

~~TOP SECRET~~

50

HR70-14

APPROVED FOR RELEASE -  
HISTORICAL COLLECTION  
DIVISION-HR70-14 DATE:  
05-17-2012

CHRONOLOGY OF THE BERLIN PROBLEM  
SINCE THE FALL OF 1958

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 13526 3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

HR70-14

[redacted]

[redacted]

Copy No.

20 March 1961

- 1958 -

27 Oct East German party boss Walter Ulbricht re-emphasized East German claims to sovereignty over the entire city of Berlin. He declared that "the continuation of the occupation regime in West Berlin is contrary to documents agreed to by the Four Powers under international law," and claimed that East Germany had the right to control all traffic between West Germany and West Berlin and within Berlin except for the transport of the Western garrisons in the city which is "for the time being" controlled by Soviet forces. Ulbricht's claim to sovereignty included the demand for the right to control all non-military flights in the Berlin air corridors.

10 Nov In a speech in Moscow, Khrushchev stated that the USSR intended to hand over to the East German regime "those functions in Berlin which are still with the Soviet organs." Khrushchev declared because of their "violation" of various aspects of the Potsdam agreement, the Western Allies "have long ago abolished that legal basis on which their stay in Berlin rested." Charging that the Allies misused Berlin "which is the capital of the German Democratic Republic (GDR)" as a base for "subversive activities" against the GDR and the Warsaw Pact countries, Khrushchev called on the Allies to "form their own relations with the GDR and come to an agreement with it themselves if they are interested in certain questions connected with Berlin...." He also committed the USSR to give military support to the GDR in the event that the Western Powers engaged in "provocation" to defend their access rights to Berlin. Khrushchev further stated that "the Soviet Union has been proposing and proposes to tackle this matter /signing of a German peace treaty/ without delay."

17 Nov

[redacted]

58/1

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[ ]

[ ]

27 Nov The USSR sent a note to the three Western Powers in which it stated that "the Soviet Government finds it possible for the question of Western Berlin to be settled for the time being by making Western Berlin an independent, demilitarized free city." The USSR laid down an apparent ultimatum stating that if the Western Powers did not agree to negotiate the details of a "free-city" status for West Berlin within six months, there would be "no topic left for talks on the Berlin question by the former occupying powers," that the East Germans would be empowered to control Allied access to the city, and the Soviet Union would refuse further contact with the Allies there. By specifically confining its proposals to West Berlin, Moscow showed that it considered East Berlin as East German territory. By demanding that both German states participate in any agreements concerning the creation of a "free-city" of West Berlin, the USSR indicated that recognition of the GDR was an immediate goal.

Late Nov The French position on Berlin included the following points: France rejected any move leading to recognition of the GDR; France accepted the concept of an airlift, recognizing that this might lead to a test of force which the West must be prepared to face; Moscow should be informed that the West will defend its position in

[ ]

[redacted]

Berlin; after a test of force, the West should be prepared to take up the question of negotiations with the Soviets on the entire German question.

4 Dec East German Politburo member Herman Matern hinted that measures might be taken to cut off civilian air traffic between West Berlin and the West, claiming that such air traffic has nothing to do with military communications.

5 Dec

[redacted]

11 Dec The Soviet Union in an official statement supported "the idea of a meeting between heads of states...on outstanding problems...." It reaffirmed its position that discussion of German reunification without participation of the two German states is out of the question.

14 Dec The Western Big Three Foreign Ministers at the NATO meeting rejected the USSR's Berlin proposals and insisted on maintaining their rights in Berlin.

16 Dec The Council of Ministers of NATO unanimously endorsed the stand on Berlin taken by the US, the UK, and France, and expressed willingness to discuss German unity and European security with the USSR.

25 Dec Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Supreme Soviet that the determination of the Western Powers to keep their troops in West Berlin by force if necessary would only lead to the threat of starting a "big war."

31 Dec The US, UK, and France sent similar notes to the Soviet Union offering to confer on Berlin in the wider framework of the problems of Germany and European security. All three notes assumed that the Soviet Union's 27 November note had not been intended as an ultimatum. They declared that they continue to hold the USSR responsible for discharging its obligations with regard to Berlin, including maintenance of free access, and will not accept the East German regime as a substitute.

[redacted]

[redacted]

- 1959 -

- 6 Jan Following a talk with Vice President Nixon during a visit to the US, Mikoyan stated that there was no change in the Soviet Union's attitude on Berlin, and gave Secretary Dulles a memo outlining Soviet peace treaty proposals.
- 9 Jan East German Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Winzer hinted that East Germany might agree to the presence of Western troops in a UN-guaranteed free city of West Berlin if they were designated as UN forces. He added that East Germany would expect to control not only the traffic but also the nature of goods delivered to Berlin from the West. He also said that air traffic in the corridors would be controlled.
- 10 Jan In reply to the Western notes of 31 December, the Soviet Union sent notes to 27 other countries that fought Germany in World War II proposing that a 28-nation conference be held within two months in Prague or Warsaw to negotiate a peace treaty with Germany as a step toward settling the West Berlin problem. Accompanying the notes was a draft peace treaty to be signed by both German states.
- 24 Jan At a news conference in Moscow, Mikoyan said that the main factor in the Berlin crisis is not the Soviet deadline but to get talks started between East and West and "to end the occupation status of West Berlin." Negotiations "could be prolonged for a few days or even a few months" if they were conducted "in the spirit of finding a settlement" and if the Soviet Union could "see there is goodwill on the part of the Western Powers."
- 27 Jan In his speech opening the 21st party congress, Khrushchev repeated the proposal to conclude a peace treaty with both Germanies, denied opposing free elections in Germany, and suggested that the UN might be called upon "to ensure the guarantee" of any East-West agreement on the city.
- 29 Jan In a major speech at the 21st party congress, Gromyko warned that if the Western Powers spurn Soviet proposals

59/1

[redacted]

on Germany the Communist bloc will "seek other ways" of solving the problem. He predicted that the Western Allies will eventually have to negotiate with East Germany and that if no agreement is reached the USSR and the GDR will put into effect measures already planned.

2-4 Feb Soviet troops held five US Army trucks at the Helmstedt checkpoint for 54 hours because of US refusal to permit Soviets to inspect the trucks before permitting them to proceed to West Berlin without inspection. Western plans for military action to force release of the trucks were well advanced by the time the USSR permitted them to proceed.

2 Feb

[redacted]

16 Feb The US, UK, and France sent similar notes to the USSR calling for a four-power foreign ministers' conference on Germany with German advisers taking part. A separate West German note supported this proposal.

17 Feb Khrushchev, in a speech at Tula, stated for the first time that the USSR is ready to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany by which the GDR would "acquire all the rights and will be bound by all the obligations of a sovereign state." "Therefore, no encroachment whatever on the territory of the GDR, in whose center Berlin lies, can be permitted, either by land, air, or water. Any violation of the sovereignty of the GDR will meet with a vigorous rebuff, irrespective of whether it will happen on water, on land, or in the air. All this should be considered by the gentlemen imperialists." The USSR, he said, has no concessions to make on the German question.

24 Feb Khrushchev rejected Western proposals for a foreign ministers' conference on Germany; he called instead for a summit conference on the entire range of East-West relations and reiterated the threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

[redacted]

[redacted]

2 Mar The Soviet Union agreed to a foreign ministers' conference on Germany, but insisted on Polish and Czech representation to achieve parity with the US, UK, and France. The note specified that both East and West German representatives should sit in on the talks and proposed that a time limit of two or three months should be imposed on them. The Soviet Union reiterated its threats to invoke the Warsaw Pact if the West should try to force its way into Berlin through East Germany and proposed that the conference should be limited to a discussion of the demilitarization of Berlin and a German peace treaty.

A joint communique issued at the conclusion of talks between Khrushchev and Macmillan in Moscow stated that they have exchanged full explanations of their respective views on Berlin and Germany, but were "unable to agree about the juridical and political aspects" of the problems. They agreed on the need for early negotiations to settle their differences.

7 Mar Khrushchev indicated in a speech at the Leipzig Fair that the Soviet Union might push back its deadline for a German settlement from 27 May to some time in June or July, if the West appears willing to negotiate. He said the USSR has no need to make haste and it will eventually sign a peace treaty with the GDR alone, if the Federal Republic and the West are unwilling to end the occupation status of Berlin.

9 Mar In Berlin, Khrushchev reaffirmed Soviet willingness to have the UN participate in guaranteeing the status of West Berlin as a "free city," adding that there would be no objection to a minimum garrison composed of US, British, French and Soviet forces as well as neutral troops to enforce the guarantee, but with no right to interfere in the "internal" affairs of the city. He repeated this formula the following day, insisting on Soviet participation if the West remained, but without mentioning neutrals.

19 Mar At a press conference in Moscow, Khrushchev accepted 11 May as a suitable date for a foreign ministers' meeting

[redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



[ ]

although he would prefer a summit conference. He admitted that the Western Powers had a "lawful right" to be in Berlin but asserted that a separate peace treaty with the GDR would cancel those rights. Khrushchev said that the USSR "is not prepared to impose sanctions" if the Berlin question is not solved, though it would proceed with a separate peace treaty.

- 26 Mar The US, UK, and France formally proposed a foreign ministers' conference in Geneva on 11 May. Notes from all three to Moscow stated that the meeting should deal with Berlin and Germany, but that any power could bring up any other question it considers relevant. All three stated that a future summit conference should be dependent upon success at the foreign ministers' level.
- 30 Mar The Soviet reply to the 26 March notes agreed to convening a foreign ministers' conference on 11 May and appeared to assume Western acceptance of a summit meeting regardless of the outcome of the foreign ministers' discussions. The Soviets left the way open to demand that Poland and Czechoslovakia participate in the meeting after it convened.
- 4 Apr The NATO Council issued a communique confirming its unanimous determination to maintain Western rights in Berlin.
- 5 Apr A Soviet note to the US charged that high-altitude flights by US planes between West Germany and Berlin were an attempt to wreck the negotiations at Geneva. The Soviets insisted that planes flying in the corridors must adhere to "established practice" and not fly above 10,000 feet.
- 9 Apr [ ]
- 16 Apr Speaking to the East German parliament, Premier Grotewohl categorically rejected any solution of the Berlin problem that would include East Berlin in a free city under international control.

[ ]



- 21 Apr The USSR announced that foreign ministers of the 8 Warsaw Pact nations and Communist China would meet in Warsaw on 27 April to draft plans for the Geneva conference.
- 22 Apr The USSR charged in a note handed to Ambassador Thompson that the US has violated conditions agreed upon after the defeat of Germany in 1945 by arming West Germany with atomic weapons. The note stated that the US is trying to torpedo coming East-West talks.
- 26 Apr The UK announced new proposals for disarmament in central Europe in what appeared to be a last minute effort to achieve Allied unity before the opening of the foreign ministers' conference. The new plan included a proposal for two zones of arms inspection: one, extending from Paris to Moscow, of aerial inspection, and another, narrower zone excluding part of West Germany which would be inspected by ground teams.
- 29 Apr The Warsaw Pact foreign ministers issued a communique expressing their unanimity of approach to the coming negotiations, emphasizing that German reunification can only occur through negotiations between the GDR and the Federal Republic.
- The Soviet Union again protested the US position on flights over 10,000 feet in the air corridors but made no threats of possible counteraction.
- 5 May Khrushchev indicated that the Soviets will reject the Western package plan at Geneva. He told a group of West German SPD newspapermen that the Soviet objective will be to obtain peace treaties with East and West Germany, but asserted that the Soviet Union will not sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany so long as prospects for a summit meeting exist.



[redacted]

The flight of substantial numbers of physicians, dentists, teachers and other professional people over a fairly long period of time has caused the East German regime considerable concern. Reportedly the alarming rise in defection of medical personnel resulted in the establishment of a new commission whose purpose was to reduce defections and induce the redefection of East Germans. The GDR was forced by shortages of medical personnel to recruit replacements from other bloc countries.

The Soviet Union reportedly planned for an article-by-article discussion of the Soviet draft peace treaty at Geneva with the West putting forward counterproposals.

9 May Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, arriving in Geneva, called for a liquidation of the occupation forces in Berlin and for an early summit conference, which could make "necessary" decisions. East German Foreign Minister Bolz called for recognition of East Germany.

Khrushchev told a group of West German editors visiting Moscow that the Soviet Union could wipe the Western Allies off the face of the earth.

10 May Gromyko asked for full participation of both East and West Germany in the conference. The Western foreign ministers said that a dispute on this question could prevent the conference from opening on time.


11 May The Geneva conference opened after a delay caused by the Soviet proposal that East and West German delegations be admitted as full participants. Both sides claimed victory in the compromise seating arrangement which permitted both German delegations to be seated near, but not at, the conference table.

12 May The Soviet delegation proposed full participation of Poland and Czechoslovakia in the conference, but the West rejected it. East and West German delegations attended conference sessions but refused to acknowledge each other's presence. Bonn Foreign Minister von Brentano would not appear in the same room with Bolz of the GDR.




- 13 May Big Four foreign ministers made their opening statements to the conference.
- The US released a memorandum outlining its "package" proposal for Berlin, German reunification, and European security.
- 14 May Secretary Herter presented the Western plan to the conference. East German Foreign Minister Bolz and the FRG Ambassador to the US each made statements to the conference.
- Khrushchev in a speech broadcast from Moscow said that the Soviet Union reiterated his determination to sign a peace treaty if current negotiations failed to produce a settlement.
- 15 May Gromyko presented Soviet counterproposals including peace treaties to be signed with both German states on the basis of the Soviet draft treaty of 10 January.
- Khrushchev rejected the Western package proposal, stating that the USSR might accept some aspects of the plan but without specifying which ones.
- 25 May Gromyko told the conferees that the only criterion used by the USSR to judge progress in the talks is how far the West has moved toward accepting the Soviet draft treaty.
- 29 May The foreign ministers met in their first private session with inconclusive results.
- 30 May Gromyko reiterated Soviet rejection of Western proposals for a solution of the Berlin problem as "unacceptable from beginning to end." In a speech in Tirana on the same day, Khrushchev condemned alleged Western "horse trading" on the basis of concessions by both sides and rejected the Western package proposal in sweeping terms. His statement that the Western plan did not "contain a single element for negotiation" was harsher than his initial response.





- 3 June      The West stated that it was ready to freeze troop strengths in Berlin in an effort to reach an interim agreement that would guarantee free access to the city. President Eisenhower indicated at a press conference that a summit meeting was conditional upon Soviet acceptance of Western rights in Berlin, to be maintained until Germany is reunified. He stated that he could not go to a summit meeting under anything that might be interpreted as a threat.
  
- 4 June      Gromyko refused to discuss the problem of access to Berlin until the conference determined what the final arrangements for the city would be.
  
- 5 June      Pravda claimed that the West had already committed itself to a summit meeting.
  
- 6 June      Gerhart Eisler, commenting on plans to hold the West German presidential elections in Berlin, implied in a Berliner Zeitung article that the GDR might impose a blockade "at least temporarily."
  
- 8 June      The West restated its basic conditions for a Berlin settlement: retention of occupation rights; expression of East and West to reduce tensions through the establishment of a Berlin commission; freezing of Western troop strengths in West Berlin; and complete freedom of access to the city. Any agreement reached under these terms would last until Germany was reunified.
  
- 9 June      The Western foreign ministers warned Gromyko that unless he modified his position there would be little use in continuing the talks. The West reportedly was considering a recess as a possible counter to Soviet intransigence.
  
- 10 June     Gromyko offered a proposal for an interim agreement on Berlin. The West could "temporarily" maintain certain occupation rights for one year. During this period the two German states would set up a committee to discuss and work out measures on unification and peace treaty. If the Germans failed to reach agreement after one year, the USSR would sign a treaty with East Germany. The Western





Powers were to reduce forces in Berlin to "symbolic contingents," restrict hostile propaganda, liquidate subversive organizations in Berlin, and agree not to station atomic or rocket weapons in West Berlin. If these were agreed upon, then the USSR would preserve communications to Berlin in present form. The interim agreement was to be guaranteed by four powers, and, secondly, by the East German government. The guarantees were to be based on a protocol already submitted (apparently for free city). The arrangement was to be supervised by a four power body.

11 June Secretary Herter told Gromyko that the conference would end soon if the Soviets did not revoke their ultimatum on Berlin. Gromyko replied that his latest Berlin proposals did not constitute an ultimatum.

Speaking in Riga, Khrushchev assailed the West's latest proposals at Geneva as "unrealistic and bankrupt."

12 June Gromyko told Secretary Herter that the USSR would never sign an agreement perpetuating Berlin's occupation status.


15 June Western foreign ministers failed to obtain any concessions from Gromyko.

16 June The West presented a "final" draft of its formula for a Berlin solution, and indicated that it was prepared to face a breakdown of the Geneva conference if the proposals were rejected.

17 June Gromyko postponed a showdown by telling the conferees that he would wait another day before giving the final Soviet answer to the West's final proposals on Berlin.

President Eisenhower indicated at a press conference that he would not make a summit meeting dependent on Soviet withdrawal of its Berlin ultimatum, but that "any kind of reasonable progress" at Geneva would justify a summit meeting. He said that he believed that prospects for such a meeting had become brighter.





18 June Gromyko, apparently awaiting instructions from Moscow, requested another postponement of 24 hours for his answer to the West's final proposals on Berlin.

Adenauer recommended that the decision on holding the West German presidential election in Berlin be postponed in order not to prejudice chances for success at Geneva.

19 June Gromyko renewed his proposal for an interim settlement on Berlin but extended the 12 month deadline to 18 months with the foreign ministers to meet at the end of this interim agreement. The Big Four foreign ministers agreed to recess the conference until 13 July. The Western foreign ministers issued a statement charging that the latest Soviet proposals would reserve "freedom of unilateral action" to the USSR at the end of the specified period. The Soviet proposals were basically the same as those offered on 10 June. The Western statement declared the Soviets hoped to induce the West to acquiesce in the liquidation of Western rights in Berlin and Western responsibility for maintaining the freedom of the city. It referred to the recess as an opportunity for the USSR to reconsider its position and for the West to examine the situation in the light of Khrushchev's 19 June speech in which he said that the Soviet Union would never sign an agreement perpetuating the occupation status of West Berlin. Khrushchev called on the foreign ministers to renew their efforts to reach an interim settlement, and asserted that the Soviets have never issued an ultimatum on the Berlin situation. He repeated his willingness to go to any number of summit meetings to achieve a solution to East-West problems, and reaffirmed his intention to sign a separate peace treaty if there were no agreement on an all-German treaty within a specified period.

Bundestag President Gerstenmaier announced that the West German presidential elections would be held in West Berlin on 1 July.

20 June The West reportedly privately told Gromyko that no more concessions could be made in order to reach a Berlin settlement.



[redacted]

20 June In a joint communique issued simultaneously in Moscow and East Berlin, the USSR and the GDR pledged themselves to solve quickly the "unbearable" situation in Berlin. The Soviets reportedly were taking an optimistic view on reaching an agreement when the Geneva conference is reconvened.

23 June In a nationwide radio and television speech, Secretary Herter stated that the US would never abandon the people of West Berlin. While the recent phase of the conference did not make sufficient progress to justify President Eisenhower's participation in a summit meeting, the President "remained willing to attend such a meeting if progress is made when the Geneva talks are resumed."

In a private conversation with Harriman, Khrushchev reportedly took an uncompromising position on Berlin, boasted of Soviet military strength, and in effect, warned that the USSR was prepared to face a showdown over the Berlin issue. He bluntly asserted that the USSR was determined to liquidate the West's rights in Berlin, and that if the West insisted on perpetuating or prolonging its rights in Berlin, this means war.

24 June Moscow radio denounced the decision to hold the West German presidential elections in West Berlin as a "dangerous provocation" aimed at destroying the chances for success at Geneva.

27 June The USSR formally protested to Bonn and the other Western Powers against the holding of the West German presidential elections in West Berlin. The Soviet press charged that Secretary Herter's 23 June speech misrepresented the Geneva talks and called on the West to make "wise" use of the recess to narrow differences.

28 June The US rejected the Soviet protest concerning the West German presidential election, pointing out that the election was held in West Berlin in 1954 without a protest from the Soviet Union.

In a prepared statement, Gromyko claimed that one of the most important successes of the Geneva meeting was that the

[redacted]



[redacted]

West was forced into de facto recognition of the GDR.

29 June Gromyko issued a statement designed to refute critics of the Soviet proposals and to answer Secretary Herter's 23 June speech. He hopes that the West would use the recess to "form a more sound appraisal of the Soviet proposals."

1 July No efforts were made either by the GDR or Soviet forces to block access of West German presidential electors to Berlin.

9 July

[redacted]

13 July The US proffered an invitation to Khrushchev to visit Eisenhower.

When the Geneva talks resumed, Gromyko repeated the Soviet proposals of 19 June and attacked the West for opposing them. He remained obscure on the matter of Western rights in Berlin under the proposals. Western probing failed to elicit any clarification of Soviet proposals and statements regarding the duration of an interim Berlin arrangement and the status of Western rights at the termination of the interim period. The implication was that the Soviets would retain a free hand for unilateral action.

20 July Secretary Herter and Lloyd stated that the West must have a clear statement concerning the situation that would exist at the end of the interim period.

22 July

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Gromyko at the conference made an explicit statement that the USSR would take no unilateral action with respect to Berlin while a provisional agreement was in effect or during subsequent negotiations on West Berlin by the states participating at Geneva. These statements left open the possibility of a Soviet claim that an "infringement" by the West would free the USSR from its own commitment not to act unilaterally. They also implicitly presupposed a situation in which the West had accepted some time limit for a provisional settlement other than German unification.

28 July Khrushchev made a statement in a speech at Dnepropetrovsk that "the time has come" for the heads of government to tackle "complex unsettled international issues."

Final Western proposals called for: a limit on Western forces in Berlin to 11,000--they would be willing from time to time to discuss the possibility of reducing such forces if developments permit; no atomic weapons or missiles in West Berlin; free and unrestricted access to Berlin; four power commission to supervise access difficulties; measures will be taken to avoid activities in Berlin which might disturb public order; SG of UN will establish a representative in Berlin with free access to all parts of the city to supervise propaganda activities in conflict with above principles. All arrangements can be reviewed at any time by foreign ministers pending German unification.

Gromyko handed Western ministers another version of the Soviet position on Berlin which maintained the link between an interim Berlin arrangement for 18 months and all-German negotiations. He proposed troops levels of 3-4,000 men, a prohibition of "subversion and propaganda" in West Berlin, banning rocket and nuclear weapons and a general reduction of Western armament in the city, and

[ ]

a provision under which the USSR might claim the right to inspect Western military cargoes to West Berlin. The Western foreign ministers termed the proposal totally unacceptable.

**29 July** Secretary Herter suggested a suspension of conference work by 5 August. Members of the Soviet delegation hinted privately that in exchange for Western agreement in principle to reduce Allied forces in West Berlin, the USSR would soften its insistence on a link between an interim Berlin arrangement and an all-German committee.

**July** The first known Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) site outside the USSR was identified at Glau, a Soviet military installation approximately 20 miles southwest of Berlin. This initial detection of the tactical deployment of a new SAM system, together with reported sites of a similar nature at Jueterbog and Halle farther south, implies improved air-defense coverage of the important Soviet army headquarters at Zossen-Wuensdorf, as well as of the southern approaches to Berlin near the vital intersection of the three Western air corridors.

**31 July** The US Mission in Berlin reported that the number of East German intellectuals fleeing to the West during July had risen sharply over the preceding month to a total of 301. This brings the total flights of intellectuals since January 1954 to nearly 40,000--a loss of brainpower which the Ulbricht regime can ill afford. As of 31 July, the total refugee flow to West Berlin and West Germany reached more than 84,000--a considerable drop below the 117,672 total in the same period of 1958. Nevertheless, the continued flow has taken its toll; East German population figures, as reported by the regime's statistical office, in August, indicated a drop from 17,517,000 in mid-1957 to 17,355,000 in mid-1958. The Mission notes that a high East German official recently admitted that there would be a decrease in the East German working force of 500,000 during the period of the Seven-Year Plan ending 1965.

**3 Aug.** TASS announced that Khrushchev would travel to the US to meet with President Eisenhower. The great satisfaction among Soviet officials was reflected in the jubilant

[ ]  
[ ]  
reaction of the Soviet Foreign Ministry press chief  
and a Pravda correspondent [ ]

[ ] They asserted that  
from the Soviet standpoint the Geneva talks had been  
a great success, since they had resulted in the long-  
sought-for invitation for Khrushchev to visit the US  
and hold private talks with Eisenhower.

4 Aug Following the announcement of Khrushchev's forthcoming  
visit to the US, the foreign ministers agreed to end  
the Geneva conference on 5 August. A communique was  
issued stating the matters that had been discussed  
and leaving the date and place for a resumption of the  
work of the conference to be settled through diplomatic  
channels.

5 Aug In a press conference in Moscow, Khrushchev adopted a  
posture of statesmanlike moderation and restraint,  
stressing the prospects for establishing a "climate  
of confidence and mutual understanding" between the US  
and the USSR and underscoring the "immense importance"  
of the state of US-Soviet relations for maintaining  
peace. He contended that there are no territorial  
disputes or "insoluble contradictions" standing in the  
way of "improved relations" and renewed his pledge  
that the status of Berlin would not be changed while  
negotiations are in progress. He added, however,  
that he did not consider the talks with Eisenhower  
a substitute for a conference of heads of government  
which the USSR still considered "useful and necessary."

13 Aug In a speech at Leipzig, Walter Ulbricht declared that  
the time had come "to advance gradually through dis-  
cussions and conferences to the peaceful coexistence  
of the states of the two systems."

16 Aug

[ ]  
[ ]

[ ]

- [redacted]
- 18 Aug In a lengthy letter to Adenauer--not published until President Eisenhower's arrival in Bonn during the course of his trip to Western Europe--Khrushchev reiterated in moderate language the Soviet position on Berlin and Germany and urged the chancellor to reconsider his entire policy. He pointed out that the economies of the USSR and West Germany are complementary and stressed the advantages to both of increased trade. West German Foreign Ministry officials speculated that the conciliatory tone of the note as well as its timing and substance were intended to have a "softening" effect on the chancellor prior to his meeting with Eisenhower.
- 19 Aug Neues Deutschland ridiculed "provocative rumors" that Khrushchev had proposed a land corridor between West Berlin and West Germany under West German control. The East Germans treat any reference to a corridor as a provocative affront to East German "sovereignty."
- 21 Aug Ulbricht summoned Premier Grotewohl to the Sochi Black Sea resort to join Khrushchev and himself in talks on current strategy. [redacted]
- [redacted] Ulbricht intended to "stay as close as possible" to Khrushchev to insure that the Soviet leader did not waver in his resolve to abide by previously agreed positions on the German and Berlin problems during his talks with Eisenhower.
- 22 Aug In a reply to the US commandant's protest over East German interference with official American travelers on the Autobahn, the Soviet commandant in Berlin, Zakharov, said that these harassments "seemed unnecessary" and he would look into the matter.
- 8 Sept The US Mission in Berlin reported that East German authorities had removed barricades, barbed wire and guard houses on certain streets on the West Berlin border in the Potsdam area, as part of the regime's effort to improve the appearance of the city for the fifteenth anniversary celebration of the founding of the GDR and avoid giving foreign visitors unfavorable impressions.

[ ]

- 16 Sept Khrushchev left Moscow for the US; he returned on 29 September and remained in Moscow for one day prior to departing for Red China.
- 18 Sept In a speech to the UN General Assembly, Khrushchev called for an end to the "cold war"; proposed "general and complete disarmament."
- 27 Sept The joint communique signed by Eisenhower and Khrushchev at the close of the Camp David talks emphasized that the question of general disarmament was "the most important one facing the world today," stated that an exchange of views had taken place "on the question of Germany including the question of a peace treaty with Germany," and that, on the subject of Berlin, an understanding had been reached "subject to the approval of the other parties directly concerned, that negotiations would be opened with a view to achieving a solution which would be in accordance with the interests of all concerned and in the interest of the maintenance of peace."
- 29 Sept At a news conference in Moscow, Khrushchev declared that President Eisenhower and he had agreed "indeed that talks on the Berlin question should be resumed, that no time limit whatsoever is to be established for them, but that they also should not be dragged out for an indefinite time."
- 6-8 Oct As part of the celebrations of the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the GDR, East German authorities raised the new regime flag over stations and buildings of the elevated railroad (S-Bahn) in West Berlin, which resulted in clashes with organized East German workers (Kampfgruppen) and transport police while so doing. [ ]
- [ ]
- 7 Oct In his major speech at the fifteenth anniversary celebration, Walter Ulbricht reiterated the demand for a peace treaty, warned West Berliners that "they live in

[ ]

[ ]

the heart of the GDR" but asserted that the East German regime would not interfere with West Berlin, proposing a settlement along the lines of Vatican City. In his speech at the same ceremony, Soviet first deputy premier Kozlov took a softer line than Ulbricht, expressly repeating the Camp David formula that a definite period should be set for negotiations but that they should not be prolonged for an unlimited time.

11 Oct

In a speech at Krasnoyarsk published on this date, Khrushchev omitted favorable comment on President Eisenhower for the first time since his visit to the US and referred to "the poison of bourgeois ideas." The generally moderate tone of his speeches, omission of reference to Berlin and other potentially critical situations and his admission that his visit to the US produced a warmer international climate, have presumably conveyed the impression to the Soviet people that a new phase in US-Soviet relations is under way.

13 Oct

[ ]

In an aggressive speech at East Germany's important Leuna works, Soviet first deputy premier Kozlov boasted of the USSR's growing power advantage over the West and declared "our rockets have forced the US and Britain to come to the negotiating table."

mid-  
Oct

[redacted] Khrushchev was vexed with Ulbricht because of the latter's sympathies for the Chinese Communists, while Ulbricht was privately concerned that Khrushchev, despite his assurances to the contrary, had been too conciliatory during his meeting with President Eisenhower, and had made more than just tactical concessions at the expense of Ulbricht's position and East German prestige.

20-23  
Oct

In successive meetings with de Gaulle, Debre and Couve de Murville, Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov unsuccessfully pressed the French government to agree to a summit meeting before next spring. These interviews were followed on 23 October by the announcement that Khrushchev had accepted an invitation to visit Paris in the spring of 1960.

24 Oct

Following President Eisenhower's statement in a press conference that he favored a summit meeting "by the end of the year," TASS withdrew a previous statement which asserted that Khrushchev, during his visit to the US, had told the President that the Soviet government felt a summit conference should be held before the end of the year. This may have indicated that Moscow feared that the initial TASS release might be interpreted as pressure on the President.

25 Oct

The East German Foreign Ministry released an official declaration protesting against the meeting of the West German Bundesrat in West Berlin on 23 October as a "provocation" which countered the relaxation of international tension.

31 Oct

In a notably moderate speech to the closing session of the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev made the fullest exposition to date of his policy of "peaceful co-existence." He indicated satisfaction with the "noticeable improvement in the international situation," said prospects for strengthening peace had "become more favorable" and claimed a major shift had occurred in Western policy and attitudes toward the USSR. His discussion gave no indication of any important shifts in the Soviet position.



4 Nov

[redacted]

11-13  
Nov

In notes to the three Western powers and to Bonn, the USSR protested West German government plans to create a new radio station in West Berlin on grounds that the Geneva foreign ministers' conference confirmed that West Berlin has never been part of West Germany.

14 Nov

In an address to Soviet journalists, Khrushchev took a somewhat harsher line than previously but reiterated his belief that there was a growing Western recognition of the need for peaceful coexistence. While repeating his praise of President Eisenhower, for the first time he qualified this to say that his impressions were "subjective."

28 Nov

West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt warned against making changes in Berlin merely for the sake of change and termed hopes for a "perfect" solution of the Berlin question an "illusion."

1 Dec

In his address to the Hungarian party congress, Khrushchev maintained his moderate and flexible line, while implying that Moscow was adopting a conciliatory posture in order to accommodate differences among the Western powers concerning the timing of a summit meeting. Certain of his references suggested that Khrushchev believed he could exploit de Gaulle's ambitions to enhance France's international prestige and influence to divide the Western Allies and weaken their negotiating position at the summit.

For the first time since his initial reference on returning from the US, Khrushchev repeated his commitment to President Eisenhower that the USSR would not impose a time limit or present an ultimatum on

[redacted]

[redacted]

the Berlin negotiations. This address contained evidence that Khrushchev was concerned over the Chinese Communists' apparent misgivings over his peaceful coexistence strategy.

1-2  
Dec

In meetings with President de Gaulle in Paris, Chancellor Adenauer sought to secure French backing for his hard-line position on Berlin. The West German Foreign Office later reported that de Gaulle and Adenauer had agreed that negotiations on Berlin should be kept on a minor key, within the framework of the German problem. There was to be no change in the present legal status of the city, nor any step toward recognition of East Germany.

14 Dec

In notes to Bonn and other members of the Western European Union (WEU), Moscow complained that despite a "certain lowering of international tensions," West Germany had become "more active" in military matters. The notes cited a WEU decision of 21 October to permit the Germans to manufacture certain types of missiles as evidence of the recent efforts to "speed up" German rearmament, and repeated standard charges that arming the West German forces with nuclear weapons and missiles has created new tension in Europe. The notes were timed to anticipate the NATO meeting of 15 December.

21 Dec

The Western powers in similar notes to Moscow proposed the holding of a summit meeting in Paris on 27 April 1960.

25 Dec

Khrushchev's prompt and cordial acceptance of the Western proposal of 21 December for a four-power summit meeting in Paris carefully refrained from injecting any controversial issues. He expressed "profound satisfaction" that the powers had found it desirable to discuss "major international problems" at summit meetings which "should be held from time to time in countries participating in such conferences." His offer of alternative dates for the meeting was carefully phrased to avoid any appearance of pressure. His reference to the "four-power" meeting suggested that he did not intend to press for full participation

[ ]

by the two German states. On the other hand, in private talks with the Western ambassadors when delivering the 25 December letters, Gromyko raised the question of bringing in the Germans.

26 Dec

An official of the East German council of ministers said that Khrushchev and Ulbricht had worked out a "Berlin strategy" to be carried out in successive phases, [ ]

[ ] In the first phase--the first summit meeting--Khrushchev would introduce a plan for the neutralization of West Berlin and follow this up with a proposal to eliminate all traces of the Federal Republic. In the second phase, the Communists would maintain pressure against West Berlin following the summit meeting to create suspense. In the third, the plan for neutralization would again be introduced, and Khrushchev would propose a four-power administration--including the USSR--in West Berlin. The Communists would be patient, in the expectation that it was only a matter of time until the Western powers became "tired." The East German official further stated that bloc strategy was to some extent based on the assumption that a Democrat would be elected to follow President Eisenhower.

30 Dec

The USSR accepted the proposal of the Western powers of 29 December for convening the summit on 16 May.

31 Dec

The US Mission in Berlin reported that the year ended on an optimistic note, as far as West Berlin business circles were concerned. Municipal economic officials nevertheless emphasized that there must be no relaxation of West German efforts to assist Berlin.

During the year 1959, a total of 143,917 refugees fled to West Berlin and West Germany--compared with 204,092 in 1958.


[ ]



- 1960 -

11 Jan Chancellor Adenauer told the West Berlin assembly that a firm Western position in the coming East-West negotiations would preserve West Berlin's ties with West Germany and warned that surrender on Berlin would lead to a whole series of capitulations.

13 Jan



14 Jan In his address to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev continued to focus on disarmament as the major international issue. He announced that Soviet armed forces would be cut by 1,200,000 men in the next few years, linking this reduction with the strong Soviet position in missile development. Referring to Berlin, he again held out his threat of a separate peace treaty but avoided linking this move to the outcome of the May summit meeting. His speech was the most sweeping Soviet claim to date that the tide of history has decisively turned against the West and that the Western powers, in the forthcoming period of high-level negotiations, would have little choice but to accommodate themselves to Soviet views.

- 60/1 -



[redacted]

18 Jan

23 Jan

28 Jan

[redacted]

4 Feb

The meeting of bloc leaders in Moscow provided the occasion for a review of political strategy in preparation for forthcoming East-West negotiations and a show of unity prior to Khrushchev's departure for a tour of Southeast Asia. A communique on private discussions between Khrushchev and East German leaders published on 5 February said that the talks covered "future efforts of the USSR and East Germany with respect to the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty and regularizing the abnormal situation in West Berlin." Khrushchev was reliably reported to have put forward a formula calling for two basically similar treaties, one between the Western powers and Bonn and the other between bloc governments and East Germany.

[redacted]

[ ]

9-10 Feb A key functionary in Premier Grotewohl's office said that Ulbricht and Grotewohl called a meeting of their staffs to brief them on the outcome of their private talks with Khrushchev, [ ] Ulbricht emphasized that Khrushchev would not "negotiate" with Eisenhower on either Berlin or Germany at the forthcoming summit meeting but would hold to the line that both problems could only be solved by the two German states. Ulbricht added that Khrushchev would try to get the Western powers to leave West Berlin or bring in the USSR as the fourth occupation power.

10 Feb West German major political parties took advantage of a foreign policy debate in the Bundstag to demonstrate their agreement that the Western position in Berlin must be maintained until Germany is reunified.

At a meeting of the principal NATO ambassadors in Moscow, Ambassador Thompson called attention to Khrushchev's repeated statements that while the USSR thought the "free city" proposal was the only satisfactory solution for Berlin, it was prepared to examine other suggestions. When Thompson queried whether Khrushchev might be hinting that a free city of Greater Berlin--including the Soviet sector --might be considered, West German Ambassador Kroll said he had raised this question with Khrushchev, who stated categorically that East Berlin was part of East Germany and could not be discussed.

20 Feb The US Mission in Berlin reported that, since early January, East German officials have refused to honor West German passports carried by West Berlin residents applying for East German transit visas to Sweden. This move is one facet of the regime's efforts to underline its position that it does not recognize West Berlin as part of West Germany.

24 Feb After the publication of the Soviet memorandum to West German Social Democratic leader Ollenhauer, an East German official close to Premier Grotewohl [ ] said that Smirnov's move in handing over the memorandum had one purpose--to test the strength of the united foreign policy front achieved between Adenauer and the SPD leaders

[ ]

[redacted]

in early January. The USSR had now ascertained that this united front was fragile. Commenting on the apparent contradictions in Khrushchev's policies, the East German official said that these could only be understood when it was realized that Khrushchev's policies were designed to probe constantly on all fronts, cause "disorder" and maintain the initiative.

29 Feb

At his press conference in Djakarta, during his Southeast Asia tour, Khrushchev again carefully avoided directly linking his threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany with the results of the May summit conference. He stressed that a series of summit meetings would be necessary to achieve a solution of international problems and expressed his expectation that the first meeting would make a good start toward this end. At one point, he referred to the idea of holding a plebiscite in Germany as "outside interference in German affairs," unless it was discussed and organized by the two German states.

1 Mar

Moscow's prompt and strong reaction to press reports that the US will resume flights in the Berlin air corridors above 10,000 feet suggests that the Soviet leaders view this as an opportunity to test Western unity in the pre-summit period and, if possible, to inject the East Germans into any technical discussion on flight procedures. A Soviet spokesman in East Berlin warned that flights above 10,000 feet in the absence of an agreement with both the USSR and East German would be regarded as a "unilateral violation of East German air sovereignty" and existing four-power agreements.

[redacted]

11 Mar

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

16 Mar

22 Mar

Soviet Ambassador Smirnov told the Foreign Press Association in Bonn that the USSR expected the Western proposals of 28 July 1959 for an interim Berlin solution would provide the starting point for negotiations on Berlin at the summit. Smirnov denied that the Soviet refusal to accept the Western proposals invalidated them for the purposes of further negotiations. In reply to a question whether the USSR would push their "free city" proposal in the face of West Berlin's insistence on the status quo, Smirnov said: "The four powers are in Berlin, not at the request of the Berlin population but for other reasons." He added that the USSR would do everything to reach an agreement with the Western powers at the summit, but referred to the urgent need for a peace treaty.

23 Mar-  
3 Apr

The initial talk between Khrushchev and de Gaulle on 24 March was devoted to a repetition of basic positions on Germany and various aspects of disarmament. Khrushchev tried to leave the impression that, if the USSR did not obtain satisfaction on Germany at the summit meeting, it would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. In

[redacted]



[redacted]

the final round of private talks on 1-2 April Germany remained the fundamental point of disagreement. Khrushchev repeated his vague threat of a separate peace treaty but appeared to accept the idea of protracted negotiations. He agreed to the French proposal for a reference in the final communique to a "progressive settlement" of these questions on the basis "agreed on through negotiations." He hinted to de Gaulle that an interim type agreement might be extended to two years.

31 Mar During March, a total of 13,442 refugees escaped to West Berlin and West Germany, compared with only 10,391 in the same month of 1959.

5 Apr

[redacted]

17 Apr In an open letter from the East German party to West German Social Democratic party (SPD) workers, Ulbricht implied that the USSR at the summit would seek to reach some form of interim settlement limited to Berlin. After reaffirming the standard Soviet position concerning a "free city," he declared that an interim solution would be acceptable, in order to create the "necessary measure of trust," but did not mention a time period for the agreement.

19 Apr During the week ending 19 April, the number of refugees fleeing to West Berlin rose to the highest figure for the corresponding period in several years. Some 2,734 persons, including large numbers of farmers and craftsmen, had been processed in the West Berlin refugee center and refugee authorities reported that the actual influx was double that figure. The extreme concern felt by the East German regime



over the mass exodus of its citizens is shown by the reported attempt of East German police--until stopped by West Berlin police--to question travelers and examine their baggage in West Berlin stations of the East German-operated elevated railroad.

- 21-22 Apr East German traffic police searched passengers in West Berlin stations of the East-German-operated elevated railroad (S-Bahn), in an evident effort to stem the rising flow of refugees to the West via the S-Bahn. West Berlin police arrested several East German police but later released them for lack of evidence of a criminal offense.
  
- 23 Apr During a talk with Ambassador Thompson and Bohlen, Gromyko repeated all the usual Soviet positions on a German peace treaty and the need to do away with the "occupation regime" in West Berlin, but in closing he made one reference to the possibility of an interim agreement for West Berlin although he did not go into detail.
  
- 25 Apr In a major address at Baku, Khrushchev combined a rigid re-statement of the maximum Soviet demands on Germany and Berlin with his most sweeping portrayal of the consequences of a separate peace treaty for the Western position in Berlin since he first threatened to conclude such a treaty. He totally rejected any summit discussion of reported Western proposals for an all-German plebiscite on reunification and a peace treaty. While his statements did not add any new elements to the established Soviet position on Berlin, he had not previously personally spoken of a separate peace treaty ending Western Allied air access to Berlin and of meeting force with force since his speech of 17 February 1959.
  
- 29 Apr At the Japanese Embassy's reception in Prague, the Soviet military attache went out of his way to stress to the US ambassador that Khrushchev's Baku speech had been misinterpreted and that absolutely no threat to use force over the Berlin issue had been intended.
  
- 1 May An American U-2 plane was shot down near Sverdlovsk.
  
- 5 May USSR announces the shooting down of the U-2.



[redacted]

9 May

[redacted]

- 11 May Premier Grotewohl, in a speech to East German Volkskammer, said GDR has given evidence of its desire to solve the Berlin issue peaceably and would accept "compromise proposal for an interim solution."
- 14 May Khrushchev arrives in Paris.
- 15 May President Eisenhower arrives in Paris.


- 60/8 -

[redacted]

- [redacted]
- 16 May Four heads of government met and Khrushchev demanded apology for U-2.
- 17 May Gromyko told [redacted] that the USSR would do nothing to make trouble before the end of a six to eight month period before a new summit, but repeated the Soviet position that if no agreement was reached on Berlin, Moscow would be forced to sign a separate treaty.
- 18 May Khrushchev in final press conference in Paris took similar position as Gromyko, but warned that the USSR had almost reached "limits" of its effort to conclude a peace treaty with both Germanies.
- 20 May Khrushchev made a speech in East Berlin in which he stated that the USSR had a moral right to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany that would end Western rights in Berlin and give the GDR full control of access to the city. No unilateral action would be taken, however, until efforts were made at a summit meeting within "six to eight months" to reach agreement on a treaty with both German states. He offered qualified guarantee of status quo on condition that the Western powers would be willing to avoid "any unilateral steps" which would prevent a meeting in six to eight months. East German leaders were visibly distressed by Khrushchev's speech.
- 24 May [redacted] Politburo member Albert Norden referring to Ulbricht's calling of a special meeting to discuss contingency plans for Berlin explained that no restrictive measures directly against West Berlin would be initiated in the near future.
- 28 May In a speech in Moscow Khrushchev again expressed hope that a new summit could take place within 6 to 8 months; he counselled patience and reaffirmed his intention to strive for a negotiated settlement of the German and Berlin problems.
- 2 June [redacted]



- 3 June In his press conference, Khrushchev warned the West against believing that the conclusion of a peace treaty with East Germany could be delayed by postponing a summit conference beyond the time period he had suggested.
  
- 10 June East Berlin party boss Paul Verner said a peace treaty might be signed "when the lilac and chestnut trees bloom" (usually mid-May) and declared that the conclusion of the treaty would end Allied rights in West Berlin; he further claimed control of air, land and water access for East Germany.
  
- 16 June In interview, Adenauer said it is wrong to consider the Berlin problem as the key to everything; it is not as decisive a matter as the need for controlled disarmament. Bonn believes an interim solution for Berlin is out of the question since it leaves the door open for later Soviet pressure.
  
- 18 June Ulbricht told West German SPD official maintenance of Berlin that the status quo was out of question; said free city status would have to include liquidation of spy centers, removal of Western troops and RIAS, end of occupation status and cessation of flying out of Bundeswehr recruits on American planes; also asserted peace treaty would mean control of access by East German organs.
  
- 23 June The US State Department in effect told the Germans that, while the decision is a Bonn one whether or not to hold the September Bundestag session in Berlin, the US would not like it; the Germans said they had heard the same from British and French.



28 June CDU Bundestag leaders were inclined not to hold first session of Bundestag in West Berlin, as has recently been the practice, in order to avoid provoking Moscow. Although they wish to assert



[redacted]

their rights in Berlin, this was no time to exercise them.

4 July US Mission Berlin, commenting on possible Bundestag session in Berlin, warned that, while it should not upset the applecart, West must not show unnecessary weakness in Berlin, since the city is held together by "psychological baling wire." If we show we are squeamish about Bonn's activity in Berlin, this might itself be what the Soviets need to set off harassments.

1-8-  
July

[redacted]

8 July Khrushchev concluded his visit to Austria by threatening to "consider" signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany if Bonn holds its annual Bundestag session in Berlin this fall. He emphasized his disbelief that the West would go to war "to save Berlin for Adenauer."

9 July

[redacted]

10 July Top French Foreign Ministry official said, re Khrushchev's threat, the Allies should pressure Bonn not to hold the Bundestag session in Berlin.

15 July The US State Department gave preliminary views on the Bundestag session in Berlin in light of Khrushchev's threat: this is a Fedrep decision and meetings in the past have not endangered Berlin's security or conflicted with its status; Soviets already have many other pretexts for a separate treaty with GDR; discontinuance of such activities which are now accepted as usual, might have a serious adverse effect on the city's morale, etc; thus the Allies should not object to holding the meeting; if Bonn decides to cancel the meeting we should not, however, urge them to reconsider.

[redacted]

[redacted]

17 July Politburo member Albert Norden reportedly stated that West Berlin definitely would become a part of East Germany, "at the latest, next spring after the new American president is elected," but claimed the takeover could come sooner if the Bundestag meets in West Berlin this fall.

19 July Aide memoire from French Ambassador Alphand to US State Department urged three Allies to advise against a meeting of the Bundestag in Berlin. In place, French suggested public statement of Western responsibility in Berlin and a possible trip to Berlin by important Allied personality. On Khrushchev Vienna speech, aide memoire said, "it is possible he will not draw from Bundestag meeting the consequences he has announced, but there is reason to anticipate the worst."

Construction of what appears to be surface-to-air missile sites reported at 10 different locations around Berlin.

28 July The USSR addressed a second note to the Western Powers protesting against Bonn's plan to establish the headquarters of the West German Radio Broadcasting Council in West Berlin.

4 Aug

[redacted]

30 Aug A total of 4,544 refugees fled to West Berlin during the week ending 30 August--the highest single figure for one week since September 1957.

An East German Council of Ministers declaration, reiterating the East German positions that West Berlin is not part of the Federal Republic and that the Western sectors are "on the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR)", announced that the regime "has ordered the measures necessary so that the territory and traffic routes of the GDR, including the democratic section of its capital, Berlin, cannot be misused for the organization or promotion of military and revanchist

[redacted]

rallies planned in West Berlin from 1-4 September." The declaration added: "The GDR government draws particular attention to the fact that misuse of the air corridors for the transport of militarists and revanchists...is impermissible," claiming that the corridors "were instituted solely and exclusively for supplying the troops of the three Western powers stationed in Berlin."

- 30 Aug The East German government put into effect a Ministry of Interior ordinance requiring all West Germans to secure special residence permits to enter East Berlin. This appeared to be the first time East German ordinances had been directly applied in East Berlin without prior adoption by the East German municipal authorities and directly contravened Four Power agreements calling for freedom of circulation within the city.
- 31 Aug The West Berlin Senat decided against taking retaliatory measures (including interzonal trade sanctions) against the GDR on grounds that they were likely to lead to more serious counter-measures by the East Germans and the Senat had no desire to aggravate the situation.
- 2 Sept East German First Deputy Foreign Minister Winzer, according to the East German news agency, argued that "the air corridors belong to the sovereign territory of the German Democratic Republic" but, under "a temporary agreement" between the USSR and East Germany are at the disposal of the Western powers for supplying their garrisons in West Berlin.
- 3 Sept In a television interview, Ulbricht asserted that the Western powers have "liquidated" the Four-Power agreements relating to Berlin, that East Germany and "its capital, Berlin" are no longer subject to occupation, and that West Berlin "is and remains part of the territory of the German Democratic Republic, and is not and will not be a state of the Federal Republic." He further asserted that the use of West German passports by West Berliners is "completely illegal."
- 4 Sept Special East German controls on West Germans were terminated at midnight during the five day period; 1,061 persons were turned back; 699 obtained free passage to West Berlin at government expense. Six West German citizens were reportedly detained in East Berlin.



8 Sept The East German Council of Ministers approved new regulations by the Ministry of the Interior under which West German citizens are required to apply for a permit to enter East Berlin. No expiration date for the requirement was announced. West Germans must now meet the same requirements to enter East Berlin as East Germany.

[redacted]

9 Sept In talks in Berlin, Mayor Brandt and Vice-Chancellor Erhard agreed that current East German harassments constitute the beginning of a new series of moves against West Berlin's ties with West Germany, each move of which is designed to appear relatively unimportant in order to deter major Western reaction. Erhard called on German businessmen to refrain voluntarily from doing business with the East Germans while restrictions on travel by West German citizens continue and indicated a willingness to interrupt interzonal trade "if the Allies are willing to accept the consequences."

12 Sept

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[ ]

[ ]

The East German Council of Ministers announced that it would no longer accept West German passports "unlawfully issued" to West Berliners for travel to bloc countries but instead would enter the visa on a special sheet to be attached to the identity card issued by West Berlin municipal officials.

- 19 Sept In a major UK Foreign Office concession, London agreed to refuse temporary travel documents to following major categories of East Germans: agriculture, medical and scientists, professional, political, cultural, sport, press, wives accompanying husbands on official travel, and tourists.
- 20 Sept The West German CDU and SPD were reported to have agreed to delay the Bundestag session in Berlin until after the US inauguration, in order to avoid sharpening tensions. The Bundestag Steering Committee reaffirmed its right to meet in Berlin but set no date.
- 22 Sept In reaction to East German harassment of Berlin, Bonn disclosed that it had initiated a few limited counter-measures including the stoppage of new permits for deliveries to East Germany, withholding implementation of the 1961 interzonal trade agreement and denial of permission for West German firms to participate in next spring's Leipzig Fair.
- 24 Sept Berlin officials announced cancellation of the meeting in West Berlin of veterans of three former Wehrmacht divisions and a guard regiment planned for 15-16 October. The East German press on 20 September had attacked meetings as another link in "chain of provocations aggravating situation in West Berlin."
- 29 Sept [ ]
- 30 Sept Bonn denounced its 1961 interzonal trade agreement with East Germany effective 31 December 1960.

4 Oct

In a statement before the East German Peoples Chamber, Ulbricht gave no indication of what countermeasures the East German regime intends to take to offset Bonn's announcement of its cancellation of the trade agreement. He proposed holding trade talks with West Germany but under such unacceptable preconditions as the repudiation of the Hallstein doctrine.

5 Oct

The British representative in Paris outlined the basic UK position that no action should be taken at this time which could be construed as economic countermeasures against East Germany.

7 Oct

UK Prime Minister Macmillan told Ambassador Whitney that he doubted a serious Soviet attack on the Western position in Berlin underlies present USSR policy.

8 Oct

Ambassador Whitney in London reported that prospects were dim for achieving British agreement to economic countermeasures in retaliation against East German harassments of West Berlin. Macmillan expressed the belief that a serious Soviet attack on the Western position in Berlin does not underlie present Soviet policy, and that recent harassments constitute isolated, separate actions. Macmillan accepts Khrushchev's statement that he does not intend to bring the Berlin situation to a head before spring, by which time a summit conference should be possible. The British resistance to imposition of economic countermeasures at this time is shared by the French Government and North Atlantic Council discussions have revealed that most other NATO governments feel likewise.

- 60/16 -

[redacted]

9 Oct In an interview, Khrushchev asserted that the Berlin and German questions must be settled by negotiation and not "by threats or the use of force or anything that would blow up both parts of the world."

In a Neues Deutschland article, East German Foreign Trade Minister Rau indicated a willingness to begin negotiations on a new interzonal trade agreement if West Germany would make the first move. He stated, however, that "any new agreement must reflect legal and factual situation, and must eliminate unsatisfactory features of 1959 and 1960 agreements."

10 Oct A Neues Deutschland editorial stated that West Germany should agree to negotiations of new interzonal trade agreement without attaching political conditions to trade. The editorial also declared that, if Bonn wished political negotiations, East Germany was ready to open talks on political subjects, including, for example, the shutting down of disturbance centers--i.e. West Berlin.

11 Oct A total of 3,653 refugees fled to West Berlin during the week ending 11 October, an increase of 262 over the previous week. American officials in Berlin note that the seasonal decline usually apparent at this time in previous years has not yet appeared.

Many government officials and Bundestag members reportedly viewed the cancellation of the interzonal trade agreement with East Germany as an ineffective countermeasure to the recent East German traffic restrictions in Berlin.

13 Oct West German Foreign Minister von Brentano expressed deep dissatisfaction over the unwillingness of Bonn's NATO allies to support economic sanctions against East Germany and noted from reports of Bonn's ambassador in Paris that French determination to stand by the status quo in Berlin was weakening.

18 Oct

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

20 Oct Khrushchev, in a speech in Moscow, warned that the Berlin problem must be solved, adding that "it must evidently be settled in 1960". He reaffirmed his pledge to maintain the situation in Berlin until a new summit meeting, provided there are no Western provocations.

[redacted]

24 Oct A delegation of East German State Planning Commission officials headed by their chief, Bruno Leuschner, arrived in Moscow on 24 October, reportedly to discuss with Soviet officials the probable economic effects of Bonn's notice of termination of the interzonal trade agreement with East Germany and of a possible embargo by NATO countries in support of Bonn. High East German officials are said to be particularly concerned about the effects on the engineering and chemical industries if commodities--primarily steel products and certain types of machinery--currently supplied by West Germany are not obtained elsewhere.

30 Oct A West German Foreign Ministry official stated that the "last recalcitrant firms" have finally cancelled space for East Germany's Spring Leipzig Fair and Bonn now expects an almost total boycott. He enthusiastically welcomed a French proposal to seek the same action by other NATO nations.

6 Nov Kozlov, in the traditional anniversary keynote speech in Moscow, stated that a peace treaty must be signed and proposed negotiations on all outstanding international issues.

9 Nov [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

The US Mission in Berlin reported that the initial East German reaction of surprise and concern to Bonn's abrogation of the interzonal trade agreement was now less pronounced and hope was apparently growing in the GDR that the effects of the move could largely be overcome in the long run. Traders from NATO countries are reported to be sending representatives to East Berlin in an effort to deal with the East German agencies.

11 Nov The US Embassy in Moscow reported that references to Berlin had virtually disappeared from Soviet news media during the past two weeks, despite continued East German pressure on West Berlin's ties with West Germany. American officials noted further that the East German delegation to the October Revolution anniversary had received little public attention and Ulbricht himself was placed in the next to the bottom position on the reviewing stand.

Adenauer hinted publicly that Khrushchev may be invited to Bonn and described the Soviet leader "as a man one can talk to."

17 Nov The Macmillan government is showing a growing aversion to countermeasures against East Germany in response to harassment against West Berlin. The Foreign Office has indicated that Britain may eliminate special restrictions on East German travel instituted in September if Bonn renegotiates its trade agreement with East Germany, as now appears likely. Foreign Secretary Home is also reported to have described proposals for a Western boycott of the spring Leipzig fair as "ill conceived."

18 Nov Adenauer decided that, since Bonn denounced the interzonal trade agreement, it is up to West Germany to take the initiative toward new negotiations. Although new talks were definitely contemplated before 31 December, he stated that there had been no decision as to the precise date.

25 Nov The Soviet Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta reported that the expansion of Soviet-GDR trade for 1961 beyond the limits set by the long term trade agreement was under consideration in talks between Soviet and GDR economic officials in Moscow.

27 Nov

[redacted]

30 Nov

In a communique issued following a Khrushchev-Ulbricht conference in Moscow, the USSR announced it would supply raw materials and commodities to East Germany in 1961, if Bonn carried out its threat to sever trade relations on 31 December. The US Embassy in Moscow notes the Khrushchev-Ulbricht meeting and resultant Soviet pledge to supply the GDR with "necessary raw materials and goods" was reported in the Soviet press without any accompanying comment or any attack on Bonn.

Bonn announced its intention to hold new talks with the East Germans in order to explore the possibilities for a new agreement on interzonal trade. West German press chief Von Eckardt stated that the talks would be conditional on the cessation of East German harassments of West German travel to and within Berlin.

2 Dec

A senior official of the East German Ministry of Foreign and Intra-German Trade [redacted] said that the Soviet promise to aid the East German economy if the interzonal trade agreement is not re-negotiated should not be taken too seriously because the statement was made "largely for propagandistic effect."

3 Dec

A Moscow radio commentator said that Bonn, by initiating negotiations with the GDR on the resumption of the interzonal trade agreement, has "basically admitted the defeat of its policy of pressure and ultimatum."

8 Dec

Preliminary information on the Communist conference in Moscow indicates that Khrushchev still hopes to solve the Berlin question by means of a summit meeting. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Khrushchev wishes to wait until he can meet Kennedy and thinks it will be easier to talk to him than it would have been with Nixon. [redacted] that Khrushchev had "won out" in an argument with the Chinese on the issue of the advisability of holding a conference.

13 Dec

[redacted]

16 Dec

Soviet Ambassador Pervukhin told Ambassador Dowling Berlin access problems could always be settled by Soviet-US bilateral talks, suggesting that Moscow is not interested in a showdown at this point.

18 Dec

In his report to the SED Central Committee last week Ulbricht called for a summit conference to be held next spring "to bring about a peaceful solution of the West Berlin question and prepare a peace treaty with the two German states."

A Moscow radio commentator, in his discussion of the NATO session in Paris, made the following reference to the Berlin situation: "West German diplomats know very well that if the US, the UK, and France do not attend the /summit/ talks on the West Berlin situation, the Soviet Union will have grounds for signing a peace treaty with the GDR. Thus the West Berlin question will settle itself and the Western Powers will forfeit any right to maintain occupation troops there."

20 Dec

In an effort to prod Bonn into reinstating the interzonal trade agreement which otherwise will lapse on 31 December, the East German mass media threaten "serious disorders." Privately, however, East German officials indicate they will make important concessions if the West Germans reinstate the agreement.

- 60/21 -

[redacted]



29 Dec


[redacted]

Following prolonged negotiations, on 28 and 29 December the interzonal trade agreement between East and West Germany was formally reinstated, with the following statement being issued to the prsss: "After sufficient possibilities were found in the course of negotiation for the continuation of contractually regulated economic relations, the heads of the delegations agreed to put into effect on 1 January, 1961, the Berlin agreement of September 20, 1951, with all supplementary agreements and annexes including the agreement of August 16, 1960." The East German press agency made an identical statement, as did TASS.

31 Dec

[redacted]

[redacted]




- 1961 -

2 Jan Khrushchev allegedly stated at a reception in Moscow he did not expect to meet with the new US President until perhaps July.

6 Jan Khrushchev's report on the Moscow Communist conference, published in Kommunist on 17 January, repeated the threat to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany and "do away with the occupation regime in West Berlin." He predicted that, since the West was vulnerable in Berlin, "sooner or later they cannot fail to understand that an end will come to the occupation regime."

9 Jan



10 Jan Addressing the West German Bundestag, Chancellor Adenauer stated that the reinstatement of the inter-zonal trade agreement meant that the Berlin problem would not lead to new East-West clashes in the near future. He also stated that the satisfactory conclusion of a new trade agreement with the USSR was a "good thing" and that he believed that the expected East-West dispute will not begin with the German and Berlin questions.

11 Jan Ambassador Thompson believes that the 22nd CPSU congress has been delayed until 17 October, because of major uncertainties confronting the Soviet leadership, such as the new US administration, difficulties with the Chinese Communists and continued troubles in agriculture at home. Thompson believes, however, that it is unlikely that Khrushchev will await the outcome of the German elections before forcing the

- 61/1



[redacted]

issue, since the congress is to meet soon after the West German elections scheduled for 17 September.

- 13 Jan In a speech at Karl-Marx-Stadt, SED Politburo member Hermann Matern said: "We have not withdrawn our decree on the regulation of travel to Berlin. The trade agreement has again been signed. Everyone can now see who is the victor and who is the vanquished." He also indicated that "the West Berlin problem has to be solved as a matter of urgency."
- 20 Jan In an article in Neues Deutschland, East German deputy foreign minister Otto Winzer called on President Kennedy to support a peace policy for Germany and recommended that a summit conference be held this spring to discuss "the peaceful solution of the West Berlin problem and the preparation of a peace treaty with the two German states." He further declared that no plan for "disengagement" in Central Europe was possible without participation of the two German states, suggesting that both Pankow's memorandum for a phased general and total disarmament in Germany and the Rapacki plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe could be considered as ways to effect disengagement.
- 21 Jan Neues Deutschland carried a front-page item by Walter Ulbricht congratulating President Kennedy on his inauguration and expressing the hope that Kennedy's "conduct of the government will contribute to reduction of tensions in the international situation and to the peaceful solution of international disputes...for the good of the American people."
- 24 Jan [redacted] the chief of the SED central committee's agitprop department said Kennedy had emphasized that "US policy must be altered and a new relationship established between the powers." [redacted] both Khrushchev and Ulbricht had sent congratulatory messages to Kennedy, and that there was "a firm possibility of establishing relations of peaceful understanding. While only the future will tell

[redacted]

whether this actually happens, the socialist states are doing everything to advance this possibility."

27 Jan In a speech at Klingenthal, Ulbricht stated that: "The Bonn state is neither final nor lawful. The lawful German state is the GDR." He also reiterated his concept of a German confederation as "the historically inevitable and necessary form of co-operation between two German states with different social systems."

2 Feb [redacted]  
a top-level SED functionary said that Khrushchev instructed Ulbricht to mark time and to undertake no moves which could in any way bring about a stiffening of the Western attitude on Berlin or Germany. Another high SED official reportedly said Ulbricht had received an order from Khrushchev to keep everything quiet, but that the latter had given Ulbricht a firm commitment that these issues would be clarified in 1961.

Mid-Feb [redacted]

15 Feb The president of the East German People's Police in East Berlin announced that "new regulations would go into force for entry into the capital of the GDR (Democratic Berlin) by citizens of the German Federal Republic, effective 16 February at 00.00 hours." The issuance of permits "in accordance with the 8 September decree" would be "simplified and facilitated."

17 Feb [redacted]

[redacted]

22 February. Moscow made no new proposals and reaffirmed its long-standing positions on establishing a free city in West Berlin and concluding a peace treaty, and described the "working in" period for the new US administration and the need to await the West German elections as a "train of delaying arguments." Although it repeated the Soviet claim that a separate peace treaty would liquidate the occupation of Berlin and force the Western powers to negotiate with the GDR, it did not insist on immediate implementation of the Soviet "free city" proposals and referred to a possible interim solution with a fixed time limit.

22 Feb During talks with Macmillan in London, Adenauer-- instead of his old insistence that "toughness" was the only way to deal with the USSR--spoke of the need for a more flexible attitude on Berlin. Adenauer generally appeared relaxed and cautious regarding the Berlin situation and gave no indication that he intended to engage in serious bilateral exchanges with the USSR on the city. He also showed no anxiety about possible bilateral US-Soviet talks.

27 Feb Soviet Berlin commandant Zakharov categorically rejected the Western commandants' protest against East German action in barring West German religious leaders from East Berlin on 12 February. Zakharov disclaimed any Soviet responsibility for East Germany's actions in "its capital, Berlin," and charged that West Germany organized from West Berlin "numerous" demonstrations and undertakings "directed against the GDR, the USSR, and other socialist countries."

1 Mar Following the introduction of "simplified" procedures for entry into East Berlin by West Germans on 15 February, the East German regime maintained a pose of reasonableness and took specific steps--albeit reluctantly--to implement the commitments it undertook on 29 December 1960 to induce West Germany to renew the 1961 interzonal trade agreement.

9 Mar In his conversation with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev showed some flexibility in his discussion

[redacted]

of the Berlin problem, and asserted that the USSR would provide any guarantees necessary to preserve the internal situation in West Berlin and assure the US that its prestige would not suffer as a result of a settlement. He reiterated his intention to sign a peace treaty with the GDR with a clause providing for a free city of West Berlin if the West did not agree to a peace treaty with both German states, but he set no deadline for action.

10 Mar

At a press conference in Bonn, Adenauer declared that in principle he was willing to negotiate on a German peace treaty, but he was opposed to a peace treaty with two German states because that would involve recognition under international law of the division of Germany.

Evangelical Church leaders decided to hold the all-German church congress (Kirchentag) in East and West Berlin from 19 to 23 July after the East German regime had attached impossible conditions to its offer to permit the meeting in Leipzig. An East German official threatened that church officials "will be responsible for the consequences" if they hold the Kirchentag in Berlin.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~