot have any relationship whatever to the tasks of guaranteeing the security of the FRG. Indeed, this is not a question of constructing shelters for the West German population beyond the Pyrenees far from the territory of the FRG which, according to the strategic plans of NATO should in the case of a military conflict, become a forward area of atomic missile warfare, but of the establishment of bases of the Bundeswehr. If one speaks

Mar. (Cont.) seriously about a threat to the security of the FRG, then this arises from one thing, from that policy which the (Unclassified) Government of the FRG itself conducts by realizing on an ever growing scale the militarization of the country and by en-couraging the extremely dangerous concentration on the territory of West Germany of aimed forces, armaments, stockpiles of atomic weapons, and launching sites of the NATO powers.

The external political steps of the Government of the FRG, especially recently when a definite reduction in international tension has been noticeable, gives every basis to suppose that the Government of the FRG fears liquidation of the cold war and fears that efforts which are being taken will lead to agreement between the great powers on the most urgent and acute international questions. It is everywhere noticeable that every time prospects open up for closer understanding among the USSR, the USA, and other Western powers, action is taken on the part of the FRG designed to disrupt international understanding and cooperation. W.O. Second World War.

Spanish-German intrigues obviously have as their purpose a split between the participants in negotiations of the states of the East and West, to undermine the committee of 10 on disarmament, and to complicate the work of the meeting at the summit. The negotiations between the Government of the FRG and Franco Spain again confirm that the Federal Government does not actually desire an improvement in the situation in Europe. This is why it opposes the liquidation of the consequences of the Second World War and a conclusion of a German peace treaty, thereby also solving other national tasks of the German people. is forced to the conclusion th

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the FRG to the extremely serious consequences of the steps it is taking for the establishment of Bundeswehr bases on foreign territory and arrangement of military collaboration with Franco Spain, which are incompatible with the interests of upholding peace in Europe and with international agreements affecting Germany. children (Moscow, March 4, 1960) o yastings edd no salest

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(Unclassified)

Khrushchev on Pushtun Plebiscite. (Excerpt from speech at Moscow reviewing his South Asian tour): Our position (on Pushtun self-determination) flows from the Leninist nationalities policy, which proclaims that every people has the right to self-determination, that national questions must be solved in accordance with the will of the peoples. We consider correct Afghanistan's demands that the Pathan people be granted an opportunity to express their will by means of an enquiry, by means of a plebiscite in free conditions to decide whether they wish to remain within the Pakistani state borders, to form a new independent state, or to unite with Afghanistan. This demand is completely legal; it is in accord with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

(Confidential)

GDR Sensitivity to Principle of Self-determination Analyzed by US Mission Berlin: Sensitivity of East German regime to possible application principle of self-determination to Berlin and German questions has been clearly reflected in the Soviet Zone press since Premier Khrushchev at end of Indonesia visit commented thereon February 29. Neues Deutschland March 3 devoted lead editorial to this topic, carefully sidestepping real issue inherent in genuine, free plebiscite and painstakingly developing position that existence of two German states leaves only issues of disarmament and peace treaty on which German people should exercise "rights of self-determination." Reimann, First Secretary of KPD, developed same theme in recent KPD delegates meeting and "appeal to German people" adopted by meeting stated: "Our people have right of self-determination in vital questions of our nation; they must have right to decide in plebiscite on immediate cessation of atomic armament, cessation of all other armament, and conclusion of peace treaty with both German states." Latest East German reports indicate same theme developed during 11th All-German Workers Conference which convened in Leipzig last weekend.

In reviewing previous East German record re application of principle of self-determination to Berlin, Mission notes increasing Communist insistence, subsequent to Khrushchev speech at Hungarian party congress (December 1), that free city proposal is consistent with that principle. Thus Neues Deutschland editorial December 19 belabored argument decision "whether West Berlin should remain a powder-keg of NATO and German militarism" is not a matter for West Berliners alone but is far more a matter for "18 million GDR citizens."

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Mar. (Cont.) (Confidential)

During visit of GDR delegation to Communist China in January this year, SED leader Paul Verner said West Berlin leaders have no right to portray themselves as defenders of selfdetermination rights of West Berlin people "while at same time those leaders defend continuation of occupation regime; peoples of Asia know from own history that a foreign occupation regime and self-determination are as irreconcilable as fire and water."

17 (Unclassified)

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sition reports

Rockets and the GDR (Neues Deutschland Article) (summary): "Rockets and Negotiations". "If the GDR continues to strengthen its armed forces and rockets are stationed in the GDR, negotiations between the two German states will not be possible," a worker in the bus and truck repair works in Berlin Traptow said.

Is this colleague right? No, he is not. Facts refute his view.

Of course, there are prospects for negotiations. The proposals made by Walter Ulbricht in his letter to Adenauer show the road to such negotiations: The two German states must come to an agreement on complete disarmament; a referendum must be held in the two German states on complete disarmament and on the question of a peace treaty with Germany.

These steps would be the best German contribution to the summit conference.

In the future we will continue to prove our readiness for negotiations, because negotiations are the only peaceful road to a gradual rapprochement between the two German states Nor will our defensive measures, including the stationing of rockets, if that should be necessary, change our attitude road to a gradual rapprochement between the two German states. rockets, if that should be necessary, change our attitude toward this question.

Rockets and rockets are not the same thing. In the hands of socialist states and governments, which persistently fight for negotiations, rockets serve peace and the principal methods to safeguard peace, namely to solve all issues through negotiation.

All reasonable people know that the socialist camp has no aggressive intentions. We do not threaten anyone, and we are ready at any time to do without rockets, atomic weapons, and all mass destruction weapons. On behalf of the entire and all mass destruction weapons. On behalf of the entire

17 (Unclassified)

Mar. (Cont.) socialist camp, N. S. Khrushchev submitted proposals to this effect before the United Nations.

What are the reasons in view of this situation, for possibly stationing rockets in the GDR, too?

German militarists are speeding the atomic arming of their army. They are preparing plans for unleashing a Blitzkrieg against the GDR. Walter Ulbricht has revealed these plans. Because of his situation, is it possible for us to encourage the German imperialists in their campaign against the East through our own defenselessness? Therefore, our warning to Bonn: Attention, gentlemen, we are compelled to protect ourselves.

All military weapons in the possession of the GDR, even rockets, if need be are an urgent warning, a means to prevent war before it is unleashed, for rockets in our hands make the "Bonn Blitzkrieg strategists" realize: Blitzkrieg means blitz suicide.

Therefore, rockets in the GDR would be no obstacle to negotiations but an instrument for peaceful negotiations.

The balance of power is of decisive importance to the safeguarding of peace, to a further detente and for negotiations between the two German states. As a result of the economic strengthening of the GDR, of the consistent peace policy practiced by the GDR, and of the growth of our military defense potential this ratio of power is constantly changing in favor of the GDR.

Mar.

Khrushchev Speech to French Peace Council (excerpts): The Communists are persistently fighting for peace. I shall tell (Unclassified) you confidentially that I am also a Communist. Fighting for peace, we say that social problems should be solved not by means of war between states, but by organizing a demonstration of which system gives greater boons to the peoples, which system better insures the advance of human culture and the national economy, which more fully satisfies the requirements of the people.

If the champions of the capitalist system believe in their system, if they are sure that their system will win in peaceful competition with the socialist system, they must

Mar. (Cont.) 23 (Unclassified)

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not be afraid of this competition with the socialist system, they must not be afraid of this competition. If they do not want to compete with us but want to propagate the cold war, this means they do not believe in their cause, do not believe in their system. But we believe in our social system, and we prove and will prove our belief not by means of war, but by peaceful competition, by developing cultural and economic contacts with other countries; we will fight for our ideas not by means of war, but by struggling for man's mind. And man's mind can be conquered only if man himself understands which idea is better, which social system better secures the full satisfaction of man's material and spiritual requirements.

The ideas of communism were born in France and in Germany, but today certain Frenchmen and Germans blame us for being Communists. We are grateful to the Germans and the French for having presented the bright ideals of communism to mankind. Guided by the ideas of scientific communism, our people have scored great successes and are putting those ideas into practice. We Communists are fighting for peace; we want to live in peace and friendship with all peoples.

Peace partisans in your country and in other countries are frequently called Communists. As a Communist I am proud of this. If reactionary forces are to consider every man who fights for peace a Communist, by this very act they will be helping to make people aware that the part played by communism is most progressive. All peoples, you see, want peace, and only madmen are capable of wanting war. But it is not madmen who should determine the policy of states! Consequently, if reactionaries identify the word "peace" with the word "communism," then that is a compliment to Communists.

I shall not develop this thought further, however, because it might be said that I am conducting Communist propaganda: my visit to France. We are fighting for peace and will continue to fight for it. We will do our utmost to bring closer the day when agreement on disarmament will be reached. Communism cannot be imposed upon peoples from outside by means of military force. The victory of communism does not call for war between states. We shall prove the superiority of communism by deeds, not by war, but by peaceful construction, by creating the best material and spiritual boons for for man's life.

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Mar. (Cont.) The Soviet Union is persistently fighting for peace. You 23 know that the USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a decision on (Unclassified) another reduction of the armed forces by one-third, and we shall carry out this decision irrespective of the position of the Western countries on disarmament. It is quite possible that sometime later we shall have the possibility to effect a still more substantial reduction of our armed forces.

What problem now worries the French and Soviet men and women? The revival of militarism in West Germany. I think I can express my opinion on this question in a country I am visiting. I believe that the German revanchists will threaten France more than any other country. To the Soviet Union they are a threat only because they might unleash war and draw many countries into it. But obviously, even the mad German militarists understand that to start war against the Soviet Union is tantamount to suicide.

We must not forget the lessons of the past. If before World
War II France and the Soviet Union had agreed to joint action against aggression by Nazi Germany, there would have been no World War II. But some leaders who hated our socialist system wanted to egg on Hitler against the Soviet Union. Hitler, however, had his own plan. He decided to deal first with France and Britain, and then with the Soviet Union. Yet we emerged victorious from this war. We routed the Nazi army. Now that militarism is being revived in West Germany a repetition of the errors of the past must be . swing of se prevented. d . os af ainfi ablot are ow semitem

I believe that you, friends, fully understand our anxiety. I beg you to understand me rightly. I came here not to conduct propaganda against the Germans. We want to be friends with the Germans. We are very good friends with the GDR, a sovereign German state. We want to be good friends with West Germany too. But we desire that militarism, a threat to peace in Europe, should not raise its head in West Germany.

I think that the French agree with this. Let us fight shoulder to shoulder against the threat of another war. Our peoples are now stronger than they were before World War II, not only spiritually, but also materially stronger. And I believe that we shall be able to bar the road to war if we pool our on , sel typefforts, as profesent bas , selimonyd on eas

I wish you, dear friends, success in your lofty activity. For you it is more difficult to fight for peace than for me. water by wildenes. The have all aye wooded the us compete.

Mar. (Cont.) As the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers I am backed by a tremendous army, a vast country, a great people inspired (Unclassified) by the ideas of peace and friendship among nations. You are pioneers, and sometimes someone does not understand you. But the greater the difficulties in the struggle for a noble cause, the more they should inspire the people to struggle. You know that anyone can accomplish an easy task, but only people with a strong will and a clear mind can accomplish a difficult task.

Let us fight together for peace irrespective of political and ideological differences. You live in one system--that is your domestic affair. But the struggle for peace is our common cause. Hence, we must jointly strive to prevent another war. taived add tenings was frest outtend bhadenabou assertaillis

Mar. Khrushchev Speech to French-Soviet Friendship Society: 23 (excerpts) The Soviet state from the first days of its (Unclassified) existence has based its foreign policy on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, which infers complete renunciation of war as the means of settling questions at of data issue, as well as noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. This principle also suggests that political and economic relations among states should be built on the basis of full equality of the parties and mutual benefit.

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ed tega tesq est: 1% evers ed; to noitttees as yasma Sometimes we are told: This is so, but you refuse to give guarantees that communism will not advance beyond your borders and spread to the noncommunist world! This holds true indeed: we cannot give such guarantees. Joliot-Curie said the remarkable words that ideas travel without visas and that there has not yet been born a man who could order thought to die and make it really die. By the way, the ideas of communism penetrated our country without any visas, too. Incidentally, they travelled via Paris, for Marx and Engels worked fruitfully here long before the October Revolution. It was said at the time that a specter of communism was wandering about Europe. Having assumed communist ideas, our people introduced them into real life, into great everied practical deeds. The house de la Jose grafate intica

that we shall be able to but the word wer if we unoi our We are no hypocrites, and therefore we say frankly: Yes, we do believe in the ideas of communism; we do believe that they will win out. But it is just because we believe in this that we have always been opposed to the spreading of any social system by violence. We have always proposed: Let us compete

Mar. (Cont.) in practice without interference in each other's affairs; let us prove by deeds whose system is better, whose system (Unclassified) gives man more material and spiritual benefits, whose system insures more freedom for the people! And let the people themselves decide which system is better.

Note: - - - (Smirnov Speech of March 23 may be found on page 48.)

Mar. Grotewohl Letter to Adenauer on a Peace Treaty: Esteemed 24 Mr. Chancellor: At the conference of the heads of the four (Unclassified) governments due to begin on May 16 in Paris, the question of the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany will occupy an important place. The interests of the German people command that the governments of the two German states and the governments of the four powers at long last take the measures which lead to a peace settlement with Germany.

For the German people the conclusion of a peace treaty is of great national importance. It would remove the biggest obstacles today preventing the peaceful and democratic reunification of Germany. The peace treaty would clear the way for an understanding of the two German states on their gradual rapprochement and final unification. The German people would be able to fully develop their peace economy. and it would guarantee other nations that peace will never again be jeopardized from German soil. The peace treaty would set up an effective barrier against a third world war.

As long ago as September 1958, the GDR Government took the initiative for speeding up the conclusion of a peace treaty by requesting the governments of the four powers to take in hand the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany. At the same time the GDR Government approached the Government of the Federal Republic with the proposal to form a joint German commission to discuss peace treaty problems. Unfortunately the governments of the Western powers and of the Federal Republic did not agree to these proposals.

In view of the impending conference of the heads of governments, the GDR Government deems it an urgent necessity that the two German states should jointly represent the just demand of the German people for the conclusion of the peace treaty and expound the point of view of the two German states regarding the peace treaty to the heads of government of the four powers, as the most important states of the anti-Hitler coalition and therefore the chief partners to the peace and assess to treaty.

Mar. (Cont.) The GDR Government proposes to the Government of the Federal Republic to nominate representatives for a joint German (Unclassified) peace treaty delegation and to authorize this delegation to submit at the conference of the heads of governments in Paris the point of view of the governments of both German states on the question of a peace treaty with Germany.

Proceeding from the fact that the two German governments have previously held different views on the need for the conclusion of a peace treaty and its contents, the GDR Government feels that the representatives of both German states to the joint peace treaty delegation should first of all strive to find a common point of view on the question of a peace treaty. So as to make possible the start of an exchange of view on this matter without delay, the GDR Government is willing to immediately nominate its representatives for the joint German peace treaty delegation. Insofar as agreement between the representatives of the two German governments cannot be reached, the exposition of the point of view on matters still under dispute would have to take place separately.

The GDR Government expects that the Government of the Federal Republic will agree to setting up a joint German peace treaty delegation and will nominate its representatives. The conclusion of a peace treaty would make it possible to concentrate the entire strength of the German people on peaceful purposes. It would be a great contribution toward a detente.

With high esteem, Otto Grotewohl, Premier, Berlin, March 24, 1960.

Mar. (Unclassified)

Khrushchev Press Conference in Paris (excerpt): Here is the question of France Soir correspondent Michel Gordet: You are regarded as an advocate of peaceful coexistence and territorial status quo between East and West. If this really is so, why do you question the status quo in Berlin where the military positions of the Western powers are weak?

Khrushchev: I should say that from the military point of view the presence of troops in West Berlin is of no importance. Can the presence of 11,000 soldiers of Western states constitute any threat to us from the military point of view? Hardly anyone can regard these troops as forces for preparing an attack against us. If we consider only the military

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Mar. (Cont.) 25 (Unclassified)

aspect of this question, it would be, probably, to our advantage if 200,000, 300,000, or half a million soldiers were brought to West Berlin. Then it would be easier to neutralize them in case of war. I repeat, from the military viewpoint the presence of armed forces of the Western countries in West Berlin is of no importance.

I hope that journalists who took part in World War II are present here. I also was not a mere onlooker in the past war and I clearly understand what war means.

Our policy on the German issue is clear. We want to eliminate the remnants of World War II, to draw a line beneath it, to conclude a peace treaty. It is natural that the policy of those who do not want to conclude such a peace treaty arouses our suspicion. Indeed, no one can convince us that if we preserve the sparks that remain of World War II, this can serve better understanding between countries and consolidation of peace. No, when sparks are smouldering and are not put out, it means that there are people who would like to use these sparks, when they find it necessary, for kindling the flames of another war.

The Soviet Government does everything in its power to put out these sparks. We have always been striving and shall continue to strive to settle this question. We are exerting all our efforts to prove to our partners, our former allies in the war against Nazi Germany, the necessity of concluding a peace treaty. This must be done in the interests of peace, in the interests of all nations.

If all our possibilities are exhausted and our aspirations not understood, we shall unilaterally sign a peace treaty with the GDR. This will settle the problems connected with the liquidation of the remnants of war in the territory of the GDR which will sign the peace treaty with us; the problem of liquidating the occupation regime in West Berlin will also be settled.

Mar.

a spound rest \$13. Fally enter Khrushchev's Undelivered Speech to French Parliament (excerpts): Finally, the most urgent and acute question, upon the solution of which depends the security of European nations, is the (Unclassified) question bringing World War II to a close. The main point here is the peace treaty with Germany, which will signify the most important step toward the solution of the German question as a whole. The French and the Soviet people, who

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have repeatedly suffered from German aggression, are primarily interested in such a solution to this problem, whereby Germany will finally cease to be a source of military threats.

Following World War II, favorable possibilities have become available for this. In the first place, the Soviet Union is now immeasurably stronger than it was in 1939. Second, a dependable shield against German aggression is now provided by the Soviet Union together with other European socialist nations. Third, considerable changes have taken place in Germany itself: For the first time in history there exists a German state in which the roots of militarism have been uprooted—the peace—loving GDR. Consequently, the base of German militarists has been considerably narrowed. Fourth, in all European countries, the peace—loving forces, who have learned the necessary lesson from the two world wars, have grown.

The people are justly anxious because all these new possibilities for strengthening peace are not being utilized. This alarm is becoming stronger, particularly because the clouds of German revanchism are beginning to form.

While taking the decision to arm the Federal German Republic, certain Western circles calmed down their compatriots by alleging that the Paris Treaty and the machinery of the West European alliance would insure a dependable control over West Germany. The reason for the control itself was a wise one, and it seems that the interest displayed in this idea in France was primarily due to this. However, in reality it turned out that the "control" was nothing but an empty formality, which by no means hindered the revival of aggressive (omission) in the Federal Republic. And now even the show of control is being cast away, as happened during the unhappy times of Versailles.

It was said that the Paris Treaty would allegedly limit the size of the West German army. Meanwhile, the Federal German army is already about the most powerful in West Europe and soon, informed observers assert, it will be as strong as all the armed forces of all West European NATO participants combined.

It was also said that the Paris Treaty would prevent the Federal German Republic from producing rockets and nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, today everyone sees how the West German army is conducting maneuvers on the borders with neighboring countries to train in the use of atomic weapons, and how West German plans are beginning to build rockets.

Mar. (Cont.) It was also said that supposedly the West German army would be radically different from the old army of the Prussian (Unclassified) militarists. And yet, the defense minister of the Federal German Republic is boasting today that tens of thousands of soldiers and officers of the Bundeswehr are "veterans of World War II," or, in other words, Hitler's soldiers.

It was said that supposedly the West German regime would consist of people who had had nothing to do with fascism and who had themselves scarcely escaped from suffering under Hitler. But in reality, people who in their time nursed Hitler, armed him, and blessed him for aggression, are raisingtheir heads higher and higher. Today these people are again talking about the "living space" and are preparing to establish their military bases in Spain and other countries.

Can we ignore these facts? Can we cover our heads and not hear the alarming news coming from Bonn?

Possibly some one in the West will say: "Why should we be alarmed? Bonn is only demanding the alteration of its eastern, not its western frontiers." But, first of all, this reasoning is as absurd as that of a man hoping to remain in the right half of a room when a fire breaks out in the left half of the room. Second, if Bonn is now talking about usurping the Polish and Czechoslovak territories, who can guarantee that tomorrow it will not again start talking about usurping lands in the West? As you know, this happened in 1939. It can also happen now, especially since the Hitlerites were soundly beaten in the east and now do not have the enthusiasm to butt in there in the atomic age.

Understand me correctly, ladies and gentlemen. I am far from the idea that the West German Bundeswehr is such a force that the peace-loving nations could not cope with it if it attacked them. The danger lies in the fact that the German revanchists may wage a war counting on, for example, knocking the heads of other powers together and warming their hands in the conflict. It does not take much wisdom to unleash aggression; it is sufficient to have a certain amount of adventurism. This is the real danger. This is what we must not permit.

Do not think that I am trying to set you against your neighbors, the West Germans, or that I have come here to breed dissension between you. Although the Soviet people suffered from the Hitlerites more than any other nation, we still do not base our policy on hostility toward the Germans, and rancor and revenge. On the contrary, we wish to be (Unclassified) friends with the Germans. We have already established relations of sincere friendship with the GDR. We are also trying to make our relations with the Federal German Republic not only normal, but also friendly.

Naturally, we see nothing wrong in establishing good relations between France and the Federal German Republic. But it is clear to us that this question can only be solved under conditions of peace, free from the vestiges of World War II, free from the atom, and free of foreign military bases in Europe, and under conditions of universal peace and disarmament.

To normalize the situation in Europe, first of all it is necessary to eliminate the source of tension -- to eliminate the remnants of World War II, to stabilize the changes resulting from this war, and to legally fix the frontiers which resulted from the fascist defeat. In other words, a peace treaty must be signed with Germany.

A peace treaty should protect the vital interests of the European people from a new threat from German militarism.

The peace treaty will also be a great blessing for the German people themselves. It will guarantee them a peaceful future, make the situation within the country healthier, and improve the prospects for its peaceful reunion. If anyone is going to suffer from it all, it will be the Hitlerite revanchists who still have not been finished off. But who will pity them? edt even

It is frequently said that the obstacle to the peaceful regulation of the German question is the fact that Germany is split into two states belonging to different social systems. It seems to me that this is rather a pretext than the real. cause.

The restoration of German unity is, of course, a difficult problem. Considering the matter realistically, the process of reunion obviously must go through several stages. Moreover, under the conditions in which two German states exist in reality, only the Germans themselves can agree on unification. Unfortunately, this stage-by-stage process has not yet begun and the cause of this is the position of the ruling circles of the Federal German Republic, who stubbornly refuse to establish any contact with the GDR. Obviously, with the Government of the Federal German Republic maintaining such a position, the reunification of Germany in the near future can hardly be counted on.

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Mar. (Cont.)
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What can be done about this? And what should be done by the nations whose interests are suffering from the lack of a peace treaty with Germany? Obviously, only one solution is possible: To sign a peace treaty with the two German states actually existing—the GDR and the Federal German Republic—and, if one of them should refuse this idea, then only with the one which would agree to a peaceful settlement.

If a peace treaty were signed, this would also solve the question of West Berlin, which now complicates the relations among the powers and threatens the peace. In essence, West Berlin now represents a special political unit. It is not included in the Federal German Republic and represents an alien political and economic organism in the territory of the GDR.

We are proposing to preserve the existing social system in West Berlin and to eliminate the occupation regime. Let it be a free city. Proposing such a solution, the Soviet Union is stressing that it is not aspiring to any unilateral advantages for itself. The GDR, which is interested in quickly eliminating the remnants of the war, agrees to the transformation of West Berlin into a free city.

The Soviet proposal does not touch the social and economic fundamentals of the life of West Berliners—they are free to elect the system they like. Add to this the Soviet Union's proposed actual and extensive guarantees against interference in the internal affairs of West Berlin and the possibilities for maintaining unobstructed relations with the outside world, and you will see a picture of a free city which will cease to be the apple of discord and will have a peaceful and quiet life.

We are ready at any moment to sit with you and your allies around the table and work out in detail exhaustive guarantees for West Berlin. Yet certain people—and I mean first of all Chancellor Adenauer—suppose that the West Berlin question should be the object of some "test of force" in the clash between the East and West. Their formula is simple: If NATO wants to prove that it is strong, then do not let it withdraw even an inch, or allow any changes in the present status of this city. But this is an extremely dangerous position. Such an approach may bring mankind to the brink of a war, and we are duty-bound to warn all the people who are interested in preserving the peace of this.

Mar. 26 (Unclassified)

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GDR Statement on Status of West Berlin: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR welcomes the fact that assertions by Adenauer and Brandt that West Berlin was part of the Federal Republic have been refuted by the statement of the U.S. State Department, which was published shortly after Adenauer's U.S. visit. The State Department thus opposes the attempts of official quarters in Bonn and West Berlin, which have been intensified especially of late, to prevent a solution of the West Berlin question serving the interests of peace and an easing of international tension. This is further confirmation of the fact, to which representatives of the GDR have repeatedly drawn attention, that the Adenauer government with its policy which is hostile to an understanding is increasingly isolating itself even from the governments of the United State and the other Western powers.

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Regarding the assertion in the State Department's statement that Berlin had never belonged to the former Soviet occupation zone, competent GDR authorities have repeatedly proved on the basis of documents the untenability of this assertion. At the Geneva foreign ministers conference, GDR Foreign Affairs Minister Bolz dealt with this matter in detail. In particular, the declaration on the zones of occupation in Germany of June 5, 1945, proves that all of Berlin is part of the GDR's territory.

The GDR Government has never denied that the Western occupation troops have come to Berlin on the basis of international agreements. However, their coming and presence was connected not only with rights, but also with a number of obligations, especially the obligation to prevent the resuscitation of German militarism. Facts show, however, that the occupation regime which exists in West Berlin today forms a screen behind which the West German militarists pursue aggression against the GDR and other socialist countries, and that West Berlin has been transformed into a frontline city of the cold war.

At present, it is the most urgent task in the interests of an understanding and peace to eliminate the dangers emanating from West Berlin.

The GDR has put forward its proposals for the liquidation of the anomalous situation in West Berlin by peaceful methods through an understanding. The best way for the peaceful solution of the West Berlin question is the creation of a demilitarized free city for this would eliminate the dangers to peace which are now emanating from West Berlin and would Mar. (Cont.) 26 (Unclassified)

have an extremely favorable influence on the further easing of tension in Europe and the world. The abolition of the occupation statute and the creation of a demilitarized free city of West Berlin would also correspond to the true meaning of the principle of self-determination.

Although the word self-determination can be constantly heard especially of late from the lips of Adenauer and his abettors, they are doing their utmost to maintain the occupation regime in West Berlin. However, as long as a foreign occupation regime exists, one cannot speak of the right of selfdetermination of the West Berlin populace.

The GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs once again stresses the need to liquidate the anomalous situation in West Berlin. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses its conviction that an understanding on the West Berlin question will come about and draws attention to the GDR's readiness to negotiate on possibilities for the solution of this question which serve the interests of peace and the population's life in tran-quility and security.

29

GDR Sensitivity to Principle of Self-Determination Further Analyzed by US Mission Berlin: Over past three weeks indica-(Confidential) tions of Soviet Zone regime sensitivity to self-determination issue have continued to increase. Hardly a day has passed without regime spokesmen commenting, or editorials being published on subject in the East press. Line followed sticks closely to that delineated by Khrushchev on February 29 in Indonesia, while side-stepping real issue inherent in selfdetermination.

In biggest play on topic to date Neues Deutschland March 27 printed full-page analysis of "What really is selfdetermination" by editor Kertzcher. Article recalled Hitler's exploitation of self-determination slogans in his aggressive acts against Austria and Czechoslovakia. According to Kertzcher, Adenauer is following course today similar in tactics and objectives to that of Hitler. While proclaiming devotion to self-determination, Adenauer plans to over-run GDR with Bundeswehr. Self-determination basic issues not permitted in Federal Republic, e.g., disarmament and peace treaty. Kertzcher insists that national right of selfdetermination in reunification is thus prevented by Adenauer who will not permit self-determination to be applied to essential first step -- i.e., peace treaty with both German

Mar. (Cont.) States. "If self-determination for the German people is proposed before impending Summit Conference, in concrete (Confidential) terms it can only mean declare yourself ready to conclude peace treaty with both German States." Kertzcher's wrath turned not only against Chancellor Adenauer; SPD leader Mommer also denounced for questioning validity of GDR elections which resulted in 99% returns in favor of regime state. Kertzcher ridicules this with question whether self-determination only operative when majorities are very small. Article concludes with lengthy "comparison" GDR and Federal Republic: Workers in GDR make own production plans while Federal Republic workers produce goods they are unable to call their own. GDR farmers voluntarily join collectives thereby broadening production potential while Federal Republic farmers are ever more harassed. Even foreign policy of Bonn doesn't want to permit Guinea to exercise self-determination in diplomatic relations.

"The flag of national self-determination is held high in

Germany by the GDR."

Earlier, in speech March 19 to workers of Leuna Works, Politburo member Norden stressed necessity to apply "real" self-determination to West Berlin problem. Free City proposal, according to Norden, would fulfill this requirement. Demilitarized Free City would have "genuine self-determination over its internal affairs, its social and political affairs, and its economic and cultural relations with other states, etc." Only in this way, according to Norden, can West Berliners achieve self-determination.

Kertzcher article and Norden speech typical of daily efforts of Soviet Zone regime to deal with self-determination issue.

Mar. Khrushchev Speech at Rheims (excerpt): Those who do not want to put out the sparks want to fan the conflagration of another 30 to put out the sparks want to fan the conflagration of another (Unclassified) war. For what purpose? To change the frontiers which took shape after World War II? But neither the Polish People's Republic, nor Czechoslovakia, nor the Soviet Union will ever accept this. I think that France could not accept this either.

We are doing and shall continue to do our utmost to achieve understanding for our policy and to secure the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. I repeat, we shall do our utmost to this end. If the Western powers do not understand our peace-loving position, we shall have to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR....

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Smirnov Speech to Bonn Foreign Press Association: Soviet Ambassador Smirnov told Bonn's Foreign Press (Official Association yesterday Soviets expect Western proposals July 28 interim Berlin solution provide starting point for Summit negotiations on Berlin. Smirnov denied Soviets' earlier rejections Western proposals in effect made them invalid for purposes further negotiations.

Asked later whether Soviets would insist upon pushing their "Free City" proposal in face West Berlin insistence, through referendum, for maintenance status quo. Soviet Ambassador replied: "Four powers in Berlin not at request Berlin population but for other reasons." Moreover, he insisted right of self-determination incompatible with continuance occupation regime.

With reference Soviet threats conclude separate peace treaty with GDR, Smirnov told correspondents Soviets "Would do everything possible reach agreement with Western powers. Summit will take place soon; let's be calm. If it produces solution, we no longer need be pessimistic." However, Soviet Ambassador then went on assert Soviet Union wants "End abnormal situation resulting from war. That situation abnormal was recognized by West at Camp David and Geneva. We therefore believe that most urgent current problem is conclusion peace treaty. Further delay seems us impermissible."

## SECRET/NOFORN

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Apr. 7 (Unclassified)

GDR Foreign Ministry Statement on Berlin Waterways Bill:

The West Berlin Senate has passed a so-called water bill, which is to liquidate the uniform administration of the waterways of all of Berlin, previously carried out by the competent organs of the GDR, and to set up a separate administrative regime for the waterways and installations situated in West Berlin.

With reference to this, a spokesman of the GDR Foreign
Ministry said: After 1945 all of Berlin was part of what
was then the Soviet occupation zone. The fact is that
the three Western powers which participated in the occupation and administration of Berlin did not impinge on the
jurisdiction of the Soviet organs over the waterway, nor
over all the Reich railway installations in all of Berlin.
With the founding of the GDR, the functions formerly carried
out by the Soviet authorities regarding all waterways of
Berlin passed to the corresponding organs of the GDR.
Since then the GDR has been the competent authority in all
matters concerning the waterways of all of Berlin. This
is the legal position, firmly established by the usage of
many years.

The water bill, passed for West Berlin at the instigation of the Bonn government, provides for large-scale interference in the competency of the GDR and for far-reaching changes in the existing position by setting up a separate West Berlin water authority, by changes in property relations (Eigentumsverhaeltnisse), etc. Certain waterways (for instance the Spree River-ADN) are to be designated as so-called "federal waterways", directly under the Bonn government.

The enactment of this law is a new provocation which definitely aims at aggravating the situation and runs counter to the normalization of the situation in West Berlin. It is incompatible with the legal position, which stipulates that West Berlin is not part of the Federal Republic and must not be governed by it. The provocative character of this new disruptive maneuver by Bonn and the West Berlin Senate is especially transparent, since even the Western powers have repeatedly stressed that West Berlin is not part of the Federal Republic, as did the State Department in a statement issued a few days ago.

These provocations are being carried out because not only the public, but also authoritative circles in the United States, Great Britain, and France have acknowledged the need to do away with the abnormal situation in West Berlin.

Apr. (Cont.)

By means of such troublemaking maneuvers, the Bonn government, actively supported by the ruling circles of West Berlin, is continuing its antidetente policy, which is aimed specifically at preventing the solution of the West Berlin problem, which is about to be tackled. The GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that the originators of this provocative act are fully responsible for all its consequences.

Apr. 17

Excerpts from Ulbricht letter on "People's Plan for Germany" (Passages in boldface type set off by virgules.)

(Text) Dear West German workers:

Like you, Social Democratic, Christian, and nonparty workers of West Germany, we, too, are concerned about the preservation of peace, the relations between the two German states, and the future of the German nation. We address ourselves to you because without an understanding among the working people, an understanding between governments appears to be hardly possible. It is urgently necessary for us to narrow the gap between us and to reach an understanding on questions which are decisive for the life and the future of our people. Time is pressing. The date of the summit conference is coming closer and closer. /We should make haste to insure that the opportunity of peace for the German people should not be missed again. What we fail to do today we shall have to do tomorrow under much more difficult and perhaps more dangerous circumstances./...

/To the German people, however, the right of self-determination means, above all, the democratic right to prevent preparation for war and war itself under all circumstances./ All responsible Germans, the German workers and their organizations in the two German states, must jointly struggle for this elemental right of self-determination of our nation.

Therefore let us fight jointly! /All the German people should decide in a referendum/ whether or not they agree to our proposal for the renunciation of atomic armaments in the two German states. /All the German people should also decide whether or not they agree to our proposal for complete disarmament in the two German states./ The attitude toward this proposal shows whether a person is really in favor of the self-determination of the German people or misuses the concept of self-determination for purposes of deception in the interest of NATO's policy.

Apr. (Cont.)

/Let us allow national peaceful interests and national commonsense to speak!/:

We spoke of our common concern about the state of the relations between the two German states. Why are the relations between the two German states so crucial to the fate of the nation? Let us look at the problem quite soberly! There are today only three alternatives for the German people.

The first alternative -- the road of war:

One German state tries to conquer the other by force.
That is tantamount to a dreadful fratricidal war; a
war in which German workers would fight German workers,
German peasants, German middle class people fight German
middle class people; a war which would unleash an atomic
world war about whose consequences no one among us is
likely to have any doubt. That is the policy of the
present Bonn government which, under the slogan of
"liberation," plans fratricidal and revanchist war in
case its attempt at blackmail with the help of atomic
weapons is abortive.

/We tell you quite frankly: No attempts at blackmail and no threats of a revanchist war can make an impression on the GDR and the socialist camp. It is obvious to everyone that the balance of power in the world is now such as to rule out once and for all an assumption of power by the West German militarists in all of Germany. A Blitzkrieg would mean "Blitz-suicide." The year 1960 is not 1933./

Those who think that the West German Government today is very powerful are mistaken. They should pender Bert Brecht's words: "What is great does not remain great; what is petty does not remain petty. The night has 12 hours, then comes the day." The world, it is known, has changed and continues to change at an ever-increasing rate in favor of socialism.

Herr Adenauer is of course aware that an atomic war would mean the complete destruction of West Germany.

It is precisely for this reason that the Bonn government tries to secure for itself military bases, facilities for retreat, and a refuge for the West German Government in Spain and other places outside West Germany.

This first alternative is unacceptable for you as well as for us, for the German people.

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Apr. (Cont.)

Second alternative -- deepening the division of Germany:

With strong intervention from outside and resistance by the Germans themselves, a war can be prevented. Peace would thus be saved. But without an understanding between both German states there still would be no rapprochement between them or, at least, a beginning to the process of reunification. Some 20 or 30 years might thus be lost to reunification. This is the aim of the Adenauer policy, for if the aggressive military plans cannot be carried out, the present Bonn government wants at any rate to prevent the reunification of Germany. These gentlemen have the idea that, if they cannot rule Germany, Germany is to remain divided. This is really the old reactionary concept of the Carolingian Reich at the expense of the unity of the German nation. This perpetuation of the division of Germany, however, must not take place any more than a German fratricidal or revanchist war. This alternative, therefore, cannot satisfy us either. The road to an understanding between the two German states must therefore in any circumstances be found.

Third alternative--understanding and peace:

The workers in East and West should come to an understanding, and through their joint struggle produce an understanding between the two German states. The remnants of World War II will finally be liquidated by conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states. A third world war will be blocked. West German militarism will be eliminated. An understanding among German workers in East and West and between the two German states will be effected on the basis of a national compromise which will be acceptable not only to the workers in West Germany and in the GDR, but also to the other classes and strata, up to and including the West German bourgeoisie. To any reasonable German with a sense of responsibility, this is the only possible plan for Germany.

Such a national compromise is the Alpha and Omega of the peaceful reunification of the German nation. Why so? The citizens of the GDR long ago made a final decision on their state and social system and will not tolerate any interference on the part of the West German Federal Republic. The citizens of West Germany should decide on the state and social system of West Germany according to their own judgment and without any interference from the GDR. /The two German states should reach an understanding on how matters are to develop. This is the

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(Cont.) right of self-determination. This is also the central idea of a confederation in which the two German states would be linked with each other on an equal basis. This is the only road to the peaceful reunification of Germany. No one in Germany other than the incorrigible militarists and revenchists would lose anything by this.
But every individual and the entire German nation would militarists and revanchists would lose anything by this. gain peace, self-determination, the overcoming of the division and the strengthening of the international reputation of Germany. We, the workers would gain; the peasants, the artisans, and small businessmen would gain; the members of the intelligentsia would gain; and even the big enterpreneurs would not fare badly. For atomic weapons have no respect even for packages of stock certificates. The elimination of the enormous armament burdens in West Germany and the tremendous possibilities of the socialist world market would assure full employment for West German industry for a long time and would thus assure the workers of their jobs. In addition, this step would greatly protect West German industry against the unavoidable fluctuations in the capitalist world market. .... tareport -- evidence la bulo

Some people say that the military status must be stipulated and that everything else would then be settled automatically. They also mean, however, that both German states would leave the alliances to which they belong, and they obviously would like to leave unchanged the rule of militarists and revanchist politicians and their armaments. However, the "military status" which the German people need must consist above all in the abolition of atomic and rocket bases and, moreover, in complete and general disarmament. This would, indeed, mean a great step forward. /There is but one good "military status" for Germany--general and complete disarmament./ ...

The safeguarding of peace requires above all that the hotbed of war in West Berlin be extinguished. The West Berlin problem has not been raised by us, but by the remilitarization and the revival of militarism in West Germany and through the misuse of West Berlin as a center of harassment and aggression. In the war plans of Adenauer and Strauss and their ilk, West Berlin plays the part of a center for harassing and subversive activities against the GDR and other socialist countries and the steppingstone to aggression. The fate of the West Berlin population, exposed to the risks involved in such a policy, is a matter of indifference to the gentlemen in -Teams as dor Bonn. Works setare nemney was not do golfasts

## SECRET/NOFORN

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Apr. (Cont.)

/Hence the situation in West Berlin, which is recognized as abnormal by all the big powers, must be straightened out in the interest of all Germans as well as of all other peoples./

Although West Berlin is situated right in the center of the GDR and is legally part of its territory, we agree, in the interest of detente and understanding, to the establishment of a demilitarized free city of West Berlin. We believe that this is a good solution acceptable to all concerned. All will gain by such a solution. They will gain peace and security by the elimination of one of the most dangerous centers of conflict. This applies to the West Berlin population and the people of the GDR as well as to the Western powers. The West Berlin people would be in a position to determine their own fate freely and without outside interference; they would have the social order they desire. And all communications of West Berlin with the West and the East would be guaranteed. West Berlin would be able to maintain economic and cultural relations with any country. A demilitarized free city of West Berlin would no doubt be the most advantageous solution for all concerned, pending reunification of Germany. ...

In order to ease the situation, however, we should be prepared to agree to an interim solution which, while in force, would enable the necessary measure of mutual trust to be established among those concerned. /Such an interim solution, however, would require that in West Berlin at least such conditions be cre ted that the city can no longer be misu ed as a base for sabotage and harassing activities of all kinds, war provocations, and other forms of the struggle against the GDR, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries./

Of course, it will not do that atomic or rocket weapons are set up or stored in West Berlin or that—as is currently done—West Berlin citizens are admitted into the West German Army. In West Germany itself it was noted /that now one out of 10 soldiers of this army comes from West Berlin. Thus compulsory military service has in effect been extended to West Berlin in violation of all international agreements./ The admission of West Berlin citizens into the West Germany Army, where they are being drilled for an attack against the GDR, is inadmissible under any aspect.

Finally, an interim solution for West Berlin would also have to include the phased reduction of the military forces and the gradual elimination of the occupation statute. All these measures would substantially ease tensions and facilitate a subsequent, more comprehensive solution. ...

SECRET/NOFORN

Apr.

(Cont.) Herr Adenauer forgot that West Berlin is situated right in the center of the GDR and is part of its territory. Hence the Bonn government has no right whatsoever to interfere in West Berlin affairs. If there should be a referendum at all, then the whole GDR population, to whose territory West Berlin belongs, would have a much more legitimate right to vote on the solution of the West Berlin problem. No doubt the outcome of this referendum would hardly please Herr Adenauer; it would backfire on him.

The conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states, with which the summit conference will also deal, would solve the West Berlin question, too. The peace treaty would liquidate all the remnants of World War II, would el minate German militarism, would create the best foundation for an understanding between the two German states and decisively facilitate their gradual reunification by means of a confederation. It is therefore in the interest not only of the working class throughout Germany, but also of all other classes and strata to exercise joint influence on the summit conference to this end. For this reason, the GDR Government has proposed /that a joint peace treaty delegation of the two German states be sent to the summit conference./ This delegation would, on the one hand, demonstrate the common interests of the two German states, and it would have the task of seeing that the summit powers assure that the views of the two German governments on the conclusion of a peace treaty and the peaceful solution of the German question is expounded at the conference.

Many of you, colleagues and comrades, ask what will happen if the Western powers obstinately refuse to conclude a peace treaty with the two German states because they do not want to put their signature beside that of the GDR. If the two German states come to a prior agreement, such a situation will not develop. However, in case you will not have succeeded in inducing the present Bonn overnment to embark on the road of understanding, it will be /possible to prepare the necessary peace treaty which the states of the anti-Hitler coalition who wish to do so could conclude a peace treaty with the GDR alone. We would, of course, see to it that in such a case the interests of the West German people would also be considered in the peace treaty.

It is true, the solution of the German question would It is true, the solution of the derman question would be much more complicated than in case of a peace treaty with both German states. The West Berlin question would simultaneously be solved on this basis.

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Apr. (Cont.) The great responsibility of the SPD:

We would like to say quite frankly, dear Social Democratic workers, that in view of the dangerous situation in West Germany we are watching the policy of your party in West Germany which broad strata of the working class consider their own. Although the KPD is working under very difficult conditions of illegality, it has in its manifesto outlined the road and the aim of the German working class and the people. This document contains the possibility of establishing a united action movement of Communists, Social Democrats, and Christian working people.

The SPD, as a legal party, has a great responsibility in the present situation, and just at this time when your party leadership has thrown overboard its German plan and left the field to the equally dangerous and bankrupt policy of the Adenauer government aimed at the destruction of Germany. ...

But nobody wants to force our social order on you. In the GDR everybody is happy to be rid of the capitalist rule. Nobody wants capitalist exploitation here. We working people have made our decision, and we know that we have made the only right decision. You yourselves will decide on your social order. We are certain that sooner or later you will arrive at the right decision. ...

But we do not intend to foist our socialist democracy on you. /As things are now, it would be progress if you worked for a change in the militarist-clerical system in West Germany and for the creation of a bourgeois-democratic order, at least one which is opposed to war and which observes the rules of a bourgeois-parliamentarian democracy./ But create the democratic order you like. We adhere to socialist democracy because we consider it the best social order. Our proposals proceed from the premise that there are two states with different social orders in Germany and that neither of these states wants to foist its state order on the other, that neither of these states must threaten the other through force, blackmail, or even war; this is to say that no differences exist in this field, either, which can prevent us from cooperating. ...

The great national compromise:

Some serious and well-minded West German people are of the opinion that reunification is impossible with the existence of two different social systems. However, (Cont.)

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the problem does not lie in the existence of two social systems in Germany, but in the fact that the West German state is a militarist state with aggressive plans, whereas the GDR is a socialist state lacking aggressive intentions. Of course, the problems of the existence of the two social systems is not easy to solve.

/But if we do not wish to renounce reunification or the waging of war against one another, the only alternative, despite all differences, to insure the maximum degree of rapprochement between the two German states and their peaceful cooperation in overcoming partition is a German confederation. With the peaceful cooperation of the two German states, the two social systems will compete with each other and demonstrate which can do most for the German people. / This peaceful contest will yield many good and useful results, not only for the workers in both German states, but for all other sections of our people. ... off wow of rebre, is

This national compromise could be achieved on the basis of the German plan.

/The people's plan for Germany--this means:

/Never a fratricidal war or other wars;

/Never a threat or blackmail, or the use of force by one against the other!

/The people's plan for Germany--this means:

/An understanding between the Germans!

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/Understanding between the German workers and their organizations; between the peasants, the intelligentsia, and all peace-loving Germans!

/The people's plan for Germany--this means:

Negotiations between the two German states with the objective of a peaceful understanding between them;

/Agreement on the renunciation by both German states of the use of force;

/An agreement on the setting up of an all-German commission based on parity!

Apr. (Cont.)

/The people's plan for Germany--this means:

/An understanding on the next steps to be taken to safeguard peace by which both German states renounce atomic armament and rocket bases;

/An understanding on disarmament and the strength of the armed forces;

/An understanding on the joint struggle for general and complete disarmament;

/An understanding of our German proposals for conclusion of a peace treaty;

/An understanding on the rapprochement between both parts of Germany through economic and cultural cooperation!

/The aim of the people's plan for Germany is Germany's reunification as a peace-loving, democratic state through German confederation./ ...

Apr.

Khrushchev speech at Baku

Excerpts from Khrushchev speech at Baku, April 25, 1960:

... The other question which affects the interests of many states is the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, including the settlement of the status of West Berlin. To solve this question means to do away with the remnants of World War II and to strengthen the cause of peace in Europe. The signing of a peace treaty is a natural way of ending a war. After every war, after the passing of some time, a peace treaty is signed. But here, no more mor less than an entire fifteen years have passed since the capitulation of Hitlerite Germany and the end of the war, a period more than sufficient for settling the relations broken by the last war.

Nobody loses by concluding peace. On the contrary, all to whom the cause of the strengthening of peace is dear can only gain as a result of this. With the conclusion of a peace treaty would come the liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin and consequently the withdrawal of occupation troops from there. Without this we can hardly count on the elimination of a dangerous focal point for contradictions between the states, and at the same time the establishment of normal conditions of life for the population of West Berlin.

Apr. (Cont.) I have already said more than once that the truest solution to this problem would be the transformation of West Berlin into a free city with firm guarantees that the economic and cultural ties of this city with all countries will not be hindered. Such a solution would make it possible to reliably insure the freedom of the peoples of West Berlin and to protect the people of the city from any interference in their internal affairs.

We put this proposal forward long ago, and every time we return to it, we analyze it over and over again. Is there anything at all in the solution of this question along the lines of the plan we have proposed which would harm our partners? To speak bluntly, we can find nothing of the sort. I would like to repeat once more that we must be only grateful to the Government of the GDR for its understanding attitude toward the necessity of eliminating the tension in the center of Germany, and for the definite sacrifice which it makes in agreeing to the status of a free city for West Berlin, although this city is geographically an inseparable part of the

It seems to us that this ought not to be a subject for quarreling, but nevertheless they also want us to for quarreling, but nevertheless they also want us to get involved in such a quarrel. Well, then, since right and justice are on our side, should we be afraid of such a quarrel? ...

Official Use Only

April 25, 1960:

Apr. "Neues Deutschland" attack on Bundestag meetings in Berlin

NEUES DEUT SCHLAND April 27 front-paged brief article stating that only a few weeks prior to Summit a new provocation has appeared in form of announcement by FedRep that Bundestag will meet in West Berlin, "therefore, outside territory of FedRep," this autumn. Article claimed that this move, long planned, was made public now in order to support Adenauer's policy of opposing "normalization" of situation in West Berlin; Chancellor himself had used article in CDU press release Apr 25 to champion retention West Berlin status quo. Noting that earlier this year Gerstenmaier and Brandt had favored holding another Bundestag meeting in West Berlin ("on territory of GDR"), article concluded with observation that both Adenauer and Luebke have made "provocative" visits to West Berlin this year.

natural way of ending a war. After every war, after the passing of some time, a peace treaty is aigned. But here,

May 6 Excerpts from Khrushchev's address to the Supreme Soviet

"This session is meeting in the momentous days when the fifteenth anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany and of the end of World War II in Europe is being celebrated. ...

"The patriotism, the stanchness and courage of millions of modest Soviet men and women, educated and inspired by our Leninist party, were the main factor insuring the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II.

"Our people have not forgotten and will never forget the price of victory. Nor has this been forgotten by the peoples of the United States, Britain, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Norway and other countries who fought in the ranks of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. ...

## 'Abnormal, Dangerous'

"That is why, comrades, the Soviet Government so persistently presses for the elimination of the remnants of World War II which poison the international atmosphere and which include, above all, the outstanding issues of a peace treaty with Germany and the abnormal, dangerous situation in West Berlin.

"That is why we want to conclude with other powers an agreement on general and complete disarmament since this is the only reliable guarantee for mankind against nuclear rocket war and the only way of safeguarding a really lasting peace. We are for an enduring peace, for peaceful coexistence and cooperations between all states. Such are the principles governing our foreign policy. They are clear and understandable to all.

"As you know, a meeting between the leaders of the four powers--the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France--will open in Paris on May 16. ...

"What are these questions? You know that the first of them, which is uppermost in the minds of all people, is the question of disarmament. General and complete disarmament is the most radical means of safe-guarding world peace and excluding war from human society. In conditions when no state had either an army or arms, all countries would have to settle even the most acute issues peacefully, through negotiations. ...

# SECRET/NOFORN

Excerpts from Khrushor-61 -- oddress to the Suprems

Our people lave not longottam and will never ' 'war

May (Cont.)

"The second question is the necessity of concluding a peace treaty with Germany and a solution on this basis of the problem of West Berlin, which has become a knot of contradictions fraught with all kind of surprises and dangerous consequences. To eliminate completely the remnants of World War II in Europe and to normalize the situation in Berlin with a long-outmoded occupation regime still functioning in the Western part of it, we suggest the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, that is, with both really existing German states.

The summit meeting will also have to discuss questions pertaining to the other relations between the Socialist and capitalist countries. These questions were already discussed during the conversations I had with the heads of government of a number of states, and many of them were the subject of discussion at various international conferences and inthe United on the Nations. add asbarmon .vdv al Jad

"Now I should like to emphasize the following: If the vital problems of the day-disarmament and peaceful settlement with Germany, including the questions of West Berlin-are solved, the problem of improving East-West relations would solve itself. ...

of the Western press in connection with my recent speech in Baku. Some people in the Western press in the Western press in connection with my recent speech in Baku. "Look at the hue and cry raised by a certain part speech in Baku. Some people in the West are trying to picture the firm desire of the Soviet Government, expressed in the speech, to make the summit meeting produce practical results, on the German peace treaty and West Berlin included, as nothing short of a "threat" to the Western powers.

One thing is absolutely obvious: Bonn has not resigned itself to the last war's defeat; sinister plans of unleashing a new war are again being hatched there; it still dreams of revenge, of doing away with the changes that took place in the world after the defeat of Hitler Germany.

"In his speeches Chancellor Adenauer tries to pretend that he is also against war. But these are mere words. Actually all his policy is aimed at creating conditions for revenge.

ote. . . ShoreT/Moreau. ...to

May (Cont.)

"Why does not the Soviet Union's desire to conclude a peace treaty with the two German states meet understanding with our former allies? Will they lose anything if a peace treaty is concluded or will anyone else profit at their expense? If one looks soberly at the state of affairs and proceeds from the recognition of the existing national frontiers, established after World War II, it will become obvious that no one will lose from the conclusion of apeace treaty but everyone will become confident in the immunity of peace.

"Talking with statesmen of Western powers one gets the impression that these arguments meet an understanding, but as soon as the question is put on a practical plane and appropriate proposals are advanced, these proposals encounter objections from the Western powers.

"Apparently the whole point is that West Germany now is an ally of our former allies in the war against Hitler Germany. Essentially they are resisting the signing of a peace treaty because this treaty is opposed by Chancellor Adenauer, whose policy is guided by purposes which are far from being peaceful.

"Defending the occupation status of West Berlin,
the representatives of the Western powers not infrequently claim that the present situation suits the population
of West Berlin. But such arguments are utterly untenable.
In the first place, the abolition of the occupation
status in West Berlin concerns not only the residents of
that city. It has wider implications. West Berlin is
located on the territory of the German Democratic
Republic. Therefore the situation in West Berlin concerns
perhaps to no smaller extent the population of the German
Democratic Republic.

When the occupation status is preserved in West Berlin and the troops of the occupying powers are stationed there, this in many respects poisons the life of the population of the German Democratic Republic and cannot but worry all Germans.

"One should remember that the troops of the Western powers are stationed in West Berlin in accordance with an agreement between the Allied powers and not at the request of the West Berlin population. This circumstance makes utterly untenable from the legal viewpoint the attempt to present the question of the presence of the Western powers' troops in West Berlin as one which should be made dependent upon the opinion of the West Berlin population.

encounter objections is a the Western powers.

May (Cont.) When I spoke in Baku I mentioned a statement by the United States Under Secretary of State, Dillon. In that statement, Dillon, as if serving a warning with regard to the foreign policy of the Soviet Government, declared that Khrushchev was walking on very thin ice, as he put it. He must have meant by that that the Soviet Government's policy may fail.

I think you will agree with me if I say that Mr. Dillon's worry about our policy and our country is out of place, to say the least. Do not you worry, gentlemen, about our policy. Wa are not walking on thin ice. We stand on a basis of monolithic granite which no one is strong enough to shatter.

If one should speak of thin ice at all, then look, Mr. Dillon, what are you standing on? Your policy rests in large measure on the support of backward peoples and economically dependent countries.

Large sections of opinion have had to pay notice to some recent pronouncements by Herter, Nixon, Dillon and other political leaders who are shaping the foreign policy of the present Administration of the United States. These pronouncements are an ill omen. They are far from inspiring hope for a favorable outcome of the talks opening on May 16.

... piferoomed Unfortunately, these speeches have been approved of by the President of the United States himself, who stated at a press conference that they had set out the foreign policy of the United States Government. This makes things still worse. ...

Monen there, this in many respects poisons the Life May Proposals of the Soviet Government for a German peace treaty

Meeting of Chiefs of State and Heads of Government Paris May, 1960

U.S. Delegation Translation of French Translation of Russian Text Handed to French by Soviet Ambassador in Paris on May 9, 1960

#### PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The Soviet Government favors proceeding immediately

May (Cont.)

to the signarure of a peace treaty with the two German 9 states. However, since such a solution of the problem raises objections on the part of the Western Powers, the Soviet Government, which as always strives to achieve concerted action on the German question among the four principal members of the anti-Hitler coalition, is prepared meanwhile to agree to an interim solution. This interim solution would consist of the signature of a temporary (provisoire) agreement on West Berlin, suited to prepare conditions for the ultimate transformation of West Berlin into a free city and the adoption of measures leading to the preparation of the future peace settlement. In this connection the Soviet Government proposes the following:

1. To conclude a temporary agreement for two years relating to West Berlin. The agreement would include approximately the same list of questions as those which had already been discussed in 1959 by the Foreign Ministers at Geneva and, without bringing any radical change to the actual status of West Berlin, would, however, open the way to the elaboration of a new and agreed status for the city corresponding to peacetime conditions.

The temporary agreement should envisage the reduction of the effective strength of the forces of the Three Powers in West Berlin, which reduction could take place progressively in several stages. It would likewise be suitable to put in writing the intention expressed by the Three Powers not to place in West Berlin any kind of nuclear weapons or missile installations.

The agreement should moreover include a commit-The agreement should moreover include a commit-ment to take measures to prohibit the use of the territory of West Berlin as a base of subversive activity and of hostile propaganda directed against other states. Measures concerning the prohibition of subversive activities and of hostile propaganda with respect to West Berlin might likewise be envisaged under an appropriate form.

In the accord account would also be taken of the declarations of the Soviet Union and of the GDR concerning the maintenance of the communications of West Berlin with the outside world in the form in which they exist at present for the duration of the temporary agreement.

The engagements concerning the GDR could in The engagements concerning the GDR could in that event take a form which would not signify diplomatic recognition of the GDR by the Western Powers who would be parties to the agreement.

HEIGHN THEORY

put edit ditu vinora especia lo execución estros: ((1203) yes May (Cont.) To supervise the fulfillment of the obligations flowing from the temporary agreement regarding agreed measures in West Berlin, and to take, in case of necessity, measures assuring the fulfillment of the agreement reached, a committee could be set up composed of representatives of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of bailing America.

2. At the same time that they conclude an agreement on West Berlin, the Four Powers will make a declaration inviting the two German states to take advantage of the interim period fixed by the agreement in order to attempt to arrive at a common point of view on the German question. Contact could be established between the two German states by means of the creation of an all-German committee or under some other form acceptable naled to them. I ar because and years and

In formulating these proposals, the Soviet In formulating these proposals, the Soviet Union proceeds from the thought that, if the German states refuse to engage in conversation with one another, or if, at the expiration of the temporary agreement, it becomes clearly evident that they are not able to come to an understanding, the Four Powers will sign a peace treaty with the two German states or with one of them, as they would judge it desirable. Of course, if the GDR and the GPR succeed in reaching an agreement, there will be no obstacle to the conclusion of a single peace treaty for all of Germany. Moreover, measures will be taken in order to transform West Berlin into a free city. As far as the statute of the free city of West Berlin is concerned, the USSR would prefer to elaborate the in common with France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In proposing the transformation of West Berlin into a free city the Soviet Union does not in any way wish to damage the interests of the Western Powers, to change the present mode of life in West Berlin or to attempt to integrate this city within the GDR. The Soviet proposal derives from the existing situation and tends to normalize the atmosphere in West Berlin while taking account of the interests of all parties. The creation of a free city would not damage the economic and financial relations of West Berlin with other states, including the GFR. The free city would be able to establish as it pleases its external, political, economic, commercial, scientific and cultural relations with all states and international organizations. Completely free relations with the external world would be assured to it.

MEGROW TERIOGE

May (Cont.)

The population of West Berlin would receive sure guarantees of the defense of its interests, with the Governments of the Soviet Union, of the United States, of France and of the United Kingdom assuming the required obligations in order to guarantee the precise execution of the conditions of agreement on the free city. The Soviet Union states that it also favors participation of the United Nations in the guarantees given to the free city. It goes without saying that, in the event of the reunification of Germany, the maintenance of the special situation of the free city of West Berlin would no longer have any basis.

May 10 Excerpts from Khrushchev's speech at the Czech Embassy in Moscow

But why? Plainly speaking, why need the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom West Berlin? They need it as a dog needs a fifth leg. West Berlin does not give them anything. By the way, no one encroaches on West Berlin. It is said, freedom is at stake, but who encroaches on freedom?

Let the West Berliners continue to live as they do now and let them have the regime they like. The Soviet Government has long since declared that to select a regime is a matter for each people and that everyone should live as he prefers to. If the Western powers do not want to sign a German peace treaty we shall have to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

The point is that even after we conclude such a treaty with the German Democratic Republic they would like to exercise those rights which flow from Germany's surrender, to exercise them in defiance of the peace treaty we would have signed. But if we sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, the terms of war will be ended and, hence, the terms of surrender will also be ended. They will cease to operate. If after the signing of a peace treaty some one would like to force his way into West Berlin which we would like to see a free city, our force will resist this force.

Aware of this, some leaders in the United States of America decided to teach Khrushchev a lesson; Since

May (Cont.) it is said that force will resist force, we shall teach a lesson to the Soviet Union, we shall fly over your territory and we already flew over it and returned home.

Soviet Notes to Norway, Turkey, and Pakistan Regarding 13 the J-2 Flight - resets proved nevi

On May 13, A.A. Gromyko, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, received O.H. Gundersen, Norwegian ambassador to the USSR, and handed him the following note of protest from the Soviet Government: The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic deems it necessary to communicate the following to the Covernment of Norway:

A military aircraft violated the Soviet frontier at 0436 hours Moscow time, May 1, and flew over 2,000 kilometers deep into the Soviet Union. The USSR Government could not, naturally, have left such a gross violation of the Soviet national frontiers (Okgo--Ed.) unpunished. As soon as the intentions of the intruding plane became obvious, it was shot down by Soviet missile forces in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk.

An expert examination of all the evidence at the Soviet Union's disposal has put it beyond dispute that the invading plane belongs to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey, and was sent to the Soviet Union via Pakistan for hostile purposes.

The exact findings of the investigation, as reported by the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, at the closing meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session May 7, leave no room for doubt as to the purposes behind the flight of the American plane which violated the Soviet frontier on May 1. This plane, of the Lockheed U-2 type, was expressly equipped for reconnaissance and subversionary flight over Soviet Union territory.

The plane carried equipment for aerial photography and the detection of Soviet radar networks and other special radio-engineering facilities of the Soviet antiaricraft defenses. The Soviet expert commission, which made the inquiry, has incontestable evidence at its disposal of the spying and reconnaissance mission of the American plane: rolls of film showing Soviet defense and industrial establishments; a tape recording of the signal of Soviet radar stations; and other evidence.

frontier at OAS

May (Cont.) It has been established that the plane in question was based at the American-Turkish airbase at Incirlik, near Adana, from where it flew to the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan, Apr. 27.

The route map taken from the surviving American spy flyer, Powers, clearly and distinctly indicates the entire route which he was instructed to follow after taking off from the Turkish city of Adama: Peshawar, the Aral Sea, Sverdlovsk, Archangel, and Murmansk, with subsequent landing at the Bodoe airfield in Norway. The spy flyer reported that he was serving with the American 10-10 unit stationed in Turkey and engaged American 10-10 unit stationed in Turkey and engaged in high altitude aerial reconnaissance, and that he had, notably, made repeated flights along the Turkish-Soviet frontier for the purpose of studying Soviet antiaricraft radar networks.

In the face of these incontrovertible facts, the U.S. State Department has had to admit that the American plane, which violated the Soviet frontier May 1, had been sent into the Soviet Union for military reconnaissance. This meant recognizing that the flight had aggressive purposes.

The American pilot testifies that in the course of thorough preparation for his flight over USSR territory, made well in advance, he had, on the instructions of his command, made a preliminary flight from Turkey to Norway via Greece, Italy, and the Federal German Republic, and stayed there for two to three weeks studying landing conditions at the Bodoe airfield.

It should be recalled in this connection that as early as January 1959, the Soviet Government, having received exact and verified information about deliberate recon-A so maissance flights to Soviet territory by American military planes from Norwegian territory, and specifically the Bodoe airfield, already told the Norwegian Government that such a state of affairs was intolerable. In its reply, the Government of Norway did not deny that planes of third countries received permission from the Norwegian authorities in isolated cases to spy on Norwegian territory temporarily, allegedly for joint flights with aircraft of the Norwegian airforce.

The Government of Norway said that these flights were made only with the permission of the Norwegian authorities and that, under Norwegian rules, allied planes were not allowed to fly across Norwegian territory east of the may be a separate to the m A title. A riprim

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24th degree Eastern longitude. But already it was clear that these assurances were an attempt to exonerate Norway's partners in the aggressive NATO bloc and to whitewash their actions which are a threat to peace and security in the north of Europe, actions for which Norwegian territory, too, is used. Now, the provocative flight over Soviet territory by an American plane which was to land on the Norwegian airfield at Bodoe proves irrefutably that the Norwegian Government did not heed the warnings of the Soviet Government. Moreover, it has in fact become an accessory to provocative actions by the United States against Norway's neighbor, the Soviet Union.

In view of the aforesaid, the question is posed: What is the real worth of the Norwegian Government's repeated assurances that the territory of Norway will not be made available in peacetime for the stationing of foreign armed forces, if this territory is already being used by planes of the U.S. Air Force making aggressive flights into the confines of the Soviet Union? The Soviet Government calls attention to the Government of Norway to the fact that it is difficult to regard these actions otherwise than as unfriendly to the Soviet Union and incompatible with the normal good neighbor relations between the two countries, and considers it necessary to stress that the Government of Norway bears a not inconsiderable share of the responsibility for the aggressive acts undertaken by the American air force with regard to the Soviet Union.

The Government of the Soviet Union protests strongly to the Government of Norway against allowing foreign military aircraft to use Norwagian territory for the preparation and commissioning of intrusions into Soviet airspace.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to warn that if such provocations continue from the territory of Norway, it will be obliged to take appropriate measures in reply. It will be recalled that the Soviet Union has the means which, if necessary, will make it possible to fully incapacitate the military bases used for the commissioning of aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the responsibility for the consequences will rest both with the governments of the states committing aggression against other nations, and the governments of the countries which are their accomplices.

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(Text) On May 13 USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko received the charge d'affaires ed interior a.A. Gromyko received the charge d'affaires ad interim of the Turkish Republic in the USSR H. Batu and handed him the following protest note of the Soviet Government: received the charge d'affaires ad interim of the Turkish

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republication deems it necessary to state the following to the Govern-The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics deems it necessary to state the following to the Government of the Republic of Turkey:

A military aircraft violated the Soviet border at 0536

hours, Moscow time, on May 1 of this year, and penetrated more than 2.000 kilometers within the Soviet Union, naturally, could not leave such a gross violation of the Soviet state frontier unpunished. When the intentions of the intruder plane became obvious, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in the Sverdlovsk area.

Expert investigation of all the data possessed by the Soviet side has irrefutably established that the intruder plane belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey, and sent via Pakistan into the Soviet Union on a hostile mission.

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Detailed results of the investigation, as announced by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikita Khrushchev at the final May 7 meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session, leave no doubt as to the purposes of the American plane, which violated the Soviet frontier on May 1. This aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type was specifically equipped for an intelligence and subversion flight over USSR territory. It carried apparatus for aerial photography and for detecting the Soviet radar network and other special radiotechnical means included in the Soviet antiaircraft defense system. The Soviet expert commission which carried out the investigation possesses irrefutable evidence of the American plane's espionage mission: films with photographed Soviet defense and industry targets, tape-recorded signals of the Soviet radar stations, and other materials.

It has been established that the plane in question was based at the American-Turkish air force base of Incirlik near Adana, from where it flew on Apr. 27 to the airport of Peshawar, Pakistan. The flight map taken from the American spy pilot Powers, who survived, shows clearly the entire course he had to fly after leaving Adana:

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May (Cont.) Peshawar; the Aral Sea; Sverdlovsk; Archangel; Murmansk; 13 and finally the Norwegian airport of Bodoe, where he was to land.

The spy pilot divulged that he served with the American unit 10-10, stationed in Turkey and engaged in high altitude intelligence, and that he, for one, made repeated flights along the Turkish-Soviet frontier in order to study the antiaircraft radar system of the Soviet Union.

Confronted with these irrefutable facts, the U.S. State Department was compelled to admit that the American plane, which violated the Soviet border on May 1 of this year, was sent into the Soviet Union on an intelligence mission. Thereby it was admitted that this flight pursued aggressive purposes.

The Soviet Government cannot disregard the part played in the preparation and implementation of this hostile act against the Soviet Union by the Turkish Republic, in whose territory the American intruder plane was based and prepared for the flight.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to state to the Government of Turkey that by lending its territory to the United States for setting up war bases and for carrying out aggressive acts against the Soviet Union by the U.S. Air Force, it becomes an accomplice in such acts and thereby has a grave responsibility for the possible dangerous consequences of such actions. All this by no means agrees with the statements of Turkish leaders about their desire to help consolidate peace, ease international tension, and improve Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government earlier warned the Government of Turkey about the danger of the situation when Turkish territory is used as a military place d'armes by third powers. The Soviet side has drawn attention to this fact when the Soviet airspace was violated by foreign planes and balloons from Turkish territory. In the light of the above, the Soviet Government cannot help concluding that the Government of Turkey has not heeded these warnings of the Soviet Union dictating concern for the preservation of peace and a desire to improve Soviet-Turkish relations.

The Government of the Soviet Union protests to the Government of the Turkish Republic against the opportunity given

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to foreign warplanes to use Turkish territory for preparing and carrying out intrusions into the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government deems it necessaary to warn that if such provocations are repeated from the territory of Turkey it will be compelled to take proper retaliatory measures. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has means to render harmless, if necessary, the war bases used for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that all responsibility for the consequences will be borne both by the governments of the states committing aggression against other countries and the accomplices in this aggression.

# Note to Pakistan

(Text) On May 13 USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko received the Pakistani ambassador to the USSR A. Hilali, and handed him the following protest note of the Soviet Government:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics deems it necessary to state the following to the Government of Pakistan:

A military aircraft violated the USSR frontier at 0536 hours, Moscow time, on May 1 of this year and penetrated more than 2,000 kilometers within the Soviet Union. The gross violation of the Soviet state frontier unpunished.
When the intentions of the intentions When the intentions of the intruder plan became clear, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in the Sverdlovsk area.

> Expert investigation of all the data possessed by the Soviet side has irrefutably established that the intruder plane belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey and sent via Pakistan with a hostile mission into the Soviet Union.

The detailed results of the investigation, as announced by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikita Khrushchev at the final May 7 meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session, leave no doubt as to the purposes of the American plane which violated the Soviet border on May 1. This aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type was specially equipped for an intelligence and subversion flight over Soviet Union territory. It was equipped with apparatus for aerial photography and for detecting the Soviet radar network and other special radiotechnical means included in the Soviet Union's antiaircraft defenses.

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The Soviet expert commission which carried out the investigation possesses irrefutable proof of the American plane's espionage mission: films with photographed Soviet defense and industry targets, tape-recorded signals of the Soviet radar stations, and other materials.

It has been established that the plane in question was based at the American-Turkish air force base of Incirlik near Adama, whence it flew on April 27 to the Peshawar airport in Pakistan. The flight map taken from the American spy pilot Powers, who survived, clearly shows the entire course he had to fly after leaving the Turkish city of Adama: Peshawar; the Aral-Sea Sverdlovsk; Archangel-Murmansk; and then the Norwegian airport of Bodoe, where he was to land.

> The spy pilot divulged that he serves with the American unit 10-10, stationed in Turkey and engaged in high altitude intelligence, and that he, for one, has flown more than once along the Turkish-Soviet border with a view to studying the Soviet Union's antiaircraft radar defense system.

Confronted with these irrefutable facts, the U.S. State Department was compelled to admit that the American plane, which violated the Soviet border on May 1 of this year, was sent into the Soviet Union on an Intelligence mission. It was thereby admitted that this flight pursued aggressive purposes.

The USSR Government cannot disregard the part played in the preparation and implementation of this act, which was hostile to the Soviet Union, by Pakistan, from whose territory the provocative intrusion of the American plane into the Soviet airspace was undertaken.

In its statements of Dec. 26, 1958, Feb. 20, 1959, and Mar. 25, 1959, the Soviet Government has already called attention of the Pakistani Government to the grave consequences connected with loaning Pakistani territory to establish foreign war bases, and their use by third powers for aggressive purposes against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving states.

The takeoff from Pakistani territory of a U.S. Air Force plane, which penetrated into the Soviet Union on May 1st of this year, again confirms with ample clarity what a dangerous policy the Pakistani Covernment pursues by allowing foreign armed forces to use its territory.

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The Government of the Soviet Union protests with the Government of Pakistan in connection with the granting of Pakistani territory to the United States for the commitment of aggressive actions against the USSR by the American air force and warns that if such actions are repeated from Pakistani territory, it will be compelled to take proper retaliatory measures. It is common knowledge to proper retaliatory measures. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union possesses means to render harmless in case of need the war bases used for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that both by the governments of the states committing aggression against other nations and by the governments of the countries which are accomplices in it.

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May
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Letter from Soviet Commander Berlin to Western commanders
To Tarding riolation of GDR sirspace regarding violation of GDR airspace cudying the Soviet Union's antisirersit rader defense

(Text) Berlin: ADN reports that on May 15 the commander in chief of the Soviet armed forces in Germany, I. I. Yakubovskiy, sent letters of similar contents-to the commanders in chief of American, French, and British forces in West Germany, as follows:

Mr. General:

On May 5, 1960, a violation of the GDR state frontier by an aircraft without identification marks which intruded into the airspace of the GDR from West Germany occurred. The aircraft crossed the state frontier of the GDR at 1722 GMT at a height of 1,700 meters, 15 kilometers southwest of Boitzenburg and penetrated 90 kilometers inte GDR territory. Soviet patrol fighters gave it frequent established signals to land. The violator aircraft did not carry out these demands and escaped over the border of West Germany.

In view of the fact that this gross violation of the GDR frontier was committed by an aircraft from the airspace of West Germany, controlled by your armed forces, I state the most firm protest to you on this incident and insist on your adoption of measures which would exclude the use of Federal Republic of Germany territory for violation of the GDR frontier in the future.

(Cont.)

I want to draw your attention to the fact that the Soviet forces in the GDR, in accordance with the Warsaw treaty, naturally could have applied such measures against the violator aircraft which would not have allowed him to fly over the GDR territory with impunity. However, the command of the Soviet forces group in Germany consider that this time it would be possible to restrain from doing so.

I trust that my approach to you will be understood correctly and that such a violation will not occur in the future. At the same time I must warn you that should there be a violation of GDR airspace from West German territory, then the Soviet command will be forced to adopt most stringent measures for curbing such violations.

With respect, the commander in chief of the Soviet forces in Germany, Colonel General Yakubovskiy.

# Soviet note to US on Berlin waterways

As has become known, West Berlin authorities have adopted law on water management which provides that competence ofFRG extends to several principal water routes in West Berlin. In connection with foregoing, MFA of USSR considers it necessary to state following.

West Berlin never was and is not part of FRG, and competence of West German authorities cannot be extended to it. This situation has been frequently confirmed in particular in official statements of USA, Great Britain, and France, which are responsible at present time for situation in West Berlin. Above mentioned activities of West Berlin authorities are contrary to existing status of West Berlin and naturally cannot have any legal force whatever. They cannot be considered as anything other than effort to aggravate still more existing abnormal situation in West Berlin and to obstruct efforts which are being undertaken for purpose of settling question of West Berlin by agreement of all interested parties.

Ministry expresses hope that necessary measures will be taken on part competent USA authorities with regard to aforementioned illegal activities of West Berlin authorities.

May 16

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Soviet note to US on violation of Soviet airspace by US aircraft

(Text of USSR Government note to U.S. Covernment, May 16)

(Text) In connection with the note of the U.S. Embassy dated May 12, 1960, the USSR Government declares the following:

In the said note the U.S. Government admits that the illegal intrusion by American planes into the confines of the Soviet Union and other states for the purpose of military espionage represents the official policy of the United States. The U.S. Government, before the whole world, thereby proclaims as its political course in relations with other states a policy of conscious provecations, a calculated gross violation of international law and the sovereignty of states, including one of its chief principles—that of the tarritorial inviolability of states.

Such a policy leads not only to an intensification of tension, suspicion, and mistrust in relations among states but also creates an atmosphere dangerous to the cause of peace. The statement by the secretary of state of May 9, to which reference is made in the embassy note, just as subsequent public statements by U.S. leaders, is an attempt to justify hostile actions which are permissible only in relations between states which are at war with each other.

A shameless incursion into the bounds of another state, whether it be by land, water, or air, cannot be viewed otherwise than as an act of aggression, and the attempt to justify and legalize these actions is nothing other than a sermon of aggression. There can be no doubt that such a policy of the U.S. Government, which brushes aside the elementary norms of international law and order and the principles of the U.N. Charter, will be decisively condemned throughout the world.

The question inevitably arises: How, in the light of these proclamations of such a policy by the U.S. Government, can one believe its statements on aspirations for peace and easing of international tension? In general, what talk can there be of trust in the foreign policy of the U.S. Government while it remains in the position of justifying and preaching aggression?

The USSR Government considers it necessary to warn once again with all clarity that in the event of new attempts a at an aggressive intrusion into the airspace of the

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Soviet Union, the intruding aircraft will be immediately annihilated. The policy of aggression and provocation proclaimed by the U. S. Covernment renders vulnerable also those states whose governments disregarding the interests of their peoples, provide their territories as sites for American bases from which are sent out aircraft to intrude into the airspace of our country; for, with regard to these states, the requisite measures will be taken by the Soviet Union, not excluding a blow at the aforementioned bases.

As far as the statement of the U.S. Government is concerned, regarding the fact that the USSR will be prepared at the conference of heads of government in Paris to seek agreements directed at a reduction of international tensions, the Soviet Union considers that the time has come for the U.S. Government to display concern for this not in words but in deeds, and, first of all, to condemn the provocative action of its aviation with regard to the Soviet Union, and to reject the policy of aggressive intrusion into the airspace of other states proclaimed by it, a policy most dangerous to the cause of peace.

The Soviet Government continues to support the restoration of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It depends on the U.S. Government, and on it alone, whether the obstacles which have now arisen on the road to this objection, will be removed.

# Khrushchev Statement Regarding Summit Meeting:

No days later President Mischnover himself confirmed

Statement by Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev to President of France De Gaulle, to Prime Minister of Great Britain Macmillan, and to President of the United States Eisenhower, May 16, 1960:

Mr. President de Gaulle, Mr. Prime Minister Macmillan, Mr. President Eisenhower: Allow me to address to you the following statement:

As is known, an act of provocation on the part of the American airforce recently took place against the Soviet Union. On May 1 of this year, a U.S. military reconnaissance plane entered the territory of the Soviet Union, carrying out a definite espionage assignment of collecting information on military and industrial objectives on the territory of the USSR. When the aggressive aim of this aircraft became known it was brought down by a detachment of Soviet rocket troops.

## SECRET/NOFORN

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May (Cont.) Unfortunately, this is not/isolated instance of aggresive and espionage activity by the U.S. Air Force against the Soviet Union.

It is natural that the Soviet Government was compelled to give a reply to these acts and to show their treacherous nature incompatible with the elementary demands for maintaining normal relations between states in peacetime, not to mention the fact that this is in gross contradiction to the task of reducing international tension and creating the necessary conditions for fruitful work at the summit meeting. This point was made both during my speeches at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and in a special protest note addressed to the U.S.Government.

At the beginning the U.S. State Department put out an absurd version alleging that the American aircraft violated the USSR frontiers accidentally and had no spying or diversionary tasks. When on the basis of irrefutable facts the obvious falsehood of this version was shown, the U.S. State Department on May 7, and then the secretary of state on May 9, stated on behalf of the U.S. Government that the American air force is carrying out intrusions within the confines of the Soviet Union with military espionage aims in accordance with a program approved by the U. S. Government and by the President dealts wom sym to personally. do aldi of fison edd on

Two days later President Eisenhower himself confirmed that the carrying out of flights by American aircraft over the territory of the Soviet Union was and remains the calculated policy of the United States.

This was also declared by the U.S. Covernment in its note to the Soviet Government May 12. By these acts the U.S. Government grossly violates generally recognized norms of international law and the high principles of the United Nations Charter, under which the signature of the United States has also been placed.

The Soviet Government and all the people of the Soviet Union have received with indignation these statements of leading U.S. statesmen, just as has every honest man in the world concerned with the fateof peace.

Now, when the leaders of the governments of the four powers have arrived in Paris to takepart in the conference, the question arises, how to hold the talks productively and to examine the questions facing the conference, when SECRET/NOFORN

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tric eded the harvey being when the U.S. Government and the President personally have not only not condemned the provocative act manifested in the intrusion of the American military aircraft into the confines of the Soviet Union, but on the contrary, have declared that similar actions remain the future state policy of the United States with regard to the Soviet Union.

> Now can one reach agreement on these or other questions, which demand settlement in order to lessen tension and remove suspicion and distrust between states, when the government of one of the great powers declares outright that its policy is intrusion into the confines of another great power with spying and diversionary aims, and consequently the increase of tension in relations between the powers? It is clear that the proclamation of such a policy, which can be carried out only under conditions in which countries are in a state of war, dooms the summit conference beforehand to complete failure.

> We, of course, take into account the proclamation of such a policy by the U.S. Government, and we declare that in the event of a repetition of the intrusion by American planes into the confines of the Soviet Union we will shoot down such planes.

The Soviet Government retains the right in all such instances to undertake corresponding retaliatory measures against those who violate the state sovereignty of the USSR, carrying out similar espionage and diversions with regard to the Soviet Union.

The USSR Government declares again that appropriate measures will also be taken against those states which are placing their territories at the disposal of U.S. military bases and assist in aggressive acts against the USSR, even to inflicting a blow against these bases.

In this connection, one cannot fail to draw attention to President Eisenhower's statement that he cannot take part in the summit conference under the threat of the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, although that which he qualifies as a threat was but a statement by the Soviet Government on its firm determination to put an end to the remnants of warfin Europe and to conclude peace, and thus to render the situation, particularly in West Berlin, in accordance with the demands of life and the interests of insuring peace and the security of the European peoples.

May (Cont.)

How can the Soviet Government take part in talks under 16 conditions of the actual threat put forward by the U.S. Government, which declared that it will in the future also continue with violations of the USSR frontiers and that American aircraft have flown and will fly over Soviet territory? By this the U.S. Government has declared its intention to continue unheard-of and unprecedented actions against the sovereignty of the Soviet state, which is a sacred and immovable principle in international relations.

It fellows from all this that for the success of the conference it is essential that the governments of all the states represented should pursue an open and honest policy and should solemnly declare that they will not commit any actions against each other which might represent a violation of the state sovereignty of powers. This means that if the U.S. Government is genuinely ready to cooperate with the governments of other powers in the interests of maintaining peace and strengthening confidence between the states, it should, first, condemn the inadmissible provocative actions of the U.S. Air Force toward the Soviet Union, and second, should renounce the continuance of such actions and such a policy against the USSR in the future.

It is self-evident that the U.S. Covernment in that case cannot help but make those immediately guilty of the premeditated violation of the USSR state frontiers by American aircraft answer severely for it. Until that is done by the U.S. Government, the Soviet Government does not see the possibility of fruitful talks with the U.S. Government at the summit conference. It cannot be a participant at talks in which one of them has made treachery the basis of its policy toward the Soviet Union.

Were the Sovet Government to take part in negotiations known to be doomed to failure under the present conditions, it would by this fact become an accomplice in deceiving the people, and this it does not intend to become.

It goes without saying that if the U.S. Government were to declare that the UnitedStates would in the future no longer violate the USSR state frontiers with its aircraft, that it condemns the provocative actions committed in the past and will punish those directly guilty of such actions--statements which would insure the same conditions for the Soviet Union as for other statesthen I as head of the Soviet Government would be ready to take part in the conference and to make every effort

May (Cont.)

to contribute to its success. New conditions in international relations have been created as a result of the prevocative flight of the American military aircraft, and especially as aresult of the declaration of such provocative flights in the future as the national policy of the United States against the socialist countries.

It is natural that in such circumstances we cannot work at the conference; we cannot work, because we see from what positions they wish to carry on talks with us—under the threat of aggressive reconnaissance flights. It is well known that spy flights are carried on for purposes of reconnaissance in order to begin war. Therefore we reject the conditions which the U.S. is creating for us. We cannot take part in any talks and . in the solution even of those questions which have already matured; we cannot, because we see that the United States has no desire to come to an agreement.

It is considered the leader among the Western countries. Consequently, a conference at the present time would be useless and would be a deception of public opinion of all countries. I repeat, we cannot take part in the talks in the situation which has arisen. We wish to take part in talks on the basis of equality, with equal possibilities for both sides.

We consider it necessary for the peoples of all countries of the world, for the public to understand us correctly. The Soviet Union is not halting its efforts to reach agreement, and we are sure that sensible agreements are possible, however, evidently not at this time, but another time.

It is, however, essential for this that, first, the United States admit that the provocative policy which it has announced as the policy of "free" flights over our country be condemned, that it renounce it and admit that it has committed an aggression, and admit that it regrets it.

The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that if it is not the present government, then it will be another, and if it is not another, then a third government will understand that no other way out exists but that of peaceful coexistence between the two systems—capitalist and socialist. Either peaceful coexistence or war, which will bring a catastrophe to those who are now pursuing an aggressive policy.

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Therefore we consider that it is necessary to give some time, so that the questions which have arisen may be settled and so that those upon whom responsibility is laid for a definition of the political course of the country may analyze the responsibility which they have taken upon themselves by declaring an aggressive course in their relations with the moviet officer that there socialist countries. Therefore we consider that there is no better way out than to postpone the conference of al dl .addill mesogram nol do heads of governments for approximately six to eight months.

The Soviet Union on its part will not relax its efforts to achieve agreement. I think that public opinion will correctly understand our position, will understand that we have been deprived of the possibility of taking part in these talks.

However, we are firmly convinced of the need for peaceful coexistence, because to lose faith in peaceful coexistence would mean to doom mankind to war; it would
mean agreeing to the inevitability of war, and under the present conditions, it is known what misfortunes a war would bring to all people in the world.

I want to address the people of the United States: I have been to the United States, have met various sections of the American people there, and I am deeply convinced that all strata of the American people do not want war. \* Lang era admaige

An exception is to be found only among a small, frantic group in the Pentagon and the militarist circles which support it, who are making immense profits on the armaments race and who ignore the interests of the American people, and in general ignore the interests of the people of all countries and pursue an adventurous policy.

> We express gratitude to President de Gaulle for his hospitality and for presenting us with the opportunity of meeting in the capital of France. We also value the efforts of the Government of Great Britain and personally those of Prime Minister Macmillan.

We regret that this meeting has been torpedoed by the U.S. reactionary circles as a result of the provocative flights of American military aircraft over the Soviet Union. We regret that this meeting has not led to the results which all the peoples of the world expected of it.

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May the disgrace and the responsibility for this rest with those who proclaim a policy of banditry toward the Soviet Union.

As is known, we agreed with U.S. President Eisenhower to exchange visits. In September of last year, I made such a vist to the United States. We were very pleased with this visit, with the meetings and talks which we had in the United States, for which we expressed our gratitude.

The U.S. President was to make a visit to our country. We agreed that he would arrive June 10, and we were preparing to receive well the exalted guest. Unfortunately as a result of the provocative aggressive actions against the USSR, conditions have now been created in which we are deprived of the possibility of welcoming the President with due hospitality with which the Soviet people receive desired guests. At present we cannot display such hospitality toward the President, because as a result of the provocative flights by American warplanes for the purpose of reconnaissance, conditions have been created which are obviously unfavorable for such a visit. The Soviet people do not want to lack frankness, and do not know how to do so.

Therefore, we can ider that the trip of the U.S. President to the Soviet Union should be put off at present and that agreement on the dates of this visit should be reached when conditions are ripe. Then the Soviet people will be able to express the fitting hospitality and reception in respect of the esteemed guest, who represents a great power with which we sincerely want to live in peace and friendship. I think that both Mr. Eisenhower and the American people will understand me correctly.

The Soviet Government states that on its part it will continue to do everything possible to contribute to the lessening of international tension and to the solution of the problems which today still divide us. We shall be guided in this by the interests of strengthening the great cause of peace on the basis of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

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May 18

## Khrushchev news conference regarding the summit meeting

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The floor is given to Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikita Khrushchev.

Now gentlemen, I wish to reply to those people here who booed and made noise in an attempt to create an un-friendly atmosphere. I was informed that Adenauer's minions had sent here some of their agents from among the fascists who were not completely beaten in Stalingrad. Everyone remembers the time when the Hitlerites also "booed" us and attacked the Soviet Union, but the Soviet people gave them such a "hec" that many of these invaders went three meters underground right away. I would like to tell the people who are booing so much here: We thrashed the Nazi invaders at Stalingrad, in the Ukraine, in Belorussia-wherever they intruded-and we finished them off on the land from which they invaded us. If the surviving fascistinvaders "boo" us, as Hitler's gangsters did, if they again prepare an attack on the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, we shall give them such a "boo" that they will never be able to gather up their bones.

Gentlemen, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the people who do the booing understand Russian without translation. This can be seen from their shouts. These, apparently, are surviving Nazi plunderers who were on the territory of the Soviet Union but managed to escape.

I should like to tell you, gentlemen, that even those who boo boo and shout here should realize who I am. I am a representative of the great Soviet people who, under the leadership of Lenin, under the leadership of the Communist part, accomplished the Great October Socialist Revolution, a representative of a people who have built socialism and are successfuly building a communist society, advancing confidently to communism.

Gentlemen, the people who boo are people of whom the German people are ashamed.

Voice from the floor This is propaganda!

Khrushchev: Listen to him; he thinks this is "propaganda." Smart isn't he! We have shown by all our deeds what sort of "propaganda" this is!

May (Cont.)

As to the people who are trying to trip me up by shouting, I declare that they are not representatives of the German people, but fascists bastards. These angry shouts gladden my heart, because they reveal the fury of the enemies of our sacred cause. I remember the words of the great German August Bebel, who said that if the enemies of the working class curse you, it means you are on the correct road.

> If you boo me, you only inspire me in our class struggle for the cause of the working class, in the struggle for the cause of the peoples desiring a lasting peace.

Gentlemen, I shall not conceal my pleasure-I like coming to grips with enemies of the working class. I like hearing the frenzy of these lackeys of imperialism. But they cannot do anything to stem our forward movement. Our socialist homeland, the land of socialism, is like a rock.

Correspondent of the West German paper DIE WELT, Mr. Schewe: Do you still believe that international problems must be solved by peaceful means?

N.S. Khrushchev: Yes, I do. It is the policy of the Soviet Government that all disputes should be settled by negotiation and not by war. This was and remains our position.

DIE WELT correspondent Schewe: Do you still stand by your proposal for transforming West Berlin into a free city?

N.S. Khrushchev: Yes, we stand by this proposal, and we see no other reasonable solution. West Berlin is in the center of the German Democratic Republic, which is a socialist country, and West Berlin is capitalistic. The occupation regime which exists in West Berlin today may become a source of great conflicts. Why preserve it? Would it not be better to change the situation in West Berlin in such a way as to avoid conflicts? We consider that the best solution would be the withdrawal of foreign troops from West Berlin, the creation of a free city there, the provision of such conditions for the people of the free city as would enable them to live under the political and social system which they consider it necessary to have, and free contact for the people of the city with the entire world.

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The conflict produced by the intrusion of an American plane within the confines of the Soviet Union has further convinced us that these questions must be settled, and we shall press for this with even greater energy and determination. Tomorrow, by the way, I am flying to Berlin. There we shall have talks with Comrades Ulbricht, Grotewohl and, in general, our friends in the GIR

Correspondent of the West Berlin paper DER TAG. A. Rosenberg: Do you intend, Mr. Chairman, to conclude a separate peace treaty in Berlin?

Khrushchev: Yes, we are planning not to make a separate peace, but to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR, to draw a line under World War II and thereby deprive the Western powers of the right to have occupation troops in West Berlin. When we deem it necessary, we shall take out our pens-the drafts have already been preparedsit down, sign the treaty, and announce it.

I should like to add the following: By signing the peace treaty with the GDR, we shall actually do what the United States did when it concluded the peace treaty with Japan. We fought together with the United States against Japan. But then the United States signed a peace treaty with Japan without us, we exerted considerable effort to preve the necessity of signing the take us into consideration. Today all our efforts to treaty together. However, the United States did not reach agreement and sign a peace treaty with Germany together are almost exhausted. When they are exhausted completely, we, and probably the other countries that fought against Hitler's Germany, will sign a peace treaty in the same way as the Americans did with Japan.

Ulbricht speech of welcome to Khrushchev at East Berlin airport; Khrushchev reply; variations between Tass and broadcast versions.

Dear Comrade Premier, dear friend Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, dear friends, members of the Soviet delegation: In the name of the GDR Government and the National Front I welcome you most cordially to the capital of the GDR. The people of the capital and all peace-loving people of Germany greet you as the

May (Cont.)

as the representative of the glorious Soviet people who 15 years ago freed our fatherland from barbarous Hitlerite fascism and thereby performed the greatest deed for the salvation of European culture and the restoration of peace.

You are coming from Paris where you have been waging a struggle for peace. The people of the GDR and all nations had hopefully watched the preparations for the summit conference. But by its air aggression directed against Soviet territory, the U.S. Government demonstrated its unwillingness to respect international law. The peace-loving people of the GDR understand very well that the air aggression of the U.S. imperialist circles was a provocation designed to proclaim the fact that imperialist rulers in the United States think they can do as they like in any country. Mr. Eisenhower, the U.S. President, thereby destroyed the basis of negotiations on the eve of the Paris conference.

(Text of Khrushchev's speech on arrival—live broadcast in Russian with passage-bypassage translation)

Dear Comrade and friend Walter Ulbricht; dear comrade and friend Otto Grotewohl; dear comrades, friends, people of the city of Berlin: We have arrived here at the friendly invitation of the GDR Government. Thank you for the invitation. We are happy to again be on the socialist soil of the German people; to have talks with our German friends; to meet peasants, workers, and the intelligentsia of your peace-loving country.

You know that I have arrived in Berlin from Paris, where a conference of the state leaders of the USSR, France, Britain and the United States was to have been held at the highest level. This important conference did not take place because of the position of the U.S. Government. It committed an aggressive act against the Soviet Union and made it impossible to discuss the questions it was intended to examine and solve at the Paris conference.

Apparently in shaping policy those circles in the United States who do not want a relaxation in international tension and the removal of the threat of a

May (Cont.) new war, again have the upper hand. They want to live by jungle law, (impose?) their will upon other countries, and act according to the principle of "What I want, I do."

They must know that since such principles were not suitable when the Soviet Union was the only socialist state, then such methods are all the more unsuitable in international relations now, when a powerful socialist camp exists capable of defending itself, of defending universal peace. Those who commit acts of aggression and then do not have the courage to discuss them openly, to give up forever such actions pregnant with the danger of a new war, cannot spread the illusion that a normal atmosphere can exist around a roundtable at summit conference. Apparently, this act of aggression was necessary to some people in the United States in order to torpedo this conference, which was awaited by all nations and on which they placed such high hopes.

Well, the United States has achieved its aim. However, now the whole world sees what a dangerous and thoughtless policy is being pursued by the leaders of the United States in following the lead of militarist and revanchists. They torpedoed the conference because they had nothing to say in Paris. They had no proposals which could have helped solve urgent international problems.

In such an atmosphere, time is essential. The efforts of all nations and governments are essential so that in six to eight months a summit conference might take place. It is essential that not threats and ultimatums, but wisdom guide the governments of states whose representatives are to meet at such an important conference. The Soviet Government will do everything that is required for this meeting to take place and for it to produce useful results.

The Government of the Soviet Union will, of course, along with the governments of other socialist countries, carefully examine the situation which has now developed, and draw the necessary conclusions. Not giving up the struggle for an easing of the international tension. our policy remains the policy of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems. Life has not yet invented a better method of maintaining peace and preventing a new war, with new great calamities for the people, than peaceful coexistence.

May (Cont.)

The peoples of the socialist countries, all peace-loving and upright people, must not, however, relax their vigilance in the fact of the provocations of the American soldiery. Resolutely exposing aggressive actions and fighting for an improvement in the international situation, we must never forget that the imperialists and militarists of the capitalist countries are still not giving up their antipopular aims and have no wish to reconcile themselves to the fact that there has not been and cannot be a return to the past, the old times when they reigned over the destinies of the peoples. Our people have a saying: What has been dropped from the cart is lost. Socialism has shown that it is a better and more progressive system, and the future belongs to it.

We are convinced that common sense will sooner or later prevail in international affairs. We are also convinced that relations between states and the destimes of the world are too important a matter to be determined by men from the Pentagon. What is now demanded for all peoples, from all benest people of the world is: One must double, treble, efforts and achieve honest observance of the principle of peaceful coexistence by every government. A resolute rebuff must be given to all attempts at new provocations.

The U.S. Government has thwarted the summit conference on which the people hadplaced such high hopes, but the questions which were to be examined at that meeting have by no means lost their importance. Among them are the conclusion of a German peace treaty and the solution on this basis, of the question of West Berlin. Taking into consideration the situation which has now arisen, we have much to discuss with our German friends, Comrades Ulbricht, Grotewohl, and other leaders of the GDR. It gives us pleasure to meet you, dear friends. I think the forthcoming exchange of opinions between us will be beneficial to the cause of peace in Europe.

The GDR is the first peaceful state of workers and peasants in the history of Germany. The creation of this state is a great victory for the German people. We are convinced that the GDR is an integral part of the mighty socialist camp and will make its worthy contribution to the cause of preserving peace in Europe and the world over.

# May (Con t.) Variations in Khrushchev Speeches

(Editor's Note —L) In the speech by USSR Premier Khrushchev made on arrival at the East Berlin airport from the Paris summit meeting.

the following difference is noted between Moscow TASS English version and the live broadcast version carried by the East German Home Service:

Where the published East German Home Service version

', line l reads, "In such an atmosphere
time ie essential," the version carried by Moscow
TASS in English at 1619 GMT on May 19 reads, "In such
an atmosphere, the efforts of all nations, etc." omitting the phrace "time is essential."

In the Khrushchev May 20 speech at the East Berlin Werner Seelenbinder Hall

the following variation is noted between the Moscow TASS English version and the published live broadcast from the East German Home Service:

Where the published home service version '
lines 5 and 6 reads "..it would be best to postpone the
conference six to eightmonths, until the problems that
have arisen have settled down, until the dust,
etc.," the version carried by Moscow TASS in English
at 1730 GMT on May 20 reads, "...it would be best to
postpone the conference six to eight months until the
the dust, etc.," omitting the phrase "until the problems
that have arised have settled down."

## May Khrushchev speech in East Berlin

In East Berlin Werner Seelenbinder Hall packed with 8,000 regime functionaries brought in from Sovzone as well as East Berlin, Khrushchev announced future Soviet policy re Cerman problem and West Berlin, after abortive Paris meeting. Khrushchev's first statement that "we will not wait long" for conclusion peace treaty and settlement West Berlin question was greeted with tremendous ovation by regime functionaries who evidently were expecting announcement re peace conference and separate peace treaty with GDR. To visible disappointment of audience (mission officers watched proceedings

May (Cont.)

on TV), Khrushchev subsequently announced as "joint Soviet/East German decision" that, in anticipation summit conference will takeplace in six to eight months, it was intention to wait and try solve question of peace treaty "with both German states which now actually exist." Khrushchev then made a commitment not to take unilateral action, stating that "we will have to maintain existing situation untilsummit conference." Commitment was made on assumption, he stated, that "no unilateral steps" would be taken by Western powers which would obstruct a summit conference in six to eight months.

Behind the speaker's rostrum was giant slogan stating: End to provocations by Eisenhower and Adenauer. For universal and complete disarmament." Major theme played repeatedly both by Khrushchev and later by Ulbricht was emergence alliance between Washington and Bonn, between rightist-conservative force U.S. Government and revanchist FedRep, between Pentagon military camarilla and aggressive West German militarists. It is quite clear from frequent repetition in both speeches that a major bloc propaganda line has been thus introduced; notable that no adverse comments whatsoever made by either speaker about UK or France.

On this occasion, as otherwise during visit East
Berlin, Soviet Defense Minister Malinovski very much in
evidence sitting in front row next to Grotewohl. Special
attention given to Malinovski by Professor Correns,
National Front Head who opened meeting. It was amusing
to note that Khrushchev, returning to his seat from
Podium after receiving two bouquets from East German
children, gave Malinovski one of bouquets.

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PART TWO

STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS FROM WESTERN SOURCES

Jan. 23 (Secret)

Mayor Brandt Comments on the Soviet Memorandum:

The responsibility for maintaining the status of Berlin (West) rests with the Three Western Powers. The Berlin Senat's viewpoint was again summarized on January 7, in five points which the Governing Mayor submitted to the House of Representatives. A copy of this statement is attached. It is known that the Federal Government and the Berlin Senat are in agreement on these points.

It is certainly not uninteresting that in the document mention is made of Soviet interest in "a mutually acceptable solution". Apparently, the impression is supposed to be created that the basic situation in Berlin, or rather West Berlin, can continue with the very important exception in the case of the international legal situation, to which reference is made below.

From the position presented it is possible to get the impression that, as far as the Soviet side is concerned, there would be some disposition to permit the Four Powers to continue to exercise over—all responsibility to a certain degree.

In particular, mention is made of "the undisturbed use of the avenues of communication". In this connection, it might be possible to assemble the agreements of the past few years and positively examine the decisions taken at the Paris Foreign Ministers' Conference of June 1949.

With reference to the relationship between the Federal Republic and Berlin (West), the Soviet political position on the matter is unchanged. The opposing German view of the situation is also unchanged.

As far as the economic considerations are concerned, the continued maintenance of the ties with the Federal Republic, as they have developed, is not opposed. That means that the Soviet circles thoroughly understand "that in practice West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic will be closer than with any other country".

It would be useful if the "responsible circles of the Soviet Union" properly assessed the following points:

a. The thesis that West Berlin is a source of danger to peace is untenable; this has not become any more convincing during the discussions of the past few months.

Jan. (Cont.) 23 (Secret)

- b. The formula for a mutually acceptable solution loses all significance at the very outset if it assumes the capitulation of the Western Powers as occupation powers as well as bearers of the supreme power. Consideration for possible supplementary agreements should not be linked with a demand for the establishment of a new legal basis.
- c. The threat of changes which would result from a new agreement between the Soviet and Soviet Zone governments complicates efforts for reaching an international detente. Ever new and further sharpening of the Berlin crisis undercuts interest in reducing and controlling armaments. It is absolutely obvious that any supplementary Berlin agreements must take into consideration the will of the people affected.
  - d. As far as the German viewpoint is concerned, the formula for a mutually acceptable solution remains particularly unacceptable if it does not take cognizance of the broader German question that is, the anomalous situation in Germany resulting from its division.
  - e. As far as the German side is concerned, there never has been an attempt to involve Berlin in the Federal Republic's military obligations; this is a separate question from that of Allied rights and responsibilities.

As far as miscellaneous points in the document are concerned, interpretations of the following points would not be uninteresting.

- a. What is meant by reaching a Berlin solution "in stages"?

  Can the Soviet side be unaware of the extent to which the SED's position stands in contradiction to the formula of a mutually acceptable solution?
- b. What is the meaning of the remarks concerning Berlin's role in bringing about an "inner German rapprochement"?

  Does this indicate a readiness to include in a possible supplementary agreement a reference to Berlin as the capital of Germany? Does it mean there is a readiness to bring its influence to bear to assure that the situation inside Berlin will not be further burdened by human practical points of view but that on the contrary serious efforts will be made to improve communication and person-to-person contacts between both parts of Germany?

Jan. (Cont.)

- c. Are they clear about the fact that West Berlin as a Federal land of a special type has developed with (Secret) the knowledge and approval of the Western Powers, whose position as bearer of the supreme power has not been disturbed thereby? Are they clear that as a result of the agreement of 1955 the mutual interdependence of rights and responsibilities of to more about the Western Powers and the Federal Republic developed with respect to Berlin?
  - d. As far as the theme of "so-called subversive and bee got a desired hostile activities" are concerned, it would be useful to point out that the Western Powers at Geneva suggested observers for both parts of Berlin. It is necessary to be clear to avoid any interpretation which could result in the limiting of the democratic freedom of opinion. Discussions can be facilitated if the participants agreed that there should be no unilateral changes in the Berlin situation and that efforts for achieving a reduction in international tension should not be disturbed by Berlin.

Feb. (Limited Official Use)

Bundestag Debate on Foreign Affairs: (Report from Embassy Bonn). On Berlin all parties agreed ultimate solution must be in framework German reunification through selfdetermination, and that until reunification attained present legal status city must not be weakened. Five points regarding Berlin which Brandt made in January 7 speech to Berlin legislature were accepted by Chancellor and all parties as common ground.

On reunification there was agreement that it could be achieved only in course general East-West detente. Despite Soviet professed desire such detente their aggressive attitude toward Berlin hardly conducive to it; Adenauer and Gradl for CDU stressed that Soviet behavior regarding Berlin at May summit conference would be test whether they really seek detente. On means making progress party opinions diverged along lines their already well-known proposals: SPD speaking for "partial disarmament" in Europe or disengagement (in accordance Helmut Schmidt November 5 proposal); FDP for negotiation between two parts of Germany under four power aegis; and government parties advocation steadfastness and patience, noting that Soviets had rejected all proposals made by Federal Republic and West in tireless efforts over years, and refusing deal with Pankow puppets when responsibility and power to act lie in Moscow.

which could result in the limiting of the democratical Freedom of opinion. Discussions can be facilitated . if the participants agreed that there should be no the unilateral changes in the Berlin gituation and that the efforts for achieving a reduction in intermetional as au tension should not be disturbed by Perlin.

Sundester Debate on Foreign Affairs: (Report from Embassy

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gress party opinions diverged along lines their almesdy ...

between two parts of Germany under four power seging and

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c. Are they clear about the fact that West Berlin as a Feb. (Cont.) All parties sought avoid polemics although there was 10 sharp exchange when SPD accused CDU of dangerous (Limited persistence in policy of strength. SPD warned against Official Use) further spread atomic weapons which would make limited or general disarmament and reunification difficult if not impossible of achievement. CDU responded with vigorous denial any aggressive ideas and repudiation of policy of weakness.

There was no expectation in any party that May summit conference would be more than possible first step and all shared discouragement at harshness recent Soviet statements but also determination not to give up. - notdederonated was blove of reals as of reseason

Mar. 9 (Unclassified)

Secretary Herter's news conference; statement on high altitude flight controversy: Q. Mr. Secretary, on his recent trip to the Far East, Mr. Khrushchev said that if the Western Powers did not come to some agreement with him on Berlin at some point he would have to go ahead with a separate treaty for East Germany. He also said when he got home from that trip that he thought it was time for everybody to avoid doing or saying anything which might impair the prospect for agreement at a summit conference. I wondered how you assessed these matters and what the United States attitude is toward this approach period before the summit.

A. Well, there are two separate thoughts to the question you have asked, as I see it. The first has to do with Khrushchev's statement that was made in Indonesia. Whether or not that constituted a violation of the agreement made at Camp David and confirmed in the exchange of statements immediately after Camp David with respect to there being no time limit on negotiations with respect to Berlin and the German question, it is our own impression -- and we have studied that statement very carefully -- that there is no time element involved. The statement made in Indonesia is similar to statements that Mr. Khrushchev has made in other places before he took that trip in which he has indicated that, if no progress is made, there will come a time when he will be forced to a separate peace treaty with East Germany. That is not at variance necessarily with the earlier agreement. But we cannot see that he has put an ultimatum date, a specific date, on that statement.

With respect to the second part of your question, I am not certain whether you are referring to any particular incident or not. If you are referring to the matter of high-altitude flights, I can just say this, that the British, the French, and ourselves have always taken the position that we have the right to fly at whatever altitude we see fit in the corridor, that there has never been any restriction agreed upon from the point of view of the height. It is true, however, that we have this matter constantly under review from the point of view of the operational necessity of high flights. The most recent review, which was concluded after the President came back, determined that there is no operational necessity at the present time. Should that operational necessity arise, we are in agreement that we have the absolute right to fly at whatever altitudes we see fit.

MOTOR LANDER

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Mar. (Cont.)
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(Unclassified)

- Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that a decision was made to make those high-altitude flights because of the operational efficiency of them. Can you say whether there has been a change of mind as between operational efficiency and operational necessity?
- A. No. I think that the two go together. And I think that the review, as I say, while it was in the course of being made and was concluded after we got back from South America, determined that there was no operational necessity or any need of these flights for the sake of efficiency at the present time.
- Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask whether this in effect reverses a decision reported about 10 days ago referring to a situation about 3 weeks or a month ago in which there was supposed to have been a decision made to conduct such flights at an early date?
  - A. No such decision was made.
- Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to the previous question on the Berlin problem and flights, I think the question was phrased, had we changed our decision to send flights in-something to that effect. What I would like to know is whether we had decided earlier, within the last month, not to send flights but to inform the Soviet authorities again with a restatement of our feeling about this problem and our rights, and was that decision changed?
  - A. No decision had been reached on that. We have discussed the matter from time to time with the French and the British, and we have been in complete agreement on the matter.
    - Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been suggested that in the forthcoming German negotiations Chancellor Adenauer has a veto power over any decision that we might make there. We have said that we would make no agreements with the Soviet Union that would not be satisfactory to the people of Germany and the people of Berlin. Is this not true then, that Adenauer does have veto power over our decision regarding Germany?
  - A. Again, when you speak about our decision over Germany, we don't pretend to have the sole right to make a determination as to w'at shall be done with Germany. This is a matter that we have continuously felt was one for consultation between the British, the French, the Germans,

Mar. (Cont.)

9
(Unclassified)

and ourselves as the powers principally responsible and principally concerned.

The question, of course, of an overall peace treaty which would settle the East German situation would, naturally, affect a great many more countries besides. So that in the Berlin situation, in which the predominant interests of these four nations reside, we have never taken it unto ourselves to say that anyone has necessarily a right of veto or that we have a right of veto. What we are obviously trying to do is to concert our position as best we can, and I think that in connection with that the visit of Chancellor Adenauer next week may be very significant.

- Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to take another crack at the Berlin flights question: If no decision or consideration had been given to resuming flights above 10,000 feet, why was it necessary, after the President returned, to make a decision that they were not now operationally necessary?
  - A. It was not necessary to make a decision, but the decision was one that was pending. The review was underway before the President got back, was brought to him, and he made the decision.
- Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may refer once more to this muchdiscussed matter: I gather from what you say about the
  Berlin flights that what the President decided against
  yesterday was any immediate flight plan at a high level
  between West Berlin and West Germany. And I wanted to
  ask you whether it is unlikely now that any such flights
  would be undertaken before the summit conference.
  - A. I don't think it has any direct relation to the summit conference at all. I think that this was determined entirely on the question of operational needs as of now. If those operational needs should change, we would feel entirely free to move ahead.
  - Q. Well, I asked the question that way, sir, because you mentioned the subject in response to the first question I asked, which had to do with Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion that nobody should to anything to upset prospects for an agreement.
    - A. Well, I was merely speculating that this was what you were inquiring about.

and principally concerned. Mar. 16 (Unclassified)

Excerpts from Assistant Secretary Foy Kohler's Speech on the Mutual Security Program. .... Within a few weeks the Heads of Government of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union will meet in Paris. At that meeting we, the United Kingdom, and France will continue our longstanding efforts to make progress toward a resolution of some of the outstanding points at issue between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

No one can now predict what will be the outcome of these discussions. No one knows whether any real progress will be made toward a just solution of the problem of Germany, which, due to Soviet intransigence, remains divided; of Berlin, whose people are determined to remain free and maintain their links with the West; and of genuine, controlled disarmament. There is, however, one thing that can be said with absolute certainty. Solutions to these problems on a basis compatible with elementary considerations of justice and consistent with basic principles from which we cannot deviate and still retain our freedom and dignity will not be promoted by any weakening of our posture or our will.

We might, in fact, take a lesson from the opposition in this regard. It is true that the time-phased Soviet ultimatum of last year has been withdrawn, and an intent to seek settlements by peaceful means through negotiations has been procleimed. However, Mr. Khrushchev has recently been making it clear that there is no alteration in the basic Soviet positions on Berlin and Germany and that the threat of unilateral Soviet action at some time remains. And while Soviet propaganda has been trying to make capital of the Soviet announcement that it planned to reduce armed force personnel over the next 18 months or so to a level approximating that of the United States Armed Forces, he declared to the Supreme Soviet on January 14 that "the Soviet Army now has combat means and firepower never before possessed by any army" and "would be able to literally wipe the country or countries which attack us off the face of the earth." Moreover, during the recent Asian tour he has been proclaiming that "the Soviet Union is the world's most powerful nation in the military sense."

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Mar. (Cont.) 16

Thus I would repeat that, as we enter into the period of renewed negotiations with the Soviet Union, the (Unclassified) unity and the strength of the free world are of the greatest importance. Solutions to outstanding problems will not come easily. They will take a long time to accomplish. While we continue to seek these solutions, as we have in the past, it would be folly to weaken our collective military posture in the uncertain period ahead. If we are not serious about our defenses now, we will never be able to convince anyone of the seriousness of our intentions in what may well be a prolonged period of negotiations.

Mar. 18

Chancellor Adenauer's Plebiscite Proposal: Frequently myself or those travelling with me have been asked about (Unclassified) the purpose of my trip. There are several reasons. Last summer I was invited by the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Kishi, to come to Japan. I am now going there to reciprocate his visit to Bonn. Also, I was invited months ago by the University of California to attend its convocation in March. I have gladly accepted, and I shall proceed from here to California. Finally, and that is not the least important reason, the political situation in the world has deteriorated during the last few months.

On the 16th of May, as you know, a Summit Conference will open in Paris in which the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union will participate. This Summit Conference will be preceded by meetings of the foreign ministers of the free nations, of NATO and of the Western heads of government. This conference may achieve extraordinary political significance. The entire subject matter is being prepared in so-called working groups. Naturally, we Germans take a very great interest in this. Therefore, I have come here with Foreign Minister von Brentano in order to discuss the whole situation with the leading authorities of the United States, especially President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter.

Before I discuss our present meeting here let me say a few words about the smears on housewalls of an anti-Semitic or National Socialist character which came as such a shock to public opinion throughout the world a short while ago. Before going any further, I should like to state this with the utmost emphasis: Germany is not anti-Semitic and Germany is not National Socialist. There can be no question that such ideas have any hold

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served negotiations with the Soylet Mar. (Cont.) among the German people. I do not minimize what has happened, but I object to any generalization. Germany (Unclassified) is and remains a democratic state. With this statement I should like to leave the subject. If, in the course of the discussion, anyone wants to address a question to me on this subject, I shall answer it.

I should now like to say something about the Summit Conference, beginning on the 16th of May. The working groups having collected all sorts of material and the situation having been considered under every conceivable aspect--as is the custom of Foreign Offices--it
may be assumed that concrete positions will presently
be agreed upon which then will have to be submitted to the foreign ministers and heads of government for their approval.

Controlled disarmament. Among the points of the agenda that we are now working on, the most important -- perhaps the decisive one-is to my mind the question of controlled disarmament -- both in respect of nuclear and of conventional weapons. As you know, a conference of ten nations is now meeting in Geneva which is to deal with this entire complex of questions. You also know that for many months past the experts in Geneva have been grappling with part of the problem -- I find no better term for it. Notwithstanding this, it seems to me an imperative necessity that the participants at the Summit Conference should go into the disarmament question in a very detailed manner. What is involved here is not a technical but a political problem of the first magnitude. Primarily, emphasis must be placed on the political character of the problem, because from the point of view of technology or physics there will always be a tendency to believe that perfection has not been reached yet. One of the participants in the pre-summit meetings will say this is the right method, while another one will say that is the right method, and thus many months and many years could still go by without any definitive agreement being reached. Certainly the problem also has its technical aspects, but predominantly it is a political problem. If one approaches it only from the technical side, humanity will never be free from the nightmare now pressing upon it. The politicians and the leading statesmen, in solving this problem, must possess the necessary vigor and the needed farsightedness so that progress may be made at long Tast.

Mar. (Cont.)
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(Unclassified)

In this field the United States can have a clear conscience. Years ago, when the United States was still the sole possessor of nuclear secrets, it declared itself ready--by its own free will--to hand over to an international body its knowledge and stocks of nuclear materials, so that this research in the sphere of physics might be made to serve peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind. The United States has gone even further. It has also expressed its readiness to make available to the countries not yet fully developed a large part of the huge sums expected to be saved as a result. At that time the Soviet Union said "no", although it did not have any bombs yet. I wish from the bottom of my heart that the United States will continue to play the leading part in the field of disarmament policy--and to play with courage, with strength, with determination and with confidence. One nation must assume leadership. The United States has been called upon to perform this role.

At the Summit Conference the disarmament problem must be dealt with within the political contexts, and some progress should be made towards its solution. Khrushchev, too, has repeatedly declared that the question of disarmament was the most essential and most important issue of our age and at this Summit Conference. Humanity desires to see some progress at long last towards a genuine peace; it looks for an escape from this era of insecurity, of crisis and of pressure in order to be able to enjoy the blessings of peace and of social progress.

German reunification. The question next in order of importance at this conference will be the German issue. That is, the question of reunification in peace and freedom and the question of Berlin. Yesterday morning I talked with President Eisenhower, and a joint communique, with which you are familiar, was issued about this conversation. Permit me to say something about this joint communique. Just now I explained to you that the preparation of the Summit Conference was still in the stage of consultation within the working groups. The result of this study by the working groups will presently be submitted to a conference of Foreign Ministers. At this stage of the proceedings it would have been discourteous and improper towards our other partners, if decisions had been formulated in advance. But I want to tell you with all emphasis that a very far-reaching

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Mar. (Cont.)
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(Unclassified)

identity of views emerged during the discussions with President Eisenhower and in the course of numerous conversations I have had during these last few days with leading American politicians. You cannot expect, however, that even now in our communique we should use definite formulae which still have to be discussed with the other partners. But anyone who reads this communique care fully—cr, permit me to say, who studies it—will feel that we have already made considerable progress in preparation for the summit conference.

Let me refer to one passage in particular:

"The President and the Chancellor reaffirmed their determination to continue their efforts to achieve the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom. They further agreed that the preservation of the freedom of the people of West Berlin, and their right of selfdetermination must underlie any future agreement affecting the city."

I would ask you to read this sentence most carefully. It contains the basis for the West's attitude toward Khrushchev's demends with regard to Berlin and it is therefore of decisive importance in the present situa-tion. The right of self-determination-which is, after all, an elementary human right which is granted to every people on earth-must also be given to the 17 million Germans in the Soviet occupied zone of Germany. I beg of you, ladies and gentlemen, to understand that we Germans dwell on this right of self-determination with all the resolution atour command. I am doing this today before you with particular emphasis because the suppression of human rights in the Soviet zone has never been as severe and cruel as just now. The churches are being oppressed; the people who support the churches are being persecuted; the parents of the children who receive religious tuition by the churches to prepare for their confirmation are threatened in such a manner and put under such pressure that they no longer dare sending their children to religious instruction. A particularly violent drive is now going on against the farmers in the Soviet Zone. Their property is being taken from them. They are forced to hand over their holdings to the Kolkhozes and to renounce the land which they and their free farmers. Anyone familiar with the mentality of the farmers, and especially the farmers in those areas, appreciates the moral torments to which the people there are exposed. All this is done at the bid of the Soviet Union. forebears have worked for centuries as free men, as Soviet Union.

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Mar. (Cont.) (Unclassified)

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Compared to conditions in the Soviet zone of Germany, the situation in Poland is much more bearable. In Poland no one dares any longer to proceed as they do in the Soviet zone. The right of self-determination which, as I just mentioned, the Soviets, too, acknowledge- at least in their words-must also be valid for these Germans who have lived for many centuries in the heart of Europe: it must form the basis of all negotiations. Listen to what Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet on 30th December 1955: "Every people has the right to build its existence in accordance with its own desires." And on 1st December 1959, he declared at Budapest that every people is entitled to choose not only the regime but also the social system under which it wants to live. On 5th March 1960, speaking at the Sports Palace in Moscow, he expressed himself in favor of the Pathans, a people who live in the region of the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan; in well-phrased words he said that they, the Pathans, must be given the right of self-determination in freedom.

The Problem of Berlin. I now turn to the question of Berlin. Naturally, the question of what is to become of Berlin is a matter of life and death for these gallant people who for nearly 15 years have endured, as on a island of freedom, within a sea of slavery. The three western occupation powers occupied Berlin during the war. Consequently, they have a right which is not by any means derived from any treaty concluded with the Soviet Union; rather this right is based on the principles of international law, it is a right per se,-a so-called original right of which no one - I repeat, no one - can deprive them. It is a right which only they themselves can renounce. The relationship between free Berlin and these occupation powers over the years has developed in a most satisfactory manner. The Western occupation powers, and especially the United States, have directed their particular care to free Berlin, and in the course of the years have stated time and again that they would support Berlin and champion its freedom.

Suddenly on 27th November 1928, Khrushchev - without any obvious reason and without any justification - demanded a modification of the legal status of Berlin. I declare emphatically that the Soviet Union does not have the least right to put forward such a demand, and, in particular, I should like to state emphatically that the people in West Berlin do not desire any change in the present status of Berlin as long as the present desolate condition continues in which Cermanyfinds itself as a result of her partition. I recommend to

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Mar. (Cont.) I recommend to the Western powers, who advocate the right of self-determination, that a plebiscite be held in Berlin even before the summit conference. The question to be voted on must be phrased quite simply, perhaps somewhat like this: Do you want or do you not want, the present legal status of Berlin to continue until reunification? Naturally, one can argue with the exact phraseology. It should also be discussed with the Berlin Senate, But I believe that the three Western powers would have an even stronger position at the summit conference - over and above their original right - if they could point once more to the freely expressed will of the Berlin population, which was expressed so clearly and unambiguously in all preceding elections. The question as to whether or not the legal status of Berlin should be modified is a matter of the utmost importance also for the three Western powers. It is my conviction that they would suffer an enormous loss of confidence throughout the world if they were loss of confidence throughout the total to surrender their pledge concerning Berlin - so often repeated - by yielding to Khrushchev's demands. I would ask you to put yourself in the position of other nations throughout the world, not only in Europe, if something like that should happen - if this great and mighty land of yours would change its previously held point of view regarding Berlin in response to the utterly unfounded claim of the Soviet Union. This cannot be and it shall not be. It is my firm conviction that Khrushchev at the summit meeting will be told this quite unmistakably by all the three Western partners. It is also my firm conviction that Khrushchev, who in my opinion does not want war - will not risk his entire work, the development of the Soviet Union and his Seven-Ver-Plan the Soviet Union and his Seven-Year-Plan.

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The time available for my speech has unfortunately expired and I am now ready to answer your questions. I shall leave Washington calmly and in the conviction that the free nations, if they stand united and firm let me repeat over and over again, these words: united and firm - that the free nations will bring the world controlled disarmament and peace,

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Mar. Comment on Adenauer plebiscite proposal by Willy Brandt

Brandt then summarized his reply to Chancellor's letter (now enroute) which also includes views of Senat and both political parties. Main points as follows: Senat ready to hold a plebiscite in west Berlin if Western powers should desire it. Berliners themselves would be prepared to sponsor plebiscite on their own if it appeared situation required such action.

Mar. (Cont.)

Re technical problem of holding plebiscite in West Berlin on such short notice, special law would have to be adopted but this could be rushed through in about 4 weeks. Proposed text of such law, with question to be posed in plebiscite omitted, has already been drafted.

Brandt said in letter to Chancellor he deplored lack consultation before Adenauer made proposal. Furthermore, difficult to understand need for plebisite without background regarding Chancellor's conversation with President and Secstate. (Brandt told us his impressions were there nothing in Washington talks indicating such a need.)

Brandt's letter further referred to importance of carefully considering theme, time and form of any plebiscite. Impression must be avoided that Germans mistrusted their Allies, nor must plebiscite appear to ask Berliners who their occupiers should be.

As to form, Brandt told Adenauer it should be "formal plebiscite" not "public opinion" poll conducted by political parties. Iatter would have two disadvantages:
(1) would be compared to sort of thing that goes on in a "Peoples' Democracy" (2) it would be impossible to achieve as good results percentage-wise. Under any circumstances it difficult obtain voting participation of 93 percent as in December 1958 elections. A vote under party sponsorship without formal voting lists might result in significantly weaker participation.

Brandt also wrote Chancellor that irrespective of plebiscite before summit, Berliners were planning to use events
of May 1 to register an impact on world opinion. Various
schemes under consideration to augment normal activities,
including participation of representative groups from
public life who might be called upon to show their support for the cause.

Brandt also told Adenauer he assumed Allies at summit would keep their word that no agreements would be made against will of Berliners. This also pointed to conclusion it preferable to have plebiscite, if any, after rather than before summit.

Mar. 22

## Brandt radio broadcast on plebiscite proposal

Mayor Willy Brandt devoted his regular biweekly radio broadcast March 20 almost entirely to Adenauer's discussions in Washington and to Chancellor's plebiscite

Mar. (Cont.) proposal. After stressing that in joint communique President Eisenhower pledged that recognition of right of self-determination must be basis any possible agreement re Berlin and that President in his press conference a day later had made an important reference to the legal basis of Western Allies in Berlin, Brandt made following points re Chancellor's plebiscite proposal:

Chancellor's suggestion that a plebiscite be held before summit conference in order to demonstrate how population of free Berlin thinks is an "improvised and not entirely new but indubitably remarkable suggestion."

It is essential "to think carefully bout the whether and how, the timing, the form and the question itself-above all impression must not be created that we are motivated by lack of confidence in our Western friends."

Technical details could be solved. Brandt agreed with those who in first reactions to Chancellor's suggestion had emphasized that there can never be any doubt as to result of plebiscite, all the more since Berlinpopulation in last elections Dec. 1958 had replied with "almost unsurpassable clarity" to (Soviet) ultimatum. Legal situation in Berlin has not changed since then. "It therefore in a way unnecessary invoke right of selfdetermination at present time because it was invoked Dec. 7, 1958."

Brandt went on to say, "We have recently pointed out that precious elementary right to have a voice in one's own fate" may be demanded byus, if necessary. "We are ready any day to conduct a plebiscite in West Berlin if Western Powers demand it. We would participate with evengreater zeal in a vote in all Berlin provided Four Powers prepared the way. And we reserve the right to take initiative in asking for an expression of the will of the people if there is a proper subject for such a vote. But this is a weighty instrument of policy which should not be blunted needlessly." -mos of betales

Mar. Brandt private comment on plebiscite proposal

Brandt told me he knows of no one who favors the plan besides Adenauer himself. In addition to entire Berlin Senat, he mentioned President Luebke (now visiting Berlin), Chancellor's Berlin representative Vockel, and even Chancellor's "Gray Eminence" Globke as being attockeig atm

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Mar. (Cont.) opposed to plan. Even Fonoff apparently opposed although 24 they have to be very careful what they say. This evident from attitude of Professor Carstens, Foreign Office representative who had accompanied Adenauer to Washington, with whom Brandt had just discussed subject at length.

Brandt then referred to same point he made to me Mar. 21: Difficult position he would be in if there is no plebiscite because of his opposition and if summit decisions leave many Germans unhappy. Adenauer would crucify him. Therefore, Brandt said, after discussing problem at length with his friends he decided go ahead with preparation technical matters that would be necessary for a formal plebiscite so that Adenauer could not later accuse him of having sabotaged idea from beginning. Necessary law to authorize plebiscite already drafted and can be acted on in one day. Preparation election lists and other details which will take about three weeks to complete will be handled by Senator Lipschitz.

Upon Chancellor's return to Cermany, Brandt will meet with him and do his best to talk him out of holding Berlin plebiscite. If not successful, he will suggest some alternatives to plebiscite, Brandt has already given some thought to alternatives and will continue Right now he is thinking seriously but as last resort of suggesting to Chancellor that Berlin Parliament be dissolved and new elections held. This would avoid many pitfalls involved in plebiscite and would be comparable in every respect to December 1958 elections. Brandt cited Carstens as having reminded him world outside of Germany only dimly aware 158 election and its significance; hence new election at this time would demonstrate in timely way allegiance Berliners to Western cause. According to Brandt, one objection to this idea voiced by Lipschitz who doubts widsom playing around with basic system of representative government itself, even though in good cause.

If he does not succeed changing Chancellor's mind, Brandt says he will have to go along but will then remind Chancellor that matter should be taken up with three ambassadors in Bonn as Brandt would not be willing carry out plebiscite if Allies object. Brandt does not see how Adenauer could take exception to this in view many occasions Adenauer himself has referred to Allied-German partnership in Berlin.

Mar. (Cont.)

Ear. (Cont.) I asked Brandt if it did not seem evident that Chancellor's position frankly based on using this method guarantee fulfillment recent pledges received from Fresident Eisenhower. Brandt referred to letter from Chancellor in which Adenauer stated reason for his proposal was "to strengthen Western position at summit." I recalled Brandt's own views that plebiscite might well be taken as sign Germans did not trust their Allies and said I believed there was indeed risk plebiscite idea might boomerang in big way when full significance brought home to British, French and American peoples. Brandt said this was just the point that troubled him.

## Mar. Publication by the U.S. of Allied World War II agree-24 ments on the occupation of Germany

During recent months, it h s been evident that representatives of the East German regime have been endeavoring to implant through various propaganda means the notion that
Berlin is "part of" or "on" the territory of the Zone of occupation allocated to the Soviet Union and hence "part of" or "on" territory of the regime in Eastern Germany.

Since the matter of the nature and definition of the areas of Germany to be occupied by the Allied Powers has thus been made a matter of public issue, there is released herewith a photographic reproduction of the original English and Russian texts of the agreement between the United States, United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. concerning the areas which their respective military forces would occupy in Germany. The Documents make clear that the Berlin area was not "part of" or "on" the territory to be occupied by any of the Powers under the agreement. Rather, the agreement clearly indicates that Berlin was designated as a separate area to be jointly occupied.

The Allied military forces have remained in Berlin without relinquishing the rights derived from the military defeat of Nazi Germany. There is, however, no basis suggesting that Berlin has somehow been mysteriously merged with or placed on the territory of one of the occupation Powers

The Documents and accompanying map were signed in London by John G. Winant for the United States, by Sir William Strang for the United Kingdom, and by F.T. Gousey for the Soviet Union.

(Note: Blanks in paragraphs of the agreement describing two zones and two sectors were filled in with"United

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Kingdom" and "United States of America" on November 14, 1944. On July 26, 1945, the agreement was amended to include the French Republic. The American and British sectors of Berlin and zones in Western Germany were subdivided to provide appropriate areas for French forces. Neither action affected sector or zonal boundaries between Western and Soviet areas.)

## woled heblyong et nottennos PROTOCOL

between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the zones of occupation in Cermany and the administration of "Greater Berlin".

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The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached the following agreement with regard to the execution of Article 11 of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender of Germany:-

- 1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into three zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the three Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the three Powers.
- 2. The boundaries of the three zones and of the Berlin area, and the allocation of the three zones as between the U.S.A., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. will be as I dist deaded follows:-

Eastern Zone (as shewn on the annexed (OSEL INTER THE MAD MAN MAN)

Section of the Section

The territory of Garmany (including the province of East Prussia) situated to the East of a line drawn from the point on Lubeck Bay where the frontiers of Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg meet, along the western frontier of Mecklenburg to the frontier of the province of Hanover, to the frontier of Brunswick; thence along the western frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony to the western frontier of Anhalt; thence along the western frontier of Anhalt; thence along

Mar. (Cont. \*

the western frontier of the Prussian 24 province of Saxony and the western frontier of Thuringia to where the latter meets the Bavarian frontier; thence eastwards along the northern frontier of Bavaria to the 1937 Czechoslovakian frontier, will be occupied by armed forces of the U.S.S.R., with the exception of the Berlin area, for which a special system of occupation is provided below.

North- The territory of Germany situated to the Western west of the line defined above, and Zone bounded on the south by a line drawn from (as shewn the point where the western frontier of on the Thuringia meets the frontier of Bavaria; annexed thence westwards along the southern map "A") frontiers of the Prussian provinces of Hessen-Nassau and Rheinprovinz to where the latter meets the frontier of France hadoson and sold and will be occupied by armed forces of .... 

remercial laneltlinesau le in South-Western annexed a senior only do t map "A")

All the remaining territory of Western Germany situated to the south of the line Zone defined in the description of the North-(as shewn Western Zone will be occupied by armed on the forces of......

The frontiers of States (Länder) and Provinces within Cermany, referred to in the foregoing descriptions of the zones, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree of 25th June, 1941 (published in the Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I No. 72, 3rd July, 1941).

Berlin The Berlin area (by which expression is Area understood the territory of "Greater Berlin" (as shewn as defined by the Law of 27th of April 1920) on the will be jointly occupied by armed forces of t annexed the U.S.A., U.K., and the U.S.S.R., assigned by the respective Commanders-in-Chief. of map "B") For this purpose the territory of "Greater and to reliance of a series Berlin" will be divided into the following nastew edf of yours to somit three parts;and gapla someth theman to related
"gapla someth theman to related to related to related."

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North-Eastern part of "Greater Berlin" (districts of Pankow, Prenzlauerberg, Mitte, Weissensee, Friedrichshain, Lichtenberg, Treptow, Kopenick) will be occupied by the forces of the U.S.S.R.:

North-Western part of Greater Berlin
(districts of Reinickendorf, Wedding,
Tiergarten, Charlottenburg, Spandau,
Wilmersdorf) will be occupied by the
forces of

Southern part of "Greater Berlin (districts of Zehlendorf, Steglitz, Schoneberg, Kreuzberg, Tempelhof, Neukolln) will be occupied by the forces of......

The boundaries of districts within "Greater Berlin", referred to in the foregoing descriptions are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree published on 27th March, 1938 (Amtsblatt der Reichshauptstadt Berlin No. 13 of 27th March, 1938, page 215).

- 3. The occupying forces in each of the three zones into which Germany is divided will be under a Commander-in-Chief designated by the Government of the country whose forces occupy that zone.
- 4. Each of the three Powers may, at its discretion, include among the forces assigned to occupation duties under the command of its Commander-in-Chief, auxiliary contingents from the forces of any other Allied Power which has partipated in military operations against Germany.
- 5. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Komendatura) consisting of three Commandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to directly jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" area.
  - 6. This Protocol has been drawn up in triplicate in the English and Russian languages. Both texts are authentic. the Protocol will come into force on the signature by Germany of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender.

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Mar. (Cont.) 24

The above text of the Protocol between the Government sof the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin" has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 12th September, 1944, with the exception of the allocation of North-Western and South-Western zones of occupation in Germany and the North-Western and Southern parts of "Greater Berlin", which requires further consideration and joint agreement by the Governments of the U.S.A., U.K. and U.S.S.R.

Representative of the Government of the U.S.A. Government of the U.K. on the European Advis- on the European Advisory Commission

Representative of the ory Commission

J. G. Winant (John G. Winant)

W. Strang (William Strang)

Representative of the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the European Advisory Commission

(ED a) State development of F. T. Gousev (F.T. Gousev)

April

## Excerpts from an address by Secretary Herter

Clearly one of the key issues before us is the problem of the division of Germany. Not only does this unnatural division represent a grave injustice to the German people, but-what is equally serious, the continued division of Germany, if not resolved, will inevitably result in jeopardizing the peace of the world.

In recent months Mr. Khrushchev has repeatedly suggested in public statements that if the Western Powers do not agree to settle the German problem on his terms, he may proceed unilaterally to conclude a separate treaty with the East German regime. While he has been careful not to be too precise in his statements on this subject, the repetition of this threat cannot help but complicate the situation and affect adversely the international atmosphere.

Mr. Krushchev has also said recently in reference to Asia that "every people has the right of self-determination." But it is clear from the Soviet record with respect to Germany that Mr. Khrushchev is not prepared to see this principle applied in the case of the 17 million people under Communist control in East Berlin and East Germany

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April (Cont.) The Western Powers, by contrast, through a long series of postwar negotiations, have insisted that the principle of self-determination be honored. More specifically, we believe that reunification should be achieved on the basis of free plebiscites, and that a final peace settlement should be concluded with the German Government formed on the basis of such plebiscites.

> The Berlin question can also be expected to figure prominently in the forthcoming Paris Heads of Government discussions. The division of Berlin is but a reflection of a larger problem of the division of Germany.

In the coming Summit conference the Western Powers are determined to protect the freedom and security of the people of West Berlin. We made this position clear at the Foreign Ministers Conference at Geneva. President Eisenhower reaffirmed it at Camp David. We and our allies agreed as recently as the Heads of Government meeting at Paris in December to continue to stand firm on West Berlin. In thus making sure that the Soviet leaders do not misjudge our firmness, we reduce the chances of rash action which would greatly increase tensions.

While reaffirming our fundamental rights and responsibilities with respect to Berlin, we are sincerely willing to enter into negotiations to solve this problem in the context of the German problem as a whole.

> While I am discussing the German problem I should like to take this opportunity to say a few words about the new Germany -the Federal Republic of Germany. I have noted in recent months many hostile attacks of Soviet origin, some from Mr. Khrushchev himself, labeling the Government of the Federal Republic as "militaristic". These charges are completely without foundation. They are clearly designed not only to discredit Chancellor Adenauer's government but also to sow the seeds of suspicion and disunity among the members of the free world alliance. During the first decade of its existence the Federal Republic, under the constructive leadership of Chancellor Adenauer, has re-established in Germany a democratic order dedicated to the principles of freedom and justice. Within the framework of such arrangements as the Europe Community and NATO, both of which have received unstinting German support, the Federal

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Republic has effectively contributed to the development of political and economic stability in Western Europe and to the maintenance of free world security. It has proved itself in every way a worthy and respected ally.

April

E of Brief a rugnementities

Text of Berlin Senate report on plebiscite proposal: (Official Use Following is translation Senat report re plebiscite Only) which being forwarded to Chancellor today.

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(Text) In its session Apr 6 in presence acting Pres. House of Representatives and Representatives both Parliamentary delegations, Senat took cognizance of report concerning conversation held in Bonn Apr 5 between the Mayors and members of FedGov regarding political situation before summit conference and questions arising for Berlin out of this situation.

Senat has determined its full agreement with FedGov re demands: (1) to maintain primary rights of Western Powers in Berlin until reunification; (2) to preserve and strengthen existing ties between Berlin and FedRep.

Furthermore, there exists complete agreement with FedGov that right of self-determination must be applied to Berlin also.

Senat reiterates its conviction that there will be no agreement on Berlin which ignores right of self-determination of population concerned. Senat has noted with satisfaction statements by Western statesmen reaffirming this right of Berlin population. With sincere satisfaction it welcomes declaration repeated by US President which confirmed once again, in communique Mar 16, 1960, that right of self-determination shall be basis for any future agreement regarding Berlin.

Senat expresses its gratitude to Fed Chancellor for having presented so resolutely and successfully the joint position on Berlin on repeated occasions including recent trip.

In election Dec. 7, 1958, Senat received convincing vote of confidence. With 92.9 percent of electorate participating, only 1.9 percent of voters supported

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April (Cont.)

candidates representing the then current Sov proposals. This is still valid today.

Senat repeates, nevertheless, that it reserves right to call on people of Berlin for a plebiscite at appropriate time.

In particular, Senat is ready for a plebiscite even prior to summit conference, should FedGov, in accord with three Western Powers, desire it.

Timing and form of question will depend on future developments. Senat has made necessary technical preparations to be able to hold plebiscite at a time to be agreed on. In this context Senat decided today to submit immediately a draft law to House of Representatives.

Senat has confidence in FedGov, which is charged with representing Berlin in sphere of international law and foreign policy, as well as in assurances three Western Powers which bear special responsibility for Berlin.

April 20 (Unclassified)

### Excerpts from speech by Under Secretary Douglas Dillon:

Problem of Germany, including Berlin: The central issue confronting the Soviet Union and the Western nations at the summit is the problem of Germany, including Berlin. No issue on earth today is more critical. It involves the immediate fate of 2 1/4 million West Berliners and the ultimate destiny of about 70 million Germans. It bears directly upon the future stability of Central Europe and the possibility of a lasting European peace. It represents a critical test of the integrity and dependability of the free world's collecting security systems, because no nation could preserve its faith in collective security if we permitted the courageous people of West Berlin to be sold into slavery. It also represents a critical test of Soviet good faith in all areas of negotiation. For the goals of disarmament and the general improvement of East-West relations have no prospect of attainment if we find that the Soviet rulers or their East German puppets are prepared to use force or the threat of force in an attempt to isolate and subjugate West Berlin. Finally, we must recognize that the issue of Germany and Berlin, if it cannot be resolved through negotiation, may involve the gravest of all issues: the issue of peace or war.

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In the long run the problem of Germany and Berlin can only be solved through Cerman reunification. This the Soviets have so far rejected, fearing to put their rule in East Germany to the test of a free vote. But we cannot abandon our goal or abate our efforts toward its achievement, because we know that a divided Germany will remain a powder keg so long as the division persists. Meanwhile we are willing to consider interim arrangements to reduce tensions in Berlin and lessen present dangers. But we are determined to maintain our presence in Berlin and to preserve its ties with the Federal Republic. We will mt accept any arrangement which might become a first step toward the abandonment of West Berlin or the extinguishing of freedom in that part of Germany which is/free, peaceful, and democratic member of the world community.

Soviet view in Berlin: It would be highly optimistic to pretend that prospects of an early agreement are bright. Mr. Khrushchev has had a great deal to say recently which bears upon Berlin and Germany, and his words leave the inescapable impression that the Soviet view of Berlin is far removed from the facts. Let us examine some of his comments.

He begins with the assertion that West Berlin lies "on the territory" of the so-called German Democratic Republic. This is not only false; it is contrary to the pledgedword of the Soviet Government. While it is true that the Soviet-occupied portion of Germany surrounds Berlin, it is equally true that Berlin was given separate status under the occupation agreement, which the Soviets themselves formulated, together with the British and ourselves.

Moreover, the so-called German Democratic Republic is one of the outstanding myths in a vast Communist web of prodigious mythology. Its puppet rulers are totally under the control of Moscow. Despite tireless efforts to build a local Communist apparatus in East Germany, it is doubtful that these rulers could remain in power for a single day without the support of Soviet bayonets. The East German regime is not recognized as a government by any non-Communist nation. Both legally and as a matter of geographic fact, West Berlin is entirely independent of the so-called German Democratic Republic - and it will remain so.

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April (Cont.)

Mr. Khrushchev continues to insist that Western forces leave West Berlin and that it be declared a "free city." He ignores the fact that West Berlin is already a free city - the lone island of freedom within the boundaries of the sprawling Communist empire. When he speaks of making West Berlin a "free city," his meaning is only too clear: He desires West Berlin to be free from protection, free from security, free from its commercial and cultural ties with West Germany - and cut off from freedom itself.

Mr. Khrushchev has also complained that the situation in Berlin is "abnormal." With this contention we can wholeheartedly agree. It is indeed abnormal when I million East Berliners are forcibly divided from more than 2 million fellow citizens in West Berlin, when they are constrained to live under a totalitarian regime unlawfully imposed by a foreign power, and when even family units are divided by an arbitrary boundary imposed in the name of a foreign ideology.

But the abnormal situation in Berlin is merely one facet of the greater abnormality created by the artificial separation of the East Zone from the remainder of Germany. The monstrous nature of this abnormality has been strikingly demonstrated by the fact that more than 2 1/3 million East Germans and East Berliners have, during the last 10 years, exercised the only franchise available to them and have voted with their feet against Communist rule by fleeing to West Berlin and the Federal Republic.

The abnormality of which Mr. Khrushchev speaks can be cured only by permitting the whole German nation to decide its own way of life. The only practical way in which they can exercise this right is through free elections.

Mr. Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen have often proclaimed their devotion to the principle of self-determination. This pretense is exposed as an empty gesture when they refuse to apply that principle to Berlin and Germany.

Mr. Khrushchev has also argued that we must move rapidly to liquidate the "leftovers" of the Second World War, among which he includes what he describes as the "occupation" of West Berlin by Americans, British and French forces. We are even more anxious than Mr. Khrushchev to liquidate the leftovers of World War II. But Mr. Khrushchev must recognize that these leftovers are mather numerous:

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April (Cont.)

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Is the Soviet Union prepared to remove its forces from East Germany and the Eastern European countries on which they are imposed?

Is it willing to grant self-determination to the East-Germans and to permit the peoples of the Soviet-dominated states in Eastern Europe to choose their own destiny?

Is it willing to abandon the fiction of a separate north Korea and to permit the entire Korean people to reunite under free elections supervised by the United Nations?

ar mao ew dolinejad Is it at last willing to cease obstructing the operation of the United Nations Charter - to which the Soviet Union pledged itself in San Francisco and whose application it has consistently frustrated by a series of vetoes in the Security Council? Se they many but

The United States and its Western allies would be happy indeed to see these leftovers of World War II liquidated. But we are not prepared to begin this process by permiting the isolation and engulfment of West Berlin.

We have repeatedly informed Mr. Khrushchev that we will ty has been ... not negotiate under duress. Yet in his recent statements about his intentions to sign a separate peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic unless an East-West agreement is reached on Berlin, he is skating on very thin ice. We are approaching the summit with every intention of seeking a mutually acceptable solution of the German problem, including Berlin, of seeking just settlements of other international differences, and of exploring ways to improve relations between the Western World and the Soviet bloc. Our positions are flexible, and we are willing to explore every reasonable avenue that may lead to agreement. But Mr. Khrushchev and his associates will be profoundly disillusioned if they assume that we will bow to threats or that we will accept their distorted piture of the German problem as a factual premise upon which to negotiate.

No nrganization has stood more firmly or been more helpful in the fight for the freedom of Berlin and all Germany than the AFL-CIO. It was in recognition of this fact that your president last December 7th received a high decoration from Chancellor Adenauer.

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April (Cont.)

As a Government, we are proud to associate ourselves with Mr. (George) Meany's statement on that occasion:

"Neither the freedom of West Berlin, nor the freedom of the 50 million people of West Germany, can be objects of international bargaining."

April 20 (Confidential)

Summary by US Mission Berlin of West Berlin and Soviet Zone morale: Following summarizes Mission appraisal of attitudes Sovzone regime and population as they have evolved in period between Fon Ministers' talks last year and forthcoming summit meeting.

Prior to Fonmin talks last year, East German leaders developed an intensive political mobilization campaign inside Sovzone during which they revealed expectations of significant and concrete gains from those talks. Cessation those talks without agreement, Khrushchev visit to us and his clear retention of tight control over both policy and policy pronouncement had local effect of pushing GDR into pose of patience and reasonableness vis-a-vis Western Powers. On the other hand, pre-summit period has brought important measure of success to GDR efforts to project Berlin and German problems onto world stage, to undermine world status of Fedrep and to enhance status GDR. Although GDR leaders now indicate they do not anticipate early incorporation of West Berlin into GDR, they seem fairly confident summit talks will result in some kind of new agreement on West Berlin and will set in motion a series of negotiations inevitably lead to decline of western position in Berlin and Germany.

Although timetable on Berlin desired by SED regime has been slowed down, SED party morale is at high level as a result growing self-confidence with context of bloc claims that international developments are turning in favor of Communism. Also regime successes in such programs as forced collectivization of agriculture have boosted morale of Communist cadres in East Germany. In contrast, morale of East German population has been falling steadily since Fonmin talks. Almost without exception, sources including refugees report widespread resignation to seeming permanence of Communist control. Although basic feeling of resignation is accompanied by a deep bitterness and hostility towards Ulbricht

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April (Cont.)

regime, prevailing opinion among Sovzone inhabitants seems to be their situation is hopeless. Net result is apathy, accompanied by apprehension concerning Western firmness and intentions in summit talks. There is real apprehension that West Berlin, and western world through West Berlin, may become inaccessible.

Prevailing mood East Germans perhaps best illustrated in following statement contained in anonymous letter Mission just received from Sovzone resident. "We Germans in Sovzone regard coming summit conference with little hope but with great anxiety." many feel entied to

April (Unclassified) Excerpts from speech by Assistant Secretary Andrew Berding:

The Question of Germany, including Berlin: As the Western leaders approach the summit they face a similar problem of finding common understanding on the subject of Germany, including Berlin.

The Soviets say they are in favor of a peaceloving, democratic, independent and unified Germany. Mr. Khrushchev has proclaimed the principle of self-determination for all peoples. Under these circumstances, and interpreting Soviet statements by the standards of free societies, the solution of the problem of a divided Germany would appear simple enough. By applying the principle of self-determination, the German people, in both Eastern and Western Germany, could be given an opportunity to express through free elections their desires on reunification. vestiers position is Berlin end

Experience has seeun, however, that by Soviet definition only countries governed by Communist regimes subservient to Moscow can be 'peace-loving, democratic and independent." But we know that the Communist regime in Fast Germany was imposed by the Soviets. It has never dared face the people it rules in free, secret elections. doue di socceous

When the Soviet leaders utter lofty aims respecting German's future, they are in fact demanding the continued subjugation of the 17 million people of East Germany. What is more, they are seeking to have the same system extended to the free people of the independent and truly democratic Federal Republic of Germany, the partner of the Western community.

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April (Cont.)

With such an approach it is perhaps small wonder that the Soviets persistently reject the very basis on which the West believes German freedom and unity must be founded - free elections. For they know that if the people of Eastern Germany could express themselves freely and without fear of retaliation, they would overwhelmingly vote to rid themselves of the Communist dictatorship that oppresses them.

From this fear of the free expression of the popular will stems the Soviet position that the only way in which progress can be made toward Germany unity is through negotiations on an equal basis between the puppet government they have set up in Eastern Germany and the freely elected Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. They have no intention, of course, of permitting the East German regime, which is under their control, to enter into arrangements that might endanger that control. A meeting such as they propose would be, in fact, not between the two parts of Germany but between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union.

The Western Powers say that the four major powers with treaty responsibilities in Germany - that is, France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the United States - are responsible for the reunification of Germany on the basis of free elections. That was agreed to in the summit conference in 1955.

The Soviets, however, seek to obtain a propaganda gain now by saying, no, the responsibility for the reunification of Germany is solely that of the German people themselves. But when we ask them what they mean by the German people they say, the Governments of East and West Germany. Their proposal for Germans "to sit around one table" is merely intended to obtain prestige and recognition for their East German puppets, who in turn would be emboldened by such recognition to frustrate even more the will of the Germans under their control. While professing to favor reunification, the Soviets perpetuate partition.

The United States will continue to press at the summit and elsewhere for the reunification of Germany. This is a fundamental American policy, and it is likewise the policy of our allies. We believe that the division of Germany is a cruel injustice to the German people and a continuing threat to peace in Europe.

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The prodlem is how to convince the Soviet leaders - who may believe that a divided Germany is essential for their national security - that the reunification of Germany could be an essential element of a working and durable European security system which, in turn, would be an effective guarantee of the Soviet Union's national security.

The problem of a divided Berlin is part of the problem of a divided Germany. Reunification of Germany is the only method for a lasting solution for Berlin. The President and Chairman Khrushchev agreed last September at Camp David "that negotiations should be resumed on Berlin, and we are indeed prepared to negotiate. But any agreement reached as to West Berlin must preserve the freedom of its 2 1/4 million people and their right of self-determination.

As we approach the summit the Soviets have tried to use Germany as a means of dividing the allies. Many hostile attacks have come from Chairman Khrushchev and other Soviet sources accusing the Federal Republic of Germany of being militaristic and seeking to stir up old enmities between Germany and other countries. These attempts have failed. The community of views and interests between Germany and the three Western Powers which will participate in the summit was again manifested at the Western foreign ministers conference in Washington last week. As the Western leaders discuss with Mr. Khrushchev the problem of a divided Germany, the United States is convinced that the Federal Republic of Germany, under the dedicated leadership of Chancellor Adenauer, has proven itself in every way a reliable ally and friend.

April Lipschitz speech re SED plebiscite proposel: (Excerpts) Joachim Lipschitz, the Berlin senator of the interior, today demanded a democratic referendum in all of Germany on the reunification proposals of the Soviet Zone, the Federal Republic, and West Berlin. Lipschitz said in a to broadcast that if SED Secretary Walter Ulbricht wanted a general rehearsal he should first make possible a referendum in all Berlin, for instance, on the question of whether the Berliners prefer the latest proposals of Ulbricht contained in his letter to the West German workers or the five points of Burgomaster Brandt on the Berlin and German question. Ada e Igneg nar jeu juli

> About the new Germany plan of the SED, Lipzchitz said that the lies and arrogance this document contained do not make it interesting. However, it is noteworthy that

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April (Cont.)

Ulbricht can no longer ignore the two demands which the free world made its own in solidarity with Berlin: Reunification and the right of self-determination. These two demands were missing for years in communist statements and pronouncements.

April 24 Ollenhauer analysis of unification prospects: (Excerpts) Addressing 1,300 delegates and guests of the Eastern Westphalia-Lippe SPD Congress today, SPD Chairman Erich Ollenhauer called on Chancellor Adenauer to at long last submit independent proposals on the German question to the big powers. "As far as it is humanly possible to judge, we will make progress in the question of reunification only if the four big powers and the Federal Republic are prepared to talk seriously about the international military status of reunited Germany," he said.

There will be no lasting security and peace in the world if the division in the heart of Europe continues. A continuing division of Germany might lead to an international catastrophe "tomorrow." As an example of these dangers, Ollen hauer mentioned the renewed unspeakably brutal method used by the SED rulers against the peasants in the Soviet zone.

In the discussion, Ollenhauer firmly rejected charges from the SPD rank and file that the SPD has abandoned its plan for Germany. The core of the plan—the incorporation of Germany as a unit in a new European order—continues to be fully valid, he pointed out. Today, unfortunately, the prospects of even a gradual rapprochement between the two parts of Germany are worse than when the plan was adopted. "We would be bad politicians if we did not adjust ourselves accordingly."

April
26
(Official Use
Only)

### Brandt letter to Herter

His Excellency Christian A. Herter Secretary of State Washington 25, D.C., USA

Dear Mr. Secretary:

If I write to you today shortly before the beginning of the summit conference in Paris, I do so first of all in order to thank you again for the decided rejection by the American Covernment and the American people of the claims made

April (Cont.) by the Soviet Union in regard to Berlin and presented in the form of an ultimatum. To this attitude of the United States, it already took up during the blockade of Berlin, we c'e that our freedom was maintained.

Only by means of your generous assistance granted to Berlin during the past years and by the protection you have afforded to this city it was, and still is possible to do the reconstruction work of which you got an idea in the summer of the past year and which to a great extent represents a German American team-work.

We are wellare that your assistance of the capital was granted to a people, whose fault essentially contributed to the situation which today is the subject of interpretional disputes. But we have beneatly been en deavoring to put our life on a new basis. international disputes. But we have honestly been en-

Please allow me to submit to you again in brief before the summit conference our opinion of the questions conthe summit conference our opinion of the questions con-cerned. When doing so, I feel sure that we agree in regard to the most essential items. Berlin hopes that at the summit conference in Paris and on the occasion of further conferences of the responsible statesmen of the major powers the international problems will be brought closer to a solution in order to come to a relaxation of the tension prevaling in the world.

I trust, however, you will understand that I resist tenaciously the obvious aim of the Soviet policy to enforce a special solution for Berlin without preparing the way for the real possibilities of a solution of the German question and the more essential international 101 10 na problems. As long as the Soviet Union denies the Ger-status of Berlin must remain unchanged, since only in this way the two and a quarter million people of West Berlin are guaranteed the maintenance of their freedom. Should the Soviet Union enforce the continuation of the mill ordivision of Germany, a change for the worse of the status of Berlin in accordance with the Soviet demands would lead to new additional conflicts in Germany and Europe.

We agree with you that a final settlement of the Berlin question is only possible in connection with the German question, with which it is inextricably entangled. We should, therefore, be pleased if the German people for the purpose of the realization of this aim would be given the opportunity to make use of its national right to self-determination. 1 400 DUA 1

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April (Cont.)

We feel sure that a false decision of the West in the Berlinquestion would have disastrous effects. It would not only affect the people of Berlin and the people of the Soviet occupied zone of Germany. It would also entail a shifting of the power in Europe in faver of the Soviet Union securing for the latter a strong initial position for a future settlement concerning the whole of Germany. In addition to this a success of the Soviet Union in the Berlin question would be prejudicial to the whole western policy.

In the event of an interim agreement on Berlin being seriously discussed at the summit conference, two basic prerequisites should in our opinion be observed at any rate:

- 1. The original occupation right of the three Western Powers and the supreme responsibility resulting therefrom must continue in force, as only in this way a dangerous weakening of general western interestswill be avoided and the personal freedom of the people of Berlin and the maintenance of their democratic rights is secured.
- 2. Within the framework of the supreme authority of the three Western Powers the close linking West Berlin has achieved during the past twelve years by the integration in the legal and financial system of the Federal Republic and its belonging to the currency and economic area of West Germany must continue.

These two prerequisites are the keystones of our life in freedom. From these prerequisites also results the right to the unhampered traffic routes between Berlin and the Federal Republic. As regards this item, it would, however, be advisable to conclude additional agreements for safeguarding the surface traffic, and the traffic by sea and by air to do away with obscurities and to remove difficulties. Moreover, nothing should be done by which this city is divested of its function to be meeting place of the people from both parts of Germany.

On the occasion of his address to the Berlin House of Representatives on 11 January 1960 Federal Chancellor Dr. Adenauer has expressly associated himself with this opinion of the Berlin Senate regarding the Berlin question as summed up above in a few items. I may assure you that the people of Berlin place unswerving confidence in the Government of the United States and the American people.

April (Cont.)

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Next week Senator Dr. Paul Hertz will stay a few days in Washington and - I hope - meet you when you are back from Istanbul. He will gladly be at the disposal of your staff for a discussion of the questions we both have at heart.

April 26 (Official Use Only)

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Berlin Senate declaration regarding Khrushchev's Baku speech: (Text) Premier Khrushchev has raised the demand, albeit in unusual form, that all-German question should be negotiated at the Summit Conference. The Berlin Senat would welcome an agreement, resulting from the Summit, to initiate negotiations on this subject at the appropriate level.

It is obvious from the distinction made by the Soviet Premier between the conclusion of a peace treaty and reunification that he is concerned with a peace treaty with both parts of Germany. The German side, on the other hand, continues to demand a peace treaty with all of Germany. Khrushchev's view that reunification is a matter for the Germans themselves is not rendered more acceptable by repetition. As to Khrus her's additional point that the Germans did not commission the victorious powers to concern themselves with German internal affairs, it must be emphasized that neither did the Germans commission the victorious powers to establish multiple national states in Germany. While the German people have had to resign themselves to the fact of occupation as a result of the war, they have an inalienable claim to the reunification of their nation.

The Premier's declaration that the conclusion of a peace treaty lies entirely within the competence of the victorious powers may be interpreted to mean that he intends to impose on Germany of dictated peace. One cannot denounce existing responsibilities of the four powers while at the same time denying to the German people their right to self-determination.

The Soviet Premier errs in his assumption that Berlin lies on the territory controlled by the authorities of East Zone. The unequivocally worded agreements prove that Berlin enjoys a special status, the unquestionable validity of which continues up to the present time. The barely concealed threats of a new strangulation cannot intimidate Berlin. The Governing Mayor will make an appropriate reply on May 1.

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April (Cont.)

The Summit partners of the Soviet Union will state their own views regarding the measures with which the Soviet Union has threatened them. The Soviet Union cannot expect to achieve results in settling the important and urgent questions of disarmament and detente by increasing tension in Perlin and abusing the rights of others through violation of agreements.

The very magnitude of Khrushchev's threats furnished proof that the problem of Berlin cannot be solved in isolation.

April 27

Eisenhower reiterates US position on Berlin: Q. Mr. President, if Mr. Khrushchev at the Summit conference raises a very heavy pressure for his demands on Berlin, and in effect creates a crisis, would you regard such a development as blocking your hopes for an easing of tensions and for some agreement in the field of disarmament?

THE PRESIDENT: I reported to you people that Mr. Khrushchev said that he was going to raise this question, - he was going to try to argue it, but that he was not putting any time limit upon this accomplishment.

Now, I think that certainly at that moment he meant it.

He knows that there are certain events coming around in
the world. There are elections here and abroad and
every place else; possibly he wants to see what's going
to happen. I don't know.

For example, there is a German election in which he is unquestionably interested. And he is probably hoping for some closer relations between West Germany and some of the border states, particularly like Poland. So there are other developments that he could expect or would hope to come about that would help him to solve his problems from his viewpoint. But I think that is the reason that he sees there is no reason for putting down an ultimatum at this moment because otherwise you just run into an immovable oject and an irresistible force and there you are. And of course that would have a very great effect on the hopes that we have.

Q. Sir, I believe in listing your hopes and prospects for the Summit you did not mention any settlement on Berlin or Germany. May we conclude from that and your answer just given that you do not have much—, see much chance of any agreement there on that subject?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think our position has been so clearly stated in speeches over the years, -just

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recently one by the Vice President, one by Secretary Dillon, one by the Secretary of State. The point is that we are not going to give up the juridical position that we have.

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Now, it doesn't seem feasible or possible to me that any agreement should now be reached that would settle--, could now be reached that would settle this whole mean that some kind of progress can be made the side thing. That we have to remember, but that does not issue or side effect of which could be the making a better approach toward Berlin in the month to come.

April 30

Adenauer article in Federal Bulletin on Soviet threat: In article entitled "Under Threat from East" published Federal Bulletin April 30, widently released with eye forthcoming Summit, Chancellor Adenauer emphasizes greatest danger Germany comes, and will continue to come, from Soviet Union. According Chancellor, really makes little difference whether Soviet offensive represents continuation Russian imperialism or extension revolution. Fact of matter is Soviet Union seeking expand power in Europe and in process attempting destroy confidence Western population in ability West withstand Soviet offensive; ergo, Soviet action against Berlin.

German policy since 1949, Chanceller explains, has taken full cognizance Eastern threat and has set as its two principal goals "safeguarding freedom for millions of people in free portion of Germany and regaining freedom for millions who, since 1945, have had to live under alien Soviet Russian rule".

First goal, Chancellor insists, has been achieved. Germany has found firm friends and allies among those states whose friendship Hitler's gangster policies alienated -USA, Great Britain, and France. As long as FedRep loyally fulfills its obligations as ally, it can be certain of Western protection against threats from East. This policy, in fact, will insure freedom for Berlin; for not only former occupation powers but also all of NATO have guaranteed Berlin's freedom. Given these factors, Chancellor certain "Allies, during forthcoming negotiations with Khrushchev, will do everything possible to implement guarantees which assured Berliners freedom,"

As far as continued Soviet occupation Soviet zone concerned, Chancellor says "it painful for us that regaining of freedom for friends and relatives on other side zonal frontier not yet achieved". However, responsibility oe need and hold toog we add to Lieu Madicart and dent greet and secret/NOFORN

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April (Cont)

for this situation rests solely with Soviet Union, for it they alone who have "denied our people right self-determination, and this only obstacle which blocks German reunification".

Replying opposition criticism, Chancellor denies there really approaches reunification other than those he and his Government have tried. "Since 1945 Soviet Union has constantly refused permit German people decide way of life. We have proposed free elections. Moscow rejected them. Now in America all-German referundum being considered. But, even before it formally tabled, Khrushchev has stated he opposed. Soviet Union will not be able deny Germans right self-determination so long as we take firm and united stand...Face of Asia and Africa has changed as result full exercise right self-determination. This bound happen in Central Europe. Even Soviet Union unable prevent such development."

If Soviets really fear course of reunified Germany, Chancellor claims, just as in past, Germans now ready provide any reasonable security guarantees so long as these would not result in undermining German security. Germans, he added, in fact ready consider "other concessions", too, but such concessions from German side of little practical value so long as Soviets insist upon forcefully enslaving 17 million Germans.

As for future Western strategy, Chanceller says Khrushchev must be made realize regardless of what he does
he will not be able, either in short or long run, break
up alliance free Western states. For, once Soviets
realize they cannot push forward further into Western
Europe, they might have second thoughts about continuing hold Eastern part of Germany.

Contrary popular opinion, Chanceller insists, he feels reunification closer than generally admitted. "Course of history", he says, "has always had its surprises, and even in Soviet Union much is changing." Unlike Stalin, Chancellor points out, Khrushchev must take popular feeling into consideration. As result, he has promised better life andhe must carry out promise. This does not mean shift from Communism, but it does mean Communism is being forced change its outward appearance. One day even Moscow hierarchy will realize it better to let every people find its own way and, once this happens, second goal FedRep policy will have been achieved—reunification Germany is freedom."

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Papers on Germany and Berlin prepared for or during Meeting of Chiefs of State and Heads of Government in Paris

Proposal for Reunification of Berlin (Approved by Western Foreign Ministers May 1, 1960 as part of report of Working Group on Germany including Berlin)

On May 26, 1959, at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the Secretary of State of the United States outlined a procedure under which Berlin might be reunified. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States consider that a genuine solution of the Berlin problem is possible only as a part of a settlement of the German question in its broader aspects. They believe that an attempt might be made to create more normal relationships between the two parts of Berlin as a first step towards the reunification of Germany which remains their ultimate goal.

> France, the United Kingdom, and the United States propose that a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, their deputies or other appropriate representatives of the Four Powers, assisted by German experts, be convened after the end of the meeting of the Heads of Government to discuss the possibility of concluding an agreement along the following lines.

France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, in the interests of creating a more normal situation in Berlin, of maintaining the integrity of Berlin and of preparing Berlin for its functions as the future capital of a reunited Germany, have agreed that: injanco duoda i

- 1. Pending the reunification of Germany and as a first step towards that goal, Greater Berlin shall be governed and administered as one indivisible area,
- 2. The people of Berlin shall enjoy the maximum selfgovernment compatible with the continuing rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers with respect to Berlin and to Germany as a whole and with the terms of this proposal.

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May (Cont.)

- be held 60 days after the conclusion of this agreement and pursuant to the following provisions:
- a. The Constitutional Council shall consist of 100 members elected by universal, free, secret and direct ballot.
- b. Greater Berlin shall emsist of one electoral district in which elections would be conducted according to the principle of proportional representation.
  - c. Nomination lists shall be submitted by political parties which participated in the last municipal elections in either West or East Berlin.
  - d. All German citizens who on the day of election had passed their twentieth birthday and had had their domicile in Berlin for a minimum period of six months shall have the right to vote.
    - e. All persons having the right to vote and having passed their twentyfifth birthday on the day of election may stand for election.
  - f. Appropriate measures shall be agreed to insure freedom of elections.
  - g. The Constitutional Council, which shall assemble one week after the election, would draft, within 60 days, a Constitution for Greater Berlin and an electoral law. The draft Constitution and the electoral law shall be submitted for approval of the people of Berlin in a plebiscite, safeguarded in the same manner as agreed under paragraph f, to be held within 30 days after completion of the drafting of the Constitution and the electoral law. The Constitution and the electoral law shall come into effect if approved by a majority of those voting.
- to The Government of Berlin shall be free to negotiate its own administrative, economic, fiscal, and judical relationships with the other parts of Germany and may charge any other part of Germany with its international representation. Pending German reunification, Berlin may not be incorporated into any other part of Germany.

May (Cont.

- 5. Legislation and administrative actions of the Government of Berlin may be suspended or cancelled only by unanimous decision of the Four Powers.
- 6. No person shall be prosecuted or punished by reason of his previous political activities.
- 7. The existing legal situation in Berlin shall remain in force until changed by law.
  - 8. The Four Powers shall ensure free and unrestricted access between Berlin and the other parts of Germany for all persons, goods and communications by land, water and air.
  - 9. The freedom and integrity of Berlin and access thereto shall be guaranteed by the Four Powers, who will continue to be entitled, as at present, to station troops in Berlin.

Meeting of Chiefs of State and Heads of Government
Paris, May 1960

# INTERIM ARRANGEMENT FOR BERLIN

(Western Proposal of July 28, 1959 with Revisions Approved by Western Foreign Ministers May 14, 1960)

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The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have examined the question of Berlin in the desire to find mutually satisfactory solutions to the problems which have been raised and which derive essentially from the division of Berlin and of Germany. They agreed that the best solution for those problems would be the reunification of Germany with the consequent re-establishment of Berlin as its capital. They recognize, however, that meanwhile the existing situation and the agreements at present in force can be modified in certain respects and have consequently agreed upon the following:

(a) The Soviet Foreign Minister has made known the decision of the Soviet Government no longer to maintain forces in Berlin.

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States declare that it is the intention

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May (Cont.) cf their Governments to limit the combined total of their forces in Berlin to the present figure (approximately 11,000), The three Ministers further declare that their Governments will from time to time discuss the possibility of reducing such forces if developments · mort miter permit.

- (b) The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States further declare that it is the intention of their Governments to continue not to locate atomic weapons or missile installations in West Berlin.
- (c) Free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air shall be guaranteed for all persons, goods and communications, including those of the forces of the Western Powers stationed in Berlin. The procedures in effect in April 1960 shall be improved with a view to facilitating communications. Freedom of movement will likewise be guaranteed between East and West Berlin. All disputes which might arise with respect to access will be raised and settled between the Four Governments. The latter will stablish a Quadripartite Commission which will meet in Berlin to examine in the first instance any difficulties arising in connection with access and will seek to settle such difficulties. The Commission may make arrangements, if necessary, to consult German experts.
- (d) Measures will be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties, to avoid activities in or with respect to Berlin which might either disturb public order or seriously affect existing rights. The Secretary General of the United Nations will be requested to provide representative, supported by adequate staff, to be established in Berlin, with free access to all parts of the city for the purpose of reporting to the Secretary General any activities which appear to be in conflict with the foregoing principles. The Four Governments will consult with the Secretary Ceneral in order to determine the appropriate action to be taken in respect to any such action.
- (e) The arrangements specified in sub-paragraphs (a) through (d) above can in the absence of reunification be reviewed at any time after five years by the Foreign Ministers Conference as now constituted, if such review is requested by any of the Four Governments.

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The rights of the Four Powers in and relating to Berlin and access thereto shall remain unaffected by the conclusion of eventual modification or termination of this agreement/\*

(f) All parties to this agreement shall refrain from any act prejudicial to the execution of the terms of the agreement.

\*Foreign Secretary Lloyd suggested, and Foreign Minister von Brentano concurred, that this sentence might be omitted if there were a real possibility of negotiation.

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### WESTERN CRITIQUE OF NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS ON BERLIN TO BE PUT FORWARD IF SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION (U.S. TEXT) \*\*

- 1. The Soviets are, in fact, proposing a solution of the Cerman problem along standard Soviet lines. Under the guise of offering a Berlin solution, they are attempting to achieve at the end of the stipulated period of two years their major objectives in Germany which are currently the subject of dispute between the Soviet Union and the Three Western Powers. In this respect, the new Soviet proposals are even more unsatisfactory than those made by Foreign Minister Gromyko last summer in Geneva.
- 2. To accept the Soviet proposal would mean that the Allies have resigned themselves to the abolition of all their rights within the former capital, to leaving the city and to abandoning the population of free Berlin. At the 1959 Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, an essential issue was the position of the Western Powers in Berlin at the expiration of the time period specified for the arrangements on Berlin which was under discussion. The Western Poers maintained that, while/existing situation and the arrangements at present in force could be modified in certain respects in any such arrangements, the existing situation and such agreements would be basically unchanged at the end of this time period.

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<sup>\*\*</sup>The substance of this paper was agreed with the British,
French, and Germans on May 15, 1960 and copies were given
to them later. \*\*The substance of this paper was agreed with the British, a contract of the second of the

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The new Soviet proposals provide that, at the end of the temporary agreement which is to last for two years, the Western Powers will be committed to negotiate a statute for a "free city" of West Berlin, as well as to sign a peace treaty with both of the two German states, or at least with one of them if this seems preferable. The objectives of the temporary agreement, as stated by the Soviets, would be:

To prepare conditions for the ultimate transformation of West Berlin into a "free city," thus establishing a new separate German state which would remain devoid of the direct protection of Western armed forces;

The acceptance of the illegal regime of the socalled GDR as having equal status with the freely elected German Government in the Federal Republic of Germany; and

The adoption of measures leading to the conclusion of a peace treaty with the "two German states" or separate peace treaties, thus confirming the division of Germany.

3. The Soviet proposal reveals more of what they have in mind when they speak of a free city, but there is little in this additional description which can overcome the fundamental injustices and dangers which have been seen in this concept ever since it was first launched. To begin with, the Soviet proposal disregards the axiom that there can be no definitive solution of the Berlin question in isolation. A real and lasting solution can only be found in the context of German reunification. However, the so-called free city would be a step towards fragmentation and not towards reunification. The Soviet propose not only the acceptance of a second German state in the form of the GDR but also the creation of a third German state in the form of a free city. Furthermore, the Soviet proposal for a free city of West Berlin would aggravate the existing division of Berlin, which in itself is a major contributing factor in making the Berlin situation abnormal. Taken in its entirety, the proposal gives wholly inadequate assurances that the freely established links between Berlin and the Federal Republic, which are essential to the city's welfare, could be maintained and developed. The provision regarding the withdrawal of Western forces seems to renew Soviet attempts to deprive the Western Sectors

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of the protection which had been constantly required in the past because of attempts to undermine freedom in Berlin. Finally, and this is perhaps most important of all, the reiteration of the Soviet proposals is a mockery of the right of self-determination, for the population of West Berlin has overwhelminly rejected the Soviet idea of a free city of Berlin.

. 4. The Western Powers maintain that the Four Powers, including the Soviet Union, have a continuing responsibility to attempt to achieve the reunification of Germany. In this connection, the western round tailed proposals in Geneva on May 14, 1959, which they tailed proposals in Geneva on Calculated to achieve Gerbelieved to be equitable and calculated to achieve German reunification on the basis of the principle of selfdetermination. They were willing to provide a role for German experts to assist them in discharging their quadripartite responsibilities. The new Soviet proposals, on the other hand, call for the establishment of an all-German committee or some other form of all-German talks, without in any way admitting the basic responsibility of the Four Powers. The Federal Republic of Germany has a freely elected government, based on the principle of selfdetermination. The regime of the so-called German Democratic Republic is not a representative government; hence, all-German talks would be essentially meaningless. If the people of East Germany could freely elected their government, there is little doubt that agreement on the reunification of Germany could be achived in short order. But the rulers of the GDR are merely Soviet nominees. Consequently, the representatives of the Federal Republic in an all-German committee would be negotiating with nominees of the Soviet Government. Thus, what in fact the Soviet Government is proposing is that the reunification question should be settled between themselves and the Federal Republic without any role for the Western Powers or any representative of the East German population.

5. The Western Allies consider that, in the absence of an agreement for the reunification of Germany and thus at the same time Berlin, it is necessary both to avoid periodic crises and to preserve the possibilities of an ultimate understanding. Until a treaty of peace can be signed with the Government of a reunified Germany, the Wester Allies are prepared to accept certain improvements in the existing situation, in a spirit of conciliation, but without sacrificing their views or obligating the Soviet Union to renounce its views. Various measures can be envisaged with respect to Berlin and to lessen the difficulties arising out of the division of Germany con competer competer The section of the standard

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May (Cont.) and of the city, but these measures must not create a situation in which, the rupture having been made definitive, both Germany and Berlin would be maintained in a state of permanent crisis. The Western Allies, for the various reasons indicated, are, therefore, unable to negotiate on the basis of the proposal of Mr. Khrushchev.

(Confidential)

Western Commandants! statement on East Berlin May Day observance: Western Commandants issued following press statement 1:30 PM today. (Text) The Commandants of the three Western Sectors of Berlin note with concern the militaristic demonstration which took place today in the Soviet sector of Berlin. The parade in the Soviet sector featured many units of East German military and para-military organizations, including the socalled "People's Army." Armored vehicles and artillery pieces participated. This was in marked contrast to the peaceful manner in which three-quarters of a million Berliners freely joined in a May Day observation in West Berlin to demonstrate their attachment to the causes of peace and liberty.

The Commandants of the three Western Sectors of Berlin deplore today's militaristic display in the Soviet sector of Berlin, which is incompatible with the quadripartite status of Berlin, constitutes a threat to public order and is not in accord with the desire for a relaxation of tensions professed on many occasions by the Covernment of the USSR.

May West Berlin May Day manifesto: Following is text of proclamation addressed to Summit Conference, read at conclusion of West Berlin May Day rally, and in effect summarizing points covered in Governing Mayor Brandt's May Day speech. (Translation prepared by Mission)

(Text) Manifesto for the First of May 1960 Berlin once more calls out to the peoples of the world in this hour.

The people of Berlin declare once again: The division of Germany and of its capital Berlin, caused by arbitrary and unnatural measures imposed from without, must be ended.

We Berliners pledge our allegiance once again to the ideals of freedom and democracy.

> Now as then, we reject the demand to declare an open season on Berlin (eine vogelfreie Stadt - a play on the Soviet "free city" proposal).

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The division of Berlin must not be deepened.

The sector border must not become a national boundary.

west Berlin belongs to the free part of Cermany.

We will not allow ourselves to be separated from the Federal Republic.

Berlin remains the capital of Germany and is today meeting place for all Germans.

Any agreement at the Summit Conference must assure the right to self-determination for the Berliners.

In all vital questions (Lebensfragen) affecting our entire people, all Germans must agree on a unified position cutting across party lines.

We have confidence in our protecting powers and in our friends the world over.

Berlin remains free!

May 12

Declaration of Berlin Senate on situation before summit conference: Governing rayor Brandt delivered today 50-minute "Declaration of Berlin Senat on situation before summit conference" before Berlin House of Representatives. Declaration was well-balanced restatement of foreign policy, moderate in tone and calmly and seriously delivered -- one of Brandt's best speeches since Berlin crisis began. Brandt expressed with conviction Senat's confidence in will of Allied Powers to resist pressure of Soviet Union at summit for agreement that would prejudice Berlin's freedom. He also pointed out dangers involved in forthcoming negotiations and stressed essential conditions for any agreement over Berlin, particularly that it must not prejudice Allied rights or ties with FedRep, must apply to all of Berlin, and cannot disregard wishes of Berlin population. No mention was made by Brandt of Khrushchev speeches before Supreme Soviet or plane incident.

Following summarizes Brandt's statements on most important topics: (1) Summit: Brandt stated that position taken by Soviet Union and Khrushchev in past 18 months precludes optimism over achieving results in discussions on German question at summit. We must expect that Sov Union will attempt in Paris to realize

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low as then, we reject the demand to declare an open

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May (Cont.) its demands directed against Germany and Berlin. It is our firm conviction that Western Powers will not yield to Soviet demands because the very credibility of Western policy is at stake. In reviewing developments over past few months, Brandt made frequent reference to statements by top Western spokesmen all of which "show determination of Western Powers to protect their rights in Berlin and to resist possibly strong pressures." Brandt quoted with particular emphasis from letter received two days ago from Selwyn Licyd, to illustrate Allied unity on Berlin, which received strong applause. Re Soviet attitude, Brandt said that successful discussions on Berlin depend upon whether Soviet Union ready, "as it seems to be on occasion", to judge situation realistically and to retreat from its unrealizable demands.

- (2) Interim agreement on Berlin: Although Allied rights must not be subject to negotiation, Mayor saw possibility of agreement over how these rights should be exercised. Berlin Government would not object to supplementary agreement which would not alter "the basis of the present status of Berlin." In referring to Western proposals at Geneva, Brandt said Senat would net object to an arrangement providing that activities in both parts of Berlin that disturb public order or endanger peace be observed and remedied if necessary. Major condition for supplementary Berlin arrangements would be that they apply to both parts of City since "there are no Four Power agreements over West Berlin but only Four Power agreements over all Berlin." Additionally, any agreement must be valid until reunification or, if given a time limit, its expiry would not prejudice Allied rights in Berlin or city's status.
- (3) Self-determination for Berlin: Brandt referred in various contexts to right of Berlin population to self-determination. He quoted President Eisenhower to effect that this right must be basis for any future agreement affecting city. "Everyone knows that no agreement can be made over Berlin that does not accord with the wishes of the population." Referring to world attention Berlin has received in recent weeks, Brandt stated Woice of Berlin has been heard; it remains an admonition to the East that new turmoil (unfriended) will with certainty arise out of a dictated solution" of the Berlin question. Brandt also referred to possibility of plebiscite, "should circumstances -not princed and object to be to be to the control of the control

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(4) German question: Brandt stressed Berlin question just part of German question which, in turn, intimately entwined with questions of European security, reduction and control of armaments, and improved East-West relations. Brandt stated agreement with FedRep that best hope for international detente lies in progress toward controlled disarmament. Although German unification not imminent, it must not be dropped from international agenda. As long as German question cannot be solved, no reason to alter basis of Berlin's present status.

May 13 FRG statement in connection with opening of summit conference: In connection opening summit meeting, FedGovt today released following statement:

"Given results previous summit meetings, there should be no illusions on eve Paris conference. No one expects sensational results, particularly since Paris conference only first of series. Moreover, present world problems which have become more complicated over years require long time for resolution. If both sides seriously interested reaching understanding-forthcoming conference will indicate whether this so-Paris could provide beginning in elimination East-West tensions. As far as Germans concerned, even minutest constructive result will be welcomed."

With reference problems be discussed at Paris, Government statement contains following observations:

- A. Disarmament. Progress this particularly important area vital interest to all. Paris conference could make great contribution by facilitating first steps in reaching agreement on general controlled disarmament. Progress this area could facilitate solution other problems including that of Germany. However, as far as German Government concerned, it could not accept measures which are of discriminatory nature.
  - B. German question. This problem must remain on agenda Four Power conferences until aceptable solution based on right self-determination found. Western Peace Plan of 1959 is fair proposal serving this purpose, for it not only provides for German reunification but also contains proposals directed toward meeting security interests all affected parties. On other hand, Soviet proposal for peace treaty with two German states as well as its proposal for confederation are un aceptable since both intended perpetuate division Germany. Unfortunately, thus far there no indication Soviet Union at forthcoming conference prepared consider proposals for re-establishment

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German unity on basis self-determination. But even though this case, we and our Allies must never tire demanding right self-determination for entire German people. One day perhaps it will dawn on Soviet Union German-Soviet relations cannot be improved so long as Soviet leadership takes negative attitude this very vital problem. "Detente cannot be based upon injustice violation human rights, and rank discrimination."

> C. Berlin question. So-called Berlin problem brought to crisis by Soviet Union can only be solved by eliminating division Germany. Isolated solution suggested by Soviets, which has as aim incorporation all Berlin into Communist sphere, unacceptable. In opposition to Soviet free city proposal, West must continue insist upon maintenance existing status until reunification achieved. This, however, does not eliminate area for negotiation, for there is room for discussion measures reduce tension Berlin and improve access to city. Right is on side West and, if Soviet leadership really interested detente, it should not permit Berlin problem reach point where peace endangered. Handling Berlin question at summit will be test for both West and East. West will have to indicate its will and power to stop Communist subversion freedom. Soviet leadership will be forced demonstrate just what it means by terms "detente" and "desire for peace. " In essence, be terribly dangerous if summit meeting concentrates on Berlin question and ignores more important and vital problems connected with existing international tensions.

D. East-West relations. It must be demonstrated that peace and detente indivisible, as was so clearly brought out in Istanbul communique. Further, it must be made clear Soviet co-existence propaganda hollow so long as it prevents peaceful living together people and instead tries expand Communist sphere influence. "Joint declaration that contains words having different meaning for free world and Soviet empire useless and can only disguise realities existing relationships. West must state concepts clearly, demand respect for right self-deterconcepts clearly, demand respect for right self-det mination, non-interference affairs other, and free association peoples and nations."

In conclusion, Government pronouncement states real cooperation in freedom of people only realizable when Soviets renounce expansionist goals. At this juncture we must limit efforts concrete first steps for improving East-West relations. Such steps possible in area cultural and information exchange. By giving people opportunity travel, read, and know each other, basis creating mutual understanding and relations can be established.

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May Brandt statements on "Meet the Press": Mr. Spivak: What do you seek from the summit as a minimum without (Unclassified) which you as Mayor of Berlin would consider the summit really a failure?

MAYOR BRANDT: Let me say, Mr. Spivak, first of all I would say no solution is still better than a bad solution. But of course I would prefer some additional greement based upon the existing rights, based upon the rights of the Berliners, based upon a recognition of our connections with the Federal Republic. Then based upon that, I think, and based upon a giving up of the Soviet threats, one could try to work out certain technical and practical arrangements.

Mr. Rich: Mayor, if there is no progress at the summit, and Mr. Khrushchev goes ahead as he has threatened and signs his peace treaty with East Germany, what is going to be the immediate effect upon your city?

MAYOR BRANDT: We shouldn't be too much afraid of that separate peace treaty. From a German point of view, of course, it is a provocation to call it a peace treaty, if he makes a treaty with himself; which means with the tools he has in power in Communist East Germany. "detente" and "desire for

For the city, I do not expect many important changes. We have to think about two. One could be to transform what is a sector borderline, which goes through the city of Berlin today, into what we could call a state borderline. This from a human point of view would be a terrible thing. But it would not hurt the position of West Berlin as such, Our economic life would go on as usual.

The other consequence could be interruption with access to Berlin. Now this would be a threat directed against our allied friends and I can not imagine that Mr. Khrush-- alby and have chev seriously believes that he can eat the cake and have it, that he can create a new Berlin crisis in addition to one which hasn't been solved yet, and still have talks going on as far as the essential world problems are concerned.

May Reaction of West German political parties to summit 20 failure: CDU in the main takes certain amount of quiet (Confidential) satisfaction at course of events during past week, CDU sees Adenauer's and CDU's estimate of character of Soviet opponent completely vindicated by Khrushchev's revelation of himself, and Adenauer's - and their - skepticism

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people opportunity travel, read, and know each other, basis creating mutual understanding and relations can

May (Cont.) about substantative political benefits of summit con-20 ference abundantly justified. Gravity of present situation seen as confirming Chancellor's gloomy forebodings, and as underlining necessity for West to draw closer together and take positive measures indicative of intentions to give no ground at any point whatsoever. Measures suggested by CDU Deputies include despatch of additional U.S. division to Europe and increased financial support immediately for military-scientific research. Great opportunity also seen for public relations exploitation of situation in south Asia and Africa. There is also satisfaction that crisis was brought to head by a direct United States-Soviet issue and not by one involving in first line Germany.

Attitude of SPD and FDP more complicated. Their hopes for conference were greater and their disappointment is more intense. SFD presidium in May 18 statement for press was reserved, reflecting view it is too soon to say very much but implying that relaxation of tension is somehow still achievable by same methods heretofore tried, a view echoed in lead article Worwarts May 26. Reference to Nato and greater defense effort lacking. Statement attributes collapse of summit conference directly and exclusively to Khrushchev's ultimatum. whose was Great opport unity had been dissipated, and world now faces more tension and greater crises. Although military and political problems have become more difficult, their solution was more urgent than ever. SPD intended to work tirelessly to promote cause of controlled disarmament and peaceful solution political problems; expected Federal Government to support emphatically such policy. Germans in Sovzone and Berlin must more than ever be given certainty that Federal Government is ready to do everything in its power to overcome present crisis.

SPD press statement contained no direct strictures against conduct of Adenauer Government or of Western Allies, but there is considerable critical speculation in private conversation and in press regarding "what went wrong". Vorwart's editor Puttkammer in lead article May 20 blames U.S. for "providing causes and occasions for Khrushchev's behavior and demands",

Markscheffel, editor of SPD Pressedienst in commentary sent from Paris May 18, referred to alleged differences on tactics which had developed at Paris between deGaulle and Macmillan on one side and US Delegation on other and said Spaak was trying to bridge over these differences by series of NATO meetings emphasizing purely military aspects of NATO. Markscheffel reported there were

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May (Cont.) doubts "in many quarters" whether Spaak was proceeding along right track. The consequences of such an exclusively military approach would be merely limitless continuation or cold war and of the armaments competition.

Die Welt gave considerable space to Markscheffel's commentary and attributed to Bundestag Deputies view that Markscheffel article is indicative of probability that opposition will seek major domestic political issue of government role in summit debacle, and of course which should now be taken, thus sharpening party differences on foreign policy. Up to now SPD Bundestag Deputies and PD Party officials with whom Embassy officers have spoken have avoided polemical line. Carlo Schmid developed following views: We must (he said) start from where we are. It is idle to speculate about reasons for Khrushchev's conduct. His words speak for themselves and he is man who means what he says. Therefore, we must expect harassments in their crudest and most brutal forms, and to counter them must draw together and take necessary (undefined) defensive measures. Whether summit becomes a domestic political issue is, says Schmid, up to Adenauer. If he continues to flail out at SPD, SPD will react.

A sharper partisen tone comes from prominent FDP Deputy Dehler, a deep-dyed Adenauer critic. Dehler expressed view that Adenauer had by adroit maneuvers kept President Eisenhower from carrying out sound idea of holding summit conference not long after Camp David meeting when atmosphere was favorable, According to Dehler, Adenauer therefore bears great responsibility for failure of conference. At present, says Dehler, there is no disposition for public debate because situation too dusaind emergero uncertain. the mainty reve of of wheer

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Summary of Adenauer speech to Bundestag regarding the 24 summit: Chancellor in Bundestag today expressed thanks (Unclassified) to Allies and satisfaction with cooperation and understanding at all levels in months of preparations for summit conference. He said all had recognized conference must concern self with threat Berlin posed by Soviet but recognized also that Berlin problem was soluble only as part of German problem, which had to be regulated ultimately by self-determination. It had been evident from Khrushchev's statements Baku and to Supreme Soviet that he had no inclination to work toward acceptable solutions. Even so there remained hope for prograss toward disarmament. In Paris Khrushchev destroyed all hopes and made it clear he had come by Beries of HATO meetings emphasized parely mristery aspects of HATOS | Parkscheffel reported Grore with

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with intention sabotage conference. It was too soon to say why. Whatever his reasons, world hopes for first step toward disarmament and lessening tensions were not fulfilled. On contrary tensions had been alarmingly increased and responsibility lay clearly with USSR.

Chancellor said Western Powers had showed readiness take up world problems earnestly and constructively. Despite insults and abuse, American President had taken calm and dignified position deserving respect and praise. DeGaulle and Macmillen had also done best to bring about situation in which vital problems might be constructively discussed. Soviet Union alone was responsible for collapse. Khrushchev's subsequently expressed readiness to move ahead at later date remained to be tested.

FEDREP and its NATO allies had already made clear their intention to continue efforts to work for solution of world problems by negotiation. They rejected use or threat of force. Paris had shown dangerous state of tension in world; it showed how right policies of Fed-Govt had been; especially it proved that division Germany and Berlin problem were not cause of world tension but effect. Only by progress toward disarmament could tension be lessened and way opened to German self-determination. World could not doubt free Germany would play responsible part in promotion world security.

Finally Chancellor said way toward peace and freedom would be blocked by any move against Berlin in which would necessarily be seen by those with responsibility for city as attack on themselves, and by all world as negation Berlin's right self-determination. All must recognize detente by negotiation is not compatible with threats to Berlin.

May

Brandt speech on German policy in respect to Berlin: Every federal government will observe validly concluded (Official Use treaties, Berlin Governing Mayor Willy Brandt declared Only) tonight over the Bavarian radio. The decision in favor of the Western defense alliance cannot be reversed by the Federal Republic.

Brandt forcibly reiterated his demand for a minimum measure of bipartisan foreign policy in the free part of Germany. This would also be a stabilizing factor in international politics. There cannot conceivably be any grouping in the Federal Republic which could question Germany's close association with its friends for a single moment. Any pretense that the Social Democrats are questioning the role of the Federal Republic

May (Cont.)

in the Western defense alliance only constitutes an attempt to evade the crux of the issue. If party politics are to be prevented from affecting (the policy) of the nation as a whole, there must be no party political stipulations in the attempt to achieve more common ground. "Nobody must try to force the other side under its yoke in this matter," Brandt said.

In yesterday's Lower House debate, Brandt added, all speakers agreed in their assessment of a number of basic facts of the foreign political situation. This measure of agreement did not result from deliberate cooperation but from factual development. In Berlin, on the other hand, cooperation between the two big parties had been deemed right even when election results would have permitted of a different method of forming the government. It was doubtful whether Berlin would still be free today if citizens of that city had not consistently manifested their united resolve whenever more than individual or group interests had been at stake.

In Brandt's view, a common foreign policy would have to begin with common stocktaking. Let the parties discuss everything together, and then common action on certain matters may follow. As an example, Brandt cited the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in Washington.

The Mayor emphasized his agreement with Federal Chancellor Adenauer on all questions concerning Berlin. "At any rate insofar as I am concerned, I shall do my part."

May 27 (Unclassified)

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Secretary Herter's report on the summit conference:

A. The threat to Berlin - In order to understand what happened in Paris we need to look back over the preceding 18 months.

In November 1958 the U.S.S.R. began a new strategy directed toward altering the situation in Berlin and East Germany in its favor. If the WesternPowers refused to give up their present position in Berlin and make West Berlin a sc-called "free city", the Soviet Union stated its intention to proceed unilaterally at the end of 6 months turning over full sovereinty to the sc-called German Democratic Republic and thereby confronting the Allies with the alternative of capitulation or resort to force which would be met by Communist forces. Though the strategy as it unfolded proved to be more flexible than

May (Cont.)

its original statement, it is still the official policy of the U.S.S.R. Its force lies in the Soviet ability to threaten Berlin, where we are morally committed but physically exposed.

The Western Powers, of course, promptly rejected the Soviet proposal and reaffirmed their determination to stand by Berlin.

In the months that fellowed, while the U.S.S.R. elaborated and pressed its strategy, the Western Powers concerted their plans to meet it. They sought to engage the U.S.S.R. in negotiation, thereby clarifying its intentions and either attaining solutions acceptable to the West or, as a minimum, convincing it that unilateral action against Berlin would not be sound.

B. Engaging the U.S.S.R. in Negotiation: It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the U.S.S.R. would negotiate on an acceptable basis. In January 1959 the U.S.S.R. proposed a conference to adopt a peace treaty with the two parts of an indefinitely divided Germany. The Western Powers continued to maintain that a peace treaty could be negotiated and signed only with a united Germany, hence that the reunification of Germany must be settled first. They also maintained that the only proper solution for Berlin lay in its becoming the capital of unified Germany, and therefore they were unwilling to discuss Berlin as an isolated issue. But the U.S.S.R. had held for some time that reunification was solely the business of the Germans and therefore refused to discuss it.

The West persisted during February and March in its efforts to get the Russians talking somehow. It proposed a meeting of foreign ministers, with the prospect of a possible summit meeting when due preparations had been made. The U.S. S.R. had repeatedly indicated a desire for one since 1956. Finally a compromise agenda, which did not prejudice the substantive views of either side, was adopted for a foreign ministers meeting, and a date was set in May, shortly before the expiration of the original deadline for meeting their arbitrary demands on Berlin.

C. Foreign Ministers' Deadlock: During the intensive preparations for the meeting the Western Powers developed a new version of their basic position regarding Germany, which was submitted at Geneva as the Western Peace plan. It consisted in approaching the unification of Germany through a series of stages, thereby offering

ollow fatelline and files at it in 119 -ra decision att May (Cont.) the U.S.S.R. a chance to adjust its position gradually 27 to the eventual loss of its hold on East Germany which free elections would presumably bring. The plan showed flexibility and imagination; it appealed to world opinion; but its rejection by the U.S.S.R was nonetheless flat. The U.S.S.R. stuck adamantly to its previously announced proposals for a peace treaty with a divided Germany. Thus the basic positions remained totally unreconciled.

Finding no progress possible on Germany, the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. explored the possibility of an interim agreement on Berlin which, without contemplating a basic solution of Berlin, as a separate issue, would do something to mitigate difficulties which the U.S.S.R. professed to find there. Though some progress was made in this direction, the U.S.S.R. insisted on language which would have implied the eventual erosion of the Western position in Berlin. Accordingly, despite the labor of 3 months with only one short adjournment, the foreign ministers meeting ended in deadlock......

.... There enseed an intensive and protracted series of preparations on the Western side, involving repeated meetings not only of the foreign ministers and of NATO but even of Heads of Government. Within our own Government we also studied most carefully the possibilities of making progress not only on Berlin and Germany but most particularly in disarmament, as well as other aspects of general Soviet-Western relations.

At the December meeting of Western Heads of Government a consensus emerged that the May summit might be only one of a series of such meetings and that it would be largely exploratory. Some modest progress was hoped for, but no major solutions on any front. But if a beginning could be made, the series of talks, possibly in a gradually improving atmosphere over the years, might do substantially more.

F. Summit prospects dimmed: In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit there was a general improvement of atmosphere and people began talking, partly in hop partly in some confusion, about detente. There were of atmosphere and people began talking, partly in hope, comparatively conciliatory speeches on each side; there was progress in the test-ban talks at Geneva; a new Soviet-U.S. cultural agreement was signed November 21; and on December 1 the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and other powers signed the Antartic treaty. most apilitam wit grifforen en wir beleisnob el inalo

(Cont.)

But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs was the strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German plans to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin. Another was the Khrushchev speech on November 14, which was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet missile provess, and began a concentrated attack on (Chancellor Konrad) Adenauer and the German Federal Republic which later increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet presummit tactics. The reason for this attack is still a matter for speculation. Perhaps they thought it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helping to divide the Western allies. It had no such effect, or course, but naturally rallied us to speak out in defense of our German ally.

Khrushchev as early as December 1 also began repeating his threats to sign a separate peace treaty with Fast Germany. He repeated these threats in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14 and in his remarks during his visit to Indonesia and other countries in January. On February 4 the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first formal bloc-wide commitment to sign a separate G,D.R. peace treaty. Thus Khrushchev's threatening Baku speech of April 25, though it was the most sweeping since February 1959, was only a harsher version of what he had been saying for months before. I shall make full documentation on his speeches available to the committee.

Not until April did we reply at length to this mounting crescendo of Soviet statements. We did so in order to keep the record straight - notably in the speeches of April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked for starting arguments that he in fact had begun.

The unity of the four Western Powers on Berlin, meanwhile, presumably signaled to the U.S.S.R. that prospects for eroding the Western postition. or obtaining Soviet terms on Berlin remained slight. President deGaulle and other leaders were quite firm in discouraging expectations on this front. The NATO Council in Istanbul May 2-4 also reaffirmed the Western position on German reunification and regretted Soviet refusal to discuss specific practical measures of disarmament. Thus, as the summit draw near, the prospects for important agreement seemed slender so long as the U.S. S.R. remained committed to driving the Western Powers out of Berlin and to discussing disarmament in terms of general principles rather than concrete steps.

ather even than. One of the sarilect into the Jani May (Cont.) The Western outlook consistently remained, however, 27 that the summit would be worth while. It would afford an opprtunity for an exchange of views which would clarify each side's position; it might contribute to some reduction of tensions over Berlin and narrow some of our differences en disarmament. It could be at least a small first step in a long process of improving Soviet-Western relations.

vedd bredter There was considerable indication, particularly during April, that Mr. Khrushchev had concluded that there was little likelihood of his having his way, particularly in regard to Berlin, at the summit. Evidence of Western determination and unity on this point in speeches and statements by Western leaders appears to have brought him to this conclusion. Thus in his Baku speech on April 25 he not only reiterated with the utmost finality his position on Berlin, including his intention to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East G rman regime, but he also began for the first time seriously to cast doubts upon the success of the summit. By this, of course, he meant success on Seviet terms.

- 2. Although the evidence is highly inconclusive, there are a number of indications that Mr. Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet foreign policy, particularly his overpersonalization and, in Communist eyes, overcommitment through personal visits to the U.S. and France, was arousing at least serious questioning if not epposition in the Soviet hierarchy. It would seem a logical deduction that some of the opposition to his conduct of foreign relations which was openly voiced by the Chinese Communists found a sympathetic response among some of his associates, and very probably among the Soviet military.
  - 3. It was against this background that the U-2 inciindustral re from dent occurred.

A combination of these three factors, in our judgment, is what resulted in the definite and brutal decision to disrupt the Paris conference. To determine how each of these factors should be weighedis, for the moment, beyond our reach.

> The U-2 incidert was most certainly seized upon and magnified beyond its true proportions as a justification for this decision. It is debatable whether it would have been possible for Mr. Khrushchev to devise another pretext for so radical and violent a position.

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May (Cont.)

ont.) It might well be that a lack of success at the summit would have confronted Khrushchev with a much more difficult choice, from his point of view, than no conference at all. He and his associates may have therefore much preferred to avoid facing the consequences of failure of negotiation by the simple expedient of torpedoing the conference.

It may seem incredible to you that responsible leaders of a great power should have come all the way to Paris merely for the purpose of wrecking the conference, thereby incurring worldwide condemnation of the Soviet Union and enhancing the sense of unity and purpose among not only the Western Powers represented there but also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and free nations everywhere.

I believe the answer lies in a basic miscalculation. in Mr. Khrushchev's and the Soviet's thinking.

Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly hoped - and this explains his early arrival in Paris - to divide the Allies and isolate the United States. He anticipated that the United States would refuse the demands he had set forth and that the conference would then collapse, with the United States bearing responsibility for the rupture before world opinion.

His plans miscarried because our two allies stood solidly and loyally with the United States and refused to be parties to Mr. Khrushchev's scheme. The result, as the whole world knows, was that the position which Mr. Kirshchev brought to Paris resulted in the complete isolation of the Soviet Union rather than the United States and in placing the responsibility for the disruption of the conference squarely where it belongs - on his own shoulders.

This estimate of the reasons for Mr. Khrushchev's behavior is strongly supported by the attack which he
made at his press conference on General de Gaulle and
Prime Minister Macmillan for what he termed their lack
of objectivity, lack of will, and subservience to the
allied relationships — in other words, in plain English,
for their solidarity with the United States, their
loyalty to our common purpose, and their refusal to
play the Soviet game.

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May (Cont.)

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What conclusions should we draw for the future?

I believe the signs are that there has been as yet no radical alteration in Soviet policy, though we can expect the continuance of a propaganda effort designed to split off the United States from its allies. This conclusion is supported by Mr. Khrushchev's Paris statements, including those at his press conference. It is supported, somewhat more specifically and definitely, by the statements which he made in Berlin on his way home.

We must remember, however, that, given the nature of the Soviet state, the men who run it can meet in secret at any time and change existing policy without public debate or even foreshadowing any such change. It is for this reason that any statement about a phase of Soviet policy must be regarded as qualified, with no certainty that it will remain valid in the future.

Thus, though the world's hopes have been keenly disappointed by the fact that the summit conference was not held as planned, the signs so far are that the basic realities of the world situation have not been greatly changed. Whether this continues to be so depends, as I have indicated, on actions of the leading Communist countries. Provisionally, however, I conclude that the implication for U.S. policy is that the main lines of our policy remain sound and should be continued. The lesson of Paris is that we should prosecute those lines with renewed effort. Proponents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our readiness to get on with outstanding international business in a sober and rational manner.

We must remain prepared to withstand aggressive pressures, not only in Berlin but also elsewhere. I trust that our evident readiness will deter such pressures.

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PRESS COMMENTARY

Jan. 30 (Official Use Only)

Frankfurter Rundschau On Ulbricht's Proposals. (Summary) Frankfurter Rundschau: Ulbricht's most recent unarticulated threats doubtless indicate Soviet pressure on Berlin is continuing or even increasing. With summit conference approaching, Moscow obviously wants to make it clear to West that Soviets not ready for any procrastination concerning Berlin settlement. It would be wrong to interpret recent Khrushchev and Ulbricht statements as empty phrases. USSR considers its Berlin position very strong. It believes ultimately West will prefer to accept Russian proposals for converting West Berlin into "free city" in view of fact that alternative would be western negotiations on Berlin problem with "GDR" government. Khrushchev seems to be determined to insist on Berlin settlement. Russian diplomacy has been trying lately to make "free city" proposal somewhat more palatable to West by hinting at extended guarantees for free traffic between West Berlin and Federal Republic. However, it hard to imagine how peaceful settlement can be found on this basis, because drastic change in Berlin's legal status would expose West Berliners to such an uncertain fate that no German political leader could approve such change voluntarily. Concern about possibility of Berlin settlement against will of both Federal government and West Berlin senate is not entirely unjustified. That is why president Luebke pointed out to western powers in Berlin that on basis of German-Allied treaties, Ponn has veto right regarding any negotiation result concerning Berlin. Under these circumstances it understandable and correct that Adenauer and Brandt have adopted "firm attitude". Bonn cannot and must not leave Berlin in lurch. It would be good idea for Bundestag to conclude its forthcoming foreign policy debate with joint resolution emphasizing once again position of West Berlin as one of West German Laender with special status.

However, if one intends to remain firm on Berlin, it is necessary to seek road to avoid new Berlin crisis. As things are, this can be done only by western initiative for East - West negotiations on German problem and on problem of European security. Such initiative would reduce Berlin problem to its proper size and postpone danger of separate peace treaty between Moscow and Pankow. It would be task of Federal Government to make serious proposals along these lines.

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TRUNK AMSORGS

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Bonn General-Anzeiger on Warsaw Pact Moscow Communique: (Summary of article appearing under the title "The Renewed Threat") General-Anzeiger (Bonn, Independent) commented Feb. 6, 1960 under title "The renewed threat": communique issued by Warsaw Pact countries at end of Moscow conference was described by Bonn as containing nothing new. That is exactly what gives this document its ominous, significance. Fact that leader of East failed to come out with any new idea proves that anticipated summit negotiations will be very tough. One cannot say East bloc has only vague ideas about what it wants to achieve at Paris summit meeting in May. Soviet threat to conclude separate peace treaty with Pankow obviously is getting on nerves of Americans at their most sensitive spot by confronting Washington with choice of war or capitulation in West Berlin.

For weeks Soviet statements have been marked by confident undertone as if there were no doubt that US, Britain and France eventually would be ready for Berlin compromise despite Adenauer's warnings. Khrushchev finds his optimism substantiated by occasional Bonn statements about necessity to prevent possible western softening or yielding to Khrushchev at summit conference. There is no doubt Khrushchev's confidence based also on feeling of military superiority. It considered possible in Washington that Soviets, on basis of this feeling of military superiority, will use blunt threats of war as means to achieve their political aims.

Balance of power seems to be somewhat disturbed. In controversy over West Berlin it quite possible that victory will go to that side which most convincing in its assertions that it ready to go to war, if necessary, rather than abandon its policy. Moscow believes to be sure this determination to go to war, if necessary, is even more remote to Americans in 1960 than it was in years before.

Americans doubtless would not hesitate to support Berlin policy of Adenauer and Brandt unrestrictedly if US military leadership in world were as uncontested today as it was ten years ago. Soviets obviously trying to make Americans answer question whether they consider freedom of West Berlin worth exposing even one American city to danger of destruction. Any western yielding to Soviets in Berlin will be taken by Moscow as sign of western military weakness rather than evidence of western love of peace.

Feb. (Official Use Only)

West Berlin Press on Smirnov Memorandum: (Summary) In editorial comment several papers praised Ollenhauer's loyalty to Federal Government in immediately turning over Soviet memo to Foreign Office. DER TAGESSPIEGEL said, "Soviet attempt to make largest German opposition party their mouthpiece has failed. Social Democrats have not debased themselves by playing game which FDP did two years ago." DER TAG remarked, "Soviet efforts to influence domestic policy of Federal Republic are not new. But seldom has an effort failed so miserably as that of the attempt to break up the joint front of German parties with regard to Berlin question ... This failure shows there is only one attitude regarding Germany's capital:-national solidarity." TELEGRAF in discussing rumor that Smirnov called on Ollenhauer because he wanted talks with Berlin Mayor Brandt, but could not approach him directly remarked: "Special Senat negotiations with Soviet quarters on Berlin are an absurd idea. The four powers are responsible for status of Berlin."

Feb. 10 (Official Use Only)

West German Press Comment on Gronchi Visit to Moscow: (Summary) Papers not only criticized Khrushchev's belligerent remarks but also lacked enthusiasm for Gronchi trip itself. Several suggested that trip might have shown Gronchi futility of his hopes to mediate East-West conflict. Papers also continued to emphasize necessity of German firmness and unity, in view of allegedly unreliable attitude of Western allies regarding Berlin.

Koelnische Rundschau: Khrushchev's statement actually amounted to blunt, unscrupulous proposal for scrapping Potsdam Agreement, which expressly states Poland's final western border will be established by peace treaty with Germany. In other words, Khrushchev is trying to prejudice this peace treaty which, in his opinion, need not be negotiated but merely signed by countries concerned. Khrushchev feels himself so strong vis-a-vis West that he considers eventual western adoption of Soviet draft for German peace treaty self-evident.

Feb. 11 (Official Use Only)

West German Press Comment on Bundestag Foreign Policy Debate: Comment on Bundestag foreign policy debate was almost unanimously favorable and largely identical in papers of all political persuasions. Papers emphasized following points: (1) unity on Berlin is good and necessary and, hopefully, will impress both East and West; (2) objective tone of debate highly commendable and long overdue; (3) fact that differences exist on other issues in no way detracts from significance of points one and two; (4) German demand for self-determinationas is being granted Africa -- altogether justifiable; (5) Adenauer can increase inter-party foreign policy cooperation by consulting with opposition before making important decisions.

Feb.
16
(Official
Use Only)

Neue Rhein Zeitung (Cologne) on Passes for Allied Military Missions: New move by East in German problem in form of issuing new passes to members of Allied military missions has appearance of insignificance. In reality, however, it is significant move because it shows once again the perfectly clear design to make West recognize Soviet Zone regime step by step. Americans, British and French now confronted with question whether to accept or reject new passes. Eastern moves of this type will continue. After abortive big blow against West Berlin, East now turning screw of pressure slowly and cautiously but persistently until, East hopes, goal will be reached some day. This is what Willy Brandt called "Salami Tactics." One thin slice of Western rights after the other is cut off by East. Are we and Western powers prepared for these tactics? Obviously not. Otherwise passes would have been sent back by Western powers immediately. Western powers should realize one thing: Every concession they make today will require thim to make further concessions at Summit conference. This is screw without end. On eve of Summit meeting, any Soviet attempt to tighten this screw must be thwarted.

Feb.
17
(Official
Use Only)

Soviet Russia Article on Legal Status Berlin: Soviet Russia attacks alleged current Bonn efforts to prevent Summit agreement on Berlin by pressing claims that West Berlin is part of Federal Republic, cites 1948 and 1949 Western statements as concurring Soviet position West Berlin part of Soviet Zone. Article concludes in moderate note that Bonn "encroachments" on West Berlin cause concern since peace—loving forces hope Berlin problem will be solved in not distant future on basis German peace treaty and West Berlin as "Free City."

Following Western statements cited: (1) Declarations of August 1948 expressing readiness "to recognize substitution Western mark by mark of Soviet Zone as only currency for Berlin." This said to constitute agreement with Soviet position as set forth in July 14, 1948 notes that "Berlin situated in centre of Soviet Zone and part of this Zone." (2) Statements that articles in Bonn constitution concerning West Berlin as part Federal Republic "must be eliminated," with specific reference March 2, 1949 memorandum of three Western military governors. (3) Letter of April 22, 1949 stating Western powers "cannot agree to inclusion

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Feb. (Cont.)

17
(Official
Use Only)

of Berlin with rights of land." (h) Statements re
West Berlin constitution that "Berlin will not possess
qualities" of one Laender. Paper also attacks Bonn
efforts to present West Berlin in "role of some kind of
administrative center" of Federal Republic, referring
this connection to Bundesrat Berlin session at end of
1959 and Adenauer and Luebke visits. West Berlin visits
of Spanish Foreign Minister and King Hussein of Jordan
said to be efforts to give impression foreign states
recognize West Berlin belongs to Federal Republic.

Feb. 25 (Official Use Only) FRG Press Comment on Herter Plan: Independent and progovernment papers warmly supported reported Herter plebiscite plan and said fact that Soviets not likely accept it was no argument against using it. Premature "leaking" of plan was strongly deplored, since this was believed to reduce its value. SPD papers considered plan utopian.

Majority view exemplified by West Deutsche Allgemeine (Essen): To disclose now what moves West intends to make at Summit meeting in May is severe tactical mistake, If one has any trump cards, they should be played at conference and not be put on table before then. Leaking of Herter's plan is deplorable. Now it is to be expected that effect of plan will be lost. Not less deplorable, however, is hasty rejection of plan by opposition spokesmen in Bonn. Plan indeed contains hardly anything new and there is no evidence Soviets would accept it. However, it is not only question of whether Western plans for Summit meeting can be implemented. If Soviets had their way, only Soviet plans would be implemented, and it would be very bad if West reacted to Soviet plans in this dangerous situation only by showing readiness to yield and to negotiate. Rather, West must meet excessive Soviet demands of its own, From this point of view, demand for self-determination is good one because it is not utopian idea, but fundamental right on which West cannot insist often enough, especially in view of continued Soviet assertions that they are for self-determination of people and that German reunification is (internal) matter of Germans. Therefore, it would be politically foolish of Germans to mag about Herter plan only because it does not go far enough to comply with Soviet wishes. Rather, one should be gratified and welcome fact that Secretary of State has once again pushed our right of national self-determination into foreground.

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MAL CHOICE

Feb. (Cont.)
25
(Unclassified)

West Berlin press February 25 front-paged reports on "Herter Plan" for German plebiscite under headlines such as: "USA: German People Must Be Heard," "Herter Plan Greates Ill-Feeling in Bonn," "All Western Powers for Plebiscite," "Indignation in Bonn Over Indiscretions," "New Proposal of US Foreign Minister," "Herter Plan Made Known Too Soon."

Muenchner Merkur believes that the best the West could achieve at the Summit conference would be a prolonged status quo. Herter's plan may create a psychological advantage for the West. However, the Summit conference may serve a purpose if the West succeeds in demonstrating to the world the immorality of Soviet policy, thus shattering the Kremlin's prestige in neutral countries. The paper concludes by asking who could have been interested in a disclosure of Herter's plan before the conference opened. Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung notes that Herter's proposal will hardly be accepted by the Soviets, nor will it surprise Khrushchev at the Summit conference. The paper contends that it is, therefore, futile to discuss whether the West has lost a tactical conference position through the early disclosure of Herter's plan. Allgemeine Zeitung, Mainz, says since Khrushchev clearly stated that he will not discuss free elections in Germany, it is very doubtful whether Herter's proposal would not block negotiations on German reunification at the very beginning of the conference. The plan as such is good but cannot be carried out at the moment, the paper believes.

March 2

GDR radio comment on Herter's plebiscite proposal:
(Excerpt) Since no positive ideas whatever are forthcoming from Bonn for the peaceful solution of the German question, U.S. Secretary of State Herter has contrived something which, despite its new wrapping, is
in reality very old and obsolete. He suddenly hit on
the idea that the great powers might, so to speak,
decide on a plebiscite for the Germans on whether they
want a peace treaty with a united Germany or with two
German states.

The USSR has stated often enough that it naturally considers a peace treaty with a united Germany highly desirable. In view of Bonn's attitude, the chances for this are at the moment unfortunately nil. It will therefore be necessary to conclude a peace treaty with both German states. This is a matter for the great powers, just as the liquidation of the remnants of the last war in West Berlin is a matter for the great powers. But a plebiscite is without doubt a metter for the two German states themselves—a matter which concerns only the Germans. In other words, it is for the two German states to deliberate and decide on this.

The GDR has already made many proposals to this end. This alone would be in accordance with the people's right of self-determination—one of the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy. The USSR has at all times said "yes" to this right of self-determination of the Germans and continues to say "yes". Reunification is a matter for the German people.

The GDR is ready at any time to sit down together with representatives of the Federal Republic to discuss all topical questions of a peace treaty, a confederation and reunification. For, every state, including each of the German states, has the right to determine its own destiny. If the two German states want to determine something together, they must sit down together. Nothing could be more logical than that.

March 8 Soviet radio commentary on German plebiscite proposal: (Excerpt) The principle of self-determination for Asian countries which the Soviet Union is supporting must be applied also to the German people. This is of course true. The German people have precisely the same right to decide their own destiny as any other people. This is the point of view of the Soviet Union. I think, however, that you will agree with me that the right of self-determination of nations under different conditions brings up different problems.

March (Cont.)

For many African countries, for instance Kenya or Nyasaland, the question of self-determination is to a great degree a question of granting the vote to the native population and abolishing discrimination and all kinds of voting restrictions, from the color of the skin to the level of education. Does this, however, mean realization of the right of self-determination in Germany, where the proportional electoral system has existed for a long time and where the right to vote is not subject to any considerable restriction?

For the Congo or Nigeria realization of the right of self-determination means in the first place an end to the colonial empire and the founding of national states. Germany, however, is no colony and has a rich history as a national state. For India and Indonesia the right of self-determination means at present the creation of a great national industry. Germany possesses a powerful industry which is capable of giving aid to India or Indonesia. As you can see, each country has its own problems and on this depends one or another form of expression of the right of self-determination. Does Germany have such problems and can the principle of self-determination be applied to them? Of course.

Let us first take the question of a peace treaty. Its conclusion would mean for Germany that foreign troops would be withdrawn from its territory, that Germany would join the United Nations, and the unlimited possibilities for the development of its peaceful economy and the restitution of full sovereignty in all their internal and external affairs. In short, under present conditions, the conclusion of a peace treaty would be the most concrete expression of recognition of the right of the German people to determine for itself the road of its national development.

As is known, the Soviet Union is in favor of the earliest possible conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. The Soviet Union has twice presented drafts for a peace treaty and repeatedly made proposals to call a peace conference. The Soviet Government declared its readiness to examine most carefully all proposals of other countries about a peace settlement with Germany. The Soviet Union, therefore, is proving by deeds its respect for the right of self-determination for the Germans. This cannot, however, be said of the Western Powers, which have not presented their draft for a peace treaty with Germany. What is the situation regarding reunification of Germany? In our opinion the German people has

March (Cont.) the full right to live in a (sovereign?) state and to 8 adopt the social order of its choice. The Soviet Union has declared this often. But self-determination means that the German people must decide their destiny for themselves, including the reunification of their country-but independently, without any foreign intervention, through negotiations between the two German states.

Recently they began to talk in this connection about a people's plebiscite for all Germany. When Nikita Khrushchev was asked about this at a press conference in Jakarta, he replied: When the question of a people's planscite is raised, then the governments of the two German states should get together, make an agreement, and carry out what they think right; the Soviet Union will recognize and respect their decision.

Is this not a concrete expression for the recognition of the right of German self-determination? One can only be surprised at the unfair attitude of some West German newspapers, which, after this absolutely clear statement by the began to say that the/Government rejected the idea of a plebiscite in Germany. Surprising, too, is the fact that the same Bonn politicians who demand so passionately the right of self-determination for the Germans, do not want to move a finger for the realization of this right. They reject obstinately all talks with the GDR, apparently expecting that someone will present them the unity of Germany on a golden plate through pressure on the GDR.

It is superfluous to say that today, when the OR is being noticed even in Africa, it is, to say the least, unwise (words indistinct) and unpardonable not to see the GDR. All kinds of expectations that pressure would be put upon the CDR or, still worse, that it can be annexed by force, are obviously built on sand. In politics, however, and particularly in such an important question as the right of self-determination, it is, as we have seen, of the greatest importance to take account of the real situation.

Federal Republic press comment regarding Herter NAB speech: FedRep press comment re Herter NAB speech.

Speech received top play in several papers yesterday and Die Welt carried full text foreign policy remarks (Embassy translation) today (April 6).

April (Cont.) Suedeutsche Zeitung (Munich, left-center) commented: Herter confirmed firm decision to stand by FedRep and treat it as "worthy and respected ally." Herter even went so far as to tell Soviets their perpetual threat to conclude separate peace treaty with Pankow was bound to have rather unfavorable effect on international atmosphere. But real political significance speech lies in fact he linked disarmament to Berlin problem by saying Western Powers hardly could negotiate confidently on arms control if USSR violated existing agreements on Berlin. Herter's statement that there is clear relation between these two problems may be taken as hint as to what policy Western Powers will pursue at Geneva and at summit.

Deutsche Zeitung (Cologne, pro-CDU): Herter merely confirmed repeatedly stated US position, but timing of speech significant. He delivered it immediately after MacMillan's visit that prompted London Times to refer to concern about Anglo-German relations and possible damage to NATO. In meantime it has become known Macmillan did not say as much about FedRep as was claimed news agencies. It also known his hasty trip to Washington was received with polite approval but little enthusiasm. Now realized regretfully in London Washington supporting European integration within EEC framework to ward off dangers emanating from Cerman rearmament. This reaction probably opposite of that which Macmillan sought. British economic interests certainly should be considered. However, British Government should not interfere with European economic integration and at same time argue non-integrated Germany represents danger. Under no circumstances should dispute about tariffs and trade barriers impair Western position at summit. Perhaps it was this idea that prompted Herter to make these statements now.

April Federal Republic press comment re Adenauer's plebiscite 6 plan: Adenauer's plebiscite proposal after his meeting with Brandt evoked generally negative press comment.

Frankfurter Allegemeine (right-center): Adenauer's proposal, referred to in American quarters as "very interesting", expression which at best indicates polite reserve. Brandt and German public also received proposal with reserve. But Adenauer apparently adheres to it. One might argue there is no harm in letting Berliners reiterate reply to Soviet attack that they furnished in elections of December 7, 1958. But upon closer study, initial reserve displayed towards Adenauer's proposal appears warranted.

April (Cont.) According to Adenauer's plan, Berliners will have to say 6 whether they want to preserve present Berlin status until reunification. This implies Berliners supposed to express themselves in favor of status that represents emergency solution. Purpose of plebiscite in West Berlin will be defeated by fact that it is impossible to formulate issue in a way that would comply with real desires of population. Berliners, of course, will express themselves in favor of present status. But Western Powers aware of this even without plebiscite and will continue to act accordingly. Even if Berliner's present status is best that is possible now, it cannot be made issue in pleb scite for which, moreover, no provision has been made in basic law.

Frankfurter Rundschau (Pro-SPD): Stubborness displayed by Adenauer in adhering to plebiscite plan is surprisin g and most likely caused by his deep distrust of US and British firmness on Berlin. Adenauer realizes West will attempt to achieve new Berlin agreement with Soviet Union and wants to force West's hand. US and British undoubtedly anxious to settle Berlin problem and therefore ready for certain concessions regarding cooperation with GDR authorities on access routes and Western propaganda activities in Berlin. But there no indication West has come round to idea of making Berlin a free city. West probably could negotiate on possible Soviet plan . West Berlin a free city if such plan for making also preserved certain key elements of West Berliner's present status (i.e., continued close relations between West Berlin and FedRep, and continued presence Western Powers.) No reason why West should refuse to negotiate on such a plan.

But Adenauer and many Berlin politicians fear revision of present status would imply danger of future complications in which position of West would be weaker than today. These fears cannot be dismissed. But to let them prevail from very beginning would be tantamount to giving up hope for international detente.

Plebiscite in West Berlin is no appropriate instrument for influencing future negotiations. Soviets would consider plebiscite provocation, and West would feel insulted by implied distrust.

Things would be different if Bonn proposed new Berlin agreement, by which present occupation rights ended, be made subject plebiscite, as was done in Saar. However, Soviet Union will not agree to plebiscite of this type because it acknowledges right of self-determination

olinaria present status

April (Cont.) for West Berliners only concerning internal matters, but denies them right to determine Berlin's international status. Those who believe reunification can be achieved only if great powers agree on basic foreign policy lines to be pursued by reunited Germany, cannot completely reject Soviet argument. This makes it all the more urgent to try to induce Soviet Union to grant right of internal self-determination to Sovzoners. Negotiations on Berlin might offer good starting point for this.

April West and East Berlin press reaction te plebiscite: West 7 & 8 papers (April 7) front-paged Semat discussions re plebiscite as "Berlin Senat decides on plebiscite law," "Plebiscite only with allied appreval," "Bonn and allied agreement is precondition." Reports said Senat had decided submit draft plebiscite law to West Berlin House of Representatives, Fut would reserve for itself right to decide when plebiscite should be held. Senat was however prepared hold plebiscite before summit if FedRep and allies desired it.

Papers cited Senat spokesman as saying Senat wanted by no means give impression it was against plebiscite, however question was not just municipal matter. On such a political question Senat would follow views of Western Powers and FedRep since "Berlin did not make own foreign policy."

Editorially, Tagesspiegel (Indep) declared decision on plebiscite could not be passed to West Berlin Government since it could not be expected shoulder responsibility for such high political question. Paper argued decision was up to Bonn and Western Powers; that Berlin would be fulfilling its responsibility by making necessary technical arrangements so that plebiscite could be held on short notice. Paper criticized Adenauer's view that Berliners should vote on whether they for or against present status of city and remarked: "inalienable rights (as victors) on which three Western Powers stand in protecting Berlin's freedom is most important basic position which West has against Khrushchev's challenge. To make an inalienable right subject to vote is illogical and is bound weaken one's argument."

Jemish h East press: In front-page editorial representative of of continuing East press comment since Adenauer first put forward plebiscite proposal. Neues Deutschland April 7 declared: "West Berlin is on territory of GDR and question city's status must be settled among four type becapte it admoviledges right of self-determination

April (Cont.) Powers and GDR." However, Adenauer has gotten idea of 7 & 8 holding immediate plebiscite. Brandt, on other hand, wants to hold back this "bomb" until he sees "danger of a compromise." Self-determination and plebiscite to them are only means of disturbing ar understanding (re Berlin). In all the confusion, it has escaped Adenauer's notice that his plebiscite idea would knock props from under occupation regime in West Berlin. When Western Bowers argue that they are in Berlin by right of conquest they cannot logically permit that right to be made subject of plebiscite. Better than Adenauer, they see that right of conquest and occupation regime are incompatible with self-determination. "We have always said this. We are for self-determination. West Berlin will receive self-determination within framework of demilitarized city free city."

Concluding, Neues Deutschland remarked: "clumsy tricks by which Adenauer and Brandt want to deceive their own Allies and over which they are quarrelling prove that position on front-city is untenable in West Berlin something will have to change.

West press: Under front-page headline, "Bonn Disappointed over Senat Decision," Tagesspiegel (Indep) reported "Fed Gov circles" were unhappy over Senat decision re plebiscite I sold be since it in effect means plebiscite unlikely to be held : before summit, Reported cited "political observers" as saying in view Berlin-Bonn differences FedGov would proad man dold bably not push ahead with plebiscite plan. However, question would no doubt be "touched upon" again at April 12 Washington meeting of ForMins.

In editorial comment Der Tag(CDU) remarked: "Ropepulling over plebiscite has hurt project more than it has been useful. We unhappy that sensible solution which Senat found not have been talked over in Bonn beforehand. Decision on whether plebiscite shall take place absorbed in Berlin, date and wording of question not up to Berlin, but primarily to Western allies .... plebiscite can be used only once and should be saved for more crucial situation. Since no plebiscite to be expected before summit, other ways should be used to demonstrate will of Berliners such as May Day rally or mass meeting on eve of summit talks. Der Kurier (Pro-CDU) and Die Welt (indept) editorially also supported Senat decision.

East press: Within framework of continued sensitivity to plebiscite idea National Zeitung carried report on Senat decision under headlines "Self-Determination at

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April (Cont.)

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Request of Western Allies; several papers carried Berlin SED First Secretary Raul Verner's comments re plebiscite in speech before FDGB (trade union) rally in East Berlin (reported separately). Verner emphasized that as long as occupation status exists there no "freedom or self-determination" in West Berlin and exclaimed, "What in the world do they (Senat) understand by democratic right to self-determination if foreign occupiers must be asked first."

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Editorially Neues Deutschland ridiculed West Berlin Senat for trying to do the "impossible" and sit on two chairs i.e. "occupation regime" and self-determination" - simultaneously. Paper declared, "As long as occupation regime is in power there is no right to self-determination. If West Berlin were granted this right, it would mean end of occupation regime...West Berlin stands before end of a status, which in interest of peace, can continue no longer. We demand peace and the right of self-determination for West Berlin also."

April 8

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Federal Republic press reaction to plebiscite developments:
Papers praised Senate action in issue without exception.
Most papers reviewed various arguments against plebiscite and reiterated there no question as to result.

Der Mittag (Duesseldorf, right-center) called it "tactical master stroke" to let Senate decide issue and added: Now Berlin Govt has m de equally impressive decision in resolving to make preparations for plebiscite which can be held any time FedGov and West so desire, even before summit.

Rheinische Post (Duesseldorf, Pro-CDU) warned "question possibly to be put to Berliners should be formulated very carefully to woid impression allied rights subject to approval by Berliners and that free population exercising right of self-determination is voting to preserve occupation status. Latter would begrist for Soviet propaganda mill and would weaken West, at least psychologically." Paper added: Political responsibility (for decision) now rests with Bonn and Western allies. Should latter disapprove Adenauer's proposal, Bonn should consider this no misfortune.

Westfaelische Rundschau (Dortmund, pro-SPD), more conscious of partisan considerations, comments: Senate reacted skillfully, thereby clearly establishing who has responsibility. Adenauer now deprived of chance

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to make Berlin scapegoat for his unsuccessful German policy, as he would have done if Senate flatly refused pre-summit plebiscite. Brandt demonstrated political skill by managing avoid conflict with Chanceller and simulataneously protecting Berlin's rights and interests.

April 14 Pravda comment on Herter speech: April 14 Pravda
"observer" more restrained than April 9 Izvestiya in
criticising Secretary April 4 Chicago speech.
Pratda welcomes "sensible" emphasis on negotiation
in speech, but charges Secretary with reverting to
outmoded conceptions in his treatment of such specific
problems as discrmament, Germany and Berlin. Pravda
varies otherwise stock comment on these problem by
adding this new twist on Berlin: Department recently
published wartime document on which Allied occupation
Berlin based. However, same documents forbid annexation of Germany territory occupied. US claim that peace
treaty between USSR and GDR does not affect Western
occupation rights in Berlin represents an attempt to
perpetuate occupation of West Berlin indefinitely,
which tantamount to annexation.

April 18 Radio Moscow regarding "People's Plan for Germany: (Excerpts) If we sum up the ideas and proposals contained in the open letter of the SED Central Committee, they point to one thing—the need for understanding between the two German states on vital questions. The German people must, by means of a general referendum, express their view on the rennnciation of atomic armament and on disarmament in the Federal Republic and the GDR.

What is Bonn's attitude? It categorically rejects the idea of concluding a peace treaty with Germany and normalization of the situation in Berlin. Moreover, Adenauer wants things to remain as they are and denounces any idea of an agreement as a deal at the expense of the Germans. Under these circumstances special significance can be attached to the appeal of the SED Central Committee for reaching an understanding and agreement. The GDR has made a newcontribution to the easing of tension on the eve of the summit meeting and has presented an important peace initiative in connection with the Grman problem. Now it is up to Bonn.

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April 20

Federal Republic press reaction to "People's Plan for Germany": Ulbricht's plan for German reunification is the main topic of press and radio comment in the Apr. 15-19 period, with agreement prevailing that the plan is unacceptable since it amounts to an unconditional surrender to communism. Frankfürter Rundschau points out over Radios Mainz and Frankfurt that Ulbricht's plan plainly has propaganda aims and that he hopes to reduce the Western forces in Berlin as well as curtail Western intelligence activity there. These demands meet with British ideas to a certain extent, notes the paper. The Soviets probably expect an agreement along these lines. Ulbricht's plan may also be an attempt to camouflage the fact that he is treading water with regard to the Berlin problem, concludes the paper.

Stiddeutsche Zeitung, read over Radio Frankfurt, believes that Ulbricht's plan is actually Khruschchev's program for the Paris summit conference. Ulbricht's disarmament activity is of Soviet origin, as well as is the hint of concluding two peace treaties should the West prefer not to deal with the Soviet Zone. The paper hints that the Soviet Zone's inhumane collectivization measures may have become a burden to Soviet international policy.

Kölnische Rundschau, over Radio Frankfurt, emphasizes that the plan is, as always, full of insults to Bonn, and nothing but an invitation to unconditional surrender to communism and that the reaction of West Germany and Berlin is therefore as negative as it has always been toward such plans. Allgemeine Zeitung, Mainz, holds that Pankow cannot seriously expect its Germany plan to be discussed since it contains nothing new and only says that the "achievements" of the Soviet Zone must remain untouched. The paper believes that the plan as merely an attempt to reconnoiter the summit conference terrain, but it has shown how narrow the negotiation room is once it comes to the German problem.

Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung, Heildelberg points out that Ulbricht presented his plan, knowing very well that it would not be accepted by the West but also knowing that the conditions he had established will not be changed by this or any other summit conference. Rudolf Rathke, over Radio Frankfurt, thinks that Ulbricht could not have chosen a more unfavorable time to publish his Germany plan than the present. The unusually high refugee figures, the conclusion of the agricultural

in the West, to mention only a few no of President de Caulle, Vice President Wixon, and then Secretary of State Dillon have token part in the discussion and

April (Cont)

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collectivization, and signs of beginning collectivization on other previously unaffected sectors of GDR life are factors which make the SED plan unacceptable to the Garman workers, Rathke points out. The many contradictions in Ulbricht's plan are not confusing enoughto hide the fact that East Berlin will accept reunification only on communist terms.

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Dietrich Partens, reporting from Berlin over Radio Munich, finds that the SED Germany plan illustrates the definite relaxation of the East-West crisis in general and of the Berlin ultimatum in particular. Ulbricht says nothing new, but his omissions are significant. He no longer asks for nuclear arms, nor does he contest the Western Allied rights in Berlim. What Ulbricht and Moscow fail to realize, however, is that the new plan is apt to effect a further rapprochement of government and opposition in Bonn, Bartens points out.

Apr. 27 (Unclassified)

Radio Moscow on Western Reaction to Baku Speech:
(Valadimirov Commentary) If one scans the West German papers these (days), one might gather the impression that the world was almost on the eve of a war or, at least, on the eve of a very serious conflict. The papers are full of the most excited banner headlines: "Soviet Threats," "Moscow Threatens," "(New) Threats by Khrushchev," and so forth.

What has actually happened? What is the explanation of the hue and cry? Or what is really behind it? On April 25, Khrushchev made in speech in Baku, Azerbyayzhan, on the 40th anniversary of this Caucasian Soviet Republic. In this speech he dwelt also on some international problems, which surely is perfectly natural. After all, such a great event as the Summit conference is imminent. Therefore, we need not be surprised that in the days prior to this important conference a discussion about problems ripe for settlement has begun. As you know in the West, to mention only a few names, President de Gaulle, Vice President Nixon, and Under Secretary of State Dillon have taken part in this discussion and have made lengthy speeches. In these speeches they expounded the view point of the Western powers. Nikita Khrushchev did the same in regard to the viewpoint of the Soviet Union. And, naturally, such an exchange of views does not provide any reason for the hysterics that seem to have gripped certain West German politicians and commentators.

Moreover, in no Western capital is there anything that resembles the hysterics prevailing in Bonn. If one examines calmly and objectively the comments of the speech of the head of the Soviet government, one definitely realizes that there is no reason whatever for all the shouting about so-called Moscow threats.

What was the point in Khrushchev's speech? The point was that one must finish with the remnants of the last war and that (peace in Europe) must be strengthened; and that toward this end a peace treaty should be concluded with Germany. On this point the Rheinische Post went so far as to print a banner headline: "Moscow Threatens with a Peace Treaty." But, my listeners, please reflect on these words. One can threaten to make war but one cannot threaten to make peace, to make

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(Unclassified)

a peace treaty. Surely one cannot threaten to conclude a peace treaty; surely this is arrant nonsense.

Is there anyone who loses through the conclusion of peace? Surely everyone will only gain by a peace treaty and, above all, the cause of peace in Europe will gain. As for the German people, they would regain their full sovereignty through a peace treaty, the foreign armed forces would withdraw, and Germany would be admitted to the United Nations. Finally, because of the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states and the improvement of relations between them resulting from it, the question of the reunification of Germany would be easier to settle. Well then, is it possible in view of this to describe a statement in favor of a peace treaty with Germany as a kind of threat?

Some West German papers, for instance (General-Anzeiger) and Frankfurter Allgemeine, write: Khrushchev was renewing his threat about West Berlin. But his, too, is hair-raising nonsense. What did Khrushchev say in his speech? He spoke about the need to normalize the situation in West Berlin and that the occupation regime existing there must be done away with, since, as it is, one could hardly expect that the dangerous tangled skein of opposing views between the states can be eliminated. But in this no one intends touching the liberty, property, and rights of the inhabitants of West Berlin.

The head of the Soviet government has particularly stressed that the West Berliners will be offered complete opportunity and all prerequisites to enable them to choose the political and social order which meets their wishes. Is this perhaps a threat? No, it is not the intention of the Soviet Union to threaten anybody. However, we do hold the view that the question of a peace treaty with Germany and normalization of the position in West Berlin is ripe for settlement and must be settled in the interest of the strengthening of peace in Europe.

As a matter of fact, this is not only our view. Only the other day, an SPD representative declared that no detente could be achieved between East and West if no attempt is made to take the German problem in hand. As to the abnormal character of the present position

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(Unclassified)

in West Berlin, it has already been acknowledged by the vast majority of Western statesmen and authoritative commentators. Only yesterday New York Times commentator Krock wisely remarked that since the geographical position of Berlin could not be changed and the use of force might cause an atomic war, the Berlin problem must be settled by negotiations.

But, of course, if the Western powers are not willing to attempt together with the Soviet Union (words apparently missing) will be compelled to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR and then Western powers will lose the right to further maintenance of the occupation regime in West Berlin, since West Berlin, as is admitted by the New York Times is situated within the GDR. This is not any kind of threat but a statement of an existing fact.

As to the real causes of the whole hullabaloo about the imaginary Moscow threats, they are not to be found in Moscow but in Bonn. It has long been known that very influential Bonn circles, first and foremost Chancellor Adenauer himself, are trying to prevent a discussion of the German and especially of the Berlin problem at the impending Summit conference by making trouble. The Chancellor made this known during his recent visit to the United States and in his latest article in the CDU press service. And today Bonn, by shouting about a Soviet threat, is trying to find reasons for its own negative attitude. The Rheinische Post is in a great hurry to draw the conclusion that the Chancellor has been right with his sombre warnings and that the West must adopt a harsh attitude. Minister Lemmer even hints that there is no point in holding a Summit conference.

No, gentlemen, the Summit conference will take place and there both the question of the peace treaty with Germany and normalization of the problem of West Berlin will be raised and this not because the Soviet Union is threatening anyone, but because these questions have been raised by life itself, and must be settled for the sake of peace on out planet.

May 3 (Unclassified)

Radio Moscow Views on Brandt and Berlin:
The frantic activity of Willy Brandt, governing Mayor of West Berlin, during the past few days has been remarkable. He made two long speeches, in West Berlin and in Essen, ran an article in the form of an advertisement in U.S. papers, and wrote an article for the London Sunday Times. What is the purpose of these long-winded pronouncements?

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The Berlin question is known to figure in the agenda of the Summit conference. The anomaly of the situation in West Berlin, where the occupation regime is still in force, 15 years after the war has ended, is recognized in the East as well as in the West. Only one conclusion can be drawn from it: the occupation regime in West Berlin must be eliminated and the situation there must be normalized.

With a zeal worthy of a better cause, Brandt is trying to prove the opposite. He declares that everything should remain as before in West Berlin; that the rights and duties of the control powers should be safeguarded until the unity of Germany has been restored. However, as Brandt states in the same breath that the German question cannot states in the same breath that the German question cannot be settled very soon, it is perfectly clear that he works for the perpetuation of the present situation in West

We do not want to discuss whether it is appropriate for a German politician to act as such a zealous advocate of the rights and duties of the control powers. We believe that the present quite obviously anomalous situation in West Berlin must not be perpetuated because it would amount to keeping a dangerous center of tension in the heart of Europe.

When submitting its proposals for converting West Berlin into a free city, the Soviet Union was guided by the desire to lessen tension and consolidate peace. In his speeches, Brandt used many words to distort the essentials of this Soviet proposal. He alleged that the Soviet Union aims at interfering with communications between West Berlin and the Federal Republic and depriving West Berliners of their freedom. That is a plain lie. The Soviet Union repeatedly declared itself ready to guarantee smooth communications between West Berlin and West Germany and even to contribute to the extension of these communications. No one after all thinks of infringing on the freedom of the West Berliners, although that freedom is somewhat illusory under an occupation regime which leaves all power in the hands of the Western commandants.

In his speech at Baku, Nikita Khrushchev went out of his way to point out that after West Berlin is granted the status of a free city, West Berliners will have full opportunities and all prerequisites for freely choosing whatever political and social order they like. We therefore think that if Herr Brandt is really as interested

May (Cont.) (Unclassified)

in the right of West Berliners to self-determination as he tries to indicate in his speeches, the status of a free city would create better prerequisites for achieving this right than the present occupation regime.

We believe the question of eliminating the occupation regime and normalizing conditions in West Berlin has long been ready for a settlement and must be settled. The Soviet Union will aim at an agreed settlement of this question. But if the Western powers ignore the need for solving this question, which is so important for the fate of peace, the Soviet Union will have no choice but to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR and settle the Berlin question on this basis. Even the most inflammatory speeches by Herr Brandt will be of no use, even if he were to make three speeches and write five articles a day.

(Official Use Only)

Neues Deutschland relates case of U-2 to Berlin: Neues Deutschland today in front page editorial related case of U.S. plane over Soviet territory to Berlin situation. Editorial, captioned "Espionage Flier and Case of West Berlin, " stated "Aggressive flight into Soviet territory was planned action against Summit conference."

According Neues Deutschland, "This alarming case will people entire world comprehend better that West Berlin as an outpost and center of subversion within middle of GDR territory is no longer bearable." Article continued that in Berlin not one spy but an army of spies is involved. "West Berlin is greatest concentration of espionage which has ever existed in the world. Dozens of secret organizations are active in Berlin against GDR and entire Socialist camp -- from American CIC to Gehlen organizations." Article also cites RIAS broadcasting on subject farm collectivization and accuses RIAS of exhorting GDR farmers to sabotage, arson and flight. (Mission comment: Of course RIAS guilty none of these charges, but merely reported facts. Interviewed refugees, and pointed out inhuman methods.)

Article states "Naturally West Berlin will not avoid opportunities torpedo Summit conference." Cited "Recent provocation against transport police of GDR" as evidence. Article concludes by citing GDR proposals in recent "German Plan of the People" listing prerequisites for interim solution and insists "Alarming act of aggression by

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American militarists against Soviet Union should awaken world and strengthen will to clean up all danger points. That means above all West Berlin must become demilitarized free city. In order to bring such solution closer to reality we have declared readiness accept interim solution which at least would create most essential factors of security for peace."

May 18 (Unclassified) ADN attack on West Berlin as spy center: Agents and the fulltime staff of the Federal Intelligence Service (formerly the Gehlen organization—ADN) and other espionage organizations have long been flown from West Germany to West Berlin and from West Berlin to West Germany by U.S. Army courier planes. The U.S. machines carry further espionage information recorded on tape and other secret matter (material) serving the preparation of a war.

In view of their topical nature, attention is being drawn in West Berlin today to these practices of the Gehlen outfit, which are contrary to international law and which were borne out in many espionage trials in the GDR. They are, after all, closely connected with the U.S. espionage flights over the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which are being energetically supported by Bonn.

The facts bear out that the Adenauer regime not only agrees with the U.S. espionage flights and guarantees their deployment from West Germany, but by the same methods, in close cooperation with the United States, also constantly engages in its aggressive activities against the GDR. The more than 60 espionage and agents organizations which exist in West Berlin are serving Bonn as a basis for the subversive activities directed against the GDR, and they are without exception instruments for stirring up the cold war and fanning the hot war. Even U.S. politicians sometime ago still referred to the machinations of these organizations and their actions as an "indirect aggression".

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# PART FOUR

REPORTS OF INCIDENTS RELATING TO BERLIN

Feb. 19 (Secret)

Letter to Soviet Commander Berlin on subject of

Military Mission Text as delivered Feb. 19, 1960:

pesses

Dear Marshal Zakharov:

I have noted with deep concern the changes in the form and wording of the new passes issued on 29 January 1960 to the United States Military Liaison Mission to your Headquarters. The new passes differ from the passes previously supplied in the following respects:

(A) Soviet insignia has been removed from the printed portion of the new pass,

(B) On page three, in violation of the HeubnerMalinin agreement which provides for "identical permanent passes in Russian and English"
you have used the German language,

you have used the German language,

(C) On page three, new language has been inserted to the effect that "personal identification number (blank) is registered with Interior

Ministry of GDR<sup>n</sup>, and

(D) On the back of the pass, in lieu of previous language which provided that identification "gives right of free movement to Officers of Mission in Soviet Zone," there has been substituted "identification, which has been registered with Interior Ministry of GDR, gives right of movement to members of mission in territory of GDR, except for restricted areas."

While the old passes by their terms were stated to be valid until February 15, our Mission was informed on January 30 that effective the next day the old passes had been declared invalid by order of the GSFG.

The registration of the identification of members of the USMLM with the regime in the territory in which the Mission is authorized to perform its functions is an irrelevant action performed unilaterally by the GSFG without our authority and without our consent.

These acts are at variance with the Huebner-Malinin agreement, with customary practice between us and with the position of my Government with relation to the authorities of the regime in the area in which your forces are deployed. By this move you have taken the Mission out of the framework created by the Huebner-Malinin agreement which provided for settling military problems by agreement between military commanders and placed them in the political field. I must, therefore, protest this unwarranted action in connection with the issuance of passes.

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Feb. (Cont.)

Under the circumstances, I must, therefore, call upon you to withdraw the new passes and to substitute for them passes in accordance with terms of the Huebner-Malinin agreement.

Since I will be without appropriate liaison to your headquarters until this question is resolved, I request prompt action to correct the situation created by the issuance of the new passes.

Mar. 14

Series reissue old passes to Military Mission personnel:
SERB informed USMIM 12 noon March 14 that Lt. Gen.
Vorontsov, Chief of Staff, GSFG, desired meeting 1800 hours March 14 at Potsdam. USMIM insisted any trip must be made without use of pass and was assured deputy SERB would meet him at Glienicke bridge and take him through without any formality. French MIM and Chief BRIXMIS also invited.

Meeting took place as scheduled with Chiefs USMIM, FMIM and BRIXMIS present.

Lt. Gen. Vorontsov referred to allied Commander-in-Chief's letters regarding new passes noting that Marshall Zakharov had referred this matter to his Government in Moscew. In light of upcoming conference and to maintain good atmosphere, group Soviet forces Germany was instructed to reinstitute old passes as temporary measure pending solution at summit conference of everall problems. Vorontsov then asked whether this was clear. When Western MIM's replied affirmatively, Chief SERB interrupted to state that an officer from the Missions should come to SERB at 9:00 March 15 to turn in the new passes and pick up old passes.

After meeting Chief SERB reissued old passes to three Mission Chiefs and officers accompanying them. Old passes have been revalidated in ink in handwriting of Col. Kozlovskyi on page 4 as follows:

Begin quote Credentials validated. Col. Kozlovskyi 14 March 1960 End quote

Normal purple ink stamp has been superimposed on left of handwriting.

Chief USMLM plans to resume operations immediately following issuance of old passes.

Radio now carrying ADN (East German News Agency) report stating in essence that Vorontsov had conveyed reply to Feb. 19 Western note on passes which provided for continuation of "old passes" for present (Bis auf weiteres). (Unclassified)

U.S. duty train detained at Marienborn check point by Soviets: A. Duty train en route from Bremerhaven to Berlin was detained at Marienborn checkpoint at 0241 hrs, 26 Mar. Marked in dust on reefer car was series of straight lines forming square with long nose which Soviets claimed represented swastika, Train held awaiting arrival of Soviet colonel who arrived at 0530. Inspection of train then revealed swastika one foot high marked in dust of car in addition to previous parkings. This marking not on car at time of original inspection at Marienborn, Soviet soldier had been observed leitering alongside of car by member of train crew. Soviets gave alternatives of detaching car or returning train to Helmstedt. Thereupon train commander was instructed to sit tight and await instructions. Soviet stated they would return train to Helmstedt at 0645.

B. Train commander lodged protest with Soviet colonel and requested Soviets to remove second marking (swastika) which "mysteriously" appeared on car while train was halted. While train commander was talking to an official on the station platform train started to move slowly from siding to main track. MP aboard train then set brakes on one passenger car and on baggage car and train stopped. Train commander then boarded train.

C. As of 0800 train was still on main track with brakes locked. Soviets rulled three engines up to train, presumably required to move train if brakes remained locked. Train commander was instructed to release brakes if forced to move. At approximately 0830 Soviets started to move train, brakes were released to prevent damage and train return to Helmstedt.

April

General Zakharov accepts Western procedure suggested following March 26 train incident: 1. General Zakharov (Confidential) accompanied by his political advisor, deputy political advisor and interpreter, visited my office this morning with reference to the train incident on 26 March. General Zakharov stated that his investigation was new complete and was not in agreement with my letter of 26 March. Insofar as the appearance of the swastika marking was concerned, he insisted that it was not placed on the train while under Soviet supervision.

> 2. From this point on, his discussion was complete sweetness and light with the assurance that no further

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incidents of this type would happen at Marienborn and that with agreement of U.S. train commander, his checkpoint personnel would have East German personnel remove any objectionable markings,

3. The personal call of Gen. Zakharov, rather than a written reply to my letter, his acceptance of procedure we suggested at POIAD meeting March 26, and his repeated assurance of the desire to avoid any type of incident in the future is/marked change in actic and atmosphere in comparison with the 26 March meeting and indicates Soviet desire to avoid any misunderstandings, at least in the near future.

April 21 (Official Use Only)

GDR transportation police attempt search passengers in US sector Berlin: On Apr. 21, an incident involving three Soviet Zone transportation policemen took place at the Steglitz station of the intercity railway in the American sector of West Berlin, West Berlin intercity railway tranvelers called on West Berlin police because the Soviet Zone police had searched their baggage and their pockets and questioned the owners of sales stands on the platform regarding how much East German money they had. When West Berlin police arrived the Soviet Zone policemen withdrew into the office of the station agent after they had asserted that the railway is part of the Soviet Zone. After being asked by West Berlin policemen to leave, the Soviet Zone police finally left for the Soviet sector by train.

West Berlin police were also called to the Innsbrucker Platz station because two Soviet Zone policemen had allegedly searched persons there. The East German policemen denied having searched passengers on the platform when they were stopped by West Berlin police. The East German policement were released.

Bus used by French forces in Berlin detained at Marienborn by Soviets: A Berlin French Forces bus returning (Confidential) from Hannover with a detachment of French military personnel stationed in Berlin arrived at Marienborn Soviet checkpoint at 7 p.m. April 22. Soviet officer attempted to climb aboard bus, or alternatively make passengers get out, in order to count them. This the French officer in charge refused to permit on the basis of instructions. Passage for the bus was refused by Soviets and bus returned to French post at Helmstedt.

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April (Cont.) On basis of instructions received from Chief of Staff of French Forces Berlin group remained overnight at Helmstedt and went to the Soviet checkpoint again at 9:30 April 23. Soviet officer at first attempted to follow the same procedure as night before but was refused permission by French, After ten minutes of "indecision" he counted number of troops from the outside of the bus and permitted the bus to pass. Soviet authorities at Berlin end of Autobahn made no difficulties; the noncommissioned officer counted the passengers from the outside.

In rendering this account, French POIAD stated a protest was being transmitted April 26 by General Lacomme to General Zakharov on this matter; letter was in fact delivered by French Protocol Officer.

Comment This is first incident reported of Sov attempt inspect vehicle on Autobahn since April 16, 1959.

April (Confidential)

East German protest against West Berlin action on Trapos: Early morning April 23 Interior Senator Lipschitz met top West Berlin police officials. Outcome of meeting was instruction to police covering: (1) increased patrol of S-bahn stations; (2) Trapos to be arrested if there are witnesses to illegal action or if violation directly observed by West police,

Lipschitz today informed Mission officers: He has received letter from Heinz Gebhardt, President Reichsben Direction Berlin, vigorously protesting West police action. Lipschitz described letter as provocative, insulting and not deserving answer. He intends answer letter indirectly by press statement which will mention, inter alia, that West police acting under principles laid down by Western Commandants. (Lipschitz has reference to instruction from Allied Kommandatura dated May 10, 1956, stating Trapes permitted on operating property of Reichsbahn for purpose insuring safe operation TS facilities but should be apprehended if they exceed this function.

Asked to comment on intelligence report that Trapo activity instigated by GDR as test of Western firmness in event GDR flags flown on S-bahn property May 1, Lipschitz stated his information indicated Trapo action resulted over-zealousness new recruits. He did not rpt not believe GDR would attempt hoist flags on S-bahn property May Day, though of course West police prepared to cope with situation if attempt made.

(Cont)

All West Berlin papers reported S-bahn incidents fully and gave prominer: coverage to Sen. Lipschitz's statement Apr 23 that provocations would not be tolerated and therefore S-bahn patrols being strengthened. East Berlin press carried detailed reports of incidents labeling measures taken by West police as latest/series provocations against S-bahn. SED organ Neues Deutschland claimed such "provocation" were aimed at poisoning presummit atmosphere and remarked that, although conversion of West Berlin into "free city" would be best solution even if interim solution would assure all such provocations would be stopped.

April (Confidential)

Arrest of two GDR transportation police in British sector: Two West police patroling S-bahn Savigny Platz (British sector) arrested two Trapos 1835 hours April 5. One Trapo allegedly used provocative language, laid hands on West policeman who immediately subdued and diarmed opponent. Second Traps also disarmed and both taken into custody. Investigating magistrate issued arrest warrant late afternoon today charging "illegal assumption of authority."

In addition to more frequent police patrols ordered April 23, Commander West police today ordered two-man patrols at all West S-bahn stations.

All West papers carried brief factual reports this incident. Neues Deutschland was only East paper to report it. Paper carried lengthy backpage account under headlines, "a new unh ard of provocation - transport police abducted," "example of abnormal situation in West Berlin."

April

Berlin Senate statement on second transport police incident: The West Berlin Senate today in strong terms (Unclassified) repudiated the excesses by Soviet Zone transport police at West Berlin S-bahn stations. The Senate statement observed that the transport police were only authorized to take measures necessary to safeguard technical operations. All Reich rail/ premises in West Berlin, it added, were West Berlin sovereign territory, on which the Senate would tolerate no excesses. The statement expressly pointed out that the Senate was making these observations in agreement with the principles of the Allied Kommandature with regard to this matter. holdes on but he in their not serrous bld to see

April (Cont.)

A spokesman of the Senate stated that the letter of Heinz Gebhardt, President of the Berlin Reich Directorate, protesting against the action taken by the West Berlin police against members of the transport police, will not be answered.

April 28 (Unclassified)

Statement by GDR Transport Minister Kramer and Gerhart Eisler on transport police incidents: East press April 28 carried statement given by GDR Transport Minister Kramer to ADN (East German News Agency), in which Kramer protested against "deliberate" West Berlin police action obstructing Trapos from performing their duties, and demanding immediate release two "pos held under arrest. Kramer stated such "provocations" hinder S-bahn operations and endanger traffic; responsibility for consequences rests with West Berlin Senat. He concluded that such provocations were in line with West Berlin and West German efforts obstruct summit conference.

As reported by West press, Chief SED propagandist Gerhart Eisler in radio broadcast April 27, repeated claim GDR sovereignty over S-bahn property in West Berlin. He claimed GDR is in position to stop these "provocations" of West Berlin police. "West Berlin authorities should recognize that 90 percent of freight traffic from FedRep to West Berlin passes through GDR territory. Wouldn't it he disturbing if traffic to West Berlin were disrupted as of interference and arrests on S-bahn?" West press also cites reply of Berlin Senat spokesman to effect that Eisler's views are not to be taken too seriously, referring to his threat last year that special taxes be put on Berlin traffic to finance work of GDR security service, and recalling that no action taken.