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## SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

DEPLOYMENT

A Report of the Deployment Working Group

of the

GUIDED MISSILES AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE



Declass Review by NIMA / DoD

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#### ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The Deployment Working Group of the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) wishes to acknowledge the support of the CIA Photographic Intelligence Center in providing facilities for meetings and working sessions, and for assistance in editing, illustrating, and publishing of this report. The Working Group also wishes to acknowledge the support and assistance provided by the photographic intelligence personnel of Army, Navy, and CIA.

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NOTE: All correspondence relative to this report should be directed to the Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC).

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#### INTRODUCTION

The specific objective of the GMAIC Deployment Working Group (DWG) has been to provide a detailed review and analysis of all data pertinent to the location of medium- and long-range ballistic missile sites.

This report has been prepared to assist GMAIC in the fulfillment of its responsibilities to USIB on surface-to-surface missile deployment. It specifically addresses itself to the problem of ballistic missile launch site locations within the Soviet Union, and provides an updating of those sections of the 4 April 1960 report of the GMAIC Ad Hoc Deployment Working Group pertaining to this subject.

The Deployment Working Group reviewed information on suspect launch sites as follows:

- 1. Re-evaluated those locations covered in detail by the Ad Hoc Deployment Working Group.
- 2. Examined in detail all suspect site locations listed by the Ad Hoc Deployment Working Group which were not evaluated in their report.
- 3. Examined in detail and evaluated additional suspect locations as suggested by the members of the DWG.

The locations included in this report are those which have been reported in various source materials as operational surface-to-surface ballistic missile launch sites or areas, as well as those which, on the basis of reported information, might conceivably have this function. In the case of some of the listed locations, there is insufficient information to firmly determine the type of site or missile system involved. It is possible, therefore, that some of the locations included in this report may actually represent other missile systems such as surface-to-air (SAM), short-range SSM (less than 700 nm), cruise-type, or perhaps test facilities. Wherever possible, however, the DWG has attempted to indicate a non-SSM association in order to eliminate such locations or areas from further SSM consideration.

Of a total suggested list of 118 individual areas or locations, the Deployment Working Group has examined 95 locations in detail. A list

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of these locations or areas, together with the DWG evaluation for each, is contained in the summary section of this report (see Table 4). The DWG also examined the evidence on an additional 23 locations and found insufficient data to warrant listing these locations as suspect launch sites at this time. These locations are listed in Table 5.

Each member of the working group presented for group consideration all information known to his parent organization pertaining to suspect launch locations or areas. A systematic review of all evidence was carried out by the DWG, and summaries of all pertinent data for each location or area are included in the body of this report. While emphasizing the review of suspect ICBM launch locations, the DWG also examined and evaluated data for other surface-to-surface missile systems when such supporting evidence was found. In all cases, the DWG attempted to establish a relationship with the Soviet missile program for each site. It then attempted to isolate evidence pertaining to surface-to-surface missile deployment, and to determine the missile system suggested by the evidence. The DWG also considered the basic parameters necessary for a surface-to-surface missile site, such as geographic factors, technical characteristics, logistic factors, security, vulnerability, and available transportation. A majority evaluation of each area or location was assigned after a careful review of all evidence.

The following site evaluation criteria were approved by GMAIC and used by the Deployment Working Group:

#### CONFIRMED

Evidence verifies the installation as an SSM site or area, either operational or under construction.

#### PROBABLE

A probable SSM site or area is one whose existence has been confidently deduced on the basis of <u>extensive</u> reliable <u>evidence</u> which is highly indicative of an SSM site or area, either operational or under construction.

#### POSSIBLE

A possible SSM site or area is one whose existence has

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been deduced on the basis of evidence which is suggestive of an SSM site or area, either operational or under construction.

#### Undetermined

Available evidence does not provide sufficient information to permit a judgment as to a positive missile association or elimination of this location from consideration.

#### Doubtful

The available evidence and other evaluation factors suggest other activity at this location.

#### Negative

A rejected or negative site or area is one on which available evidence provides firm indication that it is not an SSM site or area.

N. B. "SSM" is used throughout as an example: to be replaced with the range/type of missile under consideration.

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#### SUMMARY

The DWG has, as previously mentioned, examined in detail a total of 95 individual areas or locations, which are annotated on the map of the USSR (see Map-1). The DWG also examined the evidence on an additional 23 locations and found insufficient data to warrant listing these locations as suspect launch sites at this time. Evaluations of evidence on the 95 locations have been made for both the ICBM and the MRBM according to the established criteria.

A summary of the evaluations for the areas and locations examined in detail are presented in Table 1.

Five locations are evaluated in the "possible" or higher category for the ICBM, while 19 locations are evaluated in the "possible" or higher category for the MRBM.

The three locations listed in the "confirmed" category of Table 1 are primarily research and development facilities, and have therefore, a limited operational capability.

TABLE 1. Summary of Site Evaluations.

	, and another	
EVALUATION	ICBM	MRBM
Confirmed	1	2
Probable	0	14
Possible	4	3
Doubtful	11	16
Negative	67	42
Undetermined	12	18
TOTAL	95	95

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Table 2 represents a listing by place name of all ICBM sites or locations considered in the evaluation categories of "confirmed," "probable," "possible," and "undetermined." All ICBM sites or locations evaluated as "doubtful" or "negative" are included in a summary list of locations in Table 5.

TABLE 2. Sur	nmary E	valuation of ICBM S	Sites and Locations.
	PROB-	DOCCEPT E	
CONFIRMED	ABLE	POSSIBLE	UNDETERMINED
Tyura Tam	None	Kapustin Yar	Berezovka
		Plesetsk	Dolon'
		Polyarnyy Ural	Luginy
		Ust'-Ukhta	Shepetovka
			Surovatika
			Alsunga
			Dundaga
			Durbe
			Kurmeni
			Piltene
			Slitere
			Volkovysk

In the "undetermined" category shown in Table 2, the DWG has listed 12 locations; however, the evidence on Alsunga, Dundaga, Durbe, Kurmeni, Piltene, Slitere and Volkovysk is considered to be extremely fragmentary and unreliable. The DWG has, therefore, eliminated these locations from further consideration at this time.

The rangehead at Tyura Tam, with four launch pads, is the only confirmed ICBM site. At the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range, either launch area 2C or E is considered a possible ICBM launch site. The remaining three possible ICBM launch areas - Plesetsk, Polyarnyy Ural and Ust'-Ukhta - are located in the Arctic regions of the northwestern USSR. These possible launch areas could cover all targets in the US with missiles of about 5,300 nm range.

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Table 3 represents a listing by place name of all MRBM sites or locations considered in the evaluation categories of "confirmed," "probable," "possible," and "undetermined." All MRBM sites which were evaluated as "doubtful" or "negative" launch sites are included in the Summary List of Locations (Table 4).

UNDETERMINED PROBABLE POSSIBLE CONFIRMED Belaya Tserkov<sup>1</sup> Mukachevo Balaklava Chelkar Podpoloz'ye Gorodok Kapustin Yar Karangit Svalyava Kandalaksha Khaapsalu Khyrov Uzhgorod Luginy Volovets Medved' Spassk-Dal'niy Shepetovka Barano-Orenburgskoye Stalinabad Uman' Grodekovo Novolitovsk Vinnitsa Vinniki Prokhory Suchan Yekaterinovka Taurage Alsunga Paplaka Dundaga Durbe Kurmeni Piltene Slitere Volkovysk

TABLE 3. Summary Evaluation of MRBM Sites and Locations.

In the "undetermined" category in Table 3, the DWG has listed 18 locations; however, the evidence on Alsunga, Dundaga, Durbe, Kurmeni, Piltene, Slitere, and Volkovysk is considered extremely fragmentary and unreliable. The DWG has, therefore, eliminated these locations from further consideration.

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The two confirmed MRBM sites, Chelkar and Kapustin Yar, listed in Table 3, are primarily research and development and training facilities, and have a limited operational capability. The evidence on 14 MRBM sites in the "probable" category were considered and summarized individually. Some of these site locations are contained within certain geographic areas (i.e., Carpathian and Far East Maritime). In these cases, evaluations have been made by area rather than by specific locations. This was done because much of the evidence pertaining to individual locations applied equally to other locations within the same area.

The probable and possible MRBM launch sites located in the Baltic, Carpathian, Crimea and Maritime Far East areas could cover all major targets in western Europe, the Near East, Japan and Okinawa, with the exception of Spain and Morocco.

LOCATION PLACE		EVALUATION	
NUMBER	NAME	ICBM	MRBM
A - 1	Alsunga	Undetermined	Undetermined
A-2	Aral'sk	Negative	Negative
A-3	Ay Petri	Negative	Negative
B-1	Balaklava	Negative	Possible
B-2	Belaya Tserkov'	Negative	Undetermined
в-3	Barano-Orenburg- skoye	Negative	Probable
B-4	Berezovka	Undetermined	Negative
C-1	Chelkar	Negative	Confirmed
D-1	Daugavpils	Negative	Negative

TABLE 4. List of Sites Considered in Detail.

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LOCATION	PLACE	EVALUA	
NUMBER	NAME	ICBM	MRBM
D-2	Delyatin	Negative	Negative
D-3	Dundaga	Undetermined	Undetermined
D-4	Durbe	Undetermined	Undetermined
D-5	Dolon'	Undetermined	Negative
E-1	Engel's	Negative	Negative
F-1	Feodosiya	Negative	Doubtful
G-1	Grobina	Negative	Doubtful
G-2	Gorodok	Negative	Undetermined
G-3	Grodekovo	Negative	Probable
H-1	Hiiumaa Island	Negative	Doubtful
I-1	Iul'tin	Negative	Negative
K-1	Kaliningrad/ Leningrad	Negative	Doubtful
K-2	Kamyshin	Negative	Negative
K-3	Kandalaksha	Negative	Undetermined
K-4	Kapustin Yar	Possible	Confirmed
K-5	Karangit	Negative	Possible
K-6	Khabarovsk	Negative	Doubtful
K-7	Khaapsalu	Negative	Possible
K-8	Khashuri	Negative	Negative
K-9	Klaipeda	Negative	Doubtful

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K-17KyshtymDoubtfulNegativeK-18KhyrovNegativeUndeterminedL-1LuginyUndeterminedUndeterminedL-2L'vovNegativeNegativeM-1Malaya SazankaNegativeNegative	LOCATION NUMBER	PLACE NAME	E V A L U IC BM	ATION MRBM
K-12KraskinoNegativeNegativeK-13KrasnoarmeyskoyeK-14KrasnoyarskNegativeNegativeK-15Not AssignedK-16KurmeniUndeterminedUndeterminedK-17KyshtymDoubtfulNegativeK-18KhyrovNegativeUndeterminedL-1LuginyUndeterminedUndeterminedL-2L'vovNegativeNegativeM-1Malaya SazankaNegativeNegativeM-2Medved'NegativeNegativeM-3MozhayskNegativeNegativeM-5MurmanskDoubtfulDoubtfulN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	K-10	Klesov	Doubtful	Doubtful
K-13KrasnoarmeyskoyeK-14KrasnoyarskNegativeNegativeK-15Not AssignedK-16KurmeniUndeterminedUndeterminedK-17KyshtymDoubtfulNegativeK-18KhyrovNegativeUndeterminedL-1LuginyUndeterminedUndeterminedL-2L'vovNegativeNegativeM-1Malaya SazankaNegativeNegativeM-2Medved'NegativeNegativeM-3MozhayskNegativeNegativeM-4MukachevoDoubtfulProbableN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	K-11	Kolgompya	Negative	Negative
K-14KrasnoyarskNegativeNegativeK-15Not AssignedK-16KurmeniUndeterminedUndeterminedK-17KyshtymDoubtfulNegativeK-18KhyrovNegativeUndeterminedL-1LuginyUndeterminedUndeterminedL-2L'vovNegativeNegativeM-1Malaya SazankaNegativeNegativeM-2Medved'NegativeNegativeM-3MozhayskNegativeProbableM-4MukachevoDoubtfulProbableM-5MurmanskNegativeNegativeN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegative	K-12	Kraskino	Negative	Negative
K-15Not AssignedK-16KurmeniUndeterminedUndeterminedK-17KyshtymDoubtfulNegativeK-18KhyrovNegativeUndeterminedL-1LuginyUndeterminedUndeterminedL-2L'vovNegativeNegativeM-1Malaya SazankaNegativeNegativeM-2Medved'NegativeNegativeM-3MozhayskNegativeNegativeM-4MukachevoDoubtfulProbableM-5MurmanskDoubtfulNegativeN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	K-13	Krasnoarmeyskoye		
K-16KurmeniUndeterminedUndeterminedK-17KyshtymDoubtfulNegativeK-18KhyrovNegativeUndeterminedL-1LuginyUndeterminedUndeterminedL-2L'vovNegativeNegativeM-1Malaya SazankaNegativeNegativeM-2Medved'NegativeNegativeM-3MozhayskNegativeNegativeM-4MukachevoDoubtfulProbableM-5MurmanskDoubtfulDoubtfulN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	K-14	Krasnoyarsk	Negative	Negative
K-17KyshtymDoubtfulNegativeK-18KhyrovNegativeUndeterminedL-1LuginyUndeterminedUndeterminedL-2L'vovNegativeNegativeM-1Malaya SazankaNegativeNegativeM-2Medved'NegativeNegativeM-3MozhayskNegativeNegativeM-4MukachevoDoubtfulProbableM-5MurmanskDoubtfulDoubtfulN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	K-15	Not Assigned		
K-18KhyrovNegativeUndeterminedL-1LuginyUndeterminedUndeterminedL-2L'vovNegativeNegativeM-1Malaya SazankaNegativeNegativeM-2Medved'NegativeUndeterminedM-3MozhayskNegativeNegativeM-4MukachevoDoubtfulProbableM-5MurmanskDoubtfulDoubtfulN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	K-16	Kurmeni	Undetermined	Undetermined
L-1LuginyUndeterminedUndeterminedL-2L'vovNegativeNegativeM-1Malaya SazankaNegativeNegativeM-2Medved'NegativeUndeterminM-3MozhayskNegativeNegativeM-4MukachevoDoubtfulProbableM-5MurmanskDoubtfulNegativeN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	K-17	Kyshtym	Doubtful	Negative
L-2L'vovNegativeNegativeM-1Malaya SazankaNegativeNegativeM-2Medved'NegativeUndeterminM-3MozhayskNegativeNegativeM-4MukachevoDoubtfulProbableM-5MurmanskDoubtfulDoubtfulN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	K-18	Khyrov	Negative	Undetermined
M-1Malaya SazankaNegativeNegativeM-2Medved'NegativeUndeterminM-3MozhayskNegativeNegativeM-4MukachevoDoubtfulProbableM-5MurmanskDoubtfulDoubtfulN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	L-1	Luginy	Undetermined	Undetermined
M-2Medved'NegativeUndetermineM-3MozhayskNegativeNegativeM-4MukachevoDoubtfulProbableM-5MurmanskDoubtfulDoubtfulN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	L-2	L'vov	Negative	Negative
M-3MozhayskNegativeNegativeM-4MukachevoDoubtfulProbableM-5MurmanskDoubtfulDoubtfulN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	M-1	Malaya Sazanka	Negative	Negative
M-4MukachevoDoubtfulProbableM-5MurmanskDoubtfulDoubtfulN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	M - 2	Medved'	Negative	Undetermined
M-5MurmanskDoubtfulDoubtfulN-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	M-3	Mozhaysk	Negative	Negative
N-1Nizhnyaya SaldaNegativeNegativeN-2Nizhnyaya TuraNegativeNegative	M-4	Mukachevo	Doubtful	Probable
N-2 Nizhnyaya Tura Negative Negative	M-5	Murmansk	Doubtful	Doubtful
	N-1	Nizhnyaya Salda	Negative	Negative
N-3 Not Assigned	N-2	Nizhnyaya Tura	Negative	Negative
	N-3	Not Assigned		
N-4 Novolitovsk Negative Probable	N-4	Novolitovsk	Negative	Probable

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LOCATION NUMBER	PLACE NAME	E V A L U A IC BM	T I O N MRBM
O-1	Olen'ya	Negative	Negative
P-1	Paplaka	Negative	Probable
P-2	Piltene	Undetermined	Undetermined
P-3	Plesetsk	Possible	Negative
P-4	Poltava	Negative	Negative
P-5	Polyarnyy Ural	Possible	Negative
P-6	Podpoloz'ye	Doubtful	Probable
P-7	Prokhory	Negative	Probable
S-1	Saaremaa Island	Negative	Doubtful
<b>S-</b> 2	Samland Peninsula	Negative	Doubtful
<b>S-</b> 3	Sarny	Doubtful	Doubtful
S-4	Sarova	Negative	Negative
<b>S-</b> 5	Sary Shagan	Negative	Negative
S-6	Semipalatinsk	Negative	Negative
S-7	Sevas topol'	Negative	Negative
S-8	Shepetovka	Undetermined	Undetermined
S-9	Shikhany	Negative	Negative
S-10	Suchan	Negative	Probable
S-11	Slavyanka	Negative	Doubtful
S-12	Slitere	Undetermined	Undetermined

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LOCATION	PLACE	EVALUA	TION
NUMBER	NAME	ICBM	MRBM
S-13	Sovetsk	Negative	Doubtful
S-14	Spassk-Dal'niy	Negative	Probable
<b>S</b> -15	Stalinabad	Negative	Undetermine
<b>S-</b> 16	Sudak	Negative	Negative
S-17	Surovatikha	Undetermined	Negative
S-18	Svalyava	Doubtful	Probable
T-1	Tallinn	Negative	Doubtful
T-2	Tashara	Negative	Negative
T-3	Taurage	Doubtful	Probable
T-4	Tiksi	Negative	Negative
T-5	Tomsk	Negative	Negative
T-6	Tuapse	Negative	Negative
<b>T-</b> 7	Tukums	Doubtful	Doubtful
T-8	Tyura Tam	Confirmed	Negative
U - 1	Ugol'nyye Kopi	Negative	Doubtful
U-2	Ukraina	Negative	Negative
U-3	Uman'	Negative	Undetermine
U-4	Ust'-Ukhta	Possible	Negative
U-5	Uzhgorod	Doubtful	Probable
V - 1	Valday	Negative	Negative

- 20 -

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LOCATION	PLACE	EVALUA	TION
NUMBER	NAME	ICBM	MRBM
V-2	Verkhnyaya Salda	Negative	Negative
V - 3	Vinnitsa	Negative	Undetermined
V-4	Vladivostok	Negative	Negative
V-5	Volkovysk	Undetermined	Undetermined
V-6	Volovets	Doubtful	Probable
V - 7	Vinniki	Negative	Undetermined
Y - 1	Yuryuzan	Negative	Negative
Y - 2	Yekaterinovka	Negative	Probable
Z - 1	Znamensk	Negative	Negative

The DWG also examined the evidence on an additional 23 locations, and found insufficient data to warrant listing these locations as suspect launch sites at this time.

TABLE 5. List of Sites Eliminated from Detailed Examination.

Alykel'	Krasnoye	Sortavala
Bukhta Ugol'nyy	Motygino	Toropets
(Beringovsky)	Nesterov	Ukulan
Cherepanovo	Obninsk	Ureliki
Golitsyno	Okhotsk	Yoshkar Ola
Istra	Puchezh	Voskresenka
Ivanovo	Sambor	Ye <b>v</b> lakh
Kiev	Simferopol'	Zavitaya

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			A-1
I. Conclusions			
	is an undetermined* undetermined* MRBN		
II. Background			
TALENI	f photography of 1956	, which is partial	ly cloud-covered,
shows no unusual	activity.		
		,	
*Four members	voted "undetermined,	" and one membe	r voted "doubtful.
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#### I. Conclusions

The Aral'sk area is a <u>negative</u> ICBM area. It is a negative MRBM area.

#### II. Background

Aral'sk has long been associated with the Soviet guided missile program in the capacity of a support base for the KYMTR 650-nm impact area. A facility at Aral'sk is known as "Base 3" of the KYMTR. Aircraft from Kapustin Yar frequently visit Aral'sk in normal support roles, and there are communication facilities of the KYMTR located there.

Aircraft from Tyura Tam also have frequently visited this location, but the flights were probably associated with a TTMTR station (C05 group) which is located nearby. Aircraft flying in range support roles have utilized Aral'sk as a via point while enroute from the VAWARC and KYMTR rangeheads to downrange facilities. Aircraft flying from Moscow to Tyura Tam as well as aircraft flying from Moscow to the Sary Shagan area have also often utilized Aral'sk as a normal via point.



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It is known that personnel who launched some 350-nm missiles from a point approximately 50 nm northeast of Aral'sk (SP-2) probably staged from Aral'sk. The firings were for training purposes, and the exact location of fixed facilities, if any, is unknown.

A special construction unit was noted at Aral'sk in 1954. The unit is believed to have been involved in the construction of instrumentation and support facilities for the KYMTR 650-nm impact area.

TALENT photography of August 1957 and July 1959 revealed no unusual activity in the Aral'sk area which could be interpreted as a missile launch site.

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I. Conclusions		
Ay Petri is a <u>neg</u> It is a <u>negative</u> M		
II. Background		
The collateral so sites in the Ay Petri area evaluation. Information finaccurate and largely fab coverage of 1956, 1957, a installations.	rom these sources has l rication. and TAL	by subsequent field been determined to be LENT photographic
	<u></u>	
Ay Petri is near astrophysical observatory be located in the area. T		scope is known to
astrophysical observatory	, and a large radio tele	scope is known to

and the state







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SH-0288/60 B-1

#### I. Conclusions

Balaklava is a <u>negative</u> ICBM site. It is a possible MRBM site.

#### II. Background

Balaklava became missile-suspect when 1956 TALENT coverage disclosed a heavily-secured unidentified facility having a configuration which suggested a missile launch site. The facility had what were believed to be two elliptical launch pads. Configuration of the two pads makes the determination of the type of missiles launched here very difficult. The location of the facility on the Black Sea coast adjacent to the important naval center of Sevastopol', and the orientation of the pads toward the Black Sea, suggest a possible research and development program for cruise-type missiles for naval use. The suggested function of this installation was subsequently confirmed by a Soviet defector who, while stationed in the general area as an artillery man, had witnessed launchings of what were apparently cruise-type missiles from the facility. The launchings occurred from the summer of 1955 to November 1956. The defector also reported that naval personnel were associated with the installation.

TALENT coverage of February 1960 shows a build-up in the surrounding area, including the addition of drive-through/checkout buildings, storage and administrative buildings, and military housing. No changes in the launch site are apparent.

Previous information provided from various sources is consistent with the use of this facility for testing cruise-type missiles. However, the build-up of the installation revealed in the February 1960 photography is suggestive of facilities usually associated with ballistic missiles. The drive-through buildings are smaller than those seen at TTMTR and KYMTR for ICBMs and MRBMs.

It appears likely that cruise missiles were launched from this area prior to 1960. However, at present the evidence points toward the construction of a possible ballistic missile complex for the support of missiles no larger than the MRBM category.

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(Barano-Orenburgskoye has been associated with a missile division headquarters located at Spassk-Dal'niy. See the analysis of the Spassk-Dal'niy area /location S-14/ for specific information related to this site.)





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#### I. Conclusions

The Berezovka installation is an <u>undetermined</u>\* <u>ICBM</u> site. It is a negative MRBM site.

#### II. Background

TALENT photography of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ revealed a major installation under construction near the village of Berezovka at 51 11N -46 00E. It is situated along an improved and partially new highway under construction between Engel's, 17.5 nm to the north, and Stalingrad, 170 nm to the south. The installation encompasses an area 4 nm long which lies within and on either side of the Ovrag (Ravine) Berezovyy. This ravine, formed by an intermittent stream which empties into the nearby Volga River, ranges in width from 1,900 to 5,000 feet and has escarpments on each side 50 to 60 feet high (see Figure 1). The complex consists of a partially double-fenced operations area, containing four sites of extensive excavating, and three support areas.

The three support areas provide housing, administrative, maintenance, construction and utility facilities for the complex. Accommodations for construction personnel include dormitory space for an estimated 428 persons and housing for 14 families. Quarters under construction for permanent personnel include barracks space for approximately 440 persons and housing for an estimated 270 families.

Power for the complex is provided by an overhead power line from Engel's. Photographic evidence indicated that the complex will not require large amounts of water for its operations. A small building with an adjacent mast could provide radio communications with Engel's.

The nearby villages of Berezovka and Krasnoarmeyskoye have no facilities for providing operational support or other services to the complex. External logistical support will probably be provided by the Saratov-Engel's urban area, which has the nearest air and rail facilities. Since there is no evidence that a railroad line will be constructed from Engel's to service the complex, logistical support will probably move along the improved road under construction between Engel's and Stalingrad.

\*Four members voted "undetermined" on ICBM, one member voted "probable" on ICBM.

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SH-0288/60 B-4

The main road from Engel's intersects the internal service road network at wide-angle turns. At the time of photography, neither the main road nor the service roads appeared to be surfaced. However, the roadbed of the main road from Engel's has been completed, measuring 30 feet wide, and there are no steep grades at any point along this road.

A detailed analysis of this installation is contained in the source references. However, the function of this installation is still undetermined.

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SH-0288/60 C-1

## I. Conclusions

The Chelkar area is a <u>negative</u> ICBM area. It is a confirmed MRBM training area.

The Chelkar area is located deep within USSR territory, and is far enough from potential MRBM targets to render it almost useless as a deployment site.

# II. Background

TALENT photography of has provided evidence 25X1 that the site at Chelkar is a field-type launch site, consisting primarily of revetments for vehicles, and has been used for firings of mediumrange missiles. The site is the location of a KYMTR launch point (SP-5),

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C02093143 Janitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7 25X1 TOP SECRET 25X1 SH-0288/60 **D-3** I. Conclusions Dundaga is an undetermined\* ICBM site. It is an undetermined\* MRBM site. п. Background A search of TALENT photography, dated July 1956, covering a 40 nm radius centered on Dundaga revealed no indicators of unusual construction or missile activity. This photographic evidence would negate most of the collateral reports with dates of information in 1956 and early 1957. 25X1 - 2 -TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7



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I. Conclusions			
Durbe is	an <u>undetermined</u> * <u>ICBM</u>	site.	
It is an <u>u</u>	undetermined* MRBM site	е.	
II. Background			
TALENI	<b>photography of 1956 sh</b> o	ws no unusual activity in t	he
		e to scattered clouds. The	
*Four members	voted "undetermined," on	e member voted "doubtful	."
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## I. Conclusions

Engel's is a <u>negative</u> <u>ICBM</u> site. It is a <u>negative</u> <u>MRBM</u> site.

# II. Background

Engel's Airfield is located 4 nm east of the town of Engel's and 10 nm southeast of Saratov. This Long Range Airfield, like Poltava, has an associated Modified Type II Special Weapons Storage Area 2.5 nm southeast of the airfield with one completed bunker and a second bunker under construction. December 1959 TALENT photography of the airfield does not show anything on the airfield which can be interpreted as a missile launching site. This airfield will probably provide support for the unidentified Krasnoarmeyskoye installation (Location K-13), 22.5 nm to the south.









SH-0288/60 F-1

#### I. Conclusions

Feodosiya is a <u>negative</u> ICBM site.

It is a doubtful MRBM site.

It is a possible site for the launching of short range cruise-type missiles.

## II. Background

TALENT photography of revealed an unidentified 25X1 installation located at 45 06 36N - 35 27 06E, near Dalniye Kamyshi. This installation consists of: an administrative and personnel area (see photo, annotation B); a storage and shop area (B); an unidentified circular platform or tank (D); a motor pool (C); four concrete pads (A); and, a rail siding which appears to be under construction (E). The four concrete pads, each approximately 30 feet in diameter, are revetted on two sides and have what appear to be dark objects in the center of each pad. No electronics installations appear to be affiliated with this installation.

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	Grobina is It is a <u>dou</u>	s a negative ICB hbtful MRBM site	<u>M</u> site.			
II. <u>E</u>	Background					
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-		photography of l	956 shows no	missile-r	elated	
activi	ty in the Grob	oina area.	······			
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SH-0288/60 G-2	ć
I. Conclusions	
Gorodok is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area. It is an <u>undetermined MRBM</u> area.	
II. Background	
Aircraft flights with definite missile range-associations have, on occasion, included Gorodok in their itineraries. Direct flight associa- tions between Gorodok and the missile test ranges, however, have not	
been recorded.	
There is no recent usable photographic coverage of the Gorodok	
area.	
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Ι.	Conclusions	
	Iul'tin is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a <u>negative* MRBM</u> site.	
11.	Background	
		25>
	There is no rail or road transportation to support missile vity at this location, and port facilities at Egvekinot, which serves in, are restricted to summer operations due to the Arctic location of port.	25X1
	l'tin, although there have been pronounced shuttle activities involving	_
to th	r areas of the Soviet polar region. Most of this activity was directed e normal, seasonal re-supply of the Ice Island Expeditions at points and No 9.	۲
to th No 8 men- larg Chuk	e normal, seasonal re-supply of the Ice Island Expeditions at points	
to th No 8 men larg Chuk adeq laun	e normal, seasonal re-supply of the Ice Island Expeditions at points and No 9. The construction of a permanent airfield at Iul'tin was recom- ded in June 1959. In November 1959, construction of facilities for e aircraft was disrupted by the withdrawal of the main body of the totka Construction Directorate, and by the delay in transferring	
to th No 8 menu larg Chuk adeq laund taini	e normal, seasonal re-supply of the Ice Island Expeditions at points and No 9. The construction of a permanent airfield at Iul'tin was recom- ded in June 1959. In November 1959, construction of facilities for e aircraft was disrupted by the withdrawal of the main body of the totka Construction Directorate, and by the delay in transferring uate construction workers to the Iul'tin combine to complete the job. Other than a few vague, low-level collateral reports of missile ching sites in the Chukotsk Peninsula, there is no collateral per-	HR
to th No 8 menu larg Chuk adeq laund taini exten activ	e normal, seasonal re-supply of the Ice Island Expeditions at points and No 9. The construction of a permanent airfield at Iul'tin was recom- ded in June 1959. In November 1959, construction of facilities for e aircraft was disrupted by the withdrawal of the main body of the totka Construction Directorate, and by the delay in transferring uate construction workers to the Iul'tin combine to complete the job. Other than a few vague, low-level collateral reports of missile ching sites in the Chukotsk Peninsula, there is no collateral per- ng to site construction. photography of March 1959 and April 1960 shows msive mining activity in the Iul'tin area, but no missile or unusual	HR
to th No 8 mend larg Chuk adeq laund taini exter activ	e normal, seasonal re-supply of the Ice Island Expeditions at points and No 9. The construction of a permanent airfield at Iul'tin was recom- ded in June 1959. In November 1959, construction of facilities for e aircraft was disrupted by the withdrawal of the main body of the totka Construction Directorate, and by the delay in transferring uate construction workers to the Iul'tin combine to complete the job. Other than a few vague, low-level collateral reports of missile ching sites in the Chukotsk Peninsula, there is no collateral per- ng to site construction. photography of March 1959 and April 1960 shows maive mining activity in the Iul'tin area, but no missile or unusual wity was apparent.	HR

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SH-0288/60 No Pages\_4

LOCATION: Kaliningrad-Leningrad Area ("Lollipops") NO : K-1 COORD : 54 43N - 20 30E/59 55N - 30 15E DATE: 1 Sep 60 WAC : 169



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## I. Conclusions

The "lollipop" sites in the Kaliningrad/Leningrad area are negative ICBM sites.

They are possible SSM sites for shorter range missiles of an undetermined type.

#### II. Background

Numerous coastal defense-type emplacements in the Kaliningrad area have been referred to as "lollipop" sites, so designated because of the appearance of cleared circular areas surrounding the isolated railway spurs or roads. Emplacements such as these were generally of World War I and II vintage, and were used as gun emplacements.

Four "lollipop" type sites were considered: two west of Leningrad (59 45N - 28 07E and 59 43N - 28 01E), one at Liepaja (56 37N -21 02E), and one west of Kaliningrad (54 42N - 19 56E). The two sites in the Leningrad area were covered only on German photography of 1944 and 1941, respectively, and were under construction when photographed. Although the areas of the Liepaja site and the site west of Kaliningrad were covered by German photography of 1941 and 1944, respectively, neither site was present at the time. The latter two sites do appear on 1956 photography and some current improvement or construction was under way. All four of these sites are similar in appearance.

It appears likely that these sites were originally designed as rail gun positions, although it is feasible that the Soviets may have converted them to shorter range missile launch facilities. However, the rail sites are very closely spaced, and there are no support facilities in the vicinity for missile assembly and checkout.

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SH-0288/60 K-4

# I. Conclusions

KYMTR is a confirmed MRBM Research and Development and Troop Training facility.

Area 2C is a <u>possible ICBM launch</u> area. The facilities at areas 2C and E appear to be adequate for the launching of missiles with a range greater than 1,100 nm. The Series 65 missile was probably launched from one of these areas in July and August 1960. The facilities at area 2C appear quite similar to the facilities at launch area C at Tyura Tam.

## II. Background

The launch complexes associated with surface-to-surface missile systems at the Kapustin Yar range were examined in detail in order to ascertain whether any of these facilities could be used for the ICBM. The facilities at areas E and 2C are thought to have the physical characteristics necessary to support activity for ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 1,100 nm. No other facilities at the range are believed capable of long-range ballistic missile operations.

Complex E is a new launch facility near Complex A, and was under construction in December 1959. It consists of a large building, without rail connection, similar in size to a rail drive-through building at Tyura Tam. A single launch pad is also under construction in this area. The physical size of the facilities suggests that they were designed for a missile which could have a range greater than 1,100 nm. Another equally likely possibility for these new facilities is for testing of a solid propellant, shorter-range ballistic missile.

TALENT photography indicate that launch areas 1C and 3C have been used for the 1,100 nm and 700 nm ballistic missiles. The facilities associated with the new launch pad at 2C indicate a missile system with a range possibly longer than 1,100 nm, and logistical requirements greater than previously observed at the Kapustin Yar rangehead.

A summary of a detailed examination of the new facilities in Complex C is as follows:

1. Instrumentation and/or guidance facilities, which closely resemble equivalent facilities at the Tyura Tam area, are available at the KYMTR rangehead.

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FIGURE 4. LAUNCH AREA 2C AT KAPUSTIN YAR. Date of photography, 2. A long-range communications facility, with rhombic antennas oriented at was under construction in December 1959. The facility is located immediately behind launch area 2C. This is the first apparent long-range communications facility at the KYMTR. The antenna system's orientation is generally directed toward the Yeniseysk area, a FLIM FLAM station location known to support TTMTR firings, FLIM FLAM data was received from the station at Yeniseysk during a Series 65 firing from KYMTR in August 1960. Signals for this transmitter have not been identified.

3. It is estimated that the facilities in area 2C could not have been completed prior to May 1960.

4. A large support facility is under construction which contains a large rail drive-through building, 185 by 125 feet, that is similar to a building at Tyura Tam. Additional water and power lines are being installed.

5. A rail line is under construction, from the range support area, which probably will stop at the launch Complex C support facility. This is an apparent first requirement for close proximity of a rail offloading facility adjacent to a launch pad at KYMTR.

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6. The launch pads under construction at area 2C are the largest at KYMTR and will be able to handle equipment for a large-size missile system. The design incorporates road-served pads, with revetted servicing areas below the level of the pads which may be covered when construction is completed.

A Series 65 missile was fired from either launch area E or 2C at KYMTR. The facilities at both areas appear to be adequate for launching of missiles of a range greater than 1,100 nm. Area 2C, is a more likely launch area for ICBMs than is area E. Facilities at area 2C appear to be quite similar to the facilities noted at launch area C at TTMTR.

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## I. Conclusions

Karangit is a negative ICBM site.

It is a possible short or medium range surface-to-surface missile site of undetermined type.

#### II. Background

TALENT photography of July 1956 reveals that the Karangit installation consists of two secured areas. The larger area contains four primary buildings, several smaller structures, and an associated concrete pad approximately 200 by 190 feet. The smaller secured area is located on an adjacent hill and may be an electronics facility.

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# I. Conclusions

The Khabarovsk area is a <u>negative</u>\*<u>ICBM</u> area. It is a doubtful\*\* MRBM area.

#### II. Background

Khabarovsk became missile-suspect on the basis of collateral reports, and TALENT coverage (March 1958) which disclosed a large unidentified facility under construction (48 28N-134 49E). The function of this facility could not be determined from photo interpretation. However, the following possible functions, in the order of their probability, were suggested: (1) An electronics site; (2) a SAM site; (3) an MRBM or ICBM site; (4) or, a combination electronics and SAM site. In addition to the unidentified facility, TALENT depicted several electronics installations in the area, including three KRUG sites.

\*Four members voted "negative" on ICBM, one member voted "doubtful" on ICBM.

\*\*Three members voted "doubtful" on MRBM, two members voted "negative" on MRBM.

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there is no large-scale coverage and the poor quality of tracker cov-				
	there is no large-scal	e coverage and the	is available; poor quality of tr	however, acker cov-
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	SH-0288/60 K-9
I.	Conclusions
	Klaipeda is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a <u>doubtful MRBM</u> site. It is a <u>possible SAM</u> site.
II.	Background
pho	TALENT tography of 1956 was heavily cloud-covered in the Klaipeda area. No
	sual activity was apparent on the photography.

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(Information on Klesov is discussed and evaluated with Sarny, Location S-3).

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SH-0288/60 K-11

## I. Conclusions

The Kolgompya rail spurs are <u>negative</u> ICBM sites. They are negative MRBM sites.

## II. Background

The two rail spurs situated about a mile apart in the area south of Kolgompya are covered by 1944 and 1956 photography. TALENT photography of 1956 indicates that sections of the rail line serving both spurs are overgrown with vegetation. Therefore, the spurs are considered inactive.

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(An installation at 51 11N - 46 00E is sometimes referred to as Krasnoarmeyskoye, but is usually referred to as Berezovka. Information on this installation is discussed with Berezovka, Location B-4.)





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SH-0288/60	25X1
K-14	

## I. Conclusions

The Krasnoyarsk (Dodonovo) facility is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area. It is a negative MRBM area.

## II. Background

The information on this site is principally dated prior to 1956. Construction of this facility began in 1949, and expansion has continued to the present time. The construction has been done by a unit of the Chief Directorate of Industrial Construction, the agency that constructed other known nuclear energy installations, as well as other less significant facilities. An FPN was noted in 1957, which might represent a GUASS-MO unit.

25X1

Some mining or tunneling, as well as several manufacturingtype buildings, can be seen on 1956 GENETRIX photography of the area. A rail line was discovered leading to the facility in 1956, but no security fence was apparent. However, it is known that security passes are required for entrance to the facility.





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SH-0288/60 No Pages 2

NO : K-15 DATE: 1 Sep 60

(Location K-15 not assigned)

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	SH-0288/
	K-17
I. Conclusions	
Kyshtym is a <u>doubtful*</u> It is a negative MRBM a	
······································	
II. Background	
	Frag
mentary TALENT photography of	-
be associated with missiles, but	does provide further evidence
	does provide further evidence
be associated with missiles, but	does provide further evidence
be associated with missiles, but	does provide further evidence
be associated with missiles, but	does provide further evidence
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	IUP SECKET	) : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001 	
		K-18	
I. Conclusions			
Khyrov is It is an <u>un</u>	a <u>negative</u> ICBM area. determined MRBM area		
II. Background			
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
There is r	no collateral information	n on Khyrov. Photography	
dated July 1956 rev	veals no unusual activity	in this area.	
	- 2 -		






















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SH-0288/60 M-2

I. Conclusions

Medved' is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area. It is an undetermined <u>MRBM</u> area.

It is believed to be the location of a unit previously associated with short range rockets.

II. Background

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TALENT photography dated July 1956 identifies a secured military installation (58 18 30N - 30 30 40E) at Medved'. The installation, secured by fence and guard towers, contains eight U-shaped barracks-type buildings, two new L-shaped vehicle sheds with large concrete hardstands, and numerous other miscellaneous

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SH-0288/60 M-5	25X1
I. <u>Conclusions</u> The Murmansk area is a <u>doubtful* ICBM</u> area. It is a doubtful** MRBM area.	
II. Background	
	25X1
TALENT coverage of did not reveal any SSM-related activity.	25X1
	25X1
*Three members voted "doubtful" ICBM, one member voted "possible" ICBM, and one member voted "negative" ICBM. **Three members voted "doubtful" MRBM, one member voted "undetermined" MRBM, and one member voted "negative" MRBM.	
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NO : N-3 DATE: 1 Sep 60

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	SH-0288/60 N-4	
(Novolitovsk has been associated with a m quarters located at Spassk-Dal'niy. See the analys		

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area /Location S-1 $\frac{4}{4}$  for specific information related to this site.)

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SH-0288/60 P-1	
I. Conclusions	
Paplaka is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site.	
It is a probable* MRBM site. II. Background	
	25X1
	•
*Four members voted "probable" on MRBM, one member voted "possible" on MRBM.	
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	SH-0288/60
<b></b>	P-1
i V	TALENT photography dated reveals an installation of interest at 56 27 20N - 21 26 50E, far out on the oblique. The installation appears to be a military facility containing barracks in a wooded area, a recreational area, a troop training area with revetments and trenches, and a driver training area.
	The Air Target Chart lists the area covered as Paplaka, but
	he AMS map lists the area covered as Station Krogzenji, 1.8 nm west of Paplaka.
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				SH-0288/60 P-2
I. <u>Conclus</u>	ions			
	tene is an <u>undetern</u> s an <u>undetermined</u>	the second se	ite.	
II. Backgro	ound			
	LENT photography is obscured by sca		s no unusual ac	
Kurmeni, an	rfields and missile nd Piltene. Howev	er, in no case	is there suppl	ementary eviden
of any type	to verify or deny th	e existence of	missile units	in the Piltene ar
* December 1	1	· • •		
* Four mem	bers voted "undete	rmined," one	member voted	"doubtiul".
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SH-0288/60 P-4

# I. Conclusions

Poltava Airfield is a <u>negative</u> <u>ICBM</u> site. It is a <u>negative</u> <u>MRBM</u> site.

## II. Background

Poltava Airfield is located 2.5 nm northwest of the city of Poltava. This is a Soviet Long Range Air Force base with an 8,000foot concrete runway, and a Special Weapons Storage Site located about 3 nm west-northwest of the airfield.

TALENT photography of February 1960 does not indicate any facilities which may be associated with an SSM launching site either on or immediately adjacent to the airfield. There is a new bunker in the weapons storage area which differs considerably from the original bunkers found at Type II Weapons Storage Sites. The new bunker identified at this installation is identical to the new bunker located at Engel's Airfield.

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#### I. Conclusions

Saaremaa Island is a negative ICBM area. It is a doubtful MRBM area. It is possible that the activity may be for a shorter-range missile system related to naval activity.

#### II. Background

TALENT photography of July 1956 shows two track-centered rectangular clearings, each about 150 by 50 feet, on two of three spurs at the end of a rail line which extends out onto a peninsula at the southern tip of Saaremaa Island. At the time of the photography, construction was still under way. Photography of May 1941 shows that the spur lines were not in existence at that time.

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SH-0288/60

S-1

The security and logistics problems inherent in this coastal island's location limit the possibility of SSM deployment to Saaremaa Island.

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	L	SH S-2	-0288/60
I. Conclusions			
It is a $d$	nland Peninsula is a <u>negative</u> oubtful MRBM area. location of a confirmed SAM		
II. Background			



















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SH-0288/60 S-5

# I. Conclusions

The Sary Shagan area is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area. It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> area. The area is primarily an anti-ballistic missile research and development facility.

### II. Background

This Working Group concurs in the conclusions of the report of the Joint GMAIC/SIC Working Group on "Activities in the Sary Shagan Area USSR," dated July 1960. The major conclusions from this report are reproduced below:

"1. The activities being conducted in, and apparently planned for, the Sary Shagan Area are definitely associated with the Soviet guided missile/space program.

"2. The Sary Shagan Area as presently known comprises one of the major Soviet guided missile/space research, development, and / test areas, second only in magnitude of facilities to the Kapustin Yar/ Vladimirovka complex. Extensive cloud cover /on \_\_\_\_\_\_photography/ precludes an accurate appraisal of the actual size; some facilities have been probably missed completely. The large construction support areas and the numerous construction activities indicate that the area is still growing.

"3. The Sary Shagan Area is probably the prime air/missile defense research, development, and test center of the USSR, with current activities directed primarily toward the ballistic-missile defense problem. These activities are under the direction of the PVO (Air Defense of the Homeland). Additional current activities most likely include electronics research and development probably for ballistic-missile early warning and also possibly for space tracking, the testing of surface-toair missile defense systems against high- and low-flying aircraft and possibly aerodynamic missiles, and the actual tracking of Soviet ICBMs and space vehicles launched from Tyura Tam. We see no evidence of ICBM development, testing, production, or deployment activities in the Sary Shagan Area. We believe the tracking instrumentation and communications facilities to be compatible with land recovery of an object from space.

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SH-0288/60 S-5

"4. The ballistic-missile defense problem is the main concern of the Sary Shagan Area at present. The emphasis to date has been on the precision tracking of incoming ballistic missiles probably for acquiring the data necessary to an active ballistic-missile defense system. Some counter-countermeasure developments may be a part of this program. We believe a similar, but possibly less extensive, precision tracking program is being conducted in the Uka/Peschanyj area of Kamchatka Peninsula against ICBMs, probably as a follow-on, complementary part of the overall Soviet ballistic-missile defense program.

"5. The Soviet anti-ballistic-missile missile system is being developed in the Sary Shagan Area. We believe that missiles have been fired from the Sary Shagan Area; however, we doubt that any of these firings have been conducted with the actual complete Soviet anti-ballisticmissile missile system, or that these firings have been conducted against incoming ballistic missiles. The missiles fired to date from the Sary Shagan Area probably have been surface-to-air missiles of the SA-2 type fired from the hexagon site in Zone A, and/or possibly test vehicles representing an early anti-ballistic-missile missile prototype or vehicles carrying components of the anti-ballistic-missile missile system fired from Zone B. The major anti-ballistic-missile missile flight test program has not yet begun (as of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ from the status of the facilities and the construction activities, we would not expect to see this flight test program for at least another three to six months.

"6. We have no evidence of missile firings from the vicinity of the ICBM impact area on Kamchatka Peninsula. We believe that the majority of the Soviet anti-ballistic-missile missile flight testing will be conducted initially in the Sary Shagan Area against intermediate- and shorter-range ballistic missiles. However, we would expect to see live firings from Kamchatka against ICBMs shortly after the system is "proven out" at Sary Shagan.

"7. The future roles of the Sary Shagan Area in the Soviet missile/space program are clearly ones of increasing importance and priority. In addition to the primary anti-ballistic-missile missile development and flight test programs, we expect to see an expansion of the air/missile defense center concept to permit actual testing of an integrated active defensive system against a simulated "attack" involving ballistic missiles, aerodynamic missiles, and high- and low-flying aircraft. We further believe that research and development work on advanced

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SH-0288/60 S-6

# I. Conclusions

The rail spur near Semipalatinsk is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a negative MRBM site.

# II. Background

TALENT photography of August 1957 shows a rail spur at a point about 36 nm west-northwest of Semipalatinsk. It is located on the newly-constructed rail line that follows the south side of the Irtysh River between Semipalatinsk and Chagan. In the same locality there are two 40-foot towers, spaced about three miles apart and approximately in 60 alignment with the nautical miles farther west. The rail spur swings south from the main line in a "U" configuration; a second spur branches from the main spur and parallels it for some distance. The only structures along the spur tracks are two probable earth walls or bunkers, one on each side of the track near the junction of the two spurs. No security measures, such as fencing, were apparent at the time of photography, and no support facility is evident in the vicinity. TALENT photography of again covered the rail spur, but the facility was snow-covered and appeared to be inactive.

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SH-0288/60 S-7

#### I. Conclusions

The Sevastopol' installation is a <u>negative</u> <u>ICBM</u> site. It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> site. It is probably a support facility associated with naval shiplaunched missiles.

# II. Background

TALENT photography of revealed a possible 25X1 missile-associated facility approximately 3.5 nm east of Sevastopol'. On 1956 TALENT photography, the installation appeared to be nonexistent; however, there was evidence that some construction work was possibly being initiated at that time. Photographic coverage in 1957 revealed that some facilities had been constructed at this location.

The 1960 photography revealed an expanded road-served support facility containing a storage and assembly area, a possible checkout area, and an unidentified area, each secured by a double wire fence and guard towers. In addition, there are two possible storage areas, each secured by a single wire fence, an area of unidentified activity, and a possible housing area. Facilities at two of these areas - the storage and assembly area and the possible checkout area - are somewhat similar to areas found at KYMTR, and therefore, are suggestive of missile-related activities.

The facility is located in the Sevastopol' area and does not appear to be related to other facilities in the area. It is probably a support facility for the four guided missile destroyers operating out of Sevastopol'.

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	SH-0288/60 S-11	
I. Conclusions		
It is a <u>doub</u> t	s a <u>negative ICBM</u> area. <u>tful MRBM</u> area. ible SAM site location.	
evidence of reported	hotography of December 1956 revealed no concrete d missile sites; however, the poor quality, small nd snow cover on the photography precluded any defin-	
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I. <u>Conclusions</u>			
	ndetermined ICBM site.		
II. Background			
site located 8 nm west o	graphy of 1956 shows a pr of Slitere. It consists of fo ed objects within, oriented	our conical-shaped	7
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	SH-0288/60 S-13	
I.	Conclusions	
	Sovetsk (Tilsit) is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a <u>doubtful MRBM</u> site.	
II.	Background	
Tau	Sovetsk is believed to be associated with missile activity at arage (see T-3), although in a support capacity. There are several	
		-
heav	TALENT photography of 1956, which was vily cloud-covered, showed no unusual activity.	
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SH-0288/60	
S-14	
I. <u>Conclusions</u>	
The Spassk-Dal'niy area is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area. It is a probable* MRBM area.	
	25X1
SENSINT photography of December 1956 revealed a military complex at Yekaterinovka. The single military garrison-type area con- sists of 111 buildings for billeting, storage and administration. Other significant areas include: a probable ammunition storage area consisting	-
*Four members voted "probable" on MRBM, one member voted "possible" on MRBM.	
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SH-0288/60 S-14

of 175 acres of cleared, fenced land containing four revetted warehousetype buildings; a storage area with approximately 25 permanent-type buildings; and, a possible radar site. This area is served by Unashi Airfield.

Photography of the same date covering Grodekovo showed 12 military installations in the area. One installation appeared inactive and three others were covered by small scale oblique photography which precluded interpretation. The other installations contained vehicles, possible tanks and artillery pieces, and were used for miscellaneous storage and barracks areas. Several training areas were located throughout the area.

Photography also revealed a probable military installation located northwest of Suchan, containing 45 buildings of various types and approximately 60 unidentified objects, possibly vehicles. This installation is served by Nikolayevka Airfield, just to the southeast. A probable ammunition storage area is located 2.5 nm northeast of the airfield.

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	SH-0288/60 S-16
I. Conclusions	
Sudak is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a negative MRBM site.	
and TALENT photograph unusual installations.	hy of July 1957 revealed no
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	SH-0288/60 S-17
I. Conclusions	
Surovatikha is an <u>undetermined</u> ICBM are It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> area.	a.
II. Background	
Far oblique TALENT photographic cover does not reveal any evidence of a missile site or o construction in the Surovatikha area. Photograph	of possible missile site y does reveal a secured
storage installation 3 nm southwest of Surovatikha northeast of Arzamas, at 55 44N - 43 53E. The i two spurs from the Gorki-Arzamas railroad. Co 700 acres, the installation appears to be divided i	and 23 nm north- nstallation is served by vering approximately nto two areas: a storage
area, and a maintenance/support area. Trees in	the installation and the
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SH-0288/60 T-2

## I. Conclusions

Tashara is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> site.

## II. Background

TALENT photography of August 1957 revealed a branch rail line under construction to a point near the Ob' River at Tashara. Along the bank of the river, approximately 3,200 feet north from the end of the railroad bed, an irregularly-shaped area of approximately 35 acres had been recently cleared of trees and brush.

The Soviet press on 8 September 1956 reported that the largest timber transloading combine in Siberia was being built at the village of Tashara, on the bank of the Ob' River. However, construction of the branch rail line and associated facilities shown on August 1957 photography was not sufficiently advanced to permit their identification as a timber transloading combine.



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I. <u>Cor</u>	nclusions				
	This location i It is a <u>probable</u>			upport facilities.	
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	Poor resolution	n and obliquity	of 1956 TAL	ENT photography	]
				usual activity was letailed draft reports	
of this a	rea.				
	nembers voted " ive" on ICBM.	doubtful'' on IC	CBM, one me	mber voted	
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H-0288/60 T-5 I. <u>Conclusions</u> Tomsk is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area. It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> area. TALENT photography in August 1957 revealed only one facility (57 01N - 85 07E) warranting consideration. This facility, which has since been identified as the site of a conventional logging operation, con- sisted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area approximately 30 nm north of Tomsk.	TALENT photography in August 1957 revealed only one facility 7 OIN - 85 OTE) warranting consideration. This facility, which has nee been identified as the site of a conventional logging operation, con- sted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area approximately 30 n north of Tomsk.	nitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-R	
TALENT photography in August 1957 revealed only one facility (57 01N - 85 07E) warranting consideration. This facility, which has since been identified as the site of a conventional logging operation, con- sisted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area approximately 30 nm north of Tomsk.	Tomsk is a <u>negative ICBM</u> area. It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> area. TALENT photography in August 1957 revealed only one facility 7 01N - 85 07E) warranting consideration. This facility, which has nee been identified as the site of a conventional logging operation, con- sted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area approximately 30 n north of Tomsk.		
It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> area. TALENT photography in August 1957 revealed only one facility (57 01N - 85 07E) warranting consideration. This facility, which has since been identified as the site of a conventional logging operation, con- sisted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area approximately 30 nm north of Tomsk.	It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> area. TALENT photography in August 1957 revealed only one facility 7 01N - 85 07E) warranting consideration. This facility, which has nce been identified as the site of a conventional logging operation, con- sted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area approximately 30 n north of Tomsk.	. Conclusions	
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(57 01N - 85 07E) warranting consideration. This facility, which has since been identified as the site of a conventional logging operation, con- sisted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area approximately 30 nm north of Tomsk.	7 01N - 85 07E) warranting consideration. This facility, which has nce been identified as the site of a conventional logging operation, con- sted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area approximately 30 n north of Tomsk.		
(57 01N - 85 07E) warranting consideration. This facility, which has since been identified as the site of a conventional logging operation, con- sisted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area approximately 30 nm north of Tomsk.	7 01N - 85 07E) warranting consideration. This facility, which has nce been identified as the site of a conventional logging operation, con- sted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area approximately 30 n north of Tomsk.		
(57 01N - 85 07E) warranting consideration. This facility, which has since been identified as the site of a conventional logging operation, con- sisted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area approximately 30 nm north of Tomsk.	7 01N - 85 07E) warranting consideration. This facility, which has nce been identified as the site of a conventional logging operation, con- sted of a rail spur leading to a heavily-wooded area approximately 30 n north of Tomsk.		
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Ι.	Conclusions	
	Tukums is a doubtful ICBM site.	
<u>.</u>	It is a <u>doubtful MRBM</u> site.	0.51
		25X
	LENT photographic coverage of July 1956 showed no evidence of ssile sites or unusual installations in the area.	
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C02093143 Janitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7 25X1 IUP SECRED 25X1 SH-0288/60 T-8 25X1 Comparative TALENT photography during 1957-60 shows considerable expansion of launch and instrumentation facilities at the Tyura Tam complex. There was one completed rail-served launch area (launch area "A") at the time of 1957 photography. In 1959 a second, quite similar launch area (launch area "B") was under construction approximately 10 nm east-northeast of launch area "A". A third launch area (launch area "C"), of a less sophisticated design, was under construction approximately 4 nm east-southeast of launch area "B" in April 1960. 25X1 - 5 -TOP SECRET 25X1 ZOA Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/10 : CIA-RDP78T04757A000100010001-7



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Launch area "A" is believed to function as follows:

2. Method of Launch - The technique for fueling and launching of the missile cannot be determined. The photographic evidence does not support an underground or in-silo launch capability. Two supporting pillars have been identified, which suggest that the area underneath the platform is generally open. At least eight observation stations are positioned along the pit rim around the launch structure. These would most likely be used to observe exhaust flames during firing, which would require the area underneath the platform to be generally open and clear. The requirement for the large pit, coupled with the requirement for large amounts of water, also suggests that static tests are performed. This is inconsistent with the characteristics of an in-silo launch facility.

3. Probable Liquid Propellant Handling Facility - The opensided, rail-served structure, located near the launch platform, is probably associated with liquid propellant handling. A probable tank car, parked on the spur servicing this structure, is photographic evidence which supports this contention.

April 1960 photography revealed a third launch site (area "C") under construction. This site probably contains two launch pads in the early stages of construction. Construction appears to be 20 to 50 percent complete. Photography shows the site to be served by rail and road. Present evidence indicates that the two pads themselves will be roadserved.

The launch pads at launch area "C" are unsophisticated, and do not resemble the elaborate R&D pads at launch areas "A" and "B". Further, there is no evidence of hardened or underground site characteristics at launch area "C". It is estimated that construction could be completed by January 1961.

The installation at launch area "C" could be used as an opera-

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R70-		
	The Ugol'nyye Kopi installation (64 46 30N - 177 51 00E) was covered by far-obliquephotography of 1956. Though the poor H quality of the photography limited interpretation, two large excavations or tunnel openings and an adjacent support area were discernible. Far- obliquephotography ofrevealed no facilities in the Anadyr/Leninka area which could be related to SSM launching activity, and the Ugol'nyye Kopi installation itself was partially masked by hills and clouds.	R70- <sup>-</sup> X1
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> SH-0288/60 U-2

## I. Conclusions

Ukraina Airfield is a <u>negative ICBM</u> site. It is a <u>negative MRBM</u> site.

## II. Background

Ukraina Airfield is located in the Soviet Far East, approximately 15 nm southeast of the city of Svobodnyy. This is a Soviet Long Range Air Force base with a Type II Special Weapons Site located about 4 nm southwest of the airfield. Photography of March 1958 does not reveal any facilities which can be associated with an SSM launching site either on or adjacent to the airfield. The construction of a storage bunker, or bunkers, at the Special Weapons Site had not been started at the time of photography, though other facilities of the site were essentially completed.

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		SH-0288/60 V-4
I. <u>Co</u>	nclusions	
	The Vladivostok area is a <u>negative ICBM</u> ar It is a negative MRBM area.	ea.
re include missile	photography of the Vladivostok evealed only one installation of particular inter s a possible inclined ramp and may be associates.	rest. The installation
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	SH-0288/60 V-5
I.	Conclusions
	Volkovysk is an <u>undetermined ICBM</u> area. It is an <u>undetermined MRBM</u> area.
	TALENT photography of July 1956 revealed no unusual activity
in tl	ne Volkovysk area.

1.44 A. A.

















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(Yekaterinovka has been associated with a missile division headquarters located at Spassk-Dal'niy. See the analysis of the Spassk-Dal'niy /location S-14/ area for specific information related to this site.)





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GUIDED MISSILE AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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15 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Holder of Copy Number \_\_\_\_\_. Soviet Surface-to-Surface Missile Deployment Report (SH# 0288/60 dtd 1 Septemb r 1960)

At its 6 September 1960 meeting, the USIB approved as modified the recommendations contained in paragraph 4 o, the following GMAIC memorandum. The Board Members confirmed or expressed differences in assessments, as reflected in the footnotes, on ICBM sites page 3, and on MRBM sites, page 3 and 4.

"1. As requested by USIB, GMAIC and its Deployment Working Group evaluated all of the known evidence that may relate to ICBM operational sites. This evaluation also encompassed all locations suspected of being surface-to-surface ballistic sites in the USSR, but not in any of the Satellite countries.

"2. As a consequence of the increased effort by the member organizations subsequent to the Ad Hoc Study dtd 4 April 1960 (limited in distribution), this new study is quite complete and replaces the site evaluations of its predecessor. Nevertheless, in many "nominated" areas, there is still insufficient evidence to permit an assessment of specific missile relationship and, on others, insufficient evidence to permit unanimity of agreement. GMAIC generally concurs with the Working Group Report.

"3 The Summary of the findings of the Deployment Working Group, and GMAIC comments thereon, follow:

a. 95 of the locations nominated as potentially ballistic missile associated were assessed and written up in full detail. Evidence on 23 other sites was assessed but did not warrant detailed write up.

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b. ICBM Sites  $\frac{1}{2}$  - Working Group Findings

Confirmed

Probable

Possible\*\*

Tyura Tam (T-8)\*

None

Kapustin Yar (K-4)

Plesetsk (P-3)

Polyarnyy Ural (P-5)

Ust'Ukhta (U-4)

Eleven were considered "doubtful", 67 "negative" and 12 "undetermined" as ICBM sites.

<u>GMAIC COMMENTS on ICBM Sites</u>:  $\frac{2}{3}$ 

Although Tyura Tam is the R & D test site we believe that with prior planning a few ICBMs could be launched from there during war. A twopad complex (area C) under construction may be an operational prototype site under construction. KYMTR has never been used for ICBM firings, although two areas (2C and E) are possibly for ICBM training or are adequate for ICBM firings during war. GMAIC questions the likelihood of such use of the KYMTR rather than a site planned and constructed for an operational unit. (It is also likely that at least one of the new areas was constructed to fire the new series of vehicles to approximately 2000 nm).

- \* References are to pages in the Working Group Report.
- **\*\*** As indicated in the basic study, the majority but not all members of the Working Group evaluated these as "possible". There were major differences on Polyarnyy Ural in particular.
- 1 / See Air Force Footnote on page 6.
- 2 / See Army/Navy Footnote on page 6.
- 3 / See Army Footnote on page 7.

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c. MRBM	Sites - Working Group Findings*	
Confirmed	Probable	Possible
Chelkar (C-1)**	Taurage Area (probably 700 possibly 1100 nm) (T-3)	Balaklava (B-1)
Kapustin Yar (K-4)	Paplaka (probably 700 nm) (P-1)	Karangit (K-5)
	Mukachevo Area (range of likely missiles undetermined) (M-4 incl:	Khaapsalu (K-7) )
	Pr ipoloz'ye (P-6)	
	Svalyava (S-18)	
	Uzhgorod (U-5)	
	Volovets (V-6) Spassk Dal'niy Area (probably 70 and/or 1100 nm range) (S-14 incl:	
	Spassk Dal'niy (Div Cmd Hqs	3) (S-14)
,	Prokhory (Div Cmd Post) (P	-7)
	Barano-Orenburgskoye (Reg	t Cmd Hq s)(B-3)
	Grodekovo (Rail unloading po	oint) (G-3)
	Novolitovsk (Regt Cmd Post)	(N-4)
	Suchan (unkn function) (S-10)	
	Yekaterinovka (Regt Cmd Po	st) (Y-2)
	eral but not necessarily unanimous a See the individual sites for the vari	
<b>**</b> References are	to pages in the Working Group Rep	ort.
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## GMAIC COMMENTS on MRBM Sites:

It is noted that KYMTR is an R & D and training facility, but that there are numerous pads, check out facilities and trained crews available to launch missiles of medium range during a war; there are very few targets within range. Chelkar is apparently used for the training of operational crews on missiles launched in conjunction with the antiballistic missile (ABM) program being conducted at Sary Shagan.

Spassk Dal'niy. GMAIC believes the designation Spassk Dal'niy and 6 associated locations as "probable" MRBM sites must recognize that while the 7 locations were identified in CPX exercises as associated with MRBM activity the actual launch sites cannot be specifically located at any one of them or similar locations not yet determined. GMAIC therefore considers that Spassk Dal'niy is a probable deployment area for MRBM. 4/

<u>Mukachevo Area</u>. There is evidence from several different sources and of different types that strongly indicates the association of the several locations in the Mukachevo area with the operational or logistic phase of surface-to-surface missiles, although the range of the missiles and the specific missile functions are not so clear. The functions of the 5 places listed are not now known; there may be additional places now unknown in the same general area of similar missile function.

SUMMARY GMAIC COMMENTS, MRBM Sites:

For the reasons noted above, but without actually differing with the judgments of the Deployment Working Group, GMAIC believes that naming 14 MRBM sites can be misleading. Rather two locations (T-3 and P-1) and two areas should be listed with the understanding that within the areas there would probably be several launching locations.

"4. GMAIC recommends that:

a. USIB note:

(1) The Working Group Report, and GMAIC comments thereon.

4 / See Army Footnote on Page 7.

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(2) That GMAIC is planning to:	
(a) As evidence warrants, modify the assessments contained in the Working Group Report, and add new sites.	
(b) Add to the Report additional evaluations of surface-to-surface missiles deployed outside of the USSR proper.	
b. USIB approve GMAIC condensing and sanitizing this report to permit dissemination to U.S. personnel abroad	25X1 25X1
c. A copy of this memorandum and USIB's action thereon be forwarded to the holders of the Working Group Report.	
d. This Report be used as a guide to permit concentration of collection effort."	
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* Two sanitized versions of the basic report are being prepared which can be disseminated: (a) to U.S. personnel abroad;	25X1 25X1
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1 / The ACS/I, USAF, believes that this study represents a significant contribution to the intelligence community's appreciation of Soviet missile deployment, however, his analysis of the available evidence leads him to conclude that certain ICBM sites should be evaluated as follows:

Confirmed	Probable	Possible
Tyura Tam	Berezovka	Dolon
	Kapustin Yar	Mukachevo
	Polyarnyy Ural	Murmansk/Olenya Area
	Ust Ukhta	Nizhnaya Tura/Verknaya Salda Area
		Plesetsk

2 / The Army and Navy members of GMAIC believe that the significance of the DWG report of 1 September 1960, in view of the completeness of its examination into the available evidence on all suspect locations proposed for consideration, and in view of the absence of increased indications of expanding deployment of Soviet ICBMs during the past five months, lies in the face that this report supports the conclusions of the earlier report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Deployment of April 1960. Those conclusions, which the Ad Hoc Working Group stated were made with a reasonable degree of confidence, and which are reflected in Program "C" of NIE 11-8-60, are:

1. There are probably only a few, if there are any, completed ICBM sites (complexes) or deployed units at the present time.

2. Up to this time, the Soviet site construction program is probably less than the pace of the ICBM military buildup estimated in NIE 11-8-59.

3. The training capability for the ICBM appears to be a limiting factor on deploying operational units at this time.

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- 3 / The Army Member of GMAIC agrees with the Army Working Group Member that Plesetsk, Ust Ukhta, and Polyarnyy Ural should not be considered possible ICBM sites. There is no direct evidence on any of these locations which associate them with the Soviet ICBM deployment program. They are in the sub-Arctic region, an unlikely location for initial deployment of ICBM's. When coupled with the evidence from the Soviet test ranges indicating no ICBM deployment generally, these locations are probably not ICBM launching sites. The evidence available suggests that these locations are associated with early warning and/or other electronic functions.
- 4/ While the Army Member concurs that the Spassk Dal'niy area is a probably SSM deployment area, he agrees with the Army Member of the Working Group that the evidence available does not support a conclusion that 700 or 1100 nm missiles are probably deployed in the area at this time. Further, since the acceptance of Paplaka as missile associated depends heavily on the analysis of the Spassk Dal'niy CPX activity, the Army member does not concur in the findings of "probable" MRBM site for this location.

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