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RADIO PROPAGANDA REPORT

SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE GERMAN QUESTION
FROM THE 1958 BERLIN CRISIS TO DATE

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

Foreword

This report reviews Soviet propaganda on the German question from November 1958, when Khrushchev initiated the Berlin crisis, to the present. It delineates the basic Soviet propaganda position and traces the tactical shifts that have developed in the period leading up to the coming talks at the summit.

East German propaganda is alluded to only peripherally, in some instances when it has diverged from or significantly elaborated Moscow's line.

The report is basically designed as a research aid. The five Appendix tabs collate Soviet elite statements, primarily Khrushchev's, on key aspects of the German and Berlin problems.

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE GERMAN QUESTION
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Contents

SUMMARY 1

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS 2

I. THE POSITION ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT

 Tactical Changes Since Khrushchev's U.S. Visit 3

 Portrayal of Trend Toward More "Realistic" Western Approach 4

 Basic Stand Unchanged but Interim Berlin Accord Seen "Possible" 5

II. THE CENTRAL THEME: A GERMAN PEACE TREATY

 The Threat of a Separate Peace Treaty 7

 Use of Separate Treaty Consequences as Pressure Tactic

 Pre-Detente Development of the Separate Treaty Threat

 Progression of the Threat Since November 1959

 Peace Treaty as Only Effective Answer to "Menace" of Rearmed Germany. . 12

 Stress on the "Danger" of West German Rearmament 13

 Warnings of Retaliation Against West German Aggression

 Abusive Treatment of Adenauer

III. THE LOCUS OF PRESSURE: WEST BERLIN

 The Free City Proposal 18

 The Current Status of West Berlin 19

 Warnings About the Danger of War

 Insistence on Stopping Western "Subversion"

 Charges that the West Violated the Potsdam Agreement

 Attacks on Bonn's "Claims" to West Berlin

 Time Limits for a Berlin Settlement 24

 The Threat to Western Access 27

 The Role of East Berlin 29

(Continued)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND45358
By SA NARA Date 8/20/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

IV. REUNIFICATION: AN ISSUE "FOR THE GERMANS THEMSELVES"	29
V. THE GENEVA FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE: A REVIEW OF PROPAGANDA POSITIONS AND TACTICS	
The March-April "Thaw"	31
GDR Participation: A Preliminary Victory	32
Package Plan versus Peace Treaty	34
Interim Berlin Discussion; Charges of Western Intransigence	34
The Rapprochement	36

APPENDIX

Soviet Elite Statements on a Separate Soviet-GDR Peace Treaty	ii
Soviet Elite Statements on Time Limits for a Berlin Settlement	xix
Khrushchev's Warnings of Retaliation Against West German Aggression	xxviii
Examples of Khrushchev's Strong Attacks on Adenauer	xxxi
Khrushchev's Warnings About a War Danger Inherent in the German/Berlin Situation	xxxv

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 1 -

SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE GERMAN QUESTION

FROM THE 1958 BERLIN CRISIS TO DATE

Summary

1. A basic continuity has been maintained in Soviet propaganda on Germany since the Berlin crisis of 1958. On the eve of the summit talks Moscow presses for the same solution of the German problem it proposed in the winter of 1958-59: a peace treaty with both German states that would sharply restrict German armaments, liquidate the occupation of West Berlin, and convert the latter into a "free city." Moscow continues to threaten a separate peace treaty with the East Germans, which it says would give them control over access routes to Berlin, if agreement is not reached on an all-German treaty.
2. Tactical shifts in the propaganda line have occurred from time to time, most notably a softening during the period surrounding Khrushchev's U.S. visit. Since the advent of the "Camp David spirit" Moscow has refrained from putting precise time limits on the duration of Western rights in Berlin. There was a brief moratorium on personal abuse of Adenauer during the single month of September--although renewed vitriolic attacks on the Chancellor and continued assaults on the "militarism" of Bonn and (to a lesser extent) of "NATO circles" contravene Moscow's pleas for abstention from any action that would "heat up the atmosphere." The separate-treaty threat, dating from February 1959, was suspended--but only from mid-August to mid-November.
3. The consequences of the threatened USSR-GDR separate treaty have been made progressively more explicit since December as regards Western rights in and access to Berlin. This progression culminated in Khrushchev's statements in France (25 March and 2 April) that a separate treaty would end the "occupation regime." At the same time, leaving unclear the point at which a decision to sign a separate treaty would be made, Moscow has been careful not to specify lack of progress at the summit as grounds for such action. Khrushchev only once came close to intimating as much, when in his 29 February Jakarta press conference he juxtaposed a reiteration of the separate-treaty threat with a reference to the summit talks.
4. The possibility that an interim Berlin agreement might be discussed fruitfully at the summit was brought up directly and authoritatively for the first time in a 14 April PRAVDA Observer article. Agreement on separate Berlin negotiations was the one concrete result of the Geneva foreign ministers meeting that Moscow has periodically praised. However, the propaganda has seldom recalled in so many words that these separate negotiations were on an interim agreement that would maintain the occupation rights, but with new restrictions, while an all-German committee negotiated on a peace treaty and unification. And the propaganda stress has continued to be on the maximum Soviet goals.

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Authority NND 95358
8/20/09
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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 2 -

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

- 10 Nov. 58 Khrushchev Demands End to Berlin Occupation, Threatens to Transfer Soviet Functions in Berlin to GDR
- 27 Nov. 58 USSR Proposes "Free" City of West Berlin, Threatens to Transfer Access Controls to GDR in Six Months
- 10 Jan. 59 USSR Submits Draft All-German Peace Treaty
- 17 Feb. 59 Khrushchev Introduces Threat of Separate USSR-GDR Peace Treaty With Consequent Cut-Off of Western Access to Berlin
- 24 Feb. 59 Khrushchev Rejects Foreign Ministers Meeting Proposed in 16 February Western Note, Counterproposes Summit Conference
- 2 Mar. 59 USSR Proposes Summit or Foreign Ministers Conference
- 11 May 59 Foreign Ministers Conference Convenes in Geneva Following Agreement Reached 30 March
- 30 May 59 Ministers Begin Discussion of Interim Berlin Agreement
- 10 June 59 Gromyko Proposes 12-Month Interim Agreement on Berlin
- 19 June 59 Gromyko Extends Interim to 18 Months; Foreign Ministers Recess; Khrushchev Again Threatens Access, Rejects Idea of GDR Acting as "Agent" of USSR in Controlling Access
- 13 July 59 Foreign Ministers Conference Resumes
- 5 Aug. 59 Foreign Ministers Adjourn Two Days After Announcement of Khrushchev-Eisenhower Exchange of Visits
- 29 Sep. 59 Khrushchev Confirms Camp David Agreement that There Should Be No Fixed Time Limit on Berlin Negotiations
- 1 Dec. 59 Khrushchev Threatens Separate Treaty, First Time Since 18 August
- 30 Dec. 59 USSR Agrees to 16 May Summit Meeting in Paris
- 19 Feb. 60 Moscow Releases Ambassador Smirnov's 13 January Threat that Separate Treaty Would End Western Access to Berlin
- 25 Mar. 60 Khrushchev Specifies Berlin Occupation Would Be Ended by Separate Treaty--First Such Statement Since 19 June
- 2 Apr. 60 Khrushchev Reiterates Separate Treaty Would End Occupation; State Department Denies Occupation Could Be So Ended
- 4 Apr. 60 Khrushchev Threatens Separate Treaty, but Not Consequences
- 14 Apr. 60 PRAVDA Observer Says Interim Berlin Agreement "Quite Possible"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 3 -

SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE GERMAN QUESTION
FROM THE 1958 BERLIN CRISIS TO DATE

I. THE POSITION ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT MEETING

Soviet propaganda on the eve of the May summit talks continues to press for the solution of the German problem advanced by the USSR in the winter of 1958-59: a peace treaty with the two German states that would, among other things, liquidate the occupation regime in West Berlin and establish a free city. Moscow continues to threaten that if the West does not agree to a peace treaty, the bloc will sign a separate one with the GDR.

At the same time, the propaganda has indicated that discussions specifically on the Berlin problem could take up where the foreign ministers conference left off in August 1959. PRAVDA's Observer on 14 April of this year called a "temporary and partial" agreement on Berlin "quite possible." Yet as recently as 29 February, Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet position that there can be no satisfactory long-term Berlin solution unless the free-city proposal is accepted.

Moscow presents a peace treaty as a step toward reunification, but makes it clear at the same time that the responsibility of the Big Four ends with the peace treaty; reunification must be brought about "by the Germans themselves."

Tactical Changes Since Khrushchev's U.S. Visit

The "Camp David spirit" has influenced the tone and tactics of the propaganda, not its basic substance. Three tactical changes were only temporary:

1. There was a decrease in the overall volume of Moscow's propaganda on the German question during September and October 1959, when the spirit of detente was pervasive in propaganda surrounding Khrushchev's U.S. visit.
2. For three months surrounding Khrushchev's visit, from mid-August to mid-November, Moscow suspended its threats of a separate peace treaty with the GDR.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 4 -

3. Personal attacks on Chancellor Adenauer were suspended from late August through September.

Other aspects of the propaganda whose inception coincided with the advent of the "Camp David spirit" are still evident:

1. No precise time limits on the duration of Western occupation rights in Berlin are specified, although Moscow continues to urge their abolition and even to threaten their unilateral "liquidation" by means of a separate peace treaty. Fixing no time limits on negotiations over the Berlin occupation question (in accordance with the Camp David agreement), Moscow insists only that such negotiations not be dragged out indefinitely.
2. The West Germans or "NATO circles"--not Washington, London, or Paris--are blamed for the rearming of West Germany, which Moscow represents as a "menace" underscoring the urgent need for a peace treaty.

Portrayal of Trend Toward More "Realistic" Western Approach

Since the Khrushchev-Eisenhower talks at Camp David, Moscow has from time to time professed to see signs of growing detente in a greater Western appreciation--even at the highest level--of the reasons for the Soviet stand, at least on Berlin. The idea propagandists have sought to put across is that there is no change in the Soviet position; only the West has changed in the direction of recognizing the need for negotiations on Berlin.

Khrushchev, speaking at Luzhniki Stadium on 28 September after returning from the United States, asserted that "I think we succeeded" in convincing President Eisenhower that the Soviet position on a time limit for negotiations on Germany had been "misinterpreted in the West." All comment on Khrushchev's statement to a TASS correspondent the following day (which constituted his formal affirmation of the Camp David agreement that no time limit should be fixed) stressed that the Eisenhower-Khrushchev agreement represented no real change and certainly no concession from the USSR.

President Eisenhower's press conference of 28 September, in which he for the first time referred to the Berlin situation as "abnormal," was hailed by Moscow commentators as proof that the President also

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 5 -

had recognized the need to alter the city's status.* It was even said to display "an evident rapprochement of positions and a realistic approach to the solution of the Berlin question."

Moscow's use of the word "abnormal" to describe the Berlin situation (part of a divided city controlled by a hostile occupying force in the midst of the territory of a bloc state) has been a staple in bloc propaganda on Berlin since November 1958, used as the basis for many ominous warnings of the danger that war might flare up there. The President's use of the word, in the 28 September 1959 press conference and later on 17 February 1960, is still frequently recalled by commentators. Propaganda during Adenauer's visit to the United States in March 1960 relied heavily on it as evidence of a basic difference between Eisenhower and Adenauer. Other Western leaders are presumed to agree with Eisenhower; Khrushchev himself, writing to Adenauer on 28 January 1960, said that "our partners" in the forthcoming summit conference "admit that the situation in Berlin is abnormal."

Basic Stand Unchanged But Interim Berlin Accord Seen "Possible"

In the midst of its talk of negotiations and a trend toward better understanding, Moscow has continued to stress its basic demand for a Berlin settlement via a peace treaty. On 23 December 1959 IZVESTIA repeated almost verbatim, though without attribution, one of Khrushchev's most truculent statements--his 30 May 1959 remark in Albania that "we do not have to make any concessions because our proposals are not for bartering." The context was a discussion of the Western summit conference declaration on the Berlin problem.

Soviet commentators have occasionally, in the months following the foreign ministers conference, called for resumption of four-power

* The President used these words to explain what he meant by "abnormal": "Here is a free city, sitting inside a communist country, and 110 miles from the Western Germany of which it feels it is a part."

The U.S. note to the USSR of 31 December 1958 had also used the term "abnormal" to describe the Berlin situation, and the reference was cited in the Soviet note of 10 January 1959. But propagandists did not then generally portray Washington as recognizing West Berlin's "abnormality."

** Macmillan and De Gaulle have never been explicitly quoted as recognizing West Berlin's "abnormality." Moscow did not pick up British Foreign Secretary Lloyd's reference to it in June 1959 at the Geneva foreign ministers conference.

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 6 -

discussion on Berlin at the point where the foreign ministers left off; but they have seldom specified that this point was discussion of an interim agreement. Thus specific endorsement of an interim agreement has been avoided. And such comment has almost always been in the context of criticism of Adenauer for opposing negotiations on Berlin alone.

Not until 14 April, a month before the summit talks are to open, did Moscow indicate explicitly and authoritatively that the USSR expects the summit meeting to resume the foreign ministers' negotiations on an interim Berlin agreement. PRAVDA said the foreign ministers meeting had shown that "individual provisions" could be worked out for an interim agreement and expressed confidence that progress towards a "partial and temporary" settlement on Berlin could be made at the summit and subsequent four-power meetings. As usual, the details of such an agreement were not spelled out.

Three days after the PRAVDA Observer article, but carrying the same date, the GDR published proposals for an interim Berlin settlement in the form of an open letter from Ulbricht to the workers of West Germany. The proposals call for a "gradual reduction of military forces and the step-by-step abolition of the occupation status" and for bans on the stationing of nuclear weapons in Berlin and on anti-communist subversive and propaganda activities.

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BSS NARA Date 8/20/09

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 7 -

II. THE CENTRAL THEME: A GERMAN PEACE TREATY

The peace treaty for Germany proposed by the USSR on 10 January 1959 is presented as the best answer to the alleged threat to peace posed by German rearming--particularly "atomic arming"--and as a virtual panacea for the "tensions" in Europe allegedly resulting from the lasting "remnants of World War II."

The possibility that the Soviet Union might sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR was first raised by Khrushchev on 17 February 1959 in Tula, as an alternative if agreement is not reached with the West along the lines of the all-German treaty proposed by the USSR in January.

While since December there has been a steady progression in detailing the consequences of a separate peace treaty for the Allied position in Berlin, these increasingly detailed threats have not been accompanied by a corresponding effort to build up a sense of urgency about a peace treaty. Soviet spokesmen have been vague about exactly what circumstances would lead the USSR to sign a separate treaty with the GDR. Khrushchev's reiteration of the separate peace treaty threat on 4 April 1960, upon his return to Moscow from Paris, was accompanied by a sanguine statement of the conviction that sooner or later the West would agree to an all-German peace treaty as proposed by the USSR.

A. The Threat of a Separate Treaty

Since the separate treaty threat was introduced by Khrushchev in February 1959, it has been reiterated primarily at the elite level. The number of these elite restatements has been considerable: 20 in the five and a half months between 17 February and the announcement of Khrushchev's visit to the United States (11 of these by Khrushchev himself), and 12 in the seven and a half months since the visit announcement (nine by Khrushchev).* The threat was voiced no less than 11 times during the course of the Geneva foreign ministers conference.

* TAB A of this report, Appendix page ii, reproduces all Soviet elite statements, beginning with Khrushchev's initial one in February 1959, that have threatened a separate peace treaty.

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 8 -

Use of Separate Treaty Consequences as Pressure Tactic

Sometimes, in these statements, the separate peace treaty has been presented only as a device for spreading peace in Europe. But Khrushchev on six occasions during the winter and spring of 1959 (from 24 February to 19 June) said explicitly that it would "liquidate" or "invalidate" Western occupation rights in Berlin, and he revived this formulation of the threat on 25 March and 2 April 1960 during his visit to France.

The threat to conclude a separate treaty* has thus been used to put the West under pressure--a pressure that may be intensified or modified by detailing, obscuring, or failing to mention the consequences of such an action. It is these consequences, relating to Western rights in and access to Berlin, that Moscow has used as a lever in its tactics toward the West.

While of course the GDR, as well as West Germany, would be one of the signatories to the Soviet draft "all-German" peace treaty, Moscow takes the position that a treaty between bloc states and the GDR alone would establish a juridical basis for the invalidation of all presently existing Western rights within the borders of the GDR. It would be a fait accompli which the West could not overcome or surmount without resort to force to keep access routes open.

Pre-Detente Development of the Separate Treaty Threat

At the very beginning of the Berlin crisis, Moscow threatened that the Soviet Union would take unilateral action to achieve its aims regarding Germany if the West refused to cooperate. In his speech on 10 November 1958 Khrushchev warned that eventually "the Soviet Union, for its part, will hand over to the sovereign GDR those functions in Berlin which are still exercised by Soviet organs." This threatened transfer of access controls was linked with a six-month time limit on 27 November 1958, and thereafter referred to in the propaganda as "the well-known announced measures" relating to Berlin. The transfer of access controls was tied to the separate peace treaty threat from the outset when the threat was voiced by Khrushchev on 17 February 1959** in

* A suggestion put forward by East German Premier Grotewohl on 10 February 1960--that the West sign a separate peace treaty with West Germany and the East with East Germany, with the consequences of this for Berlin left unspecified--was reported by TASS and PRAVDA, but never commented on by Moscow. It was revived in a Grotewohl press conference of 25 March, which Moscow also reported without comment.

** This was the day after the Western powers proposed a foreign ministers conference on Germany, in a note in which they reaffirmed their intention to maintain their communications with West Berlin.

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 9 -

Tula; that speech included Khrushchev's first reference--and his only one in the period under review--to the possibility of a new Berlin airlift. If a peace treaty is signed with the two German states, "or with one of them," he said, the GDR would acquire

all the rights and will be bound by all the obligations of a sovereign state. And these rights of the GDR will be guaranteed by international law.

Therefore, no encroachment whatever on the territory of the GDR, in whose center Berlin lies, can be permitted, either by land, air, or water. Any violation of the sovereignty of the GDR will meet with a vigorous rebuff, irrespective of whether it will happen on water, on land, or in the air. All this should be considered by the gentlemen imperialists.

Thus Khrushchev seemed to regard a peace treaty--with both German states or with the GDR alone--as necessary to realizing GDR sovereignty in practice, although on 10 November he had referred to the GDR as already "sovereign."

One week later, in a Kremlin speech on 24 February while Macmillan was in Moscow, Khrushchev went so far as to assert that a peace treaty "with the two German states, or with one of them" would invalidate not only the "occupation status" of the West in Berlin but "the agreement on the division of Berlin into sectors." A broadcast to North America two days later reminded listeners that Khrushchev might take this step, ending Berlin's division, "if the West sabotages a treaty for both states." This suggestion that a separate peace treaty might result in the fusion of West with East Berlin and thereby absorb the whole city into the GDR is unique in Soviet propaganda.* Soviet propaganda on the free-city proposal notes GDR willingness to refrain from any interference in the internal order of West Berlin. But Moscow has refrained from speculation on how the USSR might regard West Berlin's status in the event that the free-city proposal was finally rejected by the West and a separate treaty signed with the GDR.

Subsequent repetitions of the possibility of a separate peace treaty generally remained at the elite level, particularly after East-West

* An unusual home service commentary on 21 March 1960 did, however, claim that all Berlin is "the capital of the GDR" since the authority for the Western occupation of West Berlin has lapsed. West Berlin was occupied under lapsed Potsdam agreements which provided for German unity, the commentator asserted, and also because Berlin was the headquarters of the now-defunct Allied Control Council.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 10 -

negotiations on the German question were finally agreed upon on 30 March 1959. Routine commentators for the most part avoided the issue and, when they did mention it, echoed the elite statements without amplification.

Soviet leaders insisted, even while warning that they were considering a separate peace treaty with "all the consequences," that the aim of such a treaty was peace and international harmony; Khrushchev and others even engaged in a play upon the word "peace" by asking rhetorically how their wish to make peace with the GDR can be called a threat. In keeping with this line, there were few references to military force directly linked with this subject. But on three occasions--17 February, 9 March, and 19 June 1959--Khrushchev stated explicitly that the Soviet Union would support the GDR by all military means if GDR sovereignty were challenged by the West after a separate peace treaty was signed. These assurances of military support were not repeated in routine comment.

Progression of the Threat Since November 1959

Following the fairly frequent Soviet elite references to a separate treaty between May and August, there was a suspension of the threat during the period surrounding Khrushchev's U.S. visit. During the four months following the announcement that he would go to the United States, Khrushchev voiced the threat only once, in a single sentence in his letter to Adenauer of 18 August 1959, and then did not refer to the consequences of a separate treaty. The only other Soviet references to a separate treaty during this period appeared in a PRAVDA editorial of 28 August, quoting Khrushchev's letter to Adenauer, and in a TASS statement of 18 November (on Adenauer's remarks about Berlin to British newsmen), where it was inserted only parenthetically. Since then, however, the threat has been renewed and progressively sharpened:

1. Renewal in December: On 1 December, Khrushchev dwelt at length on the German question--for the first time since his return from the United States--and climaxed a polemic against the West Germans with the explicit statement that a continuation of their "policy of strength" might necessitate a separate treaty with the GDR.*

* This speech was delivered at the Hungarian party congress in Budapest. Khrushchev may have selected it as the forum for renewing the offensive on the German question because it was his first speech to a bloc audience since his U.S. visit and a good occasion to reassure that audience that detente did not mean major concessions. Other speakers at the congress, even East German, made no mention of the subject.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 11 -

But he still said nothing about the consequences of a separate treaty for the occupying powers, and his tone was regretful rather than bellicose (as it had been, for example, on 19 June 1959). A few routine Moscow commentaries echoed Khrushchev's 1 December formulation. The subject was then dropped until mid-January.

2. "Consequences," Undefined: The threat was revived in Khrushchev's major address to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960. This time he spoke of the "consequences" of a separate treaty, but did not define them.
3. "Consequences for Berlin": The next step in the progression was to refer specifically to "consequences for Berlin," but without spelling them out. Such references appeared in Khrushchev's letter to Adenauer of 28 January and in the declaration issued on 4 February by the member states of the Warsaw Pact.
4. Elaboration on 19 February: These references were climaxed by the release on 19 February of an official memorandum from the Soviet embassy in Bonn, detailing a conversation between Soviet Ambassador Smirnov and West German SPD leaders which took place on 13 January. This document not only reiterated the threat of a separate peace treaty but asserted that such a treaty would establish full GDR sovereignty "over all its territory and air space," "discontinue" existing Western access rights to Berlin, and force the West to renegotiate those rights with the GDR alone. If the West refused to do so and violated the GDR's territorial integrity or air space, the Soviet Union would "render all necessary support to the GDR in defending its sovereignty."

The explicit warning that the Western powers' access rights to Berlin would have to be renegotiated in the event of a separate treaty remains unique in post-detente bloc propaganda. Khrushchev has, however, continued to threaten a separate peace treaty with "consequences for Berlin," and on 25 March and 2 April he specified that such a unilateral Soviet action would "liquidate the occupation regime in West Berlin." He had not previously made this decisive "consequence" explicit since 19 June 1959.

Khrushchev himself has refrained since his U.S. visit from openly threatening military force against the Western powers if they insist on maintaining their current access and occupation rights following a separate treaty, as he did on three occasions during the period February through June 1959. But Moscow is clearly on record, most recently in the Smirnov memorandum released 19 February of this year, as ready to support the GDR firmly in any showdown over access rights that might follow the conclusion of a separate treaty. And it may be presumed that the more often the separate treaty is mentioned

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

12 -

and linked with such assurances of support, the more difficult it would be for the propaganda to explain away a retreat by the bloc should such a crisis arise.

B. Peace Treaty as Only Effective Answer to "Menace" of Rearmed Germany

The Soviet note to the Western powers of 10 January 1959, accompanying the Soviet draft peace treaty for Germany, set the tone for all subsequent propaganda by presenting a German peace treaty as the only effective answer to the "menace" posed by Adenauer's policy of reviving German militarism:

It should be pointed out that due to the absence of a peace treaty, German militarism in West Germany is again rearing its head and gaining in strength. This cannot but worry the Soviet people as well as other European peoples on whom militarist Germany has repeatedly visited grave calamities and sufferings. A peace treaty promoting the peaceful development of Germany would create the necessary conditions to make impossible a recurrence of the tragic events of the past when German militarists involved mankind in devastating wars entailing tremendous human and material losses.

Addressing the 21st CPSU Congress two and a half weeks later, Khrushchev painted an even rosier picture of the effects of a German peace treaty:

The signing of a German peace treaty would immediately ease the tense situation in Europe. It would set up a firm legal order, would knock the ground from under the revanchist mood in Western Germany, free the German people from foreign occupation, and enable it to solve by itself all the questions of home and foreign policy.

For its part, the Soviet Union will exert every effort to insure the conclusion of a peace treaty and will act consistently and untiringly in this respect. The conclusion of a peace treaty will also lead to the settlement of the Berlin question on peace-loving and democratic principles and assure the conversion of West Berlin into a free city with an essential guarantee of noninterference in its affairs.

Exploitation of the peace treaty theme by Soviet propagandists since January 1959 has indeed been "consistent and untiring," and the subordination of the Berlin issue to the German peace treaty, at least

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 13 -

in terms of announced Soviet aims, has been undeviatingly maintained.* Through constant repetition, not only in comment on the German question but in such blocwide propaganda enterprises as World Peace Council meetings, workers' conferences, and visits by party and government delegations among bloc countries, the necessity of "struggle for a German peace treaty" has become sloganized and always appears ahead of the goal of "normalizing the Berlin situation."

Since West German "militarism and revanchism" is regarded as the chief threat to European security in general, the peace treaty is pictured as a decisive step toward a general European detente, and given primacy over such partial measures for European security as "disengagement" or an atom-free zone in central Europe.

Despite the heavy concentration of propaganda on the need for a peace treaty since the release of the Soviet draft, there was a two-month delay from the beginning of the Berlin crisis to the appearance of the draft (from 10 November 1958 to 10 January 1959), and during that time little was said about the need for a treaty.** In his press conference on 27 November 1958 Khrushchev did say that "the only realistic possibility to solve the German question once and for all is to reach a peaceful settlement with Germany," but he and routine propagandists generally argued (as in his SUEDEDEUTISCHE ZEITUNG interview of 12 December 1958) that a Berlin solution should be reached first, thereby laying the groundwork for solving "other, more complicated problems" relating to Germany. Since the proposal for a free city of Berlin was linked with the Soviet draft treaty, the propaganda has given no indication that any separation of the two would be acceptable or even negotiable.

C. Stress on the "Danger" of West German Rearmament

West German "militarism and revanchism" is, according to Soviet spokesmen from the highest to the lowest level, the greatest menace to peace in the world today. Khrushchev rarely mentions the German question,

* Even during the first three weeks of June 1959--when the Geneva foreign ministers conference was involved in an exclusive discussion of the Berlin issue and propagandists were concentrating more heavily on it than at any other time since the Soviet draft peace treaty was released--Khrushchev gave the peace treaty priority in his 19 June Kremlin speech, and it was strongly urged in three PRAVDA articles and two home service commentaries.

** Moscow could have been expected during that time to recall that in the spring of 1958 the subject of a peace treaty had been added to the Soviet-proposed agenda for summit talks.

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 14 -

and never discusses it in detail, without referring to Bonn's remilitarization. He did so even during his U.S. visit (at the National Press Club on 16 September) when he was otherwise making every effort to appear conciliatory. A continuing drumfire of radio propaganda plays upon this theme; since 10 November 1958 there have been only three weeks during which Moscow did not broadcast at least one full-length commentary on the dangers of West German militarism and the buildup of the Bundeswehr. There were 76 broadcasts on this theme during the week of 10-16 November 1958, following Khrushchev's 10 November announcement that the occupation of West Berlin must end.*

Since then the average weekly volume has remained at between five and 10 commentaries devoted exclusively to this subject, together with numerous brief references in other comment. In addition, there are frequent references to West German territorial claims and unwillingness to accept the consequences of Germany's defeat in World War II, which Moscow describes as "revanchism."

The comment on remilitarization does not directly charge (as has the less sophisticated propaganda of the GDR) that Bonn is planning aggression against East Germany or any other particular country at any particular time, but stresses that West German leaders cannot be trusted with the potential to launch an aggressive war. Similarly, it avoids any explicit charge that the Bundeswehr now possesses nuclear weapons, instead stating that Bonn "is being equipped" with rockets possessing nuclear capability, and predicting or implying that the inevitable next step is to realize that capability.

The distinction between NATO weapons under American control** and those under Bundeswehr control is consistently blurred, as is the distinction between different types of missiles. On a number of occasions the

* Although he said later, in his 27 November 1958 press conference, that he could not accept even a cessation of West German militarization as a price for giving up his Berlin demands, Khrushchev had linked the two issues on 10 November in justifying a changed status for West Berlin by pointing to alleged Western violations of the Potsdam agreement, chief among these being the rearming of West Germany. Routine commentators followed his lead.

** In discussing the President's 3 February 1960 press conference remarks on the possibility that the United States might share nuclear weapons with its allies, Soviet propaganda stressed the "danger" such weapons would constitute in West German hands.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Authority NND45358
8/20/09
CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 15 -

arrival of "Honest John" rockets in West Germany has been discussed in a manner calculated to convey the impression that they were at least IRBM's. An army, navy, and air force fully equipped with all available strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is consistently depicted as the goal of Bonn's policy.*

Warnings of Retaliation against West German Aggression

Both before and since the Camp David detente, Moscow has threatened full-scale Soviet retaliation against any West German aggression--and in exceedingly strong terms. The Soviet note to the Western powers of 27 November 1958, which detailed the USSR's proposals on Berlin and set the six-month time limit, warned that a war "unleashed" by Bonn "would inevitably transform the territory of Western Germany into a single theater of military action on which the belligerent parties would explode the maximum amount of thermonuclear weapons. Even if part of the people remain alive after this, they would not be fit to live."

Almost equally graphic threats of retaliation have been made by Khrushchev himself on 11 different occasions since 10 November 1958, two of them after the announcement of his visit to the United States.** In his 5 May 1959 interview with SPD editors he stated that West Germany could be obliterated by eight hydrogen bombs; in his letter to Adenauer of 18 August 1959 he warned that "in case of war" hydrogen bombs exploded on West German territory "would result not in a mere catastrophe but in wholesale destruction." On 14 January 1960, following a strongly worded attack on the dangers of reviving fascism in West Germany pegged to recent anti-Semitic incidents there, Khrushchev said that "should this foul creature want to crawl beyond its boundaries...it would be squashed on its own territory."

Similar threats of a devastating counterblow on West Germany in case of war have recently been made to German listeners by Radio Moscow's military commentator Colonel Vasilyev (12 February and 25 March 1960). The Soviet home audience has been told about such retaliation in a Supreme Soviet speech by Marshal Moskalenko (broadcast 16 January) as

* Despite this constant stress on a military menace from West Germany, Moscow only once officially suggested (in Khrushchev's 24 May 1958 speech to the Warsaw Treaty meeting) that the USSR might react by stationing rocket weapons in the GDR. Ulbricht's 26 January 1960 statement that he would ask the USSR for such weapons if West Germany persisted in arming itself with U.S. missiles was noted by Radio Moscow in two commentaries by Col. Vasilyev in German, but was otherwise ignored in Soviet propaganda.

** TAB C, Appendix page xxvii, reproduces a selection of these statements.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 16 -

well as in a commentary (16 February) which reviewed a speech by Adenauer at Cologne University. The propaganda concentration on the issue of West German militarization has not shown even a temporary decline during the period of detente.

Abusive Treatment of Adenauer

Personal criticism of Adenauer as the man basically responsible for the existence of a "German danger" has been utilized by Soviet propaganda to a degree and with a vehemence surpassed only in the case of attacks on the Shah of Iran among heads of government in the noncommunist world. Khrushchev's own attacks on the Chancellor are unparalleled in Soviet leaders' statements of the post-Stalin period.* Speaking to the 21st CPSU Congress on 27 January 1959, for example, Khrushchev pictured Adenauer as holding the Christian cross in one hand and an atomic bomb in the other, and told him that "according to the gospels" he was certain to go to hell. On 19 June 1959 he described him as a "megalomaniac." On 5 August he referred to his "senile prejudice." Routine commentators were quick to pick up and amplify these statements, sometimes in equally violent terms.

A temporary softening in Khrushchev's attitude toward Adenauer developed after Khrushchev received the Chancellor's reply to his letter of 18 August 1959; in a speech on 30 August he said that the Adenauer letter "produces a favorable impression." During the month of September, while Khrushchev was in the United States, Moscow propagandists refrained from direct attacks on Adenauer, drawing a careful distinction between him and "official Bonn" which for a time received all of the blame for "militarism and revanchism."

The attack was resumed on 2 October, when a commentary widely broadcast to foreign audiences stated that Adenauer "does not intend to renounce his present policy, which is aimed at equipping the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons."

The moratorium on Adenauer continued in the home service until 14 November. On that date, following the release of Soviet notes to the Big Three and West Germany protesting Bonn's plans for a new radio station in West Berlin, Khrushchev (in a speech to Soviet journalists) issued "a sharp rebuke" to Adenauer personally for the alleged plans.

* See TAB D, Appendix page xxxi, for a selection of the most extreme of these attacks.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 17 -

General and frequent criticism was then resumed, and on 14 January 1960 Khrushchev directly compared Adenauer with Hitler and said that he has "failed to draw a conclusion from the lesson given the German fascists and is embarking on their road."

Khrushchev has not yet again vilified Adenauer with the personal viciousness he displayed up to August 1959; but routine comment, mostly to European audiences, on Adenauer's visit to the United States in March described the Chancellor as the "most hateful" leader in the world today and characterized his speeches as "malicious hisses."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 18 -

III. THE LOCUS OF PRESSURE: WEST BERLIN

A. The Free City Proposal

The Soviet proposal for a new "free city" status for West Berlin, originally advanced in the Soviet notes to the Western powers on 27 November 1958, has been consistently and continually advocated in the propaganda ever since, though always subordinated to and linked with the peace treaty theme. (It is mentioned only in a single sentence in the Soviet draft peace treaty.) In his press conference on 27 November 1958 Khrushchev said that "it is impossible to think of anything better than our proposals" for West Berlin. Fifteen months later in Jakarta (29 February 1960) he still saw "no other way out."

The free-city plan, as presented 27 November 1958 and in subsequent propaganda, may be summarized as follows: all Western troops--except possibly for "token" contingents of both Western and Soviet soldiers--would be withdrawn from West Berlin, whose integrity as a "free city" would then be guaranteed by the Big Four, by the GDR, and possibly by the United Nations as well; the free city would have complete control over its internal affairs and unrestricted rights of trade with all nations, the GDR promising to permit access to the free city from "both the eastern and western directions"; West Berlin would prevent and suppress all "subversive activities," hostile propaganda, and recruiting of refugees from the bloc, particularly from the GDR; the Western "occupation regime" would be "liquidated"; and no connections with West Germany, other than economic, would be permitted. The free-city status would apply only to West Berlin; East Berlin would have no connection with it, since it is "the capital of the GDR."

Elite and routine propaganda has professed complete flexibility on the matter of the guarantees to be given a free city and access thereto, and propagandists have frequently abbreviated the original sloganized call for a "demilitarized free city" of West Berlin to simply a "free city." However, since they continue regularly to demand the abolition of the Western "occupation regime," it follows that any troops remaining in West Berlin could not be retained on the basis of any acknowledgment of current Western rights there.

Khrushchev's recent (25 March) statements on the military insignificance of the West's Berlin garrison were followed immediately--in the same answer to the same reporter's question--by a reiteration of the danger of war arising from the failure to solve the German question and a strongly worded repetition of the threat of a separate peace

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 19 -

treaty which would "liquidate the occupation regime." These statements underscore the Soviet concern with the Western garrison in Berlin as a political symbol of Western presence and authority rather than as a military menace. The presence of Western occupation troops--not their numbers, deployment, or equipment--is what Moscow regards as the "smoldering spark" that could ignite a new war.

Both Soviet and East German propagandists have stressed that, although West Berlin lies on GDR territory and ought logically to be included in it, the GDR is willing to make the "sacrifice" of permitting it to be a free city because it has a different social system from the GDR. In addition to promises that the USSR and GDR would guarantee the freedom of the free city, U.N. participation in these guarantees has occasionally been mentioned--twice by Khrushchev since his U.S. visit. On 1 December in Budapest he spoke of a Big Four guarantee of the integrity of the free city under U.N. "aegis," and on 2 April he said even more vaguely that "it would be very useful if the U.N. organization were involved to a certain extent" in such guarantees. But there is no guarantee expressed or implied that in the event the West persists in rejecting the free-city plan, the GDR would continue to refrain from demanding full control over West Berlin.

B. The Current Status of West Berlin

Although the Berlin issue itself (as distinct from West German "militarism and revanchism" and the need for a peace treaty) has not been a major theme in Soviet propaganda since Khrushchev's U.S. visit, propagandists still almost never mention West Berlin without describing it as a "hotbed of tension" and a thoroughly "abnormal" situation which holds a real danger of the outbreak of war. This characterization has remained constant in the propaganda since November 1958.

Other themes have received varying treatment:

Attacks on Western "subversive activities" against the bloc, directed from West Berlin, were widespread during the initial period of the Berlin crisis, but since the commencement of negotiations they have fluctuated sharply and for the most part have been played down by Moscow, though continually stressed by the GDR.

The assertion that Western rights in Berlin have been invalidated by Western violations of the Potsdam agreement, prominent in November 1958, has disappeared from Soviet propaganda* and is recalled only very infrequently by the GDR.

* However, a passage in the PRAVDA Observer article of 14 April 1960 may constitute a revival of this charge in a more oblique and conditional form. Referring to a U.S. statement of 2 April that a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 20 -

And demands that the Bonn government be absolutely excluded from West Berlin, a very minor theme at the beginning of the crisis, have since assumed increasing prominence.

Warnings About the Danger of War

The danger of war triggered in Berlin* was presented insistently and graphically in Soviet elite statements during November and December 1958. Comparing West Berlin to "a slow match taken to a powder barrel," the Soviet note to the Western powers of 27 November 1958 warned that "incidents arising here, even if they seem to be of local significance, in the situation of heated passions, suspicion, and reciprocal apprehensions, may cause a conflagration which will be difficult to put out." At his Kremlin press conference on the same day, Khrushchev stated that the occupation regime in West Berlin constituted so "abnormal" a situation that its perpetuation "would be to the advantage only of a party which pursues aggressive purposes" and would maintain indefinitely "the danger of the cold war turning into a third world war."

Gromyko's speech to the Supreme Soviet on 25 December 1958 included the grimmest threat made by official Moscow during the entire period since 10 November 1958:

Any provocation in West Berlin, any attempt at aggressive action against the GDR, could start a major war, in whose blaze millions and millions of people would perish and which would bring destruction and losses immeasurably greater than the last world war. The flame of war would inevitably spread to the continent of America because with modern military techniques, frontiers between distant and near theaters of war disappear for all practical purposes.

Although no subsequent warning of war dangers in West Berlin has equalled the tone of extreme menace conveyed by this Gromyko speech, such warnings continued at the highest level. They were voiced during the Geneva foreign ministers conference: in Khrushchev speeches at Riga on 11 June 1959 and at Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow on 23 July, and in Gromyko's speech of

separate peace treaty could not invalidate U.S. occupation rights in Berlin, Observer calls this a demand for the indefinite prolongation of the occupation regime and says such prolongation would be tantamount to a Western "annexation" of West Berlin, contrary to the "postwar allied agreements on Germany."

* TAB E, Appendix page xxxv, reproduces Khrushchev's references to this possibility.

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Authority NND 45358
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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 21 -

30 May at the conference and statement on the conference during its recess, 28 June. And they were reiterated by Khrushchev during his visit to the United States, when he three times mentioned the danger of war breaking out over Berlin. Khrushchev has since repeated this warning in his 1 December 1959 speech at Budapest and his 25 March 1960 press conference at the Diplomatic Press Association luncheon in Paris.

Routine propaganda tends to avoid explicit warnings about a possible outbreak of war over Berlin, but conveys this implication in repeated descriptions of the situation there as a "hotbed of tension" and so "abnormal" that it cannot and must not be indefinitely maintained. The main difference between pre- and post-detente propaganda on this theme is that it is increasingly the West Germans alone, rather than the West as a whole, who are accused of making every effort to maintain the tensions and the abnormal situation; elsewhere, according to Moscow, there is an increasing realization at least of the "abnormality" of the current status of West Berlin.

Insistence on Stopping Western "Subversion"

The necessity of suppressing Western "subversive activities" directed from West Berlin against the bloc was mentioned by Khrushchev in his 10 November 1958 speech that launched the Berlin crisis and set forth in more detail by the Soviet note of 27 November 1958 to the Western powers:

It is necessary to prevent West Berlin from being used any longer for intensified espionage, wrecking, or any other subversive activities against the socialist countries, against the GDR, the USSR, or, to quote the leaders of the U.S. Government, to prevent it being used for "indirect aggression" against the socialist camp countries.

Frequently repeated by propagandists through April 1959, this particular aspect of Moscow's dislike of the current status of Berlin was not mentioned at all during the initial phase of the Geneva foreign ministers conference, when the West's "package plan" and the Soviet draft peace treaty for Germany were being discussed. When the conference turned to the Berlin issue exclusively at the beginning of June, Soviet propaganda gave considerable emphasis to the charge of Western subversion--an emphasis which continued, though at somewhat reduced volume, until the end of the conference. On its last day (5 August) Gromyko announced, with echoes in routine propaganda, that some "rapprochement" with the Western powers on this question had taken place.

The subject then disappeared completely until the GDR's tenth anniversary on 6 October 1959, when (apparently in response to East German interest

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 22 -

in it) it was revived by Kozlov in two speeches in East Germany, and also in several Moscow broadcasts on the anniversary.

It then disappeared again until late in February 1960, with the exception of a single German-language commentary on Berlin on 23 October and the Soviet note of 12 November protesting West German plans to build a new radio transmitter in West Berlin. Since 22 February 1960,* perhaps in preparation for a revival of this subject at the summit meeting, a number of broadcasts have alluded to West Berlin as "a base of provocation and subversion against the Soviet Union, the GDR, and other peaceful states of Eastern Europe," calling this proof that it is indeed a "hotbed of tension." One of these commentaries (3 March) was widely broadcast to foreign audiences, and another (21 March) was carried in the home service.

Moscow's limited and periodic exploitation of this issue would suggest that it is not of fundamental concern to the USSR (although it is to the East Germans), and that it is employed primarily for tactical advantage--to reassure the GDR of Soviet support or to put pressure on the West for concessions when Berlin issues are being negotiated in isolation. Warnings that a war might break out over Berlin seem to be regarded as more effective propaganda than expressions of concern that Western spies are using that city to undermine the bloc.

Charges that the West Violated the Potsdam Agreement

Allegations about Western violations of the Potsdam agreement were advanced in November 1958 by Khrushchev and by the Soviet note on Berlin as a justification for Soviet denial of Western occupation rights in Berlin. In his press conference of 19 March 1959, however, Khrushchev admitted that such rights did exist--although he insisted they should no longer be exercised--and stated unequivocally that on frontier questions "the Potsdam and other agreements are and will remain valid."

Routine press and radio propaganda continued through May 1959 to refer with some frequency to Western violations of the Potsdam agreement; Gromyko mentioned it at the Geneva foreign ministers conference on 15 May. But the alleged violations were no longer offered as a basis for demanding the liquidation of the occupation regime, propagandists falling back on the argument that its "abnormality" and the tension and war danger surrounding it required its abolition.

* Shortly after a statement by West Berlin Mayor Willi Brandt and the issuance of the Smirnov memorandum.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45358
Date 8/20/09
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 23 -

Thus juridical issues have been abandoned in the propaganda on Berlin in favor of dependence on "life itself"--a phrase used in bloc propaganda on the German question as a euphemism for the necessity of recognizing the GDR. Since June 1959, references by Moscow to Western violations of the Potsdam agreement have been rare and perfunctory, with no conclusions regarding their effect on West Berlin's status spelled out.

Attacks on Bonn's "Claims" to West Berlin

West German political links with West Berlin have been attacked by Moscow as another aspect of West Berlin's current status that the USSR cannot accept, not only because of the illegality of those links but because they are seen as a part of West German "revanchist" ambitions to gain control of the GDR.

This theme first emerged as a major component of the Soviet propaganda position on West Berlin after Khrushchev's visit to the United States, although the Soviet view that "the Federal German Republic is not directly concerned with the status of Berlin" had been made clear as early as the 27 November 1958 notes and had been reiterated by Khrushchev on 5 May and 18 August 1959. Routine propagandists had raised this issue when criticizing the holding of Bundestag sessions, and especially the West German presidential elections of 1 July, in West Berlin.

The Soviet note of 12 November 1959, protesting West German plans to erect a transmitter in West Berlin as part of the proposed Deutschlandfunk radio network, stressed that West Germany had no rights in West Berlin, as did Khrushchev on 14 November and 1 December. Follow-up radio propaganda did not play up this issue, however, until Adenauer visited Berlin early in January 1960 and made a strongly worded speech on 11 January warning the Soviet Union that it would be destroyed in case of war. Propagandists then denounced as a "provocation" any and all activity by West German officials or citizens in West Berlin, or even their presence except in the capacity of "tourists." And in his 28 January letter to Adenauer Khrushchev once again made a point of rejecting any legitimate West German interest in West Berlin. The Warsaw Pact declaration of 4 February 1960 and a number of commentaries during that month pursued this theme, but during March it was subordinated to renewed stress on the "abnormality" of the occupation regime.

Moscow has linked the demand that West Germany maintain close political ties with West Berlin mainly to Adenauer and Bonn. Direct personal attacks on West Berlin Mayor Brandt have been rarer than during the Geneva foreign ministers conference; when he is attacked, Brandt is pictured as a toady to Adenauer rather than as an initiator of a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 PROPAGANDA REPORT
 22 APRIL 1960

- 24 -

policy of West German involvement in the affairs of his city. GDR propagandists attack Brandt more frequently and viciously, and also give more constant and consistent stress to the campaign against West German links with Berlin than Moscow has yet done; but, like Moscow, they present Adenauer and his ministers as the basic source of Bonn's "claims" to Berlin.

C. Time Limits for a Berlin Settlement

Despite the continued urgency of its demands for an end to the Western occupation, the Soviet Union has set successively longer and more imprecise time limits for a Berlin settlement. Originally fixed at six months in the 27 November 1958 notes, the time limit was extended informally to seven, eight and nine months; at the Geneva conference, Gromyko proposed 12- and 18-month interim agreements on Berlin. The time limit finally became indefinite (though with a proviso against prolonged procrastination) in the Camp David agreement. Khrushchev himself--like propaganda at all levels--has revealed some defensiveness about these time limits, and it has been consistently denied that they ever constituted any kind of ultimatum.

The unadulterated six-month time limit had actually a very short life in the propaganda. Announced explicitly and unequivocally as such in the Soviet notes of 27 November 1958 and in Khrushchev's press conference on the same day, it was repeated in a PRAVDA editorial of 29 November and an IZVESTIA article broadcast in German on 3 December, as well as in a number of routine radio commentaries between 27 November and 3 December.

After 3 December, though the urgency of a Berlin settlement continued to be stressed, Moscow ceased to mention the six-month time limit. (However, GDR commentators continued for some time periodically to recall it.)

On 24 January 1959 the first hint of flexibility in the time limit appeared in a statement by Mikoyan at a Kremlin press conference. He mentioned American press objections to the six-month time limit, and qualified it by saying that "if we are convinced of good will on the part of the Western powers to negotiate with the object of ending the occupation regime in West Berlin" the talks might be extended for as much as three months beyond the time limit.

Mikoyan's statement was not followed up for some time, but twice during March (at Leipzig in East Germany on 5 March and at a Kremlin press conference on 19 March) Khrushchev announced a similar modification, averring that the date of 27 May, when the original six-month limit would expire, was "not an ultimatum" but an "approximate date." If negotiations were in process, he said, they could certainly continue

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 25 -

for one or even two months past that date. A PRAVDA editorial echoed this formulation on 22 March, and then the propaganda again dropped the subject. The Geneva foreign ministers conference met some two weeks before the expiration of the six-month time limit, and 27 May 1959 passed without comment by Moscow.

On 10 June, at the conference, Gromyko introduced a new version of the time limit, now applying it to the duration of an interim agreement on the status of West Berlin which would maintain the occupation regime until the allotted time was up; its future after the expiration was left unclear.

The new limit set by Gromyko was one year, during which time "an agreed solution of the problems of a peace treaty and the reunification of Germany" must be attained by an all-German committee composed of representatives of East and West Germany. This one-year time limit, presented as a Soviet step toward meeting the position of the West, was widely publicized.

Khrushchev, in his bellicose speech of 19 June, insisted that he could never agree "to perpetuate the present position in Germany," but at the same time explained that "establishing the time limit is in no way the main question" but solely a means of preventing Adenauer from frustrating any agreement.

On the same day, as the Geneva foreign ministers conference was going into recess, Gromyko extended the one-year time limit to 18 months and modified its ultimatum-like character by stating that if no solutions "of the questions related to the peaceful settlement with Germany and Germany's reunification" had been arrived at by the all-German committee at the end of the 18 months, the Big Four "could take up the question of West Berlin once again."

And on 28 June, speaking in Moscow, Gromyko chose to address himself to Western "misinterpretations" of the latest Soviet proposal which led the West to conclude that at the end of 18 months its rights in Berlin would expire.

Declining to offer any guarantee that the West's occupation rights in West Berlin would not lapse with the expiration of the time limit, Gromyko said only that Soviet willingness to continue negotiations after that expiration "speaks for itself."

Moscow propaganda from the resumption of the Geneva foreign ministers conference on 13 July until its adjournment three weeks later played up the contrast between the 18-month period and Secretary Herter's 28 July proposal for a five-year interim agreement on West Berlin. Herter's proposal was called "procrastination" and "a blind." In

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 26 -

his final speech at the conference, on 5 August 1959, Gromyko reiterated that the five-year proposal was "unacceptable" but saw a distinct East-West rapprochement in the fact that both sides had suggested time limits on an interim Berlin agreement.

After the time limit was made indefinite in the Camp David agreement, it ceased to be discussed in the propaganda. Khrushchev's 29 September statement, confirming the agreement in the form of an answer to a TASS question, was given normal publicity and echoed briefly in comment which denied that it represented any change in Soviet policy or that any ultimatum had ever existed.

The Polish paper ZYCIE WARSZAWY (1 October) went farther than any Soviet source in specifically recalling the original six-month time limit and concluding that "the Soviet Government was perhaps too optimistic in thinking that six months would suffice for the United States to understand this attitude /that the status of West Berlin must be changed/, but it was not so far wrong after all." Moscow did not choose to indulge in such self-congratulation over the effectiveness of the time limit; and although the "Camp David spirit" has been glorified, the specific provisions of the Camp David agreement are very rarely recalled. Although Khrushchev went out of his way in his 1 December 1959 Budapest speech to disavow "fixing any time limits" or issuing any ultimatums, and referred to the detente resulting from his talks with Eisenhower, he made no mention of the terms of the Camp David agreement.

A Berlin settlement has been discussed with no increased urgency, despite the progression in detailing the consequences of a separate treaty. On 29 February 1960, in his press conference in Jakarta, Khrushchev did demand rhetorically "how long can we wait?" for an agreement on Berlin; and by juxtaposing a reference to the summit meeting with a repetition of the separate treaty threat, he suggested that the latter might depend on the results of the former. A few commentators during the next few days reflected this renewed sense of urgency, but came no closer than Khrushchev did to specifying a time limit.

The Soviet press featured Secretary Herter's 9 March 1960 press conference statement that Khrushchev's Jakarta remarks did not constitute a breach of the Camp David agreement; and Khrushchev's next mention of the separate peace treaty--at the Diplomatic Press Association luncheon in Paris on 25 March--was notably vague about how soon the occupation regime must be "liquidated." Khrushchev then declared that a separate peace treaty with the GDR would bring about this "liquidation," but that the Soviet Union would take this step only "if all our possibilities are exhausted and our aspirations not understood."

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 27 -

D. The Threat to Access

During the entire course of the Berlin crisis and recent East-West discussions of the German question, no Soviet source has ever directly threatened to impose a new Berlin blockade. The sole instance of such a threat in other bloc media was in an article by leading GDR propagandist Gerhard Eisler in the 6 June 1959 issue of the East Berlin paper BERLINER ZEITUNG, never acknowledged or repeated elsewhere in bloc media. In this article Eisler suggested that spontaneous anger among East German "workers" against Western subversive activities directed from West Berlin might cause them, on their own initiative, to halt the passage of Western vehicles to Berlin.

Both Moscow and East Berlin have denied Western speculations that they might intend to impose a blockade. Gromyko did so at the Geneva foreign ministers conference on 30 May 1959, and Grotewohl and Ulbricht renounced any such intention on 8 and 9 March 1959, during Khrushchev's visit to East Germany. More recently this denial has been repeated by Eisler himself (on 22 July in an article pegged to Western speculation, and without reference to his 6 June article); by the East German party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 1 August; and in an East German radio commentary of 22 December 1959 pegged to the Western summit conference declaration supporting West Berlin's occupation status of West Berlin.

At the same time, the consistent position of both Moscow and East Berlin has been that ultimately access controls to West Berlin would be handed over to the GDR, that the West would then have to negotiate with the GDR to reconfirm all access rights and privileges, and that any Western attempt to use force to keep access routes open would be resisted with the full might of the Soviet Union. (This formulation was specifically extended by Khrushchev on 17 February 1959 to include an airlift, in the event that the West attempted this means to maintain access without dealing with the GDR.)

The most recent Soviet elite pronouncements to state explicitly that the West would some day have to negotiate access rights with the GDR, after a separate peace treaty had been concluded, are Khrushchev's 19 June 1959 speech and the Smirnov memorandum released 19 February 1960. The 1960 statement, unlike the one in 1959, did not recall the suggestion made on 26 November 1958 by Secretary Dulles (ignored in comment at the time) that East Germans at checkpoints on Berlin access roads might be regarded as "agents" of the USSR and accepted by the West on that basis. Khrushchev on 19 June 1959, as well as Ulbricht on 27 May 1959, had denied that the agents theory could form a basis for compromise.

Numerous statements by both Soviet and East German leaders--most recently in the Smirnov memorandum--have attested to the GDR's

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 28 -

willingness to guarantee full freedom of access to a free city of West Berlin, presumably on the same basis on which civilian travel in and out of the city is now under GDR supervision. Routine comment has echoed these assurances. With the "demilitarization" of the free city--the withdrawal of all Western troops--the issue of access for military vehicles and equipment would naturally cease to exist.

Essentially, therefore, the implied threat to Western access rights to Berlin contained in bloc propaganda is inextricably involved with the demand for at least a de facto recognition of the GDR by the West. If the West is willing to negotiate with the GDR and thereby extend such de facto recognition, the threat (if Soviet and East German assurances are to be believed) would disappear; if the West remains unwilling, Western access will not be permitted once control of the approaches to Berlin has been turned over to the GDR.

Reported Western plans to make high-altitude flights to Berlin in April 1959 and March 1960 drew strong condemnation from Moscow commentators as "provocations" against impending four-power meetings, the foreign ministers conference in 1959 and the summit in 1960. After reports circulated in March 1960 that the flights had been postponed, a commentary beamed to Germany warned that they might be resumed at any time and reminded Germans who were urging such a "deliberate provocation" that "in the case of a conflict, it will be the Germans who will suffer first and foremost." The actual announcement that there would be no high-altitude flights for the time being was ignored. The concurrent dispute over the passes issued to members of Western liaison missions in the Soviet Zone, which ended with the withdrawal of the unacceptable passes, was also ignored.

E. The Role of East Berlin

Whenever the subject has been raised, Moscow has been adamant regarding any suggestion that a new status for West Berlin should include East Berlin in any respect. Khrushchev, speaking in East Berlin on 9 March 1959, said that "it would be much more logical to speak of including the entire territory of Berlin into the GDR" than to advocate the "absurd" proposal to incorporate East Berlin even into the Soviet-proposed free city.

On all occasions when a possible merger of the two parts of Berlin--or even the extension of controls urged by the Soviets for West Berlin to the eastern part of the city--was raised at the Geneva foreign ministers conference, these ideas were dismissed as totally unacceptable. Gromyko made this clear in speeches on 30 May and 2 June 1959. The position was reiterated in the USSR-GDR communique of 19 June, signed by Khrushchev, and in numerous radio and press commentaries during the first phase of the Geneva foreign ministers conference. The subject has not been mentioned since 23 June 1959.

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 29 -

IV. REUNIFICATION: AN ISSUE "FOR THE GERMANS THEMSELVES"

Soviet propaganda has insisted for years that reunification is the responsibility of "the Germans themselves"--that is, of the two German states. The inclusion in the West's "package plan" of provisions for great-power supervision of reunification was one of the chief grounds for Moscow's repeated denunciations of the plan during the foreign ministers conference.

Although Khrushchev professes Soviet support for the goal of German reunification, he has been remarkably frank on a number of occasions in projecting the attainment of that goal into a distant, indefinite future. Most recently, in his 28 January 1960 letter to Adenauer, he pointed to "the fact of the existence of two German states between which there are no negotiations on reunification" and added that "furthermore, such negotiations are hardly foreseeable." In his FOREIGN AFFAIRS article of 14 August 1959 he expressed the conviction that Germany would be united "sooner or later"--"no one can foretell when."

Khrushchev's most striking statement on the subject was in his speech to the all-German workers conference at Leipzig on 6 March 1959, which was not released by TASS until 26 March. He urged the German workers to approach the reunification question "primarily from class positions" (there must not be "just any reunification"). He reminded them that they could live "and even well" without any reunification at all, and cautioned them: "Do not hurry, the wind does not blow in your face, consider everything thoroughly."

While on the one hand speaking of reunification as a goal to be pursued in the abstract, with no real sense of urgency, Khrushchev has on the other hand used as an element in his attacks on the West the charge that the Western powers were trying to obstruct reunification by pressing for free elections. In his 5 May 1959 interview with West German SPD editors, he referred to Western "assertions that reunification can be carried out only by so-called 'free elections'"--assertions which he said were made solely to prevent reunification, since it was known that "the GDR will not agree" to them. The provision for free all-German elections in the West's "package plan" presented to the foreign ministers conference was also attacked as an attempt to make agreement impossible, based on Western foreknowledge that such a provision was unacceptable.

Soviet propaganda has not, however, made a major issue of the free-elections idea since Secretary Dulles told a press conference on

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 30 -

13 January 1959 that the West no longer considered free elections the only way to reunify Germany. Dulles' statement was reported promptly by Moscow, although follow-up propaganda was somewhat inconsistent; it was some time before propagandists began treating the statement as indicating a major change in U.S. policy on German reunification. Since the May-June attacks on the Western "package plan," the propaganda has said almost nothing about free elections.

Moscow has for years endorsed the idea of an all-German committee and confederation--an endorsement reiterated in the Soviet note of 27 November 1958 to the Western powers, and subsequently. Yet Soviet propaganda has given these proposals only perfunctory attention, except during the last three weeks of the Geneva foreign ministers conference when Gromyko tied the all-German committee to his interim plan for West Berlin. Both the idea of the committee and Gromyko's interim plan have virtually disappeared from Moscow propaganda since Khrushchev's visit to the United States, except for citations of East German statements and in Soviet speeches and comment on the GDR's tenth anniversary. Even the East Germans have increasingly presented all-German talks as a forum for negotiating an "immediate armaments stop" in West Germany or a common German position on a peace treaty rather than for the attainment of reunification.

Khrushchev took the occasion to reiterate that only "the Germans themselves" could settle their future in rejecting (at his 29 February Jakarta press conference) the idea of an all-German plebiscite under great-power supervision. Satellite media, reacting in advance of Moscow to Western press reports in late February that Secretary Herter would propose such a plebiscite at the summit, had characterized the reported Herter plan as an unacceptable "revival" of the free-elections idea and not a suitable alternative to all-German talks.

Routine Moscow commentaries in German on 4 and 7 March followed up Khrushchev's rejection of the plebiscite idea. These commentaries displayed some sensitivity to West German charges that Moscow is denying to East Germany the rights of self-determination that it advocates for colonial peoples; the 7 March commentary answered rather sharply that the two situations were not comparable because the GDR does, after all, exist. Bonn must not expect, he said, "that someone will present them the unity of Germany on a golden platter through pressure on the GDR."

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 31 -

V. THE GENEVA FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE:

A REVIEW OF PROPAGANDA POSITIONS AND TACTICS

Moscow's propaganda on the Geneva foreign ministers conference, 11 May-5 August 1959, contained the same two basic elements that have characterized its propaganda on the German question since the inception of the Berlin crisis in November 1958: (1) portrayal of East-West negotiations as almost an end in themselves and a great triumph for the Soviet Union whenever and wherever they take place; and (2) an unyielding position on the essentials of the Soviet position--the necessity of a peace treaty and the termination of the occupation regime--combined with tactical flexibility. The Soviet demand for the demilitarization of West Germany through a peace treaty, and for the removal of the Western presence in West Berlin through a new status as a "free city," has been consistently maintained.

Moscow's propaganda on the conference developed in five phases: (1) the preliminary propaganda buildup, (2) questions relating to the participants in the talks, (3) presentation of views on Germany, (4) discussion of an interim Berlin settlement and, at the same time, a buildup of the charge of Western intransigence in order to explain the failure to secure a concrete agreement, and (5) conclusion on the optimistic note of a "rapprochement" to smooth the path for Khrushchev's visit to the United States.

A. The March-April "Thaw"

Soviet propagandists promptly hailed the 30 March 1959 Soviet notes*--which accepted the Western proposal for a foreign ministers conference in Geneva on 11 May to discuss "questions relating to Germany, including the peace treaty with Germany and the Berlin question"--as signaling the beginning of a definite "thaw" in East-West relations. Commentators dwelled on the coming of spring and the breaking up of the ice of the cold war and presented the agreement to negotiate as a triumph of Soviet policy and the people's demands for peace.

* The 16 February 1959 Western notes proposing a foreign ministers conference had evoked a statement by Khrushchev (in his 24 February Kremlin speech) that such a meeting would merely increase international tension. But the 2 March Soviet note, reluctantly acceding to a foreign ministers instead of a summit meeting, was preceded by a 26 February commentary to North America which for the first time during the Berlin crisis called a foreign ministers meeting possible under certain conditions.

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 32 -

There was a perceptible thaw in the propaganda generally. Assertions that "war psychosis" was prevalent in the West were dropped. The attacks on "certain warmongering circles" in the United States and other Western countries, who were supposed to have been rebuffed by the decision to hold talks on Germany, became less strident.

There was a similar marked abatement of Soviet intransigence. While routine demands for a German peace treaty and a free city of West Berlin continued, there was only one separate peace treaty threat between 28 March and 8 May--a single sentence in an 11 April PRAVDA article by Marshal Malinovskiy in answer to "irresponsible statements by some U.S. generals" on the devastation the USSR would suffer in a nuclear war. In contrast to this near-hiatus, there were nine elite Soviet threats of a separate peace treaty between 17 February and 28 March, while Khrushchev was applying pressure for a summit meeting, and eight more threats between 8 May and 19 June, when the foreign ministers conference recessed.

Moscow returned to the separate peace treaty theme on 8 May, three days before the Geneva conference convened, with the release of Khrushchev's harsh interview with SPD editors in which he reiterated the separate peace treaty threat in uncompromising terms and asserted that West Germany could be obliterated by "not more" than eight hydrogen bombs.

In the earlier period, while almost abstaining from the separate treaty threat, Moscow had publicized a series of official warnings that Western persistence in rearming West Germany and establishing missile bases might "complicate" the work of the foreign ministers and reduce its chances of success. At the same time, however, in the 21 April Soviet notes to the United States and West Germany pointing up the dangers of West German rearmament, the agreement to negotiate at Geneva was described as "the most significant positive result" of East-West diplomatic activity in the past few years.

B. GDR Participation: A Preliminary Victory

Moscow opened its propaganda on the conference itself by proclaiming the decision to give the GDR delegation "full participation" in the deliberations as a "great victory for the policy of the USSR" and as a great historical event beginning "a new page in the postwar political life of the German people." GDR Foreign Minister Bolz's first two

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 33 -

speeches were widely publicized by Moscow, and commentators denied repeatedly that he had been or would be relegated to an "advisory" role.

Both Moscow (most strongly Khrushchev, on 19 June at the conclusion of the GDR visit to the USSR) and East Berlin repeated throughout the conference that GDR participation meant de facto recognition by the Western powers.*

Exploitation of the East German presence at the talks had not been anticipated in pre-conference propaganda; Moscow had merely reported without comment the March decision to invite representatives from the two German states. Since the conference, Moscow has not made a point of recalling the GDR-participation "victory"--although it should be noted that recent Soviet propaganda has not discussed any specific development relating to the Geneva conference. East Berlin, however, has continued sporadically to assert that the participation of the GDR was tantamount to de facto recognition.

When the Big Four held secret talks after the 27-28 May recess, (in the face of East German propaganda assurances that the USSR would never do so) Moscow waited several days before reporting that "closed sessions" were being held and never acknowledged that they represented a change in the conference proceedings. Gromyko's July demand for GDR participation in the secret sessions drew only minimal comment.

Since the conference, Moscow has never made it clear whether the USSR would seek another such "victory" by demanding GDR participation in a summit conference. However, the 2 March 1959 Soviet note to the Western powers called for East and West German "representation" and "participation" both at the foreign ministers' conference and "at the summit meeting during the discussion of the questions of a peace treaty with Germany and of West Berlin."

Except for a single statement by Toeplitz, a member of the GDR delegation returning from the foreign ministers conference (7 August, reported only by the East Berlin BERLINER-ZEITUNG), the East Germans did not call for GDR summit participation until 12 November. An interview given by Foreign Minister Bolz on that date, and subsequent GDR comment, demanded East German summit participation as a "right." GDR propaganda has displayed increasing confidence that it will be permitted, while attacking Bonn for rejecting any West German participation.

Moscow, on the other hand, has ridiculed Adenauer several times for rejecting summit participation before he had even been invited to

* By contrast with the sustained exploitation of the GDR participation issue, Moscow gave the Polish and Czech participation issues wide publicity only on the second, third, and fourth days of the conference.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 34 -

participate. On only one occasion did it mention the possibility of even an advisory role for Germans. Moscow still refrains from repeating the formula set forth in the 2 March 1959 note--the formula on which it may be presumed that the East Germans are relying on their continuing campaign to be consulted at the summit.

C. Package Plan versus Peace Treaty

During the first two weeks of the conference, until the 27-28 May recess for the Dulles funeral, all bloc propaganda on the negotiations hammered at the West's "package plan" advanced at Geneva and pointed to the Soviet draft peace treaty as the logical solution to the German issue. In his first explicit reaction to the plan (his speech on receiving the Lenin Peace Prize, 16 May) Khrushchev attacked it as a cold war maneuver backed by Adenauer, but noted that it did provide "some questions which are worthy of examination." Only a few routine propagandists picked up this hint of substantive flexibility, and none repeated Gromyko's 18 May statement that the arms-control measures were worth discussing. Speaking in Albania on 26 May, Khrushchev denied that the "package plan" offered any "basis for agreement." From then on commentators referred to it as "dead" and "buried."

The basic argument used in condemning the Western plan and extolling the Soviet draft peace treaty was the standard warning of the danger of West German remilitarization: the peace treaty would stop it, while the "package plan" would only encourage it. Inclusion of provisions for reunification and European security in the "package plan," particularly the clause calling for a merger of East and West Berlin, were also denounced.

D. Interim Berlin Settlement Discussion; Charges of Western Intransigence

Soviet propaganda marked time for several days after the 27-28 May recess, until it became clear that discussion of all-German issues had been abandoned in favor of concentration on an interim Berlin agreement. Although up to this point Moscow had been subordinating its demand for a new status for Berlin to the need for a German peace treaty, comment broadcast exclusively to foreign audiences from 2 through 5 June painted an alarming picture of "the danger latent in the Berlin problem" because of the presence of Western troops, and particularly because the city was being used as a base for subversion and espionage in the GDR.

As soon as it was apparent that the West was standing firm on its occupation rights, the stress on the danger of subversion vanished as quickly as it had appeared; it was replaced by increasingly direct and strong attacks on the West for demanding rights that the Soviet Union would never acknowledge. Gromyko's "compromise" proposal of 10 June

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 35 -

for an interim Berlin agreement was hailed as a real Soviet concession, mainly because it postponed for one year the Soviet demand for "an immediate and complete abolition of the occupation regime in West Berlin."

The retention of Western occupation rights in Berlin had thus emerged as the unbridgeable gap. Khrushchev stated flatly on three occasions-- 5 May, 6 June, and 11 June--that he could never accept the "perpetuation" of the occupation regime; Western spokesman declared that a "time limit" on the occupation rights was unacceptable.

When the West rejected the Gromyko proposals, Soviet commentators first complained that they were rejected by Herter without "sufficient scrutiny," then turned to increasingly sharp criticism. The last traces of the March-April thaw began to disappear. Accompanying Ulbricht and Grotewohl on a tour of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev on 11 June in Riga accused the West of "evading a settlement." Two days later during the same tour, in Kiev, Kozlov complained that Western representatives "prolong and delay the talks by all means and put forward plainly unacceptable proposals."

Routine Moscow commentators--who despite their attacks on the "package plan" had continued, in the days following the Gromyko proposals, to speak of the "calm businesslike atmosphere" at Geneva and the absence of the cold war "at the conference itself"--suddenly accused the West of bad faith. These charges came on 16 and 17 June, coincident with the introduction of the Herter counterproposals. Soviet commentators said the West came to Geneva "only to torpedo any proposal" for a Berlin settlement and "to intensify international tension for further inflaming the cold war." Speaking in Gorkiy on 17 June, Mikoyan described the conference as "deadlocked."

The stage was then set for Khrushchev's tough speech of 19 June at the conclusion of the GDR visit. In that speech, for the first time since 17 February, he explicitly threatened the West's Berlin access rights as a consequence of a separate treaty and rejected the theory that after a separate treaty was signed, the GDR could act as an "agent" of the USSR in controlling communications between West Berlin and West Germany. (Between 30 March, when agreement was reached to hold the Geneva conference, and 19 June, Khrushchev voiced the separate peace treaty threat six times without spelling out the consequences to the West's access rights.) Khrushchev asserted uncompromisingly that not only the foreign ministers conference but even a summit meeting would be "time wasted" if the West expected him to renounce Soviet demands for a peace treaty and the eventual liquidation of the Berlin occupation.

When the conference recessed for three weeks on 19 June, Moscow commentators echoed the tougher Khrushchev line for a few days before

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 36 -

moderating the harshness by speaking of the "positive significance" of the talks themselves while regretting the absence of "positive results." In a statement issued on 28 June, Gromyko sought to create the impression that his 19 June extension of the time limit of the interim agreement on Berlin to 18 months envisaged no automatic termination of Western rights; yet he offered no guarantee that the rights would not lapse. During the recess, Gromyko and routine commentators intensified the effort to create disunity in Western ranks by praising British flexibility and contrasting Herter's speeches with Lloyd's.

The Geneva conference received considerably less publicity after it resumed on 13 July. The propaganda became steadily more critical of the West. This trend reached a climax on 26 July when a PRAVDA dispatch from Geneva revived the bad-faith accusation, which had last been voiced just before the conference recessed, and said that the West desired only to "sabotage international cooperation." A great deal of attention was given the need for an all-German committee to promote a rapprochement between the two German states, but the chief target continued to be Western insistence on perpetuating the Berlin occupation.

E. The Rapprochement

The final phase of the propaganda on the foreign ministers conference began with the release on 30 July of Khrushchev's 28 July Dnepropetrovsk speech, in which he said that the conference had accomplished some "positive work" and that it was now time to move on to the summit since basic questions could only be solved at the highest level. The rapid propaganda footwork necessitated by Khrushchev's abrupt reversal of Moscow's gloomy assessment of the work of the conference* was not accomplished without a few missed steps. The 30 July issue of PRAVDA which carried the text of Khrushchev's optimistic Dnepropetrovsk speech also carried a dispatch from Geneva accusing the West of bad faith. On the following day the TASS correspondent in Geneva reported that an East-West "rapprochement on certain questions" was taking place, but did not identify the questions or explain the nature or extent of the "rapprochement."

During the weekend preceding the official announcement of Khrushchev's visit to the United States (Monday, 3 August), PRAVDA and a German-language commentary suddenly announced that the size of the West's Berlin garrison was the "main barrier" to agreement at Geneva.

* The reversal was quite possibly occasioned by Khrushchev's receipt and acceptance of the formal invitation to visit the United States, though it was not made public until 3 August.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 37 -

Though occasional reference had been made to this issue as it was discussed at the conference, it had been treated as a very subordinate matter.*

Propaganda on the two days between the 3 August announcement of Khrushchev's U.S. visit and the adjournment of the foreign ministers conference displayed an optimistic tone reminiscent of the "thaw" that preceded the conference. Commentators found "rapprochement" in the acceptance by both sides of the "principle of an interim agreement" on West Berlin, mutual recognition of the desirability of prohibiting subversive activities,**and the West's willingness to accept a Soviet-proposed ban on the introduction of atomic and rocket weapons. (When Gromyko had raised this last point in June, he was told that the West had no intention of introducing such weapons into Berlin and so would agree unconditionally to such a ban; it had remained only a minor issue in the propaganda.) Commentators noted the absence of agreement on the peace treaty, on the Berlin occupation regime, or on the need for all-German talks. They echoed Gromyko's 5 August concluding statement that "a conference of heads of governments can examine and settle the issues on which the ministers failed to agree."

In viewing these claims of a "rapprochement" at the close of the foreign ministers conference in the light of earlier propaganda, it may be noted that the evidences of rapprochement cited by Soviet commentators have never been major or consistent themes in Soviet propaganda on the German question; nor has the attention and emphasis given them ever compared to that consistently accorded to sloganized calls for an all-German peace treaty and termination of the occupation regime in Berlin--areas where Moscow admitted that no progress toward agreement had occurred.

* The assertion about the size of the garrison was neither anticipated nor followed up. The size of the garrison was mentioned in a few German-language broadcasts after the Geneva conference adjourned and then dropped after 23 October until Khrushchev reintroduced it in a press conference in Paris on 25 March 1960. He said on that date that while the 11,000 Western troops in Berlin did not constitute a military threat, their presence "preserved the sparks that remain of World War II" and might yet "kindle the flames of another war."

** Moscow had always rejected any similar curbs on such activities in East Berlin, consistently with its refusal to consider Berlin a single entity.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 38 -

The one result of the Geneva "rapprochement" which Moscow has mentioned frequently since the adjournment of the foreign ministers conference has been the willingness of the West to discuss the Berlin issue separately, rather than linked to other German issues. Routine commentators have recalled that Chancellor Adenauer is the only Western leader who demands that Berlin be discussed only as a part of the entire German question. They have asserted that this is actually a maneuver on his part to prevent any progress whatever in East-West negotiations.

This point was most widely stressed just before and during the Western summit meeting in December 1959 (whose support of the status quo in Berlin was condemned by Moscow as a step backward from the "rapprochement") and during Adenauer's March 1960 visit to the United States. Commentators during October and November 1959 also referred frequently to the fact that both Eisenhower and Khrushchev had agreed on the need for renewed negotiations on Berlin.

In this comment, however, Moscow tended to avoid specific endorsement of the desirability of an interim Berlin agreement or even to mention it by name. (Khrushchev has not referred to it since the foreign ministers conference.) On 23 October 1959 it was cited in commentaries recalling the work of the Geneva conference, and at the time of the Western summit meeting in December it was mentioned in passing in straight news reports (for example, a home service dispatch of 23 December, which quoted Selwyn Lloyd as saying that an interim settlement would have to be considered if a permanent settlement could not be obtained immediately). Two widely broadcast commentaries replying to Adenauer's 11 January 1960 speech--in which he urged the West not to revive its final Geneva proposals at the summit--charged that this suggestion unmasked Adenauer as a foe of negotiations and co-existence; neither, however, said anything about the contents of the interim proposals, Western or Soviet, that Adenauer opposed.

Explicit discussion of an interim agreement was then avoided until the 14 April PRAVDA Observer article, which said the Geneva meeting had shown that "individual provisions" could be worked out for an interim settlement and expressed confidence that progress toward a "partial and temporary" agreement could be made at the summit and future four-power conferences. But the article refrained from spelling out the details of such an agreement, and the provisions suggested in the Ulbricht letter, dated 14 April and released 17 April, were played down and in some cases omitted entirely by both USSR and GDR radios and news agencies.

Agreement to separate the Berlin issue from the German question, with the implication that this might lead to an East-West interim agreement on West Berlin's status, is therefore the one concrete result

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- 39 -

of the Geneva foreign ministers conference which Moscow has seen fit to praise (though mildly, and usually contrasted with Bonn's inflexibility) as new East-West negotiations on Germany are in sight. Even in the midst of its exultation over the Khrushchev visit, Moscow did not attempt to create the impression that any "rapprochement" on the basic issues of a German peace treaty and Berlin's long-term status had been achieved at Geneva, or would be achieved until the essence of the major Soviet proposals on Germany had been accepted. From "thaw" through "victory" and "deadlock" to "rapprochement," there was no change in the fundamental position; all the changes expressed by these varying key propaganda words were related to the general atmosphere or to peripheral issues. The Soviet demand for demilitarization of West Germany through a peace treaty, together with the removal of Western presence in Berlin by means of a new free-city status, stands.

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- i -

A P P E N D I X

TAB A:	Soviet Elite Statements on a Separate Soviet-GDR Peace Treaty	ii
TAB B:	Soviet Elite Statements on Time Limits for a Berlin Settlement	xix
TAB C:	Khrushchev's Warnings of Retaliation Against West German Aggression	xxviii
TAB D:	Examples of Khrushchev's Strong Attacks on Adenauer . .	xxxi
TAB E:	Khrushchev's Warnings About a War Danger Inherent in the German/Berlin Situation	xxxv

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22 APRIL 1960

- ii -

T A B ASOVIET ELITE STATEMENTS ON A SEPARATE SOVIET-GDR PEACE TREATY

(All elite statements on the subject from the first one on 17 February 1959 through 4 April 1960, in reverse chronological order. The statements are by Khrushchev unless otherwise noted.)

Lenin Stadium speech on return from France, 4 April 1960:

We shall do everything to solve this question German peace treaty on a basis acceptable to the Western powers. But if our efforts are fruitless, then the Soviet Union will conclude a peace treaty with the GDR. And we are sure that all those who understand the necessity of removing the abnormal situation in the center of Europe will sign it along with the Soviet Union.

We are also convinced that, despite the efforts of Chancellor Adenauer, the Western powers, sooner or later, will arrive at the same conclusion we have. Life itself will compel them to understand that the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states is the only correct solution insuring normal conditions of peace and tranquility in Europe.

Rambouillet press conference, 2 April 1960:

Fontaine of LE MONDE: Mr. Chairman, you more than once intimated that the Soviet Union would sign a separate treaty with the GDR if the summit meeting did not lead to the conclusion of a German peace treaty. Could you say more precisely to what extent such a treaty would affect the communications between the Western garrisons in Berlin and West Germany?

Khrushchev: If we do not meet with understanding on the part of the leaders of those countries with which the Soviet Union fought against Hitler Germany, we shall have to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR alone. However, this is very undesirable for us; we should not like to do so. But if there is no other way out, we--and not only we but a number of other countries that fought against Nazi Germany--will be impelled to sign a peace treaty with the GDR alone,

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22 APRIL 1960

- iii -

and all rights arising from the surrender of Nazi Germany would then become invalid on the entire territory under the sovereignty of the GDR. Hence, all countries now having garrisons in West Berlin on the basis of the surrender and defeat of Nazi Germany, would lose all rights connected with the occupation of the city. We have declared this more than once and we also reaffirm this today.

Rheims luncheon, 29 March 1960:

We are doing and shall continue to do our utmost to achieve understanding for our policy and to secure the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. I repeat, we shall do our utmost to this end. If the Western powers do not understand our peace-loving position, we shall have to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR.

Diplomatic Press Association luncheon in Paris, 25 March 1960:

Question of FRANCE-SOIR correspondent Michel Gordet: You are regarded as an advocate of peaceful coexistence and territorial status quo between East and West. If this really is so, why do you question the status quo in Berlin where the military positions of the Western powers are weak?

...If all our possibilities are exhausted and our aspirations not understood, we shall unilaterally sign a peace treaty with the GDR. This will settle the problems connected with the liquidation of the remnants of the war in the territory of the GDR which will sign the peace treaty with us; the problem of liquidating the occupation regime in West Berlin will also be settled.

Jakarta press conference, 29 February 1960:

AP correspondent: Did you actually say that you will insist on a Western withdrawal from West Berlin regardless of the concessions they may make to Russia's position on disarmament? Did you make this statement to President Gronchi of Italy?

Khrushchev: The question is put in a not too correct way. The Western powers are allegedly to make concessions to the Soviet Union on questions of safeguarding peace, while we are to make concessions to the West with regard to Berlin. This is incorrect. These are two independent questions, each of which requires a separate solution.

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22 APRIL 1960

- iv -

Is it only the Soviet Union and the socialist countries that are interested in disarmament, in safeguarding peace? All the peoples are interested in safeguarding peace. This is why it is necessary to consider the disarmament question and solve it in a way beneficial for all countries, for all the peoples, for the cause of peace.

The question of West Berlin is entirely different. This is a question whose solution has been dragged out for 15 years since the end of the war. How much longer can we wait? A summit conference will meet shortly to strengthen peace, but the leftovers of the last war have not been done away with yet. This situation contradicts common sense. This is why we shall strive to wipe out the hangovers of war, shall try to convince our allies of the last war to sign a peace treaty with the two existing German states. If they fail to understand this need or if they realize it but refuse to agree, then we shall sign a peace treaty with the GDR.

When a peace treaty with the GDR is signed, all the consequences of the war against Germany will cease to exist on the territory of the GDR and with regard to West Berlin as well. West Berlin is on the territory of the GDR.

Memorandum on 13 January conversation between Ambassador Smirnov and SPD officials, released 19 February 1960:

Should it prove impossible to settle the issue of West Berlin through negotiation between the countries concerned, or finally become clear that the negotiations are held only for the sake of negotiations and not with the object of settling the issue, the Soviet Union would have no other way out except to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR and to solve the problem of West Berlin on this basis.

It is perfectly clear that when the peace treaty is concluded the GDR, as any independent state, will exercise full sovereignty over all its territory and air space. Naturally, any uncontrolled communications between West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany would be discontinued and all communication routes between them will be controlled by the German Democratic Republic. If it comes to this, and if the West returns again to the idea of talks on the West Berlin issue, its only partner in these negotiations would then be the GDR.

We doubt whether a situation when the Soviet Union would be compelled to conclude, together with other nations willing

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
 22 APRIL 1960

- v -

to do so, a peace treaty with the GDR, would suit the leaders of the West Berlin magistrate better. Maybe Mr. Brandt expects in this case to reach agreement on the use of communication lines by direct talks with the GDR.

Of course, the Soviet Union would welcome such a step. If Mr. Brandt believes that one can disregard the sovereign rights of the GDR and the procedure it will establish on the lines of communications, this would be a serious miscalculation. In conformity with its commitments as an ally, the Soviet Union will render all necessary support to the GDR in defending its sovereignty.

Warsaw Pact Declaration, 4 February 1960:

If the efforts toward the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states do not meet with support and if the solution of this question comes up against attempts at procrastination, the states represented at the present conference will have no alternative but to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR, together with the other states ready for this, and to solve the question of West Berlin on this basis as well.

Letter to Adenauer, 28 January 1960:

But what if we do not meet understanding? Could it be that we should live forever without a peace treaty, and forever resign ourselves to an abnormal situation in West Berlin?

Of course, we cannot reconcile ourselves to such a situation. If the Soviet Union does not meet understanding it will have no other recourse but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all the ensuing consequences, including those for West Berlin. That treaty would settle the frontier questions of Germany with the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic.* With the signing of a peace treaty it would be clear to all that to strive to alter the existing frontiers means nothing else but to bring matters to a war. We shall not abet aggressive forces which cherish the dream of pushing German frontiers to the east. If some states refuse to sign a peace treaty it will also be clear to all what they stand for: peace or war, for relaxation of tension and friendly relations or for cold war.

* A similar statement about settlement of German-Polish and German-Czech border questions in a separate treaty was made by Khrushchev in Kishinev on 15 May 1959; see page xiii of this tab.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROPAGANDA REPORT
 22 APRIL 1960

- vi -

Supreme Soviet speech, 14 January 1960:

The Soviet Government considers that a peaceful settlement with Germany is an urgent international question, a question of the very foremost importance. We shall make every effort to have this question solved at last. We sincerely strive to find a solution for the German question together with our allies in the struggle against Hitler Germany. We consider that along with this the question of West Berlin too will be settled on an agreed basis. If, however, all our efforts to conclude a peace treaty with the two German states fail to be crowned with success after all, the Soviet Union, and other willing states, will sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all the consequences proceeding from this.

Speech at Hungarian Party Congress, 1 December 1959:

The only way [to settle the Berlin problem] is to sign a peace treaty with Germany, and we have submitted a proposal to that effect. There is no evading a peace treaty for anyone, if the other countries on whom the signing of a peace treaty depends stand for peace and coexistence. The vestiges of World War II must at long last be removed, since they constitute a source that nourishes the instigators of a third world war. We are not forcing a solution of the West Berlin problem in point of time; we are setting no deadlines, issuing no ultimatums; but at the same time we shall not slacken our efforts to come to terms with our allies.

If we try all means and they do not lead to the desired results, we shall have no other way out except signing a peace treaty with whichever of the two German states wants it. And in such a case we shall bear no responsibility for the refusal to sign the peace treaty. It will be borne by those who had an unreasonable approach to the solution of this problem, who did not take the road of easing tension in relations between states but, on the contrary, wanted to preserve the dangerous source threatening the outbreak of a third world war....

We are doing our utmost to make the Soviet proposals acceptable. We do not impose them, but wish to reach agreement through negotiations, though we have every right to sign a peace treaty with the GDR if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany does not wish to sign a peace treaty.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- vii -

We have before our eyes the example of the United States of America, which has signed a peace treaty with Japan without us.* However, it cannot be held that one side can unilaterally sign treaties while the other cannot, though a peace treaty with Japan was signed earlier to its detriment....

The liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin will undoubtedly be conducive to this improving relations. We wish to reach agreement with all our former allies. This is why we do not fix any time limits. We want the solution of this question to improve, not worsen, our relations. The Soviet Government is ready to try out any conceivable peaceful means to secure a reasonable solution of the German problem, to promote the improvement of the international atmosphere, and to create conditions for disarmament and the establishment of eternal peace on earth for the sake of mankind's happiness.

But if we do not meet with understanding, if the forces backing Chancellor Adenauer obstinately insist on the "positions of strength" policy, we shall have no other choice left but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. The Soviet Union does not intend to connive with those who are for the continuation of the "positions of strength" policy. We and our allies would readily sign a treaty with West Germany, but if we do not succeed in this, we shall be compelled to sign a unilateral treaty with the GDR.

TASS statement on remarks by Adenauer about Berlin, 18 November 1959:

The Soviet Government insistently shows the necessity for concluding a peace treaty with the two German states, or with the one which will be willing to sign such a treaty for the propose of liquidating the aftermath of the war. The Soviet Government proposes to sign a peace treaty to settle the Berlin question as well, to clear the sky of storm clouds and to create a truly quiet atmosphere in this part of Europe.

* The French press agency reported that Khrushchev in a conversation with WPC members on 24 February 1959 said that in view of the West's separate peace treaty with Japan, he was surprised at the reaction to a possible separate treaty with the GDR. Moscow radio never broadcast a text of Khrushchev's conversation with the group, and the brief TASS account (on 26 February) did not indicate that he had said anything about a separate peace treaty. The first Khrushchev reference to the Japanese treaty publicized by Moscow was that of 19 June, page ix of this Tab.

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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22 APRIL 1960

- viii -

Letter to Adenauer, 18 August 1959:

After all negotiations, all means of convincing our partners have been tried, and if they still oppose peaceful settlement with Germany, we shall conclude a peace treaty with the GDR and call upon all countries who fought against Nazi Germany to follow our example. I am sure that more than one or two states will support us.

Polish-Soviet communique, 22 July 1959:

Taking into account the situation that exists at present, the parties are of the opinion that in the present circumstances a peace treaty must be signed with both existing German states. If, however, the aggressive Western circles torpedo a peaceful settlement on this basis, the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union will sign a peace treaty with the GDR, confident that a peace treaty with the GDR will also be signed by other states which are genuinely concerned in the strengthening of peace and security in Europe....

However, if, in spite of the good will of the GDR and other socialist countries, the abnormal situation in West Berlin is not liquidated, Poland and the USSR will support the GDR regarding those measures which it will deem necessary to undertake within the framework of its sovereign rights for the elimination of the abnormal situation in West Berlin.

Kozlov, National Press Club speech, 2 July 1959:

Question: The Soviet Government has made its proposal on the Berlin issue. Will force be used to implement this proposal if no results are produced at the Geneva foreign ministers conference, which is to reconvene on 13 July?

Answer: The Soviet Union's position on this question is well known; we have expounded it more than once. The Soviet Union has exerted and continues to exert efforts to solve the Berlin problem at the Geneva conference in the interests of peace. If this does not happen the Soviet Government will conclude a peace treaty with the GDR, with all consequences arising therefrom. If the Western powers try to use force, force will be the reply to force.

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
 22 APRIL 1960

- ix -

Gromyko, statement on Geneva foreign ministers conference during recess,
 28 June 1959:

Of course, the negative attitude of the Western powers toward the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany does not signify that this subject may be regarded as exhausted. We consider, USSR Premier Khrushchev said on 19 June 1959, that the best solution of this problem would be the conclusion of a peace treaty with an all-German government, or with another plenipotentiary organ representing all of Germany. If, however, it is not possible to conclude a peace treaty on such a basis, then it will have to be signed with the two sovereign German states which exist today. If the aggressive and reactionary circles also prevent the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states, there will be nothing left but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR.

When the Soviet Government openly declares that it cannot delay the question of a peace treaty with Germany indefinitely, statesmen of the Western powers try to present this almost as a threat. Such assertions can hardly be taken seriously. Their authors cannot be slaves to their own prejudices to such an extent that they fail to realize that the question here concerns the only way left to the Soviet Union, which it will be forced to take if the Western powers continue to obstruct joint work on the elimination of the dangerous vestiges of war and occupation in Germany.

GDR-Soviet communique, 19 June 1959:

In case a peaceful settlement on this basis /all-German peace treaty/ is thwarted by the aggressive circles, a peace treaty will be signed with the GDR by those states who will agree to this and who are interested in peaceful settlement with Germany and the consequent consolidation of peace and security in Europe. It goes without saying that in this case the acts and provisions resulting from the surrender or military defeat of Germany in the last war will no longer be valid.

Speech at conclusion of visit of GDR delegation, 19 June 1959:

The Soviet Government has also stated that if the all-German committee proves unable to reach agreement on a solution of the peace treaty question, the Soviet Union, together with the other interested states who fought against Hitlerite Germany, will be obliged to sign a peace treaty with the German state that wants to do so, and the GDR

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
 22 APRIL 1960

- ix -

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- X -

Government has declared its readiness to sign a peace treaty so that the people may liquidate completely the aftermath of the war....

We think that the best solution of this problem would be the conclusion of a peace treaty with an all-German government or with any other plenipotentiary organ representing all Germany. If, however, it would not be possible to conclude a peace treaty on such a basis, then it must be signed with the two sovereign German states existing today. In case the aggressive and reactionary circles prevent the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states, nothing else remains but to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR.

We are certain that this treaty will be signed by the states which were at war with Hitlerite Germany and which are sincerely interested in a peaceful settlement with Germany, and thereby in the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. We should regret (applause) we should regret it if it were impossible to achieve a peaceful settlement, but we are aware that it is not in our power to induce the Western powers to sign a German peace treaty. At the same time the Western powers must understand that it is not in their power to hamper the Soviet Union and other states from normalizing their relations with the GDR, to close the accounts of the war, and to liquidate all the consequences which derive from the state of war which has not yet ended juridically because there is no German peace treaty.

Our former allies in the common war against Hitlerite Germany declare that such an act would allegedly mean that the Soviet Union has taken the road of separate actions in the German question. They contend that this is unfair, that this is a violation of the accepted obligations. However, such assertions have no grounds whatever. We are not striving to act separately. On the contrary, we are making all efforts to achieve an agreed solution of the German problem with the Western powers. We are doing everything to convince our Western partners of the necessity to conclude, together with us, a German peace treaty.

Those who reproach us from some alleged separate actions should recall their own actions at the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan. At that time the Western powers,

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- xi -

and primarily the United States, apparently thought it fair and justified to disregard the interests of the Soviet state--their war ally....

The signing of a peace treaty with the GDR will mean the end of all the remains of occupation which still exist on its territory, and the GDR will enjoy all the sovereign rights which every state acquires under a peace settlement. If any other states undertake any efforts to restore the occupation regime by force, the Soviet Union will support the GDR with every means at its disposal, and as a faithful ally according to the Warsaw treaty it will defend the territorial integrity of the GDR. (Long applause)

There are some in the West who are beginning to console themselves with the illusion that after the conclusion of a peace treaty the rights of the former occupation states to communications between West Berlin and the FGR through the GDR will be preserved. But one may ask what these rights will be based on. Or take another example: The Western powers, it would seem, are ready to be reconciled to having control of communications between West Berlin and West Germany carried out by German personnel, but not as representatives of their state--that is, of the GDR--but as persons empowered by the Soviet Union. Such arguments, to say the least, are naive. It must be clear to all that the Western states want to belittle the GDR and, what is more, are trying to do this through the Soviet Union.

Gromyko at Geneva foreign ministers conference, 10 June 1959:

The Soviet delegation must state that should the Western states during the transition period of one year not agree to carry out the above-mentioned minimum measures concerning West Berlin, then the Soviet Union will refuse to confirm its consent to the continuation of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

If the Western states or the West German Government prevent the achievement during the mentioned time of agreed solutions on the questions of the conclusion of a peace treaty, the Soviet Union, together with interested states which waged war against Germany, will be forced to sign a peace treaty with the GDR.

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22 APRIL 1960

- xii -

Marshal Malinovskiy, speech in Gjinokaster, Albania, 2 June 1959 (speech read by Albanian home service announcer):

How is it possible that we are threatening the capitalist world when we propose the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, and when we say that--if the Western world does not want to sign a peace treaty with the two German states--we shall be forced to conclude it with the GDR? How is it possible that such peaceful proposals can be considered as threats to other countries?

Speech in Korce, Albania, 28 May 1959:

We shall not deviate from our struggle to strengthen peace. Whether Mr. Brentano likes our policy or not, we shall be pursuing it firmly and unswervingly. In our policy we are guided by the interests of insuring peace. This aim is best served by concluding a peace treaty with Germany. If you, Mr. Brentano, and your government refuse to sign a peace treaty, we shall sign a peace treaty with the GDR and it will be signed by other countries willing to do so, and eventually even by Mr. Brentano.

Speech in Tirana, 26 May 1959:

Comrades, we shall stubbornly strive for an ending of the state of war with Germany and the signing of a peace treaty. If we fail to reach agreement on signing a peace treaty with the two German states, then we shall sign such a treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

After a certain length of time, the need to sign a peace treaty will reach the consciousness of the ruling circles of the Federal German Republic and they will sign it at once.

Speech at USSR Writers Congress, 22 May 1959:

(Recounting a conversation with the West German Ambassador to the USSR)

Khrushchev: "...It is necessary to sign peace treaties with both Germanies."

Ambassador: "That is impossible."

Khrushchev: "No. That is possible. If it is impossible for you today, we shall sign a peace treaty with the GDR and

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
 22 APRIL 1960

- xiii -

wait for the day when you say it is possible. Then we shall also sign a peace treaty with you."

Ambassador: "No, this will not happen."

Khrushchev: "Don't be in a hurry. Don't say no. Wait."

Speech at Kishinev, 15 May 1959:

But what if the Western states do not sign a peace treaty? We have stated it on many occasions, and will repeat it now: In that case the USSR will sign a peace treaty with the GDR. I think that not only we, but also other socialist countries which were at war with Germany, will likewise sign the treaty, and perhaps the peace treaty will also be signed by some nonsocialist countries. Yet no matter how many countries sign this treaty, we shall nevertheless sign it with those who want to sign a peace treaty. Thus the state of war will be ended, which will facilitate the strengthening and consolidation of peace throughout the world.

Some statesmen are trying to intimidate us by declaring that they will not sign the treaty. So what? Do not sign it then. We shall not force you. Just wait--the time will come when you shall see the necessity of this matter and also sign the treaty, because the people desire peace and demand it, and one must not resist the will of the people.

The GDR borders in the East on the socialist countries of Poland and Czechoslovakia. A peace treaty with the GDR will be signed by Poland; this is agreeable to Poland. It will be signed by Czechoslovakia, which also has expressed its agreement. Obviously, it will also be signed by others. This means that a stable peace will be insured on this border. This is a great thing.

The GDR is a highly developed industrial state with a population of 18 million. It will be developing, as at present, in the united socialist camp and in the fight for the consolidation of peace. With the signing of the peace treaty, the questions of borders between Poland and the GDR and between Czechoslovakia and the GDR, which are at present not recognized by West Germany, will be solved. Many questions will then be solved. Of course, some of the unsolved or controversial questions will remain. Let these controversial questions wait until controversy ceases to exist.

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
 22 APRIL 1960

- xiv -

Interview with SPD editors, 5 May, released 8 May 1959:

If, however, our former allies do not want to sign such a peace treaty and follow Adenauer's lead, we will sign a peace treaty with the GDR. And once a peace treaty with the GDR has been signed, the Western powers will lose their right to keep their occupation troops in West Berlin, as all existing occupation statutes relating to Berlin will cease to be valid once a peace treaty is signed.

Marshal Malinovskiy, PRAVDA article, 11 April 1959:


The Soviet Government persistently strives for solving all questions by negotiation and not from the positions of strength. It is precisely for this reason that it proposed to conclude a German peace treaty. If the Western powers do not sign such a treaty, the Soviet Union, together with other powers which were its allies in the war against the Hitlerite aggressors, will sign such a treaty with the GDR.

TASS statement on De Gaulle's 25 March press conference, 28 March 1959:

Nor can one ignore President De Gaulle's statements in which he allowed a series of attacks against the GDR to creep in. He said: The French Government does not intend to "recognize" the GDR as an independent state. His words carry the threat that if a peace treaty is concluded with the GDR and the German Federal Republic does not sign it, France and the other Western states who fought against Hitlerite Germany would not agree to such a peace treaty....

But to refuse Germany a peace treaty--that is a bad policy. The Soviet Union, of course, for its part, will sign a German peace treaty and welcome it if other states do the same. The conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is the best thing; it is awaited now by the German people and all the peoples of Europe. If the Western powers do not enter into the conclusion of such a peace treaty, and a treaty is signed only with the GDR, then the leaders of France, together with leaders of other Western powers, will have to take into account the position arising from the fact of the signing of a peace treaty with GDR. If anyone tries to violate the terms of the peace treaty the responsibility for the consequences will be borne, of course, not by those who give the rebuff to the aggressors but by the violators of international laws.

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~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- xv -

Speech at All-German Workers Conference, 6 March, released 26 March 1959:

From our point of view, it would be better to sign the German peace treaty with the two existing German states, but should this not take place we will have to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. What is wrong about that? Which is better, no peace treaty or one with the GDR? The signing of a peace treaty with the GDR will be of great constructive importance. The German people will get the long-awaited peace treaty. Should the Government of the FRG decline to sign a peace treaty, the position of the Federal Republic will become more complicated.

Kremlin press conference, 19 March 1959:

Yes, I believe that the United States, Britain, and France have lawful rights for their stay in Berlin. These rights flow from the fact of the German surrender as a result of our joint struggle against Nazi Germany. But 14 years have elapsed since the end of the war, and there is no need for the further occupation of West Berlin. That is why we proposed, at last, the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states. When a peace treaty is signed with the GDR and the FRG the right to occupation becomes invalid.

If the Western countries do not want to sign a peace treaty with Germany, the Soviet Union will still sign a peace treaty with the GDR. The rights flowing from the surrender of Nazi Germany, extending to the territory of GDR, too, will then cease to operate.

The GDR is an independent and sovereign state, and if it signs a peace treaty with the USSR, peace conditions will consequently cover the entire territory of the GDR, and West Berlin lies on the territory of the GDR. We do not intend to hurt the population of West Berlin by abolishing their way of life, and that is why, by agreement with the Government of the GDR, we propose that West Berlin should enjoy the status of a demilitarized free city.

Speech at Berlin rally, 9 March 1959:

We believe that such considerations do not stand up to criticism. They are unrealistic and could at best only complicate the solution of the creation of a free city in the Western part of Berlin. Now they are even trying to threaten us by saying that the Western powers, should the peace treaty be concluded with the GDR, would take countermeasures and would not even

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
 22 APRIL 1960

- xvi -

stop at the use of force. We will not be intimidated by
 saber rattling....

We want everybody to understand clearly: Our proposals to
 conclude a peace treaty with both German states and to liqui-
 date the occupation regime in West Berlin are dictated by
 the desire to separate the armed forces of the two camps and
 to normalize the situation in this part of the world. We
 spare neither labor nor energy in order to eliminate the
 dangerous situation which has now arisen in Germany.
 May the imperialists then try to prove to the people that
 they are acting in their interests by making an attempt to
 continue the state of war in the center of Europe.

Should the Western powers refuse to sign a peace treaty with
 both German states, we shall still sign a peace treaty with
 the GDR. We shall do so whether Herr Adenauer likes it or
 not. His policy will then be unmasked once and for all as
 the policy of preparing war. We are convinced that the people
 will not tolerate this because it knows from personal ex-
 perience to what disastrous consequences this policy leads.

Speech at Leipzig Fair Pavilion, 6 March 1959:

We have repeatedly declared and declare now that, if West
 Germany and its allies refuse to sign a peace treaty, we
 shall sign such a treaty with the GDR if it agrees to it.
 You may be sure that we shall not leave the Germans who live
 in the GDR without a peace treaty. Together with the Soviet
 Union, other countries which took part in smashing Hitler
 fascism and which correctly understand the meaning of this
 important step will surely also sign this peace treaty.

The peace treaty will clear away the remnants of the Second
 World War which unfortunately still exist. In connection with
 it, the so-called Berlin question will be solved, since with
 the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR the occupation
 regime in West Berlin will be liquidated and a situation of
 peace and calm will then be established in the whole of
 Berlin, for, if the state of war is terminated and relations
 of peace are established, the decisions of the war and postwar
 period on the occupation of Berlin automatically lose
 their validity. This is clear to everyone.

Speech at Leipzig luncheon, 5 March 1959:

Khrushchev: We shall sign a peace treaty in any case! If
 the Western powers do not agree to sign a peace treaty with

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22 APRIL 1960

- xvii -

the two existing German states, we shall sign a peace treaty with the GDR. Such a treaty will also be signed, most probably, by other states which took part in the war against Nazi Germany.

Regarding the Berlin question, we want to have it settled not separately, but in conjunction with the whole German problem. The signing of a peace treaty with the GDR would settle the West Berlin question as well.

Ulbricht: That is right.

Khrushchev: We shall continue discharging the functions entrusted to us by the Potsdam agreement and other agreements on Berlin until a peace treaty with two or one of the existing German states is signed. And when this is accomplished, all existing occupation provisions with regard to Berlin will become invalid. Then the GDR Government will exercise all sovereign rights over its territory.

Speech at Leipzig rally, 4 March 1959:

Some hotheads who are not quite responsible for what they are saying contend that in no case should a peace treaty be signed with the GDR. But we shall sign a peace treaty if the Government of the GDR will agree to sign it. We shall sign it even if the Government of the FRG refuses to sign a peace treaty.

Mikoyan speech at Rostov, 26 February 1959:

If the Western powers do not agree to sign a peace treaty with Germany, which would also solve the question of West Berlin as a free city, the Soviet Union and other nations will be compelled to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. This will be an entirely legal treaty and will represent a great contribution to the cause of peace.

Kremlin speech, 24 February 1959:

The signing of the peace treaty will invalidate all the obligations regarding Germany's occupation, both ours and those of our allies. Hence there can be no question of any violation of the quadripartite agreements on Germany, or of the West upholding its interests and discharging its functions in the "defense" of West Berlin arising from those agreements. Apart from that, nobody is attacking

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- xviii -

West Berlin. On the contrary, we propose to make it a free city.

When the peace treaty is concluded with the two German states, or with one of them, the agreement on the division of Berlin into sectors, and hence on its occupation status, will then, ipso facto, finally fall away.

Tula speech 17 February 1959:

Some Western leaders say that should the land routes to West Berlin be closed, they would arrange an "airlift." The flimsiness of this attitude is obvious. For if a peace treaty is signed with the two German states, or with one of them-- and the Soviet Union and some other states which fought against Hitlerite Germany are prepared to sign such a treaty--then the GDR will acquire all the rights and will be bound by all the obligations of a sovereign state. And these rights of the GDR will be guaranteed by international law.

Therefore, no encroachment whatever on the territory of the GDR, in whose center Berlin lies, can be permitted, either by land, air, or water. Any violation of the sovereignty of the GDR will meet with a vigorous rebuff, irrespective of whether it will happen on water, on land, or in the air. All this should be considered by the gentlemen imperialists.

~~OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~PROPAGANDA REPORT
22 APRIL 1960

- xix -

T A B B

SOVIET ELITE STATEMENTS ON TIME LIMITS FOR A BERLIN SETTLEMENT

(All such statements since November 1958,
in reverse chronological order)

Khrushchev at Jakarta press conference, 29 February 1960:

ASSOCIATED PRESS correspondent: Did you actually say that you will insist on a Western withdrawal from West Berlin regardless of the concessions they may make to Russia's position on disarmament? Did you make this statement to President Gronchi of Italy?

Khrushchev: ...The question of West Berlin is entirely different from disarmament. This is a question whose solution has been dragged out for 15 years since the end of the war. How much longer can we wait? A summit conference will meet shortly to strengthen peace, but the leftovers of the last war have not been done away with yet. This situation contradicts commonsense....

Khrushchev speech at Hungarian Party Congress, 1 December 1959:

We do not speed up a solution of the problem of West Berlin, we set no deadlines, present no ultimatums, but at the same time we will not relax our energy in striving for agreement with our allies....

The Soviet Union could have signed this treaty with the GDR, but we wish to do our best not to strain relations. The liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin will undoubtedly be conducive toward this. We wish to reach agreement with all our former allies. This is why we do not fix any time limits. We want the solution of this question to improve and not worsen our relations.

Kozlov speech in Berlin on GDR Anniversary, 6 October 1959:

Regarding the Berlin question, an agreement was reached between Comrade Khrushchev and President Eisenhower, with the agreement of the other directly interested parties, to renew negotiations for a solution in accord with the interests of the parties concerned and the interests of the maintenance

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
 22 APRIL 1960

- XX -

of peace. In this connection the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the U.S. President came to the joint point of view that no definite period should be set for these negotiations of the Berlin question, but that they should not be prolonged indefinitely. The Soviet Union has always considered and still considers that the Berlin question should be solved without delay and in accord with the interests of easing tension in Germany and Europe and in the interests of peace.

Khrushchev answer to TASS correspondent, 29 September 1959:

Khrushchev replied: Mr. Eisenhower, the U.S. president, correctly described the essence of the agreement reached by us. We have indeed agreed that negotiations on the Berlin issue should be resumed and that no time limit should be fixed for them, but that they should not be protracted indefinitely. The Soviet Government, Khrushchev said, would like to express again the confidence that all parties concerned would strive for the question of West Berlin to be settled without delay and in accordance with the interests of easing tension in Germany and in Europe, the interests of consolidating peace.


Gromyko statement at Geneva foreign ministers conference, 5 August 1959:

As a result of the exchange of views held so far, it can be acknowledged that all the participants in the conference agreed that the corresponding agreement /on West Berlin/ must have a definite time limit. For the Soviet Union this has a significance of principle since, as we have already declared more than once, it cannot underwrite any document perpetuating the existing occupation status in West Berlin....

Reaching the unanimous opinion that the agreement must be of a provisional nature and that new talks must be held after its expiration, the parties to the conference have not yet been able to reach understanding on a specific term of operation of the agreement. As is known, the Soviet Government proposes it should be concluded for a year and a half, envisaging that the discussions between both German states would also end by this time.

We have explained more than once that the term of operation of the interim agreement is for us neither a matter of principle, nor a fundamental issue. But this question, of course, must be settled in accordance with the real state of

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22 APRIL 1960

- xxi -

affairs obtaining in Germany, and one and a half year term which we suggested is fully in keeping with this state of affairs. It is to be hoped that the governments of the three Western powers will take a more realistic stand in the future than the one they take now--proposing that the term of operation of the agreement should be for a full five years, which the Soviet Union, of course, cannot accept.

Khrushchev speech at Dnepropetrovsk, 28 July 1959:

At present the lack of clarity and precise understanding has been eliminated regarding the period of validity of the agreement on the temporary status of West Berlin and the all-German organ for direct talks between the GDR and West Germany. By the way, we have emphasized more than once that the question of time limit is not the main question. All this, comrades, gives us the right to hope that we can come to a settlement of questions which would be in accordance with the interests of preserving and strengthening peace and in the interests of the European peoples, including the German people.

Kozlov speech at National Press Club, 2 July 1959:

We are proposing that there function for 12 or 18 months an all-German committee, in which the two German states would be equally represented, and that a provisional status be instituted for West Berlin. But if by then the Germans come to no agreement between themselves and no peace treaty, which of itself would solve the Berlin question, is signed, we are suggesting that negotiations on this score be resumed. Is, indeed, a proposal of negotiations an ultimatum?

Gromyko statement on Geneva foreign ministers conference during recess, 28 June 1959:

Let us, for example, take the question on the term of validity of the temporary agreement on West Berlin proposed by the Soviet Union. At first, the Soviet Government proposed to fix this at one year. However, since this did not suit the Western powers, another term was suggested, that is, one and a half years. We are prepared to negotiate on this topic. Let me recall that the governments of the U.S., Great Britain, and France have themselves proposed at the Geneva conference that a period of two and a half years should be fixed for the completion of the work of the all-German committee. If the two sides come to an agreed view on the main issue, it appears that it would not be too difficult to agree on the required period of time.

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
 22 APRIL 1960

- xxii -

I should like to call special attention to one misinterpretation of the last Soviet proposals which one often meets in the West and which, unfortunately, may be heard from statesmen of the Western powers. It is asserted that fixing a period of time as envisaged in our proposals means that when this period expires all the rights of the U.S., Great Britain, and France in West Berlin will automatically lapse, while the Soviet Union will immediately embark upon unilateral acts in relations to West Berlin. Why is such a conclusion drawn? Does not the fact that the Soviet Union is proposing to hold new negotiations on West Berlin after the expiration of the terms provided for in the agreement--if by that time the all-German committee does not succeed in its work--speak for itself?

If only a unilateral solution of the question of the rights of Western powers in Berlin--either now or after the expiration of the term of validity of the above-mentioned temporary agreement on West Berlin--were envisaged, we would not have proposed jointly to draw up an interim status of West Berlin, and to settle the questions of guarantees of such status, and of a four-power supervisory agency. We would not have proposed that the joint discussion of the Berlin question should be renewed if the GDR and the German Federal Republic fail to come to an understanding in the all-German committee.

Khrushchev speech at conclusion of visit of GDR delegation, 19 June 1959:

As far as the time limit stated by us, one should say that if it is not agreeable to the Western powers this question can be discussed. We have never stated that the time limit indicated in our proposals was the main question, a question of principle. If it is not acceptable, then with a business-like approach to it one could agree to another time limit. To call our proposals an ultimatum can only be done by one who does not want an agreement.

The Western powers have also made proposals in their package plan to establish a definite time limit for the work of an all-German committee. True, they gave a different time limit--two and a half years. However, we do not regard such proposals on a time limit as being an ultimatum. Let us talk it over, weigh all the pros and cons. Obviously we should try to meet one another and establish a time limit acceptable to all.

I wish once again to stress that establishing a time limit is in no way the main question. It is important to have an

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
 22 APRIL 1960

- xxiii -

agreement on the main questions of principle. We propose a definite time limit so as not to give Adenauer the possibility of continuing to thwart a peaceful settlement with Germany and the unification of Germany. One cannot be permitted to dictate his conditions. Just remember the proposals advanced by Chancellor Adenauer. In January of this year Adenauer advocated delaying by every means a conference of foreign ministers. Even at that time he advised as follows: Let the ministers begin the work of the conference and their deputies will continue the talks, and then subcommittees will be set up, and so on. In a word, he wanted the talks to last for many years and the present dangerous situation in Germany to be preserved forever. The impression is created that the Western powers support in essence these proposals of Adenauer.

But the Soviet Union does not wish to perpetuate the present position in Germany, in which the occupation regime in West Berlin is being preserved, which is a dangerous hotbed of a new war, and the German people are deprived of a peace treaty and therefore the unity of their country. For that reason, and only for that reason, we have named a specific time limit.

GDR-Soviet communique, 19 June 1959:

It is also envisaged that in the course of the above-mentioned transitional period an all-German committee or some other German organ, established by agreement between the two German states, must reach agreed decision on the questions of a peace treaty and Germany's reunification. Under these conditions the Government of the Soviet Union and the GDR are prepared to agree to the temporary preservation of certain occupation rights of the Western powers with regard to West Berlin for a definite period and to conclude an agreement on the provisional status of West Berlin....

The question of the time limits is not a matter of principle. Given a sincere desire of the Western powers to reach agreement, it would not be difficult to agree on the question of the time limit, which should not block the way to concord inasmuch as the Western powers themselves have advanced definite time limits in their proposals for taking measures with regard to Germany.

Instead of a businesslike discussion the Western powers continue to insist, among other things, on preserving the occupation regime in West Berlin. The Soviet Union and the

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22 APRIL 1960

- xxiv -

GDR will not sanction the preservation of the occupation regime in West Berlin indefinitely, and are fully determined to take all necessary measures for an earliest elimination of the abnormal situation in West Berlin, which endangers the cause of peace in Europe.

Gromyko statement at Geneva foreign ministers conference, 19 June 1959:

Gromyko further stressed that the question of this agreement's duration was not the basic problem of principle. We proposed one year, he said, but now we must find some intermediate period and reach an agreement decision. We hold that we could reach an agreement on an 18-month time limit. We are convinced that if there was agreement on the basic questions of principle, the necessary time limits could be found without difficulty.

In case no solution of the questions related to the peaceful settlement with Germany and Germany's reunification is reached during the agreed period within the framework of the all-German committee--or through other channels--the parties to the Geneva foreign ministers conference of 1959 could take up the question of West Berlin once again. (As reported by TASS; Soviet media did not carry the full text)

Gromyko statement at Geneva foreign ministers conference, 12 June 1959:

Gromyko pointed out that the reason the Soviet Government had proposed the establishment of a provisional status for West Berlin was because the three Western powers were opposed to the occupation regime being ended in West Berlin now. The preservation of certain occupation rights of the Western powers for a specified period of time--for a term of one year--is justifiable in such conditions and facilitates the chances of agreement....

Speaking of the new features in the Soviet proposals, Gromyko said that the one-year term did not figure in them before and that the earlier Soviet proposals did not call for associating the solution of the Berlin question with the work of the all-German committee which was now suggested. (As reported by TASS; Soviet media did not carry the full text)

Gromyko statement at Geneva foreign ministers conference, 10 June 1959:

Taking into account the position of the Western powers, the Soviet Union is prepared not to insist on an immediate and complete abolition of the regime of occupation in West Berlin.

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